126. G.R. No.

198356, ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY: ESPERANZA,
REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND SHERYL
FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO
BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, Respondent. April 20, 2015

FACTS:
Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de
Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. Said complaint sought to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441, registered and titled under the Spouses
Supapo's names.

The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court later on rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating said law. The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. While
the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.

Notwithstanding the dismissal, Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability,
praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued
the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The
RTC also denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.

The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the
quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration. The CA granted the petition ruling that
with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now have
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.

Going back to the accion publiciana case, the respondents filed their answer and moved to set their
affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing arguing that the action is barred by res judicata. The MeTC
denied said motion ruling that the arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which
at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC in turn granted the petition and
dismissed the case on the ground that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The RTC likewise denied
the petitioner’s mption for reconsideration. Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to
the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been
lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed. The Spouses Supapo moved but
failed to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the MetC has jurisdiction over the case;
(2) Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

RULING:
(1) YES. Under the law, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
 Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs. In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject
lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the
City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration. Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that
the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.

(2) NO. Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section
47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or
order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter,
parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil
action for the recovery of the subject property.

On the other hand, the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of
causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties. Even if we assume, for the sake
of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there
is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents committed the crime alleged
in the information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better
right than the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.

127. GR no. 173351. BF Citiland Corporation vs. Marilyn Otake. July 29, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner BF Citiland Corporation is the registered owner of Lot 2, Block 101 situated in Brisbane Street,
Phase III, BF Homes Subdivision, Paranaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52940. Based
on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot has an assessed value of P48,000.00. On 24
February 1987, respondent Merlinda B. Bodullo bought the adjoining Lot 1, Block 101 covered by TCT No.
77549. However, records show respondent occupied not just the lot she purchased. She also encroached upon
petitioner’s lot.

Petitioner filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 77) of Paranaque City a complaint for accion
publiciana praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to vacate the subject lot. Petitioner also
prayed that respondent be ordered to pay P15,000.00 per month by way of reasonable compensation for the
use of the lot. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ordering the respondent to vacate the land
and to pay monthly compensation to the plaintiff as well as the costs of the suit.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. The MeTC then issued a writ of
execution. Respondent filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. The MeTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution ruling
that the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions involving title to or possession of real
property with assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00.

Petitioner filed a motion for special order of demolition alleging that the lot subject of execution contained
improvements introduced by respondent. Respondent opposed the motion for being premature and moved
for reconsideration. MeTC granted petitioners motion for demolition and denied respondents motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 257) of Paranaque City a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking dismissal of the accion publiciana case for lack of jurisdiction of the
MeTC. The RTC later on ruled that the accion publiciana was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
regional trial courts.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that accion publiciana was the civil action involving title
to or possession of real property referred to in Section 33 of BP 129, as amended. Petitioner also claimed
respondent was already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC because of respondents
participation in all the proceedings in the MeTC coupled with respondents failure to timely object to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Upon the RTCs denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that the MeTC
had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition ruling that
appeal by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court could be resorted to only when what
was appealed from was a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether a petition for review under Rule 42 is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and
(2) Whether the RTC correctly ruled that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases.

RULING:

(1) NO. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of
Appeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under
Rule 42. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has
been issued against the public respondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt,
an original action. Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals should have been made by filing a notice of appeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42.
(2) NO. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before regional trial courts. With the
modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has been
limited to real actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action is
filed in Metro Manila. If the assessed value is below the said amounts, the action must be brought
before first level courts. In the present case, the complaint, which was filed after the enactment of
R.A. 7691, contained a statement that, based on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor,
the lot subject of the accion publiciana has an assessed value of P48,000.00. A copy of the tax
declaration was attached as Annex B of the complaint. The subject lot, with an assessed value below
the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila, comes within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129, as amended. Thus, the RTC erred in holding that the MeTC
had no jurisdiction in this case.
128. G.R. No. 187696, FILOMENA CABLING vs. RODRIGO DANGCALAN June 15, 2016

FACTS:

Filomena Cabling owned a 125-square-meter parcel of land located at San Vicente, Malitbog, Southern Leyte.
It was denominated as Lot No. 5056 and had an assessed value of P2,100. Adjoining her property was a parcel
of land that respondent had bought from her brother, Gerardo Montajes. Despite knowing the boundaries of
their respective properties, however, respondent constructed a perimeter fence that encroached on
petitioner's land. After several unheeded demands for respondent to remove the encroachment and a failed
conference before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against the respondent before the MCTC.l

After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner ruling that respondent's perimeter fence had
indeed encroached on some 13 square meters of petitioner's property. The court further ruled that
respondent was a builder in bad faith, because he did not verify the actual boundaries of the lot that he had
purchased from petitioner's brother. Upon appeal by respondent, however, the RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA. Said petition was denied
by the CA and annulled both the RTC and MCTC decisions for lack of jurisdiction. The CA likewise denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in nullifying the RTC and the MCTC Decisions on the ground that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's Complaint for accion publiciana.

RULING:

YES. The Court had already declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an
assessed value of less than P20,000, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. This pronouncement was based on Republic Act No. 7691, which was approved by
Congress on 25 March 1994.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint, as well as by the character of the reliefs sought. Once it is vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction remains vested in the trial court irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As the CA has correctly held, the allegations in the
Complaint filed by petitioner sufficiently made out a case for recovery of possession or accion publiciana.

The same cannot be said, however, of the ultimate outcome of her appeal from the RTC Decision. The MCTC
correctly exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding for petitioner as the plaintiff. On the other
hand, the appeal of respondent, as the defendant, properly fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the RTC,
under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended. Hence, neither decision can be struck down for being a total
nullity.

129. G.R. No. 204970, SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS
AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE PAGLINAWAN. February 01, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted a case against respondent Bernardo Sejas before the
RTC. In their complaint for specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others that Sejas
was the registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8,337; that by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold said
parcel of land to them in 1982; that thereafter, they took possession of the land and constructed a house
thereon; that they resided in said house and continued to reside therein; that Sejas later reasserted his
ownership over said land and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so doing; and that they caused the
annotation of an adverse claim.

In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages, petitioners
impleaded respondent Juvy Paglinawan as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the
subject property to her, after which she caused the cancellation of TCT T-8,337 and the issuance of a new
title - TCT T-46,627 - in her name. However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in
the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the additional causes of action, no docket fees were
charged and paid.

Respondents moved for dismissal of the case, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
prescription. The RTC then denied the motion. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the case was a real action and not for specific performance. Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that petitioners' case was not for specific performance but was in reality a real
action, in which case the value of the property should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper
filing fee may be computed and paid; that since the value of the land was not alleged in the Amended
Complaint, the proper filing fee was not paid, and for this reason the case should be dismissed. The RTC
denied said motion contending that petitioners' case is not a real action but indeed one for specific
performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents then filed an original
petition for Certiorari before the CA who in turn granted the said petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, the present Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals ruled correctly when it dismissed the complaint by reason of non-
payment of the correct docket fees due to failure to alleged the fair market value or the stated value of the
subject property in the amended complaint

RULING:

NO. As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for
specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation
of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to
secure their claimed ownership and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein.

The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required declaration of the fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined
whether the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since
the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property.

130. G.R. No. 149554. SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES TEOFEDO
AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO. July 1, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Teofredo Amarillo
Embudo and Marites Huguete-Embudo a complaint for Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No.
46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter
portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay,
Cebu, for a consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by
virtue of a deed of sale, after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that
despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, arguing that the total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

NO. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).

In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-
square meter portion of the property which they purchased from respondents. Petitioners cause of action is
based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray
that they be declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the
jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo
and respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary
before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to
petitioners.

131 G.R. No. 146744 ROBERT G. DE GALICIA vs. MELY MERCADO. March 6, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Robert G. de Galicia was a business partner in RCL Enterprises. On or about December 15, 1997, he
was asked by his partner Carmen Arciaga to co-sign with her a Philbank check for P50,000 payable to cash.
Allegedly without his knowledge and consent, Arciaga rediscounted the check with respondent Mely Mercado
at 8% interest. Respondent gave Arciaga the sum of P46,000, representing the value of the check less 8% as
interest. Later, respondent presented the check for payment but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
She then filed a complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 against petitioner and
Carmen Arciaga. Petitioner countered by filing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 32, a case
for the declaration of nullity of the agreement to pay interest between respondent and his partner, Arciaga.
After trial, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s case for lack of jurisdiction. It also denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present case.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
(2) Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to implead an indispensable party.
RULING:

(1) YES. In determining whether or not the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary
estimation, the Court, in the early case of Singsong v. Isabella Sawmill,6 laid down the following
criterion: xxx this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance (now RTC) would depend on the amount involved. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by the courts of first instance (RTC). Based on the foregoing criterion, the subject of the
action before the trial court was indeed incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable
by the RTC.
(2) YES. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-
in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. The interests of such
indispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the
other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity

In the present case, it was held that Arciaga was an indispensable party to the suit filed by petitioner
against respondent. Her interest in the suit was intertwined with the rights and interest of both
petitioner and respondent. She was as involved in the suit as petitioner and respondent, being a co-
signatory of the re-discounted check and being privy to the assailed agreement. Had the subject
complaint been resolved on the merits, any judgment made by the trial court was going to affect not
only respondent but Arciaga as well. Unfortunately, due to the failure of petitioner to implead her in
the complaint, any judgment therein could not bind her. It was as if the complaint had not been filed
at all.

132. Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739 (May 4, 2006)

Facts:

Bokingo filed an application for titling of the subject land before the DENR, which was opposed by Busa on
the ground that it was inherited by them from their late father. The Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer resolved the protest in favor of Busa and issued a certification stating that the order had
become final and executory. Busa requested for a land survey but this was prevented by Bokingo. Busa filed a
relief of injunction with the RTC against Bokingo. Bokingo filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Bokingo contended that it could be gleaned from the
complaint that the issue between the parties involved the possession of the land. As such, the assessed value
of the land was crucial to determine the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter. He contended that since
the assessed value of the land based on his tax declaration was P14,000, then the MTC should have
jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the complaint between the parties was one of possession of the land.
(2) Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

(1) NO. Busa's complaint had not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it
was principally an action to enjoin Bokingo from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the
subject land. It could not be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action.
(2) YES. The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties, or to
the waiver or acquiescence of the parties. As such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

133. G.R. No. 159941 HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely:
EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA vs.
SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ. August 17, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires
averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite
with area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from their deceased father who had been in
open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. They also alleged
that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated stating that their father had purportedly executed
whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales
Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the
respondents.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the said case and that the petitioners had no personality to commence the action since the land
in question is considered as a friar land.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that they have no jurisdiction over the case. The
petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC. The petitioners
elevated the case to the CA who in turn dismissed their petition ruling that the special civil action for
certiorari is an improper remedy and cannot be used for the lost remedy to appeal. The CA likewise denied
their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

RULING:

YES. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition
for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded
that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the
petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or
an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and
the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not
mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside
for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.

Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy
against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to
overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower
court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in
which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that
authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus,
and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all
the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

134. G.R. No. 176492 MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO

October 20, 2014

FACTS:

In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were
able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. Their marriage was later on declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property,
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to their
children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the
MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and
Marietta Nonato be adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Also, defendants counterclaim was granted ordering plaintiff to pay
damages. Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. The RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC and
ordered for the equitable partition of the property, reimbursement for payments of debts and obligations and
the delivery of the presumptive legitimes. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since
the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although
the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its
decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the MTCC had jurisdiction over the case;
and
 (2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the lot in question is conjugal after being
sold to their children.

RULING:

(1) NO. Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No.
7691) Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does
not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
(2) NO. The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership
regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages
on the spouses’ property relations. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

135. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA VS. LINDO

G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014

Facts:

Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in Davao
Oriental and covered by OCT No. (1572) P-6144.A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to
several vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months
later, OCT No. (1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of
the vendees.

On August 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC. During the
pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner, Efipania. Respondents, Sps. Lindo
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agree to cede to Epifania 3,230
sq.m..portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and
counterclaims against each other. RTC approve the compromise agreement on January 2011.

Other respondents, filed a Motion to Dismissed on February 2013 alleging lack of jurisdiction of the RTC on
the ground that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered and alleges that
the total value of the properties in issue is only P16,500 pesos. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
dismissing the case.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(2) Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

RULING:
(1) Yes. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws. Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may
be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129.

(2) It is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of
a free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this regard,
the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which
is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs
would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.

136. G.R. No. 119347. EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES,
APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA,
AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA,
DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN, respondents. March 17, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for Declaration of Nullity and Partition with the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56. The complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners are co-
owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square
meters, more or less. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria
Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and
private respondents.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of
Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended. Said motion was granted by the Court. The motion for reconsideration
that was filed by the petitioners was likewise denied by the Court. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the case.

RULING:
YES, the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation
and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court. In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule
that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

137. GR no. 145022 ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC vs LUCIO TAN. September
23, 2005

FACTS:

On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking
moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news
article.

Respondents filed their answer moving for the dismissal of the case. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved by
the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the
dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. The lower court, after having the case dismissed for
improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal,
supra, stating, inter alia, that the mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been
cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly admitted.

Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of
the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
rendered its decision denying the petitions for lack of merit. The motions for reconsideration filed by
petitioners and by defendants Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original
complaint for damages.

RULING:

YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the
case at bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case
when the case was filed before it. The additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and
the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue
and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would
respondents’ failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by
a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.

Moreover, it is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since
they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive,
relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to
trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it
relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it
being an essential element of jurisdiction.
138. G.R. No. L-23894 JANUARIO JALANDONI, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIANO H. ENDAYA, in his
capacity as Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of Batangas, Province of Batangas, and SERAFIN D.
CRUZ, respondents. January 24, 1974

FACTS:
Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Serafin D. Cruz before the Municipal Court of the
Municipality of Batangas presided over by the respondent Judge. After the respondent posted the
corresponding bail bond for his provisional remedy, respondent judge Petitioner moved to set the case for
hearing on the merits. Petitioner then, through counsel manifested in open court that under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative
response.

After hearing arguments on such motion for desistance including memoranda submitted by both sides,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioner's verbal motion to have Criminal Case No. 801 elevated
to the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The motion for reconsideration that was filed by the petitioner was
likewise denied. Hence, this petition for prohibition arising from the insistence of respondent Judge of the
Municipal Court of Batangas to try on the merits a prosecution for libel, instead of having it elevated to the
proper court of first instance as sought by petitioner under the belief tenaciously held that he had such
competence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for prohibition should be granted.

RULING:
YES. Reference to decided cases ever since effectivity of Article 360 will make clear that such an adamantine
stand is far from justified. A case where a municipal court has been sustained in its determination to go ahead
and try on the merits a prosecution for libel is to make its appearance in the judicial scene. If the law remains
what it is, as seems likely, it will be a long, long wait.

Moreover, respondent Judge was not sufficiently mindful of the legal import of such insistence on his part. As
is clear from his well-written memorandum, he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of
the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, Section 87 of which would confer concurrent
jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty
provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine
not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category. He would
thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Article 360 as
last amended by Republic Act No. 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus
repealed by implication. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not
favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.

139. G.R. Nos. 146646-49. ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. March 11, 2005

FACTS:
Anna May V. Simbajon filed a complaint for against Judge Rogelio M. Esteban before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City. In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City
Government of Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio Esteban,
herein petitioner. Two Information for violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) were
filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702
while two Information for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the same court docketed as MTCC Criminal
Cases Nos. 24703-04.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information in the case on the ground that he has been placed four (4)
times in jeopardy for the same offense. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the
prosecution to determine if the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in relation
to petitioner’s functions as a judge. Thereafter, the prosecution filed Amended Information in Criminal Cases
Nos. 24703 and 24704. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended Information on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that they were not committed in
relation to his office as a judge. Before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash, the prosecution
filed a re-amended information in Criminal Case No. 24703 which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan eventually denied petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information, holding that the act
of approving or indorsing the permanent appointment of complaining witness was certainly a function of the
office of the accused so that his acts are, therefore, committed in relation to his office. Petitioner then moved
for a reconsideration, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of
lasciviousness filed against petitioner

RULING:

YES. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 states that The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.

In People v. Montejo, we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
offense is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of
official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Hence, where the
information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between
the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
case. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. The
Amended Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations showing that the acts of
lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his official function.

140. G.R. No. 154886. LUDWIG H. ADAZA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION
composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG, CATALINO R. CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ,
JR. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION
OFFICE, respondents. July 28, 2005

FACTS:
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to
Parents and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High School (MNHS) a contract for the
construction of a school building at an agreed consideration of P111,319.50. Upon the completion of the
project, PTA failed to receive the last installment payment amounting to P20,847.17.

PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda, DPWH Cashier, that the check for
P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza). Subsequently, Mejorda found out that
acknowledging receipt of the check bears his name and signature which was not his. He likewise noticed that
Adaza‘s signature was affixed on the voucher. During that time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman.
Upon examination of DBP Check issued to payee, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at
the dorsal portion of it, his forged signature and another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza
(Aristela), wife of Adaza.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan found Adaza guilty of
the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest. Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza which was not in
relation to his position as municipal mayor

RULING:

NO. In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the accused, if at
all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. The information does not allege
that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of
the offense.

Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the office of the
accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant
case are null and void ab initio.

141. PEOPLE VS COSARE 95 Phil. 656

FACTS:

Valeria Pagas filed against the accused a complaint for "Abuse Against Chastity". The complaint was amended
charging the accused with "Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries", and was further amended
with the same offense of "Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries."

The Justice of the Peace of Tubigon, Bohol conducted the preliminary investigation having in view the second
amended complaint. Thereafter, the Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance for
further proceedings. The Provincial Fiscal filed against the accused an information charging him with the
offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness", which was amended, charging him with the offense of "Acts of
Lasciviousness Thru Qualified Trespass to Dwelling."

In the meantime, the accused filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
which motion was denied in an order of September 1, 1951. The accused was then arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty. After the trial, the court ordered that the case be remanded to the Justice of the Peace of
Tubigon in order that a new preliminary investigation may be held in connection with the original complaint
filed by the offended party. This was done after the offended party had filed an amended complaint charging
the accused with the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness." The case was again forwarded to the Court of First
Instance and on August 25, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal, filed against the accused an information charging him
with the same crime of "Acts of Lasciviousness."

When the case was called if or trial based on the new information, the accused again filed a motion to quash,
this time based on the ground of double jeopardy. The motion was denied, and after the parties had presented
their evidence, the court rendered decision acquitting the accused. From this decision the accused has
appealed. After due consideration, the Court of First Instance of Bohol finding the accused guilty of the crime
of qualified trespass to dwelling. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused be convicted of a crime alleged merely in the information as an aggravating
circumstance after having been acquitted of the main charge described therein.

RULING:

YES. Apparently, the charge under which he stands indicted is that of "Acts of Lasciviousness", for that is the
designation appearing both in the complaint as well as in the information. However, upon a cursory reading
of the averment appearing in both pleading one cannot fail to note that what is charged against the accused is
not only the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness' but that of trespass to dwelling as well. This is apparent from
the allegation appearing therein that the accused entered the dwelling house of Valeria Pagas against her will,
and that "once inside the said dwelling house the said accused, with lewd designs and by the use of force,
embraced, kissed, raised the dress and touched the breast and private part of the aforesaid Valeria Pagas
against her will." There is nothing appearing therein that trespass to dwelling is merely an aggravating
circumstance. Such being the case, it is evident that the accused can be found guilty, if proven, on both
charges, in the absence of a timely objection against such duplicity of charge.

142. PDEA v. Brodett and Jorge G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011

FACTS:
On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa charged Richard Brodett and Joseph
Jorge for violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26 (b) of RA 9165 after being caught selling and trading
9.8388 grams of methamphetamine HCL on September 19,2008. Likewise, on April 16, 2009, Brodett was
charged for violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165 for possession of various drugs in an incident on the previously
noted date. On July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among which is a
2004Honda Accord car registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett that PDEA refused to return as itwas used in
the commission of the crime and which was supported by the OCP, stating that such vehicle be kept during
the duration of the trial to allow the prosecution and defense to exhaust its evidentiary value. On November 4,
2009, the RTC ordered the return of the car to Myra S. Brodett after it was duly photographed. PDEA filed a
motion for reconsideration, such being denied. PDEA then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which was also denied, citing Sec. 20 of RA 9165.

ISSUE:
Can the car owned by an innocent third party not liable for the unlawful act be returned to its owner although
such car was used in the commission of a crime?

RULING:
The Court ruled that a property not found to be used in an unlawful act and taken as evidence can be returned
to its rightful owner but only when the case is finally terminated. The Court further states that the order to
release the car was premature and in contravention of Section 20, Par. 3of RA 9165 which states that
property or income in custodia legis cannot be disposed, alienated or transferred during the pendency of the
case. Court resolves that all RTC’s comply with Section 20, RA 9165 and not release articles, drugs or non-
drugs, for the duration of the trial and before rendition of judgment, even if owned by innocent third party.
Respondents, having been acquitted of the crime charged the Court will not annul the orders of the RTC nor
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petition is DENIED

143. G.R. No. 176405 LEO WEE, petitioner, vs. GEORGE DE CASTRO (on his behalf and as attorney-in-
fact of ANNIE DE CASTRO and FELOMINA UBAN) and MARTINIANA DE CASTRO, respondents. August 20,
2008

FACTS:
The respondents are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey building erected on a parcel
of land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16193 in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
They rented out the subject property to petitioner on a month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month. Both
parties agreed that effective 1 October 2001, the rental payment shall be increased from P9,000.00
to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however, failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his
rental obligation for the month became due.

The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon Tagapagpamayapa of Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an
attempt to amicably settle the matter but the parties failed to reach an agreement, resulting in the issuance by
the Barangay Lupon of a Certification to file action in court on. After quite some time, respondent George de
Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease agreement and demanding that the latter vacate and
turn over the subject property to respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said
demand letter, respondent George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-respondents, Annie de Castro,
Felomina de Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro, filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Alaminos
City.

After the submission of the parties of their respective Position Papers, the MTC rendered a decision
dismissing respondents' Complaint for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before
the Barangay Lupon. On appeal, the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 54, promulgated its Decision
affirming the dismissal of respondents' Complaint for ejectment after finding that the appealed MTC Decision
was based on facts and law on the matter. Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the respondents' Petition and
ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property and turn over the same to respondents. The petitioner filed
a Motion for reconsideration which was denied the appellate court. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the certification issued by the Barangay Lupon stating that no settlement was reached
by the parties on the matter of rental increase sufficient to comply with the prior conciliation
requirement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law to authorize the respondents to institute the
ejectment suit against petitioner.
(2) Whether or not the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the
case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same.

RULING:
(1) YES. While it is true that the Certification to file action of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental
increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the submission of the same
for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the
conciliation proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include
also the matter of the possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the
violation of the terms thereof.

(2) NO. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the
representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the
ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the representative of the
owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings.

144. G.R. No. L-65629 TERESITA E. AGBAYANI and LUCAS F. AGBAYANI, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE ANTONIO M. BELEN, in his capacity as Regional Trial Judge, Branch XXXVIII, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and SPOUSES SEVERO A. VILLAFUERTE AND ANA P.
VILLAFUERTE, respondents. November 24, 1986

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court Branch 38 rendered a decision dismissing the case for quieting of title and damages
involving three parcels of land located in Sual, Pangasinan filed by the petitioners alleging that they have no
jurisdiction over the case based on the ground that the petitioners failed to submit the case to conciliation
proceedings. They also contend that the parties should first appear before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat of the barangay (Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan) where the properties are located for confrontation as
mandated in Section 6 of P.D. 1508. While it appears in the record that the parties reside in barargays of
different cities or municipalities, the real property subject matter of the case are not however located in different
barangays but in one and the same barangay, that is, Barangay Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an action for the nullification of the order of respondent Judge dismissing the
civil action. The CA reversed the order of the lower court. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the "precondition," i.e., the prior submission of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation,
should apply to actions affecting real property situated in one city or municipality although the parties
actually reside in barangays which are located in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each
other.

RULING:

NO. The question has already been passed upon and answered by this Court. In Tavora vs. Veloso, et al., the
Court en banc held that the "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority.
Specifically, the Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no
jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except
where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.” In such a situation, where the Lupon is
without jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the same city or
municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the controversy is of no moment-whether or not
affecting real property or interest therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at
an altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing venue) that "disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof
is situated." The "quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in
the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3,” but obviously, the rule on venue is utterly in-
consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay Lupon does not, in the first place, have any
jurisdiction.

Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or jurisdiction of the
Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different cities and municipalities (and not in
adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing
disputes concerning real property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to comply with the
"precondition" of first referring their dispute with private respondents to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation
and amicable settlement before instituting their suit in court. Hence, it was incorrect for the Trial Court to
ascribe this obligation to them, and to dismiss their action for omission to fulfill it.

145. GR No. L-555480 Millare vs. Hernando (151 SCRA 484)

6/30/1987

Facts:
A five-year Contract of Lease was executed between Millare as lessor and the Spouses Co as lessee. They
agreed on a monthly rental rate of P350 of the “People’s Restaurant” until May 31, 1980.
During the last week of May 1980, Millare informed the Co spouses that they could continue leasing the
property so long as they were amenable to paying P1,200 a month. The Spouses Co counter-offered with
P700 a month. At this point, Millare allegedly stated that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a
later time since “the matter is simple among us”, which alleged remark was supposedly taken by the spouses
Co to mean that the Contract of Lease had been renewed, prompting them to continue occupying the subject
premises and to forego their search for a substitute place to rent. In contrast, the lessor flatly denied ever
having considered, much less offered, a renewal of the Contract of Lease.
On July 22 and 28, 1980, Millare sent demand letters requesting them to vacate as she had no intention of
renewing the Contract of Lease, which had expired. The spouses Co signified their intention to deposit the
P700 monthly rental in court, in view of Mrs. Millare’s refusal to accept their counter-offer.
As the parties were filing suits against each other in court, the trial judge rendered a “Judgment by Default”
dated 26 November 1980 ordering the renewal of the lease contract for a term of 5 years counted from the
expiration date of the original lease contract, and fixing monthly rentals thereunder at P700.00 a month,
payable in arrears.

Issue:
Whether the court may order the renewal of the Contract of Lease for another five-year term at P700 a month

Held:
No, it cannot order the renewal of the Contract of Lease. It follows that the respondent judge’s decision
requiring renewal of the lease has no basis in law or in fact. Save in the limited and exceptional situations
envisaged in Articles 1197 and 1670 of the Civil Code, which do not obtain here, courts have no authority to
prescribe the terms and conditions of a contract for the parties. As pointed out by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone, Co.,

“[P]arties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the
principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if
tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Article 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).

146. G.R. No. 85692 ANGELITO F. MAGLALANG, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, 11TH DIV.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 29, SAN PABLO CITY AND GIL C. MAGLALANG, respondents.
July 3l, 1989

FACTS:

The application of the principle of res judicata is the main issue in this case. The secondary issue is whether or
not a case involving the civil status of a person should first be referred to the appropriate barangay officials
for possible settlement in accordance with the barangay arbitration law.

Lourdes S. Flores is the natural mother of Angelito Maglalang who was born on July 6,1966. She filed a
complaint for support against Gil C. Maglalang in the then Court of First Instance of San Pablo City. However,
the parties eventually filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that after pondering about the matter for a
considerable length of time, Flores now seriously doubts that the said defendant is the person with whom she
had her child named Angelito and by that reason, thereof, Article 283 of the New Civil Code is not applicable
to the herein plaintiff and the defendant and to the above-named child. The motion was granted in an order of
the Regional Trial Court in San Pablo City and the case was dismissed with prejudice.

Lourdes later on filed a motion for leave of court in the same case for Angelito Maglalang to continue and
revive the case for support in as much as he had already attained the age of majority. However, said motion
was denied. Two motions for the reconsideration of the order of denial were also denied.
Thus, Angelito filed in the same court a complaint for support and declaration of his status as natural child of
Gil C. Maglalang with hereditary rights. A motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata and
for lack of cause of action was filed by Gil. Said motion was granted by the trial court. Angelito elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered affirming the appealed order. The
motion for reconsideration filed by Angelito was likewise denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not res judicata has set in.

RULING:
YES. While it may be true that in the first case the ostensible cause of action is for support while in the second
suit it is for support and acknowledgment as a natural child, there can be no question that the causes of action
in both cases are the same. As earlier observed, before petitioner may be afforded support, it must be
established that the petitioner is the natural child of Gil. The same evidence is required in both cases.

By the same token, even considering that the plaintiff in the first case was Lourdes, she litigated not only in
her own behalf but also in representation of her minor child, the petitioner. Obviously, there is Identity of
parties in the two cases.Thus, the questioned order of dismissal with prejudice issued by the trial court, which
order had already become final and executory, amounts to res judicata which bars the prosecution of any
similar case. By virtue of the said order, the issue of the alleged filiation of Angelito had been put to rest when
Lourdes admitted that Gil is not the father of petitioner.

147. G.R. No. 156228. MA. TERESA VIDAL, LULU MARQUEZ, and CARLOS SOBREMONTE, petitioners, vs.
MA. TERESA O. ESCUETA, represented by HERMAN O. ESCUETA, respondent.
December 10, 2003

FACTS:

When Abelardo Escueta died intestate, he was survived by his widow Remedios Escueta and their six
children, including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta and her brother Herman O. Escueta. Part of his estate was a parcel
of land located in Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (77083) - 27568, and
the house thereon. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs
executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate over the property. They also executed a special power of
attorney authorizing Ma. Teresa Escueta to sell the said property.

Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera
and the sub-lessees before the Lupon of Barangay Highway Hills. In the meantime, the heirs of Abelardo
Escueta executed a deed of conditional sale over the property including the house thereon, to Mary Liza
Santos for P13,300,000.00.

Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable Settlement, where they agreed that the
owners of the property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents therein starting May
1999, with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property on or before December 1999
and that consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property on or before
December 1999, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court order to cause the eviction and
removal of all the respondents on the property. Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through
the Punong Barangay as provided for in the amicable settlement. Neither did she file a motion with
the Punong Barangay for the enforcement of the settlement. Instead, she filed on May 12, 2000, a verified
Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sub-lessees with the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable
settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution.
The defendants opposed the motion alleging that they were enveigled into executing the amicable settlement
despite the fact that they had not violated any of the terms and conditions of the verbal lease of the property.
The court later on issued an order denying the Motion for Execution contending that the plaintiff was not the
real party-in-interest as the subject property had already been sold and titled to Susana Lim, Johnny Lim and
Mary Liza Santos. Aggrieved, the plaintiff, now the appellant, appealed the order to the RTC who in turn
rendered a decision holding that the plaintiff-appellant was still the owner of the property when the
ejectment case was filed in the office of the barangay captain, and, as such, was the real party-in-interest as
the plaintiff in the MTC. A petition for review was filed with the Court of Appeals by three of the appellees,
now petitioners Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu Marquez and Carlos Sobremonte. The court, however, dismissed the
petition on procedural grounds and for lack of merit. Hence, this case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the rules of procedure liberally;
(2) Whether or not the real parties-in-interest as plaintiffs in the MTC were the new owners of the property;
and
(3) Whether or not the Amicable Settlement was obtained by Fraud.

RULING:
(1) YES. In order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive dispensation of every
action and proceedings, the Rules are to be liberally construed. Rules of procedure are intended to
promote, not to defeat substantial justice and, therefore, should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. This Court ruled in Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that appeal is an essential part
of our judicial system and trial courts and the Court of Appeals are advised to proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. The Court has given due course to petitions where to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. In this case, the Court opts to apply the
rules liberally to enable it to delve into and resolve the cogent substantial issues posed by the
petitioners.

(2) YES. The party-in-interest applies not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendant. Interest within the
meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real party in
interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against
each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant,
must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law,
possesses the right sought to be enforced. In this case, the respondent was the party in the amicable
settlement. She is the real party-in-interest to enforce the terms of the settlement because unless the
petitioners vacate the property, the respondent and the other vendors should not be paid the balance of
P1,000,000.00 of the purchase price of the property under the Deed of Conditional Sale.

(3) YES. The petitioners are estopped from assailing the amicable settlement on the ground of deceit and
fraud. First. The petitioners failed to repudiate the settlement within the period therefor. Second. The
petitioners were benefited by the amicable settlement. They were allowed to remain in the property without
any rentals therefor until December 1998. They were even granted extensions to continue in possession of
the property. It was only when the respondent filed the motion for execution that the petitioners alleged for
the first time that the respondents deceived them into executing the amicable settlement.

148. GR NO. 191336. CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL VS JERRY D. MONTANEZ. JANUARY 25, 2012

FACTS:
Jerry Montanez (respondent) secured a loan amounting to P143,864.00, payable in one (1) year, or until
February 1, 2002, from Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel (petitioner). The respondent gave as collateral therefor his
house and lot located at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang
Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent
would settle the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, prompting the Lupong
Tagapamayapa to issue a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner then filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim, the respondent raised the defense of improper venue considering
that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal.

After trial, the MeTC rendered a Decision ordering respondent to pay the petitioner. On appeal to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, the respondent raised the same issues cited in his Answer. The
RTC later on affirmed the decision of the lower court. Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the CA raising
two issues, namely, (1) whether or not venue was improperly laid, and (2) whether or not the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos effectively novated the loan agreement. The CA in turn rendered a decision granting the petition.
Hence, this case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that she should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the
amicable settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, instead of filing a collection
case.

RULING:

(1) YES. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its
perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. This is in accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the
Civil Code.

Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the
force and effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules. Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6)
months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.

In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did
not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was
executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to
regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article
2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the petitioner
obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule
that enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.

149. GR no. 159411. TEODORO I. CHAVEZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACINTO S. TRILLANA
March 18, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease whereby the
former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years
commencing from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was two million two
hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid
upon signing of the contract. Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all
construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of
the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner.

In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not
immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later,
respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond
with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had
grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.

In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip,
Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his
personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting
lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. Alleging non-compliance by
petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing Kasunduan, respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Due to the failure of the petitioner to file his pre trial brief and
attend the pre trial conference, the respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. On the basis
thereof, a decision was rendered in favor of respondent ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the rental
payment and pay the unrealized profit as a result of the unlawful deprivation of the subject premises.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by deleting the
award of P500,000.00 for unrealized profits for lack of basis, and by reducing the award for attorney’s fees
to P50,000.00. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the
action filed by respondent

RULING:

NO. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an
amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in
nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is
judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of
the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which
provides that the amicable settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from
its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period.

Thus, although the Kasunduan executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of
the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioners non-compliance
paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise,
following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand.

150. G.R. No. 164594 MICHAEL SEBASTIAN vs ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, REPRESENTED BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ANGELITA LAGMAY, April 22, 2015

FACTS:

Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter
Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint for the collection of the sum of P350, 000 against Sebastian
before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. Angelita claimed that Annabel and Michael were
once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged
that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase
the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return
the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated
as "kasunduan” wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. Angelita
alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in
accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991
[Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160], and Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor
the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce
the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action.

After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan, Angelita filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of
the kasunduan. Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution. The MCTC rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioner. Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in prematurely deciding the case. Th RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC. Michael filed a
Motion for Reconsideration contending that an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by
the Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil
action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution and that the
MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 is in excess of MCTC's
jurisdictional amount. The RTC granted Michael's Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed Angelita's
Motion for Execution, and set aside the MCTC Decision.

Angelita moved for the reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Aggrieved, she filed a Petition for
Review with the CA who also dismissed the petition. Michael moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA
denied his motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of
the amount involved; and
(2) Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment.

RULING:
(1) YES. The Court finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Section 417 of the Local Government Code states that after the lapse
of the six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the
appropriate city or municipal court.

(2) YES. Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration often (10) days from the date
of its execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has
been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party's
failure to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.

In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period
prescribed by the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final
judgment that is ripe for execution.