CHAVEZ VS JBC
What is the effect of the Court's finding that
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an
eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one
full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of
the controversy is the phrase “a representative
of Congress.” It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of
choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution speaks of “a representative
from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from
the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members
unconstitutional?
3.
the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?
Held:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is
subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of
an act by a co-equal branch of government is put
in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’
contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the
post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
“personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can
come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members
of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts
all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of
the very process of nominations to the positions
in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post,
but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted
provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first
paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the
Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the
second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or
special members of the JBC composed of the
Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative
from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it
becomes apparent that the word “Congress”
used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may
be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying
reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or among any
of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting
process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which
the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide
for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd
composition is the best means to break a voting
deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the
bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution should be read as including both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. They
theorize that it was so worded because at the
time the said provision was being drafted, the
Framers initially intended a unicameral form of
Congress. Then, when the Constitutional
Commission eventually adopted a bicameral
form of Congress, the Framers, through
oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8
of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as
a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws,
the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers.
An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in
the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings
of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not
a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This
rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the
exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality
in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.
PEOPLE VS LACSON
FACTS:
Respondent and his co-accused were charged
with multiple murder for the shooting and killing
of eleven persons who were claimed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The said cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his motion
for judicial determination of probable cause and
for examination of witnesses.
Respondent asserts that the new rule under
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively
since there is no substantive right of the State
that may be impaired by its application to the
criminal cases in question.
According to the respondent, penal laws, either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively
applied so long as they favor the accused. He
asserts that the two-year period commenced to
run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years
thereafter was more than reasonable
opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural laws may be applied
retroactively.
RULING:
The Court agrees with the respondent that
procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides
or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished.
In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that
as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held
that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on
the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure.
*****Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall
not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice
to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived.
With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived.
Issues:
whether the 2-year period to revive it has
already lapse... whether there is any...
justification for the filing of the cases beyond the
2-year period
Ruling:
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners
that the time-bar of two years under the new
rule should not be applied retroactively against
the State.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to
apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-
year period commenced to run on March 31,
1999 when the public prosecutor received his
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with
the... intendment of the new rule. Instead of
giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less
than two years to do so.
If the Court applied the new time-bar
retroactively, the State would have only one year
and three months or until March 31, 2001 within
which to revive these criminal cases.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for
the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-
bar therein provided merely to benefit the
accused. For to do so would cause an
"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely
affect the administration of justice in general
and of criminal laws in particular.
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
Principles:
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v.
Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court
catalogued the factors in determining whether a
new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High
Court should be given retrospective or
prospective effect:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice
of a retroactive application of the new
standards."
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. CHRISTOPHER
KORUGA
G.R. No. 166199 - APRIL 24, 2009
FACTS
• BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo
received an anonymous letter requesting the
deportation of respondent as an undesirable
alien, for having been found guilty for attempted
possession of cocaine under the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act in the State of
Washington.
• Koruga was arrested and charged before
the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of
Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended, declaring him an
undesirable alien or public burden.
• BOC ordered the deportation of
respondent, the DOJ denied Koruga’s appeal.
The CA reversed the decision stating that there
was no valid and legal ground for the
deportation of respondent since there was no
violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because:
o Respondent was not convicted or
sentenced for a violation of the law on
prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed
the case.
o That even if respondent was convicted
and sentenced for the alleged offense, his
deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper,
since the prohibited drugs law referred to
therein refers not to a foreign drugs law but to
the Philippine drugs law. (IMPORTANT)
ISSUE
WON there is a valid and legal ground for the
deportation of Koruga? YES.
HELD
• The Supreme Court ruled against
Koruga.
• Respondent was charged with violation
of Section 37(a) (4) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended.
• Respondent contends that the use of the
definite article “the” immediately preceding the
phrase “law on prohibited drugs” means that the
ONLY law covered is the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. (And not other drug laws, like the
Washington law in this case.)
• Koruga is incorrect. If his interpretation
of the law is allowed, it would create a situation
where only aliens convicted of Philippine
prohibited drugs law would be deported, while
aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws
would be allowed entry in the country.
• Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be
given a reasonable interpretation, not one which
defeats the very purpose for which the law was
passed.
• Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes
no distinction between a foreign prohibited
drugs law and the Philippine prohibited drugs
law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
• Thus, Section 37(a)(4) should apply to
those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws,
whether local or foreign.
PETITION GRANTED.
Deportation; power. The settled rule is that the
entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely
a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege
is not absolute or permanent and may be
revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or
deported from the Philippines only on grounds
and in the manner provided for by the
Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended, and administrative issuances
pursuant thereto.
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry
in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be
admitted into the country by the simple passage
of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has
already physically gained entry in the country,
but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid
of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime
after it is found that he was not lawfully
admissible at the time of his entry. Every
sovereign power has the inherent power to
exclude aliens from its territory upon such
grounds as it may deem proper for its self-
preservation or public interest. The power to
deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and the
domestic tranquility of the people. The Secretary
of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No.
166199, April 24, 2009.
Adasa v. Abalos
Feb. 19, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Facts: Respondent alleged that petitioner,
through deceit, received and encashed 2 checks
issued in the name of respondent without his
knowledge and consent and that despite
repeated demands by the respondent, petitioner
failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the
checks.
Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that
she received and encashed the 2 checks. Then
she alleged in a Supplemental affidavit claiming
that it was instead Bebie Correa who received
the 2 checks, but that Correa had already left the
country.
On April 2001, the City Prosecutor of Iligan
ordered the filing of 2 separate Informations for
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Document by a Private Individual. Consequently,
2 separate criminal cases were filed against
petitioner. This instant petition concerns only
one of these criminal cases (Criminal Case No.
8782).
The trial court then issued an order directing the
Office of the City Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation. Afterwards, they issued a
resolution affirming the finding of probable
cause against petitioner.
During her arraignment, petitioner entered an
unconditional plea of not guilty. The, she filed a
Petition for Review before the DOJ, with regard
to the findings of the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution and
directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to
withdraw the Information for Estafa against
petitioner. Said Officed filed a “Motion to
Withdraw Information”.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
arguing that “DOJ should have dismissed
outright the petition for review since Sec. 7 of
DOJ Circular NO. 70 mandates that when an
accused has already been arraigned and the
aggrieved party files a petition for review before
the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and
should not take cognizance of the petition, or
even give due course thereto, but instead deny
it outright.”
On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted petitioner’s
“Motion to Withdraw Information” and
dismissed Criminal Case No. 8782. No action was
taken by respondent regarding this.
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals regarding the DOJ
resolution. CA granted the petition and reversed
the resolution of the DOJ. CA ruled that “since
petitioner was arraigned before she filed the
petition for review with the DOJ, it was
imperative for the DOJ to dismiss such petition,”
that “when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she
was deemed to have waived her right to
reinvestigation and right o question any
irregularity that surrounds it,” and that “the
order of the trial court dismissing the case
pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ
did not render the petition moot and academic.”
Since the trial court’s order rested solely on the
resolutions, it is void since it violated the rules
which enjoins the trial court to assess the
evidence presented before it in a motion to
dismiss and not to rely solely on the prosecutor’s
averment that the Secretary of Justice had
recommended the dismissal.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, on
the grounds that 1) the language of Sec. 7 and 12
of Circular No. 70 is permissive and directory
such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain
an appeal despite the fact that the accused had
been arraigned; and that the contemporaneous
construction by the Secretary of Justice be given
great weight and respect.
CA stood by its decision, construing Sec. 7 side by
side with Sec. 12 and attempted to reconcile
them. It stated that the word “shall not” in par.
2, sentence 1 of Sec. 7 denotes a positive
prohibition. It renders the provision mandatory,
meaning that the Secretary of Justice had no
other course of action but to deny or dismiss a
petition before him when arraignment of an
accused had already taken place prior to the
filing of the petition for review. Sec. 12, which
read that “the Secretary may reverse, affirm or
modify the appealed resolution”, should be read
together with Sec. 7. Together, they meant that
when an accused was already arraigned when
the aggrieved party files a petition for review,
the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not
take cognizance of the petition, or even give due
course thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it
outright.”CA added that “may” in Sec. 12 should
be read as “shall” or “must” since such
construction is necessary to give effect to the
apparent intention of the rule.
As to the other grounds presented by petitioner,
CA found them to be erroneous/without
merit/without evidence.
Petitioner remained unconvinced and thus filed
this current petition.
Issue: Can the DOJ give due course to an appeal
or petition for review despite its having been
filed after the accused had already been
arraigned?
Held: NO. Petition denied. Decision of the CA is
affirmed.
Reasoning:
1) Petitioner contends that yes, DOJ can
give due course to an appeal despite its having
been filed after the accused had already been
arraigned. Petitioner relied on statements from
other cases, Crespo v. Mogul, and Roberts v. CA,
and Marcelo v. CA, all of which basically stated
that it was still within the discretion of the DOJ
to decide what to do with petitions presented to
it, regardless of whether it was done before or
after an arraignment.
- The Court is unconvinced by this
argument. It states that the cases cited aren’t
really talking about the same issue as the current
case and that the given circumstances aren’t the
same.
2) Petitioner asserts that the CA
interpretation of the DOJ Circular violated 3
basic rules of statutory construction. 1) That the
provision that appears last in the order of
position in the rule or regular must prevail, 2)
that contemporaneous construction of a statute
or regulation by the officers who enforce it
should be given great weight, 3) that the word
“shall” had been construed as a permissive, and
not a mandatory language (from Agpalo’s
Statutory Construction).
- Court cites the rule that “when a statute officers charged with the enforcement of the
or rules is clear and unambiguous, interpretation rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled
need not be resorted to”. Since Sec. 7 clearly and to great weight by the court in the latter’s
categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright construction of such rules and regulations. That
an appeal or a petition for review filed after does not, however, make such a construction
arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessarily controlling or binding. Equally settled
necessary. is the rule that courts may disregard
- Court states that Petitioner’s reliance on contemporaneous construction in instances
the aforementioned 1st violated principle is not where the law or rule construed possesses no
applicable because there is no irreconcilable ambiguity, where the construction is clearly
conflict between Sec. 7 and Sec. 12 of the DOJ erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary
Circular No. 70. exists, and where the court has previously given
o Sec. 7 states that “If an information is the statute a different interpretation.” Also that
filed in court pursuant to the appealed “If a contemporaneous construction is found to
resolution, the petition shall not be given due be erroneous, the same must be declared null
course if the accused had already been and void.”
arraigned.” 4) Petitioner contends that Sec. 12 is
o Sec. 12 states that “He (Secretary of permissive and thus the mandate in Sec. 7 is a
Justice) may, motu proprio or upon motion, transformed into a matter within the discretion
dismiss the petition for review on any of the ff. of the DOJ. He cites a passage from Agpalo’s
grounds: Statutory Construction which did not use “shall”
e) That the accused had already been arraigned as mandatory.
when the appeal was taken. - However, the cited passage was
- Sec. 7 pertains to the action that the DOJ connected to certain conditions (subject to
must take, while Sec. 12 enumerates the options availability, etc). No such conditions are found in
the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a Sec. 7 and hence, “shall” remains mandatory.
petition for review or of an appeal - CA reasoning: “If the intent of the Dept.
- Sec. 7 specifically applies to a situation Circular No. 70
on what the DOJ must do when confronted with
an appeal or a petition for review that is either
clearly without merit, manifestly intended to
delay, or filed after an accused has already been
arraigned.
- Sec. 12 applies generally to the
disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the
DOJ may reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the
appealed resolution. The grounds are provided
for in Sec. 12 as to the dismissal of an appeal.
- The DOJ, noting that the arraignment of
an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or
petition is a ground for dismissal under Sec. 12,
must go back to Sec. 7 and act as mandated
therein. Thus, it must not give due course to, and
must necessarily dismiss the appeal.
3) Petitioner relies on the principle of
contemporaneous construction
- However, Court affirmed CA reasoning
that “contemporaneous construction by the