User Name: Emmanuel Ortega

Date and Time: Tuesday, August 20, 2019 7:30:00 PM PDT

Job Number: 95455030

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1. STATE v. RAILROAD, 91 Tenn. 445

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Search Terms: 19 S.W. 229
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STATE v. RAILROAD
Supreme Court of Tennessee, Jackson
April, 1892, Decided
No Number in Original

Reporter
91 Tenn. 445 *; 19 S.W. 229 **; 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 12 ***; 7 Pickle 445

STATE v. RAILROAD.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Prior History: [***1] Appeal in error from Circuit Court
of Gibson County. J. R. BOND, J.

Disposition: Judgment Affirmed.

Core Terms Torts > Transportation Torts > Rail

Transportation > General Overview
obstruction, train, public road, indictment, corporations,
Business & Corporate
nuisance, Railway, minutes, travel
Compliance > ... > Transportation Law > Rail
Transportation > State & Local Regulation
Case Summary
HN1[ ] That railway corporations are liable to
indictment for obstructing a public highway has been
Procedural Posture
long settled. Being a corporation, it necessarily acts only
Defendant appealed a judgment of the Circuit Court of
through its agents. If the obstruction is the act of its
Gibson County (Tennessee), which convicted it of a
agent, it is the act of the corporation; provided the agent
public nuisance and assessed a fine.
did the act in the course and scope of his duty as an
agent. It is immaterial that the agent was, by the rules of
Overview
the company, instructed not to permit such obstruction
A train of defendant's cars was permitted to stand
to continue for a time deemed by the corporation to be
across a public county road for 20 to 30 minutes,
unreasonable. If such agent disobeys the reasonable
thereby impeding the use of the road by the public. The
requirement of the corporation, it becomes liable for the
railroad was convicted of a public nuisance. Under
nuisance, because the agent was within the scope of his
defendant's rules and regulations, its employes in
duty in operating the train and in stopping it across a
charge of its trains were prohibited from permitting trains
public road. This principle is necessary to be enforced in
to stand across a public road in such manner as to
regard to acts of misfeasance by corporations of this
obstruct travel for more than five minutes. The court
character.
held that defendant, being a corporation, necessarily
acted only through its agents and that if the obstruction
was the act of its agent, it was the act of the corporation, Headnotes/Summary
so long as the agent acted in the course and scope of
his duty as an agent. Finding no evidence that the
Headnotes
employees acted outside the scope of their duty as
agents, the court held that the judgment of the circuit
1. RAILROADS. Indictable for obstructing highwayI.
court was proper.
Doctrine re-affirmed that railroad corporations are liable
Outcome
to indictment for obstructing the public roads.
The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
Case cited and approved: Railroad v.I State, 3 Head,

Emmanuel Ortega
 Page 2 of 2
91 Tenn. 445, *445; 19 S.W. 229, **229; 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 12, ***1

523.
2. SAME. Same. DefenseI.
A railroad corporation, indicted for obstructing a public
road by permitting its train to stand across the road for
an unreasonable length of time, cannot defend itself by
showing that its servants engaged in the operation of
trains were forbidden by its general rules and
regulations to permit trains to remain across public
roads for an unreasonable time. For such acts of its
servants, done within the scope of their duty, the
corporation, though forbidding the acts, is criminally
responsible.
Counsel: Attorney-general PICKLE and M. B.
GILMORE for State.
W. J. MCFARLAND and MCCORRY & BOND for
Railroad.
Judges: LURTON, J.
act of the corporation; provided the agent did the act in
the course and scope of his duty as an agent. It is
immaterial that the agent was, by the rules of the
company, instructed not to permit such obstruction to
continue for a time deemed by the corporation to be
unreasonable. [*447] If such agent disobeys the
reasonable requirement of the corporation, it becomes
liable for the nuisance, because the agent was within
the scope of his duty in operating the train and in
stopping it across a public road. This principle is
necessary to be enforced in regard to acts of
misfeasance by corporations of this character.
Otherwise, the public would be required to look alone
[**230] to subordinates, in general unknown and
irresponsible. 2 Woods Railway Law, pp. 1383, 1384,
and authorities cited.
Affirm the judgment.
End of Document

Opinion by: LURTON

Opinion

[**229] [*446] LURTON, J. A train of cars was

permitted to stand across a public county road for an
unreasonable length of time, thereby impeding the use
of the road by the traveling public. The corporation was
indicted and found guilty of a public nuisance, and fined
in the sum of fifty dollars. Upon the trial it was admitted
by the State that, under the rules and regulations of the
company, its employes in charge of its trains were
prohibited from permitting trains to stand across a public
road in such manner as to obstruct travel for more than
five minutes. In the instance relied upon by the State,
the train had been permitted to stand across a public
road for from twenty to thirty minutes.

The Circuit Judge instructed the jury that the fact that
this obstruction was for a longer time than permitted by
its rules and instructions, was no defense against the
indictment. This is assigned as error.

HN1[ ] That railway corporations are liable to

indictment [***2] for obstructing a public highway has
been long settled. L. & N. R. R. Co.I v. The StateI, 3
Head 523.

Being a corporation, it necessarily acts only through its

agents. If the obstruction is the act of its agent, it is the

Emmanuel Ortega