22. ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

andTEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of theconstitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unlesshe is a natural-
born citizen."Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente,Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935Constitution.On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corpsand, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
UnitedStates. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
Section1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenshipby, among others, "rendering service to or
acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign country."On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriationunder Republic Act No. 2630.

He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second Districtof Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto AdCautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondentCruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, canstill be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:

YES. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalizedFilipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Inrespondent
Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.Having thus
taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in theCivil Registry
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruzis deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired atbirth as the son
of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in orderto reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all thenecessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.The petition is hereby DISMISSED
23. MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on,
she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

24. Djumantan v. Domingo,

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.He then embraced
and was converted to Islam. He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then
returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests”
of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of
Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of
Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael
discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”,
however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from
temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the
ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of
Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.
Issue

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to
permanent resident legal.

Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and the
change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were
obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended
stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa.
Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay
temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among
those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine
citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right,
even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

25. Manzano vs Mercado

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of
votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

26. BOI Commissioner vs Go Callano

27. Jacot vs Dal

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-
mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more
than one citizenship.

28. Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC

petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen... she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship... pursuant to

The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines... the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before
the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the
Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has... ceased to be an Australian citizen.

petitioner ran for Mayor in

Caba, La Union... in the 2007 elections. She lost

She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor.

and was proclaimed as... the winning candidate.

private respondents... filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the... petitioner's eligibility

The petitions similarly sought the petitioner's disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign... citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by

R.A. No. 9225.

trial court held that the petitioner's failure to comply with

R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office.

the personal... declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed

Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

Issues:

For purposes of determining the petitioner's eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship"... in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
Ruling:

Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship
in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship... by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5,
viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the

Philippines and the following conditions:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of... any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath... she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of... foreign citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225,... and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of... candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

[T]he intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign... citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts
in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one
citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their
citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for
public office. The petitioner's failure to... comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law,
rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she... executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.

29. Maquiling v. COMELEC

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING,

Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On
the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended
that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto
a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as “USA-American.” The COMELEC First Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be
granted because he is still using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates
his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration.

The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use of
a US passport……. does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as
there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to “unrenounce”
what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme Court to assail the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for public office.
RULING: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of
his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.

30. David vs Agbay

FACTS:
1. In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the
portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

2. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen.

3. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

4. Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was pending, petitioner re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-
10-07 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).

5. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to
convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him
and private respondent’s family.

6. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable
cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he
filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

7. On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.

8. Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another
country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have
been lost on account of said naturalization.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino
in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225
HELD: NO.

RATIO:

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,

natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.nRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country
shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the
conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before (first group) and after (second group) the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section
3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-
acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign
country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under
the new law.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear
in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee, wherein the following was explained:

“The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth
Act 63…The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances…
eacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and
retention for those in the future.”

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,
the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country
was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-
acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document
under Article 172, paragraph 1.

31. In Re: Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines, B.M. 2112, July 24, 2012
On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that
he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and
later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required,
and incompliance thereof, petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration,

in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City

Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership
dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all
the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition
that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
appropriate fees.

32. Hyatt Elevators v. Goldstar Elevators

FACTS:

Petitioner and Respondent are both engaged in the business of importing, installing and maintaining
elevators and escalators. Hyatt filed an unfair competition case against LG and Goldstar alleging that it
was appointed as the sole distributor of LG elevators and escalators.

Goldstar moved to dismiss the case alleging that venue was improperly laid as neither the Hyatt, LG or
Goldstar itself resided in Mandaluyong city where the case was originally filed. The RTC denied the
motion. The CA dismissed the case and held that Makati was the principal place of business of both
respondent and petitioner, as stated in the latter’s Articles of Incorporation, that place was controlling
for purposes of determining the proper venue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the “residence” of the corporation is the same one as stated in the AOI.

HELD:

Yes. Although the Rules of Court do not provide that when the plaintiff is a corporation, the complaint
should be filed in the location of its principal office as indicated in its articles of incorporation,
jurisprudence has, however, settled that the place where the principal office of a corporation is located,
as stated in the articles, indeed establishes its residence. This ruling is important in determining the
venue of an action by or against a corporation, as in the present case.

33. Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation

Facts: Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a
domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring
certain areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and
mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications
of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara
Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines
and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 covering an area of over 1,782
hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-IVB-44 which
includes an area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and EP were
then transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6, 2006, assigned to
petitioner McArthur. Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development
Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & Development Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an
application for an MPSA with the MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on January 6, 1992. Through the said
application, the DENR issued MPSA-IV-1-12 covering an area of 3.277 hectares in barangays Calategas
and San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or
assigned its rights and interests over the MPSA application in favor of Narra. Another MPSA application
of SMMI was filed with the DENR Region IV-B, labeled as MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47) over
3,402 hectares in Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja, Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan.
SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned its rights and interest over the said MPSA
application to Tesoro. On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
DENR three (3) separate petitions for the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA designated as
AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 and MPSA IV-1-12. In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of
the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc.
(MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable
stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs over the areas
covered by applications since it knows that it can only participate in mining activities through
corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’ capital
stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities
through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner corporations are Filipino and can validly be issued MPSA and EP.
Held: No. The SEC Rules provide for the manner of calculating the Filipino interest in a corporation for
purposes, among others, of determining compliance with nationality requirements (the ‘Investee
Corporation’). Such manner of computation is necessary since the shares in the Investee Corporation
may be owned both by individual stockholders (‘Investing Individuals’) and by corporations and
partnerships (‘Investing Corporation’). The said rules thus provide for the determination of nationality
depending on the ownership of the Investee Corporation and, in certain instances, the Investing
Corporation.

Under the SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the Investee Corporation. The
first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the Control Test in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and
pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ‘(s)hares belonging to
corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be
considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace
the ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing Corporation since a
corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino.

The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the portion in said
Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, “but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality.” Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule
Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced
(i.e., “grandfathered”) to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership. Moreover, the ultimate
Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and added
to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation.

In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the second part of
the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases
where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or
the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in
doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.

34. Gamboa v. Teves,

Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12
million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific.
Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner
contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner,
hence this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the
respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011
decision?

Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an
economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want
to achieve, that is – to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-
controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term
‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12,
sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is
tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not
erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied

35. Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. NLRC

The issue in this case is whether the shipboard employment contract or Hongkong law should govern the
amount of death compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was employed by Golden Star
Shipping, Ltd. a Hongkong based firm.

The shipboard employment contract dated June 1, 1978 was executed in this country between Pancho
and Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star Shipping. It was approved by
the defunct National Seamen Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V Olivine for 12 months with
a gross monthly wage of US$195.
In October, 1978, he had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to the hospital while the vessel was docked at
Gothenberg, Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at the San Juan de Dios
Hospital. He died on December 13, 1979.

The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina, P20,000 as disability compensation benefits
pursuant to the above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as attorney's fees. Proserfina
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which awarded her $621 times 36 months or its
equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the benefits as attorney's fees. Golden Star Shipping
assailed that decision by certiorari.

We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that
the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the benefits" for which the
Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law.

Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The case of Norse Management
Co. vs. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a
precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine Law or the
Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater".

The Solicitor General opines that the employment contract should be applied. For that reason, he
refused to uphold the decision of the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission is reversed and set aside. The
decision of the National Seamen Board dated February 26, 1981 is affirmed. No costs.

36. Atienza v. Philimare Shipping

The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are simple and are soon resolved.

Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean
Liner Pte. Ltd. of Germany, based in Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the MV Tibati for the
stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a month from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982.[1] The Crew
Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981, provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB
Standard Format" and was validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on January 14, 1981.
[2]

On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him while working on the vessel in
Bombay, India.[3] In due time, his father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits computed
at the rate of 36 months times the seaman's monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in accordance with
the Workmen's Compensation Law of Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The private respondents,
while admitting liability, contended that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the
NSB Standard Format.

On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration sustained the private
respondent and held that the applicable law was Philippine law.[4] On appeal, the decision was affirmed
by the National Labor Relations Commission except that it increased the award to P75,000.00 pursuant
to NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981.[5]

In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public respondent on the ground that Singaporean
law should have been applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen
Board,[6] where the foreign law was held controlling because it provided for greater benefits for the
claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the application of NSB Memorandum Circular
No. 71, Series of 1981, which they say became effective after the seaman's death.[7]

On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to the present petition. The reason is that in
that case, it was specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement that "compensation shall be
paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is greater."[8]
That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such
stipulation appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration. Instead, it is clearly stated therein
that the insurance benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death of the seaman
during the term of his contract, over and above the benefits for which the Philippine Government is
liable under Philippine law."[9]

The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only the minimum benefits and does not
preclude the parties from stipulating for higher compensation. That may be true enough. But the point
is that the parties in this case did not provide for such higher benefits as the parties did in the Norse
case. There was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement of January 3, 1981, that the employee would be
entitled to whichever greater insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or the foreign law;
on the contrary, it was plainly provided that insurance benefits would be determined according to the
NSB Standard Format then in force. The consequence is that the petitioner cannot now claim a higher
award than the compensation prescribed in the said format.

As we said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. NLRC:[10]

We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that
the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000.00 'over and above the benefits' for which the
Philippine Government is liable under Philippine Law.

Hongkong law on workmens' compensation is not the applicable law. The case of Norse Management
Co. v. National Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a
precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine Law or the
Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater."

37. Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc. v. NLRC

n August 1992, the Gulf Catering Company, a foreign company operating in Saudi Arabia, recruited,
through its Philippine agent, Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc., the services of Erlinda Osdana. Osdana
was contracted to work as a waitress in Saudi Arabia. Her employment contract was duly approved by
the POEA. She was also medically examined and was declared “fit for employment”.

But when she was in Saudi, Osdana was instead forced to work as a dishwasher with a brutal shift which
starts from 6am until 6pm and this was without overtime pay. Due to the heavy work she was made to
suffer, there were months when she was unable to work. Eventually, she was diagnosed to be suffering
from carpal tunnel syndrome. She then underwent two separate operations to fix her hands. She
showed good signs and was recovering well. But four days after she was discharged from the hospital,
her employment was terminated and was sent home to the Philippines. The reason for the termination
was “illness”. She was not given any separation pay and apparently, her salaries were not fully paid.

In the Philippines, she sought the help of Triple Eight but the agency refused to help her hence she sued
them.
In its defense, Triple Eight averred that Osdana’s employment was validly terminated due to her illness.
Osdana however claimed that her carpal tunnel syndrome is not a ground for termination because it is
not even a communicable disease and that under the implementing rules of the Labor Code, there
should be a certification from a competent public authority that her illness is such that she can be validly
dismissed from employment.

On that point, Triple Eight averred that the Labor Code of the Philippines does not apply because she
works in Saudi Arabia; and that considering that she works in Saudi, it was not possible for her Arabian
employer to get a certification from a Philippine public health authority.

The labor arbiter, as well as the NLRC, ruled in favor of Osdana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Triple Eight are correct.

HELD: No. The Labor Code, as well as its implementing rules apply. The contract of employment was
executed in the Philippines. Thus, following the principle of lex loci contractus, Philippine law shall apply.
Further, it is the State’s policy to afford maximum protection to labor, domestic or overseas.

Anent the issue of securing a certification from a competent public authority, the pertinent rules are as
follows:

As a general rule, an employer may dismiss an employee found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his
co-employees (Art. 284, Labor Code). There must be a certification by competent public authority that
the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six 6 months
with proper medical treatment (Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code);

Except: If the disease or ailment can be cured within 6 months, the employer shall not terminate the
employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his
former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health (Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI,
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).
Nowhere in the rule does it state that the term “competent public authority” must be a Philippine
authority. Hence, it can be a foreign competent authority, as in this case, it could be a competent public
authority in Saudi Arabia – which Triple Eight’s principal (Gulf Catering) did not avail of.

38. Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Private respondent MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN was a passenger on board Flight SN 284 of defendant
airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to Manila. She checked in her
luggage which contained her valuables all amounting to $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No.
71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284. Upon Arrival in
Manila, she learned that her luggage was missing and was advised to accomplish and submit a property
Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day.

Upon follow up, it remained missing; thus, she filed her formal complaint with the office of Ferge
Massed, petitioner’s Local Manager, demanding immediate attention.

Two weeks later she was notified that her luggage was found. But unfortunately plaintiff was informed
that the luggage was lost for the second time. She demanded payment but the airline refused to settle
the claim.

The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Paula San Agustin. The appellate court affirmed in toto the trial
court’s judgment.

Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondent should be
considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her awareness that the
flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that her flight from Brussels to
Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner
insists that private respondent, being a seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar
with the standard provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value are required to be hand-
carried by the passenger and that the liability of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be
limited, in any event, to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and
corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca International Airport, private
respondent, in checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites
Section 5(c), Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on 02 October
1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, generally observed by International carriers, stating,
among other things, that:

“Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as checked
baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or
other valuables.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the airline is negligent? Whether respondent’s negligence is the sole and proximate of
the loss?

HELD:

Yes.

Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is demanded by the nature of an
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place. When
the source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or non-fulfillment of the
prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part of the obligor. This rule is not different in the
case of common carriers in the carriage of goods which, indeed, are bound to observe not just the due
diligence of a good father of a family but that of “extraordinary” care in the vigilance over the goods. The
appellate court has aptly observed:

“x x x Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their business and by reasons of
public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them. This extraordinary responsibility, according to Art. 1736, lasts from the time
the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and received by the carrier until they are
delivered actually or constructively to the consignee or person who has the right to receive them. Art.
1737 states that the common carrier’s duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them ‘remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit.’ And Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they had observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

The above rules remain basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tort although
noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also forming part of the
governing law. Petitioner is not thus entirely off track when it has likewise raised in its defense the tort
doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the doctrine cannot, in this
particular instance, support its case. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not
have occurred.

The above findings, which certainly cannot be said to be without basis, foreclose whatever rights
petitioner might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers
under the Warsaw Convention .

The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment ‘of the provisions which exclude or
limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct,’ or ‘if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the carrier acting within the
scope of his employment.’

The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline’s
liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability.

( Loss of baggage twice shows gross negligence)

39. United Airlines v. Uy

Facts: On October 13, 1989, respondent, a passenger of United Airlines, checked in together with his
luggage one piece of which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his utter humiliation, an
employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum weight allowance
per bag and that he should have packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front of the
milling crowd, she told respondent to repair his things and transfer some of them to the light ones.
Respondent acceded but his luggage was still overweight. Petitioner billed him overweight charges but
its employee reused to honor the miscellaneous charges under MCD which he offered to pay with. Not
wanting to leave without his luggage, he paid with his credit card. Upon arrival in manila, he discovered
that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. In a letter dated October 16, 1989, he
notified petitioner of his loss and requested reimbursement. Petitioner paid for his loss based on the
maximum liability per pound. Respondent considered the amount grossly inadequate. He sent two more
letters to petition but to no avail. On June 9, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Airline. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention. Respondent countered that according to par. 2 of Article 29, “the method of
calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.”

Issues:
1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws?

2) Has the respondent’s cause of action prescribed?

Held: 1) No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Convention provisions do not regulate
or exclude liabilities for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and
preclude recovery therefore3 beyond the limits et by said convention. Likewise, we have held that the
Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carriers
employees is found or established.

2) No. While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or
goods) is well within the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st cause of action (an action for
damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent’s rights as
passengers) clearly is not.

The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention as an absolute bar to suit and not
to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum, forecloses the application
of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. (Art. 29, par. 2 was indented only to let local
laws determine whether an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.) Since, it
is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the 2-yr time frame his 2nd cause of
action must be barred.

However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because
petitioner gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True,
respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when petitioner denied his claims but
the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be
faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for
damages should be filed within 2 years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be
applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airlines itself. Thus,
respondent’s 2nd cause of action cannot be considered as time barred.

40. Zalamea v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline
tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to
Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were

purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses
Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00
am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before tem had
already taken all the seats available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to
Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22,
were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-
listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to
board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and
purchased two tickets from American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach
of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the
TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it
is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the
United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US
Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?

HELD:

The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea
and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied
with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy
or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of
his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that
the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

41. Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Inc.

acts: County Trust Company of New York, United States of America is the domiciliary administration of
the decedent, Idonah Slade Perkins who owned 33,002 shares of stocks in the appellant, domestic
corporation, Benguet Consolidated Inc. located in the Philippines. A dispute arose between the appellee,
Tayag who is the appointed ancillary of Perkins in the Philippines and the domiciliary administration as to
who is entitled to the possession of the certificate of shares, however, County Trust Company refuses to
transfer the said certificate to Tayag despite the order of the court. Hence, the appellee was compelled
to petition the court for the appellant to declare the subject certificates as lost to which appellant
allegeed that no new certificate can be issued and the same cannot be rendered as lost in accordance
with their by-laws.

Issue: Whether or not the certificate of shares of stock can be declared lost.
Held: Yes. Administration whether principal or ancillary certainly extends to the assets of a decedent
found within the state or country where it was granted.

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property located in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is
had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile is termed the
principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.Hence, an administration appointed in a foreign
state has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies,
leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of the
deceased’s liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

Since there is refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administration in New York, to deliver
the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administration in
the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them lost and requiring the
appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby the task incumbent under the law on the
ancillary administration could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

Assuming that a contrariety exist between the provision of the laws and the command of a court decree,
the latter is to be followed.

A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has
received the imprimatur of state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore it will have rights
and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator, more than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to
yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to
do so.

42. Miciano v. Brimo

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance.
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.

43. Bohanan v. Bohanan

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding,
dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the
project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.

On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to
probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the
said order, the court made the following findings:

"According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of
that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention is
untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was
merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of
his particular choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his will. He had planned to spend the rest of his days
in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal
intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his death, he was a
citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his
exclusive personal right.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the
Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking
the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust." (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.)

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questioned on appeal. The executor filed a
project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National
Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George
Bohanan, which consists of P90,819.67 in cash and one-half in shares of stock of several mining
companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F. L. Bohanan, and his
sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consists in the same amount of cash and of shares
of mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator)
son, Edward Gilbert Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly
installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000;
Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of
P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of
several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a
legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived
of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be
entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that
it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his
Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction,
citing the cases of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court
below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any
portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

"Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her
estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts."
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's
estate had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 18, 1955, (pp. 155-
159, Vol. II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not
appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife
filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her
share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in
its said order found that there exists no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife
at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already adverted to, the decision of the court had
become final and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that
there was no community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their
coverture.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on
January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925,
Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of
the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no legal claim to any portion of the estate
left by the testator.

The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had
received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in
the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the
testator. Is the failure of the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time
of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides
that successional rights to personal property are to be governed by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
and the country in which it is found." (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16,
new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a
citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence.
(See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the testamentary
dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil
Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of
all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at
the time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in
evidence, as it was the executor's duty to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law, can only be proved
in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

"Sec. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody." * * * (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during
the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as
her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence
by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court
of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the
Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see
Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). .

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of
the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, specially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the
national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a
testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court
approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.