G.R. No.

156668 November 23, 2007

KIMBERLY-CLARK (PHILS.), INC., Petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, AMBROCIO GRAVADOR, ENRICO PILI, PAQUITO GILBUENA,
ROBERTO DEL MUNDO, ALMARIO ROMINQUIT, ANTONIO BALANO, RIZALDY GAPUZ,
RUFINO FELICIANO, RESTITUTO DEAROZ, FERMIN BERNIL, DANIEL ISIDRO,
LEOPOLDO SUNGA, ANTONIO SONGRONES, EDMUND MAPANOO, SALVADOR SAN
MIGUEL, SANTOS CANTOS, JR., EMILIO DAGARAG, NOEL MULDONG, FELIXBERTO
DELA CRUZ, ALBERTO MANAHAN, LUNA ESPIRITU, DONATO BAQUILOD, FLORENCIO
CORREA, CAMILO LEONARDO, GENER MANGIBUNOG, REYNALDO MIRANDA, ARNEL
ZULUETA, PEDRO ODEVILLAS, CONRADO DICHOSO, NELSON ALAMO, ROMEO
LIGUAN, RAYCHARD CARNAJE, FELINO GUANEZ, ANTONIO MARTIN, WALLYFREDO
ALZONA, VICTOR ABANDO, ALFREDO AUSTRIA, NESTOR SEPRADO, RICHARD
GILBUENA, EDWIN SILAYCO, JOSEPH MARCOS, NOEL OMALIN, DANILO DORADO,
LUISITO DE JESUS, EFREN SUMAGUE, CARLOS PILI, MIGUELITO ROA, and KILUSAN-
OLALIA, and SHERIFF P. PAREDES, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
June 27, 2002 Decision1 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 62257, and the January 8, 2003
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

On the recommendation of the Division Clerk of Court and in the interest of orderly administration of
justice, the Court initially consolidated this case with G.R. Nos. 149158-59 entitled Kimberly Independent
Labor Union for Solidarity Activism and Nationalism (KILUSAN)-Organized Labor Associations in Line
Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA), et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. We, however, already disposed of
the issue in G.R. Nos. 149158-59 in the Court's Resolution promulgated on July 24, 2007.3 Left for the
Court to resolve then are the matters raised in the instant petition.

We pertinently quote from the said July 24, 2007 Resolution the facts, thus:

On June 30, 1986, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) executed by and between Kimberly-Clark
(Phils.), Inc., (Kimberly), a Philippine-registered corporation engaged in the manufacture, distribution,
sale and exportation of paper products, and United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union-Philippine
Transport and General Workers’ Organization (UKCEO-PTGWO) expired. Within the freedom period,
on April 21, 1986, KILUSAN-OLALIA, then a newly-formed labor organization, challenged the
incumbency of UKCEO-PTGWO, by filing a petition for certification election with the Ministry (now
Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE), Regional Office No. IV, Quezon City.

A certification election was subsequently conducted on July 1, 1986 with UKCEO-PTGWO winning by a
margin of 20 votes over KILUSAN-OLALIA. Remaining as uncounted were 64 challenged ballots cast
by 64 casual workers whose regularization was in question. KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a protest.

On November 13, 1986, MOLE issued an Order stating, among others, that the casual workers not
performing janitorial and yard maintenance services had attained regular status on even date. UKCEO-
PTGWO was then declared as the exclusive bargaining representative of Kimberly’s employees, having
garnered the highest number of votes in the certification election.

On March 16, 1987, KILUSAN-OLALIA filed with this Court a petition for certiorari which was
docketed as G.R. No. 77629 assailing the Order of the MOLE with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO).

During the pendency of G.R. No. 77629, Kimberly dismissed from service several employees and refused
to heed the workers’ grievances, impelling KILUSAN-OLALIA to stage a strike on May 17, 1987.
Kimberly filed an injunction case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which
prompted the latter to issue temporary restraining orders (TRO’s). The propriety of the issuance of the
TRO’s was again brought by KILUSAN-OLALIA to this Court via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition which was docketed as G.R. No. 78791.

G.R. Nos. 77629 and 78791 were eventually consolidated by this Court and decided on May 9, 1990. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in G.R. No. 77629:

1. Ordering the med-arbiter in Case No. R04-OD-M-4-15-86 to open and count the 64 challenged
votes, and that the union with the highest number of votes be thereafter declared as the duly
elected certified bargaining representative of the regular employees of KIMBERLY;

2. Ordering KIMBERLY to pay the workers who have been regularized their differential pay with
respect to minimum wage, cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, and benefits provided for
under the applicable collective bargaining agreement from the time they became regular
employees.

All other aspects of the decision appealed from, which are not so modified or affected thereby, are hereby
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. 77629 is hereby made permanent.

The petition filed in G.R. No. 78791 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

xxxx

On the Decision of the Court dated May 9, 1990, KILUSAN-OLALIA and 76 individual complainants
filed a motion for execution with the DOLE (formerly MOLE). In an Order issued on June 29, 2000, the
DOLE considered as physically impossible, and moot and academic the opening and counting of the 64
challenged ballots because they could no longer be located despite diligent efforts, and KILUSAN-
OLALIA no longer actively participated when the company went through another CBA cycle. However,
the DOLE ordered the payment of the differential wages and other benefits of the regularized workers, to
wit:

ACCORDINGLY, let a partial writ of execution issue to enforce payment of the sum of (sic) ₱576,510.57
to the 22 individual workers listed in ANNEX A of Kimberly’s Comment/Reply dated 31 October 1991
representing their differential pay with respect to the minimum wage, cost of living allowance, 13th
month pay and benefits provided under the applicable collective bargaining agreement from the time they
became regular employees as above-indicated.

Further, the Bureau of Working Conditions is hereby directed to submit, within twenty (20) days from
receipt of this Order, a list of workers who have been regularized and the corresponding benefits owing to
them from the time they became regular employees.

SO ORDERED.

Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 2000, the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) submitted its report
finding 47 out of the 76 complainants as entitled to be regularized.

Kimberly filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOLE Order as well as the BWC Report, arguing in
the main that the decision in G.R. Nos. 77629 and 78791 only pertained to casuals who had rendered one
year of service as of April 21, 1986, the filing date of KILUSAN-OLALIA’s petition for certification
election. On December 6, 2000, however, the DOLE denied the motion, disposing of it as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by the COMPANY is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. No further motion of the same nature shall be entertained. Further, the Report of computation
submitted by the Bureau of Working Conditions is hereby APPROVED and made an integral part of this
Order.

Let a writ of execution be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Kimberly, steadfast in its stand, filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62257 alleging that the employees who were dismissed due to the illegal
strike staged on May 17, 1987 (the subject of G.R. Nos. 149158-59) should not be awarded regularization
differentials.

On June 27, 2002, the CA dismissed Kimberly’s petition, and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion. The
questioned orders dated June 29, 2000 and December 6, 2000 of the Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Kimberly elevated the case before this Court, on the
following grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals committed serious error in affirming the ruling of the Secretary of Labor
that even casual employees who had not rendered one year of service were considered regular
employees, thereby nullifying and disregarding the Honorable Court’s Decision dated May 9,
1990 that only casual employees who had rendered at least one (1) year of service were
considered regular employees.
 2. The Court of Appeals also gravely erred in upholding the ruling of Labor Secretary that
persons not party to the petition in G.R. No. 77629 were entitled to regularization differentials,
thereby amending the Honorable Court’s decision.4

Kimberly, in this case, contends that the reckoning point in determining who among its casual employees
are entitled to regularization should be April 21, 1986, the date KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for
certification election to challenge the incumbency of UKCEO-PTGWO. It posits that in the
implementation of the May 9, 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 77629,5 the DOLE should then exclude the
employees who had not rendered at least one (1) year of service from the said date.6

Kimberly also argues that the employees who are not parties in G.R. No. 77629 should not be included in
the implementation orders. For DOLE to declare this group of employees as regular and to order the
payment of differential pay to them is to amend a final and executory decision of this Court.7

We do not agree. In G.R. No. 77629, we ruled as follows:

The law [thus] provides for two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;
and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect
to the activity in which they are employed. The individual petitioners herein who have been adjudged to
be regular employees fall under the second category. These are the mechanics, electricians, machinists,
machine shop helpers, warehouse helpers, painters, carpenters, pipefitters and masons. It is not disputed
that these workers have been in the employ of KIMBERLY for more than one year at the time of the
filing of the petition for certification election by KILUSAN-OLALIA.

Owing to their length of service with the company, these workers became regular employees, by
operation of law, one year after they were employed by KIMBERLY through RANK. While the actual
regularization of these employees entails the mechanical act of issuing regular appointment papers and
compliance with such other operating procedures as may be adopted by the employer, it is more in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular employment attaches to the
casual worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of service. To rule otherwise, and to
instead make their regularization dependent on the happening of some contingency or the fulfillment of
certain requirements, is to impose a burden on the employee which is not sanctioned by law.

That the first stated position is the situation contemplated and sanctioned by law is further enhanced by
the absence of a statutory limitation before regular status can be acquired by a casual employee. The law
is explicit. As long as the employee has rendered at least one year of service, he becomes a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed. The law does not provide the qualification
that the employee must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally declared as such
before he can acquire a regular status. Obviously, where the law does not distinguish, no distinction
should be drawn.8

Considering that an employee becomes regular with respect to the activity in which he is employed one
year after he is employed, the reckoning date for determining his regularization is his hiring date.
Therefore, it is error for petitioner Kimberly to claim that it is from April 21, 1986 that the one-year
period should be counted. While it is a fact that the issue of regularization came about only when
KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification election, the concerned employees attained regular
status by operation of law.91awp++i1
Further, the grant of the benefit of regularization should not be limited to the employees who questioned
their status before the labor tribunal/court and asserted their rights; it should also extend to those similarly
situated.10 There is, thus, no merit in petitioner's contention that only those who presented their
circumstances of employment to the courts are entitled to regularization.111awp++i1

As to Kimberly’s assertions that some of the employees were already recalled, reassigned or replaced by
the RANK Manpower Services, and that some did not return to work, the Court notes that these are
questions of fact. Basic is the rule that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised,12 except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are
mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary
to the findings culled by the court of origin,13 which is not so in the instant case. The DOLE and the
appellate court herein are uniform in their findings.

Finally, oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual findings of the labor tribunal not
only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence,14 unless there is showing that the
labor tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to
compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.15 Likewise, the appellate court cannot substitute its
own judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence
or what evidence is entitled to belief.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED DUE COURSE.

SO ORDERED.
June 7, 2017

G.R. No. 198795

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MERCEDITAS MATHEUS y DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

In this appeal, accused-appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes assails the March 7, 2011 Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 03737, which affirmed the November 26, 2008
Joint Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 218 of Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
03-119663-69, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of Estafa and one
count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment under Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant was charged with six counts of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and one count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042, based on the affidavit-
complaints made by the following: Thelma N. Suratos (Suratos); Glenda R. Guillarte (Guillarte); Merly 0.
Alayon (Alayon); Celso J. Bagay, Jr. (Bagay, Jr.); Rogelio Duldulao (Duldulao); and Doriza P. Gloria
(Gloria).

The identical Information for six counts of Estafa, save for the names of the complainants, the amounts
involved, and the dates of their commission, read as follows:

Crim. Case No. Q-03-1196633

That on or about the period comprised from February 19, 2003 to February 26, 2003, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring together, personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained
and mutually helping each other, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
THELMA SURATOS y NARAG, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to Thelma Suratos to the effect that they
had the power and capacity to recruit and employ Thelma Suratos for employment abroad, and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereto, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Thelma Suratos to
give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P55,000.00, Philippine
Currency, on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the
same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of
₱55,000.00, which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud Thelma Suratos willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Thelma Suratos y Narag in the aforesaid amount of
₱55,000.00 Philippine Currency.

Crim. Case No. 0-03-1196644

a) Glenda R. Guillarte

b) ₱55,000.00

c) From April 1, 2003 -May 13, 2003

Crim. Case No. 0-03-119665 5

a) Merly 0. Alayon

b) ₱l5,000.00

c) April 10, 2003

Crim. Case No. 0-03-1196666

a) Celso J. Bagay, Jr.

b) ₱30,000.00

c) June 11, 2003

Crim. Case No. Q-03-1196677

a) Doriza P. Gloria

b) ₱27,500.00

c) June 18, 2003

Crim. Case No. Q-03-1196688

a) Rogelio L. Duldulao

b) ₱29,000.00

c) January 31 -March 12, 2003.

The Information for violation of RA 8042 recited the felonious acts in this wise:

Crim. Case No. 0-03-1196699

That on or about the period comprised from January 31, 2003 to June 18, 2003, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring together, confederating with another person whose true name,
identity and personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping each other, by
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment
abroad, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to THELMA SURA TOS y NARAG; GLENDA GUILLARTE y
RONDILLA; MERL Y ALA YON y ORO; CELSO BAGA Y y JORGE, JR.; DORIZA GLORIA y
PUJEDA; and ROGELIO DULDULAO y LE, without first securing the required license and authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group.

After the pre-trial, the trial ensued.

On January 15, 2003, Suratos went to an office in Cubao, Quezon City where she met the accused-
appellant, who promised her a job in Cyprus as a caretaker. She returned to the accused-appellant's office
a month later. The accused-appellant gave her a machine copy of her visa to prove that there was a good
job waiting for her in Cyprus and that she would leave in three months upon payment. Suratos gave the
accused-appellant an amount totaling to PhP55,000, inclusive of her passport and medical examination
report. After three months, Suratos became suspicious. She demanded the return of her money, but the
accused-appellant simply told her to wait. A month later, Suratos learned that the accused-appellant was
already detained and could no longer deploy her abroad. She filed a complaint for illegal recruitment
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119663. Suratos identified the accused-appellant in open court as
well as the entry permit and receipts she had issued her.

Sometime in the third week of March 2003, Alayon met the accusedappellant at the All Care Travel
Agency located at 302 Escueta Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City. Accused-appellant offered her a job in Cyprus
as a part of the laundry staff and asked her to pay the total amount of PhP55,000, to submit her resume
and transcript of records, among others, and promised to deploy her abroad by June. On April 10, 2003,
Alayon initially paid PhP15,000 to the accused-appellant. When she returned to accusedappellant's office
to pay the balance, she learned that accused- appellant had been picked up by the police. Alayon
proceeded to the police station and demanded from the accused-appellant the return of her money. She
filed a complaint against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119665.

During the first week of December 2012, Duldulao, through his wife's friend, was introduced to the
accused-appellant. When Duldulao mentioned that she had a sister working in Spain, accused-appellant
promised a tourist visa for him in exchange for PhP 45,000. In the first week of January 2003, he gave the
accused-appellant PhP l 1,000 as partial payment for the processing of his documents. The accused-
appellant only took PhP l0,000 and gave back PhPl,000 for him to open an account with Land Bank,
Cubao branch. Upon the request of accused-appellant, Duldulao deposited the amount of PhP 8,000 to the
BPI account of accused-appellant. When he was required by the accused-appellant to complete the
payment of PhP 45,000 for his tourist visa, Duldulao obtained a bank loan of PhP l1,000 and gave it to the
accused-appellant. Altogether, Duldulao paid the accused-appellant a total of PhP 29,000. When he
discovered that accused-appellant was arrested in April 2003, Duldulao went to Camp Panopio and
demanded that accusedappellant return his money but to no avail. He subsequently filed a complaint
against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119668.

Bagay, Jr. went to the office of the accused-appellant who offered him a job as a dentist in London.
Accused-appellant assured him that with an initial payment of PhP30,000, he would leave in three
months. After paying the said amount, Bagay, Jr. gave the accused-appellant his resume, transcript of
records, diploma, passport, and I.D. pictures. Unfortunately, he was not able to leave for London because
in less than three months, Bagay, Jr. learned that accused-appellant was detained at Camp Panopio for
illegal recruitment. Despite her promise to Bagay, Jr., accused-appellant failed to return the amount to
him. The complaint filed by Bagay, Jr. against the accused-appellant was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-03-119666.
Sometime in the third week of March 2003, Guillarte went to the office of the accused-appellant who
promised her work as a hotel staff member in Cyprus. She gave accused-appellant an amount totaling PhP
55,000 as full payment for her deployment abroad. But the promise of deployment never materialized.
Guillarte's demand for the return of her money from the accused-appellant went unheeded. She filed a
complaint against accused-appellant docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119664.

Private complainant Doria, however, did not testify.

For her part, the accused-appellant admitted that she was the Overseas Marketing Director of All Care
Travel & Consultancy (Hongkong), with All Care Travel & Consultancy (Philippines) as its affiliate. She
said that sometime in 1990, she was issued a professional license as an Electronics Communication
Engineer. She left the country in 2003 and was not in the Philippines from January 2003 to February
2003. She returned to the country on June 4, 2003 and left the country in the same month. She claimed
that she did not know Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Gloria. Although she knew Duldulao,
she did not promise him any job. She likewise claimed that she neither signed nor issued any receipt using
the name "Manzie delos Reyes" in favor of the complainants. She further claimed that she was not
engaged in any recruitment and placement activities. During the pre-trial, she admitted that she had no
license to recruit workers for overseas employment.

On rebuttal, prosecution witness Perla D. Sayana, Chief, Registration Division of the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC), testified that the name of accused-appellant, "Merceditas Matheus" does
not appear in the books of PRC's database. She issued a certification to the effect that "Merceditas
Matheus" is not a Licensed Electronics Communication Engineer.

Confidential agent of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), Rustico B. Romero, whose main task was to
verify travel records, also appeared for the prosecution. He testified that based on the BOI's database, the
name "Merceditas Matheus" did not leave the country from January 31, 2003 to June 18, 2003.

On November 26, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision, 10 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
large scale illegal recruitment and five counts of estafa. The complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
03- 119667 filed by Doriza P. Gloria (Gloria), however, w<;ts dismissed due to Gloria's failure to testify
and the prosecution's failure to prove appellant's guilt for the crime of estafa.

On appeal before the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. 11

Hence, the instant appeal.

In this Court's February 6, 2012 Resolution,12 We noted the accused-appellant and the Office of the
Solicitor General's (OSG) respective Manifestations stating in essence that they are dispensing with their
supplemental briefs, and thus, adopting their respective briefs which they filed with the CA.1awp++i1

The Issue

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND
ESTAFA.13

The appeal lacks merit.

On the one hand, accused-appellant maintains that she could not be held liable for the crimes of illegal
recruitment and Estafa since she never made any promise or gave the impression of having the ability to
send the complc;tinants abroad. She avers that the cash vouchers and letters acknowledging receipt of
complainants' payments were not signed by her, but by a certain Manzie Delos Reyes. She likewise avers
that she did not engage in recruitment activities as defined by law since All Care Travel & Consultancy
(Philippines)is engaged in visa applicatfons. She further avers that she did not know complainants
Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, and Bagay, Jr.

On the other hand, the OSG counters14 that the RTC correctly convicted the accused-appellant of Large
Scale Illegal Recruitment and Estafa, the prosecution having adduced sufficient evidence to established
her guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt.

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale –

The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: 15 (l} the person charged
undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; 16 (2) accused did not have
the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed
the same against three or more persons individually or as a group.

These elements are obtaining in this case.

First, the RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment activity when she promised the
private complainants overseas employment for a fee.1avvphi1 This factual finding was affirmed by the
CA. As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on
the record. 17 And when his findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court. 18 As correctly pointed out by the CA:

xxx xxx x x x Appellant, in fact, had stipulated at pre-trial that not only did she know
private complainants, she also received money from them for their deployment abroad, as she even issued
receipts to them. At any rate, absence of receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal
recruitment. 19 Private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who asked money from
them in consideration for their deployment abroad. She impressed on complainants that she had the power
or ability to send them abroad for employment so much so that the latter got convinced to part with their
money in exchange therefor.20 Illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the
victims as persons who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the
impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the
latter to tender payment of fees. 21

Second, the March 1, 2004 Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
unmistakably reveals that the accused-appellant neither had a license nor authority to recruit workers for
overseas employment.22 Notably, instead of assailing the certification, she admitted during the pre-trial
that she did not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.23

Third, it was established that there were five complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and
Duldulao.

The CA observed that:

x x x x complainants came forward and charged appellant with illegal recruitment. Appellant's claim that
she never met private complainants before was belied by her own admission at pre-trial. xxx

x x x xxx Private complainants' individual testimonies were so replete with details on how appellant
convincingly, albeit deceptively, enticed them to pay all her demands in case, how she provided for their
fake documents, and how she manipulated their thoughts and dreams for a better life, ending up in the
cruel realization that she was nothing but a fraud.24

Indeed, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the
prosecution.

Estafa under under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC of the RPC

We likewise affirm accused-appellant's conviction for five counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of illegal recruitment under
RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.25

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.26

Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant deceived private
complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for
employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment.1âwphi1 Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private complainants
parted with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which accused-
appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her receipt of the payments. As
aptly pointed out by the CA:

In this case, appellant committed estafa by using fictitious names, i.e., 'Manzie Delos Reyes', 'Manzie
Matheus' in her transactions with private complainants, falsely pretending that she possessed power,
influence, capacity to employ abroad or procure visas for them, making it appear that she had made
transactions to acquire their entry permits and visas, thus, successfully inducing them to part with their
money, albeit, knowing full [sic] well she had no authority or license to do so.27

Clearly, these acts of accused-appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.

It must be noted, however, that both the R TC and the CA failed to award interest on the money judgment
on the charge of five counts of estafa and one count of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. Following
prevailing jurisprudence,28 the Court, therefore, imposes a legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum,
from the time of demand, which shall be deemed as the same day the Informations were filed against
appellant, until the amounts are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 7, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. H.C. No. 03737, which affirmed the November 26, 2008 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 218 of Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-119663-69, finding appellant Merceditas
Matheus y Delos Reyes GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of Estafa and one count of
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, to read as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-03-11966.2, appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment punishable under Sec. 7 (b)
of RA 8042. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a
fine of One Million Pesos (PhPl,000,000).

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-03-119663, appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year, eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as minimum to eleven years of prision
mayor as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify private complainant Thelma N. Suratos the
amount of PhP55,000 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6% per annum from August 4,
2003, until the said amount is fully paid.

3. In Criminal Case No. Q-03-119664, appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year, eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as minimum to eleven years of prision
mayor as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify private complainant Glenda R. Guillarte in the
amount of PhP55,000 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6% per annum from August 4,
2003, until the said amount is fully paid.

4. In Criminal Case No. Q-03-119665, appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year, eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as minimum to six years and eight months of
prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify private complainant Merly 0. Alayon in
the amount of PhP15,000 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6% per annum from August 4,
2003, until the said amount is fully paid.

5. In Criminal Case No. Q-03-11966.Q, appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year, eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor
as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify private complainant Celso Bagay in the amount of
PhP30,000 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6% per annum from August 4, 2003, until the
said amount is fully paid.

6. In Criminal Case No. Q-03-119667, appellant Merceditas Matheus y Delos Reyes is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year, eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor
as maximum. She is ordered to indemnify private complainant Rogelio L. Duldulao in the amount
of PhP29,000 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6% per annum from August 4, 2003, until
the said amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice