51. G.R. No. 156185. September 12, 2011- CATALINA B. CHU, et al., V.

SPOUSES CUNANAN, et
al.,

Facts:
Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage[3] involving their five parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampanga
in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan).
The Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance
from Spouses Cunanan.
Thereafter, the petitioners brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the
Carloses and Benelda Estate,[11] seeking the cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name
of Benelda Estate, and the issuance of new TCTs in their favor, plus damages.
The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds, namely:
(a) bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied both motions to dismiss,[13] holding that the action
was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity of parties and subject matter
between Civil Case No.12251 and Civil Case No. G-1936; and that the Cunanans did not establish
that the petitioners had waived and abandoned their claim or that their claim had been paid by
virtue of the compromise agreement.
On appeal, the Court of appeals grants the Cunanans petition for certiorari and nullifying
the challenged orders of the RTC.

Issue
Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata ?

Ruling
YES. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions (i) identity
of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.[33]
The first requisite was attendant. As to the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the cause of action in Civil Case No. G-1936 which was an action whose subject matter was not
capable of pecuniary estimation. The requirement of the identity of parties was fully met,
because the Chus and the Cunanans were the parties in both cases along with their respective
privies. Identity of the causes of action was also met because Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No.
12251 were rooted in one and the same cause of action the failure of Cunanan to pay in full the
purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil Case No. G-1936. If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.[1]
Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the respondents in Civil Case
No. 12251 because there can only be one action where the contract is entire, and the breach
total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and damages.[39]
52. G.R. No. 45350. May 29, 1939. May 29, 1939- BACHBACH MOTOR CO., INC., v. ESTEBAN
ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC.,

FACTS
Defendant Esteban Icarañgal executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.,
a promissory note and in security for its payment, Esteban Icarañgal executed a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna.
Promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore,
plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the
amount due on the note. Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff.
The other defendant herein Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim,
alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court
of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been
levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.
By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and, in
consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.
Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered, plaintiff took the present appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage
after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the
promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security?

RULING
No. In Hijos de I. de la Rama v. Saio (45 Phil., 703), the mortgage creditor, instead of
instituting proceedings for the foreclosure of his mortgage, filed a personal action for the
recovery of the debt. The mortgage debtor objected to the action, alleging that, if it be allowed,
he would be subjected to two suits, one personal and another for the foreclosure of the
mortgage. We answered this objection, laying down the rule that "in the absence of statutory
provisions, the mortgagee may waive the right to foreclose his mortgage and maintain a personal
action for the recovery of the indebtedness."
section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a creditor holding a claim against
the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing
such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and share in the
general assets of the estate. Under this provision, it has been uniformly held by this court that, if
the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the other, and if he fails, he
fails utterly.

53. G.R. No. 197507. JANUARY 14, 2013 - Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony
Parungao, et al.
FACTS
Petitioner Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation (Rivulet) was the registered owner of
Hacienda Bacan agricultural land situated in Barangay Guintubhan, Isabela, Negros Occidental.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) commenced the administrative process to
acquire the subject property under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988) and sent Notices of Coverage (NOC) to Atty. Arroyo.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Negros Occidental enacted an ordinance reclassifying
Hacienda Bacan from agricultural to agro-industrial. l1
The OSG advised Undersecretary Parugao that there appears no legal obstacle to the
installation of farmer-beneficiaries in Hacienda Bacan. It opined that the TRO was directed only
against the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and that the
installation of farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts enjoined. Moreover, the CARP Law
directs the DAR to proceed with the distribution of the acquired land to the farmer-beneficiaries
upon the issuance of CLOAs in their favor. Accordingly, the farmer-beneficiaries were installed in
the subject landholding with the assistance of the members of the PNP. 40?r?l1

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT Rivulet claims that the act of respondents in installing farmer-
beneficiaries in the subject landholding constitutes an open defiance and disobedience of the
Courts TRO for which they should be cited for indirect contempt of court?

RULING

NO. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition

to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order,
but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered
contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus,
a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the
act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be
no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. l1

In the present case, while the DAR was an intervenor in G.R. No. 193585, the TRO issued
by the Court was only expressly directed against the LRA Administrator, the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental and/or all persons acting upon their order or in their place and stead.

Clearly, the DAR and its officials were not among those enjoined. Neither can they be considered
agents of the LRA Administrator and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Moreover, the
installation of farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts specifically restrained, negating the
claim that the performance thereof was a contumacious act.

54. G.R. No. 182435. AUGUST 13, 2012 - Lilia B. Luz, et al. v. Florante Baylon
FACTS
This case involves the estate of spousES Baylon. They were survived by their legitimate
children, namely, Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia).
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint4 for partition, accounting and damages
against Florante, Rita and Panfila alleging that Rita took possession of the 43 parcels of land
owned by the deceased spouses. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition
of the said parcels of land.
During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed Lot No.
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante.
Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners
filed a Supplemental Pleading17 praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be
rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.
The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first
obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to
the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission
is premature. Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners action for rescission cannot be joined
with their action for partition, accounting and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR RECISSION CANNOT BE JOINED WITH
THEIR ACTION FOR PARTITION, ACCOUNTING AND DAMAGES?

RULING
YES. THE ACTIONS OF PARTITION AND RECISSION CANNOT BE JOINED IN A SINGLE ACTION
A joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of
action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the
union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate
suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances
join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or
petition.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the
petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in
favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed
by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed
by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action
of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint
or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall
govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of
requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

55. G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986 - REMEDIO V. FLORES v. HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS

FACTS
 Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount
of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129
the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand
is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Counsel for respondent Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for
petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
totality rule introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOLLOWING
THE TOTALITY RULE?

RULING
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to
the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder
of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate
and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
The Court rules that the application of the totality rules under Section 33(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: "Permissive
joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs
or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest."
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under
Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to
state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

56. GR no.200009. January 23, 2017- Spring Homes Subd. Et al., v. Spouses Tablada, et.al.,
FACTS
Petitioners spouses Pedro Lumbres and Rebecca Roaring entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with Spring Homes Subdivision Co. Inc., through its chairman , the late Mr. Rolando
Pasic, for the development of several parcels of land. Sps.Lumbres transferred the titles to the
parcels of land in the name of Spring Homes.
 Spring Homes entered into a contract to sell with respondents spouses Tablada for the
sale of a parcel of land located at Spring Homes Subdivision Calamba Laguna. Sps. Tablada was
then given a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Spring Homes and was issued only a photocopy
of title over the land.
Sps. Tablada discovered that the subject property was mortgaged with Premiere
Development Bank as a security for a loan.
Spouses lumbres and Spring homes entered into a compromise agreement wherein
Spring Homes conveyed the subject property to sps. Lumbres. It then caused the cancellation of
the contract to sell executed by SpringHomes for sps. Tablada.
Sps. Tablada filed a complaint for nullification.
Sps. Lumbres filed a motion to dismiss raising as grounds the non-compliance with a
condition precedent and lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) over the subject
matter.
The RTC rendered its decision dismissing sps. Tablada’s action for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of Spring Homes,an indispensable party. Their failure to cause the service of summons
upon Spring Homes was fatal for without whomno complete determination of the case may be
reached.
The Court of Appeals finds that Spring Homes is not an Indispensable party.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the person od Spring Homes, an
indispensable party?

RULING
No. the RTC does not lack jurisdiction over the person of Spring Homes.
The failure to summon Spring Homes does not deprive it of jurisdiction over the instant
case for Spring Homes is not an indispensable party.
By virtue of the second deed of absolute sale between sps. Lumbres and Spring Homes,
the sps. Lumbres became the absolute and registered owner of the subject property. Spring
Homes, however, is no longer regarded as an indispensable party but is considered to be a
necessary party. As such, Spring homes no longer stands to be directly benefited or injured by
the judgment in the instant case.

57. GR No. 173297. March 6, 2013- Stronghold Ins. Co. Inc., v. Cuenca

FACTS
Maranon filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court(RTC) against the Cuencas for
collection of a sum of money and damages including an application of the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the application. Maranon amended the complaint
impleading Tayactac as defendant.
The sheriff enforced the writ of preliminary attachment upon properties belonging to Arc
Cuisine, Inc.
Cuencas and Tayactac presented a motion to dismiss in the RTC and to quash writ of
preliminary attachment on the ground that the action involved intra- corporate matters originally
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
 The RTC denied the Motion stating that the action was within its jurisdiction.
The court of appeals annulled and set aside the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cuencas and Tayactac could themselves recover damages arising from
the wrongful attachment of the assets of Arc Cuisine, Inc.?

RULING
No. there is no dispute that the properties subject of levy on attachment belonged to Arc
Cuisine, Inc. alone not to Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. they were only stockholders
of the Arc Cuisine, Inc. which had a personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of
them. The damages occasioned to the properties by levy on attachment, wrongful or not,
prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc. not them. As such Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive
law to claim and recover such damages.
The Cuencas and Tayactac lacked the legal personality to claim the damages sustained
from the levy of the properties. Stockholders are not themselves the real parties in interest to
claim and recover compensation for the damages arising from the wrongful attachment of its
asssets.

58. Gr no. 207246. April 18, 2017- Jose Roy v. Herbosa, et al.,

FACTS
Petitioners Jose Roy filed a motion for reconsideration declaring that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing memorandum
circular no. 8.
The grounds raised are: (1) he has the requisite standing because this case is one of the
transcendental importance; (2) the court has the constitutional duty to exercise judicial review
over any grave abuse of discretion by any instrumentality of the government ; (3) he did not rely
on an obiter dictum; (4) the court should have treated the petition as the appropriate device to
explain the Gamboa Decision.
Movants petition was dismissed based on both procedural and substantive grounds.
ISSUE
Whether or not movant’s petition should be dismissed?
RULING
Yes. The movants petition should be dismissed.
The court ruled that the petitioners failed to sufficiently allege and establish the existence
of a case or controversy and locus standi on their part to warrant the courts exercise of judicial
review. The rule on hierarchy of courts was violated and petitioners failed to implead
indispensable parties such as the Philippine Stock Exchange, inc. and Shareholders Association of
the Philippines, Inc. the petitioners failed to join or implead other public utility corporations
subject to the same restriction imposed by the constitution. They should be afforded due notice
and opportunity to be heard.
On substantive grounds, the court has conclusively found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of SEC in issuing SEC-MC-No. 8.
The court resolves to DENY the Motion with Finality
59. GR No. 173946. June 19, 2013-BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. v. CA, et al.,

FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Respondent filed a motion
for leave to admit amended answer in which she alleged that her husband and co-defendant
Manuel Toledo is already dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion to require respondent to
disclose the heirs of Manuel.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss for having been filed out of time. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of appeals which granted the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the motion to dismiss was filed out of time?

RULING
Yes, the motion to dismiss was filed out of time.
The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion
to dismiss. It acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as respondents motion to
dismiss was filed SIX YEARS ANF FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This
circumstance alone already warranted the outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed
in clear contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under this provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time but before the filing of an
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
Respondents motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation
of its ecvidence in the trial court, giving credence to pertitioners and the trial court’s conclusion
that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere play on the part of respondent to delay the
prompt resolution of the case against her.

60.Gr no. 191667. April 22, 2015- Land Bank of the Phils.(LBP) V. Cacayuran

FACTS
Through resolutions nos. 68-2005 and 139-2005, the sangguniang bayan (SB)of the
municipality authorized its then mayor eufranio eriguel to enter into a loan with LBP, the
proceeds of which were used to construct ten kiosks at the public plaza. Around a year later, the
SB issued resolution nos. 58-2006 and 128-2006 authorizing mayor eriguel to obtain another
loam from LBP for the construction of a commercial center named “Agoo People’s Center” within
the premises of the public plaza. The Municipality used as collateral a lot at the south eastern
portion of the public plaza.
Respondent Eduardo cacayuran opposed the redevelopment of the public plaza caliming
that these were “highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests and will
result to wanton desecration of public plaza.”
 Cacayuran filed a complaint against LBP and various officers of the Municipality including
mayor eriguel. The municipal officers moved for the outright dismissal of the complaint but was
denied.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the subject loans null and void. It pronounced that
the Municipality was not bound by the subject loans and the municipal officers should be held
personally liable for the same.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the RTC excluding vice mayor Antonio
eslao from personal liability arising from subject loan.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Municipality should be deemed as an indispensable party to the
instant case, and thus, be ordered impleaded herein?

RULING
Yes. The Municipality should be deemed as an indispensable party to the instant case,
and thus, be ordered impleaded herein.
A judicious review of the records reveals that Cacayuran’s complaint against LBP and the
municipal officers primarily prays that the commercialization of the Public Plaza be enjoined and
also that the subjects loans be declared null and void for having been unlawfully entered into by
said officers. However, Cacayuran failed to implead in his complaint the municipality, a real party-
in-interest and an indispensable party that stands to be directly affected by any judicial resolution
on the case.

61. GR L-31061, 17 August 1976- Sulo ng Bayan vs. Araneta

Facts:
Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed an accion de revindicacion with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Valenzuela, Bulacan, against Gregorio Araneta Inc. (GAI), Paradise
Farms Inc., National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), Hacienda Caretas Inc., and
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to recover the ownership and possession of a large tract of land
in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, registered under the Torrens System in the name of GAI, et. al.'s
predecessors-in-interest (who are members of the corporation).
GAI filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that (1) the
complaint states no cause of action; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by prescription
and laches.
Paradise Farms, Inc. and Hacienda Caretas, Inc. filed motions to dismiss based on the
same grounds.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the (amended) complaint.
Sulo ng Bayan filed a motion to reconsider the Order of dismissal, arguing among others
that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action because the subject matter of the
controversy in one of common interest to the members of the corporation who are so numerous
that the present complaint should be treated as a class suit. The motion was denied by the trial
court.
 Sulo ng Bayan appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court for resolution of the legal issues involved in the controversy.

Issues:
1. Whether the corporation (non-stock) may institute an action in behalf of its
individual members for the recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said
members, among others.
2. Whether the complaint filed by the corporation in behalf of its members may be
treated as a class suit
Ruling:

1.NO. It is a doctrine well-established and obtains both at law and in equity that a corporation is
a distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from the individual stockholders or
members who compose it, and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions
of its stockholders or members.
Clearly, no right of action exists in favour of Plaintiff Corporation, for as shown heretofore;
it does not have any interests in the subject matter of the case which is material and direct so as
to entitle to file the suit as a real party in interest.

2. NO. In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) that
the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; and
(2) that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
Here, there is only one party plaintiff, and the corporation does not even have an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, and cannot, therefore, represent its members or stockholders
who claim to own in their individual capacities ownership of the said property. Moreover, a class
suit does not lie in actions for the recovery of property where several persons claim partnership
of their respective portions of the property, as each one could alleged and prove his respective
right in a different way for each portion of the land, so that they cannot all be held to have
identical title through acquisition/prescription.

62. G.R. No. 166620. April 20, 2010- ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, et al., v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA

FACTS
The National Printing Office (NPO) was formed during the term of President Aquino by
virtue of EO No. 285.
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6
of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Executive Order
No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of
the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by
former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive
Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE
Whether or not the case is one of class suit?
RULING
No. the case is not one of class suit.
The petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the
assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor
General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in
the NPO.[4] The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees
whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an
Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, [5] ostensibly
reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged
the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such
desistance was due to pressure from people close to the seat of power.[6] Still, even if we were
to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that
a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A
perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in
the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20
petitioners effectively instituted the present case.

63. GR No. 79416, Sep 05, 1989- BONIFACIO v. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON

FACTS
Olimpio Bonifacio filed a complaint before the Court of Agrarian Relations
of Baliwag, Bulacan seeking the ejectment of private respondent Pastora San Miguel
from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan. The ground
relied upon was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R. A. 3844, otherwise known as the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B '68).
Petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No.
2160-B '68 before the respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued.
Private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution stating that the implementation
of the writ of execution of the Decision is hereby declared null and void.
Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals contending that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 can no longer be
executed as said action is purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon
Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B '68,
being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by law to be purely personal,
survives the death of a party. Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court,
a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also on their successors-in-interest,
petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY THE DECEDENT IS
INHERITED BY THE COMPULSORY HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS
CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMENT TO THE DECEDENT?

RULING
Yes. Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 as more than
an ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural
lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is more closely and strictly regulated by
the State. This factor, however, does not operate to bar the application to the instant case of the
general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party
Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family
members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding
asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-
lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners
are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.

In the case at bar, Olimpio Bonifacio's death during the pendency of private respondent's
petition was not communicated to the Court.

64. CARLOS LIM, CONSOLACION LIM, EDMUNDO LIM, CARLITO LIM, SHIRLEY LEODADIA DIZON, AND
ARLEEN LIM FERNANDEZ vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 177050 July 01, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioners obtained a loan of (Lim Account) from respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) to finance their cattle raising business. They executed a Promissory Note.
Petitioners, Shirley Leodadia Dizon, Arleen Lim Fernandez, Juan S. Chua, and Trinidad D. Chua
obtained another loan from DBP (Diamond L Ranch Account). They also executed a Promissory Note.
To secure the loans, petitioners executed a Mortgage in favor of DBP over several titled real
properties.
Petitioners made a partial payment leaving an outstanding loan balance.
Petitioners, represented by Edmundo Lim (Edmundo), requested from DBP Statements of
Account for the "Lim Account" and the "Diamond L Ranch Account."
Edmundo proposed the settlement of the accounts through dacion en pago, with the balance to
be paid in equal quarterly payments over five years but in a reply-letter DBP rejected the proposal and
informed Edmundo that unless the accounts are fully settled as soon as possible, the bank will pursue
foreclosure proceedings.
 The Ex-Officio Sheriff conducted a public auction sale of the mortgaged properties for the
satisfaction of petitioners’ total obligations. DBP was the highest bidder. The Ex-Officio Sheriff issued the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Extra-Judicial Sale in favor of DBP covering 11 parcels of land.
Petitioners filed before the RTC of General Santos City, a Complaint against DBP for Annulment of
Foreclosure and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioners alleged that DBP’s acts and omissions prevented them from fulfilling their
obligation; thus, they prayed that they be discharged from their obligation and that the foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties be declared void.
The RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and directed petitioners to post a bond in the
amount of P3,000,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether the foreclosure proceedings are null and void?
RULING:
YES. The foreclosure sale is not valid.
While DBP had a right to foreclose the mortgage, we are constrained to nullify the foreclosure
sale due to the bank’s failure to send a notice of foreclosure to petitioners. We have consistently held that
unless the parties stipulate, "personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is
not necessary because Section 3 of Act 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public
places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the
publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not
necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional
requirements.

65. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROBERT NARCEDA

695 SCRA 483 GR No. 182760 April 10, 2013

Facts:
Respondent filed with the RTC a petition for judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or
absence of his wife, Marina which was granted by said court. Petitioner, through the Office of the Sol Gen,
filed an ordinary appeal to the CA assailing the decision of the RTC and posited that respondent failed to
conduct search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling
that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under
the Family Code and Art 247 of the same provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court
proceedings shall be immediately final and executory.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the hearing of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code?

Ruling:
Yes, in summary proceedings, the losing party’s remedy is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition
for certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction as explained by
jurisprudence (Rep v Tango, 594 SCRA 560, 2009). When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42,
it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of period for filing the petition for certiorari
continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of said period, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
could no longer be questioned.
66. EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN v. WILFREDO RIVERA
GR No. 171555, Apr 17, 2013

FACTS
Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible
entry against the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc.,
Wilfredo claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land located along
C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, covered by TCT with a building used for his furniture business.
Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospital confinement, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took
possession and caused the renovation of the building on the property. The petitioners and Star Honda,
Inc., barred him from entering the property.
Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his
usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights and that another action between
the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an action for the annulment of the
petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo).
The MTCC dismissed the complaint. It found no evidence of Wilfredo's prior possession and
subsequent dispossession of the property. It noted that Wilfredo admitted that both E. Rical Enterprises
and Star Honda, Inc. occupied the property through lease contracts from Evangeline and her husband
Ferdinand.
The RTC affirmed the MTCC's findings. It held that Wilfredo lacked a cause of action to evict the
petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. since Evangeline is the registered owner of the property and Wilfredo had
voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights.
The CA affirmed with modification the RTC's findings.

The Issue
Who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical possession of the
property?

Our Ruling

Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.

"Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to
provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to
the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de
jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable."[23] Thus, "an ejectment case
will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property."[24]
Indeed, possession in ejectment cases "means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law."[25] In a forcible entry case, "prior physical possession is
the primary consideration[.]"[26] "A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor
prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him."[27] "[T]he party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown
out by a strong hand, violence, or terror."[28]
67 Manila Electric v. Heirs of Deloy 697 Scra 486
G.R. No. 192893 June 5, 2013

FACTS
Respondents are the owners by way of succession of a parcel of land located in Trece Martines
City.
Dionisio, respondent’s predecessor in interest, donated a portion of the property to the
Communication and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide a cheap and
affordable electric supply to the province of Cavite. A deed of donation was executed to reflect and
formalize the transfer.

CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution system, consisting of transformers and
accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops, and customer meters and all rights and privileges
necessary for providing electricalservice in Cavite. This was embodied in a memorandum of agreement
(MOA), dated June 28, 1985, signed by the parties. MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and
Head of the Legal Department, Atty. L.D. Torres (Atty. Torres), wrote a letter to Dionisio requesting the
latter’s permission for the continued use of the subject land as a substation site. The parties were not
able to reach any agreement. Respondents offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO, but their offer
was rejected. For said reason, in their letter, dated May 19, 2013, respondents demanded that MERALCO
vacate the subject land on or before June 15, 2003. Despite the written demand, MERALCO did not move
out of the subject land. Thus, respondents were constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE:

Who has a better right of physical possession of the disputed property?

HELD:

The Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale but found nothing that clearly stated that the
subject land was included therein. What were sold, transferred and conveyed were "its electric
distribution facilities, service drops, and customers' electric meters except those owned by the VENDOR'S
customers, x x x, and all the rights and privileges necessary for the operation of the electric service x x
x."26 No mention was made of any land. Rights and privileges could only refer to franchises, permits and
authorizations necessary for the operation of the electric service. The land on which the substation was
erected was not included, otherwise, it would have been so stated in the two documents. Otherwise, also,
MERALCO would not have written Dionisio to ask permission for the continued use of the subject land

68. PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now known as TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENTERPRISE
ZONE AUTHORITY) vs. MARCOSA A. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL, PEDRO TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, and
ROMEO TAPALES

G.R. No. 196741 July 17, 2013

FACTS
 Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (now Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone
Authority) (petitioner) is the owner of the subject property and other parcels of land located in Brgy.
Basdiot, Moalboal, Cebu. It had then been in actual, physical, continuous, and uninterrupted possession
of the subject property and had declared the same for taxation purposes.
Respondents Pedro Tapales, Luis Tapales, Romeo Tapales (Tapaleses), and SabandalHerzenstiel
(respondents) by force, strategy and stealth entered into the portion of the subject property, on which
they proceeded to cut down some coconut trees, introduced improvements and fenced the area.
Petitioner made demands to vacate which respondents ignored, prompting the filing of a forcible
entry complaint against them before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-Alcantara-Badian-
Alegria, Cebu (MCTC).
The MCTC rendered a Decision declaring that petitioner is the lawful owner of the subject
property and had been in prior possession thereof as shown by the following: (a) the deed of sale dated
February 12, 1981; (b) the tax declarations issued in its name; and (c) its act of leasing portions of the
subject property to others in the exercise of its right of ownership and possession.
Respondents' appeal to the RTC was dismissed for their failure to file a memorandum on appeal
as required under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
The CA rendered the assailed Decision nullifying and setting aside the rulings of both the MCTC
and RTC and declaring Sabandal-Herzenstiel as the lawful possessor of the subject property. The CA found
petitioner to have failed to establish prior possession of the subject property and rebut respondents’ claim
of continued physical possession in spite of the sale of the subject property to Tri-Island during which,
Sabandal-Herzenstiel leased and converted the property into a resort.20

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents may be lawfully ejected from the subject property?

RULING
YES. In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the
disputed property and that the defendant deprived him of his possession by any of the means provided
for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
In this case, respondents failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject
property after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their answer
to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting caretakers and leasing
portions thereof to third persons. Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.
Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC properly adjudged petitioner to have
prior possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who never claimed ownership
or possession thereof.
In fine, the Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging petitioner to be
the lawful possessor of the subject property, square as they are with existing law and jurisprudence.
Accordingly, the CA’s ruling on the merits must perforce be reversed and set aside.

Rule of Casus Omissus

69 Chavez v. JBC 696 Scra 496
Gr no. 202242 april 16, 2013

FACTS
 In 1994, instead of having only seven members, eight member was added to the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) as two representatives from the Congress began sitting in the JBC-one from the House of
representatives and one from the senate, with each having one-half of a vote.then, the JBC en banc,
inseparate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph Escudero and Congressman Niel Tupas simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. It should mean one representative each from both houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress
should have one representative each and mandatory components of congress as part of the biacameral
system of legislature. Both houses have their duties. Art VIII, Section 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE
Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the senate and the house of
representatives maling 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unsonstitutional as provided in Art III Section
8 of the constitution?

RULING
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase ‘a representative of congress’
should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
The framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. It is
evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in the
government- to legislate. In passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of
each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers.an inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in case of JBC representation because no liason
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
members only.

FORUM SHOPPING
70. Carlito C. Encinas v PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr and PO1 Joel Caubang
GR No. 187317, April 11, 2013

FACTS:
The petitioner Encinas was the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. He was charged
administratively with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in
violation of the Administrative Code of 1987. He was dismissed from the service. The two respondents
were holding the positions of Fire Officer I. He petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under
rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Civil Service Commission to dismiss the petitioner from the service.
The case arose when the petitioner allegedly required the respondents to pay him P5,000 in order
not to relieve them from their station at the Cabanatuan City and re-assign them to a far flung area. The
respondents decided to pay in fear of the re-assignment, but they manage to come up with P2,000 only
causing the petitioner to order for their re-assignment to Cuyapo and Talugtug.
 As a result, the respondents decided to file a complaint for illegal transfer before the Bureau of
Fire Protection and at the same time filed another complaint before the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office in Pampanga and the Civil Service Commission in Cabanatuan. Based on the filed complaints, the
petitioner alleges that the respondents are guilty of forum shopping by filing the two identical complaints.
The petitioner claims that the charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to public
interest that were filed before the Civil Service Commission and the BFP are in violation of the rules against
forum shopping.

ISSUE: Is there a violation on the rules against forum shopping?

RULING:
The court held the respondents are not guilty of forum shopping. The court enumerated what
constitutes a violation of forum shopping which include the presence of the requisites of litis pendentia
and res judicata. There is litis pendentia when: (1) identity of parties is the same with the same interests
in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for and founded on the same facts, (3)
identity of the two preceding cases where a judgment rendered in the pending case will amount to res
judicata in the other case.
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites include (1)
the former judgment is final, (2) the court rendering the said decision has jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter, (3) judgement is based on the merits, (4) between the two actions, there must be
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
In applying the above requisites, the court held that the dismissal of the petitioner based on the BFP
complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSC complaint. The dismissal by the BFP is
not based on the merits, but based on the recommendation of the fact finding committee in determining
whether a formal charge of an administrative offense may be filed. There is therefore no rights and
liabilities of the parties that were determined in the said action with finality. The court thereby affirmed
the dismissal of the petitioner and denied the petition.

71. Spouses Silverio v. Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo

G.R. NO. 184079 : April 17, 2013 and G.R. NO. 184490

FACTS

First Case
Respondents spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioners spouses Armando Silverio, Sr., and his mother, Remedios Silverio.
Respondents represented themselves as the lawful owners and possessors of the residential land.
They claimed ownership over said lot by virtue of a Decision dated of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents Marcelo. The court a quo ruled out forum
shopping upon finding that the house subject of the present case is different from that in the other case.
On appeal, the Parañaque RTC, affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. In a Decision the RTC sustained
respondents’ right to bring action to evict petitioners from the contested property. It found petitioners’
claim of ownership unsubstantiated and their defense of forum shopping without merit since the
properties involved in the two cases are different from each other. Petitioners filed a Petition for
Review with the CA.

Second Case
 Petitioners spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against
respondents Armando Silverio, Sr., and Remedios Silverio.
Petitioners’ Complaint bore essentially the same allegations as their Complaint in the first case
save for two allegations: (1) respondents requested petitioners’ permission to construct a house in the
lot; and (2) respondents "improved the house and even operated a sari-sari store" in Marcelo Compound.
The MeTC of Parañaque City, ruled for petitioners Marcelo. The court a quo ordered respondents
to vacate the subject property, to surrender peaceful possession thereof to petitioners, to give reasonable
rent until they have moved out and to pay attorney’s fees and costs.
In a Decision, the Parañaque RTC, affirmed in toto the MeTC ruling.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC judgment. It brushed aside the alleged procedural
infirmities that attended the filing of respondents’ petition for being trivial and insufficient to warrant its
dismissal. The appellate court found petitioners guilty of forum shopping and splitting of a cause of action.
It observed that the two cases for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners are based on a single claim of
ownership over the same lot which embraces the subject properties.

ISSUE:
Are the spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo guilty of forum shopping?

RULING
YES. Forum shopping is a deplorable practice of litigants consisting of resort to two different fora
for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment. The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions.
In this case, the spouses Marcelo filed two cases for unlawful detainer against Armando Silverio,
Sr. and Remedios Silverio. In Civil Case 1, the cause of action is the alleged unlawful withholding of
possession by the Silverios of the house which Florante Marcelo and Marilou Silverio constructed in the
lot. On the other hand, the cause of action in Civil Case 2 for unlawful detainer is the supposed unlawful
withholding of possession by the Silverios of the house which they, themselves, built in the lot. While the
main relief sought in Civil Case 1 appears to be different from that in Civil Case 2, the right on which both
claims are hinged is the same – the purported ownership by the spouses Marcelo of the lot.
Basically, the cause of action in both cases is the unlawful withholding by the Silverios of the lot.
Evidently, the spouses Marcelo engaged in forum shopping by filing separate cases for unlawful
detainer based on a single claim of ownership over the lot. Said act is likewise tantamount to splitting a
cause of action which, in this case, is a cause for dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia.

72. KAPISANANG PANG~AUNLARAN NG KABABAIHANG POTRERO, INC. and MILAGROS H.

REYES, vs.REMEDIOS BARRENO, LILIBETH AMETIN, DRANREV F. NONAY, FREDERICK D. DIONISIO and
MARITES CASIO
G.R. No. 175900 June 10, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Kapisanang Pangkaunlaran ng Kababaihang Potrero, Inc. (KPKPI) is a non-stock, non-
profit, social service oriented corporation. Sometime in November 1997, the Technology and Livelihood
Resource Center (TLRC) tapped KPKPI to participate in its micro lending program and was granted a loan
for microfinance or re-lending for the poor. Respondents were hired by the petitioner on different
positions.
 Respondents filed a Complaint before the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital
Region (DOLENCR) for underpayment of wages, non-payment of labor standard benefits, namely,
legal/special holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, and non-coverage with the
Social Security System and Home Development Mutual Fund against KPKPI. During its pendency,
however, respondent Barreno was served a memo signed by petitioner Reyes terminating her from
employment. On even date, respondent Barreno filed another Complaint against petitioners, this time
for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of their money claims before the NLRC.
Respondents Ametin, Nonay, Dionisio and Casio were also verbally informed by petitioner Reyes of their
termination effective October 9, 2001, but they still reported for work until disallowed on October 15,
2001. This prompted the filing of their Complaint8 dated October 16, 2001 with the NLRC which was
subsequently consolidated with Barreno’s Case.
Petitioners claimed that respondents were not employees but mere volunteers who received
allowances and reimbursements for their expenses. Hence, they are not entitled to recover their money
claims. Further, petitioners averred that respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the
NLRC CASE during the pendency of the DOLE CASE.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement and remand of the NLRC CASE to the NLRC
despite its finding of forum shopping.

HELD:
Forum shopping exists "when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely, by some other court." What is truly important to consider in determining whether it
exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts
and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
by different fora upon the same issues.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, respondents did not commit forum shopping.
Clearly, there is no identity of causes of action between the cases pending with the DOLE and the NLRC.
The DOLE CASE involved violations of labor standard provisions where an employer-employee relationship
exists. On the other hand, the NLRC CASE questioned the propriety of respondents' dismissal. No less than
the Labor Code provides for these two (2) separate remedies for distinct causes of action. More
importantly, at the time the DOLE CASE was initiated, respondents' only, cause of action was petitioners'
violation of labor standard laws which falls within the jurisdiction of the DOLE. It was only after the same
was filed that respondents were dismissed from employment, prompting the filing of the NLRC CASE,
which is within the mantle of the NLRC's jurisdiction. Under the foregoing circumstances, respondents
had no choice but to avail of different fora.