EH 409 Criminal Procedure Case Digests BATCH 1 Cases 1 60 v2

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS | Atty.
Soleng
1. BONIFACIO v. RTC OF MAKATI

[G.R. No. 184800. May 5, 2010.]
FACTS:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent
Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint
before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public
hatred and contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a
defamatory article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the
said company. This is after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss
under the policies they obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding
probable cause to indict the petitioners, filed separate information against them.
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the
grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the
RPC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the
trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the
offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and
first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where
the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner's’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.
HELD:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to
only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.
The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the
offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In
University of San Carlos | EH 409 2018-2019 | Page 1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS | Atty. Soleng
other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication. This is wrong. For the court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pep coalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
This goes against the purpose as to why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel
suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts

2. TIJAM v. SIBONGHANOY
[G.R. No. L-21450. April 15, 1968.]
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c.] and
86[b.], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
HELD:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as
in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July
19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiff's' motion for execution against
the surety x x x

3. ANTIPORDA VS GARCHITORENA
[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999.]
FACTS:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping,
the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the
prosecution to submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the new
information contained the place where the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be

conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the
Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to
hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied.
Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit themselves
to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(2) Whether or not reinvestigation must be made anew.
HELD:
(1) No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the
offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that
the said crime is work connected.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of
estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

(2) No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be
impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the
Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to
the Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated
where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it

is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof,
and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no
cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

4. MIRANDA ET AL. V. TULIAO

[G.R. No. 158763. March 31, 2006.]
FACTS:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were
later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal
in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC
convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the
SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In September 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and

identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued
a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the
urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
HELD:
No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of
the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the

defendant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.

5. REODICA V. CA
[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998.]
FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless

imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before the
Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the
victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in
cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months,
as in the instant case, “the prosecution commenced by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information.” However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with
said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.

Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case
of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised
Penal Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of
the offenses charged in the information in this case.

6. FRANCISCO V. CA
122 SCRA 538 (1983)
FACTS:
On February 6, 1966, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong
Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December
26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry Bernardino. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information against Francisco and Bernardino with the CFI of Rizal of the crime of grave oral
defamation. Later, upon order of the court, the information was amended by adding
statements allegedly uttered by the two accused constituting the crime of slander.
On Feb. 1, 1973, the trial court convicted Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave
oral defamation and sentenced each of them the penalty of arresto mayor and was made to
pay the complainant P10,000. Upon appeal in the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision
was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. Bernardino passed away while this
petition was instituted in the Supreme Court. Francisco, then argues that since the CA had
found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which under Art. 90
of the RPC, prescribes in two months, the CA should have dismissed the case.
Further, Francisco claims that the CA should have acquitted him on the ground that the
said crime had already prescribed as per evidence presented, the alleged defamatory remarks
were committed on December 26, 1965, while the information charged against him was filed
more than four months later.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that "for the purpose of determining the
proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in
the information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as
said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander". Since the prescription for
grave oral defamation is six months, the crime has not yet prescribed when it the information
was filed. Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's
office interrupts the period of prescription. Only 39 days had passed from the time the offense
was allegedly committed to the day of the filing of the complaint.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the CA to be the offense
committed by the petitioners has prescribed.
(2) Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the
prescription of an offense.

HELD:
(1) Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in
the crime charged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of
the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver
offense.
(2) Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without
jurisdiction, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. Thus,
the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription.

7. DOMINGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 109376. January 20, 2000.]
FACTS:
Domingo was accused of violating RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. The accused filed
a motion to quash on the ground that (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
by prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. His motion was denied
by the CA and (3) his right to a speedy trial was violated
ISSUE:
Whether the information should be quashed
HELD:
No. A motion to quash on the ground that the allegations do not constitute the offense
charged should be resolved on the basis of the allegations alone whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. In this case, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation
of RA 3019 so the motion to quash must fail.
The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is
a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said
public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or
in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officer
has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Clearly,
the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. Hence, the motion to quash must fail.
If the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is not known
at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof,
i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Lastly, Domingo cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering
that one of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to
submit his counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved.

8. DOMONDON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 129904. March 16, 2000.]
FACTS:
On February and May 1994, four (4) separate informations were filed at the Sandiganbayan
against certain officials of the Philippine National Police due to the discovery of a chain of
irregularities within the PNP Commands. The petitioner was included as an accused on account
of his approval of the Advice Allotment in the amount of P5M and P15M respectively which
amounts to a violation of the Anti-Graft Law under Sec 3 of RA 3019.
On May 17, 1994, the Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders, the first was ordering the prosecution to
demonstrate probable complicity in the transaction described in the information and the
second order was deferring action on the motion for consolidation considering the uncertainty
of the Court in proceeding the case at this time and considering that only one of the 15 accused
filed a motion for consolidation.
A Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 26, 1997
and included petitioner as they were recommended for further prosecution by the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleges that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent cases
have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has revested" in the latter and "…it is
grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating these cases.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from proceeding with the hearing and other
incidents of Criminal Case No. 20574 against the petitioner during the pendency of the petition.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner are untenable. The Court
explained that “Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either
through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following
instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;

(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance;
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied;
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners.”
Corollary to the rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman
to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he
otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the
investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.
However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when
there is an abuse of discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, we proceed to
determine whether the respondents Ombudsman Desierto and Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Villa acted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Such arbitrariness or
despotism does not obtain here.
With regard to respondents’ denial of petitioner’s motion for consolidation of Crim. Case No.
20574 with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098, we find the same to be
wellfounded.
While the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so
that the informations may not be dismissed, or in the instant case, may not be consolidated
with other pending cases, without the approval of the said court.
Thus, the Court dismissed the petition for prohibition and prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction to nullify the order of the Ombudsman

9. ONG V. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000.]
FACTS:
Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine from the Solid Cement Corporation but
no machine could be given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier
mortgaged to a creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein
petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed
a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
Information for estafa and other deceit was filed with MeTC. Evidence presented consisted of
private documents. Petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, attaching
thereto their demurrer and stressed that all the above-mentioned documents being uncertified
photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence.
MeTC Decision: demurrer denied. The petitioners here then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the RTC.
RTC Decision: reversed decision and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.
CA Decision: reversed RTC’s decision. Order dismissing case was set aside and the accused were
given the option to either present their evidence before the trial court below (Metropolitan
Trial Court) or to submit the case for decision based solely on the prosecutor's evidence. Held
that petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence, should not have
filed a petition for certiorari with the regional trial court.
Petitioner’s Contention: the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that appeal and not certiorari was the remedy
that should have been availed of by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not accepting the demurrer to evidence of petitioners.
HELD:
Yes. The denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.

10. SAMSON V. GUINGONA

[G.R. No. 123504. December 14, 2000.]
FACTS:
On July 13, 1995, at about 8:05 p.m., at Scout Reyes Street, Barangay Paligsahan, Quezon City,
patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the intersection of Scout Reyes
Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with Datu Gemie Sinsuat as passenger.
Instantly, the patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in different parts of the body, inflicting upon him
multiple gunshot wounds, causing his death
The Court finds that at the time of the filing of the information for murder based on the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and Resolution dated September 29,
1995, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against accused
Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order. However, before the
Department of Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, on February 6, 1996, petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court the instant petition to enjoin respondents from further proceeding
with the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a reinvestigation
of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for determination of probable
cause.
HELD:
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will injunction not lie when the
case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. However, in extreme
cases, we have laid the following exceptions:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused;
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and

(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.
As a rule, the Court does not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender.

11. JADEWELL V. LIDUA

[G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.]
FACTS:
Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any motor vehicle
immobilized by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Balajadia and the
other respondents dismantled, took and carried away the clamps attached to the wheel of the
vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed a complaint for robbery against the
respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003. However, the Informations
were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed a motion to quash.
The MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewell‟s subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Jadewell‟s petition for certiorari with RTC was likewise denied.
Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Jadewell argued that the filing of the
criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the
criminal information before Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the
criminal action had prescribed. Respondents argued that the proceedings mentioned in Section
2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. The respondents invoked the
ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged
date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7,
2003.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
HELD:
No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information
tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The
respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes involving a violation
of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal which also featured similar facts and issues with
the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was
received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

12. CITY OF MANILA V. RIZAL

[G.R. No. 7946. March 9, 1914.]
FACTS:
The defendant in this case was convicted in the municipality court of the city of Manila
of a violation of a municipal ordinance against gambling, and appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Manila. In that court a demurrer to the information was sustained on the ground
that the action was brought in the name of the city of Manila, and not in the name of the
United States as required by the provisions of section 2 of General Orders, No. 58.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecutions charging violations of the municipal ordinances of the city
of Manila, for which punishment by fine or imprisonment is prescribed, may be brought in the
name of the city of Manila.
HELD:
No, Section 2 of General Orders, No. 58, provides that in this jurisdiction "all
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the same of the United States against the persons
charged with the offenses." Violations of municipal ordinances for which punishment by fine or
imprisonment is lawfully prescribed are, in our opinion, public offenses as that term is used in
the above-cited section of the order, and prosecutions for such violations of municipal
ordinances must therefore be instituted in the name of the United States.
It is sufficient at this time to point out that there is no express authority granted the city
of Manila in its charter to institute criminal actions in its own name, and that in this jurisdiction
actions instituted to enforce penalties of fine or imprisonment prescribed for the violation of
municipal ordinances are purely criminal actions and are in no sense civil in their nature.

13. NGO YAO TIT V. SHERIFF OF MANILA

[G.R. Nos. L-9619 and L-9620. March 28, 1914.]
FACTS:
Herein petitioners are detained under a commitment issued upon a final judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting them on a new trial, following an appeal from
the municipal court of said city, of a violation of section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, and sentencing
each one of them to pay P100 fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment.
Said accused were arrested in a house, allegedly a Chinese club, where certain utensils
used in smoking opium, namely, a pipe, a lamp and three small packages, two of them empty
and one containing a quantity of opium were found. Sergeant Worrel and Patrolman Penalosa,
as witnesses before said court, testified that a strong odor of opium fumes and an opium pipe
found upon the bed was still warm upon entry.
The trial court declared the accused guilty of violating said ordinance. And so,
petitioners elevated the case to the SC with applications for writs of habeas corpus.
The petitioner’s contended that before a conviction can be had under section 3 of
Ordinance No. 152, it should be proved that the house they visited was one generally used for
smoking opium. As there was no affirmative statement coming from the court that said club
was not destined or generally used for the smoking of opium, and there being no finding that
the accused were unlawfully there, the judgment of conviction has nothing to sustain it and is,
therefore, absolutely void.
A writ of habeas corpus will therefore lie and imprisonment under a judgment
absolutely void is an illegal imprisonment and not only should the court have jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter, the court must have jurisdiction to render the particular
judgment. Stating further that habeas corpus will lie for the discharged of one imprisoned for
an act which does not constitute any offense known to the law;
- A finding with nothing to sustain it is arbitrary and useless and is a nullity;
- Action should have been in the name of the United States, being wrongly entitled, the
court had no jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the action rendering the judgment
of conviction as absolutely void. Therefore, habeas corpus will lie as the imprisonment is illegal.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to be availed of by
the petitioners
HELD:
NO. The trial court had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and the subject
matter. Therefore, if the acts of the petitioners constituted the crime defined in that ordinance,
they were properly convicted. As demonstrated by the evidence, the petitioners were found in
the club house in question and that opium was being smoked therein, it then became the duty

of the court to determine, by the exercise of its judicial functions, whether such acts
constituted the crime defined by the ordinance. This was a judicial determination admittedly
within the jurisdiction and authority of the court to make. The exercise of that jurisdiction
would not result in a void judgment, provided the court kept within the limits thereof. It is clear
that the court kept fully within the limits of its jurisdiction in this case and, a right exercise
within that jurisdiction, determined the question whether the acts developed by the evidence
fell within the prohibition of the ordinance. This same question is one which is passed upon by
a court every time it tries a criminal cause. That is one of the necessary adjudications. If it is to
be held that a wrong determination of that question deprives the court of jurisdiction, then the
correctness of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case will nearly always be determinable by
a writ of habeas corpus. (Ex parte Coy, 127 U. S., 731.) This, of course, is not the function of that
writ, and makers of legislation and constitutions which preserve the writ never intended that it
should be used in that manner and for that purpose.
- Admittedly according to the SC, there was a failure to support the contention. However,
said decision is not wholly founded on nothing contrary to petitioners’ claims. Here, there were
evidence supporting the findings, although not sufficiently.
While the judgment attacked in these proceedings was erroneous and the conviction
unwarranted by the evidence as it stands before us, it was not void. While it may be a case of
improper conviction, the court had jurisdiction to convict and its determination, therefore, is
not a nullity. It necessarily follows that the petitioners are restrained of their liberty by reasons
of being " in custody of an officer under process issued . . . by virtue of a judgment . . . of court
of record, and that the court . . . had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment or
make the order. . . .." (Code Civ. Proc., 528.)
- The bringing of the action in the name of the city of Manila instead of the United States is
an error merely and not a jurisdictional defect. It is not similar to the case where, as claimed by
petitioners, an information is filed by a person who is not authorized in law to file it. Petitioners
were in no sense injured or prejudiced by it.
The defect is one which could have been cured at any stage of the trial by an
amendment on the motion of the court itself or upon the motion of any person interested in
the prosecution. Defects of that character which are not taken advantage of in the court below
in the manner prescribed by law cannot be raised for the first time here, and especially in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus was not intended and cannot be used to correct mere errors
or defects in proceedings, and accordingly does not lie in the present applications.

14. PEOPLE V. MENDEZ

[G.R. No. 132546. July 5, 2000.]
FACTS:
Accused was found guilty of raping his 16 year old step daughter. The complaint specifically
accused him of rape committed “by means of force.” The information alleged that the carnal
intercourse was “against the will” or “without the consent” of the victim. He assails the
defective information.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint prevails in case of variance between the victim’s complaint and the
information in crimes against chastity.
HELD:
The failure of the information to state that the accused raped the victim “through force or
intimidation” is not a fatal omission in this case because the complaint alleged the ultimate fact
that the accused raped the victim “by means of force”. So at the outset, the appellant could
have readily ascertained that he was being accused of rape committed through force, a charge
that sufficiently complies with Art. 335. However, since the information alleges that the victim
was his daughter, when in truth the actual relationship of the appellant with the victim is that
of stepfather and stepdaughter, the appellant can be held liable only for simple rape.

15. TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR

[G.R. No. 122452. January 29, 2001.]
FACTS:
Sometime before November 1992, Vic Ang Siong issued a check to Concord-World
Properties, Inc. The check amounted to P83.5 million. The check however bounced. In
November 1992, Tam Wing Tak filed an affidavit-complaint for violation of the Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law against Ang Siong. The fiscal did not file a criminal information against Ang Siong
because apparently Concord-World and Ang Siong are settling out of court (in fact Ang Siong
already paid P19 million); and that Tam Wing Tak was not authorized by the Board of Directors
of Concord-World to sue Ang Siong. Tam Wing Tak then filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the fiscal to file the information. Judge Ramon Makasiar dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petition should be granted.

(2) Whether or not the suit be considered a derivative suit where the Board’s
authorization may not be had.
HELD:
(1) No. The petition for mandamus shall not lie. There was no grave abuse of discretion
when the fiscal refused to file the information. Concord-World is the named payee in the check
that bounced. As payee, Concord-World is the injured party hence only Concord-World can file
the criminal case against Ang Siong but it did not do so because it chose to amicably settle the
issue with Ang Siong. Where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its
board of directors or trustees. This can be delegated but Tam Wing Tak never proved that he
was authorized by the Board of Concord-World.
(2) No. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing
for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative
cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who
may wish to join him in the suit. In this case, this was not complied with. Hence, Tam Wing Tak
cannot sue Ang Siong.

16. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU

[G.R. Nos. 111771-77. November 9, 1993.]
FACTS:
Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with the rape-
slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought the petition
to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the information for
rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground he is being charged
with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. The petitioner submits that
the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the two victims
in these cases could not have died seven times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the
grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons.
HELD:
The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape
with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the
crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on
the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a
new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with
homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-
accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six.
Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution
is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing
her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them
decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged
separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the
petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them
allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate
rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of
Sarmenta.

17. PEOPLE V. OSO

[G.R. No. L-42571. October 10, 1935.]
FACTS:
Oso is accused of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, a complex crime under the RPC. He
allegedly kidnapped a married girl and forced her to cohabit with him. Oso even drove out his
wife and children to be able to cohabit with the girl. After multiple attempts to free the girl
failed, Oso was finally arrested and put behind bars. By then, the victim had been living with
Oso for a week. A few days after Oso’s arrest, he escaped and was only captured almost a year
later. After trial, the court convicted Oso of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Oso’s conviction on the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is
correct.
HELD:
While the facts alleged in the information filed are sufficient to constitute the crime of forcible
abduction, they are not sufficient to constitute the crime of rape as define under the RPC. And
even though there was an attempt to correct the defects in the information later, but since the
offense is jurisdictional in nature and the omission thereof is a fatal flaw and cannot be
corrected in the latter stages of the trial, Oso should therefore only be convicted of the crime of
forcible abduction only, and not the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.

18. VISBAL V. JUDGE RAMOS

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306. March 20, 2001.]
FACTS:
Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal delegated his prosecutory authority in a certain criminal case to
the Station Commander or duly authorized representative citing the Rules of Court. He
contended that there was no regular prosecutor available in the respondent Judge’s sala in
Jaro, Leyte since Visbal is officially and regularly assigned in the RTC Branch VIII of Tacloban City
(travel time from Tacloban to Jaro is more or less 1 hour para ma gets nato kung unsa siya ka
layo so mej layo siya but sakto lang) forcing him to delegate the prosecution of the case to the
police investigator. However, on February 18, 1998 Judge Ramos issued an order directing him
to appear for the prosecution despite the fact that he has already delegated it to the authorized
representative.
Visbal argued that respondent Judge was motivated by malice and bad faith when he issued the
order because Visbal filed and action against Judge Ramos back in 1994. He also alleges that
Ramos deliberately failed to rule on the prosecution’s offer of evidence which was submitted as
early as March 10, 1997.
Judge Ramos denied said liabilities and admits that he ruled on the Offer of Evidence only on
November 24, 1997 (after seven months) but he insists that it was not done deliberately since
he wanted the accused to have a no other chance to make a comment on the said offer.
OCA: Recommended that respondent judge be sanctioned for his unjustified delay on the
resolution of the prosecution’s offer of evidence but he did not abuse his authority when he
issued the assailed order to Visbal pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 110.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the Order directing Visbal to continue on his appearance as
prosecution in the said criminal case constitutes gross ignorance of the law given that he has
already delegated it
HELD:
No. The said order does not constitute gross ignorance of the law. It is in accord with Sec 5 Rule
110 (Revised). It is a general rule that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control
and direction of the prosecutor. An exception would be the assigned prosecutor is not
available, in cases before the MTC and MCTC it may be prosecuted by the offended party, any
peace officer or any public officer. However, such authority ceases upon the actual intervention
of the prosecutor or upon elevation to the RTC. The said exception must be applied strictly
citing the case of People v. Ramos that it is necessary that the prosecution be handled by
persons skilled in the said function. Instead of being entrusted to private persons or public
officers with little or no preparation for this responsibility. In the case at bar, a prosecutor has
already intervened in the case Prosecutor Ricardo P. Candido but since he was hospitalized, he
transferred it to Prosecutor Visbal. Hence, a prosecutor was available. There was no reason for

the delegation of the prosecutor authority to the police chief of the municipality. Gross
ignorance of the law is a serious accusation so complainant should be more circumspect in
hurling this charge.
19. PEOPLE V. BERIALES
[G.R. No. L-39962. April 7, 1976.]
FACTS:
Three men (Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio, and Pablito Custodio ) who were charged for
the murder of Saturnina on Sept. 13, 1974. Before trial, the accused moved for reinvestigation
which was granted. Before its completion, however, the trial court relying on the constitutional
right of the accused for speedy trial, finally set the case for hearing, notwithstanding vigorous
objections thereto on the part of the accused, on the ground that the City Fiscal had not yet
completed the reinvestigation. The City Fiscal through Special Counsel, then manifested that
the private prosecutor be authorized to conduct the trial in behalf of the prosecution. When
the case was called, counsel for the accused reiterated his objection to the trial and requested
the court to wait for the Fiscal who might be able to submit his report on the reinvestigation
but the same was turned down. Subsequently, the court ordered for the arraignment of the
accused. The latter refused to plead, whereupon, the court entered a plea of not guilty for
them and ordered the private prosecutor to commence the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. However, counsel for accused refused to cross-examine the witnesses which
refusal was considered as waiver. Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case, which was
then, declared submitted for decision. On the date set for the promulgation of the judgment,
the accused manifested their disagreement to the promulgation of the sentence on the ground
that the trial was irregular. The court nevertheless proceeded with said promulgation and
convicted the accused of the crime of murder. Appellants appealed invoking that the Trial court
committed irregularity.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Instance of Leyte committed irregularity when it ordered the
arraignment and trial of the case before the completion of the reinvestigation by the fiscal.
HELD:
We sustain the appellants/accused. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and
trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of
such reinvestigation.
The Supreme Court held that since the reinvestigation had not yet been completed there was a
possibility for the City Fiscal to change his conclusion. The trial court thus committed a serious
procedural irregularity when it ordered the arraignment and trial of the case before the
completion of the reinvestigation by the fiscal.


20. BRAVO V. CA
[G.R. No. 48772. May 8, 1992.]
FACTS:
Private respondent Vina sued petitioner Bravo with a civil suit in which the CFI rendered
judgment on Vina’s favor. To delay the execution of his properties, petitioner filed a motion to
stay with the CA, which it granted. But the sheriff was not notified of such development and
proceeded to execute the writ in the absence of Vina. The properties of Bravo were thus seized
and sold at auction.
As a result of these events, Bravo filed a complaint for robbery against Vina and others who
participated in the seizure of his properties. Bravo then furnished copies of the complaint
against Vina to several government agencies. He also sent a letter to the Provincial
Commander of Naga City saying that Vina had threatened him and his family times
Eventually, the complaint for robbery was dismissed by the fiscal and because of the letter
which Bravo wrote and spread about Vina, the latter filed a complaint for libel against the
former. After trial, the court convicted Bravo for libel. He was sentenced to prison and ordered
to pay Vina damages. Bravo appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner Bravo is guilty of libel.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner’s contention that his imputations against Vina are covered by privileged
communication thus, he could not be held liable is not meritorious as the nature of
communication as privileged was lost the moment he imputed malice to VIna. His other
accusations that Vina threatened him was also not true as he had taken back his statements in
open court.
His other argument that the information is defective because the charge was in filed in Quezon
City rather than Naga City is also erroneous because the RPC allows libel charges to be filed
either in the place where the libelous material was first printed and published or in the place of
residence of the complaint. In this case, the complainant chose the second option.

21. CHUA-BURCE V. CA
[G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000.]
FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, requested through his Assistant to conduct physical bundle count of the cash
inside of the vault, and is expected to be 4,000,000. After the physical bundle count there was
shortage of 150,000. To determine if there was really shortage a verification of the records was
conducted, and it was verified that there was really shortage. A investigation was conducted
and it was discovered that Chua-Burce, cash custodian, was responsible.
To recover the amount a civil case was filed against Chua-burce, which was also followed by the
filing of the criminal case for estafa.
Accused then filed for suspension of criminal case on ground of a prejudicial question, which
was granted but CA later on ruled that there was no prejudicial question.
While criminal case was suspended, the civil case continued. By the time of arraignment, the
civil case was submitted for decision. The partied then, agreed to adopt the respective evidence
in the civil case for the criminal case. Such was agreement was in written form, which was with
the conforme of the public prosecutor
After which RTC convicted accused, who appealed it to CA which also affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1) Was there a valid trial of criminal case?
(2) whether the elements of the crime of estafa under 315 was proved beyond
reasonable doubt?
HELD:
(1) There was a valid criminal case. The records clearly show that the pre-trial agreement
was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5
of Rule 110 requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecutions by private persons." The records show that the public
prosecutor actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its
inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their
respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2
(e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides that during pre-trial conference,
the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious
trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, reduced to writing such
agreement.
(2) The Court, however, ruled that petitioner cannot be convicted of estafa
through misappropriation because petitioner is a mere cash custodian who had
no juridical possession over the missing funds. In the absence of the element of

juridical possession, petitioner cannot be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (1)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner was acquitted.

22. PEOPLE V. TANADA

[G.R. No. L-32215. October 17, 1988.]
FACTS:
An information was filed before the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office charging Romulo Prostrero with
rape. The offended party wrote a letter to the Fiscal indicating her intention to file a rape case
against Prostrero for allegedly ravishing her without her consent while drugged and thus unable
to defend herself.
Prostrero then moved to quash the information against him stating that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged as the complaint was not signed by the offended party as
required both in the RPC and in the Rules of Court that crimes such as rape, which at that time
was still considered a private crime could only be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the
offended party. The respondent Judge granted the accused’s motion and dismissed the case
over the objection of the prosecution. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was also
denied, thus this petition.
ISSUES:
Was the respondent Judge correct in granting the accused’s motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction?
HELD:
No he was not. It is true that the RPC and the Rules of Court mandate that the crime of rape be
prosecuted only upon the complaint of the offended party, but the provisions in the RPC and
Rules of Court do not determine the jurisdiction of the courts over the offense, because the
court’s jurisdiction is determined by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and not the RPC. The required
complaint is only a pre-condition for the authorities’ power to prosecute the accused.
Jurisprudence has established that the overriding consideration in determining whether or not
the pre-condition as prescribed by the RPC is the intent of the affected parties to seek judicial
redress for the offense committed. Thus, the respondent Judge was in error when he granted
the accused’s motion to quash because it is clear from the letter complaint that it contains all
the elements for a valid complaint. Names of defendants, designation of the offense, acts or
omissions constituting the offense, the name of offended party and the time and place of the
commission of the offense. Thus, petition is granted.

23. PEOPLE V. BUGTONG

[G.R. No. 75853. January 31, 1989.]
FACTS:
Sometime in July, 1984, Luisa Cutiam noticed that the stomach of her daughter Irene Cutiam,
who was 15 years old, was growing bigger and bigger. Dr. Salome Pilit, a government physician
who conducted a medical examination confirmed that Irene was pregnant. Irene, at first, would
not reveal the identity of the man responsible for her condition, but when she felt something
moving inside her belly, she confessed to her mother Luisa that Andres Bugtong, their
neighbour, raped her and that her refusal to talk earlier was due to the fear that accused would
make good his threats to kill her should she squeal. With this information, Luisa, together with
Irene, went to the Acop Tublay Police Station to report the crime which resulted in Irene's
pregnancy. Irene gave birth to a baby boy later on. Andres Bugtong was thereafter charged
before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet with the crime of Rape in which the
accused plead not guilty.
On motion of the fiscal, Irene was made to undergo psychological testing which revealed that
she had an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of only 47, equivalent to the mental age of a person
between the ages of 5 and 8 years and her mental retardation was classified as moderate.
Irene Cutiam testified that one day in January 1984, she was sent by her mother Luisa Cutiam to
the house of Andres Bugtong, the herein accused to pay her account to the latter in the amount
of TEN PESOS (P10.00). This fact of indebtedness and payment of the same was previously
testified on by Luisa Cutiam. She claimed that when she handed the money to Andres Bugtong,
the latter grabbed her other hand and placed her on the bed, and when she tried to shout, the
accused covered her mouth with his hand and allegedly threatened her by saying. 'If you will
report the matter, I will kill you, anyway our house are near each other.”
Andres Bugtong gave a different version. According to him, one day in January 1984, Irene
came to their house after lunch. Andres Bugtong was then alone. Without any word, she just
entered the one-room house, sat on the bed and kept on smiling without any word sat beside
the complainant, who in turn leaned on the former with her breast on his left shoulder. At this
stage when accused was already sexually aroused, he laid down the complainant on the bed
and after closing the door, he removed his clothes, sat between the legs of the former, lifted
her skirt and when he noticed that complainant had no panty, he proceeded with the sexual
intercourse with both hands holding her shoulders while the latter took hold of his waist. This
was the first sexual intercourse which was repeated four or five times during the succeeding
months of 1984.
The trial court rendered judgment finding Andres Bugtong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape as defined in Article 335 (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Appellant contends that as rape is a personal offense which, under Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, now Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985

Rules on Criminal Procedure, must be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended party,
the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the instant case on the basis of the
Information signed by the fiscal alone.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the instant case on the basis
of the Information signed by the fiscal alone since rape as a personal offense be prosecuted
upon a complaint filed by the offended party?
Whether or not the trial court erred on finding that he is guilty of the crime of rape as defined
in Article 335 (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
In the case at bar, it is evident that the prosecution for rape was initiated by the offended party
herself with the assistance of her mother. The Information filed by the Fiscal said so, thus:
"The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal, upon a sworn originally filed by the offended
party accuses Andres Bugtong of the crime of Rape . . ." The appellant's insinuation that the
Information should have been signed and sworn to by the complainant is incorrect for it is not
necessary for the complainant to sign and verify the Information for rape filed by the Fiscal.
There is merit in this contention. Herein appellant was tried on an information charging him
with rape committed thru force and intimidation (355 par. 1), his conviction for rape committed
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious (355 par. 2) would be
violative of his constitutional right as an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
This is not to say however, that the conviction of accused-appellant should be set aside
altogether. Only his conviction under par. (2) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is
nullified as his guilt of the crime of rape committed thru force and intimidation, as charged in
the Information, has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, except for the modifications that (1) the conviction of accused-appellant under
paragraph (2) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is set aside and (2) the civil indemnity to
be paid to the victim is increased to P30,000.00, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respect.

24. PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA

[G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them, and such connubial disharmony eventuated
inn private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany while
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation. The Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon, and as a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings, however, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment. A motion to
quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was
denied by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge has acquired jurisdiction to try petitioner for the crime of
adultery?
HELD:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Corollary to such
exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. As cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery. When said respondent initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to

protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the
particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would henceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other. To put it in simpler terms, he can no longer have standing to initiate the
complaint of adultery which can only be filed by the aggrieved husband, since at the time he
filed the complaint, he is no longer considered the husband of petitioner via the divorce decree
of the Federal Republic of Germany, such requirement is jurisdictional which insufficiency
thereof results in the court being bereft of jurisdiction . Therefore this motion is granted.

25. PEOPLE V. SCHNECKENBURGER

[G.R. No.L-48143. November 10, 1941.]
FACTS:
Roberto married Elena Ramirez Cartagena on March 16, 1926 but after 7 years they agreed to
live separately. They then executed a document which states that they agree to live apart from
each other for the rest of their lives and will not intervene, under any circumstances, in each
other’s public or private life. On June 15, 1935, Roberto secures a decree of divorce from the
civil court in Chihuahua, Mexico without ever leaving the Philippines. On May 11, 1936:
Roberto marries Julia Medel in Malabon. Then, 2 actions were filed against Roberto:
a. Bigamy (Court of First Instance in Rizal) – convicted, penalty: 2 months and one day of
arresto mayor
b. Concubinage (Court of First Instance in Manila) – Accused posed a plea of double
jeopardy and the case was dismissed.
The Fiscal appealed and the Court held the dismissal to be premature.
The case was then remanded to the trial court. He was finally convicted and sentenced to two
months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment of the court of first instance in Manila was valid, and that the
respondent is guilty of concubinage.
HELD:
No, Roberto should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage.
The document executed by the accused and his first wife, in which they agreed to “complete
liberty of action”, while illegal for the purpose it was executed, constitutes a VALID CONSENT to
the act of concubinage.
Under Art 344 of the RPC: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders. Pardon refers to offense AFTER its commission, while
consent must have been intended to refer to the offense PRIOR to its commission.
Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting
the offense. Judgment is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

26. FERNANDEZ V. LANTIN

[G.R. No. L-44759. December 17, 1976.]
FACTS:
A libel case was filed against petitioner accusing him of writing and publishing a letter wherein
he maliciously imputed a crime, vice, or defect, to one Iluminada Tandiama. The letter stated
that: Iluminada, an employee of the Bureau and married to Celedonio, was allegedly discovered
having an “illicit relationship” with Hector Valdeleon, who was a Prison Guard. When the Acting
Director learned of it, he dismissed the prison guard while Iluminada, being the niece of the
Acting Director, was spared. The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that
according to Article 360 RPC, the criminal action for defamation cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
Assistant City Fiscal opposed saying that the “illicit relation” does not necessarily connote to
adultery. The respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion saying that the imputation
of the “illicit relation” could be a vice or defect hence not covered by Article 360 RPC which only
covers crimes such as adultery, concubinage, etc. Hence this petition to for certiorari
questioning the validity of the order of respondent judge.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the terms “illicit relation” and “paramour” stated in the letter connote the
commission of the crime of adultery.
(2) If yes, whether the criminal action cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
HELD:
(1) Yes. When the term "illicit relationship" is used to describe the relationship between a
married woman and a man other than her husband and at the same time the former is labelled
as the “paramour” of the latter, there can be no other purpose than to imply that the two are
having carnal intercourse with each other. Thus, the phrase "illicit relationship" when used in a
complaint for abduction had been construed to mean clearly the existence of an unlawful
sexual intercourse. Similarly, the word "paramour", according to Webster, is "one who loves or
is loved illicitly; one taking the place without the legal rights of a husband or wife; mistress —
called also lover." To state that Iluminada is having carnal intercourse with Hector is to accuse
her of committing adultery. For adultery means the carnal relation between a married woman
and a man who is not her husband.
(2) Yes. Article 360 (4) RPC requires that if the defamation consists in the imputation of a
crime against chastity, such as adultery, concubinage, etc., a complaint by the offended party is
required.

However, the SC ruled that this error could be corrected without sustaining the motion to
quash and dismissing the case. Pursuant to Sec. 1 (a) of PD 77, under which the Assistant City
Fiscal conducted the preliminary investigation, the statement of the complainant was sworn to
before the aforesaid Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the recitals in said sworn statement
contain all those required of a complaint under the rules, a copy of said verified statement of
the complainant should be filed with respondent Court in order to comply with the
requirements of Article 360; otherwise, the Fiscal should file with said court a verified
complaint of the offended party. Petition denied but ordered the Fiscal to file with respondent
court, within 10 days from notice, either the aforestated sworn statement of the offended
party, or her verified complaint.

27. PEREZ VS HAGONOY RURAL BANK

[G.R. No.126210, March 9, 2000.]
FACTS:
Private respondent owns Hagonoy Rural Bank which employed Perez as Officer in Charge,
Cashier and Teller, along with several others (Fabian et. Al.) Private respondent filed a case for
estafa against the said employees and 2 outsiders (Jordan and Mangahas). This was for
anomalous withdrawals unearthed by the auditing firm in the course of tis audit of the
company. Finding a prima facie case to file a case for estafa through falsification of commercial
document, the fiscal recommended that on information be filed against in Court. The charges
for Jordan and Mangahas were however, dismissed. The private respondent for her part,
moved to reconsider the dismissal of charges of Jordan and Mangahas. The fiscal granted the
private respondents Motion for Reconsideration. The SOJ then ordered the fiscal to dismiss the
charges against Perez, for insufficient evidence. The fiscal, acting on such orders, moved to
dismiss the case against Perez, and to amend the information to exclude Perez. Private
respondent moved to reconsider, but such was denied by the trial court on the ground that
private respondent had no legal personality to question the dismissal of charges against Perez.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Judge Masadao committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner filed by the prosecutor.
(2) WON Respondent Hagonoy has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the
trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the
prosecutor.
HELD:
Petition was denied.
(1) Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice. Judge Masadaos reliance on the recommendation on the dismissal
of the case against the petitioner was an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court's pronouncement in Crespo v.
Mogul as reiterated in the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

"…The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence
against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial
judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise
of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency…”
(2) Respondent Hagonoy had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against
the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Cited in the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, which says:
"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed
by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case
so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said
complainant."
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to
bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the
courts of law.
Also, the very nature of the offense charged in this case is estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, which connotes damages for which the accused may be held civilly
liable in case of conviction. It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may
file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to
move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against
the petitioner.

28. PEOPLE V. BAYYA

[G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000.]
FACTS:
Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape as
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
7659 before the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela.
On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the grounds that the
information charging of the offense did not made any mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he
was only charged using Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that
which is provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As
such, in convicting him under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a transgression of his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondent’s right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him.
HELD:
Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the information indicting him
and nothing more.
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S.
Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is
not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than
what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may
be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or
information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed
of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an
accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is
tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.

29. SERRA V. MORTIGA

204 U.S. 470 (1907)
FACTS:
Adriano Mortiga filed a complaint of adultery against his wife, Maria Oblena committed with
Vicente Serra. The defendants were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. They were convicted by
the trial court, stating in their written opinion that by analyzing the testimony and pointing out
that all the essential ingredients of the crime of adultery, as defined by the articles of the penal
code already referred to, were shown to have been committed. The accused were sentenced to
pay one-half of the costs and to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day. The
record does not disclose that any objection was taken to the sufficiency of the complaint before
the trial. Indeed, it does not appear that by objection in any form, directly or indirectly, was any
question raised in the trial court concerning the sufficiency of the complaint. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not objections to the sufficiency of the complaint of statements constituting an

offense be considered on appeal.
HELD:
No. "The objections to the complaint, based upon an insufficient statement of the facts
constituting the offense, cannot be considered here, because they were not presented in the
court below.
Under the RPC, it will be seen that an essential ingredient of the crime of adultery, as therein
defined, is knowledge on the part of the man charged of the fact that the woman with whom
the adultery was committed was a married woman. Although there were deficiencies in the
complaint because it did not specify the place where the crime was committed, nor does it
expressly state that Serra knew that Maria Obleno was at the time a married woman,
objections of that nature must be taken at the trial, and but when no such challenge was made
in the trial court before judgment, no denial of the guarantees of the statutory bill of rights
arose from the action of the appellate court in refusing to entertain an objection to the
sufficiency of the complaint because no such ground was urged in the trial court.
While the powers of the Supreme Court hears a case on appeal as a trial de novo. As pointed
out in the Kepner case, whilst that court on appeal has power to re-examine the law and facts,
it does so on the record and does not retry in the fullest sense.

30. PEOPLE V. NARVAES

[G.R. No. L-39799, March 20, 1934.]
FACTS:
On August 28, 1932, Pedro Narvaes (farmer-tenant) inflicted 3 wounds using a penknife on
Benito de Silva (foreman) which caused his untimely death. Narvaes attacked Benito as the
latter embarrassed him in front of the rest of the farmer-tenants. Defense tried to prove that
when the Narvaes was already plowing, Benito continued to insult him. It was also alleged that
Benito caught him by the neck, choked him and threw him to the ground where Benito
mounted on top of Narvaes and placed his knee on Narvaes’ abdomen without loosening his
grip on his neck; and that it was under these circumstances when the Narvaes remembered his
penknife. With this, Narvaes pleads justification of his acts, insisting that he justly acted in self-
defense.
Narvaes was charged and convicted for homicide in 1933 sentencing him to fourteen years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties to
indemnify the heirs of his victim, Benito de Silva, in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs of
the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in not declaring that the defendant's true name is Primo
Narvaes instead of Pedro Narvaes.
HELD:
No. The weight of the evidence shows that the appellant's true name is Pedro Narvaes, not
Primo Narvaes. The baptismal certificates of Primo and Pedro and which were duly admitted
without any objection on the part of the defense, show that the said two persons are brothers
by the same father and mother and are furthermore grandsons of the same paternal and
maternal grandparents. There is a little discrepancy on the father’s name, however, it is of no
consequence because Leoncio and Lucio sound practically the same, and the error in their
spelling must have been due to carelessness on the part of the clerk who prepared and wrote in
the baptismal record.
The witnesses claimed that appellant is the same Pedro Narvaes, elder son of the spouses
Leoncio or Lucio Narvaes and Teodora Castillo, not Primo Narvaes, who is the second son of the
said spouses, and who does not live with them during the school year because he is studying in
another municipality different from Cabuyao, Laguna. Also, when the appellant was arraigned
under the name of Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he merely
entered his plea of "not guilty" under the said name. It was on that occasion that he should
have for the first time raised the question of his identity, by filing a demurrer based on the

court's lack of jurisdiction over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as Pedro
Narvaes, not Primo Narvaes. Not having filed the said demurrer, it must necessarily be
understood that he renounced it and therefore he is now estopped from raising, or insisting to
raise, the same question, not only in this appeal but even in the trial.
Sentence is affirmed in toto. However, in view of Act No. 4103, which provides for an
indeterminate sentence, and taking into consideration the youth of the appellant, who is only
19 years old when he committed the crime, the minimum of the said penalty imposed upon
him is fixed at six years and one day of prision mayor, so that the same shall be understood to
be from six years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal. So ordered.

31. PEOPLE V. RAMOS

[G.R. No. L-2171. March 4, 1950.]
FACTS:
By order of the Mayor of Pandan, Antique, policemen were sent to implement arrest warrants
against 2 individuals and to check reports of unrest in the neighborhood.
They were not able to go the place agreed, so a policeman was sent to look form them, but
when the said policeman arrived at the house of a certain Napat, 3 men caught him. He was
able to run to the house but then 4 men armed with guns and other high-powered firearms
caught him. When the policemen sent to implement the arrest warrant arrived, the 4 men
(including the accused) fired a barrage of bullets which killed 2 of the policemen while the
others fled in fear. Eventually, the 4 men responsible for the deaths of the 2 policemen were
charged with robbery with homicide while accused Ramos was charged with illegal possession
of firearms. The CFI convicted Ramos and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In his appeal,
Ramos contends that he was not properly identified, thus the case against him should be
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case against Ramos should be dismissed on the ground he cited.
HELD:
No. Although Ramos contends that that he is called Aurelio Lagon and Ide Lagon Ramos, the
evidence clearly contradicts his claim. He used the name Ide Lagon Ramos in all his signatures
and not Aurelio Lagon. He also be made Napat, the owner of the house he stayed in when the
crime was committed, that his name is Ide Lagon Ramos and in fact he was arrested under that
name. Thus, the case against the accused Ide Lagon Ramos should not be dismissed, but in fact
affirmed because the evidence clearly points to him and his companions as the perpetrators of
the crime and the defenses he presented are not enough to contravert the evidence of the
prosecution pointing to him as one of the culprits.

32. PEOPLE V. PERRERAS

[G.R. No. 139622. July 31, 2001.]
FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the trial court convicting accused Perreras of murder and
sentencing him to death. In his appeal before the Court, accused maintains that the trial court
erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness Salazar. He pointed out
several inconsistencies in his testimony such as the ocular inspection of the area was east of the
shed was inconsistent with Salazar’s testimony that he was facing west when the event
transpired. Second, the location of the electric post which illuminated the vicinity was not 20
meters in front of the house as Salazar claimed, but on its southern direction 100 meters away.
Third, it was impossible for him to have asked directions to the house of Manoling Pastoral
because he personally knew Pastoral and the location of his house.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder and whether or not the imposition of the death
penalty on the accused is proper.
HELD:
The trial court was correct in convicting the accused of murder. But as to the penalty of death
imposed on him, the Court found the same to be improper as not all the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances were alleged in the complaint. This is in light of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure were given retroactive effect to benefit the accused. Thus, for the
maximum penalty to be appreciated, the information must contain all qualifying and
aggravating circumstances in the crime charged. Since dwelling was alleged in the information,
it cannot be considered to raise the penalty to death.
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies in Salazar’s testimony, the Court found them to be
minor, which would not affect his credibility as a witness. The court gave credence to the
ocular inspection which settled all doubts regarding the positions of the structures within the
crime scene. Said findings are entitled to great respect as the trial court judge had the
opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses’ demeanor.

33. PEOPLE V. LABADO

[G.R. No. L-38548. July 24, 1980.]
FACTS:
Engracia Baclas was walking from the house of her sister to her house when 5 men approached
her and asked her for tuba. When she told them she had none, they followed her into her
house, demanded money from her and her husband, took money from them held her husband
hostage and then the 5 men took turns in raping Engracia. One of the men was identified to be
accused Pauling. He was the only one apprehended and he reportedly waived his right to a
preliminary investigation. He was charged with robbery with rape and after trial on the merits,
he was convicted and sentenced to death. Hence this automatic appeal to the SC. One of
Pauling’s arguments is that the offence for which he is charged for was not properly designated
as it did not mention Art. 335 of the RPC and thus he was depreived of his right to be informed
of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused was deprived of his right to be informed because the offense was not
properly designated.
HELD:
No. The accused was not deprived of his right to be informed of the accusation against him.
The fact that Art. 335 of the RPC was not mentioned in the information is not fatal because
such defect is merely to form and it did not in any way prejudice the defendant’s susbstantial
rights. This is especially so because the facts constituting the offense is clearly stated in the
information. Thus the information is valid.
And because the evidence against the accused overwhelmingly proves beyond reasonable
doubt that he was guilty for the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the guilty charge
against him is affirmed, with modification of reducing his penalty to reclusion perpetua due to
the divided voting of the SC Justices.

34. PEOPLE V. TORRES

[G.R. No. 76711. September 26, 1988.]
FACTS:
On Nov 1983 at around 7:00 p.m., Herminio Nocum, a bicycle mechanic, went to Ventanilla
Street on his bike to practice caroling with friends lasting until 11:00 p.m. On his way
home, Nocum met Erwin Alcantara who was on his way to buy pandesal. Alcantara then asked
Nocum to accompany him and rode the bicycle in tandem to the bakery but found it closed.
On their way home, they met Torres and Salas who waved at them. They approached them and
Alcantara went off the bike and talked to them. After a few seconds Nocum heard Torres
challenging Alcantara to a fist fight stating, "Pare, gaano ka ba kalaki; magsukatan o
magsuntukan na laang tayo." Torres pulled out his knife and pointed it to Alcantara at the same
time telling Salas "bunutan mo na iyan."
Salas followed the bidding of Torres and stabbed the left shoulder of Nocum while Alcantara
was also being stabbed by Torres. While Salas tried to stab again Nocum, Torres grabbed his
wrist watch. Nocum and Alcantara was able to run away.
Nocum and Alcantara tried to go to Pasay City General Hospital but was referred to Ospital ng
Maynila which did not admit them as well for lack of x-ray. They were rushed instead to the
Philippine General Hospital where Nocum was confined for 5 days but with Alcantara dead
from multiple stab wounds (2 on the chest and 1 at the back).
Nocum gave his statement to Police Officer Ilas of Pasay City Police Station. Torres, picked up
for another robbery case, was pointed at by Nocum as the one who grabbed his watch.
An amended information for violation of P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Highway Robbery) was filed before
the RTC of Pasay. The trial court convicted the accused, Marvin Torres, for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Erwin Alcantara in the sum of 63, 000.00Php.
An appeal was filed by herein accused before the SC with the following assigned errors:
1. The Trial Court erred in giving faith and credence to the incredible and unbelievable
testimony of Herminio Nocum.
2. The Trial Court erred in giving weight and consideration to the unverified statement of
Aurora Torres.
3. The Trial Court erred in not giving weight and consideration to the defense raised by accused
Marvin Torres.
4. That conspiracy was not proven as a fact.

5. That granting that accused Torres committed the acts complained of, the Trial Court erred in
finding him guilty of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide instead of the separate
offense of Homicide and Theft.
6. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the said crime in the absence of evidence
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court in convicting the accused of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide was proper.
HELD:
It is clear that accused-appellant and Salas acted in concert in assaulting, stabbing and robbing
Nocum and Alcantara of their wrist watches. They admitted that they had borrowed the
weapon the night before the incident and were together again the following night with the said
weapon. They were loitering in the vicinity at the unholy hour ready to challenge anyone to
fight and divest them of their belongings. Each of them stabbed the victims and succeeded in
grabbing their watches. There can be no question about the existence of conspiracy.
Accused-appellant cannot be held guilty of the separate offenses of homicide and theft. With
conspiracy having been proven, the act of one is the act of all. The plan to commit robbery and
its eventual commission by the accused-appellant and Salas is unquestionable, homicide and
frustrated homicide were committed on the occasion of the robbery.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It was not necessary
for witness and victim Nocum to have seen the actual act of stabbing by accused-appellant of
the deceased Alcantara. The combined circumstances that Nocum saw accused-appellant with
the knife, the weapon that the latter admittedly borrowed the night before; that accused-
appellant told Salas "bunutan mo na yan" after which Salas, using his own weapon, pre-
occupied himself with stabbing Nocum; that when Nocum heard a moan, he looked back and
saw Alcantara holding his face and his wound at the back; and that only Alcantara and accused-
appellant were at Nocum's back at the precise moment that Alcantara was being stabbed — all
point to no other conclusion but that it was accused-appellant who had stabbed Alcantara,
while Salas was stabbing Nocum.

35. PEOPLE V. COSARE

[G.R. No. L-6544. August 25, 1954.]
FACTS:
On July 1, 1950, one Valeria Pagas filed against the accused a complaint for "Abuse Against
Chastity". The complaint was subscribed to by her as required by law. On August 3, 1950, the
complaint was amended by the Acting Chief of Police charging the accused with "Qualified
Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries", and on September 23, 1950, the complaint was
further amended by the Chief of Police charging the accused with the same offense of
"Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries." The Justice of the Peace of Tubigon,
Bohol, with whom the above mentioned complaints were filed, conducted the preliminary
investigation having in view the second amended complaint. Thereafter, the Justice of the
Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.
On January 24, 1951, the Provincial Fiscal filed against the accused an information charging him
with the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness", which was amended on August 29, 1951, charging
him with the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness Thru Qualified Trespass to Dwelling." In the
meantime, the accused filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was denied in an order of September 1, 1951. The accused was then
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
On April 3, 1952, the case was called for trial, and it was at this instance that counsel for the
accused reiterated his motion to quash on the plea that the accused was given the benefit of
preliminary investigation, not in connection with the complaint filed by the offended party, but
with that filed by the Chief of Police of Tubigon, a matter which places the case beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, and considering this plea tenable, the court, on the same date, ordered
that the case be remanded to the Justice of the Peace of Tubigon in order that a new
preliminary investigation may be held in connection with the original complaint filed by the
offended party. This was done after the offended party had filed an amended complaint
charging the accused with the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness." The case was again
forwarded to the Court of First Instance and on August 25, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal, filed
against the accused an information charging him with the same crime of "Acts of
Lasciviousness."
When the case was called if or trial based on the new information, the accused again filed a
motion to quash, this time based on the ground of double jeopardy. The motion was denied,
and after the parties had presented their evidence, the court rendered decision acquitting the
accused of the charge of acts of lasciviousness but finding him guilty of qualified trespass to
dwelling and imposing upon him the penalty as stated in the early part of this decision. From
this decision the accused has appealed.
ISSUES:

(1) Can be convicted of a crime alleged merely in the information as an aggravating

circumstance after having been acquitted of the main charge described therein?; and
(2) Has he been placed in double jeopardy?
HELD:
(1) It appears in the information that accused was charged for both acts of lasciviousness and
qualified trespass to dwelling. There is nothing in the information charging the qualified
trespass to dwelling. There is nothing in the information charging the qualified trespass to
dwelling as a mere aggravating circumstance. Such being the case, it is evident that the
accused can be found guilty, if proven, on both charges, in the absence of a timely objection
against such duplicity of charge. Here the record discloses none. The objection hinted by the
defense refers to a different information.
(2) The plea of double jeopardy cannot also be sustained it appearing that the case was not
dismissed but merely remanded to the Justice of the Peace in order that he may conduct a new
preliminary investigation. The rule regarding double jeopardy invoked by the accused only
applies when the case against him is dismissed or is otherwise terminated without his express
consent. This situation does not here obtain, for the case was neither dismissed nor
terminated. It was merely remanded to the Justice of the Peace for a new preliminary
investigation. And even if the action of the court may be considered as dismissal, it appears that
it was done with his express consent, or at least with the conformity of his counsel. This case,
therefore, does not come within the rule.

36. PEOPLE V. NUNEZ

[G.R. No. 128875. July 8, 1999.]
FACTS:
Demeterio Nunez, was charged for raping his 14 year old daughter. When arraigned, he
entered a plea of not guilty. Then trial on the merits ensued. Thereafter, the changed his plea
to guilty. Thereafter, the prosecution continued to present evidence and the defense waived
their right to present evidence. After trial, he was convicted of rape and sentenced to death.
Accused now argues before the SC that the trial court gravely erred in accepting his guilty plea
to a capital offense where there was failure to conduct a searching inquiry to fully determine
whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the death penalty on the accused.
HELD:
The records reveal that in making the plea of guilty, the accused was proceeding under the
mistaken assumption that it would mitigate his liability. The accused was categorically advised
that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce his sentence. At any rate, even if such please
was improvidently made, it does not negate the findings of the trial court as such was
supported by the evidence on record. The Court is convinced of the guilt of the accused was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the accused because the fact of the victim’s
minority was not alleged in the information or complaint. The accused therefore can only be
convicted of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. He is also liable for damages to the
victim.

37. PEOPLE V. NAVA

[G.R. No. 130509-12. June 19, 2000.]
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Marcelo Nava, Jr. was charged with 4 counts of Rape under 4 separate
informations for raping her daughter Maribeth A. Nava.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant enters a plea of not guilty to each one of these
informations and interposed the defenses of alibi and denial.
During the trial, Maribeth claimed that she was raped several times by accused-appellant.
The first incident of rape took place in the morning of Thursday in January 1996, while her
mother and eldest sibling were in Manila. While the rest of the siblings were playing outside
their house, accused-appellant forced himself on Maribeth. Accused-appellant, armed with a
knife, forced her to undress and to part her legs and sexually assaulted her. He threatened to
kill her if she revealed the incident to anyone.
In the evening of that same day, Maribeth was again raped by accused-appellant.
The third incident of rape took place in the evening of Monday in the same month of January
1996.
The fourth incident happened in the evening of August 9, 1996, at the house of her paternal
grandmother. Maribeth acceded to her father's bestial advances for fear of being harmed.
The Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
rape in all the four cases and sentenced him in each case to suffer the penalty of death and to
indemnify the private complainant and pay moral and exemplary damages. Hence, this
automatic review.
Accused-appellant attacked the credibility of private complainant by pointing out

inconsistencies in her testimony.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court erred in according weight and credence to the testimony
of private complainant despite its lack of credibility
(2) Whether or not the Court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty to
death
HELD:
(1) No, the Court did not err in giving credence to Maribeth’s testimony.

Errorless testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to remember
and recount every ugly detail of the harrowing experience and appalling outrage she went
through, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to recall the same, as they are too
painful to remember. Indeed, an accurate account of the harrowing experience such as rape
has never been required from a victim. Moreover, no young woman would accuse her own
father or anybody else for that matter, of so grave a crime as rape unless she truly has been
aggrieved.
As per the Court:
“In this light, we are convinced of Maribeth's credence. Besides, the precise time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element in the crime of rape. In fact, it is settled
that even a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that
established by the evidence during trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to
warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.”
Considering that Maribeth had been molested by accused-appellant since she was in Grade III,
and considering also that the episode referred to was only the first of three in January 1996, we
cannot expect her to narrow down to a particular incident and mechanically remember the
triviality of the same.
We must keep in mind that after the first incident mentioned above, three more followed. Save
for the last, which may still be vivid in her memory, Maribeth could not possibly give an
exacting detail for each of the previous incidents since, for Maribeth, these may just be but
mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare. A calvary she might even be
struggling to forget.
Thus, "Errorless testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to
remember and recount every ugly detail of the harrowing experience and appalling outrage she
went through, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to recall the same, as they are
too painful to remember. Indeed, an accurate account of a harrowing experience such as rape
has never been required from a victim.”
(2) Yes, the Court erred in imposing death penalty in the case at bar.
The Court did not agree with the imposition of the death penalty by the court a quo. The special
circumstances of rape introduced by Republic Act 7659 should be properly pleaded with
information in order to be appreciated as having qualified the crime. In the present case, the
concurrence of minority of the private complainant and her relationship to the accused-
appellant should have been specifically alleged in the information in order to afford the latter of
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Although the
complaint sufficiently established the age as well as the relationship between the private
complainant and accused-appellant, the indictment on which he was arraigned failed to

reiterate the same. Hence, accused-appellant can only be held liable for simple rape and the
penalty in each case was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

38. ROALLOS V. PEOPLE

[G.R. No. 198389. December 11, 2013.]
FACTS:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which calls to
annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals where it affirmed with modification
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b), Article III
of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act." Roallos asserted that his arrest
was illegal since the same was effected without any warrant of arrest. He said he was not
informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roallos’ claim that his arrest was illegal for lack of warrant of arrest , non-
information of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary
investigation tenable.
HELD:
Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of
arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable.
An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived.
At the time of arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his
arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. He actively participated in the
proceedings before the RTC. Therefore he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity
in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

39. US v. Chan Toco

[G.R. No. 3851. December 17, 1908.]
FACTS:
Chan Toco was charged with an infraction of section 4 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippines
Commission when he smoked opium in the store of Liangco in Santo Niño, Samar on October
23, 1906 without securing a certificate.
His counsel’s contention was that it was not alleged in the information that the use of opium
had not been prescribed as a medicine by a physician. They further contended that where the
enacting clause in a statute described an offense with certain exceptions, the exceptions should
be negative in the indictment, complaint, or information.
ISSUE:
Whether exceptions should be negated in the complaint or information.
HELD:
Section 4 of Act No. 1461 is as follows:
(a) Except when prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician, it shall be
unlawful for any person to smoke, chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise consume or use opium in
any of its forms unless such person has been duly registered as provided in section two hereof
and has secured the certificate therein prescribed. Except when prescribed as a medicine by a
duly licensed and practicing physician, no registered confirmed user of opium shall smoke,
chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise use or consume opium except in his own residence.
b) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
The evident intent and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and penalize the smoking of opium.
The legislators however decided that the operation of said statutes should not apply to a
limited number of smokers such as those who smoke opium under the advice and prescription
and licensed physician What the accused should have done is to set up the defense that he
smoked opium under the advice of the physician and not impose the burden upon the
prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that each person using opium does so
without the advice of a physician for that would result to absurdity and impracticability. The
doctrine laid down in the case of US vs. Nelson stating that "as a rule, an exception in a statute
by which certain particulars are withdrawn from or excepted out of the enacting clause thereof
defining a crime concerning a class or species, constitutes no part of the definition of such

crime, whether placed close to or remote from such enacting clause” should be followed.
Decision of the trial court is affirmed.

40. PEOPLE vs GIANAN

[G.R. No. 135288-93. September 15, 2000]
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged, tried and convicted of multiple rape by the Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, for raping his daughter Myrna Gianan, then twelve (12) years old, and
sentenced him to "triple death" and ordered to pay complainant compensatory damages. The
trial court found credible the testimony of the complainant that her father committed acts of
lasciviousness against her once in December 1992, raped her twice in December 1992, twice in
1993, specifically in the months of March and April, and once in November 1995. She positively
established in detail the antecedents and surrounding circumstances of the sexual assaults
committed by her father against her.
In his appeal, accused-appellant contended, among others, that the information against him
was void because it did not allege with certainty the dates of commission of the rapes, as a
result of which he was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to defend himself.
ISSUE:
Whether failure of stating the exact time of the commission of the offense would make the
information or complaint defective.
HELD:
This Court has held that the allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October
15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, § 11. In any event,
even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes,
the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during the trial and any objection based
on this ground must be deemed waived as a result of accused-appellant's failure to object
before arraignment. Accused-appellant's remedy was to move either for a bill of particulars or
for the quashal of the information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form. In this case, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial. He cross-
examined the prosecution's witnesses and afterwards presented evidence for the defense. It is
now late in the day for him to claim on appeal that the information against him was defective.
Accused-appellant's reliance on United States v. Dichao is unavailing because in that case, the
accused made a timely motion to quash the information.
With regard to the contention that the information against him is defective because it charges
more than one offense, the pertinent provisions of Rule 117 state . . . as a result of accused-
appellant's failure to move for the quashal of the information on the ground that more than
one offense was charged, he is deemed to have waived his objection based on such ground.

41. PEOPLE V. MAGBANUA

[G.R. No. 128888. December 3, 1999]
FACTS:
Upon his arraignment on 23 July 1996, appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.[4] Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Poblica
Magbanua, the complaining witness; Leonilo Magbanua, the uncle of Poblica and older brother
of appellant; and Dra. Arlene Sy, the physician who examined Poblica and issued the medical
certificate.
Poblica Magbanua, the complaining witness, is the eldest among the seven (7) children of
appellant with his wife, Aniceta Magbanua. She was eighteen (18) years old, single, jobless and
a resident of Ilin, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, at the time of the trial. Poblica testified that in
the year 1991, when she was barely thirteen (13) years old and not yet having her menstrual
period, she was sexually abused by appellant, her own father.
It was around noon when appellant first molested her. She averred that appellant approached
her and poked a knife at her. She narrated that her defilement did not end there.
Since then until 1995, appellant continuously abused her several times a month. The sexual
assaults usually took place at noontime when she was left alone with appellant while her
mother went to town to buy their basic needs and while her brother and sisters were at the
house of their grandmother which was quite far from their house.
As a result of the frequent sexual violations, Poblica became pregnant. She gave birth to a baby
boy on 15 November 1995 at the house of her grandmother where she temporarily transferred.
She named the child Roger Roldan Magbanua and registered his birth with the local civil
registry without stating the name of the natural father in the certificate of birth. When asked
about the identity of the father of the child, Poblica categorically answered that it was
appellant who sired the baby. She explained that appellant fathered the child since he was the
one who abused her from 1991 until she became pregnant.
According to Poblica, she did not report the rape incidents to her mother because appellant
threatened to kill her.
Three months after she gave birth, she went to live with her Uncle Leonilo and his wife at
Malvar Street, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. While there, she disclosed to her aunt the
harrowing experience she had in the hands of her father.
Her uncle learned about her story and assisted her in filing the complaint for rape against
appellant. She went to the police station where she voluntarily executed a Sinumpaang

Salaysay before SPO2 Resurrecion Atlas concerning the rape incidents. Dr. Sy explained that
Poblicas vagina admits two (2) to three (3) fingers with less degree of resistance because its
orifice was already wide and elastic as a result of the entry of a foreign object. According to Dr.
Sy, cervicitis could have been sustained from the delivery of the child. When asked by the trial
court to clarify this point, she averred that cervicitis may also be contracted through sexual
intercourse with a man having a venereal disease. However, she did not negate the possibility
that cervicitis could also result from the delivery of a child and by the poor hygiene of the
patient.
The last witness presented by the prosecution was Leonilo Magbanua. Leonilo testified that
sometime in November 1995, his mother, Perpetua Magbanua informed him about the
pregnancy of Poblica. Perpetua then requested him to convince Poblica to stay with him so that
he would be in the position to elicit from her the identity of the person who caused her
pregnancy.
On the other hand, the defense presented only one witness, the appellant himself. On the
witness stand, appellant admitted that Poblica is his daughter, the latter being the eldest
among his seven children. However, he denied raping Poblica.
After hearing the evidence from both sides, the trial court was convinced that appellant was
guilty of the crime charged. The trial court believed the testimony of Poblica who positively
identified appellant as the author of the sexual attack. The decision is now the subject of the
present review.
ISSUE:
Whether the information insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for its failure to state
the precise date of the offense, it being an essential ingredient of the crime charged.
HELD:
With respect to the allegation of insufficiency of the information, we find the contention devoid
of merit. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto
make the information defective on its face.
The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient
of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force
and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing
on its commission.
As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the
complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as

possible to the date of its actual commission. The purpose of the requirement is to give the
accused an opportunity to defend himself.
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states thus:
Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense.- It is not necessary to state in the complaint
or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when the time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any
time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit.
Although the information did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual attacks
took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed on (sic) the
year 1991 and the days thereafter substantially apprised appellant of the crime he was charged
with since all the essential elements of the crime of rape were stated in the information. As
such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature
of the case filed against him. An information can withstand the test of judicial scrutiny as long
as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof.
The rule is that at any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The
failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except the grounds of
no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or
penalty, and jeopardy.
Perforce, a formal defect in the information not being one of the exceptions to the rule,
appellants failure to invoke the same through a motion to quash is deemed to be a waiver of
such objection and he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief on that ground.
Moreover, objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for
the first time on appeal.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense
with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court of 1964.
It is already too late in the day for appellant to question the sufficiency of the information. He
had all the time to raise this issue during the course of the trial, particularly during his
arraignment. He could have filed for a bill of particulars in order to be properly informed of the
dates of the alleged rapes. However, appellant chose to be silent and never lifted a finger to
question the information. As a result, he is deemed to have waived whatever objections he had

and he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief. Furthermore, objections as to matters of
form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
At any rate, although the prosecution failed to specify the particular dates in 1991 when the
sexual assaults took place, we are convinced that it was able to establish the fact of rape. Thus,
whatever vagueness may have attended the information was clarified when Poblica testified
that she was defiled by appellant when she was barely 13 years old, having been born on 3
March 1978.

42. PEOPLE V. LADRILLO

[G.R. No. 124342. December 8, 1999]
FACTS:
Jane Vasquez, the offended party accused Edwin ladrillo of rape. The offended could not state
the month and year however the precise time she was rape. But she recalled that one
afternoon she was raped by the accused herein.
In 1994, It was discovered by her mother that such event happened. They then proceeded to a
hospital to have Jane physically examined. And it was discovered that jane had a non-intact
hymen, which may indicate a male organ has penetrated the private female organ.
January 3, 1995 a case was then filed against the accused.
Accused however deny such charges from the offended party. That he didn’t even knew Jane
nor her mother at that time or by year 1992, in which the alleged crime has been committed.
As stated in the information,the crime was committed “on or about the year 1992”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information was valid.
HELD:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the
Rules of Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as
near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs
afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to
time to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been
committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992
but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g.,1991 and 1993, for which accused-
appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to
allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to
prove during the trial the date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information,
deprived accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly
refute the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of
residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly
committed the rape.


43. CRESPO V. MOGUL

[G.R. No. L-53373. June 30, 1987]
FACTS:
Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on
the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice.
However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later
date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the
arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig
Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal
and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The
accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA
dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders
from the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of
a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The
same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as
the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the
power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise,
that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The

preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing
of the information in the proper court.

44. DIMATULAC V. VILLON

[G.R. No. 127107. October 12, 1998.]
FACTS:
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga against private respondents
Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti
David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz,
Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain
"Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." After conducting a preliminary examination in the
form of searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate David of
the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-
affidavits. Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were
arrested; while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. Judge David in a
Resolution 4 in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof and
circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy based on the following
information:
That on or about November 3 1995 all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago
"Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding,
went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding,
stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused
descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by
the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard
One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he
died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor
"Docsay" as the one responsible. That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay"
Yabut ordered his men to go on board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio
Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
Warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut,
Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz,
Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended. However, only accused Francisco
"Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others waived the filing of the same. The
court then found the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared] to the others,
which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty.
On January 29, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and
the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one

another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. The command of
Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford no opportunity for the assailant to choose
the means or method of attack. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant
at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and
consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably
believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to
murder.
On 23 February 23, 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein
petitioners, appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). However, on 28 February 1996, an Information for Homicide, signed by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before
Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and
John Doe alias "Danny Manalili. Furthermore, on 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura,
presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each in the amount of
P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest.
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure
Order Against All Accuseds 14; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings. The private
prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the need for a hold-
departure order against the accused and contended that the accused's invocation of the right
to a speedy trial was, inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions during the
preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder to this Opposition. 1996, Judge Roura
deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he
found no compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal was filed on 23
February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was
given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the
accused on 12 April 1996.
On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura from hearing Criminal Case
No. 96-1667(M) on the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the
former's appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having
remarked in open court that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify
the case into Murder. Subsequently, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the
case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge
Sesinando Villon.
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May
1996. On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. Alarmed by the conduct
of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment.

Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary
Guingona ruled that treachery was present "and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to
murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The YABUTs
opposed petitioners' Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already
been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public
prosecutor — not the private prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case. The
Secretary of Justice then set aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder
considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the
accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty.
In his Order of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment,
citing Section 4, DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1
July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration
ISSUES:
Whether the office of the provincial prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1)
giving due course to the motion for reinvestigation by private respondents against whom
warrants of arrest were Issued but who had not yet been brought into the custody of the law;
and (2) filing the information for homicide despite knowledge of the appeal from said
prosecutor's resolution to the office of the secretary of justice.
Whether public respondent judge acted in excess of Jurisdiction in proceeding with the
arraignment and in denying petitioners' motions to set aside arraignment and reconsideration
thereof despite his knowledge of the pendency of the appeal and the submission of vital
evidence to prove that murder and not homicide was committed by the accused.
Whether public respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in

reconsidering his Order finding that the crime committed was murder and directing the
provincial prosecutor to amend the Information from homicide to murder
HELD:
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail
recommended for their temporary liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in
the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never
brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu
proprio or upon motion of the YABUTS, conducted reinvestigation since accused were at large,
Alfonso-Reyes should not have done so. Furthermore, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to
submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of the
standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make
a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be
charged with the lesser offense of homicide.

In addition, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for
homicide on 28 February 1996. While the information was dated 29 January 1996 , it was
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996 . This simply means that the
Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. It is undebatable
that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The
last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March 1996 he
deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the
reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was given
due course by the Secretary of Justice." Precisely, immediate action thereon was called for as
the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if they
wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order
could obviously defeat the purpose of said order.
Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on
the assailed information for homicide. Again, the state and the offended parties were deprived
of due process.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to
determine the regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ
as early as 23 February 1996.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case is void, hence, double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago
Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise
declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED
to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing
with the trial court the amended information for murder.

45. DUNGOG V. CA
[G.R. No. 77850-51. March 25, 1988.]
FACTS:
Provincial Fiscal Ucat issued a resolution finding a prima facie case to file an information for
estafa against a certain Pantaleon del Rosario (Pantaleon), for alleged misappropriation of
proceeds of the sale of 24 heads of cattle.
The resolution was approved by the Chief Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol. The private
respondent then filed a motion for reinvestigation that there is no prima facie case to charge
Pantaleon with estafa. So the fiscal moved to withdraw the information before the RTC, but
the trial court denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, it granted the motion and enjoined the
Judge from proceeding with the case.
ISSUE:
Once an information is filed in Court, can the prosecutor impose his opinion on the Court?
HELD:
No. The fiscal has quasi-judicial discretion, direction and control of the prosecution and if he
finds reason to do so, may even reinvestigate a case and move for its dismissal should the
reinvestigation show no sufficient evidence to indict the accused.
But when case is already filed in court, whatever disposition the fiscal may have should be
addressed to the court. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case based on the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
court.
After trial has commenced, it is the court and not the fiscal who has control over the case. The
case cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the Court.
The RTC decision was reinstated. The prosecutor or any other person assigned is directed to
continue with the prosecution of the case.

46. GABIONZA V. CA
[G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001]
FACTS:
Dennis Gabionza was a defendant in a civil case entitled "Achievers Sales Corporation v. Pasvil
Liner, Inc., et al." filed before the RTC, Branch 155, of Pasig. Contending that there was no basis
for impleading him as a party-defendant in that case, Gabionza filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint as against himself. The motion was denied by the trial court.
In the present Petition for Review, Gabionza admits that the docket number of the case before
the trial court whose order was sought to be set aside, had not been set forth in the caption of
his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. Gabionza, however, maintains that his
Petition should nevertheless not have been dismissed by the CA, but rather should have been
deemed in substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91, for the reason that the docket
number of the case pending before the trial court was in fact set out in the body of his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gabionza is guilty of forum-shopping
HELD:
No. Petition given due course.
Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and
condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper
conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described
as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.
Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two (2) different forums, for such practice works havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure. 4 That rule was formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
issued by the Supreme Court on 11 January 1983 in connection with the implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Section 17 read as follows:
17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc. — No petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if another
similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may a petition be
filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the
Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by the Intermediate

Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of
court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the
taking of appropriate actions against the counsel or party concerned.
Circular No. 28-91, in its original form, established two (2) requirements which are to be
complied with by every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The first
requirement related to the caption of a petition or complaint filed with the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals; 5 the second requirement related to the certification which must
accompany that petition or complaint.
The first requirement was set out in the following terms:
The attention of this court has been called to the filing of multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency with the result that said tribunals or agency have to
resolve the same issues.
To avoid the foregoing, every petition or complaint filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency shall comply with the
following requirements, aside from pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing
circulars:
The first requirement had two (2) components: first, the docket number of the case before the
lower court whose order is sought to be reviewed, should be in the petition; and second, that
docket number should be in the caption of the petition. In the instant case, there is no dispute
that the docket number of the case before the trial court had not been set out in the caption of
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals. However, that docket
number, as well as the title of the case, before the trial court had in fact been set out in the
second page of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
There is also no dispute that petitioner Gabionza had complied with the second requirement of
Circular No. 28-91, i.e., that the required sworn certification (to the effect that "there is no
similar petition [with] the same subject matter previously filed, pending, withdrawn or
dismissed in the Supreme Court, in this Honorable Court [Court of Appeals] or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency") 6 was attached to the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals. There has been no allegation that the sworn
certification filed by petitioner was false or untrue in a material respect or that petitioner
Gabionza had sought to deceive the Court of Appeals.
We, therefore, believe and so hold that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
Gabionza with the Court of Appeals was in substantial compliance with the original
requirements of Circular No. 28-91 and that the objectives of that Circular were not being
subverted by Gabionza's.


47. PARULAN V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

[G.R. No. L-28519. February 17, 1968]
FACTS:
Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to 20 years by the President) in Muntinlupa.
In Oct 1964, he was transferred to Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month, but was
recaptured in Manila. He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under Art. 157 of the RPC. The CFI in Manila found him guilty and sentenced him
accordingly. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Director of Bureau of
Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered “to release immediately and without delay the body
of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement.” Parulan contended that his
confinement illegal because the sentence of conviction imposed upon him for the crime of
evasion of service of sentence was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and
of the offense with which he was charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the
sentence upon Parulan for evasion of service of sentence
HELD:
Yes. In transitory crimes or continuing offenses, acts material to the crime occur in one province
and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where
any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. In some
crimes, although the elements thereof for its consummation occurred in one place, yet by the
very nature of the offense committed, the violation is deemed to be continuing. Crime is not
consummated after the convict has escaped from confinement, for as long as he continues to
evade the service, he is deemed to continue committing the crime and may be arrested without
warrant at any place where he may be found – Sec. 6 (c) Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court
supports this.

48. PEOPLE V. GROSPE

[G.R. No. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988]
FACTS:
Grospe was accused of estafa and violation of BP 22 for issuing a bouncing check. Grospe who
was a dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) issued checks amounting to P86,071 in favor of
SMC but was dishonored due to insufficient funds. having failed to make good on the check
after having received a notice of dishonor, he was now charged and prosecuted. The two
checks subject of this case were issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan and Sta. Maria, Bulacan. But the
checks were forwarded, deposited, and dishonored in a bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. The
SMC depository bank received the notice of dishonor from the drawee bank in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. The case was filed in the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. Upon motion to quash by
the accused based on lack of jurisdiction, the San Fernando RTC dismissed the case because the
deceit and damage, the 2 elements essential to these offenses did not occur in Pampanga but
in Bulacan, where Grospe issued the checks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the San Fernando RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases for estafa
and violation of BP 22.
HELD:
Yes. A person charged with a continuing crime may be tried in the court of the place where any
essential element of the crime took place. The crime of estafa allegedly committed by Grospe
was committed both in San Fernando, Pampanga and in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The deceit took
place in Pampanga while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan. Both courts, therefore have
jurisdiction to try and decide the case, but the first court taking cognizance of the case (the San
Fernando RTC) will exclude all others. For while the check was issued in Bulacan, it was not
completely drawn there, but rather in Pampanga, where the check was delivered.
For the violation of BP 22, such is also of a continuing nature. Bouncing Checks Law penalizes
not only the dishonor of the check, but also the act of issuing a bouncing check. The case could
also have been filed either in Pampanga or Bulacan. Because while the check was issued in
Bulacan, the knowledge on the part of the drawer that he does not have sufficient funds
happened in Pampanga.

49. DIEL V. MARTINEZ

[G.R. No. L-247. March 14, 1946]
FACTS:
An information for illegal practice of medicine was filed against petitioner. The respondent’s
lawyer was permitted to appear in the case as private prosecutor over the petitioner’s
objection and the fiscal turned the trial of the case over to the private prosecutors. The
petitioner objects such intervention by Atty. Sotto, the private prosecutor because no offended
party was named in the information and Atty. Sotto expressed reservation to file a separate
civil action against petitioner. The respondents counter that they are the offended parties and
that Atty. Sotto withdrew his previous statement of reservation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sotto may intervene as private prosecutor after reserving the right tofile a
separate civil action but withdrawing it later on.
HELD:
The Judge in this case did not err in permitting the intervention of Atty. Sotto as private
prosecutor. The fact that Atty. Sotto expressed his intention to reserve the right to file a
separate civil action should not matter as he subsequently withdrew such statement.
Prosecution of offenses is a public function. This function can be performed not only by fiscals
not also by private attorneys in cases where they are allowed to intervene as private
prosecutors. Lawyers are also officers of the court and assume public and official
responsibilities.

50. LIONG V. LEE

[G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013]
FACTS:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a
company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer
company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate
disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a
majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI filed for a verified petition for the Issuance of an
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 which covers a property owned by CHI. Petitioner
submitted Affidavit of Loss stating that said TCT was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his
files and discovered such loss in May 1999, and despite diligent efforts, such TCT has not been
found and is already beyond recovery. Such petition was granted by RTC and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by his brother, filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the order of RTC be
set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that she was in possession of the said Owner’s
Duplicate Copy, being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI.
Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he
planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Thus, RTC recalled and set
aside its previous order.
On May 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint-affidavit stating that petitioner made a wilful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly
knew that she was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of the said TCT. Respondent
executed a Supplemental Affidavit stating that she was accusing petitioner of Perjury. The
Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. Upon Review Resolution, the
recommendation to dismiss was set aside. Thus an information for Perjury was filed.
At the trial, Atty. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with
the consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. Petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a
private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. MeTC denied said motion,
and its MR. CA upheld such decision by the MeTC holding that the presence of the private
prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the
criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated
that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the private complainant therein,
hence, an aggrieved party.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against
public interest.
(2) Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action.
HELD:
(1) Yes. When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually
or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's
property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious
to respondent's personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the
duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court ordered issuance of a new owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent's timely discovery of the case filed
by petitioner in the RTC.
(2) Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "when
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the
MeTC, this Court declared that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for
the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter
of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is
always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

51. LEVISTE V. ALMEDA
FACTS:
On January 12, 2007, Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was charged with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner was placed under police
custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct
a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense which was granted.
An amended information charging the petitioner instead with murder was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the information from homicide to murder is considered
substantial amendment which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes. Substantial amendment consists of recital of facts constituting offense charged and
determinative of court jurisdiction.
The amendment involved in the present case consists of additional averments of the
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense
charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and material element of the offense,
petitioner should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely
clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the prosecution's original theory of the case and
certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was
conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial
amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the
same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend
himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him
as early as the first motion.

52. MENDZOA v. ARRIETA
FACTS:
A three-way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner
Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a
gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.
As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing
Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of
Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in
view of its findings that the collision between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s car was the result
of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was
petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but
only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents
Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving
their vehicles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damages based
on quasi-delict against private respondents.
HELD:
Yes, insofar as Timbol is concerned. The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbol’s
allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against
him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the
latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For
petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict. Respondent
Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as
said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, “When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”
No, insofar as Salazar is concerned. Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained
by petitioner’s car for considering that the collision between the jeep driven by him and the car
owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck
driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to
claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action
as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal

Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section3(c)
which provides that, “Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil right arise did not exist…”

53. YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND SALVADO vs. CA et al
FACTS:
A five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and
driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. Later on, a complaint for
damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult
Philippines and Larry Salvado in the RTC of Manila.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiff for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills, attorney’s fees
and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil
case.
Petitioners’ thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal
negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless
reservation thereof is expressly made.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed can prosper even if
there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.
HELD:
Yes. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an

express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents
its evidence.

54. MANIAGO V. CA (G.R. NO. 104392)
FACTS:
One of the shuttle buses owned by petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by Herminio Andaya,
figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by respondent Boado along
Loakan Road, Baguio City.
A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical
injuries was filed against petitioner’s driver. A month later, respondent Boado filed a civil case
for damages against petitioner Maniago himself. Petitioner moved that the civil case be
suspended citing that a criminal case was already pending. The trial court denied the motion on
the ground that the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal action.
On appeal to CA, petitioner reiterated his contention adding that the civil action could not
proceed because no reservation to bring it separately was made in the criminal case. CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action when no
reservation of right to bring it separately was made.
HELD:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required
by Rule III, Sec. 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
Sec. 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted
with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense
charged,” as originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988.
In other words, the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.

55. NISSAN-GALLERY ORTIGAS V. FELIPE
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 filed by petitioner Nissan
against respondent Purificacion for her issuance of a postdated check in the amount of
P1,020,000.00, which was subsequently dishonored upon presentment.
After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but holding
her civilly liable to Nissan. Purificacion appealed to the RTC but the RTC affirmed the MeTC
decision. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA reasoned out that there was no privity of contract
between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability could be adjudged against her because of her
acquittal from the criminal charge. It was Frederick who was civilly liable to Nissan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Purificacion is civilly liable.
HELD:
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The
civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not
necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently
established. Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose, which was the
making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her acquittal from the
criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the
corresponding civil liability.
However, the liability of Purificacion is limited to her act of issuing a worthless check.

56. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JACINTO
FACTS:
The First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank. As
security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land
Bank nine (9) postdated checks amounting drawn against FWCCs account at the Philippine
National Bank. Later, the loan agreement was restructured, its terms of payment, among
others, having been changed or modified. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan
obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment
to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, all the checks were
dishonored due to insufficient funds. Hence, on January 13, 1999, Land Bank filed a Complaint-
Affidavit against respondent for violation of BP 22.
The prosecutor dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that the letter-agreements
between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement. It was
held that there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had
lost their efficacy and validity and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of
B.P. 22. Upon review by the DOJ, it was held that novation is not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability.
Upon appeal, the CA found merit in respondents assertion that a prejudicial question exists in
the instant case because the issue of whether the original obligation of FWCC subject of the
dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements entered into by FWCC
with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case pending before the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the elements of a prejudicial question exist in the instant case.
HELD:
No. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action
and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action
with which said question is closely connected. Not every defense raised in a civil action will
raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its
resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed. If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.

It is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an
accommodation, is covered by BP 22. Thus, the Court held that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22 and does
not give rise to a prejudicial question.

57. CO V. MUNOZ
FACTS:
Munoz (R), a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co (P), a wealthy
businessman, was behind the filing of the suit, Munoz made statements claiming that (a) Co
influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor to expedite the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him, (b) Co manipulated a government bidding involving a dredging project, and (c) Co
received Php2,000,000 from him on the condition that Co will subcontract the project to him,
which Co did not comply with.
Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal informations for libel
before the RTC. He, however, did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil
action arising from Munoz's libelous remarks against him.
The RTC found Munoz guilty of three counts of Libel. The CA reversed the ruling and acquitted
Munoz since the existence of actual malice wasn't established.
In this petition to claim damages, Munoz countered that Section 2, Rule 111 presupposes the
filing of a civil action separately from the criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of
the right to separately institute the civil action arising from the offense, the extinction of the
criminal action extinguishes the civil action. Since Co did not reserve his right to separately
institute a civil action arising from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him
from filing the present petition to enforce the civil liability. Munoz further posits that Co is not
entitled to recover damages because there is no wrongful act to speak of.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he
seeks to enforce the accused’s civil liability.
(2) Whether or not the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous
remarks despite his acquittal.
HELD:
(1) No. the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the
civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal,
the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto:
(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed. The CA has acquitted
Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the existence of
malice is essential as it is an element of the crime.
(2) No. In light of the privilege nature of Munoz’ statements and the failure of the prosecution
to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Munoz. Without the crime, no
civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present petition. There
is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

58. PADUA V. ROBLES
FACTS:
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and
driven by Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles)
struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The
impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him,
as a result of which he died.
Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with
the Court of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and
the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court
(criminal case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent
liabilities.
HELD:
Yes. It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a
negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and
independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2)
the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of
fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration
from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and
independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be
varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the
bigger amount.
That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the
other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the
excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in
the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar,
inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the amounts
above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher
amount.

59. GUINGONA V. CITY FISCAL OF MANILA
FACTS:
Private respondent Clement David invested with the National Savings and Loan Association
(NSLA) placed on 9 deposits through the inducement of an Australian national who was
allegedly a close associate of petitioners herein. NSLA was then placed under receivership by
the Central Bank. David filed claims for his and his sister’s investments and received a report
that only a portion of the investments they claim were entered in the records of NSLA. David
alleged that there was misappropriation of funds and violation of Central Bank circulars, hence
charged petitioners herein with estafa. Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges on the ground
that David’s claims comprised a purely civil obligation which was itself novated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal complaint for estafa will prosper.
HELD:
No. It must be pointed out that when private respondent David invested his money on nine
and savings deposits with the aforesaid bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of
simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of deposit.
Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan
Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount
deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use
of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to
pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has,
however, no obligation to return or deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the
failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through
misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will
only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no- jurisdiction.
But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private
respondent David would constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, nevertheless any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided, because when
the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners Guingona
and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David, thereby resulting
in the novation of the original contractual obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan
and converting the original trust relation between the bank and private respondent David into
an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and private respondent.
Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of

private respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay
the obligation as a debtor.

60. LIMJOCO V. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to
the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and
one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said
plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had
lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the
certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and
the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left
by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which
survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person
is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling
such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of
the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial
administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which
survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part
and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if

any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the commission.

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS | Atty.

1. BONIFACIO v. RTC OF MAKATI

Whether petitioner's’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.

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Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

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The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be

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It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it

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4. MIRANDA ET AL. V. TULIAO

In September 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and

Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

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A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless

On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.

Whether or not prescription has set in.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.

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Whether the information should be quashed

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(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

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10. SAMSON V. GUINGONA

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11. JADEWELL V. LIDUA

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12. CITY OF MANILA V. RIZAL

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13. NGO YAO TIT V. SHERIFF OF MANILA

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14. PEOPLE V. MENDEZ

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15. TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR

(1) Whether or not the petition should be granted.

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16. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU

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17. PEOPLE V. OSO

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18. VISBAL V. JUDGE RAMOS

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Whether or not petitioner Bravo is guilty of libel.

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22. PEOPLE V. TANADA

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23. PEOPLE V. BUGTONG

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24. PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA

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