SUICO RATTAN & BURI INTERIORS VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 138145. June 15, 2006]
As to petitioners’ contention that they are not liable to pay since there is no showing
that the principal debtor cannot pay, the time-honored rule is that the surety obligates
himself to pay the debt if the principal debtor will not pay, regardless of whether or not
the latter is financially capable to fulfill his obligation. Thus, a creditor can go directly
against the surety although the principal debtor is solvent and is able to pay or no prior
demand is made on the principal debtor. Although a surety contract is secondary to the
principal obligation, the liability of the surety is direct, primary and absolute; or
equivalent to that of a regular party to the undertaking. A surety is considered in law to
be on the same footing as the principal debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged
against the latter.

JEANETTE D. MOLINO vs. SECURITY DINERS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION [G.R. No.

136780. August 16, 2001]

The Surety Undertaking expressly provides that petitioner’s liability is solidary. A

surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever
is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as
to be inseparable. Although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a
valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor is direct, primary and absolute; he
becomes liable for the debt and duty of another although he possesses no direct or
personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. There
being no question that Danilo Alto incurred debts of P166,408.31 in credit card
advances, an obligation shared solidarily by petitioner, respondent was certainly within
its rights to proceed singly against petitioner, as surety and solidary debtor, without
prejudice to any action it may later file against Danilo Alto, until the obligation is fully
satisfied. This is so provided under Article 1216 of the Civil Code:

“The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to
those which may be subsequently directed against the others, so long as the debt has
not been fully collected.”

LIVING @ SENSE, INC. vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE CORP.

[G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012]
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
GATEWAY ELECTRONICS vs. ASIANBANK CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 172041. December 18, 2008]

Clearly, Asianbank’s right to collect payment for the full amount from Geronimo, as
surety, exists independently of its right against Gateway as principal debtor; it could
thus proceed against one of them or file separate actions against them to recover the
principal debt covered by the deed on suretyship, subject to the rule prohibiting double
recovery from the same cause. This legal postulate becomes all the more cogent in case
of an insolvency situation where, as here, the insolvency court is bereft of jurisdiction
over the sureties of the principal debtor. As Asianbank aptly points out, a suit against
the surety, insofar as the surety’s solidary liability is concerned, is not affected by an
insolvency proceeding instituted by or against the principal debtor. The same principle
holds true with respect to the surety of a corporation in distress which is subject of a
rehabilitation proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As we
held in Commercial Banking Corporation v. CA, a surety of the distressed corporation
can be sued separately to enforce his liability as such, notwithstanding an SEC order
declaring the former under a state of suspension of payment.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 173946. June 19, 2013.]

It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this
matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.” The choice is undoubtedly left
to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of
the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the
estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed
as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased
solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it
a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper,
would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code.

CONCLUSION:

1. The law on sureties remains to be the same.

2. Filing a separate case against the surety will not constitute forum shopping
because it arises from a different cause of action, the CSA vis-à-vis the PN. The
surety is not an indispensable party because the case can be finally determined
even without him being impleaded. The surety is not even a necessary party.
However, the cause of action against the surety may be joined and is encouraged
by the courts to avoid multiplicity of suits.