1.

ADALIM vs TANINAS et al
G.R. No. 198682 April 10, 2013

FACTS:

During the 10 May 2004 elections, Diego Lim (Lim) was proclaimed Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. Petitioner
Francisco C. Adalim (Adalim), a candidate for the same position, filed an election protest against Lim before the
RTC who ruled in favor of the latter and declared him as the winning candidate in the elections. Lim appealed to
the COMELEC.

Subsequently, Adalim’s motion for Execution pending appeal was granted by the RTC. Adalim then issued a
memorandum directing all employees to log in and log out in Cyrus hotel where his temporary office was located.
The employees, herein respondents failed to do so, hence, they were dropped from the employees’ rolls due to
AWOL. The respondents filed an appeal with the CSC alleging that they were dropped without due process in
which the CSC ruled in their favor. CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the
ground that the respondents filed the appeal out of time.

ISSUE:WON THE CA ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF
RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES WITH THE CSC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR AFTER MORE
THAN SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THEIR RECEIPT OF THE DISMISSAL ORDER.

RULING: NO. The petition has no merit.

At the outset, Adalim assails the CSC’s liberal application of its rules. In a number of cases, we upheld the CSC’s
decision relaxing its procedural rules to render substantial justice. 14 The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service themselves provide that administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse
to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. 15 The case before the CSC
involves the security of tenure of public employees protected by the Constitution. 16 Public interest requires a
resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a rigid application of the CSC Rules
of Procedure.17 Accordingly, both the CSC and the CA properly allowed respondent employees’ appeal despite
procedural lapses to resolve the issue on the merits.
 2. EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, VS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

FACTS: M/V Criston HAD been detained at the Portof Tabaco, Albay, for carrying smuggled imported rice consigned
to Chua and Carillo, Chua and Carillo filed the required bond, the 35,000 bags of rice were released to them. M/V
Criston, however, failed to return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found. On 8 November 2001, the
BOC received information that M/V Criston was found in the waters of Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune
Breeze.
The Legaspi District Collector then ordered an order for the forfeiture of the as M/V Neptune Breeze. In the
meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze,. filed with the
Manila District Collector a Motion for Intervention and Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure Detention with Urgent
Prayer for the Immediate Release of M/V Neptune Breeze which was ruled in El Greco’s favor for want of factual or
legal basis. On automatic review by BOC Commissioner reversed the decision which CTA and CTA en banc also
affirmed.

ISSUE: WON El Greco was denied of due process by the CTA when it upheld the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze
on the basis of the evidence presented before the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure of which El Greco was not
notified and in which it was not able to participate.

RULING. No. We sustain the determination of the CTA En Banc on this matter.

Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be
disturbed on appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

A review of the records of the present case unveils the overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of
evidence that more than meets the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune Breeze is the
very same vessel as M/V Criston, which left the anchorage area at Legaspi, Albay, without the consent of the customs
authorities therein while under detention for smuggling 35,000 bags of imported rice.

The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial numbers of the engines and generators of the
two vessels are identical.

Equally significant is the finding of the Legaspi District Collector that all the documents submitted by M/V
Criston were spurious, including its supposed registration in the Philippines. In a letter dated 14 March 2002, Marina
Administrator Oscar M. Sevilla attested that M/V Criston was not registered with the Marina.
 3. SUPREME TRANSLINER INC., va CA
[G.R. No. 125356. November 21, 2001]

FACTS: The bus driven and owned by petitioners collided with a jeepney, which was at that time owned by Decena
and Villones carrying private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. PR suffered injuries and instituted a case for
damages on the ground of quasi delict against petitioners. and Decena and Villones for breach of contract. It also
found that the actual damages representing the medical expenses incurred by private respondents were properly
supported by receipts.
Hence this petition.

ISSUES: (a) Who has the burden of proving herein petitioners liability? (b) May the evidence presented by Decena
and Villones be considered in determining preponderance of evidence against herein petitioners?

RULING: Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The party, whether plaintiff
or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment. For
the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of
action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e. an avoidance of the claim.
In this case, both private respondents as well as the jeepney driver Reynaldo Decena and its owner Marcelino
Villones claim that the bus driver, Novencio Flores, was liable for negligently operating the bus. For private
respondents, the claim constitutes their cause of action against petitioners which said private respondents must
prove by preponderance of evidence. At the same time, the same claim is a matter of affirmative defense on the
part of Decena and Villones who are impleaded as co-defendants of petitioners. Therefore, both private respondents
as well as the said co-defendants had the burden of proving petitioners negligence by the quantum of proof required
to establish the latters liability, i.e. by preponderance of evidence.
On the second issue, we rule in the affirmative. The evidence presented by the jeepney owner and its driver,
Villones and Decena, forms part of the totality of the evidence concerning the negligence committed by petitioners
as defendants in quasi-delict case. Preponderance of evidence is determined by considering all the facts and
circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[11] Petitioners liability
were proved by the evidence presented by Decena and Villones at the trial, taken together with the evidence
presented by the victims of the collision, namely herein private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal.
We find petitioners reliance on Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court misplaced. Petitioners cited
these rules to support their allegation that evidence by Decena and Villones should not be considered in private
respondents favor since the latter did not adopt much less offer them in evidence. Nothing in Section 34 requires
that the evidence be offered or adopted by a specific party before it could be considered in his favor. It is enough
that the evidence is offered for the courts consideration. We find, moreover, no pertinence in petitioners invocation
of Rule 35, on when to make an offer, except to indicate to us petitioners reliance on inapplicable technicalities that
betray the lack of merit of their petition.
 4. BAUTISTA and CORPUS vs. HON. SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-45137 September 23, 1985

FACTS: An estafa case was filed against the petitioners before the sala of Hon. Malcolm Sarmiento, herein
respondent. The only witness of the prosecution is Dr. Leticia C. Yap,the private complainant. The petitioners
moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the evidence.

The respondent judge denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and motion for reconsiderations on the ground
that the prosecution established a prima facie case.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. WON the respondent judge should affirm the petitioner’s MTD for the reason that the prosecution only
established a prima facie case and not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2. WON the respondent Judge erred in directing the petitioners to present their evidence after the denial of their
motion to dismiss, in effect, be relying on the possible weakness of the defense' evidence, rather than on the
strength of the prosecution's own evidence in resolving their guilt or innocence,

RULING:

1. No. There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them,
they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if
not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. 7 This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of
the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe.

In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their evidence. They
refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of
evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

2. NO, We find petitioners' aforesaid submission utterly devoid of merit. Such a procedure finds support in the
case of Arbriol vs. Homeres 10 wherein we held that—

Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy (Sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has
rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to
hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved
its Tight to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied The reason is that it is the constitutional
right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused has
no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative but to decide the
case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.
5. OGAWA VS MENIGISHI

G.R. No. 193089 July 9, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Ogawa filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, breach of good human relation and unjust
enrichment before the RTC against respondent Menigshi alleging that the latter borrowed from her the amounts
of P15,000.00, P100,000.00 and P8,000.00. Unable to pay, the respondent offered to sell her building and its
improvements to petitioner for a consideration of P1,500,000.00 with the agreement that her outstanding loans
with petitioner be deducted from the purchase price and the balance payable in installments. Petitioner paid a
total of P400,772.90 but the respondent backed out. Respondent specifically denied the allegation and countered
that it is the petitioner who owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen, equivalent to about P500,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA, affirmed the RTC’s ruling but added that it gave probative value to the
receipt for 1,000,000.00 Yen and held it sufficient to establish petitioner's indebtedness to respondent considering
that the petitioner’s counsel admoitted the same and the petitioner failed to specifically deny the receipt. Finally,
having found both parties at fault, the CA deleted the awards of damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: WON the receipt is considered as an actionable document, which therefore should be specifically denied by
the petitioners.

RULING: No. While the receipt indubitably containing the signatures of both parties, what is apparent is a mere
written and signed acknowledgment that money was received. There are no terms and conditions found therein
from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot be considered an actionable document 9 upon
which an action or defense may be founded.

Hence, absent any other evidence to prove the transaction for which the receipt was issued, the Court cannot
consider Exhibit 1 as evidence of a purported loan between petitioner and respondent which the former
categorically denied. It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a
counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant, by the quantum of
evidence required by law, which in this case is preponderance of evidence. On this score, Section 1, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance of evidence or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of
the case, the witness’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.

"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of credible
evidence."11

From the evidence on record, it is clear that respondent failed to prove her counterclaim by preponderance of
evidence.
6. SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP VS. ROSALIE PALAA CHUA
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners upon failure of the
latter to pay rentals of 2 cubicle units even after a demand letter was sent through counsel. The petitioners did not
vacate the premises as well.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in
full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. Spouses Latip
asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane
Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to
purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip,
the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first
priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.

The respondent on the other hand to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill
payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights which is a common
practice in the area.

The MetC ruled in favor of herein respondent. The RTC revered the decision. The CA, on the other hand reversed the
decision of the RTC averring that the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money. The
CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church.
According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders
at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.

ISSUE: WON the court should take judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area
to pay goodwill money to the lessor.

RULING. No, I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power
to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

.Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally
or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are commonly known.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. However, in this case, the requisite
of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the
stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie;
contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the
Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to
take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample
reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

Petition GRANTED and ruling of the CA REVERSED.

7. ASIANTERMINAL vs MALAYAN INSURANCE

G.R. No. 171406 April 4, 2011

FACTS: Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash
dense from China to Manila which was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. Upon arrival, the
stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals] unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought
them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the
Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee.When the unloading of the bags was completed, 2,702 bags were
found to be in bad order condition.

On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the
amount of P643,600.25.

Respondent, as subrogee of the consignee filed an action in the RTC for damages against petitioner On June 26,
1998, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss which decision was affirmed by the
CA.

The petitioners now come to this court contending that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00,
pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) which
the CA should have taken judicial notice since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial
cognizance.

ISSUE: whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability.

RULING: Judicial notice does not apply

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts
can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was
created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled corporation
in charge of administering the ports in the country.Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function
when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner.As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

Petition denied.
8. PEOPLE VS ANTONIO ARIZALA Y FLORES @ TONY
G.R. No. L-59713 March 15, 1982

FACTS: Respondent (Tony) was convicted of rape by the CFI of La Union which was alleged to have transpired on
JUNE, 1974 in La Union.. Trinidad Baladad, private complainant alleged that the accused came to their dwelling
where the crime was consummated, punched her in the stomach and she lost consciousness. . When she regained
consciousness, the accused was no longer there. She was lying on her back on the cement floor with her "duster" (a
loose kind of dress) raised to her waist, her legs apart, her panties removed and placed near the wall Seminal fluid
was oozing from her vagina. As the mother of ten children, these circumstances made her realize that she had been
abused
The respondent, on the other hand, claimed of having an intimate relationship with the private complainant which
eventually turned sour when the wife of the respondent found out about it, hence, prompting the private
complainant and her brother to file a complaint against him.
The appellant also claims that he could not possibly have gone to bed with the complainant on June 17, 1974,
because on that day she had her monthly period.

ISSUE: WON the court may take judicial notice of the fact that the private complainant had her monthly period at
the time of the crime.

RULING: YES. The SC took judicial notice of the fact that such a condition does not bar sexual union. Intercourse may
be messy but it is not impossible. And to bolster his contention, the appellant claims that he even consulted Mrs.
Leonora Manantan the registered midwife at the Rural Health Unit in Bauang who gave him a pamphlet of the
rhythm method of family planning (Exh. 3-A). But there is no showing that the complainant had asked the appellant
to do what he did. Accordingly, his act cannot bind her.
Petition dismissed.
9. S/SGT. ELMER T. VERGARA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 128720. January 23, 2002]

FACTS: A complaint of robbery was filed against petitioner alleging that on October 1990, the petitioner together
with a band committed the crime of robbery on a certain Catherine F. Manalo and feloniously took payroll money
amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J & E Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2)
pendants, 18K valued at P17,000 from the latter’s possession while in a private car.

The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by private complainant in the police station and in
court. Petitioner, while denying any participation in the offense, claimed an alibi that he was in san Pedro Laguna
at the time of the occurrence of the crime, being a member of the narcotic operatives engaged in a surveillance of
a suspected drug pusher, was corroborated by the team leader.

The prosecution countered that conceding the fact that accused Emer Vergara was in San Pedro, Laguna, it is not
physically impossible for him to have gone to Pasig, Metro Manila, considering that he had an available means of
transportation. The distance between San Pedro, Laguna where the accused claimed he was at the time the
robbery took place, and Pasig, Metro Manila, where the crime was committed, is less than an hour drive by car and
can easily be reached by one who, like the accused Elmer Vergara, had a car available to him.

The RTC and CA ruled against the petitioner and charged him guilty of robbery.

ISSUE: WON the distance between San Pedro Laguna and Pasig should be given Judicial Notice by the court.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to contradict his alibi. He submits that the
prosecution failed to prove that he had a car available to him, or that he drove one from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig,
Metro Manila. Petitioner further insists that the trial courts finding that the place where the crime was committed
is less than an hours drive by car and can easily be reached by one who, like petitioner, had a car available to him, is
erroneous and unsupported by the evidence on record.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City, Metro Manila,
because it is capable of unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is already of public knowledge, especially to
commuters.[11] We find no error in the trial courts finding that it was not impossible for petitioner to be at the scene
of the crime, despite his alibi that he was engaged in intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of
October 19, 1990.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime
was committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. [12] It is essential that credible and tangible proof of physical
impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime be presented to establish an acceptable
alibi.[13] Petitioner failed to meet this test. While petitioner could have been working as intelligence agent in San
Pedro, Laguna from October 19 21, 1990, contrary to his claim, it was not physically impossible for him to have been
in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission of the crime.
Petition dismissed,