TRANSPORTATION LAW DIGEST CASES

1. Shewaram vs PAL Case Digest

Shewaram vs, Philippine Airlines
(17 SCRA 606, (1966)

Facts:

A PAL ticket, on the reverse side, stated in fine print that if the value of baggage is not stated, and the
baggage is lost, the maximum liability of PAL is P100.00 if value in excess of P100.00 is stated, PAL will
charge extra because PAL is being held liable for an amount exceeding P100.00. Shewaram, a Hindu
from Davao, boarded a PAL plane for Manila. Among his baggage was a camera with P800.00 and it was
lost. PAL offered to pay P100.00. Shewaram wanted full payment of P800.00.

Issue: Whether the limited liability rule shall apply in the case at bar?

Held:

The limited liability rule shall not apply. Since this is a stipulation on qualified liability, which operates to
reduce the liability of the carrier, the carrier and the shipper must agree thereupon. Otherwise, the carrier
will be liable for full. PAL is fully liable (for full) because Shewaran did not agree to the stipulation on
the ticket, as manifested by the fact that Shewaram did not sign the ticket. Ticket should have been
signed.

Doctrine:

It can not be said that a contract has been entered into between a passenger and the common carrier,
embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. The fact that those conditions are printed at
the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption
that the passenger was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those
conditions. The passenger is considered not having agreed to the stipulation on the ticket, as manifested
by the fact that he did not sign the ticket.
2. TABACALERA INSURANCE CO., PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE, INC., and
NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO., LTD., vs.NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.,
and COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 119197. May 16, 1997

Facts:

Sacks of grains were loaded on board a vessel owned by North Front Shipping (common carrier); the
consignee: Republic Floor Mills. The vessel was inspected by representatives of the shipper prior to the
transport and was found fitting to carry the cargo; it was also issued a Permit to Sail. The goods were
successfully delivered but it was not immediately unloaded by the consignee. There were a shortage of
23.666 metric tons and some of the merchandise was already moldy and deteriorating. Hence, the
consignee rejected all the cargo and demanded payment of damages from the common carrier. Upon
refusal, the insurance companies (petitioners) were obliged to pay. Petitioners now allege that there was
negligence on the part of the carrier. The trial court ruled that only ordinary diligence was required since
the charter-party agreement converted North Front Shipping into a private carrier.

Issues: WON North Front Shipping is a common carrier. If indeed, did it fail to exercise the required
diligence and thus should be held liable?

Held:

North Front Shipping is a common carrier. Thus, it has the burden of proving that it observed
extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.
The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills
Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. A “charter-party” is
defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another
person for a specified time or usex x x

Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn
grains that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually deteriorate when stored in sealed and
hot compartments as in hatches of a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his
crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or lessen the cargo’s possible deterioration
as they were presumed knowledgeable about the nature of such cargo.
But none of such measures was taken.
It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the
following: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the
public enemy in war, whether international or civil; © act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods; (d) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of
competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other
than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable therefor.

However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed solely to the carrier. The
consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation is guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably
notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations.
 3.Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA Case Digest
Valenzuela Hardwood vs. Court of Appeals
(30 June 1997,274 SCRA 643)

Facts:

On January 16, 1984, plaintiff entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers Shipping corporation
whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassadors 940 Lauan round logs
for shipment from Isabela to Manila. On January 20, plaintiff insured the cargo with South Sea Surety and
Insurance for two million pesos. However on January 25, 1984, the M/V Seven Ambassador sank,
resulting in the loss of petitioners’ logs. Pursuant to the loss, petitioner filed a claim with South Sea
Surety and Insurance for the insured amount of the logs, but the latter refused, denying liability under the
policy. Petitioner likewise filed a formal claim against Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value
of the lost logs, but the latter likewise denied their claim.

The trial court found for the plaintiff, holding South Sea and Seven Brothers liable for the loss. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the liability of South Sea Surety and Assurance but exonerated Seven Brothers, stating that the
latter is a private carrier therefore the provisions on common carriers is not applicable to their contract.
Hence the present appeal.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the validity
of the stipulation in the charter party executed between petitioner and Seven Brothers exempting the latter
from liability of loss arising from the negligence of its captain.

Held:

The decision of the Court of appeals is correct. The contract between petitioner and Seven Brothers is one
of Private Carriage hence the provisions on common carriage do not apply. In a contract of private
carriage parties are free to stipulate that the responsibility for the cargo rests solely in the charterer, such
stipulations are valid because they are freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to
law, morals, good custom, public order or public policy.

Doctrine:

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests
solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused
even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code, such stipulation
is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of
adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier,
private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not
contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.
 4.NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL VS. NYK-FILJAPAN SHIPPING CORP.
G.R. No. 171468, Aug. 24, 2011, Abad

FACTS:

Petitioner New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. (New World) bought from DMT
Corporation (DMT) through its agent, Advatech Industries, Inc. (Advatech) three emergency generator
sets worth US$721,500.00.DMT shipped the generator sets by truck from Wisconsin, United States, to
LEP Profit International, Inc. (LEP Profit) in Chicago, Illinois. From there, the shipment went by train to
Oakland, California, where it was loaded on S/S California Luna V59, owned and operated by NYK Fil-
Japan Shipping Corporation (NYK) for delivery to petitioner New World in Manila. NYK issued a bill of
lading, declaring that it received the goods in good condition.NYK unloaded the shipment in Hong Kong
and transshipped it to S/S ACX Ruby V/72 that it also owned and operated. On its journey to Manila,
however, ACX Ruby encountered typhoon Kadiang whose captain filed a sea protest on arrival at the
Manila South Harbor respecting the loss and damage that the goods on board his vessel suffered. Marina
Port Services, Inc. (Marina), the Manila South Harborarrastre or cargo-handling operator, received the
shipment and upon inspection of the three container vans separately carrying the generator sets, two vans
bore signs of external damage while the third van appeared unscathed. An examination of the three
generator sets in the presence of petitioner New World‟s representatives, Federal Builders (the project
contractor) and surveyors of petitioner New World‟s insurer, Seaboard–Eastern Insurance Company
(Seaboard), revealed that all three sets suffered extensive damage and could no longer be repaired. For
these reasons, New World demanded recompense for its loss from respondents NYK, DMT, Advatech,
LEP Profit, LEP International Philippines, Inc. (LEP), Marina, and Serbros.

While LEP and NYK acknowledged receipt of the demand, both denied liability for the loss. Since
Seaboard covered the goods with a marine insurance policy, petitioner New World sent it a formal claim.
Seaboard required petitioner New World to submit to it an itemized list of the damaged units, parts, and
accessories, with corresponding values, for the processing of the claim. But petitioner New World did not
submit what was required of it, insisting that the insurance policy did not include the submission of such a
list in connection with an insurance claim. Reacting to this, Seaboard refused to process the claim.
Thus,petitioner New World filed an action for specific performance and damages against all the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

The RTC rendered a decision absolving the various respondents from liability with the exception of NYK.
The RTC found that the generator sets were damaged during transit while in the care of NYK‟s vessel,
ACX Ruby.The RTC ruled, however, that petitioner New World filed its claim against the vessel owner
NYK beyond the one year provided under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered judgment affirming the RTC‟s rulings except with respect to Seaboard‟s
liability. The CA rendered an amended decision, reversing itself as regards the claim against Seaboard.
Petitioner New World asserts that the roles of respondents DMT, Advatech, LEP, LEP Profit, Marina and
Serbros in handling and transporting its shipment from Wisconsin to Manila collectively resulted in the
damage to the same, rendering such respondentssolidarily liable with NYK, the vessel owner.

ISSUE: W/N the carrier, NYK, is liable for the damage.

HELD:

Yes.Consequently, the Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the
generator sets were totally damaged during the typhoon which beset the vessel‟s voyage from Hong Kong
to Manila and that it was her negligence in continuing with that journey despite the adverse condition
which caused petitioner New World‟s loss.That the loss was occasioned by a typhoon, an exempting
cause under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, does not automatically relieve the common carrier of liability.
The latter had the burden of proving that the typhoon was the proximate and only cause of loss and that it
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize such loss before, during, and after the disastrous typhoon.
As found by the RTC and the CA, NYK failed to discharge this burden.
 5.Maranan vs. Perez | Common Carrier | Negligence

Facts of the Case:

The carrier was charged for damages due to the case where his former employee executed homicide.

According the Civil code of the Philippines, made a point that the common carrier is "liable for the
damages done by his employees to their

passengers" by the wording of Art. 1759 which states that:

"Common carriers are liable for the death or of injuries to passengers through negligence or willful acts of
the former's employers, although

such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the Common
carriers."

Antonia Maranan, the mother of the victim filed an action in the court of First Instance of Batangas to
recover damages from Perez who is the carrier and Valenzuela, who is the suspect found guilty of
homicide for the death of Rogelio Corachea, her son. In defense of Perez claimed that deceased was killed
in self-defense because he was the first who assaulted the driver. In addition to that, the defendant
claimed that the death was caso foruito which means Perez, the carrier is not liable for the damages done.
In the end, the lower court adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Article 1759 of the Civil
Code

Issues:

1. Whether the carrier did not partake on the crime scene, is responsible for the protection of the
passengers?

2. Whether the carrier is not involve in that event, is responsible for the action of his employees?

3. Whether it is not the fault of the carrier committing the crime, is liable due to the fact that he hired the
employee whofailed transporting the passenger to safety?

4. Whether it's the employee's fault, the carrier will bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the
carrier's employees against passengers?

Decisions:

The court's decision is yes, the carrier is liable for the damages due to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code proves
his guilt.

The three very least reasons to which the remaining issues are also 'yesy', explained in Texas Midland
R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85:
(1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of
protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from
violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the
carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety;

(2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers
confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger,
delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and

(3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence
of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them.

Maranan vs Perez Digest

Doctrine:

The common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers. (Art.
1759)

Facts:

Rogelio was a passenger in a taxi owned and operated by Perez, when he was stabbed and killed by the
driver, Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide. He was found guilty.Maranan, Rogelios
mother, filed an action to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son.
Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by
stabbing him from behind. Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier
was not liable

Issue/s: Whether Perez is liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.2. Whether the dismissal of the
claim against Valenzuela is correct.

Held:

YES. Unlike the old Civil Code, the New Civil Code expressly makes the common carrier liable for
intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers (Art. 1759). This rule was adopted
from Anglo American law, where the majority view, as distinguished from the minority view based on
respondeat superior, is that the carrier is liable as long as the assault occurs within the course of the
performance of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of
authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability is absolute in the sense that it
practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.2. NO. Plaintiffs action
was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability
is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
 6.G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS:

The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido Ramos) collided with the truck of
PEPSI, driven by the driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses sued
Bonifacio and Pepsi. The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs damages.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, but
absolved PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the
selection of its driver Bonifacio. In its decision, CA stated the basis for its decision:

“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company,

was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the
production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into
his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and
later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: first,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. Our Supreme
Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In order that the defendant may be considered as having
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the
mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the
applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service.’
Defendant Company has taken all these steps.”

ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee.

HELD:

The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and an
interested witness. This is a question of fact, and the SC would not disturb the findings of CA.
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to due diligence in the
supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points out that the owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. This responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be relieved
from liability (rebuttable presumption of negligence). The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed. RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1 in that
at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being
driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a
rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver. There is no finding that the tractor-truck
did not have a rear-vision mirror.

Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor
Vehicle Law, alleging that the truck exceeded the dimensions allowed. It is not enough that the width
of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also appear that there was no
special permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is missing.
There was no proof much less any finding to that effect.

We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We cannot however,
abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the law. A motor vehicle
owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil
Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what
that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not
that of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and
supervise his erring employees. We do not — and have never — followed the respondent superior
rule. 8 So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not
authoritative here. In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

8. Landingin v. Pantranco
G.R. No. L-28014, May 29, 1970
FACTS:

Petitioners are the parents of two girls who died while riding a bus
owned/operated by PATRANCO and driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan. The bus
was driving uphill in Bagiuo when the engine stopped, causing the bus to slide back.
When the driver suddenly swerved and steered the bus, some passengers jumped
out in panic while the two girls, Leonila and Estralla, together with some other
passengers remained seated. But the two girls later on jumped out out of panic.
Defendants argued that the driver was driving at the slow speed of 10 km/h; that
the two girls recklessly jumped out of the bus despite the driver’s shouted warnings
and advice; that the bus was driven with extraordinary care, prudence and
diligence; that PATRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

RTC ruled that there was no negligence on
the accident was a fortuitous event but still
sum money “not in payment of liability
expression of sympathy and goodwill”. This,
sum of money to the families of the
admissionof fault/negligence.
both parties based on the finding that
ordered PATRANCO to pay plaintiffs a
because of any negligence...but as an
because PATRANCO offered to pay a
other deceased passengers without any

ISSUE: Whether or not PATRANCO is liable. Whether or not the accident was a fortuitous
event.

RULING:

Yes. PATRANCO was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. It was hired to transport the excursionist
passengers from Dagupan to Bagiuo. The said two passengers did not reach the destination safely.

As a common carrier, PATRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers “safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of every cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.” (Art. 1755) PATRANCO did not exercise the required care and foresight.
No, the accident was not a caso fortuito. Accidents caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso
fortuito. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has neither the choice nor
control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier.
(1976) When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it
acted negligently. This presumption is only rebutted by proof that the carrier observed
extraordinary diligence required in Art. 1733 and the utmost diligence of very cautious persons
required in Art. 1755. Despite PATRANCO’s assertion that the bus was inspected the day before, it
seemed that it did not gave due regard for all the circumstances in connection with the said inspection.
The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order would not exempt the
carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel
were also considered. (the bus was heavily laden passengers; traversing mountainous and
ascending roads)

The SC sustained the amounts ordered but found the bus company guilty of negligence, as it had not
observed utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755) with regards to maintenance. A bus on an
excursion trip from Dagupan to Baguio had an accident after it stopped and the driver was forced to
swerve to the side to avoid moving back, and because one side of the bus was open, the daughters of
plaintiffs were thrown to the side of the road and died. The CFI decided the bus company was not liable
but ordered them to pay amounts as a measure of sympathy or goodwill, from which they appealed.

10. LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO
TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.

Facts:

The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and
wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger,
and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of
October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control
of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now
petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and moral damages; and counsel fees. CA affirmed.

Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON petitioners are
liable for moral damages.

Ruling:

Judgment affirmed.

(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the
accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it as "hindi
masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot be entertained.
The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which
was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough check-up before it took to the
road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.

(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are
recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier,
as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
Robert De Alban and his family rode a bus owned by Joeben Bus Company. Upon reaching their desired
destination, they alighted from the bus but Robert returned to get their baggage. However, his youngest
daughter followed him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, the bus accelerated
that resulting to Robert’s daughter death. The bus ran over her. Is the bus company liable?

Yes. The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises (La Mallorca
vs. CA, GR L-20761, 27 July 1966).

10. La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

Facts:

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel,
about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga, bound for
Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.

They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belonging. The conductor
of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No
fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height which fare is charged in accordance
with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some
of their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his
companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from the
vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind, but
in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its
seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the
baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete stop,
it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running board without
getting his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded
place where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather around the
body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none
other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent.

For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from the latter
damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the incident, and
therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?

Held:
There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his
bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter,
after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights from
the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.

The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from
the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent
had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to
run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading
part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus
was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to
the protection under their contract of carriage.

--

12. LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA Bus COMPANY, petitioner, vs. VALENTIN DE

JESUS,
MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Full Case

Damages; Accident caused by mechanical defect; Liability of owner of vehicle.—Where the

cause of the blow-out, which precipitated the accident, was known in that the inner tube of the
left front tire was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had
slipped out of the wheel, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment
which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-
up before it took to the road, the owner of the vehicle is liable for the accident. It was not due to
force majeure. Moreover, the bus was running fast. Moral damages; Common carrier; Breach of
contract.—In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in
relation to Article 2206, of the New Civil Code (Necesito vs. Paras, L10605, June 30, 1958;
Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18937, April 23,
1963). PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Manuel O. Chan for petitioners.

Sixto T. Antonio for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., commonly known as La Mallorca-Pambusco,
filed this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its civil case No. 2100, entitled “Valentin
de Jesus and Manolo Tolentino vs. La MallorcaPambusco.” The court a, quo sentenced the
defendant, now petitioner, “to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for actual damages;
P14,400.00 as compensatory damages; P10,000.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages;
and P3,000.00 as counsel fees.” Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) “in
sustaining the decision (of the court a quo) holding that the petitioners were liable for the
accident which was caused by a blow-out of one of the tires of the bus and in not considering the
same as caso fortuito,” and (2) in holding petitioners liable for moral damages.

The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de
Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner’s bus, on which
she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in
Marilao, Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was
the fact that the driver of the bus Iost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly
exploded.

Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation
Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June
27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are not binding on this Court but were based on
considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. The appellate Court there
made no findings of any specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined
itself to the question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as
to the causative factors, would generate liability. In the present case, the cause of the blow-out
was known. The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioner’s own evidence and as
found by the Court of Appeals, “was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the
rim which had slipped out of the wheel.” This was, said Court correctly held, a mechanical
defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had
been subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning.

Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running
quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not
new—petitioner describes it as “hindi masyadong kalbo,” or not so very worn out the plea of
caso fortuito cannot be entertained.

The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages
are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a
common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
These articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc.
vs. Paras, et al., L-10605–06, June 30. 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328–29, Sept 29, 1961;
Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963.
The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages
are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a
common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
These articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc.
vs. Paras, et al., L-10605–06, June 30. 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328–29, Sept 29, 1961;
Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963.

Judgment affirmed.

NOTES

1. Regarding the rule that a mechanical defect in the vehicle is not force majeure, it was held
that the defects in the steering gear of a car did not constitute a fortuitous event (Lasam vs.
Smith, 45 Phil. 659); that the defective engine or “drag link spring” of a truck did not exempt a
carrier from liability for damages (Son vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892) and that the
defect in the steering knuckle of a truck was not a fortuitous event (Necesito vs. Paras, L-10665,
June 30 and Sept. 11, 1958).

2. As to the liability of a common carrier for moral damages, see annotation under ‘Lopez vs.
Pan American World Airways, L-22415, March 30, 1966 and Laguna Tayabas Bus Co, vs.
Tiongson, L-22143, April 30, 1966, both reported in 16 Supreme Court Reports Annotated 431,
445 and 940. [La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 SCRA 23(1966)]

12.La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De Jesus, Tolentino and CA
LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS,
MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.
Case Digest

Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA which affirmed that rendered by the CFI
Bulacan
MAKALINTAL, J.:

Facts:

The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de
Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which
she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao
Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact
that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The
court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory,
and moral damages; and counsel fees. CA affirmed.
Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON
petitioners are liable for moral damages.

Ruling:

Judgment affirmed.

(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately
before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it
as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner
cannot be entertained. The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a
fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more
thorough check-up before it took to the road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.

(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral
damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract
of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.