The Evolution of Imagination: An Archaeological Perspective

Author(s): Steven Mithen

Source: SubStance, Vol. 30, No. 1/2, Issue 94/95: Special Issue: On the Origin of Fictions:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2001), pp. 28-54
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3685503
Accessed: 06-11-2015 15:01 UTC

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The EvolutionofImagination:
An ArchaeologicalPerspective

StevenMithen

Introduction

The imaginationis one of thosecriticalfacultiesof the human mind

that defies adequate definition.To describe it as "creative,conscious,
thought," is inadequate,becauseeachofthesebuildingblocksremainsfuzzy.
One mightargue that definitionsare unnecessarybecause we have an
intuitiveunderstanding ofthisphenomenon,and can safelyassumethatall
otherpeople (barringthosewithcognitivepathologies)engagein thesame
typesofmentalactivitythatwe considerto be imagination.
A definitionbecomes necessary,however,when we wish to examine
how and when thisremarkableabilityofthehumanmindevolved. While
we cannotdoubtthatall livingmembersofour specieshave a capacityfor
imagination,and hencethisis in some mannerpartofour geneticmakeup,
we can be equallyconfident thatotherspecieslackthiscapacity.AlthoughI
appreciate that some entomologistsand ichthyologistsmaydisagree,neither
insectsnorfisharelikelytopossessimagination, exceptwhenthisis defined
in themostminimalistic terms.
The more problematicspecies are those closely related to humans,
notablythegreatapes. Do chimpanzeesand gorillaspossess imagination?
Ifso,we mustask whethertheircapacityis thesame as ours,as surelythere
mustbe variousgradesortypesofimagination. Ifthegreatape's imagination
it
(if exists) is not identicalto ours, then the human capacitymust have
evolvedduringthecourseofourrecentevolutionary history--duringthe5-
6 million years since the human lineage split from that leading to
chimpanzees.And if "imagination"evolved duringthatperiod,we must
ask whetheritwas presentin all membersoftheHomogenus,or just those
fewspecieswithbrainsthesame size as our own. Perhapsitwas restricted
to ourclosestancestor, and henceabsentfromthebig-brainedNeanderthals.
Perhaps imaginationis indeed unique to H. sapiens.To address these

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 ofImagination
Evolution 29

questionswe need to clarifythetermimagination, even ifa tightdefinition

will always be elusive.
Such evolutionaryquestionsgo to theveryessence of understanding
what it means to be human.Is imaginativethoughtsimplya curiousby-
productofour evolution,orwas itspecifically selectedbecause itincreased
thefitnessofthosewho,throughsomerandomgeneticmutation, weremore
imaginative than others?If the this
latter, need not imply thatthe whole
panorama of human is
imagination explicable in functional terms.Justas
we evolved dextrousfingersformanipulatingobjectssuch as fruitbut can
use themfortypingon computers, so toomaywe putimagination topurposes
thatbear no relationto its originaladaptive function.If indeed one ever
existed;perhapstheimaginationis no morethanan evolutionaryspandrel.
Suchquestionscan onlybe answeredbyexaminingourevolutionary history
and askingwhetherour relativesand ancestorspossessed a capacityfor
imagination.

Types of Imagination

So what is imagination?Perhapsthe mostbasic formof it is simply

envisioningalternativecourses of action: which food to choose in the
supermarket, whichpersonto ask on a date. Answeringsimilarquestions
would have been of considerable reproductivebenefitto our human
ancestors.Hence we can appreciatethatevolved mechanismsforfinding
thoseanswersmayhave been placed withinourmindsby naturalselection
(Barkowetal. 1992).Whensearchingfortheanswerswe are,ineffect,
creating
alternativepossiblefutureworldswithinour heads-what sauce will taste
betteron mypasta,whichpersonwill be morefunat thedisco?

ImaginativeDecision-Making

When we address such questions,we certainlyuse our imaginations.

But thistypeofthinkingmustbe adoptedby a wide varietyofanimals,all
ofwhichneed tofindsufficient, nutritiousfoodand to selectsuitablemates.
Evena ratin a maze mustdecidewhichway togo,and todo so mustconsider
differentcourses of actionat each junction.One mightargue thatthe rat
does this unconsciously,neverbeing aware of alternativefutureworlds.
Perhapsit is onlyhumanswho consciouslyand imaginatively thinkabout
whichfoodwill tastebetteror whichgirlorboy will make a betterpartner.
Butofcoursewe are unable to genuinelyknowthis,and our own decision-

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30 StevenMithen

makingis moreoftenunconscious thanbasedon a consciousweighing of

pros andcons.
Thistypeofimagination appearsas a pre-requisiteforanycomplex
livingbeing-one thatmustrapidlyadapt itsbehaviortoa changingworld.
Whether a parrot,
a porpoiseora professor, creatures
living areconstantly
facedwithchoices.Evaluatingthecostsandbenefitsofthedifferent
courses
of actions requiresimagination-sometimesconscious,frequently
unconscious.

FromImagination
toFantasy

A secondtypeofimagination is quitedifferent,and initially

appears
quiteincompatible withan evolutionary perspective on thehumanmind.
Thisis imagination aboutworldsthatwe canonlyinhabitin ourminds-
worldsinwhichthelaws ofnatureareregularly brokenor simplydo not
exist.Examplesaretheworldscreated inmythology andsciencefiction,the
worldsofsupernatural beings,from Hieronymus Bosch to Salvador Dali.
Theseimaginary worlds,responsible fora vastamountofliterature
andart,areintriguing fromanevolutionary perspective ontwocounts. First,
evolutionary psychology providespersuasive arguments thatour minds have
had manyofthe"rulesofnature"embeddedin thembynaturalselection
(Shepard1987;Cosmidesand Tooby1994).Thesemostlikelyresidein
discrete,content-rich mentalmodules.By"rules"I meansuchbasicthings
as thelawofgravity. Thisisquitelogical;becausesuch"rules"areinflexible,
itmakeslittlesensetospendtimelearning them,and doingso wouldrisk
fatalinjury.Itisfarbetter
tohavesuchrulespre-programmed intothebrain.
Evolutionary psychologistshavemarshalled substantial
evidencetoargue
thatthisis indeedthecase(as summarized inMithen1996).
Butiftheyarecorrect, howis itthathumansareabletoimagine worlds
wheresuchrulesdo notexist?Notonlydo theyhavetheability todo this;
theydelightin theexperience. Andwhyaresuchworldsso easytoenter,
especiallybyyoungchildren withlimited experience oftheworld,whose
minds,onewouldthink, arefarmoredominated bypre-programming? As
weallknow, childrenenjoycartoonsinwhich therulesofnature areflaunted;
themorerulesbrokenthebetter. Whilewatching, theyempathize withthe
charactersas iftheyreallyexisted.Theydo thisevenwhendealingwith
talkinganimalsorsuper-humans-precisely theconfusing entitiesthattheir
brains are supposed to be guarded against.So if the evolutionary
psychologistsare correctand rules of naturereallyhave been pre-

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Evolution
ofImagination 31

programmed intominds,howcansuchrulesbe so easilyandso frequently

forgotten orignored?
Whileitmaybe easytoenteran alternative worldina filmora book,to
dothecreating inthefirst is
place immensely difficult,
requiring aninordinate
amountofimagination. Arthur C. ClarkeandGeorgeLukasarepraisedfor
havingcreatedthefictional worldsof2001andStarWars, whichwe canall
so easilyenter.Imagessuchas Dali's melting clocksin ThePersistence of
Memory can be imitated by lesser artists,but we all acknowledge the
imaginative brilliance ofDaliwhobrought suchvisionsintotheworld.And
whenweturntothesupernatural worldscreated within religious ideologies,
many believethat the in
stories the Bibleand Koran are so remarkable as to
exceedthelimitsofhumanimagination; they must be the word of God.
Thistypeofimagination, whichcreatesmentalworldsin whichthe
earthlyrulesofsocietyandnaturedo notapply,is difficult toexplainfrom
an evolutionary perspective. Yetevenit failsto encompasswhatwe may
intuitivelysensearethemostimpressive worksofthehumanimagination.
In fact,manyoftheseimagined worldsareoflimitedinterest; theyareno
morethanfantasy-momentarily thrillingbutultimately unfulfilling.
Someofthemostimaginative worksofartareprecisely thoseinwhich
therulesofsociety andnaturearenotbroken. ThenovelsofJaneAustenor
thepaintings ofVermeer or Constablewouldfallin thiscategory. These
in
positivelyrevel conforming to societyand nature,yet achieve a
transcendent qualitythatis different fromanything realizedby worksof
fantasy.They are ina different
league from the fantasiesofArthur C. Clarke
orSalvadorDali,whilesuperficially dealing with the the
familiar, ordinary,
theseemingly trivial.JaneAusten'sgreatachievement isherability toplace
herselfand herreadersinsidethemindsofhercharacters, and to see the
worldfrom theirperspective. Thisis,perhaps, thetypeofimagination that
we findmostfulfilling, whether achievedon ourownorthrough theaegis
ofauthorsandartists.
Another prizedelement ofimaginative worksis narrative. Itis indeed
difficult
tothinkofan imaginative workthatdoesnotincludenarrative in
somefashion. Thoseworksofliterature, film, artor oral narrative that "tell
a goodstory" areparticularly praised. Youngchildren from allenvironments
areperhapsthegreatest story-lovers, and appreciation ofnarrative seems
deeplyengrained in the human psyche. Why is thisqualityof the imagination
so highlyvalued?AsAbbott (2000)hasexplained, addressing narrative from
an evolutionary perspectivemaydevelop our understanding how of
narrativeinfluences thenatureofhumanthought.

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32 StevenMithen

The ImaginativeLeap

A case can be made thatthemostimaginativethoughtsor worksare

thosethatcombineelementsofbothother-worldliness and thefamiliar.In
literature,one would obviouslythinkofShakespeare, whose playsallow us
to enterworlds inhabitedby ghostsand magic,but whichwe experience
throughthereactionsof people withthoughtsand feelingssimilarto our
own.
In thevisual arts,I immediately
thinkoftheworkofAnthonyGormley,
thecontemporary Britishsculptorwhose worksare made fromcasts ofhis
own body.Thesespeak abouttheexperienceofhavinga body,ofoccupying
physicalspace. It is an experiencewe can all understand,thoughperhaps
rarelythinkabout. Yethis works,by isolatingindividualsfromtheworld
and seemingto deny themsensoryexperience,seem to allude to a world
quite differentfromour own.
In science,theobviousexampleofsuchimaginativeachievementis not
CharlesDarwin,but his mentor, thegeologistCharlesLyell.He enabledus
to thinkabout anothertemporalworld,thatof the verylong term-the
millionsofyearsduringwhichmountainrangesareformed-a worldquite
different fromthetemporalexperiencedictatedto us by humanlifehistory.
did
Lyell this,however,simplybyinvokingthefamiliarprocessesoferosion
and deposition,whichwe see happeningwithinthetime-frame ofour own
shortlives.
I suspectthatthecases ofShakespeare,Gormleyand Lyellillustratethe
type of imagination that is of most importancefroman evolutionary
perspective.The abilitytotaketheordinary--having thoughtsand feelings,
havinga humanbody,watchingtheworldgo by--and using itto explore,
expressor discoversomethingquite extraordinary, is, I suppose,what we
mean by the"imaginativeleap."
Althoughthe typesof imaginationI have referred to probablyfailto
encompassall dimensionsof the imagination,theycan at least providea
means to address the evolutionaryquestion I began with: what sortof
imaginationwas possessed by our ancestorsand relatives?It is to this
questionthatI will now directlyturn,by initiallyconsideringevidencefor
imaginationin thechimpanzeemind.I do so because thechimpanzeeis our
closestlivingrelative,one withwhom we shared a commonancestorno
morethanfivemillionyearsago. Indeed,thechimpanzeeis oftentakenas a
modelforthatearlyhumanancestor.I will followthisby selectinga sample
of humans fromthe fossiland archaeologicalrecords,and inquiringinto
theirimaginativeexperiences.As I do so, I will seek to address some ofthe
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EvolutionofImagination 33

questions that have just been raised: How can minds supposedly pre-
programmedwiththerulesofnaturecan so effortlessly ignorethoserules?
Whyis imaginingwhatis withinthemindsofotherpeople so valued? Why
is narrative such a pervasive and important feature of the human
imagination?

Chimpanzee Imagination

Do chimpanzeeshave imagination? Thereis no clearansweremanating

fromthesubstantialfieldstudiesand laboratoryexperiments conductedon
eitherthecommonchimpanzee(Pantroglodytus) orthebonobo(Panpiniscus).
The questionis perhapslittledifferent fromaskingwhetherchimpanzees
think,and more specificallywhethertheythinkcreatively. RichardByrne
(1998) has addressed thisveryquestion and concluded thatunderlyingthe
actionsofthegreatapes is an abilitythatis bestidentifiedwithhumannon-
verbalthinking. Thisimplies,atleast,thefirst
typeofimagination I discussed
above. Chimpanzeethoughtprocessesare,accordingto Byrne(1998,121),
"computational,and involvesome formof reasoningwithrepresentations
ofstatesdesiredinthefuture,
ofreality, orofthebeliefsofotherindividuals."
Yetto reachthisconclusion,all thatByrnewas able to do was to citevarious
disparatestrandsofevidence,largelyfromanecdotalobservations, none of
whichprovidesa compellingargumentby itself.
The mostpersuasiveevidenceconcernstheuse of tools,or ratherthe
forethought thattool-useimplies.Boeschand Boesch(1984) describedhow
chimpanzeeswithintheTai forestcarryhammerstonestonut-bearing trees,
oftentransporting theseseveralhundredyardsand selectingthemostdirect
routeto thesourceofnuts.Thus theyappear to anticipatenut-cracking and
deliberatelyselect stones forthattask. Had it been people carryingthe
hammerstoneswe would nothesitateto statethattheyhad imaginedwhat
typeoftool was requiredby imaginingthetaskahead.
Similarobservationshave been made by Goodall (1986)withregardto
thepreparationoftermite sticksbychimpanzeesat Gombe.These aremade
in advance by selectinga stem,strippingit of leaves and bitingtheend to
provide a tool of the rightlengthand shape. Such preparationhas been
observedwhenthetermite moundis outofsight,so we arenotdealingwith
a simplestimulusresponse.Planning,and imaginationof the task ahead,
seem appropriatedescriptiveterms.
Byrne(1998; Whitenand Byrne1988) provides several examples in
whichchimpanzeeshavebeenseen--orat leastclaimedtohave been seen-
to deceiveone another.Deceptioncertainly impliesimagination--onemust
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34 StevenMithen

imaginewhatthedeceivedindividuals'reactionswillbe. Themostintriguing
exampleand theone thatappears quiteimpossibleto explainin any other
terms,is thehide-and-peeptactic.Byrne(1998) relatesit as follows:
... a dominantchimpanzeewas observedconfronted by an attemptat
deception.Anotherchimpanzeeinhibited itsnormaltendency to begin
eatinga covetedfooditemwhenitsaw thedominant chimpanzee nearby
(itselfa tacticthatcouldhavebeenlearnedfrompastcoincidences). The
dominant's reaction showedthatthedeception was notsuccessful:ithid
andpeepedoutfrom behinda tree.Presumablythinkingthatthedominant
animalhad insteadleft,thesubordinate chimpanzee pickedup thefood,
and was promptly relievedofit.(117)

Byrne (1998) makes the point that the importantfeature of this

observation is that hide-and-peep is simply not part of the normal
chimpanzeebehavioralrepertoire. For our concerns,it seems difficult
to
avoid concludingthatthe dominantchimpanzeehad imagined thatthe
subordinatewas up to something,and imaginedthatifhe hid himselfthe
subordinatewould behave in a quitedifferent manner.
in
Such tacticaldeception chimpanzeeshas been used to argue that
chimpanzeesengagein mind-reading, whichin turnhas been characterized
as Machiavellianintelligence,or havinga "theoryof mind." More thana
decade ofintensedebateabouttheanecdotalevidence,and thedevisingof
laboratory has beeninconclusive.
experiments, Whetherornotchimpanzees
have a theoryof mind-whethertheycan imaginenot onlyfutureevents
but what anotherindividual is thinkingin the present-remains quite
undecided(Whiten1996;Povinelli1996).Nevertheless, ithas becomeevident
thathavinga theoryofmindis probablyessentialto social complexityand
most probablya pre-requisite forthe evolutionof language (Smith1996;
Mithen2000a). In thisregard,we should notbe surprisedthatthisis one
type of imaginationthatwe particularlyvalue, attributingto it greater
significancethanimaginationabout fantasyworlds.
Do chimpanzeeshave fantasiesin whichtherulesoftheirsocietiesand
natureareundermined?Itseemsimpossibletosay.I knowofno descriptions
ofovertbehaviorthatsuggesta chimpanzeeis thinking fantastical
thoughts
while carryingout some actions. Many examples of such behavior are
apparentin humans,such as childrenpretendingto be airplanesor adults
engaging in religiousceremonies.Chimpanzee equivalents of these are
certainlyconceivable-a juvenilepretendingtobe a leopardor monkey,an
adult placingseeminglyunrelatedobjectstogetheras ifbuildinga shrine.
Because we do notsee suchthings,we mustassumeimaginationleadingto
fantasydoes not existin thechimpanzeemind.The problemis thatmany

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 ofImagination
Evolution 35

people--myself included--often findthemselves quitestillbutday-

sitting
dreaming themostbizarrefantasies. Perhapschimpanzees do thesame.
The closestexampleI can findofa chimpanzee beingexposedto a
fantasyworldis in one oftheexperiments thatSue Savage-Rumbaugh
conducted withKanzi.He isthebonobothathasacquiredparticularly good
skillsbyusinga computer
"linguistic" keyboard, although whether these
skillsareproperly describedas linguistic remainsunderdebate(Savage-
and
Rumbaugh Rumbaugh 1993).In this experiment, Kanzi'scomprehension
ofspokenEnglishwas beingtested.Savage-Rumbaugh satin frontofhim
withherfacecoveredbya mask,toavoiddelivering unintentional
cues.On
thefloorbetween themwasanassortment offooditemsandobjects;adjacent
toKanziwas a refrigeratorand a doortotheoutside.To avoidtheriskof
Kanzisimplyperforming actionsthathe had learnedby association with
sounds,perhapsbyobserving
particular others, Savage-Rumbaugh asked
himtoperform somerather bizarreactions, whichhecouldneverhaveseen
or beenaskedto perform before.He was asked,forinstance, to place a
vacuumcleaneroutside,and to put foliageintotherefrigerator. Kanzi
these
performed tasks, demonstrating that henot onlyunderstood the names
ofobjects,
butthewholeutterance.
A humanchildof threeor fouryearsold wouldhave been able to
undertake thesametasks.Butwhenaskedto do so, one wouldexpecta
reactionsuggesting thechildappreciated thatthoseactionsweregoing
againstthenormalrulesofbehavior-vacuum cleanersaresimplynotused
inthebackyard,andleavesdo notbelongintherefrigerator. On thebasisof
no morethanmyownexperience as a parent, I wouldexpectthaton some
oftheseoccasionsthechildwouldwillingly elaboratethefantasy byusing
hisorherownimagination. Kanzi,however, performed theactionswithout
evena slighthesitation,
without anyindication thattherequestwas outof
theordinary.Thismay,ofcourse,be simplydue tohisunderstanding and
experienceofthe world:Kanzi is unlikely to know what vacuum cleaners
orrefrigerators
arefor.Butitmayequallybe thatthereis simply nocapacity
forimaginativefantasywithin the chimpanzee mind.

and EarlyHomo
Australopithecine

Thechimpanzee mindislikely
tobe quitesimilar
tothatofthecommon
ancestorofmodernhumansand chimpanzees thatlived5-6millionyears
ago. Betweenthatdate and 1.8 millionyearsago, numerousspeciesof
hominids existedinEastandSouthAfrica,someofwhichareplacedinthe

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36 StevenMithen

Australopithecinegenus, and some into Homo,notablyH. habilis.A key

developmentduringthisperiodis theevolutionofbipedalism,evidentin a
partialmannerin "Lucy,"A. afarensis, 3.5millionyearsago. Quitehow many
species existed this
during period, referred toas thePlio-Pleistocene, remains
unclear.Similarly,how thesevaried in theirsocial and foragingbehavior,
tool-makingskillsand intelligenceremainsa matterof debate.Wood and
Collard(1999)have made a persuasiveargumentthatHomo habilisand Homo
rudolfensisshould be as
re-classified australopithecines, since theyappear
morphologically and behaviorallyfarcloserto theotheraustralopithecines
thanto laterHomo.Hence theysuggestthatthe firsttruememberof our
genus is H. ergaster,
appearing1.8 millionyearsago.
There are two key differences betweenthe behaviorof the common
ancestor/chimpanzee and theaustralopithecines (and perhapsearliestHomo),
bothofwhichare evidentfromthearchaeologicalrecord,and mayimpinge
on ourinferences abouttheirimaginative abilities.Thefirstis themanufacture
of stonetools.Whereassome chimpanzeesuse stonehammers,therehave
been no observationsofintentional flakingin thewild. Onlyfrom3 million
yearsago have pieces of flakedquartzite,basalt,chertand limestonebeen
found in the archaeologicalrecordof East and South Africa.These are
characterizedas theOldowan industry, named afterOlduvai Gorgewhere
the most substantialassemblageshave been acquired.WhetherOldowan
artefactsdisplaysignificantly greatertechnicalskillthanthosedisplayedin
the tool-makingof chimpanzeesis a moot point (Toth 1985; Wynnand
McGrew1989).Whatis evident,however,is thatOldowan artefacts have a
very limited of
degree imposed form, any if at all It
(Potts1988). appears
thatthetool-makers did notimaginethefinishedformofa chopperorscraper
in theirheads and thenknap the stoneaccording.They simplyremoved
flakesfollowingthe"pathofleastresistance"in thenodule. In thisrespect,
therefore,even ifOldowan artefactswere technicallymore demandingto
make than termitesticks,theydid notnecessarilyrequiremoreimagination.
A second keydifference betweentheaustralopithecines/earliest Homo
and the common ancestor/chimpanzee is the extent of meat-eating.
Chimpanzeescertainlyhuntand eat meaton a regularbasis,but notto the
extentas did thePlio-Pleistocene hominids.Therehas been a verylongand
oftenacrimonious debate as to how the fragmentedanimal bones in
archaeologicalsitesshouldbe interpreted (e.g.Isaac 1978;Binford1981,1986;
Bunn and Kroll 1986). Whetherthe meat was obtained by huntingor
scavengingremainsunclear;but increasedmeat-eatingcertainlyappears
centralto the package of evolutionarychanges in the Plio-Pleistocene

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Evolution
ofImagination 37

concerningincreasingbodysize,brainsize,tooluse and bipedalism(Aiello

and Wheeler 1995). The postive feedbacksbetween these are critically
important, such as the mannerin whichincreasingbrainsize enables the
manufacture ofstonetools,whichin turnplaced moreselectivepressureon
bipedalism raw materialacquisition,theevolutionofwhichremoveda
for
thermalconstraint on theevolutionofa largerbrainand henceallowed the
production of more complex tools. Such feedbacksappear sufficientto
explain the developments in the archaeological record in the Plio-
Pleistocene-there appears no need to invoke significantchanges in
humanoidimagination,overthatseen in thechimpanzee.
In summary,by 1.8 millionyears ago our ancestorswere routinely
makingand usingtools,habituallywalkingon two legs,eatingsubstantial
quantitiesof meat and sportingbrainsizes approachingtwice thatof the
chimpanzee.Neverthelessitseemsunnecessaryto attribute to themgreater
featsofimaginationthanthecommonancestorof5 millionyearsago, orthe
chimpanzeetoday.

Imaginationin the EarlyHuman mind:

H. ergaster,H. erectus,H. heidelbergensis

WhetherornotH. ergaster shouldbe seen as thefirsttruememberofthe

Homogenus,thisspeciescertainly appearstobe behaviorallydifferent from
human ancestorsof the Plio-Pleistocene.Morphologicallyit is the firstto
adopt a characteristicallyhuman stature,as exemplifiedby the specimen
WT 15000,the Nariokotomeboy (Walkerand Leakey 1993). It is also the
firstspecies to spread out of Africa.Exactlywhen thisoccurredremains
unclear,but verysoon after1.8 millionyears ago appears most likelyin
lightofdiscoveriesat Dmanisi,LonguppoCave, Riwat,and there-datingof
H. erectusskulls-a likelydescendantofH. ergaster-from Java(Larickand
Ciochon1996).Anotherdescendantis likelyto have been H. heidelbergensis,
as foundin bothAfricaand Europe,whereit is representedby specimens
such as the500,000-year-old tibiafromBoxgrove,thejaw fromMauer,and
the collectionof specimensfromthe "pit of bones" at Atapuerca,dating
from300,000yearsago (Johnsonand Edgar 1996).
I have groupedthesethreespecies togetheras "EarlyHumans," since
theyshare significantsimilarities,and are quite different fromboth the
australopithecines/earliestHomoand LaterHumans-H.neanderthalensis and
H. sapiens.The use ofthelabel EarlyHumans is also convenientas thefossil
evidenceforH. ergaster, H. erectus,
and especiallyH. heidelbergensis
is highly

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38 StevenMithen

variableand itis unclearhow manyspeciesreallyexisted.As we aredealing

with a timeperiod between 1.8 millionand 300,000years ago, and with
settlementinAfrica,Asia and Europe,and withatleastthreedifferentspecies,
we mustexpecta considerableamountofbehavioralvariability withinEarly
Humans. Similarly, thesespecies are likelyto have varied substantiallyin
thenatureof theirintelligence.In thispaper,however,I wish to stressthe
betweenthesespecies,and to considergeneralfeaturesoftheir
similarities
imagination.
As regards brain size, Early Humans all fall around 1,000 cc.-
smallerthanthatofmodemhumans.And althoughtheevidence
significantly
remainsunclear,it seems unlikelythattheypossessed advanced linguistic
abilities.Vocalizationsare likelyto have been significantly
different
from
those of apes and monkeys,but forthe sake of thispaper I will consider
EarlyHumans as pre-linguistic. Thisis probablyan appropriateassumption
fortheearlierpartofourperiod,as demonstrated by WT 15000(Walkerand
Shipman1996), but by 300,000 theterm "proto-language"(Bickerton1996)
may be an appropriatedescriptionforincreasingly complexvocalisations
(and perhapsgesturalcommunication).
Thereare threeaspectsofthebehaviorofEarlyHumans thatsuggesta
richerimaginationthanhad previouslybeen thecase in humanevolution.

Imaginationand ArtefactProduction

One ofthemostcharacteristic artefacts

oftheEarlyHuman timeperiod
is thehand axe. Thisis a bifaciallyworkedstonenodule or flake,frequently
made into a symmetrical pear or ovate shape. Many Early Human com-
munitiesdid notmakehand axes; some continuedto use an Oldowan-style
technology,whilethoseinSoutheastAsiaseemtohave lackedstoneartefacts
altogether.Nevertheless,hand axes are foundin Africa,Asia and Europe,
datingback morethana millionyears,and are themostenigmaticartefact
fromprehistory (see Roe 1981;Isaac 1977).
For thepurposes of thispaper,the key featureof thehand axe is the
imposed form (Pelegrin 1993). Artefactsin the same and different
assemblagesare sometimesalmostidenticalin form(Tydesley1986).This
suggeststhatthe tool-makerimaginedthe formof the artefactin his/her
mind,and held thatthoughtduringthe20 minutesor so requiredto make
the tool. He/she needed to imagine the sequence of knapping actions
necessaryto movefromtheoriginalnodule tothefinishedform,and had to
be preparedto alterthatsequence as contingenciesarose,such as unseen
flawsin thematerial.
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 ofImagination
Evolution 39

An argumentagainstinvokingsuchrichpowersoftheimaginationcan
be made by citing"artefacts"producedby non-humananimals thatalso
display a seeminglyimposed form,oftensymmetrical in nature-spider
webs, beaver dams, birdnests. We do not attribute to these animalsan idea
of the finishedformwithin theirminds. There is, however, a critical
difference.Hand axe manufacture is a reductivetechnology, and one witha
of
high degree unpredictability as to the form of detached flakes.Animal
artefactsare constructivein nature,most likelyachieved simplyby the
iterationof a simple routine.When blindly repeated, this may end in
something that looks like a product of design and imagination. The
manufactureof a hand axe is quite different. Wereone to make it withthe
unimaginativerepetition ofa few knappingactions,one would end up with
an artefactsimilarto an Oldowan chopper.
Imaginativepowermayalso have been a necessaryprerequisite forthe
culturaltransmissionof technicalknowledge.Early Humans were great
followersof tradition;theskillsofhand axe manufacture and ideas about
formappear to have been passed down fromgenerationto generation(see
Mithen 1994). This may have depended on passive observationalone-
didacticteachingoftechnicalskillsseemsrareevenamongmodernhumans.
Alternatively,some instructionby the use of gesture may have been
employed.In eithercase, imaginationofwhatan observedtool-makerwas
tryingtoachievewitheachblow seemsessential.Had theskilledtool-maker
been able to explainwhathe/shewas doing,thedemands on imagination
may have been significantly reduced.
the
However, powersofimagination necessaryfortool-making inEarly
Humans remainedquite limited.One of the most remarkablefeaturesof
hand axe technologyis thatit remainedeffectively unchangedover such
of
long periods time, and in such a wide range of environments (Mithen
1996). We normallyassume thathigh levels of technicalskill,as evident
fromhand axes,goes hand-in-handwithabilitiesto innovateand improve
technology.Yet thisis not the case withEarlyHumans; theywere either
unable to imaginemakingothertypesofstoneartefacts-suchas thespear
points,stoneknives,and arrowheads used extensively by laterhumans-
or had no need of these.The latterseems unlikely.Thereshould be little
doubtthatEarlyHumansocietywas highlycompetitive, and a moreefficient
huntingtechnology would have provided individuals with considerable
advantages.They seem not to have been constrained by technical skillfrom
makingthese,and consequentlyone mustconcludethattheconstraint was
on theirimaginativecapacityto inventbetterweapons.

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40 StevenMithen

Imaginationand Planned Hunting

The huntingbehaviorof theaustralopithecines and theearliestHomo

remainsunclear;theopportunistic takingof small game seems mostlikely.
In contrast,at least some EarlyHumans were big game hunters.The best
evidence forthiscomes fromEurope and relatesto H. heidelbergensis. The
500,000yearold faunalremainsfromBoxgrove, England,especiallythehorse
and rhinos,have cutmarksand breakagepatternsthatsuggesttheseanimals
had been hunted(Roberts1997).Carefullydesignedand executedwooden
spears dating from400,000 years ago have been found at Schdningen,
Germany(Theime 1997). These were associated with horse bones, and
indicatebig game hunting.
Such huntingseemsmostlikelytohave been a co-operativeenterprise,
requiringcarefulorganizationand planningbetweenthehunters.This,in
turn,is likelyto have requiredsome formof communication, and in the
absenceofspokenlanguage,gesturesand facialexpressionsmayhave been
critical.Mime mighteven have been used, as argued by Donald (1990).
Indeed,manymodemhunter-gatherers makesubstantial use ofgesturewhen
hunting,so as notto scaretheprey.Forsuchcommunication tohave worked
amongEarly Humans, each individualmind would have needed toimagine
thescenarioofco-operativeaction,and theirown specificrolewithinit.In
effect,a narrativewould need tobe imagined-who would be thetrackers,
whereand how theanimalswould move,who would be thebeaters,who
would striketheanimal,whatwould be thedangerand what thepayoff.
Again,one mightinvoketheco-operativehuntingofsocial carnivores
orevenchimpanzeestosuggestthatsuchimagination is simplynotrequired.
It seems unlikelythateach memberof a lion pack imaginesthe hunting
scenariobeforeplayingitsrole.Yethumans are likelyto be different. It is
evidentthatsuch big game hunting,especiallywithweapons,was a fairly
recentand perhapsquitesudden additionto theirbehavioralrepertoire. In
contrastto thebehaviorofsocial carnivores, big game huntingwas notpart
of the EarlyHuman evolved psychology-althoughan interestin animal
behaviorwas certainlya criticalelementoftheirmentalfaculties.Big game
huntingamongEarlyHumans is likelyto have been quite rare;moreoften
theywould scavengeformeat.

Imaginationand Colonization
EarlyHumans were thefirstof our ancestorsto dispersefromAfrica.
Some ofthelandscapestheyeventuallyoccupiedwere quitedifferent
from
theAfricansavannahs (Gamble 1993).The causes and mechanismsof this
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 ofImagination
Evolution 41

dispersalremainquite unclear.It seems unlikelythatpopulationpressure

in Africaled to migration.Humans mostlikelydispersedas partof a large
mammalcommunity, as severalothertypesof animalsalso spread out of
AfricaduringtheearlyPleistocene(Turner1984).
Nevertheless,a case can be made thatamong EarlyHuman societies,
individualswere travellinglongerdistancesand returning to theirgroup
withknowledgeofunfamiliar places. The robustbodies and thickbones of
Early Humans suggesthigh degreesof mobilityand physicalendurance.
The demandsofcommunication bypre-linguistichumans,presumablywith
a substantialamountof gestureand perhapsmime,would again place a
substantialonus on the imaginationof the individualsconcerned.Those
who were able to imaginethenew places beingdescribed,and hencehave
the opportunityto exploitnew resources,are likelyto have been at an
advantage.

Domain-SpecificIntelligenceand EarlyHuman Imagination

Hand axe manufacture, hunting, and colonizationappeartohaveplaced

substantialdemands on EarlyHuman imagination,especiallyforspecies
withlimitedlinguisticabilities.Itwas duringthisperiodofhumanevolution
thatindividualswithenhancedpowersofimagination, especiallywithregard
to futurescenarios of behavior,may have been at a particularselective
advantage.
Nevertheless,imaginativepowersseem to have remainedlimited.For
instance,thereappearstohavebeenconsiderablepotentialformakinghand
axes in differentshapes and sizes, and witha varietyoftypesofstoneand
knappingtechniques. Yetthereseemstohavebeenno potentialforimagining
how those technicalskillscould have been applied to different tasks,or
how different three-dimensional formscould be realizedin stoneor bone.
As well as thelimitedrangeofstoneartefact formsproduced,we mustalso
notetheabsenceofanyrepresentational carvedstoneorbone objects(Mithen
1996).Moreover, all appear have been used forinteraction
artefacts to with
thenaturalworldalone;thereareno tracesof,say,beads orpendants.There
are several possible explanations:perhaps these were made but did not
survive,or perhapsthesocial interactions of theEarlyHumans were such
thattherewas no need tosendsocialmessagesbytheuse ofmaterialculture.
Anotherexplanationis thatthe EarlyHumans lacked the imaginationto
conceiveofusingmaterialartefacts in thesocial realm.
A substantiallimiton imaginationis indeed my favoredexplanation.
This arises,I believe,fromthenatureoftheEarlyHuman mind.As I have
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42 StevenMithen

previouslyargued (Mithen1996),theEarlyHuman mind appears to have

been constructedon the basis of multipleintelligences-specificways of
thinkingand specifictypesofknowledgededicatedto specificdomainsof
behavior.Therewere, I have suggested,threemajor domains of thought
withintheEarlyHuman mind,thoserelatingto technology, to people and
to naturalhistory. As domains of thought,thesewere quite isolatedfrom
each other,withno possibilityforan integration of knowledgeor flowof
ideas. As a consequence,ideas about, say,animal behavior,could not be
engaged withthoseabout,say,people, to come up withnotionsof talking
animals or beings thatare part human and part animal. In this regard,
imaginativeabilitieswere limitedwithinthe bounds of each cognitive
domain ofthought.
I have expressedthisdomain-specific mentalityas a constraint
on Early
Human cognition.Butitmustbe remembered thathavingdifferent ways of
and of
thinking types knowledge isolatedfrom each other would have been
ofimmensevalue to theEarlyHuman mind.Ifeverything could mixwith
everything else therewouldbe a greatriskformistakes,and decision-making
would become impossible.Reasoningabout,say,who to choose as a mate
mightbe used whendecidingwhatfoodto eat.A femalemightend up with
toughold vegetables(because she prefershermenwithplentyofmuscle),
whilea male mightend up stillhungry(becausehe prefershis womentobe
slim).Makinga decisionaboutwhatshape ofhand axe to makemighttake
foreverbecause knowledgeabouttoolmaking,ideas about-animals, people,
the weatherand all mannerof thingswould flood the mind. These are
preciselythereasonswhyevolutionary psychologistshave arguedthatthe
humanmindshould be composedofmultiplespecialisedmentalmodules
(Cosmides and Tooby1994).A personwitha generaltypeof intelligence
would suffer a catalogueoferrorsand be easilyout-bidforfood and mates
by those with specialised ways of thinking,where content-rich mental
modulesare safelyisolatedfromeach other.Thatseemstobe preciselyhow
theEarlyHuman mindwas constituted.

Imaginationin the NeanderthalMind

Between500,000and 200,000yearsago therewas a substantialincrease

in brainsize, seemingto affecttwo separatelineages-that in Africagiving
riseto anatomicallymodernhumans130,000yearsago, and thatin Europe
leading to the Neanderthals(see Stringerand Gamble 1993). Studies of
ancientDNA suggeststhatthesetwo lineages divergedbetween600,000-
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 ofImagination
Evolution 43

500,000yearsago. By200,000brainsize had reachedthesamerangeof

variation as foundinmodernhumanstoday.It seemsmostlikelythatthis
rapid periodof braingrowthwas relatedto the evolutionof a more
sophisticated linguistic whichmostlikelyco-evolved
ability, witha modern
theory ofmindcapacity(Mithen 2000a).
TheNeanderthals, H. neanderthalensis,
providea particularly important
casestudyforunderstanding theevolution andnatureoftheimagination.
Theyevolvedfrom H. heidelbergensis
inEurope, withspecimens from 200,000
yearsagobeingclassified as Neanderthals. Thisspeciessurvived inEurope
and theNear East untilsqueezed intoextinction by modernhumans
dispersing from Africa (forreviews ofNeanderthal evolution, anatomy and
see
archaeology, Stringer and Gamble 1993, and Mellars 1996). The last
Neanderthals knownare fromthefarSouthwest ofEurope,some28,000
yearsago.
Neanderthals are important becausealthoughtheirbrainsizeshave
thesamerangeas thoseofmodemhumans, andalthough theyhadrelatively
advancedabilities atspokenlanguage, their behavior showsa limited range
of variation,whichmaybe assumedto reflectthecharacterof their
imagination. ThenatureofNeanderthal languagehasbeensubjecttomuch
debate.Theanatomical evidence provides compellingevidence thata modem
vocalapparatushad evolved(Schpartz 1993),buttherestricted natureof
theirbehaviorseemstoargueagainstattributing themwithfullymodern
language, onewitha complex grammar anda vastlexicon(seeMithen 1996).
SeveralaspectsofNeanderthal behavior appeartobe a continuation of
thoseinferred forEarlyHumans.Neanderthals wereclearly engagedinbig
gamehunting, andhadsophisticated technicalskills.Somehandaxeswere
stillproduced, butnewtechniques werenowemployed, notablythelevallois
method, in which either flakes,blades or of a
points pre-determined size
and shapewereremovedfrom a stonenodule.Itis a difficulttechnique to
master, one as complexas anystone-working methodused by modern
humans.Yetevenwiththisnew technique, Neanderthal technology is
immensely monotonous through space and time.
Neanderthals alsohave a
robustmorphologyand appear to have been engagedin substantial
movement through thelandscape.Consequently, thesame demandson
with to
imagination regard communicating aboutnew placesandforaging
opportunities, transmitting knapping and
techniques, planning huntswere
presentamong the Neanderthalsas amongthe EarlyHumans. But
communication by theNeanderthals mayhavebeen facilitated by more
effective
vocalpowers.

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44 StevenMithen

Burial,Religion and Art

One new type of behavior is that of burial. Although convincing
examples remain relativelyscarce, therecan be no question that some
individualswere intentionally placed withinpitsdeliberatelydug intothe
ground. Much of the archaeological debate has been concerned with
identifying whichspecimensconstitute suchburials,and whicharefortuitous
survivalsofrelativelycompleteand articulatedbodies (e.g. Gargett1989).
A relatedissue concernsthe presenceor absence of grave goods, or
itemsrelatingtogravesideritual.Atpresent, thereappeartobe no convincing
examples. Those thatwere previouslycelebratedand thatenteredboth
academic and popular literatureas examples of Neanderthal religious
behavior are now discredited.The most famousof these is the Shanidar
flowerburial, where high densitiesof flowerpollen were found in the
sedimentsovera claimedburialin ShanidarCave, Iraq, and interpreted as
thetracesofwreathsofflowerslaid acrossthegrave(Solecki1971).It seems
mostlikelythattheflowerpollen eithersimplyblew intothecave, or was
broughtin on workmen'sboots(Gamble1989);theexcavationoccurredat a
timeoflessrigorousmethodsthanthoseemployedtoday.Anotherpossibility
is thatthehighdensityofpollenwas theresultofvoles who nestedclose to
thewarmthof the decayingbody and lined theirnestswithflowerpetals
and anthers(Stringer, personalcommunication).
The act ofburialsuggeststhattheNeanderthalshad strongemotional
tiestothedeceased,and wishedtoremember themand carefortheirbodies.
This should notbe a surprise.The Neanderthalsare likelyto have lived in
largeand complexsocialgroups.Specimenswithhealedbone fractures have
been found,suggestingsupportand care forthe injured.Burial simply
appearsas a continuation afterdeathoftheemotionalbonds and social care
thatexistedbetweentheliving.
The questionremains,however,as to whetherthe Neanderthalshad
religiousideas,whethertheybelievedin an afterlife, in supernaturalbeings,
and the otherproductsof the religiousimagination.The absence of both
gravegoods and evidenceofgravesideritualis notconclusivein itself;the
religiousceremoniesofmanysocietieswould leave no archaeologicaltrace
at all. Nevertheless,it is thecase thatthereare no convincingexamplesof
Neanderthalritual.Previousclaimsofcannibalistic activity and arrangement
ofskullson thefloorofGrottaGuttari,Italy,have been showntobe no more
thanhyenabehavior(Whiteand Toth1991;Stiner1994).
Similarly,thereareno persuasiveexamplesofNeanderthalart,although
strong claims have been made-both coming fromeither very early
Neanderthalsor late H. heidelbergensis. The mostcontroversialpiece is an
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EvolutionofImagination 45

alleged"figurine" foundatBerekhatRam,Israel,and datingfromca. 250,000

yearsago. The stone is no morethan3 cm.high,butis claimedto have been
carved intothe figureof a woman witha head, bust and arms at her side
(Marshack1997).Thereis indeeda superficial resemblance, butmanybelieve
thisis chanceratherthana deliberatelyimposedform.Recentmicroscopic
studyhas demonstratedthatthe stonewas indeed carved by a flinttool
(D'Errico and Nowel 2000),but thismay have been formundane reasons
ratherthanto createan "art"object(Mithen2000b).
A sampleofbonesfromthesiteofBilzingsleben, Germany, haveincisions
made withstonetoolsthatalso appeardeliberateand non-utilitarian (Mania
and Mania 1988). On one bone theseconstitutea set of parallel lines that
seem mostunlikethosecreatedduringbutchery. These have been claimed
as evidencefor"conceptmediatedmarking"by Bednarik(1985),although
exactlywhat is meantby thisphraseremainsunclear.
Withtheexceptionoftheseexamples,theonlyevidenceforNeanderthals
making"art"objects,comes fromtheveryend oftheirexistence,at a time
when theyare likelyto have had contactwiththefirstmodernhumansin
Europe,35,000-30,000 yearsago. ThisverylateNeanderthalculture,known
as theChatelperronian, includesbeads and pendantscarvedfrombone and
ivory,although such objectsremainrareand subjectto considerabledebate.
While a strongargumentcan be made thattheseobjectswere carved by
Neanderthals,othersbelievethattheywerescavengedfromoccupationsites
ofmodernhumans,or thatthearchaeologicaldepositshave becomemixed
(see discussionin D'Errico et al. 1998). A non-partisanevaluation of the
evidence suggeststhattheseobjectswere indeed made by Neanderthals,
but onlyundertheinfluenceofmodernhumans;leftto theirown devices
theidea ofbody adornmentseemsto have been beyondthem.
Overall,therefore, theNeanderthalimaginationappears littledifferent
fromwhat went beforein human evolution.Because theylived in large,
complexsocial groups,imaginingthethoughtsand likelybehaviorofother
individuals-having an advanced theoryofmind-is likelyto have been a
criticalfeatureofNeanderthalmentality. Similarly,imaginingotherplaces,
and
journeys, hunting scenarios is also likelyto have been important.A key
aspect ofthesewould have been a
imagining narrative-asequenceofevents
or actions.

The Impactof Language

There is a long and complex literatureon the relationshipbetween
thoughtand language(Carruthers and Boucher1998),butthisissue has not
been addressedfroman evolutionary perspective.One perspectiveon this,
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46 StevenMithen

relevant
whichappearsdirectly tohowlanguagemayhaveinfluenced the
has
imagination recentlybeen airedbyClark He
(1996). has written
how:

[ofideasbylanguage]mayallowthecommunal
... migrations construction
ofextremely delicateanddifficult
intellectual andprogressions.
trajectories
An idea thatonlyJoe'spriorexperience couldmakeavailable,but that
canflourishonlyin theintellectualnichecurrentlyprovidedbythebrain
ofMary,cannowrealizeitsfullpotential byjourneying betweenJoeand
Maryas and whenrequired. Thepathtoa goodidea cannowcriss-cross
individuallearning so thatone agent'slocalminimum
histories becomes
another'spotentbuildingblocks...culturallyscaffoldedreasonis able to
incrementally explorespaceswhichpathdependentindividualreason
couldneverhopeto penetrate. (206)

Thedilemma wefaceisthatalthough theanatomical evidencesuggests

sophisticated linguistic the
abilities, archaeological evidence providesno
indication thatthisled to thedevelopment ofthenew ideas thatClark
suggests.Althoughtechnologywas morecomplex,thereseems no
exploration ofnewconceptual spaceswhich,according toClark,shouldbe
a consequence ofhavinglanguage.Perhapsthisdid occurand simplyleft
notraceinthearchaeological record.Alternatively,itmaybe thatNeanderthal
language did in factremain the of
verysimple, type non-grammatical proto-
languageproposedbyBickerton (1996).
A third possibility,andtheoneI support, is thattheNeanderthal mind
a of
possessed type domain-specific intelligencesimilartothat foundamong
EarlyHumans(Mithen1996).In otherwords,althoughtheycouldthink
imaginative thoughts within eachofseveraldomainsofbehavior, theywere
unabletobringknowledge ofonedomaintoimpinge upon another. Thisis
the
just type of mind thatthe evolutionary psychologists predictwould be
theresultofnatural selection-specific mental modules/cognitive domains/
intelligencesdedicated tosolvingspecifictypesofproblems andhavingthe
"rulesofnature"embeddedwithinthem.Consequently "rules"about
fracturedynamics of stonemay have been an integral of
part theirtechno-
logicalintelligence,and those about facialexpressions partoftheirsocial
intelligence.As I discussedabove,thetypeofimagination thatleads to
fantasyrequires thatsuch rulesbe broken, or atleast ignored.Neanderthals
do notseemto havebeenable to do that.In thisregardtheywerevery
literal-minded, unabletoengageinflights offantasy; theynotonlylacked
sculptureandpainting, butalsopoetry andprayer.
One wayto conceiveoftheNeanderthal mind,is thatitwas a mind
thatlackedtheability foranalogyandmetaphor. Theuseoftheseis perhaps
thekeytothemodern mindandespecially themodern imagination.Indeed
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 ofImagination
Evolution 47

somearguethatmetaphor underliesall conceptualthought(Lakoffand

Johnson1999).Bylackingtheability tobringknowledge fromonedomain
ofthoughttoimpinge upon the
another, power theNeanderthal
potential of
mindwas seriouslyinhibited--whatever theextent
oftheirvocabularyand
grammar. Forinstance eventhough theNeanderthalsmayhavehadwords
for"daughter" and "flower,"I doubtifa Neanderthal father
was able to
entertain
thethought thathisdaughterwas "pretty
as a flower,"
orthathis
sonwas "braveas a lion."

ModernHumansand theExtension
ofMind

Anatomically modern humansevolvedinAfrica around130,000 years

ago,a dateindicated by both fossiland genetic evidence.Thisdatecoincides
withtheharshclimatic periodofoxygenisotopestage6,whichmayhave
beenintegral tothespeciation eventleadingtoourspecies(LahrandFoley
1998).Once present,thereis likelytohavebeena longandcomplexhistory
ofmultiplepopulationdispersalsfromAfrica.Theconsequenceofthese
was thatH. sapiens achievedremarkable successincolonizing a widerange
ofenvironments throughout the world and in all
out-competingotherhuman
species.Soon after H.
30,000yearsago, sapiens was theonlymember ofthe
Homogenus survivingon theplanet,and had occupiedall habitable
continents,including theNewWorld.
Modernhumansengagedina widerangeofbehaviors neverpreviously
seen,notably art,religion,
farming and warfare. The first
signofartis most
probably found inthe Middle Stone Age of South Africasome 120,000 years
ago,whensignificant quantities ofredochreintheform ofpowder, crayons
and scratched plaquesarefoundincavesites(Watts1999).It seemslikely
thattheochrewas usedforbodypainting; Watts(1999)and Power(1999)
makeextravagant claimsthatthisbodypainting wasusedinritualbehavior
similartothatusedbytheKhosianpeopleofSouthAfricatoday.
Thefactthatno representational artis founduntil33,000yearsago in
Europemay reflectnomore than poorpreservation ofearlier
works, perhaps
producedfrom organicmaterials. Thesameargument canofcoursebeused
fortheabsenceofartamongNeanderthals andEarlyHumans,although in
theircasesit appearsmoretenuous,due to themuchgreater timespans
involved.Thecapacityforart,however, maybe a consequence ofa major
change inhuman mentality that occurred some 50,000yearsago.Soonafter
thisdate,a wide rangeofnewbehaviors becomeevident,knownas the
Upper Palaeolithicrevolution (Mellars and Stringer1989).Whether ornot
a changeinhumancognition,
thisreflects orsimply reflects
social,economic
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48 StevenMithen

and demographicdevelopments,remainsunclear.
Whethermodernformsofmentality evolvedcontemporaneously with
modernanatomyaround 130,000years ago, or resultedfromsome later
developments-presumablya neuralmutation-some 50,000yearsago, is
of littleconsequenceforthepresentargument.What is evidentis thatby
30,000yearsago at least,modernhumanswere engagingin thoughtsand
behaviorof a radicallydifferentkindfromthatofNeanderthalsand Early
Humans. A simpleway ofdescribingthisis thatmodernhumanswere far
moreimaginativethanall humanancestorsand relatives.
Examples of these new behaviors have been described at length
elsewhere (Mellars 1989, 1996; Mellars and Stringer1989; Stringerand
Gamble 1993; Mithen1996).Key featuresinclude religiousand ritualistic
behavior,productionof paintingsand sculptedobjects,multi-component
tools,and substantialarchitecture. Thereseems littledoubt thatmodern
humanswerecreatingcomplexmythologies, involvingsupernatural beings,
as has been recordedamongrecenttribalpeoples, such as theindigenous
Australians.Some ofthemosttellingimagesfromtheirartare thoseofpart
human/partanimalfigures, suchas thebison/manpaintingfromChauvet
cave, France (Chauvet et al. 1996). These demonstratemost clearlythat
modernhumans of 30,000yearsago were able to conceiveof entitiesthat
broketherulesofnature,entitiesthatcould notexistin thephysicalworld.
In otherwords,theywere engagingin thetypeof imaginationthatcan be
describedas fantasy.
How weremodernhumansable toengagein thisnew typeofthinking?
The answerI have providedin mypreviousworkis thattheywere able to
integratebodies of knowledgeand ways of thinkingthathad evolved in,
and previouslybeen restricted to, quite differentcognitivedomains. For
instance,they could take knowledge about a lion, and about a man, and
come up with a new imaginarytypeof animal-that representedby the
33,000-year-oldlion/man carving fromHohlenstein Stadel, Germany
(Mithen1996).I havetermedthisability"cognitivefluidity" and have argued
thatit underliesart,religionand science.

Material Cultureand the ExtendedMind

Anotherway of conceivingof cognitivefluidityis thatcapacitiesfor

analogyand metaphorhad arisenin thehumanmind,whichthenprovided
thepowersforconceptualthoughtas describedbyLakoffand Johnson (1999),
and forfantasticalimagination.This returnsus to one of thekeyproblems
raisedabove: iftherulesofnaturehave been encodedintothehumanmind
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EvolutionofImagination 49

bynaturalselection,how aretheyso easilyovercomewhenwe createfantasy

worldswithinour minds?
One meansby whichtherule-boundconstraints on thoughtmayhave
been over-riddenis by some formofmutationallowingthedevelopmentof
new patternsof neural networkswithinthe brains of modernhumans.
Whereasin EarlyHumans and Neanderthalsthepartsofthebraindealing
with,say,animals,artefacts and otherhumanswereisolatedfromeachother,
such new paths may have allowed knowledgeto have become entwined,
leadingtocompletely new typesofthoughts. Thenew objectsand behaviors,
suchas carvingsand tracesofritualbehavior,can be seen as productsofthis
new typeofthinking.
Argumentsabout mutationsand new neural connectionscannotbe
currently tested,and possiblyneverwillbe. Moreover,itmayseemunlikely
thatmillionsofyearsofevolutionthatdeveloped domain-specific thinking
could be so easily over-ridden.Further,as I describedabove, cognitively
fluidmindsaretheoretically proneto all sortsoferrors:inappropriate types
of reasoningor the wrongtypesof knowledgemightbe drawn upon to
solve problems.In thislight,it seems likelythatthemodernhumanmind
has largelyretaineda domain-specific character withsomedegreeofisolation
betweendifferent types ofmodules or cognitivedomains.
How, then,is the human imaginationable to createfantasyworlds?
How are the (adaptivelyessential)domain-specific constraintson human
thought over-ridden? I suspect thatthe answer lies with theuse ofexternal
supports to human of
thinking-theobjects art, the paintings,the rituals
createdafter50,000years ago are not onlythe productsof a new way of
thinking, but also theirsource.
Considertheimage ofthebison/manin Chauvetcave-most likelya
being fromthespiritworld of theUpper Palaeolithic.Comingup withan
idea likethismaybe relatively easy.Wecan all sitand day-dreamand think
of fantasticalmonsters;but to describethatmonsterto someone else, or
recallit yourselfthefollowingday is not so easy-unless thebasic idea is
offloadedfromthemindintothephysicalworld,as by drawinga pictureor
making some notes. Such ideas are difficultforminds to remember,to
manipulate,and to communicate, because theydo notcorrespondto a part
of our evolved psychology.Contrastthiswith thinkingabout, say,some
gossipconcerningan acquaintance.Thatis alwayseasy to rememberand to
pass on. Thisis because itengageswitha partofourevolvedpsychology-
theideas in gossipare exactlythetypesofideas our mindshave evolved to
deal with.In contrast,ideas about monstersand supernaturalbeingshave
no naturalhome withinthemind.
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50 StevenMithen

The "trick"thatmodernhumanslearnedwas to createanotherhome

forsuch ideas--one in the physicalworld,in the formof a carvingor a
painting.Such images thenacted as a cognitiveanchorforthe conceptso
that,wheninthepresenceoftheimage,theidea canbe recalled,manipulated,
and shared (Mithen1998).The same argumentcan be made forritualistic
The
behavior,say people dressingas animalsand actingout performances.
ritualitselfis a cognitiveanchor,an extensionof the mind, a means to
overcome the natural limits on thought(necessarily) imposed by our
evolutionaryhistory.
ritualistic
The materialobjects,social structures, performances,actsof
and
story-telling, complex toolsof modern humans arenot,therefore,
simply
productsor representationsof our innerthoughts.Theyplay an essential
roleinformulating,
manipulating and sharingthosethoughts.In thisregard,
thebrainofmodernhumansmaynot,in itself,have any greaterpowersof
imaginationthan thatof the Neanderthals.It simplyexploitsthe world
outsideoftheskullto augmentitspowersofcreativethought.

Conclusion

There are various typesof human imaginationwhose originslie at

differentplaces in ourevolutionaryhistory.Imaginationin termsofthinking
(perhapsunconsciously) abouttheconsequencesofdifferent coursesofaction
is likelyto be veryold indeed,as thisis a typeof imaginationmostlikely
sharedby manytypesof animals.Imaginationin termsof thinkingabout
thecontentsofothermindsprobablystretches backtothecommonancestor
of 5-6 millionyears ago, and was an essentialmeans of maintainingthe
complexand large social groupsof EarlyHumans. This way of thinking
played an essentialrole in human evolution,and remainscriticalto our
everydaythoughtand behavior.We revelin it,and applaud thoseartists
who place this type of imaginativethoughtat the centerof theirwork.
Imaginationin termsofnarrativewould also havebecomeimportant within
the world of Early Humans, as transmissionof tool-makingskills, the
planningofbig game hunting,and communicationabout new places and
landscapes were essential.In the absence of language,gestureand mime
mayhave played a criticalrole.Butitwas because of--notin spiteof--the
absence of spoken language,thatsuch selectivepressuresmay have been
placed on imaginativeabilities.If anotherindividual could have simply
told what he/she had seen or what was beingplanned,the EarlyHuman
mindmaynothave requiredsuch powersofimagination.

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Evolution
ofImagination 51

Imagination in termsofcreating worldsin whichtherulesofnature

andsociety arebroken-fantasy--is themostrecent formofimagination to
haveevolved.Evolution had guardedagainstsuchwaysofthinking that
arepotentiallyso maladaptive bycreating mindswithbothwaysofthinking
andbodiesofknowledge quiteisolatedfrom eachother. Modernhumans,
especiallythose after50,000 yearsago, learned how to overcomethose
evolutionary constraints by exploitingmaterial culture, by tellingstories,
andperforming ritualsas a meanstooffload andprovidecognitive anchors
forideasthathavenonatural homewithin theevolvedmind.Inthisregard,
themodernbrainis unlikelyto be significantly differentfromthatofa
Neanderthal. Butitis linkedintotheworldofhumanculture thataugments
and extendsitspowersin remarkable ways. It is thislinkagethatleadsto
worksofartandscience, whichthenactas cognitive foundations forfurther
works,and so on,through humanhistory. In recent times,theimaginative
geniusexpressedin theplaysofWilliamShakespeare, thenovelsofJane
Austen, the science of Charles Lyelland the paintingsofSalvadorDali
emergedfromthiscumulative and on-going dialecticbetweenbrainand
culture.
UniversityofReading

Acknowledgments
I am gratefulfortheinvitation
tocontributetothisvolume,and to delivera lecture
at UCSB. The followingfromUCSB helpedmakethatvisitenjoyableand stimulating.
Theirownideas,publicationsandsuggestionshavebeena greathelpinthedevelopment
ofmythinking aboutimagination,and theevolutionofthehumanmind:PorterAbbott,
CharlesBazerman,Leda Cosmides,Paul Hernadi,and JohnTooby.I would also liketo
thankMikeJochim forhissupportand hospitality
duringmyvisitto UCSB.

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