11. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, ART.

36, NCC
b. Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases on prohibited motions, meritorious motions,
archiving of cases
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the
Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge
Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered
the filing of an Information against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency
of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order dated August 31, 1998.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9,
1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9,
1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In an Order dated
January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued
another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for
annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the
marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner
because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that
the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of
psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never
existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a
married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage,
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring

1
such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The
pertinent portions of said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that
pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.
Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.
Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. R-5387, for the annulment of the
marriage of petitioner Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court.
The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a
complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. R-
5387. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated him
into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over five
years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character,
without the need for marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her
relatives into entering the marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde; that
immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with her; that the defendant
wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have
the marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth Ceasar filed
her answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as
affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that
sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent to their
marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised him
to finish his studies first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff was engaged to marry
Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery, showed her a letter which he wrote breaking
off his engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit, fraud and
insidious machinations committed upon her by plaintiff.

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On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for
bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the Assistant
City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage. The information
reads.
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of bigamy, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Abundio Merced, being previously united in lawful marriage with Eufrocina Tan, and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously contract a
second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".)
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil Case No.
R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will determine the
innocence of the accused. After an opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the court granted the
motion. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order was set aside and another entered
denying the motion of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings, which last order is the one sough herein to
be annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous
marriage is not necessary, there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the second marriage, or to determine
and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same, but that said grounds should be used as a defense in
the criminal action. A motion to reconsider the second order of the court having been denied, petition herein was filed.
When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner secured from this Court a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding further in the criminal case.
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question
in a prosecution for bigamy.
The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as follows:
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal (Cuestion
prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto
del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion. — Enciclopedia
Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is its first
element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an action
for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such
validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must be first decided before the action for bigamy can
proceed, hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off.
Gaz., No. 10, 4863).
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all
the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of
this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil., 246, where we said:
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requisites,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to have
been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be
considered as such, according to Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in
the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely
and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613,
otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal
action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action
for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the
elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the
second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must be determined
beforehand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where the issue of the
validity of the second marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before the criminal action
for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question,
because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the
criminal action for bigamy.

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Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has been taken, requires that the essential
element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement of a different
court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided according to their jurisdictions, some
courts being exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our courts are
vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only
one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when
exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and
different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.
Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a prejudicial
question, insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting
opinion in De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus:
La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo delito u ofensa, la segunda debe
verse antes que la primera, por la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito para la
averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio civil. Esta regla tiene, sin embargo, una excepcion, y es la que se
refiere a una cueston civil prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse antes que una
cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito, pero tan intimamente ligado a el que
determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo, una accion criminal por bigamia.
The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains the theory that when a civil action is pending
in court, in which a validity of a document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not prosecute
the person who allegedly executed the false document because the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice
and the prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial question has been
finally determined. Thus the Court said"
Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no deben ser controlados ni
coartados por los tribunales; pero no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de ella.
Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y entorpece la recta administracion de justicia procesando
a una persona por hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-judice y de los cuales se propone una cuestion
prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda accion criminal
hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya decidido finalmente. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.)
The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the respondents rely, presents a different sets
of facts from the case at bar. So is the ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case of People vs. Mendoza,
Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in August,
1949. Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time with Olga
Lema; and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de Asis died. The court
citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that the second marriage of the appellant Mendoza with
Lema was operation of law null and void, because at the time of the second marriage in 1941, appellant's former wife
Josefa de Asis was still living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and void at the time the appellant
contracted the said marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did not exist. Hence the appellant was acquitted
of bigamy for the 1949 marriage because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941, by operation of law, was void ab
initio.
In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she
contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned
in the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed.
For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted.
The order of the court denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for
bigamy, criminal case no. V-6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and the preliminary
injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So Ordered.
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G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is
whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in

4
view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru
Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said
court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground
that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she
had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since
it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit
executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with
pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed
by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case
can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova.
The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of
proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito which was a much later case than
that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of
merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein
private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that
her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later
when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by
the case of Landicho vs. Relova may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not
mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In
order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the
time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as

5
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the
hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been
obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such
it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly
different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted
a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent
Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting.
Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was
null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case,
there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one
and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The
records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent
executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it
was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact that it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627
was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage
that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November
1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier
order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in
the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge
dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case

6
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas,
Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order
issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the arraignment
of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending between him and the complainant in the trial courts in
Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans
totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its option to
purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of
₱21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de
la Cruz and Consing in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other
half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really
TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been
paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for
injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the
₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against
Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an
information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120),
which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence
of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing
reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration.
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held
liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the
Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case
show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate
of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in
question are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is identical
in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the
criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of
Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view
of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take

7
judicial notice of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of
action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private
respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an
offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil
Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing and
De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite
criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the
Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter,
Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated
its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of
the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila
civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the
May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193,
and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA, viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case
No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify
public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be
determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of
the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through
falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid
the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt
may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal
Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of the
previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of
the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel
mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in
abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before
the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that
no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the
fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc.
on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation
of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the

8
criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal
cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: "In cases
of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
(j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made
with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at
bar.
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA,
citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that
under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would
cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was
not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in
the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and executory, and
could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that he had
acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a contract that
had involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and
held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the
issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals
with the same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment
on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is
an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court,
We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and
March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of
December 11, 2003.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R.
No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that
in arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-
1418), which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the issue
of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which
would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as
an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully
authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took
cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil case, just
like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the
Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and
that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial question, because the
sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or liability toward
Unicapital.
In his reply, Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not intended
to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil cases could

9
be validly considered determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal
Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension
of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an
independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case
with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a
"wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property
which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title." As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension
of a criminal case. This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action. x x x x
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at
bar.
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with
Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and
Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother who should not be
criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also
been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case
No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify
public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document. (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

10
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch
72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v.
Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City
held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case
could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be instituted before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004
as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for
pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005. Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As

11
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide
from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences." In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned."
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
91867.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 128663 September 10, 1999
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF
PASIG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending
the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

12
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay
Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims
that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother
Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be
known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22,
1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective
plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on
June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)3 and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the
Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed
barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the
creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary
dispute involving the two municipalities. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being moot in view of the
holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute
between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action
and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule, this
Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we can very well
suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays
Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy
shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material
bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a
barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and
unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be
an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that —
The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance
the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are
truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay
Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by
the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of
Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows —

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Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the
fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us
cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province
which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if
indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli,
then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal
of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what
the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with
ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or
stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to
bring about a fait accompli.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution
of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig
City, should be annulled and set aside.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-
002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay
Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the
courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case
No. 94-3006.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 203287 April 5, 2017
RENATO S.D. DOMINGO on his own behalf and on behalf of his coheirs of the late SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE
DOMINGO and MACARIO C. DOMINGO, Petitioners vs. SPOUSES ENGRACIA D. SINGSON and MANUEL F.
SINGSON, Respondents
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari - G.R. Nos. 203287 and 207936 - under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054
and the Decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, both issued by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Facts
The spouses Macario C. Domingo (Macario) and Felicidad S..D. Domingo (Felicidad) (Spouses Domingo) ate the
parents of respondent Engracia D. Singson (Engracia) and petitioners Renato S.D. Domingo (Renato) and his co-heirs
whom he represents herein, namely: Consolacion D. Romero (Consolacion), Josefina D. Borja, and Rafael, Ramon,
and Rosario, all surnamed Domingo (collectively, the petitioners).
During their lifetime, the Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of land, situated in F. Sevilla Street, San Juan, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TC1) No. 32600 (23937) 845-R, and the house built thereon (subject
property). Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Fel.icidad died on September 14, 1997.
It appears that on September 26, 2006, Engracia filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila a complaint8 for
ejectment/unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 9534, against Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon.
Engracia claimed that she is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought the same from the Spouses
Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale9 dated June 6, 2006. She likewise averred that TCT No. 32600
(23937) 845-R was already cancelled and TCT No. 12575 covering the subject property was already issued under her
name. The petitioners only learned of the supposed sale of the subject property when they received the summons and
a copy of Engracia's complaint in Civil Case No. 9534.
Consequently, on July 31, 2006, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
which sought the nullity of the sale. They alleged that the Absolute Deed of Sale dated June 6, 2006, upon which
Engracia bases her ownership of the subject property, was a nullity since the signatures of their parents appearing

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thereon as the supposed vendors were forged. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70898 and was raffled to
Branch 160 of the RTC.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2007, Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint with the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City, claiming that Engracia falsified the signatures of their parents in the Absolute
Deed of Sale and, thus, charging her with the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified
documents. Consequently, on May 6, 2008, the OCP filed an Information with the RTC, charging Spouses Engracia and
Manuel Singson (Spouses Singson) with the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 137867 and was raffled to Branch 264 of the RTC.
On July 11, 2008, the Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question with the
RTC in Criminal Case No. 137867. They alleged that the validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which
is the subject of Civil Case No. 70898 then still pending with the RTC Branch 160, are determinative of their guilt of
the crime charged. Accordingly, they prayed that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 be suspended pursuant
to Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The private prosecutor filed an opposition to the motion, stating that
Criminal Case No. 137867 can proceed independently from Civil Case No. 70898 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
On February 12, 2010, the RTC Branch 264, issued an Order in Criminal Case No. 137867, which granted the motion
to suspend the proceedings filed by the Spouses Singson. The private prosecutor sought a reconsideration of the
Order dated February 12, 2010, but it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated June 7, 2011.
Unperturbed, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122054, claiming
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it directed the suspension of the proceedings in · Criminal Case No.
137867 on the ground of prejudicial question. They pointed out that the bases of their respective claims in both Civil
Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 are the forged signatures of their deceased parents. They claimed that
where both a civil and criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence.
On August 31, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054, which denied the petition for certiorari.
The CA opined that all the elements of a prejudicial question under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
are present; hence, the RTC did not abuse its discretion when it directed the suspension of Criminal Case No. 137867.
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial conference on February 7, 2008. However, upon motion
of Engracia, the pre-trial was reset on March 6, 2008. During the pre-trial conference on · March 6, 2008, Engracia
moved that Rafael be substituted by his heirs since he had already died on October 15, 2007. Thus, the RTC issued an
Order dated March 6, 2008 directing the petitioners to comment on Engracia's motion to substitute Rafael as plaintiff
in the case below. On April 8, 2008, Engracia filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that the petitioners
failed to substitute the heirs of Rafael as plaintiff in the case. The motion to dismiss was consequently denied by the
RTC in its Order dated November 12, 2008 for lack of merit.
The continuation of the pre-trial conference, which has been sidelined pending the resolution of Engracia's motion to
dismiss, was· then set on March 19, 2009. On March 12, 2009, Engracia's counsel, with her conformity, withdrew his
appearance as counsel in the case. During the pre-trial conference on March 19, 2009, the petitioners and their
counsel appeared. Engracia was likewise present although without her new counsel. Accordingly, pre-trial was again
reset on June 1, 2009 to afford Engracia time to secure the services of a new counsel.
Thereafter, Atty. Tristram B. Zoleta entered his appearance for Engracia and moved that the pre-trial conference on
June 1, 2009 be reset on July 13 or 20, 2009. However, Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Judge Fabros) was reassigned to
Muntinlupa City and Judge Myrna V. Lim-Verano (Judge Lim-Verano) was named to replace Judge Fabros as Presiding
Judge of· Branch 160. On June 17, 2010, Judge Lim-Verano, having previously presided over Criminal Case No.
137867, recused herself from adjudicating Civil Case No. 70898. 'Civil Case No. 70898 was subsequently raffled to
Branch 264 of the RTC then presided by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. (Judge Janolo). On July 15, 2010, Judge Janolo
issued an Order, setting the pre-trial of the case on August 25, 2010.
On August 12, 2010, the petitioners' counsel moved to reset the pre-trial on September 15, 2010 due to previously
scheduled hearings in the trial courts of Malolos City and Parañaque City. Accordingly, the pre-trial was reset on
October 6, 2010. On October 6, 2010, the respective counsels of the parties jointly agreed to reset the pre-trial on
December 9, 2010. However, the pre-trial scheduled on December 9, 2010 was again reset on January 24, 2011.
On December 27, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion, which sought to exclude Rafael as being represented by
Renato. They averred that they were unable to effect a substitution of the heirs of Rafael as plaintiffs in the case since
they could not locate them.
On January 27, 2011, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear and the pre-trial was reset on March 24, 2011. In the
morning of March 23, 2011, the petitioners' counsel informed Renato that he would not be able to attend the pre-trial
conference since he was indisposed and asked the latter to go to the RTC and request for a resetting of the hearing.
When the case was called, the petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, which thus prompted Engracia's counsel
to move for the dismissal of the complaint and be given time to file the proper pleading. Thus, the RTC gave

15
Engracia's counsel 10 days within which to file a motion to dismiss. The continuation of the pre-trial was reset on May
26, 2011.
On April 5, 2011, Engracia filed a motion to dismiss48 in compliance with the RTC's directive. During the pre-trial on
May 26, 2011, the RTC gave the parties' respective counsels, upon their request, five days to file a comment on the
motion to dismiss and a reply to such comment, after which time the motion to dismiss is deemed submitted for
resolution.
On July 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 264 issued an Orders' in Civil Case No. 70898, dismissing the petitioners' complaint
due to their and their counsel's repeated failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing dates.
The petitioners then filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, insisting that the RTC erred in
dismissing their complaint on a mere technicality. They also claimed that Engracia's motion to dismiss is but a mere
scrap of paper since the same did not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The CA, in its
Decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the petitioners' complaint.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth for the Court's resolution are: first, whether the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
137867 were properly suspended on the ground of prejudicial question; and second, whether the dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 due to failure · to prosecute was proper.
Ruling of the Court
The petitions are denied.
First Issue: Suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial
Question
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of
prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the
issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil
case before the criminal action can proceed. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflict decisions.
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must -be present: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 against the Spouses Singson,
and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in
the case at bar. The defense of the Spouses Singson in the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the
subject property from her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of
Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts, which would be
necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case.
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there would be no
falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged. Otherwise stated, a conviction on
Criminal Case No. 137867, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be set
aside if it were finally decided in Civil Case No. 70898 that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were
authentic.
The petitioners' reliance on Section 356 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 3357 of the Civil Code,
is misplaced. Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code, which may also constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the criminal action. In
instances where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or
conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this case. Clearly, Civil Case No. 70898 is very much
relevant to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867. To stress, the main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898,
i.e., the genuineness of the signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of Sale, is intimately
related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public document in Criminal Case No. 137867; the resolution of
the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Spouses
Singson.
Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of
prejudicial question since, at the time the proceedings in the criminal case were suspended, Civil Case No. 70898 was
still pending.

16
Second Issue: Dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 70898
Under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are mandated to appear at the pre-trial. Pre-trial cannot be
taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification,
abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the
pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed, which shall be
with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial on February 7, 2008. In July 2010, after more than two years, Civil
Case No. 70898, which was still in the pre-trial stage, was re-raffled to Branch 264 presided by Judge Janolo; the
latter immediately scheduled the pre-trial on August 25, 2010. What transpired thereafter is a series of resetting of
the hearing due to the failure of the petitioners and/or their counsel to appear during the scheduled pre-trial dates.
During the scheduled pre-trial on March 23, 2011, the petitioners and their counsel again failed to appear without
informing the RTC of the reason for their non-appearance. Clearly, the petitioners' wanton disregard of scheduled pre-
trial indeed justified the dismissal of their complaint.
It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules they are to be followed,
except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
The petitioners have not shown any persuasive reason, which would justify a relaxation of the rules on pre-trial. That
the petitioners' counsel was supposedly indisposed during the pre-trial on March 23, 2011 does not excuse the
petitioners themselves from attending the pre-triaL Moreover, the· petitioners have failed to advance any valid
justification for their and their counsel's failure to attend the previously scheduled pre-trial hearings. Accordingly, the
trial court could not be faulted for dismissing the complaint under Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners' claim that the motion. to dismiss filed by Engracia with the RTC is a mere scrap of paper for her
failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is without
merit. Said sections provide that:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and .the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as
to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.
The pertinent portions of the motion to dismiss filed by Engracia with the R TC read:
NOTICE
CLERK OF COURT
RTC, Branch 264
Pasig City [San Juan Station]
ATTY. EMERITO M. SALVA
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
15th Floor, Washington Tower, Asia World
Complex, Marina Bay, Pacific Avenue
Paranaque City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion [in compliance with the order of the Honorable Court during the hearing on March
23, 2011] for the consideration and resolution of the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof.
(Sgd.)
TRISTRAM B. ZOLETA
EXPLANATION
Copy of this pleading was sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs through registered mail due to lack of messenger at the
time of service rendering personal service not possible.
(Sgd.)
TRISTRAM B. ZOLETA

17
That the notice of hearing is addressed to the petitioners' counsel and not to the petitioners directly is immaterial and
would not be a cause to consider the same defective. The requirement under Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court that the notice be addressed to the opposing party is merely directory; what matters is that adverse party had
sufficient notice of the hearing of the motion. Further, even if the notice of hearing in the motion to dismiss failed to
state the exact date of hearing, the defect was cured when the RTC considered the same in the hearing that was held
on May 26, 2011 and by the fact that the petitioners, through their counsel, were notified of the existence of the said
motion.
Anent the supposed lack of proof of service of the motion to dismiss upon the petitioners, suffice it to state that a
copy of the said motion was served upon and received by the petitioners' counsel on April 15, 2011. The petitioners
were duly given the full opportunity to be heard and to argue their case when the RTC required them to file a
comment to the motion to dismiss during the hearing on May 26, 2011, which they did on May 30, 2011. "What the
law really eschews is not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of opportunity to be heard."
Considering, however, that the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 had already been dismissed with prejudice on
account of the petitioners' and their counsel's persistent failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearings, the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 should now proceed. There is no longer. any prejudicial question in Criminal
Case No. 137867 · since the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 had been dismissed without definitely resolving the
question of whether the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale .are genuine. Thus, it is up
for the RTC Branch 264, in Criminal Case No. 137867, to resolve the said issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203287 and 207936 are hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054 and the Decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98026 issued by the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 264, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with Criminal Case No. 137867 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

18