COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

MIDDLESEX, SS. PROBATE & FAMILY COURT

Docket # 99P 5181 GM

In Re: )
)
Guardianship ) MOTION TO DISMISS
)
of )
)
Zachary Tringali )

Now comes Leisha Tringali, party to this case, and requests this Court immediately Dismiss this
case for the following reasons:

1. Leisha Tringali has asserted her right to a public defender to defend her against the quasi
criminal complaint filed on March 18, 2010 and the state has been unable to provide a public
defender willing to accept the case after four attempts.

a) On April 7, 2010 Judge Digangi appointed Barbara M, Egan, Esq to represent

and protect Leisha Tringali’s interest in this proceeding.

b) On May 4, 2010 Judge Digangi vacated Barbara M. Egan, Esq. appointment.

c) On May 4, 2010 Judge Digangi appointed Anna Maria Lembo, Esq. an attorney
at law of 371 Moody St. Waltham, Massachusetts 02453 ( 781-894-0022 ) to represent
and protect Leisha Tringali’s interest in this proceeding.

d) On May 13, 2010 Leisha Tringali spoke with Anna Maria Lembo, Esq. Attorney
Lembo stated to Leisha Tringali she would contact the courthouse to decline the
appointment.

2. On July 12, 2010 Leisha Tringali was without representation to protect her interest, through no
fault of her own, and requested a continuance. Said motion was allowed.

3 On July 12, 2010 Judge Digangi appointed Deborah S. Butler, Esq. an attorney at law of 19
Overlook Road, Arlington, Ma. to represent and protect Leisha Tringali’s interest in this
proceeding.

4. Attorney Deborah Butler declined the appointment to represent Leisha Tringali. Attorney
Deborah Butler stated to Leisha Tringali she would contact the courthouse to decline the
appointment.

5. On August 18, 2010 Judge Digangi appointed Maria Ioannou - Begin, Esq. an attorney at law
of118 Union Ave, Framingham, Ma 01702 to represent and protect Leisha Tringali’s interest in
this proceeding.
6. On August 25, 2010 Leisha Tringali spoke with Attorney Maria Ioannou - Begin. Attorney
Maria Ioannou - Begin stated to Leisha Tringali she would contact the courthouse to decline the
appointment.

7. The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is
a fundamental right essential to a fair trial

8. In the landmark case Gideon v. Wainwright1, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
concluded that states have a constitutional obligation under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to provide counsel to indigent defendants. Over the ensuing 40 years, the
right to counsel has been consistently extended to any case that may result in a potential
loss of liberty.

9. Argersinger v. Hamlin ( 1972 ) and Scott v. Illinois ( 1979 ) expanded the right further,
guaranteeing counsel in any charge resulting in a sentence of actual imprisonment.

10. As stated in Brewer v Williams, 430 U.S. 387, the rights granted by the sixth and the
fourteenth Amendment “mean at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him, whether by formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, or arraignment” 430 U.S. at 398. Brewer goes on to conclude
that once adversary proceeding have begun against defendant, he has the right to leagal
representation when the government interrogates him. 430 U.S. at 401. Citing Massiah v. United
States 377 U.S. 201.

11. The order dated April 1, 2008 by Judge Judith Nelson Dilday is unconstitutional on its
face and denied due process to Leisha Tringali making it a likely a void (not voidable)
order which has no force or effect whatsoever as does any order that denies real “Due
Process” as defined by the U.S. Constitution, not this 14th Amendment Administrative
Court. The defendant has not, and will not, waive any rights afforded to her by the U.S.
Constitution and Massachusetts Constitution and appears here under duress and threat of
jail, not because she believes this court has proper authority to enforce the order in
question.

12. The state presented no state compelling interest to override a fundamental

constitutional right protected by the first amendment of free speech. Any such order
which interferes with a constitutional right requires “strict scrutiny” and all protection,
yet not even basic due process was performed. This is a civil right violation which places
all involved under the classification of “acting under color of law” and personally liable,
not acting in any official capacity which would have some immunity.

13. The defense provides no evidence that the defendant posted the alleged internet
references and not one of more third parties.

14. The plaintiff provides no information on when the evidence was released and to
whom, therefore it is just as likely it was released before the unlawful gag order was in
effect. Without such evidence linking the defendant directly to the Internet postings even
the hurdle required for a criminal show cause hearing is not met and the state is required
to dismiss for lack of evidence.

Signed under pains and penalties of perjury

____________________________________________________

Leisha Tringali
11 Indian Valley Road
Pelham, New Hampshire 03076
(603) 893-9333

Date: August 31, 2010

 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

MIDDLESEX, SS. PROBATE & FAMILY COURT

Docket # 99P 5181 GM

In Re: )
)
Guardianship ) MEMORANDUM OF LAW
)
of )
)
Zachary Tringali )

1. State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect
persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. Gross v. State of Illinois,
312 F 2d 257; (1963).

2. Where a fundamental right is implicated, the State of Massachusetts must provide

expressly written mandatory due process procedures and use the least restrictive
means of intrusion to achieve an optimal outcome. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).

3. No statutory scheme contains a constitutionally compliant evidentiary standard.

"Clear and convincing" evidence (of parental unsuitability) is the highest
evidentiary standard in civil law that meets constitutional scrutiny pursuant to
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

4. Where a state law impinges upon a fundamental right secured by the U.S.
Constitution it is presumptively unconstitutional. Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).

5. Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular

emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. 28
USCA § 2411; Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App
MN, (1972).

6. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving any person of “life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.” The Court has long recognized
that the Due Process Clause “guarantees more than fair process.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). It also includes a substantive component
that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). Any denial of Due Process must be tested by the
“totality of the facts” because a lack of Due Process may “constitute a denial of
 fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice…” Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 26 (1964) (quoting from Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-
462 (1942) where it was noted that any violation of any of the first Nine
Amendments to the Constitution could also constitute a violation of Due Process).
"[T]he court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect
and a hand to prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect
methods. constitutional provisions for the security of person and property are to
be liberally construed, and ‘it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 , 6 S. Ct. 524, 535 (29 L. Ed.
746); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 304, 41 S. Ct. 261, supra." (as cited
from Byars v. U.S., 273 US 28, 32). And it is further established that any law
impinging on an individual’s fundamental rights is subject to strict scrutiny (San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). “In order to withstand
strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least
restrictive means available.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). And by fiat,
any judge interpreting, presiding, or sitting in judgment of any custody case under
the law must apply this same standard. Justice Stevens in Troxel comments on
the appropriate standard of review stating:
“The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter
recognize such a [parental constitutional] right, but curiously none of them
articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict
scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”

Signed under pains and penalties of pergury

____________________________________________________

Leisha Tringali
11 Indian Valley Road
Pelham, New Hampshire 03076
(603) 893-9333