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EN BANC Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:
vs. belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to
Leyte, respondent. deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
MAKASIAR, J: Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the

respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge." 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.

1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene 3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half

Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus: the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the

estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene 5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one- Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal

partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to shares;

Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be

Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita 6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions

Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant. Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,

Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of shares, provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong

things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary

Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above

with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be

deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of the approved.

deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the

Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his second parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties (SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. (SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first

the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this

divided equally among his children by his two marriages. claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C]. Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the

respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant

Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads: 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked approving the above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to

Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in

preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are

Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela convenience is quoted hereunder in full: directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and

Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were

marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the

Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) the following project of partition: delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project

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of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and

effectuate the said Project of Partition. properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of

violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

SO ORDERED. paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963. Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary

EXH. B. Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive

for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by portion of which reads as follows:

to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly

adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U). advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by (1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has

one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.). jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project

the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the

adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a partition;

Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of (2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of (3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge

subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V). the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, Elias B. Asuncion,

the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 (a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in damages;

Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for

2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he exemplary damages;

who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes (c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

city of Tacloban (Exh. 12). of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated. (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR

with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —

S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al.,

taxation purposes (Exh. F). defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment (1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the

of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of

respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.

Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the

the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,

Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —

Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31,

The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R.

Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O.
Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378- ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Reyes.

385, rec.]. Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and

respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases

dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus (1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

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earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely,

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.] Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the

decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife

Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971. Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the

partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to project of partition, Exh. A.

I 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for

which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that

Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the

violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of

a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Respondent's Memorandum).

Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides: Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the

secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 xxx xxx xxx

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of

or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another: partition. On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record

showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in

xxx xxx xxx While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator

an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the

and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge

property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within same, however, is of no moment. Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this

prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in

with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We

which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied]. he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:

dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the longer subject of litigation. 1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of

property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition

have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by

the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion

property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,

Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]). long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders. That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B

and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear

portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that

June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead

within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition,

the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's New Civil Code. Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following
order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 documents:

approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E

1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders. to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was 1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the

only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963,

directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

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(Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article

November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D); 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which xxx xxx xxx

was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which 5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce

Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one- requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of in a determinate territory.

fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the

vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in

having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it,

Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship

3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices

of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e). transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the and judges.

time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the

project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the

October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43

1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional

Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public

after the preparation of the project of partition. actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes

that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one- from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence,

fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which political in essence.

because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his

the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of

the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de

share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines

adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on

Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot rec.). December 1, 1888.

1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola

sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was II Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from

wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of

A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is

during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether

sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,

deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

3010 relative to the project of partition. having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by

properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another,

Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their
the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties: nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease

when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence 1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public

there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of

of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.). municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of

are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14).

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However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code

constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within

conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge

war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his

U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of

Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

said: Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly

becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil

of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be

former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without

the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall

their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]). Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the

regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business

altered by the newly- created power of the State. It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the

undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not

"It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. " the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the

corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A.

aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section

from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section

Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,

and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967. undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the

H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as

Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that: there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

or having interest in any lawful business.

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service,

corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon

fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its

xxx xxx xxx other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to

permission of the district judge concerned. conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from

official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the

having any interest. upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of

nature. the Judiciary.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because

there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official

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It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that

may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that

office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of

or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1),

one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of

Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did

against civil service officers and employees. his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ... not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned.

There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his

employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his

Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor

to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no said Dominador Tan.

Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the

Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as

the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and

1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or

considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30,

the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself

of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that

grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency. Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor

withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the court litigation

Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the

decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative III Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land

cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private

except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,

separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,

and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized

and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are

service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF

by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section follows: APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE

16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent SO ORDERED.

jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and

710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]). publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K. Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and
a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor"

Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of

Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been

Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as

Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that: an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the

words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but

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EN BANC To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation, petitioner went
G.R. No. L-19272 January 25, 1967 to the Court of First Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for (2) The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices and their assistants
JAIME HERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant, preliminary injunction.3 The decision dated October 13, 1961, reached upon a shall not, during their continuance engage in the practice of any profession, or
vs. stipulation of facts, dismissed the petition, with costs. intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control of any private which
DELFIN ALBANO, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., City Fiscal of Manila in any way may be affected by the function of their office; nor shall they directly or
and CARLOS C. GONZALES, Second Assistant City Fiscal of Mania, Petitioner appealed. indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the Government, or any
respondents-appellees. subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for petitioner-appellant. 1. Stripped of inconsequential issues, the forefront question thrust upon us is
City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal E. S. Arguelles whether the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained from Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of this
for and in their own behalf. proceeding with the investigation of the charges levelled against petitioner. constitutional precept, i.e., a fine of not than P5,000 or imprisonment of not more
Valera Law Office for respondent-appellee Albano. than 2 years, or both.
SANCHEZ, J.: By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are

This case has its roots in a complaint lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal of empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all

Manila, by respondent Delfin Albano, quondam Congressman for the lone district Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the

of Isabela, against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then the Secretary of Finance and criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate postulates the other municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the

Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank — for violation of obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly and file the case of as essential ingredients thereof took place."9 This principle is fundamental. 10 Thus,

Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code, Commonwealth Act 6261 or Republic Act speedily. Public interest — the protection of society — so demands. Agreeably to where an offense is wholly committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court

265.2 The complaint revolves around petitioner's alleged shareholdings in the the foregoing, a rule — now of long standing and frequent application — was operates, said court is powerless to try the case. For, "the rule is that one cannot

University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it

and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations obtained prohibition or injunction.4 Really, if at every turn investigation of a crime will be was committed." 11

dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice will meet with an

petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof. The charges involved were undue setback.5 Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants — as such — may not

docketed in the City Fiscal's Office, as — tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in hollow sound rather than as a part and investigate a crime committed within the exclusive confines of, say, Camarines

parcel of the machinery of criminal justice. Norte. This proposition offers no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting

I.S. No. 11379 — re petitioner's holdings in Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres; officers would then be overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, in

I.S. No. 11380 — re petitioner's holdings in the University of Nueva Caceres; We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of a the process, step on the shoes of those who, by statute, are empowered and

I.S. No. 11381 — re petitioner's holdings in the Bicol Electric Co.; prosecutor may not be shackled — under all circumstances. The rule is not an obligated to perform that task. They cannot unlawfully encroach upon powers and

I.S. No. 11382 — re petitioner's holdings in the University of the East; and invariable one. Extreme cases may, and actually do, exist where relief in equity prerogatives of the Fiscals of the province aforesaid.

I.S. No. 11383 — re petitioner's holdings in the DMG, Inc. may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is

necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the constitutional

At the joint investigation of the foregoing charges before respondent Carlos C. strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid violation charged. His claim is that — except for his holdings in Manila's University

Gonzales, the investigating Fiscal, complainant moved to exclude therefrom the multiplicity of actions;6 (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; 7 of the East — the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him. His reason is

alleged violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code because the applicability and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in

of this statute was in issue of Solidum, et al. vs. Hernandez, L-16570, at the time "held invalid."8 corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of

pending before this Court, but which had since been resolved by us — February Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG Inc.); and

28, 1963 — adversely to Hernandez. Fiscal Gonzales granted the motion. With the foregoing guidelines, we come to grips with the legal problems of that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares."

whether —

Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the averment In effect, petitioner asks us to carve out an exception to the rule that said Fiscals

that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, a. Violation of Art. VII, Section 11, Subsection (2) of the Constitution punishable may not be enjoined from conducting the inquiry aforesaid. We would not hesitate
punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of under C.A. 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprise to state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential ingredient thereof

the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of affected by the violation; and was committed outside the boundaries of the City of Manila, petitioner's argument

Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal was denied; reconsideration b. Violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is criminal in nature. should merit serious consideration. For, orderly administration of justice so

thereof failed. demands; multiplicity of criminal actions is to be obviated; the long arm of the law

2. The constitutional prescription allegedly violated, Article VII, Section 11(2), cannot be used in an oppressive or vindictive manner.

reads:

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But let us take a look at the admitted facts of this case. Petitioner himself concedes the deliberations thereon. The minutes of the meeting shall note the withdrawals of others, the provisions of said Act. This grouping of penalties obviously was

that he stands "charged with allegedly having shareholdings in the Bicol Electric the member concerned. intended to present a clearer picture of the liabilities which the Central Bank Act

Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres, DMG Inc., and specifies, and thus avoid confusion. 17

the University of the East, and a that the said corporations purportedly obtained The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that for a violation of Section 13 of the

doll or allocations from the Central Bank thru the Monetary Board during the law aforesaid, Section 15 of the same statute provides "only for a civil sanction." — All else failing, petitioner summons to his aid the Congressional Record on the

incumbency of respondent as presiding officer thereof." 12 "not a criminal sanction." Said Section 15 reads: deliberations on House Bill 1704 (which later became Republic Act 265), to wit:

Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy et al., 221 Pac. 425, 426, SEC. 15. Responsibility. — Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or Mr. Topacio Nueno. On page 6, Section 13 - prohibiting relatives from transacting

thus — employee of the Central Bank who willfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross business. I should like to insert a punishment, a penal clause. On line 11, add the

negligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury following: "Violation of this section is punishable by dismissal and fine of from five

Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are unlike other suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. ... thousand to ten thousand pesos."

classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of stock can only

be exercised or enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of The nonsequitur is at once apparent. For, Section 34 of the same Republic Act The Speaker. What does the Committee say?

business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation, 265, in terms clear and certain and free from the taint of ambiguity, provides the

and this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the corporation itself. penal sanction.13 thus — Mr. Roy. We cannot accept the amendment.

By no stretch can the cited case be taken as germane to the controversial point SEC. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. — Whenever any The Speaker. When we come to the provision with regard to the penalties, the

here. It speaks of property right to shares of stock which can only be enforced in person or entity willfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation gentleman from Manila may propose that amendment, in order that they may be

the corporation's domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are not directed against legally issued by the Monetary Board, the person or persons responsible for such included in the same section.

the corporations. Not mere ownership of or title to shares is involved. Possession violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos and

of prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. As by imprisonment of not more than five years. ... Mr. Topacio Nueno I reserve that amendment later on.

necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department

— Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department and But, petitioner draws attention to the fact that Sections 13 and 15 both fall under xxx xxx xxx

chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the "Article II — The Monetary Board," of Chapter 1. — "Establishment and

corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act Organization of the Central Bank of the Philippines," whereas Section 34 comes Mr. Laurel. May we be informed which of the three offenses mentioned in Sections

officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held under the heading "B. — Department Supervision and Examination" of "Article IV. 32, 33, and 34 is regarded to be the most serious? I am asking this question

his office. — Departments of the Central Bank." From this, petitioner puts forth the claim that because I notice that the penalties imposed are not the same. Which of the three

the penal provisions in Section 34 are "to be restricted to the matters offenses covered by the three sections I have mentioned is the most serious?

Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an encompassed in that topic, that is, the supervision of banking institutions."14 We

essential ingredient there of, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila are unable to join petitioner in this ipse dixit pronouncement. And, for a number of Mr. Roy. Under Section 32, the offenses intended to be punishable are specified. It

under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation reasons. First, because while Section 15 provides for the civil liability "for any loss is in Section 34 where the law is very broad. It provides: 'Whenever any person or

complained of. or injury suffered by the (Central) Bank as a result of such violation," Section 34 entity willfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation legally

prescribes the penalty for the willful violation of "this Act," irrespective of whether issued by the Monetary Board, ....' I think the court will determine the gravity of the

3. The other argument pressed upon us — that a violation of Section 13 of the bank suffered any loss or not. Second, the entire statute is not in piecemeal offense. Mr. Speaker, because there are many provisions of law; and the rules and

Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature — furnishes no better foundation. style — but as a whole. Effort be exerted "to make every part effective, harmonious regulations of the Monetary Board will vary in their importance and in the

sensible." 15 And so construing we find that the one refers to the civil liability at the seriousness of the consequences of the violation. So we will leave to the Court the

Section 13 of Republic Act 265, allegedly violated by petitioner, recites: same time that the other specifies a separate criminal liability. Indeed, it could well determination of the gravity of the offense. That is why the range of penalties

be said that the penal sanction in Section 34 is an "additional incentive toward provided under Section 34 is not more than ten thousand pesos and by

SEC. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. — Whenever any obedience of the mandates of the law." 16 One does not preclude the other. Third, imprisonment of not more than five years. ...
person attending a meeting of the Monetary Board has a personal interest of any We observe that the penal provisions of Republic Act 265 were placed in three

sort in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, or any of his business successive sections thereof, Sections 32, 33 and 34. Section 32 penalizes any Congressional Record, First Congress, Third Session, Vol. 3, pp. 1259, 1281.

associates or any of his relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or owner, agent, manager or other officers in charge of any banking who willfully

second degree of affinity has such an interest, said person may not participate in refuses to file the required reports to have the bank's affairs examined. Section 33 Petitioner notes the failure of Congressman Topacio Nueno to reiterate his

the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting during penalizes the making of a false statement to the Monetary Board. Section 34 proposed amendment to Section 13 by providing therein a penal clause. Paying full

provides for the penalty to be imposed upon any person who violates, among respect to the congressional intent as it may be reflected in the debates,

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nonetheless it seems to us that nothing in the quoted transcript of the to petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was

congressional record may be reasonably deemed as foreclosing criminal action. Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the

That the announced amendment was not submitted, is perfectly understandable. present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

There was no need therefor. For, as Congressman Roy aptly puts it (in the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent

aforesaid record), "Under Section 32 the offenses intended to be punishable are judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First

specified. It is under section 34 where the law is very broad, which simply means grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the

that any person — and this includes the Chairman of the Monetary Board — who Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the

"wilfully violates this Act," shall be punished. which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was

complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was

The respondent Fiscals, indeed justifiably relied or Section 34 in pursuing their preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the instituted.

investigation for a violation Section 13. For Section 15 is not intended to write off justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail

from the said Section 34. To do so is to sanction pointless rigidity in statutory the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence

construction. section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a waiver of his alleged

In the light of the considerations, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution,

Costs against petitioner. So ordered. authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably that is, of the preliminary investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P., Zaldivar and calculated to bring out the truth." Act No. 194, to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon

Castro, JJ., concur. as the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the filed a motion with said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948 complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner, preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he squarely
vs. attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the ground that it
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent. the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for
E. M. Banzali for petitioner. absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with Constitution.
Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent. entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
TUASON, J.: process clause to a fair trial. In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of said section 11 in

of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question was not raised

praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the therein, and we merely construed the provisions on preliminary investigation or

Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and Rule 108. In said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said:

complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength his witnesses to testify anew.

of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting

and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding. Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one who prepared the draft of the

against the petitioner. Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure, and the provisions on preliminary

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court investigation in the draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the

of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur. defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses for

appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the Separate Opinions the prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft,

peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, FERIA, J., dissenting: except the part referring to preliminary investigation which it modified, by

upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the I am sorry to dissent from the decision. suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11 of
complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not

examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the subscribe to the majority decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the

and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the criminal charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-examine the

objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant present witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or

intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace her evidence so that her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the officer conducting the preliminary investigation.

forwarded the case to the court of first instance. manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected

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But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case of Dequito nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to

presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass upon it. and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of the peace courts have confront witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away

discretion to grant a defendant's request to have the witnesses for the prosecution with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due

Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall recalled to testify again in the presence of the defendant and be cross-examined process clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose

have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all by the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the exercise of an the constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding the

courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject.

constitution added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it.

to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not Petition is therefore granted. It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 1 infringes section

enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which PERFECTO, J., dissenting: 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that the rule in question deals with

diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.

laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:

We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108,

It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted, and applied in a like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive

upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the way that will not contravene the constitutional provision guaranteeing to all right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect

prosecuted in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a accused the right "to meet the witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17], Article III.) may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those

substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a person is rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal

not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,

latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of fundamental right to her the defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give

his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is substantive testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and to cross-examine them. rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to

right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method

evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be convicted, he is of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S.,

not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been committed liable to endure the ordeal eloquently depicted in the decision, and the 1026.)

and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and constitutional guarantee protects defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being

not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, finally convicted and punished, but also from the physical, mental and moral As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are

the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or sufferings that may unjustly be visited upon him in any one of the stages of the crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from

moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails. criminal process instituted against him. He must be afforded the opportunities to the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who

have the charges against him quashed, not only at the final hearing, but also at the commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is

This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused preliminary investigation, if by confronting the witnesses for the prosecution he can eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal

outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of convince the court that the charges are groundless. There is no justice in prosecution.

criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged compelling him to undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the preliminary

with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of hearing the case can be terminated in his favor. Otherwise, the preliminary As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which

the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that should not have a place is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on

disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a within the framework of dignified and solemn judicial proceedings. which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is

constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are

Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be granted and so enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is

Constitution. we vote. punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs.

Petition dismissed. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) the entire rules of evidence have been

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several RESOLUTION incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108

cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not March 8, 1949 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it TUASON, J.: embodied in these Rules.

follows that said section 11 diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration.

criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme

therefore is null and void. In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and Saling Court said:

Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional right of an accused to be

confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings;

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Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary

constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and

or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage."

vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to

221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from procedure, for

procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and the distinction is not always well understood. Substantive law is that part of the law

under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to which creates, defines, and regulates rights as opposed to objective or procedural

otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights. What constitutes practice and

constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, procedure in the law is the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced,

Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, "that which regulates the formal steps in an action or judicial proceedings; the

Rep., 620. But it is not well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules course of procedure in courts; the form, manner and order in which proceedings

rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which without regard to their source and discarding old ones. have been, and are accustomed to be had; the form, manner and order of carrying

operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not on and conducting suits or prosecutions in the courts through their various sages

prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who The motion is denied. according to the principles of law and the rules laid down by the respective courts."

may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted 31 Cyc. Law and Procedure, p. 1153; id., 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's

of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur. Law Dictionary; Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the FERIA, J., dissenting:

rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the I dissent. Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the Constitution or in any

accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., The motion for reconsideration must be granted. branch of the law, civil, criminal, administrative or procedural law. In our old Code

380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut. According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be confronted with and of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there are provisions which create,

vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in a preliminary investigation define and regulate substantive rights, and many of those provisions such as those

criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. granted by law or provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as amended, in force relating to guardianship, adoption, evidence and many others are incorporated in

S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570. prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court, is not a substantive right but a mere the Rules of Court for the sake of convenience and not because this Court is

matter of procedure, and therefore this Court can suppress it in section 11, Rule empowered to promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of Criminal

Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an 108, of the Rules of Court, for the following reasons: Procedure General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the right to commence

accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had a criminal action or file a complaint against the offender and to intervene in the

given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is criminal prosecution against him, and grants the defendant in the Court of First

constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As a rule of evidence, section 11 Instance (except in the City of Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary

is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . . "The entire rules of evidence have been investigation including his rights during said investigation, and the rights at the trial,

this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can incorporated into the Rules of Court." And therefore "we can not tear down section which are now reproduced or incorporated in Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the

not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition. 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole Code of Rules of Court, except the rights now in question. And all these, and others not

evidence embodied in these rules." necessary for us to mention, are obviously substantive rights.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine

witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due (1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary investigation is eminently

unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere and essentially remedial is not correct. Undoubtedly the majority means to say

both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within procedural, in line with the conclusion in the resolution, because remedial law is

proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, the constitutional prohibition." one thing, and procedural law is another. Obviously they are different branches of

he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the law. "Remedial statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an injury as

the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is distinguished from a penal statute. A statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a
to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree" . . . wrong where he had none or a different one before. . . . Remedial statutes are

It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights common law, as arise either from the general imperfections of all human law, from

definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. . . . change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determination

89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular "This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever."

case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to (Black's Law Dictionary, third edition, pp. 1525, 1526.)

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with the commission of a crime shall be deprived of his liberty or subjected to trial arrest after the preliminary investigation, would have to be held for trial and wait for

It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to right of without prior preliminary investigation (provided for in General orders, No. 58, as a considerable period of time until the case is tried and acquitted after trial by the

defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore is also procedural." In amended) that shall show that there are reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, Courts of First Instance in provinces on account of the admission of such evidence

the first place, the provisions of said section to the effect that "the defendant, after there can be no doubt that the accused who is deprived of his liberty, tried and in the preliminary investigation, evidence not admissible at the trial.

the arrest and his delivery to the court has the right to be informed of the complaint sentenced without the proper preliminary investigation having been made in his

or information filed against him, and also to be informed of the testimony and regard, is convicted without the process of law," (United States vs. Banzuela, 31 Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the necessary

evidence presented against him, and may be allowed to testify and present Phil., 564). proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or modified in accordance with

witnesses or evidence for him if he so desires," are not rules of evidence; and in my dissenting opinion.

the second place, it is evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all, are The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, quoted in the

substantive laws that define, create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules resolution, has no application to the present case, for the question involved therein PERFECTO, J.:

of evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing out of was the power of Congress to alter the rules of evidence and procedure without We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion for

reasoning, experience and common sense of lawyers and courts." (State vs. violating the constitutional precept that prohibits the passing of ex post facto law, reconsideration should be granted.

Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true that weighing of evidence and the rules of while the question herein involved is the power of the Supreme Court to Footnotes

practice with respect thereto form part of the law of procedure, but the classification promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure, which diminish the TUASON, J.:

of proofs is sometime determined by the substantive law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 substantive right of a defendant, expressly prohibited by the same provision of the 1 Rights of defendant after arrest. — After the arrest of the defendant and

Phil., 170, 176.) How can the law on judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris Constitution that confers upon this Court the power to promulgate said rules. his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed

tantum presumption, hearsay and best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and

interpretation of documents, competency of a person to testify as a witness be (3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that "the distinction evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present

considered procedural? between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact definition;" indeed witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of

"the difference is somewhat a question of degree," (Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be

Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down section 11 of 487), is immaterial, because, as we have already said in refuting the majority's first taken in writing and subscribed by him.

Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of reason, remedy and procedure are two completely different things. 2 The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning

evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently wrong, not only for the reason just pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of

stated, but because our contention that the defendant can not be deprived of his As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from procedural law and law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not

right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witness of the prosecution is a practice. But even assuming arguendo that it is difficult to draw the line in any diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,

preliminary investigation under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear particular case beyond which the power of the court over procedure can not pass practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules

down said section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so construed as to without touching upon the substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.

be valid and effective, that is, that if the defendant asks the court to recall the in that case would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure which The National Assembly shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the

witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in his presence, and to many increase, diminish or modify substantive right in order to avoid violating the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the

allow the former to cross-examine the latter, the court or officer making the constitutional prohibition above referred to. Because as this Supreme Court is not practice of law in the Philippines.

preliminary investigation is under obligation to grant the request. But if the empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but

defendant does not so ask the court, he should be considered as waiving his right only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which "shall not

to be confronted with and cross-examine the witness against him. diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this Court can not step on them in

making the rules, and the Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect

(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that the preliminary such incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in any manner.

investigation as provided for in the General Orders, No. 58, as amended, is not an

essential part of due process of law, because "due process of law" is not iron clad Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and cross-examine the

in its meaning; its does not necessarily mean a particular procedure. Due process witness against him in a preliminary investigation would affect the accused not in a

of law simply requires a procedure that fully protects the life, liberty and property. limited and unsubstantial but in a harsh and arbitrary manner. The testimony of a
For that reason the investigation to be made by the City Fiscal of the City of Manila witness given in the absence of the defendant and without an opportunity on the

under Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the Administrative Code, before filing an part of the latter to cross-examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be

information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due process of admitted against the defendant in a preliminary investigation that is granted to the

law constitutional requirement (U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Grant and latter as a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions (U. S.

Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is also true that we have already and correctly held vs. Grant and Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused who is innocent and should

that: "The law having explicitly recognized and established that no person charged not be arrested, or if arrested should be released immediately a short time after his

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THIRD DIVISION complainant alleged that it was through the conspiracy of Mallari and the
March 8, 2017 respondent that the crime charged was consummated.13 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the
A.C. No. 11346 Respondent's commission as a notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified
DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence for being a notary public for two (2) years with a stem warning that a repetition of
vs presented was insufficient to establish conspiracy between Mallari and the similar offense shall be dealt with more severe 1y .25
ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS, Respondent respondent, thereby dropping the latter's name from the indictment, the
DECISION complainant remained unfazed and thus, initiated the present petition for In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
REYES, J.: disbarment seeking the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the approved Commissioner Esquivel's report and recommendation with modification,

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr. respondent.14 The complainant claimed that the respondent, by notarizing the to wit:

Basilio Malvar (complainant) against Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros (respondent) for assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land, made it

acts amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of public document, appear that he executed the same when the truth of the matter was he never went RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

violation of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules on Notarial to the office of the respondent for he was in Manila at the time of the alleged APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the

Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor.15 Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this

Resolution as Annex "A", for failure of Respondent to observe due diligence in the

Antecedent Facts On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated performance of her duties and obligations as a Notary Public specifically Rule VL

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Notice of Mandatory Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the respondent's] notarial commission, if

The complainant is the owner of a parcel of lana located .in Barangay Pagudpud, presently commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore, [she] is

San Fernando City, La Union.2 On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a Conference16 requiring both parties to appear before it on November 18, 2014. DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and

Deed of Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari (Mallari) over the said lot for the However, the scheduled mandatory conference was reset to December 2, 201417 SUSPENDED from tile practice of law for six (6) months.27 (Emphasis and italics

amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00). This transaction was where the complainant personally appeared while the respondent was represented in the original)

acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a document by her attorney-in-fact and counsel.18

denominated as Confirmation of Sale.4 The Issues

The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent

The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the consummated the crime of falsification of public document as delineated under Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the

legal tussle between the parties. According to the complainant, an agreement was Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and thus, the presumption of regularity in following acts alleged to have been committed by her:

made between him and Mallari wherein he unde1iook to facilitate the steps in order the notarization of the contested document has been overthrown and cannot work 1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land;

to have the title of the lot transferred under Mallari's name.5 However, without his in her favor.19 He recapped that he never appeared before the respondent to have 2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the complainant; and

knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to withstand the delay in the the subject document notarized.20 The complainant stressed that the respondent 3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.

delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application for made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by notarizing the Application for Certification

Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the of Alienable and Disposable Land in his absence. Ruling of the Court

segregation and titling of the same before the Community Environment and Natural

Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling reason

(DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using the complainant's name and signing narrating that Benny Telles, the complainant and his sons came to her office to to deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

the said application.7 A civil case for collection of sum of money was instituted by have the subject document notarized and that she is certain as to the identity of the

Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aringay, La Union seeking complainant.22 Moreover, she argued that the charges filed against her were all With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court hall not

reimbursement for the expenses she incurred by reason of the transfer and titling part of the complainant's scheme to avoid his obligations to Mallari as the buyer of inquire into the merits of the said criminal case pending adjudication before the

of the property she purchased.8 A compromise agreement9 was forged between his lot.23 MTCC and make a ruling on the matter. Commissioner Esquivel orrectly declined

the parties which failed because two out of the four checks issued by the to resolve the falsification case pending resolution before the regular court to which

complainant were unfunded.10 This prompted Mallari to file a criminal case for Ruling of the IBP jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment roceedings are sui generis as
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks they belong to a class of their own and are distinct from that of civil or criminal

Law, against the complainant before the MTC of Aringay, La Union.11 On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) actions, it is judicious for an administrative body ike IBP-CBD not to pre-empt the

found that the respondent was negligent in the perfonnance of her duties as a course of action of the regular courts in order to avert contradictory findings.28

Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was notary public and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby recommending disciplinary

filed before the Office of the Prosecutor and now pending before the Municipal Trial imposition against her.1avvphi1 The pertinent portion of the Report and The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the

Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 1.12 The Recommendation24 reads: respondent violated several provisions of the Notarial Rules.1âwphi1 The

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complainant insists that the Application for Certification of Alienable and b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, (e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn

Disposable Land was notarized sans his presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register,

which the respondent admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010 forms personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on

part of the subject document. The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her, thus, making the notarial individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification. x x x x (Emphasis ours)

certification essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct

complainant appeared before her and signed the contested document in her Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of documents. In an order of the MTCC where the criminal case for falsification of

presence cannot prevail over the evidence supplied by the complainant pointing the notarization of the contested document on August 18, 2010, the respondent document was pending, Clerk of Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-Andres (Atty. Estigoy-

that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to appear before the remained unjustified in not requiring him to show a competent proof of his Andres) was directed to transmit the original document of the Application for

respondent on the date so alleged that the subject document was notarized. The identification. She could have escaped administrative liability on this score if she Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land which was notarized by the

complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court was able to demonstrate that she personally knows the complainant. On the basis respondent.35 A similar order was issued by the MTCC requiring the DENR for the

patients' record cards showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, of the very definition of a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules, case production of the impugned document.36 The DENR issued a certification that

2010 in De Los Santos Medical Center, E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.30 law echoes that the non-presentation of the affiant's competent proof of despite diligent efforts they could not locate the said document but which they were

identification is permitted if the notary public personally knows the former.33 A certain was received by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon Atty. Estigoy-Andres'

Ajurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount requirements 'jurat' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in certification,38 it was discovered that as per the respondent's notarial register

of the physical presence of the affiant as well as his act of signing the document person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No. 288, Page No. 59,

before the notary public.31 The respondent indeed transgressed Section 2(b) of personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010 does not pertain to the Application for Certification

Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and seal on the competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the of Alienable and Disposable Land but to a notarized document denominated as

notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for Certification of presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners39 executed by Ricardo Sibayan and Cecilia

Alienable and Disposable Land in the absence of the complainant and for failing to as to such instrument or document.34 Flores. Undoubtedly, the document entitled Application for Certification of Alienable

ascertain the identity of the affiant. The thrust of the said provision reads: and Disposable Land nowhere appears in the respondent's notarial register. The

Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the nonobservance of the respondent further exposed herself to administrative culpability when she

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. obligations imposed upon her under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to regretfully offered plain oversight as an excuse for the non-inclusion of the

xxxx wit: challenged document in her notarial register and by stating that it is her office staff

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to who usually fills it up. To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and

the instrument or document- SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. notarized the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but

(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time based from the foregoing, she indubitably failed to record the assailed document in

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and of notarization the following: her notarial book. It is axiomatic that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary (1) the entry number and page number; routinary act. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is

through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (2) the date and time of day of the notarial act; converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of

(3) the type of notarial act; preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution.40 "If the document or

The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the (4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding; instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it

notary public under the law to determine whether the former's signature was (5) the name and address of each principal; therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really

voluntarily affixed.32 Aside from forbidding notarization without the personal (6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made

presence of the affiant, the Notarial Rules demands the submission of competent not personally known to the notary; based on this document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial function of

evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph and signature (7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear contravention of the

which requirement can be dispensed with provided that the notary public person's identity; explicit provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her

personally knows the affiant. Competent evidence of identity under Section 12 of (8) the fee charged for the notarial act; and not somebody else. This likewise violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR

Rule II of the Notarial Rules is defined as follows: (9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular which provides that:
place of business; and

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of (10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task

identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on: relevance. which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

xxxx

a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the

the photograph and signature of the individual; or respondent failed to retain an original copy in her records and to submit the

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duplicate copy of the document to the Clerk of Court. However, in a previous case, notarized document in his notarial register and notarizing a document without the

the Court ruled that the requirement stated under Section 2(h) of Rule VI of the physical presence of the affiant.

Notarial Rules applies only to an instrument acknowledged before the notary public

and not to the present document which contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a distinct Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that their

creature from an acknowledgment."43 It is that part of an affidavit in which the solemn duties which are imbued with public interest are not to be taken lightly, the

notary certifies that before him or her, the document was subscribed and sworn to Court deems it proper to revoke the notarial register of the respondent if still

by the executor; while an acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a existing and to disqualify her from appointment as a notary public for two (2) years.

deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act She is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Contrary to the

or deed.44 Hence, no liability can be ascribed to the respondent relative to such complainant's proposition to have the respondent disbarred, the Court is of the

ground. belief that her acts do not merit such a grave penalty and the sanctions so imposed

suffice. The Court held in an array of cases that "removal from the Bar should not

The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary

Under the circumstances, the respondent should be made liable not only as a suspension or fine - would accomplish the end desired."50

notary public who failed to discharge her duties as such but also as a lawyer who

exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the

The acts committed by the respondent go beyond being mere lapses in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the

fulfilment of her duties under the Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel breach Lawyer's Oath. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and

of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule 9.01, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which provides she is hereby DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of

that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful two (2) years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)

conduct" and the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do no. months effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED that a repetition of the

falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal system being one of their primordial same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized SO ORDERED.

documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in her notarial BIENVENIDO L. REYES

register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized Associate Justice

when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot be veremphasized that notaries public are

urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the Facts: Dr. Malvar claimed that Atty. Baleros, by notarizing an assailed “Application

performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land”, made it appear that he
executed the same when in truth, he never went to the office of the latter since he
of notarized deeds will be undermined .46
was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his
duties as a doctor. Accordingly, Dr. Malvar filed a disbarment complaint against
In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their
Atty. Baleros for acts amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of
duties as notaries public to disciplinary sanction. Failure to enter the notarial acts in
public documents. On the other hand, Atty. Baleros argued that the charges filed
one's notarial register, notarizing a document without the personal presence of the
against her were all part of Dr. Malvar’s scheme to avoid his obligations to the
affiants and the failure to properly identify the person who signed the questioned
buyer of his lot.
document constitute dereliction of a notary public's duties which warrants the

revocation of a lawyer's commission as a notary public.47 Upholding the role of Issue: Whether or not Atty. Baleros should be held administratively liable.

notaries public in deterring illegal or immoral arrangements, the Court in the case
Decision: Yes. Atty. Baleros shall be made liable not only as a notary public who
of Dizon v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.48 prohibited the respondent for a period of two (2)
failed to discharge her duties but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to
years from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing a compromise
the integrity and dignity he owed to the legal profession. Atty. Baleros is ordered:
agreement without the presence of all the parties. In the case of Atty. Benigno T
Bartolome v. Atty. Christopher A. Basilio,49 which factual milieu is similar to the 1. Suspended for six (6) months;

present case, the Court meted out against therein respondent the penalty of
2. Revoked notarial commission;
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification for two (2) years from being

appointed as a notary public and suspension for six (6) months from the practice of 3. Disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years;
law due to various infringement of the Notarial Rules such as failure to record a
4. Warned that repetition would be dealt with more severely

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