Professional Documents
Culture Documents
N.Nuruzzaman
ANR. 768670
Second Reader:
Tilburg University
2010
Abstract
This study scrutinizes the link from micro-small-medium credit to poverty and income
inequality. In a broader sense, this research can be viewed as an attempt to provide empirical
evidence on how financial development affects growth, poverty, and inequality. This research
employed data micro-finance and poverty data from 319 regencies in Indonesia at 2002. Using
distance to Jakarta as the Instrumental Variable for micro-small-medium credit, the author
finds that micro-small-medium credit negatively affect the poverty rate and positively affect
income inequality. After decomposing micro-small-medium credit and including dummy
variable for region, the author finds that micro-credit is negatively correlated to poverty index
and income inequality. Small-credit has no effect on both poverty and income disparity.
Meanwhile, medium-credit is negatively correlated to poverty index but positively correlated to
income inequality. At the end of this research, the author proposes several policy implications
from the empirical evidence.
Background 1
Research Statement 4
Literature Review
Methodology 14
Data 20
Result
Preliminary Evidence 22
Conclusion 40
Policy Implication 42
Figures
Figure 1.1 Number of Population below Poverty Line & Headcount Index 1999-2009 1
Tables
Table 4.5 Estimation Result Model (i) after Instrumenting Explanatory Variables 26
Table 4.6 Estimation Result Model (ii) after Instrumenting Explanatory Variables 28
Table 4.7 Estimation Result Model (iii) after Instrumenting Explanatory Variables 30
Boxes
Aristotle (384 – 322 BC)
a. Background
Poverty might be the most serious problem in the world, from the early age of humankind until
current generation. One thing that makes poverty become the main concern is the non‐isolated
impact of poverty. As Aristotle asserted, poverty could be the root of other social problems. Thus,
alleviating poverty might solve other social problems such as crime and prostitution.
In Indonesia, as in other developing countries, poverty is the main political issue. Every politician
will exploit this issue in his/her campaign. This phenomenon is to be expected. There are more than
32 million people being under poverty line in 2009 (BPS, 2010). This is counted as 14.51% of the
population in Indonesia. Attracting this group will certainly give an advantage in the national
politics.
However, based on the data released by Badan Pusat Statistik (Statistic Bureau of Indonesia),
poverty in Indonesia has been declining significantly for the last decade. In 1999, the headcount
index was 23.55%, which has dropping off as much as 9.04% for a decade. The following figure will
exhibit number of population below poverty line and headcount index of poverty in Indonesia.
Figure 1.1 Number of Population below Poverty Line and Headcount Index 1999 – 2009
47.97
39.3
38.7 37.9 38.4 37.3 37.17
36.1 35.1 34.96
32.53
23,43 %
19,14 % 18,41 % 18,20 % 17,75 %
17,42 % 16,66 % 15,97 % 16,58 %
15,42 %14,15 %
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Headcount Index (%) Number of Population below Poverty Line (in Million)
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000 – 2009
1
From the above figure, it is obvious that both number of poor people and headcount index are
showing declining trend over the last decade in Indonesia. Any line of reasoning could be possible
to explain this, and perhaps none of it was wrong. In general, academia in economics field offers
two approaches to answer that question, which are financial and non‐financial access.
With respect to financial access, both theoretical and empirical researches have not reached any
consensus to confirm whether increasing financial access would eradicate poverty. The theoretical
approach generates an ambiguous prediction. On one side, finance can increase productivity by
reducing information asymmetries and transaction cost (Levine, 2005). On the other side, financial
development can slow down the saving rates, thus deliver poor economic growth (Gurley and Shaw,
1955). Meanwhile, the empirical researches using cross‐country data do not give convincing
evidence due to measurement error problem, reverse causation, and omitted variable bias (Beck,
2008).
However, increasing attention has been paid to micro, small, and medium credit (MSM‐credit). The
case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or Bank Rakyat Indonesia in Indonesia can be used as the
grounds on exploring the relationship between MSM‐credit and poverty. The provision of MSM‐
credit could occur from both formal and informal institutions. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is the
example of MSM‐credit that being provided by informal institution. Meanwhile, MSM‐credit of
Bank Rakyat Indonesia is offered by formal institution.
Grameen Bank is always associated with the early history of micro‐credit. Founded by Muhamad
Yunus, Grameen Bank is a project to provide loans to the poor in Bangladesh. The bank focuses on
women and would lend only to the poorest of the poor in the rural areas (Bakhtiari, 2006). The
collateral is not needed to apply for a loan. In addition, the bank would also support the poor
borrowers in their business. This strategy was claimed as a proven approach on alleviating poverty.
The other success story of micro finance takes place in Indonesia. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is a
state‐owned bank that is firstly began as agriculture bank in rural areas. Currently, BRI is known as a
bank with largest network that can reach the bottom level of the society. It has more than 3500
local units and serves more than 3 million borrowers (Bakhtiari, 2006). Bakhtiari (2006) stated that
BRI is the evidence of profitable microfinance intermediary. Although they are different in the
sense that Grameen Bank is informal institution while BRI is formal institution, but both banks
receive growing attention for the contention that they have been substantiated on eradicating
poverty in rural areas.
The BRI phenomenon in Indonesia should stimulate the researchers to elaborate the relationship
between micro‐credit and poverty based on data gathered, particularly aggregate data. If we take a
look at rough data from Central Bank of Indonesia (BI), it is expected that development of MSM‐
credit has a correlation with poverty level. The following figure will exhibit the trend of MSM‐credit
in Indonesia, and will compare it with the poverty data. Clearly we could observe that from 2003 –
2005, the growing of MSM‐credit is followed by the decreasing trend of poverty, although after that
2
poverty and micro credit are following the same pattern. It is also obvious to notice that private
credit and poverty followed the opposite direction.
Figure 1.2 Micro‐Credits and Poverty in Indonesia 2004 ‐ 2009
Number of Population below Poverty Line (In Million)
39.3
37.3 37.17
36.1
35.1 34.96
32.53
Private Credit per GDP (%)
21.63 22.19
20.74 20.31
19.19 19.43
18.60
17.42 17.75
16.66 15.97 16.58
15.42
Headcount Poverty Index (%) 14.15
Micro Credit per GDP (%)
On the ground of the presumption mentioned above, this research was designed. It was inspired by
a very simple question; can we generalize the effectiveness of MSM‐credit on alleviating poverty in
the aggregate level? Moreover, this inquiry basically has its roots on the finance‐poverty nexus.
Questioning the effectiveness of MSM‐credit on alleviating poverty is parallel to questioning the
mechanism on how financial development will benefit the poorest member of the society. The line
of reasoning is straightforward. The level of MSM‐credit implies the outreach of financial system.
Ergo, this will indicate the degree of financial development.
In addition, this research tries to assess the ability of MSM‐credit on altering the income
distribution. The link between MSM‐credit and distribution of income is an important subject
matter. As Bourguignon (2004) argued that growth might have very limited impact to poverty if
growth failed to correct income distribution. Thus, the significance of financial development should
be viewed not only on its ability to promote growth, but also how it affects poverty and inequality.
3
This research has both theoretical and policy implications. On the theoretical side, this research is
expected to provide evidence on the debate of how financial development affects poverty and
inequality. On the practical point of view, this research is also expected to evaluate government
policy in encouraging the growth of micro finance in Indonesia. However, the implication might be
very limited to Indonesia economy and could not be generalized to other countries.
b. Research Statement
This research prompts two main questions. First question is how financial development, in the form
of micro‐credit, affects poverty. Second inquiry then questions the effect of financial development
to income distribution. The link between financial development and poverty does not have to be in
line with the link between financial development and inequality. Investigating both channels will
generate better understanding on how financial development works in the economy.
Thus, there are three main variables involve in this research. They are MSM‐credit, poverty, and
inequality. This research is mainly an empirical research utilizing 4 years data from 319 regencies in
Indonesia. The proposed methodology to test several hypotheses is cross‐section instrumental
variable. This methodology is expected to solve measurement error, reverse causality and
unobserved variable bias. Thus, instrument is needed in this research. Methodology and Data
section will provide the instrument employed and the grounds to exercise that instrument.
The result of this research is quite unpredictable. This is due to the ambiguous theoretical
predictions. On one side, some economists argued that financial development in general and micro
finance in particular could reduce poverty and correct income distribution. On the other side,
financial development is expected to hinder the poverty alleviation and worsen income distribution.
Specifically, this research uses MSM‐credit as the main variable of interest. The main distinction
between MSM‐credit and non‐MSM‐credit is the maximum amount of credit being provided.
Micro‐credit is credit that less than Rp. 50 million, small credit is credit between Rp. 50 million and
Rp. 500 million, and medium credit is credit from Rp. 500 million to Rp. 5 billion. The small amount
of this credit reflects the collateral of the debtor. The lower the former implies the lower the latter.
This indicates that MSM‐debtor is a micro‐to‐medium company which has under average size of
initial wealth endowment. The other characteristic is that the credit is also provided together with
business coaching from the bank.
The data of MSM‐credit is obtained via website of Central Bank of Indonesia. However, there is a
limitation of using this dataset. This dataset records only micro, small, and medium credit that
provided by formal financial institution. The provision of micro‐credit from informal institution is
excluded from the dataset. If informal financial sector plays an important role in the economy, then
this might affect the result. Therefore, the expected outcome cannot be generalized to financial
system as a whole, but only to formal financial system.
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c. Differentiation of This Research
Hitherto, there are abundance research papers that investigate finance‐poverty nexus, either
theoretical or empirical. Beck, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Levine (2007) proved that financial development
has been benefited the poor by increasing the poor’s income and this, in turn, decreases the rate of
poverty. Using fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), Akhter and Daly (2009) indicate that
financial development is conducive for poverty alleviation, although the instability of financial
sector is detrimental to the poor.
This research differs from cross‐country empirical researches mentioned above as this research
utilizes single country as an object of research. This brings some advantages. First, this research will
not be suffered from the (financial) policy distortion that might affect the result. This is due to the
single banking policy in Indonesia, which is governed by Central Bank of Indonesia. In addition,
there is no discrepancy in legal system across regencies in Indonesia. Second, there are more than
400 regencies in Indonesia. This number is quite large and therefore will enable researcher to
conduct empirical research by exploiting a very extensive dataset.
In addition, this research also differs from Geda, Shimeles, and Zerfu (2006) and Hiatt and
Woodworth (2006) who conducted micro study to investigate the link between finance and poverty.
This research does not exploit micro dataset. Thus, in contrast with Geda, Shimeles, and Zerfu
(2006) and Hiatt and Woodworth (2006), through which channel microfinance able to alleviate
poverty is not main concern in this research.
However, as mentioned above, the outcome of this research can only be generalized in Indonesia. It
might not be wise to generalize the result of this research in a broader scope. More detailed on
finance‐poverty‐inequality researches, both theoretical and empirical, are discussed in next section.
d. Structure of the Paper
This thesis will consist of five sections. First section is introduction. Second section is literature review,
which offers detail explanation on the theory of finance‐poverty and empirical evidence on that issue.
Third section will discuss empirical method to test the hypothesis as well as econometric models and
data sources. The fourth section will reveal the result from empirical estimation. In addition, the
extension of this research will also be presented in this section. Fifth section will draw conclusion of
this research and propose several policy recommendation regarding the issue of finance‐poverty‐
inequality.
5
Literature Review
The banker, therefore, is not so much primarily middleman...
He authorizes people in the name of society.
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883 – 1950)
This research prompts a main question on whether or not financial development, in the form of micro
financing, has been able in alleviating poverty and correcting income inequality. Instead of providing
theoretical explanation on finance‐poverty nexus, this research is intended to come up with the
evidence. However, several theoretical predictions are being presented to give big picture on how we
might expect the link between finance and poverty.
This section consists of three sub‐sections. First, it will discuss financial development and poverty.
Second, theoretical explanation on how financial development affects income distribution will be
examined. The last sub‐section will summarize the empirical evidence on financial development and
poverty.
a. Financial Development and Poverty
There are two conflicting predictions regarding how financial development affects the poor. On one side,
some theorists assert that financial development will have detrimental impact on the poor. On the other
side, some economists claim that financial development will benefit the poor. This section will elaborate
these two competing arguments.
The contention that claims financial development has unfavorable effect on the poor, can be traced
back to Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), and Aghion and Bolton (1997). By
developing a non‐linear model of development process, Banerjee and Newman (1993) demonstrate that
capital market imperfections will cause the poor to work for a wage rather than self‐employment. This
implies that the poor has a limited ability to exploit investment opportunity due to informational
problem in the capital market. Following the same line, Galor and Zeira (1993) assert that capital market
imperfections deteriorate the capacity of the poor to invest in education. Thus, capital market may
foster economic growth, but it will depend on initial wealth endowment. This denotes the appearance
of multiple equilibria on how capital affects economic growth.
The contention of these two concepts lies on the idea of asymmetric information in the capital market.
The allocation of credit in the capital market suffered from both ex‐ante adverse selection and ex‐post
moral hazard. Only prospective debtor has full information on the project. Meanwhile, the creditor (the
bank) has limited information as well as limited ability to reveal the proper value of business venture.
The screening mechanism, which banks build up to separate bad entrepreneurs from good
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entrepreneurs, is through collateral provision. Consequently, only entrepreneurs with high wealth
endowment can provide high value collateral. Credit, hence, is being allocated based on initial wealth
endowment, not on investment opportunity. Ergo, wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs are being excluded
from capital markets.
In addition, Aghion and Bolton (1997) confirm the claim that poor entrepreneurs are being discouraged
to borrow funds from capital markets. Aghion and Bolton (1997) find that as effort supply diminished
when entrepreneur borrows more, the unit repayment must be commensurately escalated to guarantee
that lender will obtain the equal expected repayment. This in turn, will depress wealth‐deficient
entrepreneurs on gaining advantage over capital market because the poorer the entrepreneurs, the
higher his/her repayment.
On the other side, some theorists argue that better functioning financial system will have positive effect
on the poor. By ameliorating information and transaction cost, financial development expands the
allocation of capital, benefited larger portions of population, including the poor (Levine, 1997). Durnev,
Morck, and Yeung (2001) argue that capital markets create incentives for investor to gather information
on projects’ return, hence allocate capital investment efficiently.
Moreover, specifically on micro‐finance, theorists argue that financial development in the form of micro
credit is able to foster the capability of the wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs. There are at least five
mechanisms through which micro credit benefited the poor. First, micro‐finance helps the poor
increasing the income through intensifying production capability and protecting against income risk
(Morduch and Haley, 2002). Second, Simanowitz and Walter (2002) find that the clients of micro‐finance
institution experience consumption smoothing and increasing in ability to sustain over time through risk
diversification.
In addition, through micro‐finance the poor could have better access on nutrition (Swope, 2005). Access
to micro‐finance in rural areas could help the poor on maintaining their consumption level in the hard
time. Thus, stable consumption pattern will increase the probability of the poor to attain better
nourishment. This in turn, will increase productivity of the poor. Fourth, access to finance will help the
poor to gain access on education (Morduch and Haley, 2002). From dynamic perspectives, this will
facilitate the poor to leave vicious circle. The last mechanism works through empowering the woman in
rural areas. Women in rural areas are being prioritized to get the loan from micro‐finance institution
such as Grameen Bank. Increasing the financial access for women could broaden the source of
production capability in the society (Simanowitz and Walter, 2002).
b. Financial Development and Inequality
In line with financial development and poverty, the theoretical link between finance and inequality is
vague. In one side, we might expect that financial development able to correct income distribution to be
more equal. In the other side, financial development could worsen income inequality due to capital
7
market imperfections. This section provides conceptual review of the link between financial
development and income inequality.
Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that credit constraint, which is inherited in financial development process,
will impede the poor to gain advantages from human capital investment. The access to financial assets
will be influenced by the initial wealth of the agents. This implies that only wealthy agent in the
economy able to invest in human capital through education. The poor, who inherits low level of initial
wealth endowment, could not attain credit due to high cost of borrowing. This in turn, limits the poor to
invest in education. Thus, as long as credit constraint is binding, the financial development will be in
favor of wealthy agent. In this scenario, the financial development will worsen income distribution. The
work of Galor and Zeira (1993) also initiate the possibility of multiple equilibria in the relationship
between capital accumulation and economic growth. Box 2.1 will illustrate the general idea of Galor and
Zeira (1993).
Box 2.1 Dynamics of Capital Accumulation and Income Inequality
Where:
Xt+1 A
Xt = wealth of current generation
Xt+1 = wealth of subsequent generations
Xn and Xs = the wealth which are being inherited in
the long run.
B
A = long run equilibrium of wealthy agents
B = Long run equilibrium for wealth‐deficient agents
Xn f g h Xs Xt
Agents who inherit more than f but less than g will invest in human capital but not all their
subsequent generations will continue in the skilled labor sector in the future. After some
generations their descendants turn back into unskilled workers and their inheritance will
converge to Xn in the long run.
Agents who inherit more than g in period t could invest in human capital. Thus, their
descendants will be able to gain skill and become skilled workers. This lasts form generation to
generation. This implies that this group can maintain their inheritance in level Xs in the long run.
In other words, this group is able to maintain high level of wealth in the long run.
Ergo, there are two groups in the economy in the long run. The first group is the wealth‐
deficient group that has limited ability to invest in education and thus stay poor in the long run.
The second group is dynasty that is able to invest in education, be skilled workers, and continue
being rich in the long run. The wealth‐deficient dynasty remains poor because this group has no
access to credit due to capital market imperfections.
Source: Galor and Zeira (1993)
8
In addition, Galor and Moav (2004) assert that financial development will be the source of income
inequality if the primary source of economic growth is physical capital accumulation. In this contention,
Galor and Moav (2004) argue that although it might have positive impact on economic growth, but
financial development will enlarge the income disparity because financial development will enhance
development by routing resources to individual whose marginal propensity to save is higher. However,
in the later stage of development, human capital accumulation offsets the inequality effect of financial
development and thus narrows down the income gap between the poor and the rich. Ergo, based on
this proposition, financial development is expected to worsen income inequality if physical capital acts
as engine of growth in the earlier stage of development.
Other predictions come from Claessens and Perotti (2007). Reviewing evidence on the relationship
between finance and inequality, Claessens and Perotti (2007) exhibit that there is unequal access to
financial asset, which leads to economic inequality. This economic inequality, in turn, will cause
infeasibility of financial reform. Thus, vicious circle of development might be expected due to initial
wealth inequality that generates unequal access to financial assets. Moreover, Claessens and Perotti
(2007) find a threshold for the development of financial institution that can guarantee the
accomplishment of financial reform.
On the other side, if financial development is able to facilitating allocation of capital, monitoring
investment, ameliorating risks and mobilizing savings (Levine, 2004), then it would be able to select
wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs with excellent investment opportunity. If financial development benefits
the poor, then it should be able to correct income disparity. However, this claim assumes perfect
information in capital market.
Nevertheless, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) propose inverted U‐shape curve on the relationship
between financial development and inequality. This proposition follows the idea of Kusnetz (1955)
hypothesis regarding the process of economic development. Greenwod and Jovanovic (1990) argue that
at the early phase, financial development widen the income gap as financial resources being allocated to
wealthy agents who needs liquidity service. When financial structure becomes more settled, financial
development has higher capability to distribute the resources equally, hence cut down the income
disparity. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argument is also helpful to explain the idea behind Kusnetz
curve. Grenwood and Jovanovic (1990) contention generates the idea that the phase of financial
development is crucial to clarify the link between inequality and economic growth.
c. Empirics on Financial Development, Poverty, and Inequality
In contrast to previous section, which reviews several theoretical works, this section will provide
empirical evidences on finance, poverty, and inequality. The explanation will be divided into two sub‐
sections. First sub‐section will briefly explain cross‐country empirical studies. Second sub‐section will
elaborate country specific studies.
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Cross‐country Studies
Early cross‐country studies on finance, poverty, and inequality was conducted by Beck, Demirguc‐Kunt,
and Levine (2007). Using legal origin and geographical latitude as instrumental variables to deal with
reverse causality bias and measurement error, they construct econometrics model to test whether or
not financial development narrow down income gap and eradicate poverty. Beck, Demirguc‐Kunt and
Levine (2007) find that countries with higher private credit per GDP enjoy faster decline on poverty rates
and income inequality. This implies that better functioning financial system will enable country to raise
income of the poor disproportionately, compare to the average income, which results in higher level of
poverty alleviation and lower level of income inequality.
Second cross‐country study on financial development and poverty is a research conducted by Akhter
and Daly (2009). Using panel data of 54 countries from 1993 to 2004, Akhter and Daly (2009) undertake
the research to clarify the link between financial development and poverty reduction. In their research,
Akhter and Daly (2009) employ fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD). They find that financial
development contributed to poverty reduction around the world. However, they also find that financial
development brings instability that can be detrimental to the poor.
Both of these two studies measure the effect of financial development on poverty and income disparity
in aggregate level. Hence, both of these studies did not measure the access to finance, micro aspect of
finance and poverty. From both studies we can infer that financial development is able to alleviate
poverty, but through which channel it alleviates poverty has not been revealed yet. However, both
studies can be generalized due to the fact that these two studies utilize data from multi countries as the
object of research.
On the other side, Cull, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Morduch (2008) conducted cross‐country study, but using
micro‐level data. Exploiting dataset from 346 world leading micro‐finance institutions, Cull, Demirguc‐
Kunt and Morduch (2008) find that profit‐maximizing investor that invest their capital in micro‐finance
institutions are less interested on allocating loan to poorest member of society as well as women.
Hence, profit‐maximizing micro‐finance institutions charge higher interest on loan to cover high
transactional cost as transaction unit becomes smaller. These evidences indicate that micro‐finance
does not fully address informational problem in capital market, and thus contradict the results of
previous studies.
Country‐specific Studies
Tam (1988) provides case study on rural finance in China during early period of liberalization. Tam (1988)
finds that there has been significant progress on china’s rural financial institution after the period of
liberalization. Although distortions still appear, mainly through government intervention, financial
liberalization brings advantage to rural entrepreneurs by providing easy access to credit. This in turn
facilitate rural entrepreneur to lift out the poverty line.
10
In Indonesia, Panjaitan‐Drioadisuryo and Cloud (1999) could have evaluated the government program
for the poor called “Small Farmer Development Program” (SFDP) and micro‐credit from Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI), a state‐owned commercial bank in Indonesia. They observe the evidence that SFDP
along with micro‐credit from BRI has been successful on reaching poor women in the society and
provide them with credit and training. Both credit and business training enable poor woman to boost
their income through developing new business such as trading goods, producing handicraft, and
weaving traditional cloth. In addition, Panjaitan‐Drioadisuryo and Cloud (1999) also find that micro‐
credit has multiplier effect to the poor as micro‐credit enable poor family to attain better nutrition and
repay family loans. Ergo, these findings confirm the positive impact of micro‐finance to poverty
reduction.
Another micro‐econometrics study conducted in Vitenam’s rural credit market. Using several
methodologies, they examine both formal and informal credit markets. They found that production‐
specializes‐entrepreneur tend to demand credit from formal financial institution, whereas the clients of
informal financial institution are more diverse. They also observe that the reputation, dependency ratio
of household, and the amount of credit application determine the credit rationing by rural bank.
Nevertheless, Duong and Izumida (2002) draw conclusion that elasticity of output to credit was very
high. This result implies that financial access will have positive impact on productivity and poverty
alleviation.
Burgess and Pande (2005) conducted econometric study in India, which attempts to investigate the
effect of banking deregulation on poverty reduction. After controlling for health and development
spending, fraction of legislator, state and year dummy, Burgess and Pande (2005) observe that opening
bank in rural unbanked area is associated with poverty alleviation in India. In addition, Burgess and
Pande (2005) found that reduction in rural poverty is related to increasing saving mobilization and credit
provision in rural areas.
The fifth country‐specific study to be discussed is research conducted by Geda, Shimeles, and Zerfu
(2006). Exploiting household panel data in Ethiopia, they asses the finance‐poverty nexus. After
controlling for endogeneity variables, they show that financial access is a crucial factor in consumption
smoothing of the poor. Thus, finance does matter to alleviate poverty in Ethiopia. Moreover, Geda,
Shimeles, and Zerfu (2006) observe the evidence of poverty trap due to liquidity constraints. They also
propose policy maker to extend the access to finance especially in the rural areas.
Hiatt and Woodworth (2006) perform the analysis of micro‐finance, provided by three Central American
NGOs, on poverty alleviation. They observe the increasing income of new micro‐credit participants since
they started participating. Moreover, Hiatt and Woodworth (2006) also observe that entrepreneurs who
stayed in the program earned higher income than entrepreneurs who left the program. This evidence
confirms the ability of micro‐credit to assist the poor through raising their production capacity.
11
Maldonado and Gonzales‐Vega (2008) detect the mixed evidence on the relationship between micro‐
finance and schooling‐gaps. Utilizing data from survey of households that participate in micro‐finance
program in Bolivia, they discover that on one side micro‐finance reduces schooling gaps due to
increasing ability of poor household to send their children to school. However, on the other side, micro‐
finance increases production capacity of poor households and thus, increases their demand on child
labor. This evidence indicates that micro‐finance might narrow down the schooling gaps as long as
wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs, who participate in micro‐finance program, can find substitute of child
labor. Conditional on this prerequisite, micro‐finance has positive impact on poverty alleviation program.
Liverpool and Winter‐Nelson (2010) offer more detail research from Ethiopia, which decompose the
poverty into several level. In addition, the link from which micro‐finance affects poverty is being
examined. Liverpool and Winter‐Nelson (2009) find that the impact of micro‐finance differs across group
of the poor. For the poorest group, there is no relationship between participation in micro‐finance and
the use of technology. Meanwhile, for the other group, participation in micro‐finance program has
positive effect on the use of technology. However, Liverpool and Winter‐Nelson (2009) find that
participation in micro‐finance has positive impact on consumption and asset growth for both groups.
This research clarifies the assertion that micro‐finance is able to alleviate poverty through the use of
technology, consumption smoothing, and asset growth, although the magnitude of the effect differs
across groups.
However, Coleman (2006) doubts the effectiveness of micro‐finance on alleviating poverty. Coleman
(2006) investigates the performance of micro‐finance on poverty alleviation in Thailand. Coleman (2006)
finds that wealthier villagers are more likely to participate in micro‐finance program than less wealthy
villagers. Coleman (2006) also observes that the wealthiest members of the village society often become
committee on selecting the loan applicants. The latter evidence could explain the reason why micro‐
credit usually goes to wealthier entrepreneurs, instead of being allocated to poorest villagers. This
evidence implies that micro‐credit does not fully solve asymmetric information problem in the capital
market. If this is valid, then the ability of micro‐finance to eradicate poverty is being doubted.
The following table will present summary of empirical research in the field of financial
development/micro finance‐poverty‐inequality.
Table 2.1 Summary on Empirics of Finance‐Poverty‐Inequality
Cross‐Country Studies
1 Beck, Demirguc‐Kunt, Levine Better functioning financial system will enable country to raise
(2007) income of the poor disproportionately, which results in higher
level of poverty alleviation and lower level of income
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inequality.
2 Akhter and Daly (2009) Financial development contributes to poverty reduction
around the world, although it brings instability that can be
detrimental to the poor.
3 Cull, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Profit‐maximizing micro‐finance institutions charge higher
Morduch (2008) interest on loan to cover high transactional cost. Thus, micro‐
finance does not fully address informational problem.
Country Specific Studies
1 Tam (1988) Financial liberalization in China brings advantage to rural
entrepreneurs by providing easy access to credit.
2 Panjaitan‐Drioadisuryo and Confirms the positive impact of micro‐finance to poverty
Cloud (1999) reduction in Indonesia through assisting new business,
obtaining better nutrition, and repaying loans.
3 Duong and Izumida (2002) Elasticity of output to credit was very high. Ergo, financial
access will have positive impact on productivity and poverty
alleviation in Vietnam.
4 Burgess and Pande (2005) Opening bank in rural unbanked area is associated with
poverty alleviation in India.
5 Geda, Shimeles, and Zerfu Financial access is an important factor in consumption
(2006) smoothing of the poor in Ethiopia.
6 Hiatt and Woodworth (2006) Confirms the ability of micro‐credit in Central America to assist
the poor through raising their production capacity.
7 Maldonado and Gonzales‐Vega Mixed evidence on the relationship between micro‐finance
(2008) and schooling‐gaps in Bolivia. On one side micro‐finance
increases ability of poor household to send their children to
school. On the other side, increasing production capacity leads
to increasing the demand on child labor.
8 Liverpool and Winter‐Nelson Clarifies that micro‐finance in Ethiopia is able to alleviate
(2010) poverty through the use of technology, consumption
smoothing, and asset growth, although the magnitude of the
effect differs across groups of poor.
9 Coleman (2006) Wealthier villagers in Thailand are more likely to participate in
micro‐finance program than less wealthy villagers. Micro‐credit
usually goes to wealthier entrepreneurs, instead of being
allocated to poorest villagers. This evidence implies that micro‐
credit does not fully solve asymmetric information problem.
13
Methodology and Data
The Poor will always be with you.
John 12: 8
This section will present the methodology employed and data used in this research. As mentioned in the
first section, instrumental variable will be utilized to obtain precise estimate on finance‐poverty nexus.
The first part will describe the purpose of applying instrumental variable, conditionals required to be a
proper instrument, econometric models and the hypothesis. The second part will briefly explain the
nature of data and the sources of data.
a. Methodology
This subsection will explain the econometric issue and how to overcome several econometrics problems.
Furthermore, this subsection will present the model and elaborate the main hypothesis.
Econometric Method
To test the relationship between finance and poverty, one can employ a simple regression model, OLS.
However, OLS will suffer from biases, which are omitted variable bias, reverse causality bias, and
measurement error (Beck, 2008). All these biases will hinder the result of estimation. This implies that
researcher cannot fully depend on the result as it will be less precise and accurate.
Omitted variable bias arises in the model where relevant variable is being excluded from the model. If
one relevant variable being excluded from the model, then the estimation will treat the beta estimate of
omitted variable to independent variable as fixed when calculating expected beta estimate (Wooldridge,
2009). This will lead to bias in the beta of variable of interest as expected beta estimate will not be equal
to actual beta.
Reverse causality bias appears in the model as financial development might depend on the level of
poverty. It is possible that the bank’s decision to open branch or expand the business to the place where
level of poverty is lower or higher. This bias will cause the endogenous variable to be correlated to the
error term. In turn, this correlation will impede the true relationship between endogenous variable and
dependent variable.
The other problem is measurement error. Measurement error problem arises when the researcher
cannot collect true data on the variable that affects economic behavior (Wooldridge, 2009). If
measurement error appears in the explanatory variable, then the estimator will be biased and
inconsistent as the error term is correlated to endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2009).
14
In the field of finance‐growth nexus, which also can be applied to finance and poverty, omitted variable
bias, reverse causality bias and measurement error can be overcome by several methodologies. Beck
(2008) mentions some useful approaches such as cross‐section instrumental variables, dynamic panel
approach, time‐series econometrics, and difference‐in‐difference estimate. Although they still contain
several problems, but those methodologies at least able to reduce bias and thus, enable researcher to
obtain better estimate.
This research is using cross‐section instrumental variable to obtain accurate estimation. The reason is
that dynamic panel approach and time series require a very large dataset (Beck, 2008). Meanwhile,
difference‐in‐difference estimate can be employ if natural experiment is available. Thus, cross‐section
instrumental variable is the main method that feasible to be employed in this research. The following
section will explain the mechanics of cross‐section instrumental variable and what is the proper
instrument for this research.
Instrumental Variable
Instrumental variable is being useful to solve the above three biases. It can overcome those biases by
separating the component of endogenous explanatory variable that is correlated to error term from the
component that is not related to error term (Beck, 2008). In addition, instrumental variable recognizes
the presence of omitted variable (Wooldridge, 2009).
To acquire consistent estimator, additional variable is needed. This new variable, which is called
instrumental variable, is expected to convey additional information. However, this new variable should
satisfy two assumptions. First, instrumental variable is uncorrelated with error term. Second, this
instrumental variable is correlated with endogenous explanatory variable that is being instrumented
(Wooldridge, 2009).
There is no technique to test the first assumption, which requires instrumental variable to be
uncorrelated with error term. Instead of using statistical technique, the first assumption should be
verified theoretically (Verbeek, 2008). This implies that instrument variable is uncorrelated to error term
by construction. However, The second assumption can be tested by assessing the correlation coefficient
between instrumental variable and endogenous explanatory variable.
In the case that instrumental variable is weakly correlated to endogenous explanatory variable;
substantial bias will be appeared in the IV estimator (Wooldridge, 2009). In this setting, OLS is more
useful than the IV method as IV estimator will be less efficient than OLS estimator. In turn, this poor
instrumental variable will thwart the consistency of the result (Wooldridge, 2009).
Ergo, the instrumental variable should be employed to deal with omitted variable bias, reverse causality
bias, and measurement error problem. The instrument should satisfy two criteria. First, it should be
15
indirectly correlated with poverty and inequality. Second, it should be directly related to microfinance
variable.
In cross‐country study, legal origin and geographical latitude usually are being employed as instrumental
variable to explain financial development (Beck, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Levine, 2007). Obviously, this
research cannot use legal origin as instrumental variable because legal system is indifference across
regencies in Indonesia. The Geographical latitude differs across regencies. However, the difference is
very small. Thus, both legal origin and geographical latitude cannot be useful as instrumental variable.
The other possibility is by using distance to Jakarta as instrumental variable. The argument is that the
further away the regency from Jakarta, as financial center in Indonesia, the lower the magnitude of
micro‐credit per capita. The line of reasoning following this argument is straightforward. The further
away a regency from Jakarta, the higher the cost for a Bank to open a branch in that regency. Thus the
number of bank’s branch in the regency will be negatively correlated with the distance from that
regency to Jakarta. As the number of bank goes down, the amount of micro‐credit being allocated will
be dropped because financial institutions’ capability to collect fund is being declined.
Theoretically, the distance to Jakarta will have no direct effect to poverty level in the regency as well as
its income distribution. Meanwhile it could have direct effect on micro‐credit per capita. If this
contention is hold, then theoretically distance to Jakarta can serve as a proper instrument for micro‐
credit per capita as it satisfies both requirements to be good instrument.
Econometric Model and Hypothesis
The econometric model is being established based on the idea from the previous section. The
econometric models along with the hypothesis to answer main inquiry on this research are presented in
this section.
The main econometric models to test the link between finance, poverty, and inequality are
HCIi = α1 + β1MSMi + γ1GRCi + δ1DEVi + θ1SCHi +εi (i)
PGIi = α2 + β2MSMi + γ2GRCi + δ2DEVi + θ2SCHi +еi (ii)
GINi = α3 + β3MSMi + γ3GRCi + δ3DEVi + θ3SCHi +vi (iii)
Where:
HCIi = headcount poverty index in regency i
PGIi = poverty gap index in regency i
GINi = gini coefficient in regency i
MSMi = micro‐small‐medium credit per capita in regency i
GRCi = growth of GDRP per capita in regency i
16
DEVi = Development expenditure per capita in regency i
SCHi = Percentage of Population with Primary School or less in regency i
εi, еi, vi = Error term
As mentioned earlier in the previous sub‐section, instrumental variables are needed to deal with reverse
causality bias and measurement error problem. In this research, all explanatory variables are
endogenous. Thus, four instrumental variables are needed to avoid over/under‐indentified problem.
Economic growth is instrumented by total local government expenditure for the reason that
government expenditure of the regency will have multiplier effect to its economic performance.
Meanwhile, government expenditure will indirectly affect poverty or income inequality through
economic growth.
Development expenditure per capita is instrumented by local government income after excluding
income from natural resources. How much government of regency will expend on development
expenditure is determined by the local government income. We cannot expect that local government
income has an effect on poverty/inequality. Government income might have indirect effect on poverty
through government spending on poverty program. It is possible that the relationship appears the other
way around. We can expect that the poorer the regency, the lower the tax that can be collected.
However, this relationship works indirectly through the taxes.
Percentage of population with primary education or less is instrumented by Public Expenditure on
Education for the reason that public expenditure on education will directly affect the number of
educated people. Meanwhile, public expenditure on education will not have a direct effect on poverty
and income inequality. This can be true by assuming there is no large difference on education
expenditure across time. This implies that today public expenditure on education reflects past public
expenditure on education.
Thus, the econometric models to instrument endogenous explanatory variables are:
MSMi = α4 + φDISi + ωi (iv)
GRCi = α5 + ρGOVi + µi (v)
DEVi = α6 + λGICi + ξi (vi)
SCHi = α6 + πPEDi + υi (vii)
Where:
DISi = distance to Jakarta from capital of regency i
GOVi = total government expenditure in regency i
17
GICi = government revenue after excluding income from natural resources in regency i
PEDi = public expenditure on education in regency i
ωi , µi, ξi, υi = error term
The variable of interest is micro‐small‐medium credit per capita (MSM). Hence, the magnitude of β1, β2,
β3 is the main interest in this research on determining the link from microfinance to poverty and
inequality. If β1 = 0, then micro‐small‐medium credit brings no effect on headcount poverty index. If β1 is
positive (negative), consequently micro‐small‐medium credit has positive (negative) effect on headcount
poverty index. In line with β1 to headcount poverty index, β2 and β3 follow the same logic.
Operationalization of Variables
In contrast with Beck, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Levine (2007) this research is employing absolute
measurement of poverty. The poverty line being used is the poverty line created by Badan Pusat
Statistik Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics). The reason is that absolute poverty will be useful on
making comparison among several areas (Cutler, 1984). In this case, the poverty line is the minimum
amount of money to attain certain amount of needs. The second reason is that the absolute poverty line
measures the poorest of the poor. It is important to distinguish between absolute and relative poverty
line, as this will influence the interpretation of results. The following box 3.2 will exhibit the difference
between absolute and relative poverty measurement.
Box 3.1 Absolute VS Relative Poverty Line
Absolute Poverty Line: Relative Poverty Line:
‐ Conditions of failure to meet the essentials ‐ Income relative to others’ income
of physical existence ‐ Measures the poor relative to well‐being of
‐ Measures the poorest of the poor others
‐ Data based on consumption survey ‐ Data based on Households’ Income
‐ Free from cross‐cultural bias ‐ Easy to attain, for instance from data on
income tax
This research is exploiting poverty data from BPS Indonesia. Thus it is an absolute poverty line as
BPS defines the poor based on its consumption. The main advantage of using absolute poverty line
is that the data will be standardized because it is based on minimum living standard. In addition, it
measures the poorest of the poor in society. However, the consumption data cannot be obtained
effortless. The statistic bureau has to conduct household consumption survey, which is more
difficult and more expensive than to collect income data.
Sources: Cutler (1984) and Roemer and Gugerty (1997)
After defining the poverty line, then both headcount poverty and poverty gap index are being
determined. Headcount index is calculated by dividing the number of people who live under poverty line
18
by total population. Thus, headcount poverty index simply is percentage of poor people (people living
under poverty line) to total population. Meanwhile, the poverty gap index is being established by
measuring the average poverty gap across the entire population (Roemer and Gugerty, 1997).
Roemer and Gugerty (1997) emphasize that poverty gap index is more sensitive than headcount index.
Headcount index measures only the changes in income of the poor who cross the poverty line and
disregards the change below poverty line. Poverty gap index resolve the weakness of headcount index
by measuring the aggregate amount of poverty relative to poverty line. The poverty gap index
epitomizes the transfer of income to the poor that would be necessary to eradicate poverty. The main
weakness of poverty gap index is that it does not denote the meticulousness of poverty (Roemer and
Gugerty, 1997).
The other variable of interest is the gini coefficient. Gini coefficient measures the income inequality by
simply taking differences between all pairs of income and sums the absolute differences (Ray, 1998).
This implies that the gini coefficient is equal to the sum of all pairwise comparisons. Gini coefficient is
normalized by dividing to population squared and mean income (Ray, 1998).
The gini coefficient can easily be understood by probing the Lorenz curve. The idea of Lorenz curve and
how it links to Gini coefficient will be clarified in Box. 3.3.
Box 3.2 The Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient
The vertical axis is the cumulative shares of income,
Cumulative Shares of Income
Gini coefficient is obtained by dividing area A by the sum of area A and B. The higher the value of
gini coefficient, the more unequal the society is. Hitherto, gini coefficient is widely used to measure
income inequality. Most countries regularly report the gini coefficient.
Source: Ray (1998)
The gini coefficient satisfies all four principles of Lorenz curve. First principle is anonymity, which implies
that it does not matter who is earning the income. Second principle is population principle. This
principle portends that replicating the entire population (and their incomes) should not change the
inequality. Third is relative income principle, which implies that population shares matter but the
absolute value of population itself does not matter. Fourth principle is the Dalton principle. Dalton
19
principle claims that if one income distribution can be achieved from another by constructing a
sequence of regressive transfers, then the former distribution (before transfer) is more unequal than the
latter (after transfer).
The main explanatory variable is micro‐small‐medium credit per capita. This variable is acquired by
dividing total micro‐small‐medium credit from all formal institutions in the regency by total population
in that regency. MSM credit is the credit that has value not more than Rp. 5 billion, and is allocated
mostly to small and medium enterprises in Indonesia. The MSM‐credit could be decomposed into micro‐
credit, small‐credit, and medium‐credit. Micro‐credit is credit that less than Rp. 50 million, small credit is
credit between Rp. 50 million and Rp. 500 million, and medium credit is credit from Rp. 500 million to Rp.
5 billion. The small amount of this credit signals the collateral of the debtor.
The other explanatory variables are growth of gross domestic regional product per capita, development
expenditure per capita, and percentage of population with primary school or less. Development
expenditure per capita is public expenditure on poverty alleviation program divide by total population in
the regency. The last control variable is primary school. It measures the portion of population that
finished only primary school or less. All these three variables are expected to have negative effect on
poverty and inequality.
b. Data
This research is exploiting data from 319 regencies in Indonesia. It covers more than 80% of regencies in
Indonesia. Regencies that are being excluded from the sample set are regencies in Aceh province and
Jakarta province. Regencies in Aceh are being excluded because Aceh was a conflict area during that
period. Regencies in Jakarta are also being excluded as Jakarta is special region where all policies in
those regencies are centralized on provincial government. The second reason is that not all data from
regencies in Jakarta province are available. The period covered in this research is 2002, except when
conducting decomposition analysis for micro‐small‐medium credit. The reason of using the data on 2005
is to reduce the potential reverse causality bias since instrumental variable can no longer be used. Detail
explanation on this will be presented on the section of the extension of result.
Poverty indicators (headcount index, poverty gap index), gini coefficients, total population, GDRP/capita,
and percentage of primary school could be obtained from central bureau statistic and are available for
more than 340 regencies in Indonesia for the period of 2002 – 2005. Micro‐small‐medium Credit data
and inflation rate for all regencies could be found from Central Bank of Indonesia website and are
available from 2002 to 2010. Local government spending on development, government revenue, and
education expenditure could be acquired from the website of Ministry of Finance and are available from
2001 to 2009.
Distance to Jakarta is measured by calculating the distance of straight line from Jakarta to the capital of
regency. To obtain the distance of straight line from Jakarta to the capital of regency, data on
20
geographical coordinate system is needed. The second step is calculating the distance by applying
Pythagoras theorem. However, data on distance can be easily acquired through several website or
software, for instance Google maps and http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/calculate‐distance.html. Both
of these websites provide ready to use data on distance between two locations in the earth. The
distance is being calculated by inserting geographical coordinate into Pythagoras formula. The
descriptive statistics on all variables involved in this research is being presented in Appendix A.
21
Result
This section will present the evidence of finance‐poverty‐inequality. The econometric model and the
idea behind it are presented in the previous chapter. This section consists of three sub‐sections. First, it
will present the preliminary result. Then, estimations using Instrumental Variable are discussed in the
second sub‐section. The last sub‐section will present the extension of this research, which will cover
decomposition analysis and regional differences.
a. Preliminary Evidence
This sub‐section will portray the preliminary result by regressing poverty indicators and gini coefficient
on micro‐small‐medium‐credit per capita. The following table will exhibit the result of preliminary
regression. The model employed in this regression is ordinary least square estimation without
controlling for any variable. Data employed is data on 2002.
Table 4.1 Preliminary Evidence on Finance‐Poverty‐Inequality (2002)
X = Micro‐Small‐Medium Y
Credit per Capita HCI PGI Gini
Beta 0.0004** 0.0111** 0.0007**
Standard Error 0.00004 0.0009 0.00003
t‐statistic 11.0546 11.5672 20.1194
N 319 319 319
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, E‐views output in Appendix B
The results from preliminary regressions show that micro‐small‐medium credit positively correlated to
headcount index, poverty gap index, and gini coefficient. All betas in table 4.1 are positive and
statistically significant. These results denote that poverty level and income inequality are higher in the
regencies where micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is higher. This preliminary result is not what the
author might anticipate, as it contradicts to the general idea that micro‐small‐medium credit has
negative impact on poverty.
However, robust and precise conclusion cannot be drawn from these results due to several biases
problem. The main expected problem is the reverse causality bias. It is possible that the positive
relationship between finance and poverty due to the higher demand of micro‐small‐medium credit in
the poorer regencies. It is also possible that banks allocated more micro‐small‐medium credit in the
22
regencies where poverty level and income inequality are higher. Instrumental variable estimation, which
is expected to solve several biases, will be presented in the following sub‐section.
b. Evidence using IV method
Instrumental variable can resolve biases that might hinder the result. As explained in the previous
section, distance to Jakarta serves as an instrument in this research. The idea is that distance to Jakarta
is expected to affect the willingness of a bank to expand the business into certain area. On the other
side, distance to Jakarta will not have direct effect on the poverty level and income disparity in that area.
Ergo, distance to Jakarta could perform as proper instrument.
However, that contention should be verified statistically. Unfortunately, there is no procedure available
to verify whether or not distance to Jakarta will indirectly affect poverty and inequality. Thus, only first
assumption can be tested. Meanwhile, second assumption should rely on theory instead of statistic.
Table 4.2 will show the evidence to validate the assumption.
Table 4.2 Regression of Distance to Jakarta on MSM‐Credit per Capita
X= Distance to Jakarta Y = Micro‐Small‐Medium Credit per Capita
Beta ‐0.1004**
Standard Error 0.0133
t‐statistic ‐7.5178
R2 16.08%
N 319
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, E‐views output in Appendix B
Table 4.2 reveals that distance to Jakarta is significantly correlated to the amount of micro‐small‐
medium credit per capita. The beta estimate of OLS regression is ‐0.1004 and is significant at 95% level
of confidence. The variation of variable distance to Jakarta explains 16.1% of the variation of micro‐
small‐medium credit per capita. The result confirms that the distance to Jakarta is negatively correlated
to micro‐small‐medium credit per capita. Thus, the distance to Jakarta can serve as proper instrument
for micro‐small‐medium credit per capita.
In addition, it is necessary to verify the validity of other instruments used in this research. As already
mentioned in previous section, GDRP per capita growth, development expenditure and percentage of
population with primary school or less might have two‐way relationship with poverty and income
inequality. Thus, all those control variables should be instrumented. GDRP per capita growth is
instrumented by government expenditure. Development expenditure is instrumented by government
revenue after excluding income from natural resources. Percentage of population with primary school
or less is instrumented by public expenditure on education. All of those instruments are presumed to
23
indirectly affect poverty and income inequality and directly influence each endogenous explanatory
variable. The regressions to confirm that each instrument has direct effect on each endogenous
explanatory variable are presented in Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3 Instrumental Variables on each Endogenous Explanatory Variable
Endogenous Explanatory Variables
Summary of
GDRP per Capita Development Percent of Population
Regressions
Growth Expenditure per Capita with Primary School
Beta 0.0249** 8.6414** ‐0.0006**
Standard error 0.0014 0.7109 0.00021
t‐statistic 17.7981 12.1560 ‐2.7103
2
R 2.95% 31.58% 1.96%
Instrumental Government Government Revenue Public Expenditure on
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, E‐views output in Appendix B
The second column of table 4.3 is the first regression’s result of Government Expenditure per Capita on
GDRP per capita Growth. Government expenditure per capita is positively correlated with GDRP per
capita and is statistically significant. The third column is the summary of the second regression. It regress
government revenue per capita on development expenditure per capita. The result on table 4.3 exhibits
that government revenue per capita is positively correlated with development expenditure per capita.
The variation of government revenue per capita explains 31.58% of the variation of development
expenditure per capita. The last column presents the result of the third regression between public
expenditure on education per capita and the percentage of population with primary school or less,
assuming that there is no large variation over time on public expenditure on education. The result is that
public expenditure on education per capita is negatively correlated with percent of population with
primary school or less. It is possible because public expenditure may go more to secondary school
instead of primary school. Thus, in the regencies where public expenditure on education per capita is
higher, number of people with secondary school will be higher as well. Consequently, the percentage of
population with primary school or less is lower in the regencies with higher public expenditure on
education.
Those results simply indicate that all instrumental variables satisfy the first assumption to be proper
instrument. With regards to exogeneity assumption, which denotes that the instrument is uncorrelated
with error term in poverty and inequality equations, number of instrumental variables in this research
should be more than the number of endogenous explanatory variables. This implies that the exogeneity
24
assumption cannot be tested statistically (Verbeek, 2008), except if the model is over‐identified. In this
case, economic argument should be the origin of justification.
However, we might expect that multicollinearity appears in the model since all control variables are
related to government expenditure. For instance, growth is instrumented by the government
expenditure, while at the same time primary schooling is being instrumented by education expenditure.
Thus, multicollinearity test, which can be done by calculating correlation coefficient, should be
conducted. Table 4.4 will exhibit the result of multicollinearity test.
Table 4.4 Correlation Coefficient among Explanatory Variables
From table 4.4 it is obvious that micro‐small‐medium credit per capita has no significant correlation with
all control variables. However, primary schooling is expected to be correlated to GDRP per capita growth
and development expenditure per capita. Although it might bias the result for control variables, this
correlation will have no effect on the coefficient of micro‐small‐medium credit per capita. As stated in
Wooldridge (2006), correlation between two variables will have no effect on the main variable as long as
that main variable does not correlate to one of those two variables. Ergo, in this case all control
variables will be used to reduce omitted variable bias in the model. Nevertheless, the coefficient of
control variables might be less reliable as its variances will be higher.
If instruments already satisfy two basic assumptions, then the next step is utilizing this instrument on
the econometric models. The explanation on the result of instrumental variable method will be covered
in the subsequent sections and will be explicated separately based on independent variable.
25
Headcount Poverty Index
The result in this sub‐section is obtained by employing model (i). Variables distance to Jakarta, growth of
GDRP per capita, development expenditure per capita and primary schooling are being instrumented.
Table 4.5 exhibit the estimation result of model (i).
Table 4.5 Estimation Result of Model (i) after Instrumenting Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable
Explanatory variable
Log (HCI) Log (HCI) Log (HCI) Log (HCI)
Log (MSM‐Credit per Capita)
Beta ‐0.5899** ‐0.5749** ‐0.5941** ‐0.6198**
Standard Error 0.0917 0.0974 0.0987 0.0945
Control Variables
Growth of GDRP per Capita
Beta ‐7.2511** ‐6.1401** ‐9.2414** ‐10.757**
Standard Error 2.4056 3.4817 3.7117 3.2488
Log (Development Expenditure per Capita)
Beta ‐0.0489 ‐0.1134
Standard Error 0.0960 0.1049
Log(Primary School)
Beta ‐2.0008** ‐1.5354**
Standard Error 0.9024 0.8498
Adjusted R2 11.89% 11.71% 12.43% 12.30%
White Heteroscedasticity Test 6.7792 7.0562 8.3199 7.9311
Number of Observations 319 319 319 319
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, E‐views output in Appendix C
Second column exhibits the result by including growth of GDRP per capita as control variable and
excluding other control variables. The estimation result confirms that after controlling for GDRP per
capita growth and instrumenting with distance to Jakarta, micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is
negatively affect headcount poverty index.
The coefficient of interest is ‐0.59. As the model is log‐log model, then the interpretation is obvious.
Ceteris paribus, 1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will lower headcount poverty index
by 0.59%. This model explains 11.89% of variation in headcount poverty index.
26
The third column of Table 4.5 presents the evidence of model (i) by adding development expenditure
per capita as control variable. For main explanatory variable, the result is still consistent. Micro‐small‐
medium credit per capita is significantly affect headcount poverty index with coefficient ‐0.5749.
In contrast, the variable development expenditure per capita is not statistically correlated to headcount
poverty index. The inclusion of development expenditure per capita reduces the ability of model to
explain headcount poverty index, as we can notice from adjusted R2 value. However, the other variables
(GDRP per capita growth and MSM‐credit per capita) are still statistically significant despite the fact that
coefficients are changing.
The fourth column presents the estimation result after including additional control variable, which is log
value of percent of population with primary school or less. The evidence is still consistent, where micro‐
small‐medium credit per capita negatively affects headcount poverty index. The coefficient for micro‐
small‐medium credit per capita is ‐0.5941. This implies that, ceteris paribus, 1% increase of micro‐small‐
medium credit per capita will bring down headcount poverty index by 0.59%. It is obvious that this result
is consistent with the first model.
The value of adjusted R2 is higher in the third model, which controls for all possible explanatory variables,
than the adjusted R2 of first model. From the fourth column, the value of adjusted R2 is 12.43%. This
value indicates that the 12.43% of variation of poverty index is explained by the variation of current
model.
In this scenario, all control variables are significant except for development expenditure per capita. The
GDRP per capita growth variable has coefficient of ‐9.2414, and coefficient for percentage of population
with primary school or less is ‐2.0008. This implies that both variables are negatively correlated with
headcount poverty index. This result is consistent with the earlier prediction, which expects that if GDRP
per capita growth and percentage of population with primary school or less go up, then the headcount
poverty index will go down.
The last column shows the result if development expenditure per capita is being excluded from the
model. Meanwhile, GDRP per capita growth and percentage of population with primary school or less
are included in the model as control variables. The development expenditure per capita is being
excluded as it might generate less efficient estimator. Wooldridge (2006) argued that the inclusion of
irrelevant variable will cause the estimator to be less efficient and thus will hinder the result.
Furthermore, the last model satisfies parsimonious condition, which is better than the model in fourth
column.
The result obviously shows that all variables significantly have an effect on headcount poverty index.
The coefficients for all explanatory variables are negative. In absolute term, the value of all coefficients
increases, except for percent of population with primary school or less. This result confirms theoretical
prediction that financial development, in the form of micro‐small‐medium credit, will be able to alleviate
27
poverty. Ceteris paribus, 1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will result in 0.62%
decrease in headcount poverty index. This model explains 12.30% of the variation of headcount poverty
index.
Poverty Gap Index
Poverty Gap Index is different from Headcount Poverty Index, although both measure the poverty level.
Poverty Gap Index is more sensitive than the Headcount Index as it takes into account the income gap
across groups under poverty line. Consequently, the result presented in this sub‐section will give more
precise effect of micro‐small‐medium credit per capita to poverty reduction.
Table 4.6 Estimation Result of Model (ii) after Instrumenting Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable
Explanatory variable
Log (PGI) Log (PGI) Log (PGI) Log (PGI)
Log (MSM‐Credit per Capita)
Beta ‐0.6012** ‐0.5968** ‐0.6193** ‐0.6401**
Standard Error 0.1177 0.1193 0.1215 0.1221
Control Variables
Growth of GDRP per Capita
Beta ‐4.7575* ‐4.4131 ‐8.3660** ‐9.6614**
Standard Error 2.7141 3.7997 4.170 3.9531
Log (Development Expenditure per Capita)
Beta ‐0.0151 ‐0.0963
Standard Error 0.1182 0.1298
Log(Primary School)
Beta ‐2.5188** ‐2.1269**
Standard Error 1.2101 1.0333
Adjusted R2 9.5% 9.19% 10.06% 10.14%
White Heteroscedasticity Test 13.0333 16.6031 17.6516 13.9545
Number of Observations 319 312 312 312
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, * significant at 90%, E‐views output in Appendix C
Second column displays the result if the model is controlled only by GDRP per capita growth. Both main
explanatory variable and control variable are statistically significant. This model could explain 9.5% the
variation of poverty gap index.
28
The coefficient for micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is ‐0.60. As the model is log‐log model, then
the result implies that 1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will result in 0.60% decrease
in poverty gap index, ceteris paribus. The value of coefficient is not much different from the coefficient
in the previous model of headcount poverty index.
The third column portrays the estimation result if development expenditure per capita is included as
control variable. This additional variable brings no extra information, which can be seen from the
evidence that the variable development expenditure per capita itself is not statistically significant as well
as variable GDRP per capita growth. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 goes down to 9.19% because the
number of observation is being declined to 312.
However, micro‐small‐medium credit per capita still significantly affects poverty gap index; despite the
value of coefficient is lower compared to the previous setting. This finding suggests that, ceteris paribus,
1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will lower down the poverty gap index by 0.59%.
The fourth column reports the results if all control variables are being included in the model. Thus,
percent of population with primary school or less is incorporated in the model. The value of adjusted R2
rises to 10.06%. All variables negatively affect poverty gap index. However, the development
expenditure per capita remains statistically insignificant. The coefficient of variable of interest, which is
micro‐small‐medium credit per capita, is ‐0.62. This finding does not deviate so much from earlier result.
The last column conveys the result if development expenditure is being excluded. Micro‐small‐medium
credit per capita as well as all control variables negatively affect poverty gap index. Ergo, all variables
confirm theoretical prediction. The variation of this model explains 10.14% of the poverty gap index
variation, which is better than the previous models.
Furthermore, except for variable percentage of population with primary school or less, the values of all
coefficients are going up. Based on this result, ceteris paribus, 1% increase (decrease) in micro‐small‐
medium credit per capita will lead to 0.64% decrease (increase) in poverty gap index. However, it is
obvious that all these findings confirm that micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will have positive
effect on poverty reduction.
Gini Coefficient
Previous sub‐sections reveal the empirical evidence on the relationship between micro‐small‐medium
credit and poverty. This sub‐section will describe the estimation result on model (iii) that test the
relationship between micro‐small‐medium credit and income inequality. Income inequality is measured
by Gini Coefficient. The following table of 4.7 will exhibit the estimation result.
29
Table 4.7 Estimation Result of Model (ii) after Instrumenting Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable
Explanatory variable
Log (Gini) Log (Gini) Log (Gini) Log (Gini)
Log (MSM‐Credit per Capita)
Beta 0.0337 0.0307 0.0343 0.0391*
Standard Error 0.0225 0.0241 0.0238 0.0223
Control Variables
Growth of GDRP per Capita
Beta 0.6779 0.4445 1.0175 1.3269*
Standard Error 0.6458 0.8559 0.8758 0.7738
Log (Development Expenditure per Capita)
Beta 0.0101 0.0221
Standard Error 0.0231 0.0257
Log(Primary School)
Beta 0.3715 0.2829
Standard Error 0.2927 0.2625
Adjusted R2 0.16% 0.15% 0.24% 0.28%
White Heteroscedasticity Test 7.6244 14.247 16.613 8.3740
Number of Observations 318 318 318 318
Notes: * significant at 90%, E‐views output in Appendix C
Surprisingly, the results in this sub‐section contradict the previous finding. In the previous sub‐section,
there is enough evidence that micro‐small‐medium credit negatively correlated to poverty. Based on
previous finding, we might expect that micro‐small‐medium credit would correct income inequality as it
alleviates poverty. However, the empirical evidence based on equation (iii) does not confirm this
prediction.
As the results from second to fourth column exhibit, it is obvious that micro‐small‐medium credit per
capita is not statistically correlated to gini coefficient. The second column presents the result if only
growth of GDRP per capita is being controlled for. The third column reports the result if development
expenditure per capita is added to the equation. The fourth column gives details on the result after
controlled for growth of GDRP per capita, development expenditure per capita, and percentage of
population with primary school or less. All these scenarios give consistent results. Financial development,
in the form of micro‐small‐medium credit, does not statistically correlate to income inequality. In
30
addition, the model is very poor on explaining the variation of gini coefficient. All models explain not
more than 1% of gini coefficient, as adjusted R2 value indicates.
However, the outcome presented in the last column tells different story. In the last column, only growth
of GDRP per capita and percentage of population with primary school or less are being controlled. The
variable development expenditure per capita is being excluded from the model as it might reduce the
efficiency of estimation result. As mentioned earlier, this model suffers from multicollinearity between
GDRP per capita growth and primary schooling. However, this multicollinearity will not affect the
coefficient of main variables. Those two variables need to be controlled to deal with omitted variable
bias. In this setting, micro‐small‐medium credit per capita positively correlates to gini coefficient as well
as all control variables. This result holds at 90% level of confidence. Thus, we might reject the hypothesis
that micro‐small‐medium credit is statistically affect gini coefficient at 95% level of confidence.
Nevertheless, the result is still surprising. At 90% level of confidence, we might anticipate that micro‐
small‐medium credit per capita positively affects gini coefficient. This implies that, instead of correcting
income distribution, micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is worsening the income distribution. This
finding contradicts the previous result. As micro‐small‐medium credit helps to alleviate poverty, but it
does not correct income disparity. Ceteris paribus, 1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita
will result in 0.039% increase in income inequality.
Summary of Findings and Proposed Explanation
Three sub‐sections portray the empirical evidence on micro‐finance, poverty, and inequality. Poverty is
measured by headcount index and poverty gap index. Meanwhile, income inequality is measured by gini
coefficient.
In regards to finance‐poverty, results suggest that micro‐small‐medium credit is able to alleviate poverty.
The result is consistent using both headcount poverty index and poverty gap index. In general, 1%
increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will result in 0.62% decreasing of headcount poverty
index and 0.64% on poverty gap index, holding other things constant. These results confirm the
contention that better functioning financial system will enable the wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs to
exploit investment opportunity. However, these findings confirm only on macro level, not on the
channel through which micro‐financing helps the poor.
Furthermore, the result on the link between micro‐small‐medium credit and income inequality
contradicts the previous result. At 90% level of confidence, micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is
worsening the income distribution. Considering the first result, this result is quite striking. If financial
development, in the form of micro‐finance, could alleviate poverty, supposedly it could adjust income
distribution to be more equal.
31
There are at least two explanations on this result. First explanation for this contradiction lies on the
nature of measurement method for both poverty indicators and gini coefficient. Headcount index
measures only the percentage of poor relative to total population. Thus, headcount index will change
easily if some groups of poor, who live in the margin of poverty line, cross the poverty line. Headcount
index does not take into account the change of income for the people within the poverty line.
Poverty gap index measures the gap among groups whose income below poverty line. However, poverty
gap index does not denote the meticulousness of poverty. Meanwhile, gini coefficient is able to measure
the income difference across all groups within society. Thus, the change of gini coefficient will reflect the
change of relative income, not absolute income. Meanwhile, all poverty index used in this research
reflect only the change in absolute income.
Therefore, in the case that income of 20% richest people rises more than income of 20% poorest people,
then the Gini Coefficient will be higher than before although the poor is relatively richer than before.
This implies that it is possible that financial development, along with the improvement of micro‐small‐
medium credit, benefits the richer more than it benefits the poorest of the poor. In this case, the
number of absolute poverty is being diminished, although income distribution is getting worse. The
definition of “richer” is the group whose income more than median income.
The second possible explanation is that micro‐small‐medium credits are being allocated more to the
median income group than low income group. Thus, although it still is beneficial for the poor, but micro‐
small‐medium credit will worsen income distribution. This proposition is different from the first
proposition mentioned above. The first proposition implies that regular credit (credit for big
corporations) brings more benefit than micro‐small‐medium credit. Second proposition implies that
micro‐small‐medium credit is being mis‐allocated.
This research can be extended to find more explanation on those findings. Next sub‐section will
elaborate the extension of main research by decomposing micro‐small‐medium credit and controlling
regional differences. As mentioned before, the main research employs aggregate data on micro‐small‐
medium credit. The main disadvantage of aggregate data is that the results do not offer detail
explanation. By decomposing, this disadvantage can be overcome.
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c. Extension of the Research
This sub‐section presents the extension on the research. Two things will be covered in this sub‐section,
decomposition of micro‐small‐medium credit and investigation of regional differences. Both
decomposition and investigation of regional differences are useful to get bigger picture on how financial
development affects poverty. In addition, these two attempts can be useful to propose policy
implication. For instance, by acknowledging the different effect of financial development on each region,
then the financial authority could design more detail policy.
Decomposing Micro‐Small‐Medium Credit
Previous econometric models use aggregate data on micro‐small‐medium credit to explore how
financial development affects poverty and inequality. This sub‐section tries to disaggregate micro‐small‐
medium credit and investigates whether or not different type of credit will have different effect.
There are two steps to conduct this test. First, aggregate data on micro‐small‐medium credit is being
decomposed into three types, which are micro‐credit, small‐credit, and medium‐credit. Then, new
models are constructed to replace earlier model. Instrumental variable cannot be used in this section as
instrumenting all variables related to credit with distance to Jakarta will cause perfect multicollinearity
among those variables. However, if endogenous variables are not instrumented, then the model will be
suffered from reverse causality bias.
Hence, to overcome reverse causality bias, the model should be modified. Model can be modified by
using different year for dependent variable and explanatory variables. For dependent variables, 2005
data will be exploited. Meanwhile, data 2002 will be utilized for explanatory variables. The line of
reasoning is that micro, small, medium‐credit in 2002 will affect poverty and inequality in 2005.
However, we cannot expect that poverty and income disparity in 2005 affects credit allocation in 2002.
Therefore, reverse causality bias is being reduced. Mathematical equation for that model will be
HCIi,05 = α1 + β1SMICi,02 + β2SSMLi,02 + β3SMEDi,02 + δ1(Ci,02) +εi (xi)
PGIi,05 = α2 + γ1SMICi,02 + γ2SSMLi,02 + γ3SMEDi,02+ δ2(Ci,02) + еi (xii)
GINi,05 = α3 + θ1SMICi,02 + θ2SSMLi,02 + θ3SMEDi,02 + δ3(Ci,02) +vi (xiii)
Where:
HCIi,05 = headcount poverty index in regency i at 2005
PGIi,05 = poverty gap index in regency i at 2005
GINi,05 = gini coefficient in regency i at 2005
SMICi,02 = Micro‐credit per Capita at regency i for 2002
33
SSMLi,02 = Small‐credit per Capita at regency I for 2002
SMEDi,02 = Medium‐credit per Capita at regency I for 2002
Ci,02 = Set of control variables at 2002.
εi, еi, vi = Error term
The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, β3, γ1, γ2, γ3, θ1, θ2, θ3. The interpretation is that if
micro/small/medium credit per capita change by Rp. 1, then poverty index will change by β1, β2, β3, γ1, γ2,
γ3, θ1, θ2, θ3 unit.
Table 4.8 Result after Decomposition
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
HCI i,05 PGI i,05 GINI i,05
Micro‐Credit per Capitai,02
Small‐Credit per Capitai,02
Medium‐Credit per Capita i,02
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, * significant at 90%, E‐views output in Appendix D
The second column shows the result on model (xi). It is noticeable that all credit variables are negatively
linked to headcount poverty index. The model explains 9.78% of the variation of headcount poverty
index in 2005. The coefficient of micro‐credit per capita is ‐0.000134. This result indicates that if micro‐
credit per capita increases by Rp.1, then headcount poverty index will decrease by 0.000134%. The
coefficient is quite small, but in term of absolute value, it is the highest coefficient among other
coefficients of credit variables. However, according to t‐test result, there is no significant difference
34
between coefficient of micro‐credit per capita and the coefficient of small‐credit per capita. Thus, micro‐
credit and small‐credit bring, more or less, the same effect to headcount poverty index.
The third column reports the result on model (xii). In this model, credit variables are negatively
correlated to poverty gap index. The adjusted R2 value is 9.99%, which means the model explains 9.99%
of the variation of poverty gap index. In line with the result from model (xi), coefficient for micro‐credit
per capita is the highest among other coefficients of credit variables, in terms of absolute value.
Coefficient for micro‐credit per capita is ‐0.0025, which implies that Rp.1 increasing of micro‐credit per
capita will result in decreasing of poverty gap index by 0.0025%. Based on t‐test result, there is no
significant difference between coefficient of micro‐credit per capita and medium‐credit per capita. This
result implies that micro‐credit and medium‐credit bring similar effect to poverty gap index.
The last column exhibit estimation result for model (xiii). In this estimation all credit variables are
positively correlated to gini coefficient, except medium‐credit per capita which is statistically
insignificant. Based on this model, small‐credit will generate more inequality than micro‐credit as
coefficient for small‐credit is higher than coefficient for micro‐credit. However, t‐test reveals that there
is no difference between coefficient of micro‐credit per capita and the coefficient of small‐credit per
capita. Both of these variables generate equal impact on income inequality. Meanwhile, medium‐credit
has no effect on income disparity.
Ergo, according to the previous estimation results micro‐credit is as effective as small credit to cut
headcount poverty index down. Moreover, micro‐credit and medium‐credit generate equal effect on
poverty gap index. However, both micro‐credit and small‐credit enhance income inequality at the same
impact. The first conclusions are expected, as micro credit is the smallest form of credit, which implies
that collateral needed to obtain this type of credit is also smaller than other types of credit. Therefore,
there is a high possibility that micro‐credit is being allocated to the poorest entrepreneurs, which
implies that this credit will be more effective on alleviating poverty. However, the latest result exhibits
that micro‐credit also enhance the inequality. Assuming that the size of credit is parallel to the wealth
endowment, this result confirms that although micro‐credit also allocated to wealth‐deficient
entrepreneurs, but it is being allocated more to the median income group rather than the poor group.
This is the reason why micro‐credit could alleviate poverty while at the same time worsen income
distribution.
Regional Differences
The last issue to discuss is regional differences on absorbing credit. In Indonesia, regencies in west
region are usually richer than regencies in east region. In east region, especially in Papua Island, poverty
level is higher than other islands in Indonesia. Thus, we might expect that the same amount of money
will create different impact of poverty reduction between west and east region since the level of capital
scarcity is different.
35
That proposition could be helpful to reveal the connection between financial development and poverty‐
income inequality. By controlling for regional differences, better result might be obtained. A modified
econometric model is needed to investigate the idea of regional differences. This could be done by
introducing an interaction term in the model. The interaction term can be obtained by multiplying
variable micro‐small‐medium credit per capita to dummy variable of region. The value of dummy
variable will be 1 for regencies located in west region and 0 otherwise. West region consists of Sumatra,
Java, Bangka‐Belitung, Riau, and Kalimantan Island. Thus, regencies located outside these islands are
being considered as east region.
HCIi = α1 + β1MSMi + β2MSMi*DWEST+ δ1(Ci) +εi (xiv)
PGIi, = α2 + γ1MSMi + γ2MSMi*DWEST + δ2(Ci) + еi (xv)
GINi = α3 + θ1MSMi + θ2MSMi*DWEST + δ3(Ci) +vi (xvi)
Where:
HCIi = headcount poverty index in regency i
PGIi = poverty gap index in regency i
GINi = gini coefficient in regency i
MSMi = micro‐small‐medium credit per capita in regency i
MSMi*DWEST = interaction term by taking into account the region where regencies is located
Ci = Set of control variables
εi, еi, vi = Error term
Similar to estimation of model (i), (ii), and (iii), variable micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is being
instrumented with distance to Jakarta. The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2. The main
interpretation will lie on the magnitude of β2, γ2, and θ2. If these coefficients are statistically significant,
then regional differences does appear. The table 4.9 will portray the estimation results.
Table 4.9 Estimation Results on Regional Differences
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
Log(HCIi) Log(PGIi) Log(GINIi)
Log(MSM‐credit per Capitai)
Log(MSM‐credit per Capitai) * Dummy West
36
Beta 0.0606** ‐0.0115 0.0041
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, * significant at 90%, E‐views output in Appendix D
The result on this section is still consistent to the result from model (i), (ii), (iii). As shown in the table,
micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is negatively correlated to headcount poverty index and poverty
gap index, while is positively correlated to gini coefficient. The model can explain 15.37% of the variation
of headcount poverty index, 9.96% of variation of poverty gap and 2.3% of the variation of gini
coefficient. The magnitude for the coefficients of variable micro‐small‐medium credit per capita is
similar to earlier result. The coefficients are ‐0.88 for model (xiv), ‐0.59 for model (xv), and 0.06 for
model (xvi).
However, as reported in Table 4.9, the interaction term is statistically significant when explaining
headcount poverty index. Meanwhile, for poverty gap index and gini coefficient, the interaction terms
are not statistically significant. This implies that regional difference on the effect of micro‐small‐medium
credit appears only on headcount poverty index model. In other words, regional difference has nothing
to do in the variation of poverty gap index and gini coefficient among regions.
For the west region, a 1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will decrease headcount
poverty index by 0.81%. For the east region, a 1% increase in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will
lead to decreasing in headcount poverty index by 0.88%. This indicates that the same amount of money
will generate different impact on poverty level, conditional on regency’s location. Nonetheless, this
contention does not hold for poverty gap index and gini coefficient.
The evidence to prove the existence of regional differences is weak and not convincing. Thus, to get a
better picture of regional differences and how it affects the finance‐poverty nexus, micro‐small‐medium
credit will be decomposed and multiplied by dummy variable of region. We might expect that micro‐
credit will give higher impact on poverty reduction (both headcount poverty index and poverty gap
index). The following table 4.10 will present the regression result.
Table 4.10 Decomposition and Interaction Term
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables
37
HCIi,05 PGIi,05 GINIi,05
Micro‐credit per Capitai,02
Micro‐credit per Capitai,02 * Dummy West
Small‐credit per Capitai,02
Small‐credit per Capitai,02 *Dummy West
Medium‐credit per Capitai,02
Medium‐credit per Capitai,02 *Dummy West
Notes: ** significant at 95% level of confidence, E‐views output in Appendix D
Table 4.10 reveals more detail evidence after decomposing credit variables and using dummy variable.
Second column presents the evidence where headcount poverty index serves as dependent variable. In
38
this setting, adjusted R‐square increases significantly to 24.64%. This implies that the model can explain
better the variation of headcount poverty index.
There is enough evidence to conclude that micro‐credit and medium‐credit negatively affect headcount
poverty index. Meanwhile, small‐credit has no effect on headcount poverty index, although the sign is
negative. In addition, the interaction term is statistically significant in the case of micro‐credit. The
interaction term for micro‐credit is positive. This result indicates that micro‐credit will generate less
effect on poverty reduction in the west region than in the east region. In other words, the same amount
of money from micro‐credit will reduce poverty more in the east region than in the west region. Rp.1
from micro‐credit in west region will bring down the headcount poverty index by 0.005 percentage point.
Meanwhile, Rp.1 of micro‐credit in east region will cut down the headcount poverty index by 0.041
percentage point.
The third column exhibits the result when the dependent variable is poverty gap index. The result in this
part is in line with the result from the previous result. The micro‐credit and medium‐credit are
negatively correlated to poverty gap index. Small‐credit is negatively correlated to poverty gap index,
but it is not statistically significant. As well as previous result, there is evidence that the same amount of
money from micro‐credit alleviates more poverty in the east region than in the west region. Rp.1 of
micro‐credit in the west region will cut down the poverty gap index by 0.16 percentage point, while in
the east region it will diminish the poverty gap index by 1.2 percentage point.
The result in the fourth column tells a different story. In this scenario, where gini coefficient serves as
dependent variable, all credit variables and interaction terms are not statistically significant. However,
the coefficient for micro‐credit per capita has a negative sign. This indicates that micro‐credit as the
smallest form of credit is negatively correlated to income inequality, although it is not statistically
significant. Small‐credit and medium credit coefficients, in contrast, show a positive sign. In this scenario,
although they are not significant, all interaction terms are positively correlated to income inequality.
If we put these results altogether, then it will notify the explanation of the link from financial
development to poverty and inequality. Based on these results, micro‐credit consistently diminishes and
narrows down income inequality, although it is not significant in the case of income inequality. On the
other side, medium‐credit also brings negative impact on headcount poverty index and poverty gap
index, although according to its sign, medium‐credit worsens the income distribution. In addition, small‐
credit has no effect on poverty and income inequality statistically.
Thus, after controlling for regional differences, there is evidence that micro‐credit as the smallest form
of credit is able to alleviate poverty and narrow down income inequality. Medium‐credit is proven to
reduce poverty, but not income inequality. Meanwhile, small‐credit has no effect on both poverty and
income inequality. These results confirm that overall financial development benefits the rich than it
benefits the poor. The smallest form of credit, which is micro‐credit, is able to alleviate poverty and
narrow down income inequality. However, in general financial development brings advantage more to
the rich than to the poor.
39
Conclusion and Policy Implication
Remember the Poor – It costs nothing
Mark Twain (1835 – 1910)
This last section will draw conclusion from empirical result and propose several policy implications. This
research starts by prompting questions on how financial development affects poverty and inequality.
Instead of proposing theoretical link, this research offers empirical evidence. Taking cases in Indonesia,
this research attempts to reveal finance‐poverty‐inequality relations. Distance to Jakarta is employed as
instrumental variable for micro‐small‐medium credit, assuming that distance to Jakarta has no direct
effect on poverty and inequality. Instrumental variable model is utilized to deal with reverse causality
bias, measurement error, and omitted variable bias. By using instrumental variable, the result is
expected to be more precise and accurate.
However, there are some limitations in this research. First, data used is data gathered only from formal
financial institutions. This might be a significant drawback if dual financial system exists and informal
financial institutions play important role in the economy. Second, the data gathered limited only to
Indonesia geographical area. Thus, it is not wise to generalize the result for other countries. Third, due
to the nature of data, this research can only obtain evidence on macro level. The channel through which
micro‐small‐medium credit affects poverty and inequality cannot be revealed by this research. Hence,
conclusion and policy implications are built regarding these limitations.
Conclusion
Based on econometric result, there is enough evidence to conclude that micro‐small‐medium credit per
capita is negatively correlated to poverty. Both models using headcount poverty index and poverty gap
index confirm the contention of Levine (1997) and Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2001) that better
functioning system will enable the poor to access financial asset and thus help the poor leaving out the
poverty line.
According to the result, 1% increasing in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will reduce the
headcount poverty index by 0.62% and poverty gap index by 0.64%. The magnitude could also be
meaningful as it measures the elasticity of micro‐small‐medium credit per capita to poverty reduction.
Micro‐small‐medium credit has an inelastic relationship with poverty reduction.
On the other side, financial development, in the form of micro‐small‐medium credit, has a positive
effect on income inequality. Although, it is accepted only at 90% level of confidence, but 1% increasing
in micro‐small‐medium credit per capita will lead to 0.04% increasing of Gini coefficient. This implies
that as financial system is getting better, the income disparity will be widened. This finding confirms
40
theoretical prediction from Galor and Zeira (1993) that financial development will result in higher
income disparity. However, these results are quite striking. If financial development is able to alleviate
poverty, then it should be able to correct income distribution to be more equal.
Nevertheless, combining all the results, we will get two important ideas. First, micro‐small‐medium
credit is able to alleviate poverty. Second interpretation is that instead of shifting the income
distribution to the right, micro‐small‐medium credit skewing income distribution to be less equal. There
are two proposed arguments to explain this.
First, financial development, as indicated by the improvement of micro‐small‐medium credit, brings
more benefit to the rich than to the poor. Thus, poverty indices are going down by the improvement of
micro‐small‐medium credit, but Gini coefficient rises. Second, micro‐small‐medium credits are being
allocated more to the median income group than the poor group. In this case, micro‐small‐medium
credit might alleviate poverty, while at the same time worsen income distribution as median income
group enjoys more benefit from micro‐small‐medium credit. These two arguments will have different
implication on policy, which will be elaborated in the next sub‐section of policy implication.
Furthermore, the second attempt to explain the link from micro‐small‐medium credit to poverty and
inequality is being conducted through the desegregation of credit variable. There are several
noteworthy conclusions from this part. First, micro‐credit is as effective as small‐credit to cut down
poverty index. Second, micro‐credit and medium‐credit generate equal impact on poverty gap index.
Third, micro‐credit and small‐credit enhance income inequality, more or less, at the same rate.
With respect to the claim that there is regional difference on the effect of micro‐small‐medium credit to
poverty and inequality, this research finds that contention holds only for headcount poverty index.
Based on the estimation, the impact of micro‐small‐medium credit per capita on headcount poverty
index reduction in east region is higher than in west region.
Nevertheless, to get a better picture on how financial development, in the form of micro‐small‐medium
credit, affects poverty and income inequality, the research is extended by elaborating decomposition
analysis and regional differences. There is evidence to draw a conclusion that that micro‐credit as the
smallest form of credit is able to alleviate poverty and narrow down income inequality. Therefore,
micro‐credit is expected to have direct effect on poverty and at the same time on income inequality.
Medium‐credit is proven to reduce poverty, but not income inequality. Based on this result, we might
expect that medium‐credit diminishes poverty indirectly through helping the median‐income group.
Thus, there is a trickle‐down effect of medium‐credit on alleviating poverty. This is the reason why it is
able to reduce poverty andworsen income distribution at the same time. Meanwhile, small‐credit has no
effect on both poverty and income inequality.
All these findings will be useful on designing the policy implication, which will be explored on the
following sub‐section.
41
Policy Implication
As explained in the previous sub‐section, there are two arguments to clarify why financial development
is able to alleviate poverty on one side, and worsen income distribution on the other side. These two
arguments could both be true. However, they bring different policy implication.
The first argument suggests that financial development benefits the rich more than it benefits the poor.
This is the reason why the entire income distribution is getting worse as financial system is getting
better. In this case, there is nothing that actually can be done by the policy maker. Policy maker can only
expect that in the long run, financial development carries trickle‐down effect to the poor as the poor
experiencing higher capacity on managing business.
If the second argument is true, which states that micro‐small‐medium credits are being allocated more
to the median income group than low income group, then financial/banking authority can overcome this
by reducing information asymmetry in credit market. This can be done by creating credit information
sharing. Public credit information sharing can give information on investment opportunity that is
proposed by wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs. By creating credit information sharing, authority bridges
the innovative wealth‐deficient entrepreneurs with the banking system. This could benefit both the
entrepreneurs and the banks. In addition, policy maker could provide coaching for small and medium
enterprises, so that they can be both profitable and bankable.
However, it is quite correct to conclude that policy maker should aim its policy to reduce informational
problem in the capital market. Low information asymmetry will result in better functioning and more
efficient capital market.
Regarding regional difference on the effect of micro‐small‐medium credit on headcount poverty index
and poverty gap index, it is possible to conclude that east region should be prioritized on developing
financial infrastructure. As the result exhibits, the same amount of credit will generate more impact on
poverty reduction in east region rather than west region. Ergo, prioritizing financial development in east
region can create higher contribution in poverty reduction. Channeling more credit to east region is a
reasonable idea.
Suggestion for Future Research
New idea and conclusion from this study can be the foundation of future research. Future research
should aim to explore the channels through which micro‐small‐medium credit alleviate poverty. This
might be very useful to design specific policy on micro‐finance.
42
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Appendix A
Percentage
GDRP per Development of
Headcount Poverty Gap Gini MSM-Credit
Capita Expenditure Population
Poverty Index Index Coefficient per Capita
Growth per Capita with Primary
Education
Mean 0.1985 4.9527 0.2609 211.7031 0.1553 294.7391 0.5854
Median 0.1745 3.5650 0.2573 156.7650 0.1401 136.4877 0.6292
Maximum 0.8708 35.4600 0.4227 933.2390 1.5572 5227.099 0.9171
Minimum 0.0283 0.4100 0.1630 3.2030 -0.9137 0.5898 0.0000
Std. Deviation 0.1251 4.2821 0.0384 188.6773 0.1604 547.6068 0.1709
Skewness 1.7984 3.1806 0.6035 1.5626 1.7830 5.3350 -0.8246
Kurtosis 8.1793 19.0748 4.0561 5.3195 28.2759 38.8802 3.0612
Jarque-Bera 528.511 3885.238 34.0827 187.4463 8633.591 18624.76 36.1994
Appendix B