Summary of Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

Michael Stone – September 21, 2005

In his article “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, Louis Althusser
describes his investigations of a fundamental problem in Marxist social and
political thought: “What is the reproduction of the conditions of production?”
(127). While answering this question, Althusser wrestles with thorny questions
about the meaning of the term “subject”.
Althusser’s first step is to subdivide the problem into two smaller
questions concerning the reproduction of labor power: he must consider both the
conditions of its material reproduction (i.e. where to new laborers come from?)
and of its socio-technical reproduction (i.e. where do new skilled laborers, adapted
to the socio-technical division of labor come from?). In his words, these twin
questions can both be answered in terms of the ideology of the ruling class, or
more simply, “the ruling ideology”.
The second strand of argument woven by Althusser concerns the Marxist
definition of the “State” and complications thereof. He summarizes the classical
construction of by stating:
“The State is a ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling classes (in the
nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the ‘class’ of big landowners) to
ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to
subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to capitalist
exploitation).” (137)
However, he determines soon after that the Marxist classics were forced to
distinguish between “State power” and “State apparatus” (141-142) because of
observations (of the 1917 Revolution, for example) that indicated that State power
could change hands between classes while the State apparatus, the mechanisms by
which that repressive power was exercised, remained the same (141).
Althusser’s contribution to this discussion is the formal
invention/recognition of “Ideological State Apparatuses” (ISAs) such as the
Church, the Family, and the School which exist in the private domain in addition
to the public domain (as opposed to the “Repressive State Apparatus” [note the
singular] which Althusser claims is wholly public in nature [144]). To substantiate
his concern with theorizing these institutions, he points to “Lenin’s anguished
concern to revolutionize the educational Ideological State Apparatus…” (146)
Why else does Althusser care about ISAs? He remarks that:
“…the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site
of class struggle… The class (or class alliance) in power cannot lay down the
law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the (repressive State apparatus), not only
because the former ruling classes are able to retain strong positions there for a
long time, but also because the resistance of the exploited classes is able to find
means and occasions to express itself there, either by the utilization of their
contradictions or by conquering combat positions in the struggle.” (147)
Apparently, much is at stake. However, we are only left with a host of
new questions.
 “What is the relationship if the ISAs to the sole RSA?” According to
Althusser, the RSA is the “shield” behind which the ISAs work; the RSA
is ‘responsible’ for “securing by repression… the political conditions for
the action of the Ideological State Apparatuses” (150).
  How do new ISAs form and old ones lose prominence? Althusser glosses
over this discussion on pages 151-154.
 How and why does Education in particular come to replace the Church in
Europe? In part because of its unfettered access to children for eight hours
each day, five to six days each week (156-157).
That was the warm-up. The real questions concern the theoretical description
of ideology – of ideology in general as opposed to ideologies in particular (159).
For example, where does the term “ideology” originate? (158). For Marx,
ideology was illusion, utterly lacking in meaning – an unsystematic distortion of
reality. Not so for Althusser. For him, the distortion is systematic – and is
emblematic of Freud. Hence we enter the discussion of ideology’s omni-
historicity (159-161).
Having skipped from one question to the next like a spun stone skating
over the surface of a vast lake, Althusser finally wends his way to his own
definition of ideology: the “representation of the imaginary relationship if
individuals to their real conditions of existence” (162). Is it simply the Beautiful
Lies of the eighteenth century Priests and Despots (163)? Is it the simple result of
alienated labor, as Marx and Feuerbach thought? Neither, according to Althusser.
Instead, we must stop looking for a ‘cause’ and instead search for understanding
of the ‘imaginariness’ of the relation (165).
Suppose for a moment that, as good Marxists, we are materialists. How
might we analyze this imaginary quality of ideology? If we were Althusser, we
might start by analyzing what happens to the individuals who live their lives
embedded in ideology – we could ask ‘How does ideology inscribe itself on these
individuals?’ (paraphrasing 166). We soon find that we become embroiled in a
discussion of the ‘subjects’, ‘consciousness’, ‘actions’, ‘practices’, and ‘rituals’
(168-169). What are these “subjects” (170)?
The remainder of the essay encompasses three questions on which I
cannot adequately summarize Althusser’s position:
1. How do we recognize ourselves or others as subjects? Does this
recognition/misrecognition function (called “interpellation” by
Althusser) suffice to define the function of ideology (170-172)?
2. What is the difference between individuals and subjects? Can groups
be subjects? Can individuals fail to be subjects (172-176)?
3. How does ideology ‘hide itself’ (175)?
4. What is the relation of the subjects to the Subject (181-182)?
Criticisms:
1. Marx starts from the ground up with capitalism. We’re trying to argue, in
some sense, that freedom is the ideology that brings capitalism and
“democracy” together under the same roof. How does ideology work in
non-capitalist societies?
2. Althusser is dressing up as a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist. Where’s the
revolution?
3. Is Althusser’s understanding of language (through Freud, Lacan,
Habermas) adequate to his understanding of language’s role in ideology?