WORKING CONDITIONS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES permanent job in a stable company.
Thus, could not be a ground to terminate
A. Women (Art. 130, 132-136)
1. Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. NLRC
Facts: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace
de Guzman specifically as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon
who went on leave on 2 periods. De Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as
a probationary employee. She indicated in the portion of the job application
form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier.
When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the
discrepancy including a reminder about the company’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the
company and Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed de Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. It was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds
to terminate the services of an employee.
Held: No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status
from PT&T could not be properly characterized as in bad faith as she was
moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
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her services.
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female
employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those
provided by law.
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination
provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution.
The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136
of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it
likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of
her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual
as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T
strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such
policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order
but also imperatively required. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did
commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore
agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary
suspension of Grace from work.
 Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts was misplaced. He draws attention to
2. Libres v. NLRC victim Divina Gonzaga’s immediate filing of her letter of resignation in the
Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her
Facts: Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a complaint against him. He now surmises that the filing of the case against
managerial position with National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant him was merely an afterthought and not borne out of a valid complaint,
Manager. He was then asked to comment regarding the charge of sexual hence, the Villarama case should have no bearing on the instant case.
harrassment filed against him by the VP's secretary Capiral. This was included
with a waiver of his right tobe heard once he didn't comment. Issue: Was Libres accorded due process when the MEC denied his request for
On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation personal confrontation?
denying the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for
clarificatory interrogation. Held: Yes Petition denied. On not strictly applying RA 7877- Republic Act No.
The Management Evaluation Committee said that "touching a female 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act
subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and telling other people complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when
that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have
sexual advances are unauthorized acts that damaged her honor." They no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case
suspended Libres for 30 days without pay. when their application will favor the accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have
He filed charges against the corporation in the Labor Arbiter, but the to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment
latter held that the company acted with due process and that his punishment as it is generally understood by the public. Faced with the same predicament,
was only mild. the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. In so doing, the NLRC did not
Moreover, he assailed the NLRC decision as without basis due to the commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
massaging of her shoulders never “discriminated against her continued On the Villarama afterthought-it was both fitting and appropriate
employment,” “impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code,” or since it singularly addressed the issue of a managerial employee committing
“created a hostile, intimidating or offensive environment.” sexual harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the periods of filing the
He claimed that he wasn't guaranteed due process because he wasn't complaints in the two (2) cases did not in any way reduce this case into
given the right be heard. This was due to his demand for personal insignificance. On the contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to
confrontation not being recognized by the MEC. focus on sexual harassment as a just and valid cause for termination.
In the Supreme Court, petitioner assailed the failure of the NLRC to Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day suspension by the NLRC,
strictly apply RA No. 7877 or the law against sexual harassment to the instant Villarama, in the other case was penalized with termination. As a managerial
case. Moreover, petitioner also contends that public respondent’s reliance on employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live

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up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral
perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust
and confidence.
“It is the the duty of every employer to protect his employees from
oversexed superiors.” Public respondent therefore is correct in its observation
that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and
jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful for.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be expected since
Libres was Capiral’s immediate superior. Fear of retaliation and backlash, not
to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this
human frailty usually suffer, are all realities that Capiral had to contend with.
Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the facts.
Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral’s allegations. In fact
his narration even corroborated the latter’s assertion in several material
points. He only raised issue on the complaint’s protracted filing.
On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently
complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and
in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when
a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation
informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to
submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his
written explanation to his superior. The VP further allowed him to air his
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grievance in a private session He was given more than adequate opportunity
to explain his side and air his grievances.
Personal confrontation was not necessary. Homeowners v NLRC-
litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position
papers, memoranda or oral arguments.
3. Domingo v. Rayala
Facts: These are 3 consolidated cases for certiorari assailing the decision of
the CA affirming with modifications the decision of the Office of the President
dismissing from the service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at
the NLRC, filed a Complaint against Rayala for alleged acts of sexual
harassment like pinching her shoulders and tickling her neck which suggest
sexual desire before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The OP dismissed Rayala. The latter filed before the CA a certiorari
under rule 65 but the same was denied. CA subsequently modified the ruling
holding Rayala liable with the penalty of suspension for 1 year and not
dismissal from service.
Domingo, OP and Rayala filed petitions for review. Domingo and OP
argued that the dismissal was proper and within the prerogative of the
President as Rayala was a presidential appointee. Rayala argued that he is not
guilty of sexual harassment.
Issue: A. Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
B. If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Held: A. Yes, It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of
the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with
her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all
these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for
a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the
respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee.
B. Only 1 year suspension as enshrined in AO 250. It is the President of
the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine
whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman.
This power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by
law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered
discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for
such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of
either the administratisve offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and
immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon
Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be
imposed upon commission of a second offense.
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Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance57and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.58 Hence,
the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one
(1) year. Decision affirmed.
4. Duncan Association of Detailman v. Glaxo Wellcome
Facts: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24,
1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others,
that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose
to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest,
to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides
the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to
another department in a non-counter checking position or preparation for
employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic
relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before
getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the
conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999,
Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of interest. Tecson asked for time
to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their
respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred
Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request
against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance
Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these
in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the conditions are present in the instant case.
National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid.

Issue: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its

employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid
Held: On Equal Protection Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential
programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against personal
or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be
denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection
clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its
authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court
decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely
privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to
the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy
was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the
lot of the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in
rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or
5. Star Paper Corp. v. Simbol
Facts: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of
Star Paper the employees are:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has
a relative, up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the
company.
2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another
female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow
employees. Estrella on the other hand had a relationship with a co-employee
resulting to her pregnancy on the belief that such was separated. The
respondents allege that they were forced to resign as a result of the
implementation of the said assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from
working in the same company, a valid exercise of management prerogative.

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Held: No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates
the rights of employees under the constitution. The case at bar involves
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated , or to actually dismiss, discharge ,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
her marriage.” The company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly
establish the requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar, there was no
reasonable business necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee
of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the
only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable
despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the absence
of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction
cannot benefit the petitioners.
B. Night Workers (Art. 154-161)
C. Minors (Art. 137-138)
D. Kasambahay
1. Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC
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Facts: Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex
Mining Company, Inc to perform laundry services at its staff house.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task
and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on
a stone. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her
work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication.
De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually
increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the
offer and preferred to return to work.
Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on
February 4, 1988.
Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department
of Labor and Employment, which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering
the Apex Mining Co. to pay Candida the total amount of P55,161.42 for salary
differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and
separation pay.
Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as
househelper or domestic servant or a regular employee.
Held: Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the
term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic
servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.
 The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or
laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like private respondent
who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing
of said facilities.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its
officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or
domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee.
2. Remington Industrial v. Castaneda
Facts: Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime services, non-payment of
SIL pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington Industrial
Sales Corp. before the NLRC-NCR.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for
Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading business and that she
continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously
prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that
Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda worked as a
cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in
construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products.
In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the
respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service of Antonio Tan
(the Managing Director), finding that her work as a cook was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the
petitioner corporation, and that the latter did not exercise control over her
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functions. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was
the respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the
corporation transferred office and that, therefore, respondent could not have
been illegally dismissed.
Issue: is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant?
Held: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decisions of the
CA are AFFIRMED. She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a
househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular
employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended,
the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows: “The
term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic
servant’ and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer’s family.”
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or
domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.
Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women,
yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the
employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature
of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home
or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the
family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or
similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to
the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic
servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer that
such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an
employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The
mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic
servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer
and NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated
in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that
respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook and
prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the
nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of
Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees, makes
her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the
doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within
company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal
comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the
petitioner’s right of CONTROL over her functions, which is the PRIMARY
indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
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was there illegal dismissal? NO
Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondent’s
part when she refused to report for work when the corporation transferred to
a new location in Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would make
long distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal
dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner
relocated, she was no longer called for duty and that when she tried to report
for work, she was told that her services were no longer needed. She
contends that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or authorized cause
and that she was not given prior notice, hence rendering the dismissal illegal.
We rule for the respondent. As a regular employee, respondent enjoys
the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code and may
only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the dismissal
becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the
time of actual reinstatement.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee
to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause
for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer.
For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be
present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is
manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee
has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment
must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. This, the
petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.
Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the respondent who
quit her employment and refused to return to work, greater stock may be
taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC.
Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any
reasoning be said to have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the
filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for
reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating
the employer’s charge of abandonment.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause; failure to do so would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employer’s case
succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of
the employee’s defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor
of the latter
It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure
may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in
labor cases. Labor cases must be decided according to justice and equity and
the substantial merits of the controversy. Rules of procedure are but mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
E. Homeworkers (Art. 151-153)
F. Handicapped/ Disabled (Art. 78-81)
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1. Bernardo v. NLRC
Facts: Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various
periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as
Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called
‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are
dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular
employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary
and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that
their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to
bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were
hired only as “special workers and should not in any way be considered as
part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special”
workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held: The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that
they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer
shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month
term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract
at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the
employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56
handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two
of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of
the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that
their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or
unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a
qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions
of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna
Carta provides: “Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled
person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A
qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and
conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons
necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80.
Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied
persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which
provides: “ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment
is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by
the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The
test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme
of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has
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been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing
need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is
considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such
activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56
handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two
of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of
the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that
their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or
unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary
and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of
sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.
Petition granted