G.R. No.

124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ​petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, ​respondents.

Principle the case falls: LOCUS STANDI: TAXPAYERS AND CONCERNED CITIZENS

FACTS:

The petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." Under the deregulated environment, any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil
or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Petitioner’s Argument:

1. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a ​de facto cartel among the
three existing oil companies — Petron, Caltex and Shell — in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondent’s Argument​:

1. Aver that petitioners have no ​locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury
as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180 as taxpayers or concerned citizens.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of Republic Act No. 8180 as
taxpayers or concerned citizens.

HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the locus standi to assail the validity of the R.A. No. 8180. The Supreme
Court brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's ​locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In the instant case, they posed issues
which are significant to the people and which deserved the Court’s forthright resolution. The Court
stressed citing ​Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc​. v​. Tan where the
Court had brushed aside technicalities of procedure and had taken cognizance of the petitions
notwithstanding the objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, considering the
importance to the public of the cases and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.
G.R. No. 200903 July 22, 2014

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC., ​Petitioners,

vs.

JESSIE ROBREDO, ​Respondent

Principle the case falls: Lis Mota

FACTS:

The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279
(RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act, which authorizes evictions and
demolitions under certain circumstances without any court order.

Petitioner’s Argument:

1. Petitioners occupied certain parcels of land in San Juan, Navotas, and QC, which were owned by
their respective city LGUs. The LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition
pursuant to Sec 28 (a) & (b) of RA 7279 to give way to the implementation and construction of
infrastructure projects (city hall, roads, public school) in the areas.

a. Sec 28 (a) & (b) of RA 7279 authorise evictions and demolitions without any court order when: (1)
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places and (2) persons or entities occupy
areas where govt infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

2. On Mar 23, 2012, petitioners directly filed petition for prohibition and mandamus to compel the public
respondents to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to implementing RA
7279. They justified their direct recourse to the SC by averring that:
a. they had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
b. the respondents committed GAD in implementing RA 7279;
c. they stand to be directly injured by the threats of eviction/demolition and in the alternative, the
transcendental importance of the issues clothed them with standing.

3. They also argue that Sec 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of:
a. Art. 3, Sec. 1 (Due Process) because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court
order;
b. Art. 3, Sec. 6 which prohibits impairment of liberty of abode without court order;
c. the right to adequate housing as recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Sec 2 (a) of RA 7279;
d. Art. 13, Sec 10 because the previously conducted evictions/demolitions were conducted in a
violent manner.

4. Respondents’ positions are as follows:

 a. Petition should be dismissed for its serious procedural defects: (1) ignored hierarchy of courts
when they directly filed Rule 65 petition before the SC; (2) incorrectly availed of petition for
prohibition and mandamus; (3) failed to state particular GAD committed; (4) no justiciable
controversy as petitioners in Navotas were already evicted; and (5) filed out of time.
b. Art. 13, Sec. 10 allows evictions/demolitions without court order provided that they are done in
accordance with the law and in a just and humane manner. RA 7279 is precisely the law referred
to and was faithfully implemented by the LGU by giving a 30-day notice and holding
consultations.
c. Petitioners’ right to choose their abode is misplaced since they had no vested rights over
properties they do not own.

ISSUE:
WON Sec. 28 (a) & (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Art. 3, Sec. 1 and 6 of the 1987 Constitution

HELD:

No, the resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the lis mota
of the case. The petition must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites that would
warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial review. “It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the
courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present:

(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination;
(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the
constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.

Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action";​ it is rooted in the principle of separation
of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government. This means that the petitioner who claims the
unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the
disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality
should be avoided.Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.”

The Court concludes that the petitioners fail to compellingly show the necessity of examining the
constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution. In an earlier case Magkalas v. NHA, the Court has already ruled on the validity of
evictions/demolitions without any court order. In that case, the court affirmed the validity of Sec. 2 of PD
1472 and held that Caridad Magkalas’ illegal possession of the property should not hinder NHA’s
development of Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project.

a. Furthermore, the Court stated that demolitions/evictions may be validly carried out even without
judicial order in the following instances:
 1. when the property involved is an expropriated property xxx pursuant to Sec. 1 of PD 1315;
2. when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any
homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to Sec. 2 of PD
1472;
3. when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds, pursuant to Sec. 28 (a) of RA 7279;
4. when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented
pursuant to Sec. 28 (b) of RA 7279.

b. The court notes that Art. 3, Sec 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers
shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with the law and in a just and
humane manner. Sec. 28, par. 2 of RA 7279 commands compliance with the following prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders, as summarised below:

1. notice of at least 30 days prior to date of eviction/demolition;

2. adequate consultations on the matter of settlement;
3. presence of local govt officials or representatives during eviction/demolition;
4. proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
5. execution of eviction/demolition only during regular office hours from Mon-Fri and during good weather,
unless affected families consented otherwise;
6. no use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete
materials;
7. proper uniforms for members of PNP who shall occupy first line of law enforcement & observe proper
disturbance control procedures; and
8. adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent.

Thus, the Court held that the petition must necessarily fail.

G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL., respondents.

PRINCIPLE​: ​EFFECT OF DECLARATION AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: MODERN VIEW

​The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the
private respondents. The latter demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on
fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the
basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The
RTC ruled for the private respondents. The CA affirmed said decision. Hence, the instant petition by the
Republic contending that in ​Export Processing Zone Authority (“EPZA”) vs. Dulay, etc. et al., ​the Court
held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby
declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533,
to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives.
The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive,
application.

HELD:

There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute:

“The first is the ​orthodox view​. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is
therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the
parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no
one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is,
in other words, a total nullity.

The second or ​modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if
such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the
law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The
opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede,
revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one
else is bound.

The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that "when the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. . . .”

An otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively
such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive
application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts. ​A judicial declaration of
invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act
occurring prior to such a declaration.

A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the exceptional cases. The fact of
the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the
EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties. The appellate court in this particular
case committed no error in its appealed decision. The instant petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ​petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, ​respondents.

Principle the case falls: PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

FACTS:

The petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." Under the deregulated environment, any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil
or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Petitioner’s Argument:

That R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondent’s Argument​:

Fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180, aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b)
implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential
is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries.

ISSUES:

WON R.A. No. 8180 violates Article XII, Sec.19 on constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

HELD​:

It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not
concur with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute
details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and
the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date
of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable.

Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution.
Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason
for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the
reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19,
Art. XII of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the
only major league players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products
therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the
huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against
prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA
8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this
requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.

The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without
invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.
RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the
offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180.
Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately,
contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. m