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Proceedings of the
Fifth AWWARF / JWWA

Water System Seismic Conference
August 15 – 17, 2007
Proceedings
of the
Fifth Water System Seismic Conference
August 15-17, 2007
East Bay Municipal Utility District
Oakland, California
Co-Sponsored by
American Water Works Association Research Foundation
East Bay Municipal Utility District
Japan Water Works Association
Taiwan Water Works Association
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research

All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
Copies of this report may be obtained from:
American Water Works Research Foundation

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Email: info@awwarf.org
Web site: www.awwarf.org
Table of Contents
Overview..........................................................................................................................................1
Participants List ...............................................................................................................................5
Agenda ...........................................................................................................................................17
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Prof. Yosihiko Hosoi
Tottori University, Japan,
"Earthquake Countermeasures for Water Supply Systems from Standpoint of Residents" ........
Prof. Thomas O’Rourke
Cornell University, US
"Recent Advances in Research and Practice for the Seismic Performance of Water
Supplies" ..................................................................................................................................25
SESSION 1 – SEISMIC MITIGATION MEASURES

Mr. Masaru Oneda
Tokyo Metropolitan Waterworks Bureau, Tokyo, Japan
“Seismic Measures and its Emergency Plan of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau” .........................31
Ms. Chandrika Winston
Memphis Light Gas and Water, Memphis, TN, US
“Seismic Performance Objectives for MLGW Water Facilities Past, Present and Future” ....43
Mr. Shigeru Hataya
Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau, Chiba Perfecture, Japan
“Anti-earthquake Measures of Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau” .................................55
Ms. Elizabeth Bialek and Mr. Atta Yiadom,
East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US
“A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam – The Case of San Pablo Dam” ..........................65
Mr. Nobuhiro Hasegawa
JFE Engineering Corporation (Japanese Water Steel Pipes Association), Yokohama, Japan
“Manual for Improvement of Over Aged Reservoirs with Steel Plate” ..................................77
SESSION 2 – SEISMIC MEASURES FOR PIPELINES
Mr. Hiroaki Miyazaki

Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, Osaka, Japan
“Seismic Damage Estimation of Distribution Pipes” .............................................................91
Mr. David Tsztoo
“Challenges of the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project” ........................................103
Mr. Yukio Mabuchi
Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, Japan
“Earthquake Countermeasures in Nagoya” ..........................................................................115
Mr. Ahmed Nisar
MMI Engineering, Oakland, CA, US
“Fault Crossing Design of a Critical Large Diameter Pipeline” ...........................................127
SESSION 3 – OUTREACH, EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE

RISKS
Mr. Kazuhiko Mizuguchi

Kobe Municipal Waterworks, Kobe, Japan
“Seismic Practices and Strategies of Public Relations in Kobe City” ...................................139
Prof. Adam Rose
University of Southern California, US
“Regional Economic Analysis of Earthquake Losses, Mitigation and Resilience”...............151
Dr. Nagahisa Hirayama
Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institute, Kobe, Japan
“Participatory Planning in Development of Comprehensive Crisis Management Plan
for Water Supply Authorities” ...............................................................................................167
Mr. Luke Cheng
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco, CA, US
“Seismic Aspects of the SFPUC Water System Improvement Program” .............................179
Mr. Shinji Nakayasu
Hanshin Water Supply Authority, Hyogo, Japan
“Information Provision to Residents on Construction of Regulating Reservoir at
Landslide Site Caused by an Earthquake” .............................................................................191
SESSION 4 – SEISMIC SYSTEM EVALUATIONS
Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura

Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, Japan
“A Case Study on How PIs Should Be Applied in Evaluating Seismic Performance
Along with the Water Works Guidelines” .............................................................................203
Mr. Yasuhiko Sato
Japan Water Research Center, Tokyo, Japan
“Function Diagnosis Method to Improve Earthquake Resistance of Water Supply
Facilities” ...............................................................................................................................215
Mr. Noboru Murakami
Hachinohe Water Supply Authority, Hachinohe, Japan
“Nejo Purification Plant Water System Facilities Today”.....................................................227
Mr. Hidehiko Aihara
Yokohama City Waterworks Bureau, Japan
“The Quakeproof Diagnosis of Waterworks Facilities in Yokohama City”..........................241
Ms. Crystal Yezman
Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, US
“Santa Clara Valley Water District Reliability Program, Implementing Improvements for
Seismic Response”.................................................................................................................255
SESSION 5 – EARTHQUAKE STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS
Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka

University of California, Irvine, US
“A Sensor Network for Real-Time Damage Location and Assessment” ..............................269
Mr. Munetaka Abe
Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, Japan
“Damages to Water Supply Facilities by the Noto Peninsula Earthquake in 2007 and
Restoration Works and Issues” ..............................................................................................277
Mr. Jianping Hu
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles, CA, US
“Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System Using GIRAFFE”....289
Dr. Gee-Yu Liu
National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering, TAIWAN
“Seismic Repair Rate Analysis and Risk Assessment of Water Pipelines”...........................303
Mr. Kuniaki Nakamura
Fukuoka City Waterworks Bureau, Fukuoka, Japan
“Emergency Measures - A Study of the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake” ....................315
SESSION 6 – EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Mr. Ken-ichi Koike

Kanagawa Water Supply Authority, Yokohama, Japan
“Water Supply Control and Management in Emergency in the Wide Area Water Supply –
Using the Mutual Communication Raw Water Conveyance Facilities” ...............................329
Mr. Mike Ambrose
“Multi-Hazard Emergency Preparedness at East Bay Municipal Utility District”................341
Dr. Siao-Syun Ke
National Science & Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, TAIWAN
“The Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness of Water Supply System in Taipei City
under Earthquake” .................................................................................................................353
Mr. Steve Welch
Contra Costa Water District, Concord, CA, US
“Earthquake Response Planning – Gaining Control of Disaster”..........................................365
Prof. Tatsuo Ohmachi
Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, Japan
“Near-field Earthquake Displacements of the Non-liquefiable Ground Relevant to Damage to
Buried Pipelines” ...................................................................................................................375
Discussion Session and Closing Remarks ...................................................................................385

Technical Tour .............................................................................................................................457
5th AWWARF/JWWA Water Seismic Conference
Overview
Experiences from past earthquakes have highlighted the vulnerability of water systems in
seismic regions in the world. Earthquakes have resulted in catastrophic water service
interruptions and millions of dollars in damages. Differing seismic mitigations practices
are being developed by a wide variety of organizations in the United States, Japan and
Taiwan. Each practice attempts to address specific observations from past earthquakes.
Seismic mitigation measures can best be improved if these practices are gathered,
critically examined and disseminated to the international seismic community. Through
this process we can all learn from one another.
The AWWARF/JWWA Water Seismic Conference were a series of joint workshops

convened by the American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AwwaRF)
and the Japan Water Works Association (JWWA). They brought together experts from
utilities along with consultants and academicians from the United Sates, Japan and
Taiwan to discuss both the differences and similarities of the seismic practices for water
systems. Participation was strongly emphasized to focus on practical and useful
information generated from experience and research. The workshops further promote the
corporation and collaboration among the participating organizations in developing the
state-of-the-art technologies of improving earthquake preparedness and response. Results
from each workshop are documented in proceedings which are available from AWWARF
and JWWA.
The US/Japan/Taiwan interchange on water system seismic practices was initially

conceived in 1997 after JWWA visited East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)
and received information on the EBMUD’s Seismic Improvement Program. The past
history of the interchange is:
1997 - Informal Interchange during JWWA visit to EBMUD

1998 - EBMUD was invited to International Water Supply Association
Conference (IWSA), Tokyo, Japan
1999 - Proposals to AWWARF and JWWA for Joint Workshops
2000 - 1st Workshop at EBMUD in Oakland, California, USA
2001 - 2nd Workshop in JWWA in Tokyo, Japan
2003 - 3rd Workshop in LADWP in Los Angeles, California USA
2005 - 4th Workshop in Kobe City in Kobe, Japan
This conference (the 5th workshop) was held at EBMUD in Oakland, California from
August 15 through 17, 2007. The first day and a half of the workshop was for
presentations. The afternoon of the second day was devoted entirely to questions and
answers, and discussions among the participants. The third day was for a technical tour
of EBMUD Walnut Creek Water Treatment Plant, San Pablo Reservoir and the
construction site of the San Francisco PUC seismic isolation valve. There were 65
attendees who participated in the workshop with 19 from Japan, 2 from Taiwan, and the
balance from the U. S.
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Mr. Dennis Diemer, the General Manager of EBMUD, welcomed the participants at the
opening ceremony for the conference. Mr. Roy Martinez of AwwaRF, Prof. Hiroshi
Nagaoka of Musashi Institute of Technology and Mr. Donald Goralski of MCCER also
delivered the opening remarks. Two keynote speeches were given by Prof. Yosihiko
Hosoi of Tottori University and Prof. Thomas O’Rourke of Cornell University. 29
technical papers were presented in the following six sessions:
1. Seismic Mitigation Measures

2. Seismic measures for Pipelines
3. Outreach, Education and Communications for Earthquake Risks
4. Seismic System Evaluations
5. Earthquake Studies and Evaluations
6. Emergency Response
During the discussion session, the participants expressed strong interests in continuing
and expanding the workshop in the future. The organizing committee with members
from the U.S., Japan and Taiwan also discussed the possible dates and locations of the
next workshop. It was agreed among the committee members that the next workshop
will be held in either Japan or Taiwan within 24 months from the completion of the fifth
workshop.
The conference proceedings include the technical papers, presentation slides, summary of
the discussion session and the survey results from the participating water agencies.
Roy Martinez David Lee

Conference Co-Chair Conference Co-Chair
American Water Works Association East Bay Municipal Utility District
Research Foundation
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AGENDA
th
5 AWWARF/JWWA Water System Seismic Conference
August 15-17, 2007
375 Eleventh Street
Oakland, CA
DAY 1 – Wednesday, August 15, 2007
1. REGISTRATION
8:30-9:00 East Bay Municipal Utility District – Large Training Center – 2nd Floor
2. OPENING CEREMONY
9:00-9:10 Mr. Dennis Diemer, General Manager – East Bay Municipal Utility District
9:10-9:20 Mr. Roy Martinez, Senior Account Manager – American Water Works
Association Research Foundation
9:20-9:30 Prof. Hiroshi Nagaoka, Musashi Institute of Technology – Japan Water Works
Association
9:30-9:40 Mr. Donald Goralski, Senior Program Officer – Multidisciplinary Center for
Earthquake Engineering Research – Earthquake Engineering to Extreme
Events
3. KEYNOTE SPEECH
9:40-10:10 Prof. Yosihiko Hosoi, Tottori University, Japan, "Earthquake

Countermeasures for Water Supply Systems from Standpoint of Residents"
10:10-10:40 Prof. Thomas O’Rourke, Cornell University, US, "Recent Advances in
Research and Practice for the Seismic Performance of Water Supplies"
10:40-10:50 Break (10 minutes)
4. PRESENTATION PART I (15 minutes including questions & answers)
SESSION 1 Seismic Mitigation Measures
Chairpersons: Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura – Japan

Dr. Fred von Hofe – US
10:50-11:05 Mr. Masaru Oneda, Tokyo Metropolitan Waterworks Bureau, Tokyo, Japan –
“Seismic Measures and its Emergency Plan of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau”
11:05-11:20 Ms. Chandrika Winston, Memphis Light Gas and Water, Memphis, TN, US –
“Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division Seismic Performance Objectives for
Water Facilities Past, Present and Future”
JWWA-AWWARF 5th Water System Seismic Conference Page 1 of 6

Conference Agenda 17
11:20-11:35 Mr. Shigeru Hataya, Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau, Chiba Perfecture,
Japan – “Anti-earthquake Measures of Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau”
11:35-11:50 Ms. Elizabeth Bialek and Mr. Atta Yiadom, East Bay Municipal Utility
District, Oakland, CA, US – “A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam – The
Case of San Pablo Dam”
11:50-12:05 Mr. Nobuhiro Hasegawa, JFE Engineering Corporation (Japanese Water Steel
Pipes Association), Yokohama, Japan – “Manual for Improvement of Over
Aged Reservoirs with Steel Plate”
12:05-13:30 Lunch – Sponsor: East Bay Municipal Utility District
SESSION 2 Seismic Measures for Pipelines
Chairpersons: Dr. Gee-Yu Liu – Taiwan

Mr. Xavier Irias – US
13:30-13:45 Mr. Hiroaki Miyazaki, Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, Osaka, Japan –
“Seismic Damage Estimation of Distribution Pipes”
13:45-14:00 Mr. David Tsztoo, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US –
“Challenges of the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project”
14:00-14:15 Mr. Yukio Mabuchi, Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, Japan
– “Earthquake Countermeasures in Nagoya”
14:15-14:30 Mr. Ahmed Nisar, MMI Engineering, Oakland, CA, US – “Fault Crossing
Design of a Critical Large Diameter Pipeline”
SESSION 3 Outreach, Education and Communications for Earthquake Risks
Chairpersons: Mr. Munetaka Abe – Japan

Mr. Brian Sadden – US
14:45-15:00 Mr. Kazuhiko Mizuguchi, Kobe Municipal Waterworks, Kobe, Japan –

“Seismic Practices and Strategies of Public Relations in Kobe City”
15:00-15:15 Prof. Adam Rose, University of Southern California, US – “Regional
Economic Analysis of Earthquake Losses, Mitigation and Resilience”
15:15-15:30 Dr. Nagahisa Hirayama, Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institute,
Kobe, Japan – “Participatory Planning in Development of Comprehensive
Crisis Management Plan for Water Supply Authorities”

15:30-15:45 Mr. Luke Cheng, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco,
CA, US – “Seismic Aspects of the SFPUC Water System Improvement
Program”
15:45-16:00 Mr. Shinji Nakayasu, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, Hyogo, Japan –
“Information Provision to Residents on Construction of Regulating Reservoir
at Landslide Site Caused by an Earthquake”
SESSION 4 Seismic System Evaluations
Chairpersons: Prof. Tatsuo Ohmachi – Japan

Prof. Adam Rose – US
16:10-16:25 Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura, Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, Japan –
“A Case Study on How PIs Should Be Applied in Evaluating Seismic
Performance Along with the Water Works Guidelines”
16:25-16:40 Mr. Yasuhiko Sato, Japan Water Research Center, Tokyo, Japan – “Function
Diagnosis Method to Improve Earthquake Resistance of Water Supply
Facilities”
16:40-16:55 Mr. Noboru Murakami, Hachinohe Water Supply Authority, Hachinohe,
Japan – “Nejo Purification Plant Water System Facilities Today”
16:55-17:10 Mr. Hidehiko Aihara, Yokohama City Waterworks Bureau, Japan – “The
Quakeproof Diagnosis of Waterworks Facilities in Yokohama City”
17:10-17:25 Ms. Crystal Yezman, Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, US –
“Santa Clara Valley Water District Reliability Program, Implementing
Improvements for Seismic Response”
5. GROUP PHOTO
17:30-18:00 East Bay Municipal Utility District – 1st Floor Lobby
6. CONFERENCE DINNER AT SCOTT’S SEAFOOD, Jack London Square

Sponsor: American Water Works Association Research Foundation
18:30-21:00 Dinner

DAY 2 – Thursday, August 16, 2007
7. PRESENTATION PART II (15 minutes including questions and answers)
SESSION 5 Earthquake Studies and Evaluations
Chairpersons: Prof. Hiroshi Nagaoka – Japan

Mr. David Pratt – US
9:00-9:15 Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka, University of California, Irvine, US – “A Sensor

Network for Real-Time Damage Location and Assessment”
9:15-9:30 Mr. Munetaka Abe, Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, Japan –
“Damages to Water Supply Facilities by the Noto Peninsula Earthquake in
2007 and Restoration Works and Issues”
9:30-9:45 Mr. Jianping Hu, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles,
CA, US – “Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply
System Using GIRAFFE”
9:45-10:00 Dr. Gee-Yu Liu, National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering,
TAIWAN – “Seismic Repair Rate Analysis and Risk Assessment of Water
Pipelines”
10:00-10:15 Mr. Kuniaki Nakamura, Fukuoka City Waterworks Bureau, Fukuoka, Japan –
“Emergency Measures - A Study of the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake”
SESSION 6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Chairpersons: Mr. Yasuhiko Sato – Japan

Mr. John Vrymoed – US
10:40-10:55 Mr. Ken-ichi Koike, Kanagawa Water Supply Authority, Yokohama, Japan –
“Water Supply Control and Management in Emergency in the Wide Area
Water Supply – Using the Mutual Communication Raw Water Conveyance
Facilities”
10:55-11:10 Mr. Mike Ambrose, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US –
“Multi-Hazard Emergency Preparedness at East Bay Municipal Utility
District”

11:10-11:25 Dr. Siao-Syun Ke, National Science & Technology Center for Disaster
Reduction, TAIWAN – “The Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness of
Water Supply System in Taipei City under Earthquake”
11:25-11:40 Mr. Steve Welch, Contra Costa Water District, Concord, CA, US –
“Earthquake Response Planning – Gaining Control of Disaster”
11:40-11:55 Prof. Tatsuo Ohmachi, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, Japan –
“Near-field Earthquake Displacements of the Non-liquefiable Ground
Relevant to Damage to Buried Pipelines”
12:00-13:30 Lunch – Sponsor: East Bay Municipal Utility District
8. DISCUSSION (With English – Japanese Translation)
Chairpersons: Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka – US

Prof. Yoshihiko Hosoi – Japan
Dr. Craig Davis – US
Prof. Hiroshi Nagaoka – Japan
13:30-14:50 Discussions
15:10-17:00 Discussions
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
17:00-17:10 Mr. Roy Martinez – American Water Works Association Research Foundation
17:10-17:20 Prof. Hiroshi Nagaoka – Japan Water Works Association
10. RECEPTION AT PACIFIC COAST BREWERY

Sponsors: Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research and
17:30-19:00 Reception

DAY 3 – Friday, August 17, 2007
11. TECHNICAL TOUR
Tour Coordinator – Mr. Chieh Wang, East Bay Municipal Utility District
8:30-9:30 Tour EBMUD Emergency Operations and Oakland Control Centers
9:30-10:15 Departure by bus and travel
10:15-11:45 Tour EBMUD Walnut Creek Water Treatment Plant
12:15-13:45 Lunch at San Pablo Reservoir Picnic Area
14:45-16:00 Tour of SFPUC 96-inch Isolation Valve Project (Fremont)
17:00 Arrive at EBMUD Administration Building
17:30 Arrive at Pickwick Hotel (San Francisco)

5th AWWARF/JWWA Water System Seismic Conference
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Prof. Yosihiko Hosoi, Tottori University, JAPAN, "Earthquake countermeasures for water
supply systems from standpoint of residents"
Prof. Thomas O’Rourke, Cornell University, US, "Recent Advances in Research and Practice
for the Seismic Performance of Water Supplies"
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RECENT ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE FOR THE SEISMIC
PERFORMANCE OF WATER SUPPLIES
T.D. O’Rourke
Thomas R. Briggs Professor of Engineering
Cornell University
ABSTRACT
Some of the most important recent advances in research and practice for the seismic
performance of water supply systems have been associated with the 1) development and
application of models for complex water supply system performance during earthquakes,
and 2) large scale soil-structure interaction experiments. Numerical simulations of water
supply performance during and after earthquakes has been facilitated by the development
of programs that account for water flow under conditions of heavy damage after an
earthquake, multi-scale modeling techniques to represent the network behavior of trunk
and distribution pipelines, and visualization through geographical information systems
(GIS). In the US, large scale soil-structure interaction experiments have been facilitated
through the George E. Brown, Jr Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation
(NEES) http://www.nees.org/ , which is a nation-wide network of test sites supported by
the National Science Foundation (NSF) interconnected through high performance internet
for real-time physical and numerical interactive modeling.
Research supported by MCEER at Cornell University and the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power (LADWP) has focused on the development of a decision support
system to plan operations, emergency response, and new system facilities and
configurations to optimize water supply performance during and after earthquakes. The
system is generic, and the architecture of its computer programs is adaptable to any water
supply. The system works in conjunction with an easily accessible hydraulic network
model, EPANET, and a special program for damaged network flow modeling, known as
Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE).
The decision support system was developed using the LADWP water supply as a test bed.
As applied to the LADWP network, the computer model simulates all 12,000 km of water
trunk and distribution pipelines and related facilities (e.g., tanks, reservoirs, pressure
regulation stations, etc.) in the LADWP system. The decision support system accounts
for the aggregated seismic hazard in Los Angeles through an ensemble of 59 scenario
earthquakes. The 59 scenario earthquakes also provide a library of seismic scenarios,
from which engineers can select specific scenarios or combinations of scenarios to assess
system performance. The decision support system works with risk and reliability
assessment tools to provide metrics of system performance. The computer simulations
account for the interaction of the water and electric power supplies, and model output can
be used to evaluate the regional economic and community impacts of water losses. All
system input and output can be visualized through GIS with advanced query logic and
web-based features. The simulations are dynamic in time, and can account for loss of
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service as tanks and local reservoirs lose water over time through leaks and breaks in
pipelines.
System simulations have been performed to show the aggregated effects during an
earthquake of loss in functionality of transmission pipelines (Los Angeles Aqueducts 1
and 2), loss of electric power due to earthquake effects, damage from local, permanent
ground deformation to trunk and distribution pipelines, system-wide damage from
transient ground deformation effects, and damage to facilities. The damage can also be
de-aggregated to show the most important sources and quantify their ramifications on the
system.
System performance is expressed in terms of system serviceability index, SSI, which is

the ratio of flow at demand nodes before and after the earthquake. There are 1,052
demand nodes that are geographically distributed throughout the system. The SSI can be
determined for the entire system or for any part of the system so that the spatial
variability of SSI can be evaluated.
Studies for LADWP with the decision support system to date have focused on a repeat
Northridge earthquake scenario. The studies show the great importance of dynamic
behavior over time, especially during the first 24 hrs after the earthquake when leaking
water through damaged pipelines diminishes local tank and reservoir levels, thereby
reducing SSI. The studies show the importance of disruption in flow from the Los
Angeles Aqueducts and electric power losses. Each of these effects has similar
consequences for the system, resulting in low SSI for water service areas in the northern
part of the system. The studies also show the effects of lost storage capacity. Over the
past 10 years several large reservoirs have been taken out of service because of water
quality concerns, resulting in a reduction of approximately 30 X 106 m3 of readily
available water and placing greater dependence on the Los Angeles Reservoir. For peak
summer demands, the SSI for the entire network 24 hrs after the earthquake is increased
by 30% if the out-of-service reservoirs are restored on an emergency basis. The decision
support simulations demonstrate explicitly where the locally most important effects are
and indicate what pipelines and facilities are most critical for effective performance.
Collaborative research on ground rupture effects on underground pipelines is in progress

with the NEES equipment sites at Cornell University http://nees.cornell.edu/index.htm
and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) http://nees.rpi.edu/. The Cornell facility
provides for full-scale testing that concentrates on detailed soil-structure interaction. It
permits accurate representation of both the soil and buried lifeline in the vicinity of ground
rupture. The RPI facility provides an excellent complement. Through multi-g scaling,
larger prototype dimensions and rates of loading can be tested.
Large scale and centrifuge tests have focused on steel and high density polyethylene
(HDPE) pipelines. The large-scale experiments at Cornell are the largest tests ever
performed on ground rupture effects on pipelines in the laboratory. The tests involve 1.2 m
of left lateral strike-slip fault movement of approximately 60 m3 of partially saturated sand
with pipelines embedded at a depth of 1m to top of pipe at a fault crossing angle of 65°.
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The pipeline orientation with respect to the ground rupture plane generated tension and
bending in the first series of tests. A second series is currently under way in which right
lateral strike-slip fault movement will generate compression and bending in the pipelines.
Four large scale experiments on 400-mm-diameter HDPE pipelines, both without internal
water pressure and with 500 kPa of internal water pressure, have been performed.
The research program has been used to develop advanced sensor technology. A pipeline
robot equipped with a laser profiling device was used to obtain continuous digital images
of the interior shape of the pipeline both before and after ground rupture. The digital
images provide 3-D data on the degree of ovaling experienced by the pipeline and the
cross-sectional flexural strains in the pipe. Tactile force sensors were used to measure the
distribution of pressure around the pipe circumference due to soil-pipe reactions during
ground rupture. A tactile force sensor is a fabric in which is embedded a matrix of
polymeric resistive contacts. Over 2000 restive contacts were involved in the 500 mm x
400 mm sheets that were used in the experiments. A protective Teflon sheet was used to
isolate the tactile force sensors from shear cross-sensitivity effects.
The experiments have demonstrated that the HDPE pipelines are capable of sustaining
large deformation without loss of service during ground rupture, on the order of several
meters, depending of fault crossing angle. The experimental evidence and analytical
modeling of lateral soil forces imposed on the pipelines have resulted in the development
of a design chart to predict horizontal forces on the pipeline from ground rupture as a
function of soil properties, pipe diameter, and depth of pipe burial. Equations accounting
for force-displacement interaction during relative pipeline movement in the soil have also
been developed.
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SESSION 1
Seismic Mitigation Measures
Mr. Masaru Oneda, Tokyo Metropolitan Waterworks Bureau, Tokyo, JAPAN – “Seismic
Measures and its Emergency Plan of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau”
Ms. Chandrika Winston, Memphis Light Gas and Water, Memphis, TN, US – “Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Division Seismic Performance Objectives for Water
Facilities Past, Present and Future”
Mr. Shigeru Hataya, Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau, Chiba Perfecture, JAPAN –
“Anti-earthquake Measures of Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau”
Ms. Elizabeth Bialek and Mr. Atta Yiadom, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland,
CA, US – “A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam – The Case of San Pablo
Dam”
Mr. Nobuhiro Hasegawa, JFE Engineering Corporation (Japanese Water Steel Pipes
Association), Yokohama, JAPAN – “Manual for Improvement of Over Aged
Reservoirs with Steel Plate”
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Seismic Measures and its Emergency Plan
of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau
Masaru ONEDA
ABSTRACT
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau ranks the seismic resistance measures as one of the most important
problems, so we have tried for the measures from both sides of facilities improvement and system of
emergency restoration up to now.
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau settles on “The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures” for the
facilities improvement. The purposes of this plan are to reduce the damage of the water supply
facilities by the earthquake, and to secure the water supply to the customers as much as possible. Up
to now, we have promoted strengthening of the water service system such as making
earthquake-proof of the Yamaguchi Reservoir and water distribution reservoirs. And we have
constructed emergency water tanks to secure the drinking water against the earthquake disaster.
Moreover, “The Plan of Emergency Seismic Measures” is settled to restore the water supply
facilities and to do emergency water supply to the customers smoothly when the earthquake disaster
occurs.
On the other hand, the Central Disaster Prevention Council of Japanese government made
public “Measures outline of the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area” in
September 2005. When the water supply facilities to the capital center organizations, etc. are
damaged, this outline requests to restore the facilities within three days after the earthquake occurs.
Therefore, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau settled on “New Facilities Improvement Long Term
Conception” in November 2006. In this plan, we decided that we make the water supply routes to the
capital center organizations, etc. earthquake-proof by priority.
Masaru ONEDA, Director for Construction Division, Construction Section, Bureau of Waterworks,
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 8-1 Nishi-Shinjuku 2-Chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 163-8001 Japan
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OUTLINE OF TOKYO WATERWORKS
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau began supplying water in 1898. The water resource volume
currently secured by us is 6,230,000m3 per day. And water is supplied to the area of 1,222km², and for
12.25 million people in the entire 23-wards area and 25 cities in the Tama area as of March 2006. In
addition, we provisionally supply water to three cities that are not included in the service area of
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau. And the capacity of purification facilities is 6,860,000 m³ per day, total
length of water distribution pipes is 25,000km. In 2005 FY, the maximum daily water supply volume
is 4,980,000m3. It is 5,080,000m3 if we include provisionally supply water to the three cities.
Tokyo is the center of Japanese politics, economy, and culture. And, Tokyo is one of the
cosmopolitan cities that give big influence to the world. A lot of people gather and live besides 12
million Tokyo citizens, and ceaseless accumulation of industry and commerce has been done.
It leads to not only the influence on the politics of Japan but also an international confidence
losing of Japan if the function of the Tokyo water service stops. Additionally, in Tokyo where there
are a lot of high medical institution and research organizations, water service is exactly a lifeline, and
water supply must not stop at one time.
Thus, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau not only supports the citizen's life and activity but also greatly
contributes to the development of Tokyo.
SEISMIC MEASURES OF TOKYO WATERWORKS BUREAU
Outline of Seismic measures
Recent years, the severe earthquakes occurred one after another in Japan.
About twelve years have already passed from The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that caused
unprecedented damage. The various standards concerning earthquake were reviewed in Japan with
this earthquake. However, large earthquakes occurred such as The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, and
The Noto Peninsula Earthquake, etc. and they had caused the serious damage to the water supply
facilities.
On the other hand, The Chiba Northwest Earthquake occurred in the metropolitan area the year
before last. This earthquake registered the seismic intensity 5-upper in Adachi Ward in Tokyo after
an interval of thirteen years in the metropolitan area. Therefore, the possibility of the Earthquake with
an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to be occur increases. Tokyo is a capital of Japan, and
the center of Japanese economy. Therefore, the function recoveries with the early moment are
requested at the earthquakes.
Especially, the water supply facilities are indispensable for the daily life water such as rest
rooms and baths. In addition, water is important also for cooling such as the emergency electric
supply units and computers these are necessary for operating important equipments of the capital
center organization. Moreover, the shortage of water in the medical institution becomes obstacles of
the operation and the dialysis, etc., and is related directly to victim's life.
Therefore, we locate the seismic measures to one of the high-priority issues, and are working
from both sides of facilities improvement and system of emergency restoration. Concretely, Tokyo
Waterworks Bureau settles on “The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures” for the facilities
improvement. The purposes of this plan are to reduce the damage of the water supply facilities by the
earthquake, and to secure the water supply to the customers as much as possible. Moreover, “The
Plan of Emergency Seismic Measures” is settled to restore the water service facilities and to do
32
Seismic Measures of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau
The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures The Plan of Emergency Seismic Measures
Reinforcement for Seismic Resistance Staff Gathering
Improvement, Reinforcement
Emergency Restoration
Reinforcement of the Water
Supply System Emergency Water Supply
Securing of Drinking Water

Practice and
Enhancement of Emergency In-service Training
Water Supply
Figure 1. The System of Seismic Measures
emergency the water service facilities and to do emergency water supply to the customers smoothly
when the earthquake disaster occurs. (Figure 1)
The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau made extended 7th plans from 1973 FY to 2001 FY called “The Plan
for Prevention of Earthquake Disaster” and had advanced the seismic measures. Moreover, we
renamed the plan to “The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures” in 2002 FY, and have been working
on “reinforcement for seismic resistance of facilities” and “securing of drinking water” as the plan
period from 2005 FY to 2007 FY now.
Reinforcement for seismic resistance of water distribution reservoirs, etc.
After The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (1995), we executed an earthquake-proof diagnosis

of the embankment of the Yamaguchi Reservoir and the Murayama-shimo Reservoir. As a result of
diagnosis, it became clear that the embankment of the Yamaguchi Reservoir and the
Murayama-shimo Reservoir would be damaged when great earthquakes occurs. We decided to carry
out the reinforcement work of the embankment in consideration of the importance of these Reservoirs
and the present condition that urbanization has advanced under the embankments. The reinforcement
work of the Yamaguchi Reservoir completed in 2002 FY, and we are executing the reinforcement
work of the Murayama-shimo Reservoir now.
On the other hand, the structures such as the water purification plants, the water distribution
reservoirs, and the pumping stations, etc. are constructed based on the seismic design after the good
ground is selected. Moreover, enough foundation works were given to facilities in case of
constructing them unavoidably on weak grounds. However, in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake,
damages were caused in the facilities that were thought to be strong for earthquakes, and large-scale
water suspensions were generated. Based on such a situation, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau executes
33
seismic diagnosis for facilities that designed before
present seismic design guideline was enacted, and if
necessary executes reinforcement for seismic flexible
resistance of these facilities. lock ring
Making pipeline earthquake-proof

restraint projection
To reduce the damages of the water suspensions
at the earthquakes, and to ensure stable water supply, Figure 2. Mechanism of NS type Joint
we are executing the replace project of aged pipes
(We call it K-Zero project.). In the project, we execute replacement of aged pipes such as the cast-iron
pipes to earthquake resistance pipes such as the ductile iron pipes, and we are executing construction
aggressively aiming at completing it 2013 FY now. Moreover, when replacing it, we positively adopt
the pipe that has the slipping out prevention joint such as the NS type ductile iron pipe. (Figure 2)
Reinforcement of the water supply system
The water supply system is composed of water storage facilities, intake facilities, raw water
transmission facilities, purification facilities, water transmission and distribution facilities, and water
supply equipments. Therefore, these facilities must function in union to secure the water supply at the
earthquake. Moreover, it is technically difficult to make facilities earthquake-proof completely. Not
only the reinforcement for seismic resistance of individual facilities but also the reinforcement for
seismic resistance of the entire water supply system is important.
Therefore, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau has aimed at the stabilization of the water supply system
and advances the construction of water transmission pipe network, the construction of cross-supply
pipes with neighboring water utilities, and the improvement to block distribution system.
(Figure 3, Figure 4)
Construction of Emergency Water Tank (Securing of drinking water)
At the earthquake, we think that we cannot avoid temporary water suspension by the damage
of the pipes. Therefore, securing the drinking water is indispensable. When the earthquake occurs,
drinking water required for person is assumed three liters per day for the life maintenance. We have
Asaka, Misono
Higashi-Murayama
Ozaku Misato
Distribution
Main Block
Sakai Kanamachi
Distribution
Sub-main
Nagasawa Kinuta Block
Main Transmission Pipe Purification Plant
Construction necessity route Water Supplying Station
Figure 3. Transmission Pipe Network Figure 4. Block Distribution System
34
established bases for emergency water supply, each of which is placed within approximately every
2km to be reached from any place in Tokyo. And, we have constructed Emergency Water Tanks at
the region where the purification plants and the water supplying stations do not exist in the vicinity.
Moreover, we transport the drinking water by car from the purification plants and the water
supplying stations to the refuges away by 2km or more, and execute the emergency water supply.
And, we completed the construction of the emergency water tanks in 2005 FY because we have
secured an enough volume of water. Hereafter, we will renew them premeditatedly according to
aging.
We had constructed the Emergency Water Tanks of 1,500m3 46 places in the entire 23-wards
area, and 7 places in the Tama area. Moreover, the small-scale emergency water tanks of 100m3 were
constructed 22 places in the entire 23-wards area, and 3 places in the Tama area. Adding the numbers
of the purification plants and the water supplying stations to these, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau has 97
places of the emergency water service stations in the entire 23-wards area, and 103 places in the Tama
area. And total of the emergency water service stations are 200 places. As a result, the secured
volume of water is about 1.03 million cubic meters in total, and this is an amount that 12 million
citizens of Tokyo can consume for four weeks. (Figure 5, Figure 6)
TREND OF SEISMIC MEASURES IN RECENT YEARS
The Central Disaster Prevention Council “Measures outline of The Earthquake with an
Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area”
The Headquarters of Earthquake Research Promotion of the government is forecasting that

the probability is 70% that the earthquake of magnitude about 7 will occur at South-Kanto within 30
years in the future. Moreover, The Central Disaster Prevention Council also pointed out the
imminence of the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area of magnitude 7
classes. This conference announced “Estimation of damage of the Earthquake with an Epicenter in
the Tokyo Metropolitan Area” in February 2005, and settled on “Measures Outline of the Earthquake
with an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area” in September of the same year. This is because,
when the severe earthquake occurs in the capital region, a large area disaster emergency measure that
emergency water
supply tap
emergency stop valve
non-utility
generation facility
emergency water
Purification plants and water supplying stations(122) supply pump distribution main
circulation pump
Emergency Water Tanks(78)
Figure 5. Location of Emergency Water Figure 6. Image of Emergency Water Tank
Service Stations
35
extends over the capital and the vicinity prefectures is necessary. Therefore, the continuance of the
capital center organizations such as the political function, the administrative function, and the
economic central function, etc. of our country is indispensable. The outline requests that the supply
lines to the capital center organizations and important medical facilities are made earthquake-proof,
multiplex, and disperse to the water utilities.
Moreover, when the water supply facilities that supplied to the capital center organizations, etc.
are damaged, the Outline requests to restore within three days by priority after the earthquake occurs,
and sets the restoration target of other water supply facilities within 30 days.
The capital center organizations and important medical facilities that we are considering are 81
functions.
1 Politics and administrative function: The Diet, Government Ministries and Agencies, Tokyo
Metropolitan Government, and Embassies, etc. (39 functions)
2 The economic function etc.: The Central bank, The computer center of the main financial
institutions (21 functions)
3 Tertiary emergency medical institution: (21 functions)
Waterworks play the role to supply the cooling water, etc. of various equipments. Therefore, we
should promptly make cooling water available in the capital center organizations. Moreover,
multiplexing the water supply routes to the capital center organizations and making the base facilities
earthquake-proof are requested.
“Estimation of the damage in Tokyo by the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area” by Tokyo disaster prevention conference
To defend citizens’ lives and the properties, to promote the earthquake measures, and to improve
disaster prevention consideration of citizen of Tokyo, Tokyo Metropolitan Government made
original estimation of damage public, receiving the estimation of the damage in Tokyo by Earthquake
with an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area that the Central Disaster Prevention Council made
public in February 2005. The assumed earthquake was the Tokyo Bay Northern part Earthquake and
the Tama inland Earthquake. The scales of the earthquakes were M6.9, M7.3, and the hypocenter
depths were about 30-50 kilometers respectively, and the technique of estimation of damage is as
follows.
In this estimation of damage, the water suspension rate in 23-wards by the Tokyo Bay Northern
part Earthquake is assumed to be 46%. And, the water suspension rate in the Tama area by the Tama
inland Earthquake is assumed to be 25%.
Estimation of damage technique (Figure 7)
1 The water suspension rate is calculated from the material damage rate of the pipes calculated
by the speed distribution of the ground and the liquefaction distribution.
2 When a large-scale power failure occurs because the substation received damage, temporary
water suspension is generated by the stop of the function of the base facilities. However,
water suspension will recover by switching the electric power system in a short time.
Therefore, the functions stops by struck of the base facilities are not targeted.
3 The relation between the damage rate and the water suspension rate adopts the technique of
Kawakami (1996) set based on the damage realities at the past earthquakes including The
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
36
Distribution Pipe
Length
Speed of the Standard Damage Rate

Ground of the Ground Speed
Correction coefficient
of Material kind and
Perilousness of
Correction coefficient of Caliber of Pipe
Liquefaction
Liquefaction Risk Rank
(PL)
Pipe Damage Rate
Water Suspension Rate
Figure 7. Calculation flow of water suspension rate
4 The damage rate of the water distribution pipes of each mesh that divides Tokyo into
250m×250m mesh is calculated based on the damage realities at the past earthquakes
including The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. And it is corrected by the liquefaction risk
rank, the material kind of the pipe, and the caliber of the pipe.
Relational expression of water suspension rate with damage rate of water distribution pipe
(Based on the damage realities at the past earthquakes including The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
1 Water suspension rate (next day of earthquake) =

1 / {1+0.307× (water distribution pipe damage rate)-1.17}
2 Water distribution pipe damage rate (damage number / km) =
Number of water distribution pipe damage / distribution pipe length (km)
3 Number of water distribution pipe damage =
Standard damage rate × correction coefficient of liquefaction risk rank
×correction coefficient of material kind and caliber of pipe × pipe length
(TABLE I, TABLE II)
Standard damage rate (It is based on the damage realities at the past earthquake including The
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
Standard damage rate (number /km) = 2.24 × 10-3 × (the speed of the ground (cm/sec)-20) 1.51
TABLE I. CORRECTION COEFFICIENTS OF LIQUEFACTION RISK RANK

PL Rank PL=0 0<PL<=5 5<PL<=15 15<PL
Correction Coefficient 1 1.2 1.5 3
37
TABLE II. CORRECTION COEFFICIENTS BY THE MATERIAL KIND AND THE CALIBER OF THE PIPES
(Based on the damage realities at The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.)
Pipe Material Caliber 75mm or less 100-250mm 300-450mm 500-900mm 1000mm or more
Ductile Iron Pipe
0
(Earthquake-proof Joint)
Ductile Iron Pipe
0.6 0.3 0.09 0.045
(Normal Joint)
Cast Iron Pipe 1.7 1.2 0.4 0.15
Steel Pipe 0.84 0.42 0.24
Polyvinyl Chloride Pipe (PVC) 1.5 1.2
Asbestos Cement Pipe 6.9 2.7 1.2
NEW FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT LONG TERM CONCEPTION OF TOKYO

WATERWORKS BUREAU
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau ranks the seismic resistance measures as one of the most important
problems, and has promoted the seismic resistance measures steadily based on The Plan of Projects
for Seismic Measures, up to now.
However, the reviewed new estimation of damage exceeds that in 1997, and it is forecast that the
influence on the water supply facilities is huge. Moreover, because a part of the supply route to the
water taps is damaged even if individual facilities are made earthquake-proof, it is feared that
securing the water supply becomes difficult. Therefore, we decided that at once the seismic measures
were progressed based on the following basic policies without waiting for the decision of The Plan of
Projects for Seismic Measures from 2008 FY for the next term.
Reinforcement of seismic resistance
To make up the water supply system that can be stably supplied not only peacetime but also at
the earthquake, the measure is promoted by the following policy.
1 We give priority to making the water supply facilities of the supply routes about the capital
center organizations and the tertiary emergency medical institutions earthquake-proof, and
execute it at the early stage. (Figure 8)
2 We improve the earthquake
resistance of the water supply
distribution pipe
facilities considering
continuousness from the water distribution station
resource facilities to the taps.
Especially, to secure some water distribution pipe
purification capacity at the early

stage, we promote making each
purification system Tertiary Emergency
Medical Institutions
earthquake-proof, considering the Making to
continuousness from the receiving earthquake-proof Capital Center Organizations
wells to the water distribution

reservoirs is advanced. Figure 8. Earthquake-proof of Important Route
38
TABLE III. PERFORMANCE INDICATOR OF SEISMIC MEASURES (PI)
Past Records Target
Ten Years After
2005 FY
(2016 FY)
100
Ductile Iron Pipe Rate (%) 98
(2013 FY)
Earthquake-proof Joint Rate (%) 20 35
Earthquake-proof Rate of Supply Route to
2 100
Important Facilities (%)
Earthquake-proof Rate
0 60
of Purification Plants (%)
Earthquake-proof Rate
31 95
of Water Distribution Reservoirs (%)
3 We clarify the priority level, and making the water supply facilities earthquake-proof is
advanced effectively. The water supply facilities are systems that consist of huge facilities. It
requires a long tract of years and huge cost to complete making all facilities earthquake-proof. It
is important to clarify the priority level of improvement at the same time as hurrying up making
of the weak points and important facilities earthquake-proof in order to advance reinforcement
for seismic resistance of the water supply facilities effectively.
Especially, it is necessary to renew old pipes that are weak to earthquake in the east area of
23-wards where big damage is assumed by the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area. (TABLE III)
Strengthening of backup function
To improve the stability of the water supply at the accidents and the earthquakes, Tokyo
Waterworks Bureau promotes the measure by the following policy.
1 To strengthen the backup function, we promote the improvement of water supplying stations
and non-utility generating facilities. It is important to secure appropriate capacity of the water
distribution reservoirs against the emergency to do an effective backup at the accident.
Moreover, it is necessary to construct the water distribution reservoirs newly and to
reorganize the wide supply area. Therefore, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau advances the
construction of water distribution reservoirs that become bases in the water supply districts,
and secures the capacity of the water distribution reservoirs of 12 hours of the amount of the
maximum daily supply in preparation for the change by time and accidents. (As of the end of
2005 FY: about 70%)
Moreover, to supply water with stability at the large area power failure, we are advancing to
equip non-utility generating facilities to the purification plants and the water supplying
stations, etc.
2 Construction of network of transmission pipes
To do the efficient water supply control and management and strengthen the backup
function at emergency, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau constructs the large area transmission
pipes network that connects between purification plants and water distribution reservoirs and
between water distribution reservoirs.
Moreover, in the Tama area we make the network of main distribution pipes that are like
tree branch now, in order to improve their mutual flexibility and the backup function.
39
REVISION OF EMERGENCY MEASURES PLAN
Tokyo Metropolitan Government has received “Estimation of damage of the Earthquake with an
Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area” and “Measures Outline of the Earthquake with an
Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area” of the Central Disaster Prevention Council, and settled on
“Estimation of damage of Tokyo by the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Area” that forecast the damage of each cities, towns, and villages more in detail in March, 2006. The
estimation of damage of the water supply facilities reflected Ductile Iron Pipe Rate and
Earthquake-proof Joint Rates of each city, town, and village, based on the condition of the ground
data and the liquidizing index, etc. Moreover, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau revised “The Plan of
Emergency Seismic Measures” to improve “Mobility” with which we can deal with the earthquake
promptly and “Effectiveness” with which we can carry out our mission steadily with the large
earthquake.
Establishment of Water Supply Headquarters
When the earthquake causes damage, it is difficult to act in the emergency measures in the usual
organization. Therefore, when the earthquake more than seismic intensity 6-under occurs, and the
extensive damage occurs in the water supply facilities, the director of waterworks bureau sets up the
water supply headquarters in the bureau. In this case, the post provided beforehand does the
information gathering, the emergency restoration, and the emergency water supply. Moreover, when
the earthquake occurs on nighttime and holiday, it is assumed that the specified standby directorate
members, the specified directorate members, and the resident in the disaster measures staff house, etc.
do these works as the first movement worker. (There is no change from the plan of the previous state
about this.)
System of emergency restoration
It was clearly shown to restore struck water supply facilities in the whole area of Tokyo within
30 days. For three days after the earthquake occurs, we restore the water distribution pipe damage
parts to the capital center organizations, etc. and do investigation and the water distribution control,
etc. of the other facilities. Then, four days after the earthquake, we execute real restoration of the other
facilities. Up to now, when the earthquake occurs on nighttime and holiday, the greater part of staff
are supposed to gather in the office that is the nearest from each one’s home. The mobility at the first
movement could be expected of this system. However, necessary personnel did not necessarily gather
in the office that was necessary for the operation management and the emergency restoration, and
there was an anxiety from effectiveness. Therefore, the effectiveness was valued, and, as a rule, the
staffs assumed the gathering to the belonging office.
System of emergency water supply
Up to now, only staffs of a part of posts have done the emergency water supply. However, a
prompt action at the first movement is especially important. Therefore, staffs are specified
beforehand (about 7-10 persons per every base, about 300 persons as a whole), and when the
40
earthquake occurs, the staffs assume direct gathering to the water supply base (29 bases in the
23-wards and 16 bases in the Tama area) where it had been specified within roughly 5 km from their
home.
At the purification plants and water supplying stations, the staffs of the bureau do the operation
management in facilities and the installations of the emergency water supply tools and materials to
the emergency water supply activity and staffs of the wards and the cities do the emergency water
supply to the resident. Moreover, at the emergency water tanks, the staffs of the wards and the cities
are supposed to do all of the work of the operation management in facilities, the installations of the
emergency water supply tools and materials, and the emergency water supplies to the resident, etc.
Review of gathering standard
The standards seismic intensity of the emergency disposition system was reviewed with the
change of the gathering places. Tokyo waterworks bureau provided that all staffs gathered
independently at the seismic intensity 5-upper or more had been observed in consideration of
importance of the water supply facilities by planning that had been settled on in 1996. (All staffs
gathering standard of Tokyo Metropolitan Government is seismic intensity 6-under.)
However, the reinforcement for seismic resistance of the water supply facilities have advanced
as about ten years pass afterwards and the rate of the ductile iron pipe becomes 98% at the end of
2005FY. (TABLE III) Moreover, in 2005, damage was not caused in the water supply facilities
though seismic intensity 5-upper was observed at Tokyo due to The Northwest Chiba Earthquake,
and seismic intensity 6-under was observed due to The Miyagi Offing Earthquake. Therefore, we
reviewed the gathering standard seismic intensity this time, and the standard to independent gathering
of the staffs that specified beforehand changed to seismic intensity 5-upper, and the standard to
independent gathering of all staffs became seismic intensity 6-under.
Securing of restoration constructors and restoration materials
Securing of the constructors engaged in restoration is important to do restoration works

adequately after the earthquake occurs. Therefore, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau has concluded the
agreement with the unit price contract constructors up to now, and has maintained the cooperative
relationships of the emergency restorations. This time, when contracting to the total value contract
constructors, we decided to obligate the restoration cooperation at the earthquakes to do more certain
restoration. Moreover, we assumed that we introduced the method to evaluate not only the price
evaluation but also the responsive capability in the emergency one by one when contracting to the
unit price contract constructors, and improved the incentive of the cooperation at the earthquakes.
On the other hand, the manufacturers secured the restoration materials such as the water pipes by
the agreement of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau and current manufacturers, and the constructors who
restore the damaged facilities procure the restoration materials. In this revision, to secure the
restoration materials surely, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau secures all the restoration materials of the
supply routes such as the capital center organizations. And, the materials for the emergency
restoration of the other routes were secured by the Waterworks Bureau and the manufacturers, and
procurement was decided to doing of the Waterworks Bureau.
41
CONCLUSION
We think that the emergency measures of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau came to have mobile
power and execution power more than before by reviewing this earthquake measures. However, to
behave each staffs according to the plan when the earthquake actually occurs, and to execute the
emergency restoration and the emergency water supply, it is necessary that each office settle on
“Action manual” based on this plan, and make each staff well-know. Moreover, it is necessary that
we make the plan more established. Therefore, we will improve the staff's consideration by the
earthquake measures training, appeal to administrative bodies such as wards and cities, and
appropriate review of plans. (Figure 9)
We think that we must work on the earthquake measures to secure safety and the peace of mind
of the citizen’s life, and to defend the capital center organizations more than before.
Figure 9. Appearance of Training
REFERENCES
[1] The Central Disaster Prevention Council. 2005 “Measures outline of the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area”
[2] Tokyo disaster prevention conference. 2006 “Estimation of the Damage in Tokyo by the Earthquake with an
Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area”
[3] Tokyo Waterworks Bureau. 2005. “The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau”
[4] Tokyo Waterworks Bureau. 2006. “The Plan of Emergency Seismic Measures of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau”
[5] Tokyo Waterworks Bureau. 2006. “The Outline of Waterworks in 2006”
[6] Tokyo Waterworks Bureau. 2006. “The Annual Report of Waterworks in 2005FY”
[7] Tokyo Waterworks Bureau. 2006. “New Facilities Improvement Long Term Conception of Tokyo Waterworks”
42
Seismic Performance Objectives for MLGW Water
Facilities Past, Present and Future
Chandrika Winston, P.E. and Fred Von Hofe, Ph.D., P.E.
In 2006 Memphis Light, Gas and Water (MLGW), the nation’s largest three
service electric, gas and water public utility, hired a team of nationally recognized
engineering consultants to perform a Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment. As part of this risk
assessment, the consultant team was asked to investigate a range of seismic event
scenarios resulting from seismic activity in New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). The
consultant team identified seismic performance objectives used in past MLGW seismic
studies and strengthening/retrofit projects. Performance objectives were then established
for evaluation criteria for the current study and for future seismic strengthening/retrofit
projects. This paper and the associated presentation discuss seismic performance
objectives recommended by the consultant team and accepted by MLGW’s management
for the current evaluation of structural and non-structural elements. It also discusses the
recommended seismic performance objectives to meet MLGW’s goals for new
construction and future seismic strengthening/retrofit projects.
Introduction:
The City of Memphis is earthquake series occurred at Marked

approximately 35 miles from Marked Tree.
Tree, Arkansas, which is located at what
is generally considered to be the Figure 1. USGS NMSZ Seismic Event
southern tip of the New Madrid Seismic Map
Zone as shown in Figure 1. Memphis is
not located in the NMSZ per se and is
not generally considered to be a potential
location/focal point of a major
earthquake or seismic event. However,
Memphis is in the zone of influence of
the NMSZ and major earthquakes in the
NMSZ will impact significantly
Memphis, particularly those occurring
on the southern segment. Events at
Marked Tree are often used as a
benchmark for events that could affect Marked Tree, AR
Memphis since it is located in the area of
the NMSZ closest to Memphis and one
of the major events in the 1811-1812
43
Figure 2. National Seismic Hazard Map
As noted in Figure 2, the 2002 USGS
National Seismic Hazard Map, the
United States Geological Survey
(USGS) has established a level of
seismic hazard in the NMZS and at
Memphis approaching that of the West
Coast. Memphis, TN
Should a major seismic event ever occur in the southern segment of the NMSZ,
water will be a critical issue. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division will be called
upon to provide potable water for human consumption, water for fire suppression, and
water to meet sanitary needs. MLGW has realized the importance of the water system
and for many years has been addressing the water system’s vulnerability to major seismic
events. The water system is highly dependent upon the electrical system which also has
substantial seismic vulnerabilities. MLGW also owns and operates the electrical system
and is addressing electrical system vulnerabilities at the same time water system
vulnerabilities are addressed. However, to insure electricity to meet the electrical
demands of the water plants and well fields an alternative source of electricity must also
be available to provide electricity in the case the electric system is seriously damaged or
destroyed.
History
In 1989 MLGW completed an Emergency Preparedness Study that included a

seismic risk assessment study and seismic mitigation plan prepared by an outside
engineering consultant. As a result of the study, MLGW began to harden all of its major
water plants and well fields. A water plant in MLGW’s system includes a water
treatment plant and pumping station. These first upgrades were those that had a minimal
cost but could yield big dividends in case of a major seismic event. It did not take long
until all of the simple and easy upgrades were accomplished. The next step was to
address major items that were more complex, expensive and time consuming. These fell
into five categories: 1) water plant seismic retrofits, 2) water plant header valves, 3) water
plant emergency generators, 4) water production well dedicated circuits, and 5) water
production well seismic retrofits.
Water plant seismic retrofits included the garage, aerator, filter building, pump
building and equipment. Typical methodology included assessment by an engineering
consultant to determine the feasibility of seismic strengthening/retrofit of the facilities
and equipment. The basic procedure incorporated a review of local geological and
seismological data, existing plans, one or more visits to the site, measurements, and
additional data collection. The collected information was used to make preliminary
calculations for structural and non-structural seismic strengthening/retrofits. These
calculations were used to prepare draft specifications, and preliminary construction plans.
If the study and preliminary information identified the proposed project as feasible, an
engineering consultant was then hired to do final engineering and preparation of
44
construction specifications and construction plans for competitively bidding the
construction of the project. Once a contractor was selected, the engineering consultant
provided construction administration and full time resident inspection of the construction
project.
Water station header valves are used to isolate a facility or part of a facility
without forcing a major shut down. The valves may be remotely or manually operated.
Upgrades to the existing header valves were identified as a needed improvement to insure
that a facility or part of a facility could be isolated from the entire system in case of a
major seismic emergency in a matter of minutes.
Header valve improvements have been in-house design projects. Typically, the
project is designed by an in-house engineer who also prepares the specifications and
construction drawings for the project. The design is reviewed by personnel from the
Water Operations and the Water Distribution Departments. A de-watering plan is
prepared to evacuate the lines in preparation for the construction. The construction is
either contracted or handled internally. A water plant is never totally shut down during a
header valve replacement project. Only one or two header valves are replaced at a time.
Water station emergency generators serve as a back up to the electric distribution
system. A generator provides an electrical supply to high service pumps and select wells
on a dedicated circuit at each individual water plant and well field. Site selection at each
water plant is coordinated with the Water Operations Department. An in-house engineer
is assigned to prepare engineering specifications and construction drawings. The project
is competitively bid and a contractor is selected and awarded a contract for the
construction and installation of the generators and associated fuel tanks. Currently, seven
of MLGW’s eight major water plants have generators. Most are sized at 1500 KW.
However future and replacement generators will be sized at 2000 KW. All generators
use diesel fuel supplied from underground storage tanks (USTs) most with 20,000 gallon
capacity storage tanks.
A dedicated circuit for water production wells is located at each water plant well
field. The dedicated circuitry is a specifically dedicated line from the electric generator
to each of the wells on the circuit. The dedicated circuit is designed and installed to make
sure that the electric motors that drive the deep well vertical turbine pumps have an
adequate electric supply. Approximately ten wells at each well field are on the dedicated
circuit. The design and installation of the dedicated circuit is an in-house project handled
by MLGW’s Electric Distribution Engineering. An in-house engineer is assigned the
project. The existing circuitry is reviewed and design drawings and construction
specifications are prepared. The in-house engineer is responsible for the coordination of
the construction from the generator to each of the wells. Typically an MLGW Electric
Distribution crew will install the dedicated circuitry.
Water production well seismic strengthening/retrofits were necessary to ensure
selected wells will be available to produce water in the case of a major seismic event.
Previously an engineering consultant has been selected to prepare the design. The
engineering consultant focused on the electric well cabinet and the electric well cabinet
foundation. The engineering consultant reviewed local geological data, visited the sites,
took measurements, and collected data. Using the collected information the engineering
consultant performed seismic structural and non-structural calculations. Specifications
and construction plans and drawings were prepared and competitive bids were taken to
45
seismically strengthen/retrofit some existing electric well cabinet and electrical cabinet
foundations. The construction was in most cases administered by an in-house project
engineer.
Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment
In 2006, MLGW’s Executive Management Team decided it was time to

reevaluate the seismic strengthening/retrofits along with the electric gas and water
systems vulnerabilities to other natural hazards (wind, ice, storms and flooding). It was
also determined that an effective study would address not only specific facilities and
components but would also address the water (and gas and electric) systems as a whole,
including interdepencies on other systems such water system dependency on electric
power. A request for proposals was developed for a Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment
study with the following seismic objectives: 1) Evaluate the seismic performance of the
electric, gas and water systems as-is system, 2) recommend measures to improve
MLGW’s systems seismic performance, 3) identify system performance under various
seismic scenarios, 4) develop system restoration curves. A team of nationally known
consultants was hired to perform the study. Information gathering, site visits and data
collections was the initial focus of the engineering consultant teams efforts.
Early in the project it was realized that three of MLGW’s water plants were built
before the 1960’s and that little or no consideration was given to seismic load at the time
they were designed. It was also realized that these plants were the same ones identified
in the first Emergency Preparedness Study as difficult, if at all possible, to seismically
strengthen/retrofit.
A brief review of seismic building code history is appropriate at this time. In 1992
the City of Memphis, for the first time, adopted seismic design requirements - the
Southern Building Code (SBC) with local amendments diminishing the SBC
requirements. In 1995, the City adopted the then current SBC without local amendments
impacting seismic requirements. In 2005, the City of Memphis Adopted the International
Building Code (IBC 2003). IBC 2003 require two-thirds of 2% in 50 years for non-
critical facilities with respect to ground shaking, resulting, as noted in following tables, in
a PGA (peak ground acceleration) of about 0.40 g. IBC also incorporates an importance
factor (a multiplier on design forces of 1.5) for critical facilities. Water treatment plants
and pumping stations that provide water for fire fighting and maintaining water system
pressure are considered critical facilities. The resulting PGA for critical facilities is about
0.60 g.
The goal of the Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment was to evaluate the seismic
performance of the water plants and well fields under three scenario earthquakes or
seismic events at the southern tip of the New Madrid Seismic Zone (Marked Tree, as
noted previously). MLGW’s definition of performance included not only the performance
of individual buildings and components, but also the performance of the system in terms
of level of service to the customers after each of the scenario events. The first scenario
event M6.2 was selected because it represented the lower end threshold event likely to
have an affect on MLGW’s system and customers. The second scenario event selected
was a M7.0 event representing an intermediate earthquake that was likely to have a
significant affect on MLGW’s system and customers. The third scenario M7.7 event was
46
selected to be generally comparable to major events that occurred in the 1811-12 series of
events in the NMSZ and what is generally considered to be a maximum credible event for
the NMSZ.
The consultant was asked to estimate the expected damage to MLGW’s utility system
on a building by building and a component-by-component basis. Using estimated
damage to the system buildings and components, the consultant was requested to estimate
the MLGW’s system performance. The system performance was to be characterized by
expected amount of service available after each scenario and by the system restoration
curves. The system restoration curves are developed to give the rate at which the system
is expected to be restored and are developed from data from previous experience such as
the 100+ mph windstorm Elvis in 2003 which left a major portion of the City without
electrical service for over a week. The second task was to make recommendations to
improve the performance of MLGW’s water systems as well as gas and electric systems
under each scenario. The water system was deemed especially critical because the water
would be needed for fire suppression and a potable supply to meet the human needs of
the community as well as the sanitary needs. Also the consultant was asked to prioritize
the recommended improvements to the system. The idea was to obtain the maximum
amount of benefit for each mitigation dollar spent. Figure 3 shows an overview of the
MLGW Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment. Tasks 1 and 2 were mainly data gathering.
Establishing performance objectives for Task 3 evaluation of component vulnerability is
the subject of this paper. Previous to this study MLGW had used a combination
deterministic and probabilistic approach to seismic studies and seismic
strengthening/retrofits.
Figure 3 Current MLGW Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment Overview

Task 1 Task 2 Task 3
Hazard Evaluation System Operating Evaluate Component
Characteristics Vulnerabilities
Task 4
Evaluate System Performance for
Each Scenario Hazard Event
Task 5a Task 5b
Recommendations for Evaluate Capital Improvement
Specific Components Program Alternatives
47
Four of MLGW’s 8 major water plants have been strengthened/retrofitted using the
previously established performance objectives shown in TABLE I.
TABLE I. Performance Objectives For Previous Seismic Retrofit

M 7.0 (Marked Tree) or 10% in 50 Years Ground Motion
whichever is larger
Building Structural Performance: Immediate

Occupancy
Nonstructural Equipment and Systems:

Operational Level
2% in 50 Years Ground Motion
Building Structural Performance: Life Safety

(To protect occupants)
Nonstructural Equipment and Systems:

Operational Level
Note that these performance objectives are a combination of probabilistic methodology

and deterministic methodology. The use of deterministic methodology vs. probabilistic
methodology was discussed with MLGW’s Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment consultant.
After much consideration it was decided to use the probabilistic approach The
probabilistic approach requires the development of seismic fragility curves that define the
probability of a building or nonstructural component being damaged at any level of
ground shaking. TABLE II gives a comparison of deterministic versus probabilistic
ground shaking.
Table II. Deterministic versus Probabilistic Scenarios

Scenario PGA (g) 0.2 sec (g) 1.0 sec (g)
M 6.2 0.130 0.202 0.069
M 7.0 0.239 0.353 0.189
M 7.7 0.370 0.507 0.384
Probabilistic PGA (g) 0.2 sec (g) 1.0 sec (g)

2% in 50 yrs. 0.590 0.730 0.722
2/3 of 2% in 50 yrs. 0.393 0.487 0.481
5% in 50 yrs. 0.391 0.503 0.356
10% in 50 yrs. 0.249 0.354 0.180
48
For the study MLGW’s consultant used values from the Cramer et al (2004) USGS
seismic hazard data, as the best available from Shelby County. This was done because
the data reflects the influence of Memphis/Shelby County soil effects. The values are
approximate median values for Shelby County. Note 10% in 50 years is generally similar
to but higher than a scenario M7.0 at Marked Tree. Also two thirds of 2 % in 50 year is
similar to and generally a bit higher than the scenario M7.7 scenario ground motion. 2%
in 50 years is much higher than a scenario M7.7 event.
The City of Memphis has adopted the International Existing Building Code 2003
as its existing building code, and has been determined appropriate for use in addressing
seismic retrofits (vs. the requirements of the IBC 2003 – Chapter 34). This is much less
prescriptive than for new construction. Other than in the Federal sector, retrofits are
generally voluntary and are not required with certain exceptions. Generally, seismic
retrofit is not mandated under the City of Memphis Existing Building Code (MEBC
2005) except for change in classification of a building or changes which increase the
force on structural elements by more than 5% - provisions not generally applicable to
MLGW’s systems.
For existing buildings Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 356
provides a number of seismic retrofit options. These include operational performance,
immediate occupancy performance, life safety performance and collapse prevention
performance and several earthquake design levels (50% in 50 years, 20% in 50 years,
10% in 50 years, 2% in 50 years). Seismic retrofit is not necessarily mandated or
required for all buildings or structures not meeting FEMA 356 evaluation parameters. In
some cases it may be more economical to remove the building and replace with a new
building or structure. In other cases the building does not pose any safety threat to
customers or employees. Before undertaking a seismic strengthening/retrofit, some
consideration should be given to the following issues:
1) May not need to be retrofitted if they pose little or no risk to life safety or no risk
to significant loss of customers.
2) Retrofitting existing building to performance levels of new construction may not
be possible even though MEBC 2005 (IBC 2003) permits design to reduced IBC
level seismic forces (i.e.,75% of IBC design load for new construction).
3) Non structural component retrofits are comparable to installation of new
nonstructural components.
4) Retrofits should be made on a case by case basis considering engineering
characteristics, cost of retrofit, importance of the facility, building or
nonstructural components for life safety and /or customer service or system
performance.
TABLE III shows the recommended evaluation criteria for existing MLGW facilities
developed as part of the Multi-Hazard study. TABLE III contains evaluation criteria for
two building categories and two nonstructural categories (non-system and minor and
(major) utility buildings and components).
49
TABLE III. Recommended Evaluation Criteria for Existing MLGW Facilities
Buildings Non-Structural Components
Seismic Hazard Non-system Major Non- System Utility System

Level and Minor Utility Components Components
Utility Buildings
Buildings
Immediate
10 % in 50 Years Life Safety Occupancy Life Safety Operational
2 % in 50 Years Collapse Life Safety Life Safety Operational

Prevention
Figure 4 shows the evaluation methodology that was used to evaluate MLGW’s
existing building and non-structural elements. If both criteria in TABLE III were met,
the building or non-structural element were deemed satisfactory and no retrofit was
needed. If the building or non-structural element failed one or both of the criteria in
TABLE III, the building or non-structural element was a candidate for a seismic retrofit.
The failures were then prioritized based on the risk to life safety and the importance of
each facility to the overall water system operation.
Figure 4. Evaluation Methodology
Evaluation of Existing
MLGW Facilities
Fails One or Both Passes

Evaluation Criteria Both Retrofit
Retrofit May Be Desired: Prioritize Retrofit Not

Possible Retrofits Necessary
Urgent High Priority Moderate Priority Low Priority
50
The prioritization specifically considered water system operating characteristics as well
as demand capacity relationships as well as redundancy. The prioritization was
considered as desired targets for future seismic retrofits not mandates of work that need
to be done.
The Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment consultants’ recommendation for the actual
design bases for seismic strengthening/retrofits to structural and non structural elements
is shown in TABLE IV. The single difference between the evaluation criteria and the
recommended design basis for existing MLGW facilities is life safety for non-system and
minor utility buildings. It is understood that if cost of any of the proposed seismic
retrofits exceeded the replacement cost of a new facility, the new replacement facility
would be constructed. Additionally, if the facility is especially critical and the retrofit
could not achieve the desired performance, a new replacement facility would be the
preferred alternative.
TABLE IV. Recommended Seismic Design Basis Existing MLGW Facilities

Buildings Non-Structural Components
Seismic Hazard Non-system Major Non- System Utility System

Level and Minor Utility Components Components
Utility Buildings
Buildings
Immediate
10% in 50 Years Life Safety Occupancy Life Safety Operational
2% in 50 Years Life Safety Life Safety Life Safety Operational
The scope of work for the Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment did not include
recommendation for new construction. However, new construction design requirements
provide useful comparative tools for the evaluation of existing facilities both structural
and non-structural. The consultants recommendation to MLGW were based on the IBC
2003 seismic design provision and are shown in TABLE V.
51
TABLE V. Recommended Seismic Design Basis For Construction of New Facilities
Facility Type Design Seismic Building Nonstructural Importance
Criteria Hazard Components Factor
Non-system Life Safety Life Safety 1
Buildings IBC 2006 Two-
Utility System and ASCE thirds
Buildings and 7-05 of 2% Immediate Operational 1.25 and
Important Non- in 50 Occupancy 1.5
System Buildings yrs.
Essential Immediate Operational 1.5

Facilities Occupancy
The Multi Hazard Risk Assessment consultant recommended all utility system building
be given an importance of 1.25 and non-structural components an importance factor of
1.5. It was recommended that essential buildings like pumping stations be provided with
an importance factor 1.50 according to the code.
52
References
1) ASCE 7-05: Minimum Design Load for Buildings and Other Structures, American
Society of Civil Engineers.
2) Cramer et al (2004): The Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee Seismic Hazard Maps,
USGS Open File Report (OFR 2004-1924).
3) FEMA 356: Prestandard and Commentary for Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings,

FEMA (2000).
4) MLGW Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment, Seismic Performance Objectives, March 2,
2007.
5) MLGW Seismic Mitigation Plan 2003 for Earthquake Preparedness of Critical Water
System Facilities.
53
Acknowledgements
Quinton Clark P.E., Supervisor Water Engineering, Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Division, Memphis, Tennessee.
Kim Deaton, Senior Communications Specialist, Memphis Light,

Gas and Water Division, Memphis, Tennessee.
Jeffery Embry, P.E., Lead Distribution Engineer, Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Division, Memphis, Tennessee.
Kenneth A. Goettel, Ph.D., Goettel & Associates, Inc, Davis California.
Richard E. Howe, P.E., R. W. Howe & Associates, PLC, Memphis Tennessee.
Charles Truax, P.E., Lead Civil Engineer, Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division,
Memphis, Tennessee.
54
Anti-earthquake Measures
of Chiba Prefectural Waterworks Bureau
Shigeru Hataya
ABSTRACT
The Chiba Prefectural Waterworks Bureau tackles the establishment of initial

organization quickly at an earthquake, deploying the information apparatus, strengthening
facilities against earthquake and the guaranty of water.
In 2,006, using the e-mail function of a cellular phone, the Bureau made "Gathering
Personnel System in Emergency" which will appeal automatically to personnel for
gathering to offices at an earthquake.
In 2,007, the Bureau will make "Damage Information Collection System" which totals
automatically the damages of an earthquake. Moreover, the Bureau will install "Satellite
Radio Apparatus" for disaster prevention as a more strengthening step of means of
communication. In order to supply the power to the offices for power failure, the Bureau
will install "Private Power Generation Equipment".
In order to be able to recover the damages quickly, the Bureau cooperates with the cities
and the villages in a water supply area. In addition, the Bureau concludes the support
agreements with other waterworks entities and private organizations.
Shigeru Hataya, Engineer, Planning Division of Engineering Department, Chiba Prefectural Waterworks
Bureau, 417-24, Makuhari 5-chome, Hanamigawa-ku, Chiba-shi, Japan, 262-0032
55
１．INTRODUCTION
Water supply exists as a vital lifeline supporting civic life and urban activities, charged
with minimizing damage from earthquake disasters, providing immediate emergency water
supply and rehabilitation.
The Waterworks Bureau established its “Interim Management Plan”, its 5-year
management guidelines in 2005, citing the “creating of a water service that can withstand
earthquakes and other emergencies”, and is working to establish an immediate first response
to emergencies, installing and enhancing information communication functions and
providing water, as well as constructing facilities that can endure disasters.
In 2006, the Bureau established its own Emergency Management Response Section in
planning division and completed creation of “Gathering Personnel System in Emergency”
calling for the automatic involvement of personnel when disasters strike.
Then in 2007, the Bureau will develop “Damage Information Collection System” for
automated damage estimates, and it is planning to install “Satellite Radio Apparatus” for
disaster prevention and “Private Power Generation Equipment” to its offices.
The Bureau is also working to strengthen its links with the cities and the villages in water
supply area to ensure proper water supply and rehabilitation when disaster occurs, and is
moving ahead on support arrangements with other waterworks entities and private
institutions.
This paper focuses on explaining new measures relevant to the “Interim Management
Plan”.
２. OVERVIEW OF CHIBA PREFECTURAL WATERWORKS BUREAU
The Bureau were established in Chiba Prefecture in 1934, and currently supply water to
11 cities and 2 towns mainly in the coastal areas facing Tokyo Bay, thus providing water to
a population of around 2.8 million people, with a maximum daily water supply of around
1.0 million m3, making it the 3rd largest water service population-wise in Japan.
The Bureau has 5 water intake facilities, 5 water purification plants and 14 water
pumping stations with the water source of 85% of dependence on reservoirs along the Tone
River and a total of 8,400 km of pipeline extensions (not including water service piping).
３.OVERVIEW OF EARTHQUAKE MEASURES
1) Basic Measures
The Japanese Islands located in the circum-Pacific orogenic zone, is vulnerable to

large-scale earthquakes at any point throughout the country each year from any sea trench
or inland earthquake.
56
The Bureau is charged with strengthening earthquake resistance of facilities, establishing
a deployment system, deploying a communications system and establishing an immediate
emergency water supply and rehabilitation system for earthquake disaster measures based
on lessons learned from the Kobe (Hanshin-Awaji) Earthquake in 1995 and the
Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake two years ago.
2) Anti-earthquake Disaster Measures System
A simple systematizing of basic measures organizes measures into the 5 categories as

shown in attached Figure-1. The basic system design concept is to minimize damage to
water supply facilities and immediately establish a first response system at earthquake
disasters. These 5 categories are illustrated below.
W ater P urification P lants

S trengthen Earthquake
R esistance of Facilities
P ipeline Facilities
M ake M anuals
D evelop Inform ation M eans

E nhance Em ergency
A ctivities
Im plem ent T raining
Disaster M easures
Link w ith R elevant Institutions

Anti-earthquake
Enhance Functions
　of O ffices Install Equipm ent in O ffices
C onstruct D istribution reservoirs
U tilize U nderground W ater S ources

P rpvide E m ergency
W ater S upply
Install W ater S upply Equipm ent
W ater T ransportation S ystem
S tockpile M aterials
K eep Em ergency M aterials
S upply M easures of M aterials
Figure-1 Anti-earthquake Measures System of the Bureau
(1) Strengthen Earthquake Resistance of Facilities
a) Promote strengthening earthquake resistance of water intake facilities, water

purification plants, water pumping stations and pipelines, and establish private power
57
generation equipment for power outages. (91% of facilities earthquake resistant at
present, installed private power generation equipment at all water purification plants
and water pumping stations)
b) Promote to make water distribution blocks smaller in order to minimize water
suspended area and speed up rehabilitation activities. (Blocks from 33 to 62 by 2,010)
(2) Enhance Emergency Activities
a) Determine roles of emergency water supply and rehabilitation and places to gather for
all personnel at earthquake disasters every year after personnel changes, note these on
business card size “Personnel Dispatch Instruction Cards”, and hand these cards to all
personnel.
b) Make activities manual at earthquake disaster, conduct training according to the
manual, check and revise manual and hone the mastery of assigned roles through
earthquake disaster training.
c) Promote the deployment of satellite radio apparatus for information communication
with the prefecture, cities and villages in water supply area, work to maintain and
expand various communications means in the Bureau such as the already-installed
commercial wireless devices and satellite phones, as well as IP phones using network
lines in the Bureau.
Meanwhile, utilize e-mail functions of cellular phones and create an “Gathering
Personnel System in Emergency ” calling for personnel to assemble immediately,
develop a “Damage Information Collection System” for automated estimations of
disaster information and work to enhance information communication functions.
d) Strengthen links with cities and villages in water supply area, conclude support
arrangements with private organizations for receiving support at disasters.
(3) Enhance the Functions of Offices
a) Strengthen earthquake resistance in all bureau offices which are the sites for
emergency activities after earthquake and install private power generation equipment.
b) Install satellite radio apparatus for disaster prevention in all offices as a reliable
information means at earthquake disasters.
c) Install emergency water supply tank to offices for water reservation.
(4) Provide Emergency Water Supply
a) Construct water distribution reservoirs in water purification plants, install emergency

stop valves to water distribution reservoirs for prevention of saved water outflow.
Properly maintain and manage underground water as an emergency water source.
b) Install emergency water supply equipment at 5 water purification plants and 14 water
58
pumping stations.
c) Establish a backup system countering damage to water purification plants, water
pumping stations and main pipelines at earthquake disasters. Develop a program of
automated selection of water transportation route for immediate alternate supply to
back up smoothly damaged plants and pipeline by the other remained facilities.
(5) Keep Emergency Materials for Rehabilitation
a) Disperse and stockpile emergency materials in water purification plants and water
pumping stations , and Makuhari Earthquake Response Warehouse.
b) Conclude materials supply support arrangements with private organizations.
４. MAJOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURES IN INTERIM MANAGEMENT

PLAN
In the earthquake response system of the Bureau, major crisis management measures are
being mapped out as essential measures of the Interim Management Plan, and system
related measures forming the main theme of this workshop are illustrated below.
(1) Create Gathering Personnel System in Emergency
The most important thing in crisis management gets in contact with personnel and
staffs. The concept leading to creating this system is to acquire a communication mean
for ensuring contact with personnel and other staffs during earthquake disasters.
The Bureau is currently focused on the remarkable spread of cellular phones around
the world, which are used daily by people in Japan as a communication mean between
business, home and friends, having considered its use as a communication mean during
earthquake disasters using e-mail functions.
This System is linked to earthquake information announced by the Japan
Meteorological Agency to send e-mails immediately to personnel and other staffs from
system computers before communication regulations are started, call for personnel to
assemble and check on their safety. The assembling of personnel is tracked through
their replies to plan mobilization of personnel for emergency activities.
This system was created in December 2006, trials were completed in January 2007,
and surprise training for information communication was conducted on personnel using
this system in April when favorable communications results were gained.
59
Grasp real-time status of
Countermeasure HQ
personnel participant
Earthquake
Group Nam e Response Date/time Response
Response
No User Nam e
Asc . Dec . Asc. Dec . Asc. Dec . Comment
Nobunaga Planning Dept.,
001 Oda General Affairs
2006/12/31 0:25 Within 30 min On the way
Hideyoshi Planning Dept.,
002 Hashiba General Affairs 2006/12/31 0:32 Within 1 hour Immediately
Mitsuhide Planning Dept.,
003 Akechi General Affairs 2006/12/31 0:33 Within 3 hours Delay in Participation
Screen Image
Internet
Weather
Association Personnel
Participant
System
Personnel’s Cell
Phones
Figure-2 Gathering Personnel System in Emergency
(2) Create Damage Information Collection System
The Bureau will create this system in 2007. Personnel and other staffs report damage
information on water facilities at an earthquake using a cellular phone’s mobile
communications. This system classifies these data according to region, damage type and
scale, and automatically calculates the number of affected locations. Tabulated damage
information is shared with the Earthquake Response Headquarters and the Forward
Command Center which is useful for the planning of emergency water supply and
emergency rehabilitation.
(3) Deploy Satellite Radio Apparatus for Disaster Prevention
Although the Bureau has already deployed a variety of communications equipment

such as IP phones, commercial wireless devices and satellite phones, the satellite radio
apparatus for disaster prevention is the most reliable communication equipment during
disasters. The Bureau will deploy these to strengthen an information communication
mean with the cities and the villages in water supply area.
4 portable satellite radio apparatus for disaster prevention were deployed in 2005, and
the fixed satellite radio apparatus will be installed in all 11 command center office
locations for emergency water supply in 2007.
60
Photo-1 Portable Satellite Radio Apparatus for Disaster Prevention
(4) Deploy Private Power Generation Equipment
Private power generation equipment will be installed in all 11 command center offices
for power outages during disasters. These have been installed to 4 offices by 2006, and
the remaining 7 offices will have this equipment installed in 2007. The private power
generation equipment is diesel engine power which uses light oil as fuel with a power
capacity of 30 KVA to 130 KVA according to the size of the office, and keeps a fuel tank
for 12 hours of operations.
Photo-2 Private Power Generation System
61
(5) Conclude Support Arrangements with Other Organizations
a) Link with Cities and Villages in Water Supply Area
In order to perform immediate, proper emergency water supply during earthquake

disasters, the Bureau needs to link closely with cities and villages in water supply area,
liaison and exchange information in advance; therefore, the Bureau established a
Coordinating Committee with those cities and villages in water supply area in 2004
which meets yearly.
This committee works to coordinate information communication systems, emergency
water supply activities, press releases and other tasks during earthquake disasters.
The Bureau, cities and villages recognized creating a command system and organizing
specific role sharing among them for emergency water supply, when the Disaster
Response Headquarters was established.
The roles of the Bureau are as shown below:
○ Site water supply at water purification plants and water pumping stations
○ Water transport and supply to shelters and important institutions using water
tank trucks
○ Emergency water supply using temporary water supply tap facilities
Municipal mayors are charged with supplying potable water during emergencies in the
“Chiba Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan”.
b) Support System with Other Prefectures
In the event the Bureau finds it difficult to conduct its emergency water supply and
rehabilitation response on its own, the Bureau shall request assistance from other
waterworks entities based on the following agreements.
○ “Mutual Disaster Assistance Agreement” with the Chiba Branch of Japan Water
Works Association”
○ “Mutual Disaster Assistance Agreement" with the waterworks bureaus of Tokyo,
Yokohama City, Kawasaki City and Kanagawa Prefecture
c) Support System with Private Organizations
The Bureau has concluded water supply disaster assistance agreements with private
concerns to equip it for damage.
In order to smooth out emergency activities when disasters occur, the Bureau has
concluded agreements on the supply of recovery materials with the Japan Ductile Pipe
Association and private materials companies, and for rehabilitation construction work
with the Water Piping Construction Cooperative Society and the Construction Work
Association. The Bureau has deployed a support system for disasters.
62
In particular the Bureau has concluded the “Agreement on Water Piping Rehabilitation
at Disasters” with Water Piping Construction Cooperative Society on provision of
support for pipeline patrol, emergency water supply and emergency rehabilitation
activities by the Cooperative Society members, when seismic intensity 5 or greater
earthquake occurs in the water supply area.
In the event the Bureau is requested to send support to the waterworks entities of other
prefectures, the Bureau can request active support on the agreement to the Water Piping
Construction Cooperative Society for a wide array of tasks such as dispatching Society
members in cooperation with the Bureau.
５．CONCLUSION
The postwar baby-boom generation is starting to retire, and organizational downsizing is

advancing along with this. Whether emergency water supply or emergency rehabilitation
activities can be conducted immediately when an earthquake disaster occurs, depends on
whether water supply activities and water leakage repair work can be performed in
everyday work on water suspension and colored water countermeasures.
As experience and technology including emergency responses are passed down to the
next generation, the younger generations must be taught through everyday work and
earthquake disaster training in order to ensure onsite responses, while softening water
transportation system to back up accumulating past accident examples must be created,
support systems for supplementing the lack of experience of younger people established,
earthquake resistance strengthened in order to minimize damage to facilities at an
earthquake, water distribution blocks made to prevent expansion of pipeline damage and
accelerate rehabilitation, and backup facilities deployed countering main facilities damage.
A system from both soft and hard aspects must be established to work on preventive
measures against snowballing damage and the effects therein.
In the event the damage incurred exceeds the response limit of the Bureau, immediate
and intensive emergency water supply and emergency rehabilitation activities should be
conducted through the support received from other municipal waterworks entities and
private organizations. The Bureau makes efforts to install communications, power supply
means and drinking water equipments to offices in order to display many functions as a
command center at an earthquake.
63
64
A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam -
The Case of San Pablo Dam
Elizabeth Z. Bialek1, Fred M. Starr2, and Atta B. Yiadom3
ABSTRACT
San Pablo Dam is a water supply reservoir owned by the East Bay Municipal Utility District
(EBMUD). The dam was constructed between 1917 and 1921 and is composed entirely of
hydraulic fill with a clay “puddle” core. The materials for the fill were obtained from the
abutments and consisted of mudstones, siltstones, sandstones and shales containing a
considerable amount of clayey materials. The dam is 170 feet high with the crest at elevation
329 feet and the spillway at elevation 314 feet providing 15 feet of freeboard.
Previous seismic evaluations had indicated that improvements were necessary, and therefore
buttress fills at the downstream and upstream slopes were constructed. Placement of a buttress
fill at the upstream slope of the dam in 1980 has increased the dam width from 50 feet to 125
feet. The dam has a crest length of 1200 feet. In 2002, the State of California Division of Safety
of Dams (DSOD) requested the District to again reanalyze the seismic stability of San Pablo
Dam, among other dams owned by EBMUD. The result of the analysis concluded that the dam
could be subjected to large deformations due the liquefaction susceptibility of the foundation and
embankment materials.
Several alternatives were evaluated for the seismic retrofit of the dam including removal and
replacement of large portions of the liquefiable materials. Preferred alternatives that would
allow the continued use of the reservoir were given higher priority. These included in-place
improvement of a portion of the foundation material and a buttress fill at the downstream toe to
limit seismic deformations. In order to ensure a continued water supply and less disruption to
the environment and recreation, in-place improvement techniques were selected. Analyses are
under way to finalize design of an upgrade, with improvements to the hydraulic fill dam
foundation through cement deep soil mixing (CDSM) or slurry walls using cement medium
strength material (CMSM).
INTRODUCTION
San Pablo Dam is a water supply reservoir owned by the East Bay Municipal Utility District
(EBMUD). EBMUD is a publicly owned utility formed under the Municipal Utility District Act
passed by the California Legislature in 1921. The Act permits formation of multipurpose
government agencies to provide public services on a regional basis. In accordance with the Act's
provisions, voters in the area created EBMUD in 1923 to provide water service. EBMUD
1. Engineering Manager, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California

2. Senior Civil Engineer, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California
3. Associate Civil Engineer, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California
65
supplies water to about 1.3 million people in parts of Alameda and Contra Costa counties on the
eastern side of San Francisco Bay in Northern California.
EBMUD’s primary water source is the Mokelumne River. The Mokelumne River watershed is
on the west slope of the Sierra Nevada and is generally contained within national forest or other
undeveloped lands. The water is stored at Pardee and Camanche Reservoirs in the foothills of
the Sierra Nevada mountains in eastern California. Water from Pardee Reservoir is carried 90
miles by three aqueducts, and the portion of the water not immediately treated is stored in local
terminal reservoirs, including San Pablo Reservoir. The terminal reservoirs provide emergency
storage which would be critical in case of a problem with the aqueducts. These reservoirs are
also needed to meet normal summertime demands, when the Pardee supply by itself is
insufficient. EBMUD operates 6 water treatment plants, has over 4,000 miles of potable (treated
water) distribution and transmission pipes, 13 local tunnels, 175 potable water reservoirs, and
130 pumping plants to constitute the backbone of the water system.
EBMUD’s service area and water supply is shown in the figure below:
FIGURE 1: EBMUD Service Area and Water Supply
66
SAN PABLO DAM AND RESERVOIR
San Pablo Dam has a capacity of 38,600 acre-feet, and the reservoir has a surface area of 834
acres and a shoreline length of about 14 miles. The reservoir serves four water supply functions:
emergency standby storage, regulation of Mokelumne water supply, conservation/storage of
local runoff and raw water supply for two water treatment plants. In addition, it provides flood
control benefits to the downstream community and provides recreation opportunities such as
fishing, boating, picnicking, nature study, horse riding, and hiking. A view is shown below in
Figure 2:
FIGURE 2: View of San Pablo Dam and Reservoir
The dam was constructed on San Pablo Creek between 1917 and 1921, prior to the formation of
EBMUD, by the People’s Water Company. It was formed almost entirely as a hydraulic fill with
a clay “puddle” core. The materials for the fill were obtained from the abutments and consisted
of mudstones, siltstones, sandstones and shales containing a considerable amount of clayey
materials. Using hydraulic jets, the materials were washed from the hills, transported
hydraulically to the deposition site via open flume viaducts. (Figure 3 shows the construction of
the dam.) The deposits were sloped to facilitate the migration of the finer-grained sediments
toward the middle of the embankment to form the puddle core for the dam. A cutoff trench,
approximately 10 feet wide and centered about 50 feet downstream of the embankment
centerline, was excavated to bedrock and backfilled with clayey material before the hydraulic fill
process started. The embankments were founded on alluvial sediments and colluvial materials
associated with San Pablo Creek drainage and landslide materials along the creek banks. The
alluvial deposits range up to 100 feet thick in some areas.
67
FIGURE 3: Construction of San Pablo Dam
The dam is 170 feet high with the crest at elevation 329 feet and the spillway at elevation 314
feet providing 15 feet of freeboard. Placement of a buttress fill at the upstream slope of the dam
in 1979 has increased the dam width from 50 feet to 125 feet. The dam has a crest length of
1200 feet. The upstream has a slope of 4 horizontal to 1 vertical. The downstream has a slope of
about 2 horizontal to 1 vertical. As a result of seismic stability evaluations over the years, a
buttress fill was placed at the downstream toe in 1967 and the core of the dam was extended
about 3 feet above the spillway elevation, and an upstream buttress was placed in 1979. A
typical dam cross section is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: San Pablo Dam Typical Cross Section
68
SEISMIC SETTING
San Pablo Dam is in the seismically active area along the North American-Pacific plate boundary
where the San Andreas Fault zone acts as the active transform system of shears between the
plates. Significant active faults that could produce ground shaking to potentially affect the
reservoir include the San Andreas, Hayward, Calaveras, Concord, and Mount Diablo (thrust)
faults. The closest fault is the Hayward Fault, which lies less than 2 miles (3 kilometers) west of
the site, and is capable of producing a Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) of moment
magnitude 7.25. The other major fault is the San Andreas Fault, which lies about 20 miles to the
west, and is capable of an MCE of moment magnitude 8.
FIGURE 5: Map of Regional Seismicity (USGS 2002)
San Pablo Dam
In 2002, the Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities under the auspices of the
United States Geological Survey concluded that there is a 62 percent probability of a strong
earthquake (magnitude greater than 6.7) striking the greater San Francisco Bay Region over the
next 30 years (2003-2032). As a result of this information and in response to the ever evolving
field of earthquake engineering, EBMUD has completed several seismic studies of its dams. The
history of seismic evaluations of San Pablo Dam is outlined in the next section.
HISTORY OF SEISMIC STUDIES
EBMUD started to review the seismic design of its embankment dams in the 1960s. Following
subsurface investigations and laboratory testing, pseudo-static analyses of the dam by Shannon
and Wilson Consultants concluded that the dam was essentially stable but recommended that the
impervious puddle core be extended at least 3 feet above the maximum water level and that a
buttress fill be placed at the downstream face of the dam to improve slope stability of the toe.
69
The recommendations were constructed in 1967. The buttress fill is 35 feet high to elevation 235
feet and about 150 feet wide at the top.
Following the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, the District again performed seismic analyses of
its major embankment dams including San Pablo Dam. The analysis performed by Woodward-
Lundgren and Associates concluded that substantial settlement and lateral deformation of the
upstream slope of the dam could occur during a major seismic event. The analysis and
conclusions at that time relied primarily on laboratory cyclic triaxial testing measurements to
determine the seismic strength of the materials to withstand the earthquake loading. The report
recommended that an earthfill buttress be placed on the upstream slope of the dam to increase the
seismic stability. The reservoir was drained and the upstream buttress was constructed and
keyed into bedrock in 1980.
In 2002, the State of California Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) requested the District to
again reanalyze the seismic stability of San Pablo Dam, along with other dams owned by
EBMUD. The request was driven by advances in knowledge of earthquake ground motions,
current field investigation methodologies to characterize the materials that comprise the dam, the
nature of the dam construction (in this case, being a hydraulic fill dam), and by the proximity of
the dam with respect to major seismic sources (Hayward and San Andreas Faults). As a result of
this request, an updated seismic study was completed in 2004.
2004 SEISMIC ANALYSES AND ALTERNATIVES
The 2004 seismic analyses assumed that the hydraulic shells and the alluvium/colluvium
foundation soils would liquefy (a common problem in typical hydraulic fill dams), resulting in an
estimated 35 feet of maximum deformation for the downstream slopes. The improvements
constructed in 1980 at the upstream slopes limited upstream deformations to less than 2 feet.
EBMUD immediately lowered the maximum reservoir level by 20 feet to provide at least 35 feet
of freeboard and embarked on a plan to evaluate alternatives to strengthen the dam. The results
of the 2004 seismic stability analyses are shown below:
FIGURE 6: 2004 Seismic Stability Analyses Results
70
The alternatives evaluated included removal and replacement of much of the downstream
embankment and foundation soils; several combinations of in-place improvement of the
foundation soils and building larger downstream buttress fill to replace the existing smaller
downstream buttress.
The removal and replacement option would have required the EBMUD to build a 5-mile long
temporary pipeline to provide uninterrupted water service to its customers. The pipeline cost
would also substantially increase the project cost and add to environmental impacts along the
pipeline route.
FIGURE 7: San Pablo Dam Replacement Alternative
Existing Outline Reservoir Level
Existing Embankment
Rebuilt Embankment
Foundation Alluvium
EBMUD decided to focus on alternatives that would allow the reservoir to be operational while
constructing the improvements. This way, some level of water supply could be maintained, and
impacts to the environment and recreation could be minimized. The selected alternative to
improving the hydraulic fill dam built on a very thick liquefiable alluvium/colluvium included
the in-place improvement of a section of the foundation soils, and building a larger buttress fill to
confine the hydraulic fill shell zone at the downstream end. The larger buttress fill was designed
to confine and resist slope movement of the liquefied shell materials.
FIGURE 8: Preferred Alternative: In-Place Ground Improvement of Foundation Alluvium

Existing Outline Reservoir Level
Proposed Buttress
Existing Embankment
In-place
Improvement Foundation Alluvium
Zone
The in-place improvement technique considered during the conceptual design phase is a cement
deep soil mixing (CDSM) method. The foundation soils will be improved by mixing in-place of
the foundation soils with cement grout using large (3- to 5-foot-diameter) mixing augers. The
augers are equipped with paddles along the shafts and grout injection ports at the tips. As the
augers are advanced into the soil, cement grout is pumped through the hollow stem of the shafts
and injected into the soil at the shaft tips. After withdrawal of the augers, overlapping soil-
cement columns remain in the ground. The improved columns will not be susceptible to
liquefaction and there will be an increase in the shear strength of the improved soils. In this way,
the foundation soils can be improved in place rather than replaced.
71
The photo below shows typical CDSM construction equipment, which was used for the pilot
testing at San Pablo..
FIGURE 9: Typical CDSM Equipment
2006 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES AND DESIGN OF UPGRADES
Once the in-place improvement alternative was selected, final design began in 2006.
Supplemental investigations were conducted as part of the effort to complete the design details.
Supplemental subsurface investigations using 1) rotary wash test borings with Shelby and Pitcher
Barrel samplers and Standard Penetration test soundings, 2) cone penetrometer soundings, and 3)
laboratory index tests, showed that the hydraulic fill materials were not susceptible to
liquefaction and were in fact very clayey due to the sources of the fill. Typical hydraulic fill
dams consist of loosely deposited granular materials. However, this was not the case for San
Pablo Dam. The surrounding native soils and soft rock materials are clayey in nature, and thus
although hydraulically placed, were fundamentally fine-grained soils. Because of the source of
the material, the embankment shell materials consist of over-consolidated clayey soils that over
time have become further compacted. This was verified by visual inspection of the samples
72
taken during the most recent investigation and further validated by strength and index testing.
Furthermore, a seepage analysis backed by field permeability tests confirmed that the shell zones
have very low permeabilities consistent with their clayey nature.
The current study also investigated the condition of the foundation soils. The embankment is
underlain by alluvium and colluvium up to 100 feet thick. The alluvium/colluvium is composed
of both fine-grained and coarse-grained zones that will behave differently under seismic loading.
The fine-grained zones, which represent a large portion of the soils underlying the dam, have a
low potential for liquefaction. However, the coarse-grained portion, which represents a smaller
portion of the soil underlying the dam, will likely be subject to pore-pressure increases and
liquefaction during seismic loading. Both the 2004 and 2006 analyses concluded that while most
of these soils were fine-grained and not susceptible to liquefaction, there were enough
liquefaction susceptible zones that required a parametric analysis treating the alluvium/colluvium
as potentially liquefiable. The seepage analysis results also showed that the alluvium/colluvium
in general has high permeability and that the coarse-grained zones may be continuous.
Based on these findings, the 2006 analyses showed lower downstream deformation than the
previous analysis and the conclusion was that there was no need for a much larger buttress fill as
initially designed to confine liquefiable zones within the shell. The exact size of the new buttress
fill is now being optimized. Again, it will be founded on alluvium that has been improved using
in-place foundation improvement methods. Although the foundation materials do not have the
wide-spread liquefaction potential that was previously assumed, they represent heterogeneous
native materials that would ordinarily be removed in modern dam construction. Therefore, the
alluvium soils we be improved to more conservatively prevent downstream lateral spreading of
the liquefiable zones within the rest of the alluvium and also limit dam crest deformations.
During final design, two in-place methods emerged as being most suitable for the existing
foundation soils. The two methods are: The CDSM method identified during the conceptual
design phase (described previously) and cement medium strength material (CMSM)
improvement method. CMSM uses the slurry trench method to build walls within the
alluvium/colluvium. Vertical walls are first excavated to the design depth by using bentonite
slurry mixture to support the trench walls and to prevent movement of groundwater into the
trench. CMSM backfill is a lean ready-mix concrete that contains chemical admixtures to
modify performance properties of flow, set, permeability and strength and is tremied into the
trench to form a wall. This method allows better control of the strength of the wall.
To evaluate the actual performance of each method and to more reliably estimate the final in-situ
strength of the improved soils, pilot tests of the methods were performed during the design
phase. The CDSM pilot test consisted of using 2 different cement factors (weight of cement per
volume of treated material) and water to cement ratios to construct several wall sections.
73
FIGURE 10: San Pablo Dam CDSM Test Section
The CMSM pilot test consisted of constructing one wall section to obtain a 28-day mix
compressive strength of at least 600 psi. Both methods were expected to penetrate at least 3 feet
into the bedrock (with depths ranging from 50 to about 100 feet). The drill rig for the CDSM
method had no difficulty in reaching the 3 feet embedment. The backhoe for the CMSM method
was able to penetrate 2 feet into bedrock before reaching refusal. The CDSM columns and the
CMSM walls were cored full depth to confirm adequate improvement in the alluvium/colluvium
and bedrock. Cores are being stored to test for their 28-day and 56-day strengths (results not
available at the time of writing this paper).
74
FIGURE 11: San Pablo Dam CMSM Slurry Trench Test Section
NEXT STEPS
The results of the pilot tests will help optimize the foundation improvement design in terms of
CDSM column layout and CMSM wall spacing and overall size of the improvement zone. The
buttress fill will be supported by the improved alluvium/colluvium and will be designed to be
high enough to limit shallow slope deformations in the hydraulic fill. It is anticipated that final
design will be completed by the Fall of 2007. Project construction is scheduled for the Spring of
2008 and will continue until 2010.
75
76
MANUAL FOR IMPROVEMENT OF
OVER AGED RESERVOIRS WITH STEEL PLATE
Nobuhiro Hasegawa, Takahiro Yabuguchi, Toshio Imai
ABSTRACT
The publication of the “Manual for improvement of over aged reservoirs with steel plate” 1)in
Japan is a result of a joint research by the Japan Water Works Association (JWWA) and the Japan
Water Steel Pipe Association (WSP).
In recent years, it is becoming more important to carry out proper maintenance work on a water
supply system which requires stability and continuity for operational management.
Most water supply systems in Japan that were constructed and/or extended in the 1960’s are now
in the stage of reconstruction, rehabilitation or repair.
Therefore, many Waterworks Bureaus are doing their best to prolong the life of their respective
water supply systems with minimum cost and without stopping the daily supply of water.
Many reservoirs such as sedimentation basin, filter, pure water tanks in water purification plants
and distributing reservoirs in water supply areas are recognized as key facilities in a water supply
system. These key facilities however are over age such that rehabilitation or reconstruction is
needed.
If seismic assessment is conducted on these systems, many facilities might be retrofitted or
reinforced to comply with seismic requirements.
Several methods to improve reservoirs’ performance with steel plate are introduced in this
manual. This is a prospective technology to improve the resistance to earthquakes and to prolong
the life of deteriorated facilities in the near future.
This report summarizes the manual for maintenance, investigation, and diagnosis with typical
examples of improvement (repair, rehabilitation, etc.) methods for over aged reservoirs.
_____________
Nobuhiro Hasegawa, Pipeline Engineer, Water Pipeline Department, JFE Engineering Corporation,
2-1 Suehiro, Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 230-8611 (hasegawa-nobuhiro@jfe-eng.co.jp)
Takahiro Yabuguchi, Pipeline Engineer, Water Pipeline Department, JFE Engineering Corporation,
2-1 Suehiro, Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 230-8611 (yabuguchi-takahiro@jfe-eng.co.jp)
Toshio Imai, Manager, Water Pipeline Department, JFE Engineering Corporation,
2-1 Suehiro, Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 230-8611 (imai-e-toshio@jfe-eng.co.jp)
77
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 The state of aqueduct facilities in Japan
In June 2004, Water Supply Division, Health Service Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare came out “Waterworks Vision”, which suggests the policy for what the Japanese water
supply services in the future should be. Among the measure goals which the water supply systems
should be achieved in “Waterworks Vision”, main issues concerning about key facilities, they are
located at upper positions in the water supply systems and also very influential in the case of
disaster, such as sedimentation basin, filter, treated water reservoir and service reservoir are as
follows;
1) Promoting appropriate renewal of waterworks facilities, and ratio of deterioration facilities,
which need renewal at once, should be zero.
2) Ratio of earthquake-resistant facilities among key facilities such as the filter and the purification
plant should be 100%.
3) Especially, they should be achieved as soon as possible in the area that the serious effect of
“Tonankai Earthquake” is estimated.
4) Target period of above issues makes 10 years in general.
Although, many of these reservoirs constructed in 1960’s are Pre-Stressed Concrete (PC) or
Reinforced Concrete (RC) and became too old, renewal of these facilities are not carried out
because of the financial aspects. As the result, many of water supply systems holds serious problems
such as the decrease of safety against disaster like earthquake and increase of maintenance cost for
the deteriorated facilities.
Below, example of the troubles that accompanies the deterioration of the reservoirs is shown.
Figure 1 shows the example of water leak from crack and Figure 2 shows the example of the
concrete exfoliation due to the corrosion of the reinforcing steel rod in at the ceiling. As these
examples, structural strength of concrete reservoir is gradually decreasing with the crack initiation
and the corrosion of reinforcing rods.
Figure 1. Water leak from crack Figure 2. The corrosion of the reinforcing steel rod
The Japan Water Steel Pipe Association (WSP) executed the questionnaire survey result vis-à-vis
the domestic water works utilities, shown the Figure 3 Among 160 reservoirs as subjects of this
survey, the facilities that elapse 40 years and more after constructed is entire 1/3, the facilities that
elapse 30 years and more is entire 2/3, then it may be inferred that most of reservoirs are in severe
78
situation with deterioration. In addition, the utilities, which are worried about leak of water because
of deterioration, are 32% and the utilities that fear seismic performance are entire 56%.
1.2 Purpose of manual compilation
As description above, many of the reservoirs for the water supply in our country are deteriorating,
in spite into either many water works utilities are feeling insecurity in seismic performance of them,
reconstruction have not progressed because of the restriction of public finance. It is really important
to improve deteriorated water supply facilities suitably as soon as possible to keep their adequate
performance and safety for from the viewpoint of “guaranty of stable water supply”, that is a
mission of water supply utilities, simultaneously, it is useful for decreasing of life cycle cost (LCC)
too.
Then, JWWA and WSP made a collaborative research about this theme. The results of this
research were collected and published as the manual that contains maintenance method,
investigation method and evaluation method of the deteriorated reservoirs. Furthermore, this manual
contains improvement method with the steel plate that is the most familiar structural material for us.
1.3 Merits of the improvement with using the steel plate
Various materials and construction methods are utilized as a rehabilitation method and/or
improvement method for the concrete structure. However, the prevention from water leak and the
high seismic performance are required for the reservoirs originally. Therefore, we paid attention to
the steel plate that is most familiar for us as the material for the improvement of the deteriorated
reservoirs.
Merits in utilization of the steel plate are as follows;
1)Superior toughness and seismic performance can be obtained in the construction of reservoir
because steel works easily.
2)Because it is assembled with welding, high water tightness is guaranteed.
3)There is superior spatial guaranty characteristic in inside and outside the reservoir that can make
the component thickness thin in comparison with the concrete and such.
4) By using the stainless steel, both maintenance free conversion and reduction of LCC are possible.
55
50
45
40
Number
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
(1905) (1915) (1925) (1935) (1945) (1955) (1965) (1975) (1985) (1995) (2005)
The number of the aging

（CE）
Figure 3. Distribution of the number of the aging of the reservoirs
79
Material Shape and cell number
Steel
5
cylindrical
PC (single-cell)
35 38
RC Rectangle
(multi-cell) Rectangle
115 (single –cell)
95
22
Structure classification
Yes
32％ No Yes
No 44％ 56％
68％
The concern of the leak of water The concern of the leak of water
(When a big earthquake occurs)
Figure 4. The present conditions of the reservoirs
1.4 Definition of terminology
Main terminologies used in this manual are rearranged in Table 1. The subject “improvement” is
used as the general term that includes repair, rehabilitation and renewal. The improvement method
should be selected according to the structural condition and other factors.
80
Table 1. Definition of main terminologies
Terminology Definition
Functional evaluation To appraise the functional state of the structure.
Repair To recover or improve the resistance against the deterioration of the structure.
Rehabilitation To recover or improve the structural strength and the stiffness of the structure.
Renewal To re-install higher quality with abolishing function of the facilities or

structure which decrease the performance.
Improvement General term including of repair, rehabilitation and renewal.
Repair To recover until the proper condition or the original form with adding the
hand to the components which decrease the performance.
Below, it introduces concerning the contents of the manual, which is the research result.
2. MAINTENANCE AND EVALUATION OF RESERVOIRS
2.1 Maintenance procedure of reservoirs
Figure 5 shows the flow diagram of the Check

maintenance procedure for the reservoirs.
Maintenance work is classified into the daily no Disorder（Leak,
maintenance work and the improvement Transformation）
activity. In the former work, it includes a yes Daily maintenance work
periodic inspection, which is previously Is maintenance yes
planed with proper period and contents, and possible by repair?
cause investigation and repair when it is Repair
no
recognized that there is slight abnormal
phenomenon such as minute leak of water etc. no Is there concern of the
In the latter work, it is the activity which functional decline?
should execute when remarkable change such yes Setting of aim
as an occurrence of large crack or
Function diagnosis
deformation of the structure etc. by periodic Improvement activity
inspection. It includes (1) the evaluation of
no Does the diagnosis result
the facility with investigation in detail and
need improvement?
examination about structural strength, (2) the
design and planning of some measures based yes
on the required function and level of the END Improvement
facility, LCC, and their possibilities, (3)
improvement with appropriate method after Figure 5. Maintenance procedure
comparing plural alternatives.
With this manual we have described in detail concerning especially latter works.
2.2 Evaluation of reservoirs’ performance
1) Purpose of evaluation
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Evaluation of reservoirs’ performance is the activity that has the purpose to judge if it needs the
improvement or not. It can classify the standard evaluation method and the detailed investigation
method. At the time of the execution of the evaluation, it is necessary to make clear the target level
of structural function and to give coherence in maintenance.
2) Standard evaluation and detailed investigation
With this manual, the method is based on "Renewal Guide for Water Facilities" 2) of the JWWA
as standard diagnostics. Eq.-1 can be used to appraise the physical condition of distributing
reservoir. The diagnostic result with the score is shown in Table 2.
S = ( S Y × S N × S σ × S L × S S × S C )1 / 6 (Eq-1)
Where,
S : Physical appraisal score of the structure.
SY: Converted score from the degree of decrepitude of the structure.
SN: Carbonation score of the concrete.
Sσ: Compression strength score of the concrete.
SL: Converted score from the reservoir’s leak ratio.
SS: Converted score from the seismic intensity of facility.
SC: Capacity score of the reservoir.
Table 2. Physical appraisal score and appraisal contents

Score Appraisal contents
76 - 100 Good condition.
51 - 75 Allowable condition. However, it is necessary to improve and to strengthen the weak point.
26 - 50 Bad condition. Deliberate renewal is necessary.
0 - 15 Terrible condition. It is necessary to renew urgently.
On the other hand, detailed investigation is the activity when it is necessary to get more
information to decide the measure or it is obvious that improvement is necessary from the results of
standard evaluation. It is constituted from the individual jobs such as preliminary investigation,
simple deterioration diagnosis, cause presumption of deterioration, estimation of seismic
performance and evaluation for required efficiency. The results of these activities are not only used
for the final decision about the necessity of improvement but also used for the selection of the best
measure for improvement.
In this report, only the seismic evaluation is described in detail and the others are neglected.
2.3 Seismic evaluation of the reservoir
Seismic evaluation of the reservoir is done as a part of performance evaluation. Seismic

evaluation has 2 types; one is the simple method that is executed as a part of standard evaluation,
which is based on the information that the water works utilities have generally, and the other one is
the evaluation which is based on the result of detailed investigation of deterioration and numerical
verification of seismic strength. In this manual, the former method is called “Simple seismic
evaluation”, and the latter is called “Detailed seismic evaluation”
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Simple seismic evaluation estimates the value of seismic performance of the facilities relatively
or conceptually, it cannot estimate the value of whether the whole and the component structure of
the individual facility possessing some seismic performance or whether some part how strength it is
insufficient. Detailed seismic evaluation is executed in such case.
1) Simple seismic evaluation of individual facility
Concerning the simple seismic evaluation procedure of the individual facility, it conforms to the
method stipulated with "Renewal Guide for Water Facilities" of JWWA. With this method, we can
easily classify the seismic performance level of the facility using the degree of seismic score (SS)
according to its seismic design level shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Degree of seismic quantitative evaluation method of facilities

Level of seismic design Degree of seismic score (SS) (point)
Almost no seismic design is considered. 25
Seismic design is executed as the seismic level corresponds to
50
the horizontal seismic coefficient 0.2.
75
ground motion level 1, criticality rank A
100
ground motion level 2, criticality rank A
* The seismic performance level of the facility is evaluated as a score on a maximum scale of 100 points.
2) Detailed seismic evaluation of individual facility
As for detailed seismic evaluation of the individual facility, it executes seismic verification that
conforms to the seismic design method shown by “Seismic Design Code of Water Facilities”
(JWWA) 4) from the investigated data such as ground condition, material characteristic and
structural details. Regardless of seismic design method, it is required that the facility would sustain
no damage against the ground motion level 1. On the other hand, against the ground motion level 2,
the facility should keep its performance and the damage on the facility should be restricted as a
slight level.
a) The method due to seismic coefficient method

The seismic verification with seismic coefficient method is applied to the reservoir on the ground.
In this method, it seeks horizontal seismic intensity for design in ground motion level 1 from
standard horizontal seismic intensity at the center of structure and correction coefficient classified
by area. In addition, it calculates horizontal seismic intensity for design in ground motion level 2
from standard horizontal seismic intensity at the center of structure, natural period of ground and
structural property coefficient in ground motion level 2.
As for each ground motion level 1 and 2, it calculates earthquake dynamic water pressure and
force of inertia according to horizontal seismic intensity, and it executes verification for stress in
each element and for possibility of reservoir’s overturning.
b) The method due to seismic deformation method

The seismic verification with seismic deformation method is applied for the underground
reservoir. With the method due to seismic deformation method, it seeks the ground horizontal
displacement amplitude in ground motion level 1 from the response spectrum of velocity, natural
83
period of surface ground, horizontal seismic intensity for design of the design basis surface and
thickness of surface ground in ground motion level 1. In addition, it seeks the ground horizontal
displacement amplitude in ground motion level 2 from the response spectrum of velocity, natural
period of surface ground and thickness of surface ground in ground motion level 2.
Seismic strength of the reservoir is evaluated for both ground motion level 1 and level 2, by using
structural model shown in Figure 6.
Force of inertia Force of inertia

Ground spring
Displacement amplitude
(forced displacement)
Hydrostatic pressure
Dynamic water pressure
Figure 6. model of seismic coefficient method Figure 7. model of seismic deformation method
The structural strength of reservoir’s foundation also should be checked. For the structural
evaluation of reservoir’s foundation, it is necessary to make a structural analysis with referring
“Seismic Design Code for Water facilities”(JWWA) based on the data such as the type of
foundation and the property of surrounding ground. In addition, when the improvement of reservoir
is done with using the steel plate, the dead load to act the foundation increases slightly. It is a rare
case that the additional load makes a problem, because the increase amount of load is very small in
comparison with the load of existing reservoir and containing water. However, according to the
result of verification of the foundation, when it becomes insufficient, it needs to examine the
rehabilitation measure of the foundation as soil improvement or additional piling.
2.4 Final decision for measure of improvement
The final decision about the necessity of reservoirs’ improvement should be executed based on
the consideration about several factors on basis of viewpoint as waterworks utilities such as the
balance of the total water supply system, the improvement priority of this facility, business
environment, cost performance of improvement and social needs.
The way of thinking about the comprehensive decision is introduced in “Renewal Guide for
Waterworks Facilities” (JWWA). The summary of this technique is shown in Table 4.
After the final decision that the improvement is necessary for the facility is made, the selection of
the optimum improvement method should be executed. In order to select the optimum method,
confirmation of the purpose of improvement and establishment of the target level are necessary at
first phase. And then, planning of several alternatives for improvement should be executed. The
final selection of the best improvement method is executed by comparing of these alternatives from
the view of cost performance and their possibility.
There are many alternatives as the improvement method from the view of using materials. For
example, steel plates, cement mortar, resin mortar, rubber and paint are available for improvement
of the reservoir. In this manual, we picked up the large-scale improvement methods with steel
because of the aforementioned reason.
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Table 4 Comprehensive decision technique
Renewal Guide for Waterworks Facilities (JWWA)
Appraisal of facility renewal is to examine the positioning of renewal as a judgment of
Basis necessity of renewal due to the physical characteristic of waterworks facilities and as
waterworks utilities.
To advance renewal works, it is necessary to make standard of measuring effect and
Additional
estimating criticality appraisal after grasping what the consumers want, what is important
factors for
they think and whether they are satisfied vis-à-vis waterworks utilities in advance.
decision
Priority It does the sequencing of renewal by estimating and deciding “the importance of the
waterworks facilities” and “the effect of renewal” etc, based on these items of information.
Comprehensive physical appraisal score（point）
100
Good condition
XII XI X
75
Necessary of reinforcement with
improving the weak point
IX VIII VII
50
Bad condition.
Deliberate renewal is necessary.
VI V IV
25
Terrible condition.
III II I It is necessary to renew urgently.
0 30 70 100
small middle big
Appraisal criticality（point）
* The Arabic figureures show priority
1)Appraisal as an aqueduct business
・To decide criticality of the aqueduct facility which becomes the renewal object from the
table
・To decide Fixed quantity appraisal renewal precedence from the Figureure
・To examine alternative characteristic of the facility
Procedure of ・To examine he effect of renewal front and back
the final 2)Solution of technical problem
decision ・To examine water supply guaranty circumstance during renewal period
・To examine renewal method
3)To examine problem with respect to public finance
4)To examine correspondence as an organization
5)To examine harmony as an aqueduct business
Over-all judgment renewal with above.
3． THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE RESERVOIRS WITH STEEL PLATE
Table 5 shows several improvement methods with steel plate.
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Table 5. Measures and improvement methods with steel plate
Kind of measures Purpose Improvement method
Repair Repair of leakage Coating with stainless steel plate:
Type-1
Above + Coating with stainless steel plate:
Deterrence against deterioration Type-2
Rehabilitation Above + Coating with stainless steel plate:
Seismic reinforcement Type-3
Renewal Above + Pluralization of the reservoir Tank in tank method
Tank out tank method
Repair of leakage, Seismic reinforcement
Donut tank method
& Increasing capacity
Replacement 1) Steel tank
2) Stainless steel tank
3.1 Coating with stainless steel plate
Figure 8 shows an example of improvement method by coating with stainless steel plate from the
inside of the reservoir. There are 3 types of improvement methods as shown in Table 5, suitable
type can be selected as the condition of the reservoir, the purpose of improvement and the financial
condition of waterworks utilities, etc.
This method is very economical and also ecological because it arrows re-use of the existing
reservoir.
Furthermore, the improved structure requires minimum maintenance by coating with stainless
steel, and it would be able to reduce the maintenance cost in the future.
1）Coating with stainless steel plate:Type-1
This method, shown in Figure 8 is applied for repair of the reservoir. Purpose of improvement
with this method is to prevent water leakage from existing reservoir. Structural strength depends on
the existing reservoir, because the effect of reinforcement is not expected with this method. As
shown in Figure 9, the thin stainless steel plates are fixed by pins of the machine casting in the
existing service reservoir inside and are joined along superposition point of stainless steel plate by
fillet welding. In addition, the casting pin zone realizes security of the water tightness and
adaptation to the heat shrinkage because fillet welds cover cap circumference in a stainless steel pin
cap.
Gas Area
Fillet Weld
Liquid Area Stainless Pin + Pin Cap

Thin Stainless Plate
86
Figure 8. Example of Type-1 Figure 9. Example of Type-1
2）Coating with stainless steel plate:Type-2 Gas Area
It is a repair method aimed for prevention of leakage from the

inside and prevention of subsurface water invasion from the
outside. The structural strength depends on an existing service
reservoir as same as Type-1. As shown in Figure 10, some Anchor Bolt
stainless steel beams are installed with anchor bolts, then
arc-shaped thin stainless steel plates are joined together, and Installation Plate
mortar fills up a gap with the existing service reservoir inner wall. Liquid Area
Improved reservoir with this method has the structural strength
against the water pressure from inside and outside of reservoir.
Figure 10. Example of Type-2
Gas Area
3）Coating with stainless steel plate:Type-3
It is a rehabilitation method aimed for improving the seismic Stainless Plate

performance and water toughness of the reservoir. It realizes Stud Bolt
prevention of leakage from the inside and the prevention of the Tipping
subsurface water invasion from the outside, and improvement of Enlargement Concrete
Liquid Area
structural strength of the reservoir. As shown in Figure 11, this Existing Concrete
method forms Steel Concrete Composite Structures by installing
concrete in the stainless steel plates which installed a stud dowel
in inside gap, after having done tipping of the deterioration
concrete layer of the existing service reservoir inside. In this case,
thickness of stainless steel plates should be increased in Figure 11. Example of Type-3
comparison with the repair methods above.
3.2 Renewal of the reservoir
There are several ways to renew the reservoir with

steel according to the purpose of improvement. Figure 12
shows an example of “Tank in tank” method that is to set
up a new reservoir with steel or stainless steel in which
contacts with existing reservoirs’ sidewall for improving
the seismic performance and water-toughness. On the
other hand, Figure 13 shows an example of “Tank out
tank” method that is to set up a new reservoir with steel Figure 12. Tank in tank method
outside of existing reservoir in order to improve it’s
seismic performance. Figure 14 also shows a kind of
“Tank out tank” method, called “Donut tank” method that
is to set up a new reservoir with steel increase it’s
capacity and improve security to be duplicated.
87
Figure 13. Tank out tank method

Adopting these renewal methods is very profitable because they are not only ecological but also
economical. With these methods, it is not necessary to prepare new construction yard and it is able
to re-use the existing reservoir, therefore no cost
concerning about demolishing existing reservoir and
disposal of construction waste is needed.
3.3 Reinstallation of the reservoir
In the case of reinstallation, steel or stainless steel is

suitable for the use of reservoirs’ construction because
of its characteristics. With using these materials, it is
able to construct a new reservoir that is superior in Figure 14. Donut tank method
seismic performance and durability.
4. CONCLUSION
In this report, “Manual for improvement of over aged reservoirs with steel plate” as the results of
the collaborative research by JWWA and WSP are summarized. Improvement method of the
reservoirs by using steel plate is one of the technologies that apply to many existing facilities
because of the increasing tendency about improvement of seismic performance of existing
reservoirs and actualization of demand of improvement of deterioration facilities.
We hope this manual be utilized for the maintenance works in the waterworks utilities and be
helpful for effective improvement of the deteriorated reservoirs to extend their life time and to
protect against the earthquake which should come in the future.
REFERENCES
1) Japan Water Works Association, 2006, “Manual for improvement of over aged reservoirs with steel plate”
2) Japan Water Works Association, 2006, Maintenance Guide for Waterworks Facilities.
3) Japan Water Works Association, 2005, Renewal Guide for Waterworks Facilities.
4) Japan Water Works Association, 1997, Seismic Design Code for Water Facilities.
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SESSION 2
Seismic Measures for Pipelines
Mr. Hiroaki Miyazaki, Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, Osaka, JAPAN – “Seismic
Damage Estimation of Distribution Pipes”
Mr. David Tsztoo, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US – “Challenges of
the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project”
Mr. Yukio Mabuchi, Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, JAPAN –
“Earthquake Countermeasures in Nagoya”
Mr. Ahmed Nisar, MMI Engineering, Oakland, CA, US – “Fault Crossing Design of a
Critical Large Diameter Pipeline”
89
90
Seismic Damage Estimation of Distribution Pipes
Hiroaki Miyazaki, Takashi Nakai, Yoshimitsu Komatsu and Kazuya Yamano
ABSTRACT
Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau made an estimate of the damage of our distribution pipes
and the suspension area of water supply occurred by scenario earthquakes in Osaka city. We designed
the plans of emergency water supply and emergency rehabilitation, and then we promoted earthquake
preparedness projects, such as pipe replacement, based on the results of the estimation.
In the seismic damage estimation of distribution pipes, we analyzed the damage record of pipes
and the instrumentation record of peak ground velocity in 1995 Kobe Earthquake, and established the
damage ratio equations for each pipe. However, the scenario earthquakes in Osaka city were recently
reviewed which are 4 fault earthquakes such as Uemachi Faults Earthquake and Nankai Trough
Earthquake. And it is found that an earthquake which scale is larger than Kobe Earthquake may
occur. For this reason, we have to obtain a closer estimation of the damages occurred by a strong
seismic motion that is larger than the past records.
So, we started to review our method of damage estimation in 2005. In the review, we applied
some achievements made available by recent research in earthquake engineering, such as the seismic
motion of Kobe Earthquake that has been reproduced scientifically, and so on. And we examined
damage characteristics of distribution pipe by a strong seismic motion. As a result, we improved the
reproducibility in our damage estimation.
In this paper, we would like to report the outline about the damage estimation of distribution pipes
by a strong seismic motion both in non-liquidated ground and in liquidated ground.
Hiroaki Miyazaki, Staff Officer (Earthquake Measures), Engineering Div., Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-14-16
Nanko-kita, Suminoe-ku, Osaka JAPAN
Takashi Nakai, Staff, Planning Dept., Engineering Div., Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-14-16 Nanko-kita,
Suminoe-ku, Osaka JAPAN
Yoshimitu Komatsu, Staff, Kunijima Purification Plant, Engineering Div. Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-3-14
Kunijima, Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka JAPAN
Kazuya Yamano, Manager for Crisis Management, Engineering Div. Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-14-16
Nanko-kita, Suminoe-ku, Osaka JAPAN
91
1. Introduction
The Osaka City Waterworks Bureau has just finished drafting emergency water supply and
restoration plans and been taking antiseismic measures such as to replace pipes, based on estimations
of seismic damage of distribution pipes and areas affected by water supply interruptions in the event
of an earthquake of parameters set by the City.
The seismic damage that acted as the basis for the current emergency water supply and restoration
plans and antiseismic measures was deduced from studies conducted in 1995 ~ 1996. This study
analyzed the recorded peak ground velocity and seismic damage of pipes in the Kobe Earthquake
(1995) and built a damage estimation model from that.
Then, in 2004 ~ 2005, studies were directed at earthquakes of parameters set by the City based on
newly acquired information. Results indicated that seismic motions could be greater in central Osaka
than those experienced in the Kobe Earthquake.
Because of this, it became necessary to estimate seismic damage under unprecedented seismic
motion. Therefore, efforts were launched in 2005 to rework the seismic damage estimation model.
Reworking involved analyses of seismic damage using the reproduced seismic motion of the
Kobe Earthquake and interjecting the latest findings from research into earthquake-triggered disaster
prevention. And, the accuracy of damage estimations was improved by adding new studies of the
seismic damage models under strong seismic motion and by applying new methods of seismic
damage estimation in areas where liquefaction might occur.
2. Seismic Damage Estimation Model in 1995 ~ 1996 Study
The scale of seismic damage caused by an earthquake is determined by numerous factors other
than the magnitude of seismic motion, to note pipe materials and coupling type, diameters at
openings, year of installation, backfill conditions, ground and topological conditions, etc.
Earlier seismic damage estimations by Osaka City did a regression analysis of a combination of
pipes and joint types and standardized pipe diameters, from which a relational formula was built
between the magnitude of seismic motion and the average failure rate (failure/km).
The number of seismic failures was estimated from pipe data and set seismic motion parameters
for each 250 m x 250 m cell of a city-wide projected grid.
Generally, (1) peak ground acceleration (PGA), (2) peak ground velocity (PGV), (3) (measured)
seismic intensity, (4) SI value, and (5) peak ground strain are considered indicators of seismic motion
magnitude, but it was comparatively easy to obtain measured data and forecast data for (1) PGA and
(2) PGV from past records.
Toki studied the relationship between seismic failure rate and PGA and PGV, and presented data
that identified a stronger correlation between PGV and seismic failure rate (damage index)1).
92
Acceleration
Velocity
Damage Index (D)
Velocity (cm/sec)
Acceleration (g)
Figure 2.1 Relationship of seismic failure rate to PGA and PGV
From that research, this City dedicated to use PGV as an indicator of seismic motion magnitude.
Moreover, ground conditions were reflected in the calculation process of seismic motion
magnitude, however the following ground deformations were considered inapplicable to calculations.
(1) Ground liquefaction and lateral fluidization
(2) Slope collapses
In areas where these ground deformations occurred, studies of past earthquake damage confirmed
prominent seismic damage. Therefore, separate studies based on the characteristics of the target area
and estimation methods were needed to determine whether these factors could be applied to seismic
damage estimation.
Therefore, to set correction coefficients for each factor that could affect the scope of seismic
damage, Osaka City gave consideration given to opening diameters and whether liquefaction would
occur or not in addition to the seismic motion magnitude for the following reasons:
・Much of Osaka City sits on an alluvial plain and there is little topology that would accompany
abrupt ground changes like in the Hanshin area (Kobe City, Ashiya City, Nishinomiya City,
Amagasaki City).
・Damage estimations for the city divide the city up into a grid of 250 m x 250 m cells and
estimate the failure rate for each cell, therefore it would be difficult to take into consideration
the detailed topologies within each cell.
Here following is the seismic damage estimation formula from this study.
DI = C1× C 2 × DI 0
Wherein, DI: Rate of Damage (failure/km)
DI0: Average Ratio of Damage (failure/km)
C1: Diameter Correction Factor
C2: Ground Correction Factor
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TABLE2.1 Average Damage Ratio Equation (DI0)
Pipe type Average Damage Ratio Equation
DIP-S, SP-N DI0＝0.0
DIP, SP-O DI0＝0.004(PGV-20)
CIP DI0＝0.010(PGV-20)
CIP-L, VP DI0＝0.016*PGV
DIP: Ductile Iron Pipe (mechanical joint)
DIP-S: Ductile Iron Pipe (restraint joint)
SP-N: Welded Steel Pipe (more than 800mm diameter or placed after 1968)
SP-O: Welded Steel Pipe (less than 700mm diameter and placed before 1967)
CIP: Cast Iron Pipe (mechanical joint)
CIP-L: Cast Iron Pipe (lead socket joint)
VP: Polyvinyl Chloride Pipe
TABLE2.2 Diameter Correction Factor (C1)

Diameter DIP,SP CIP VP
～75 2.1 1.7 1.1
100～150 1.0 1.2 0.8
200～250 1.0 1.1 -
300～450 1.0 0.6 -
500～ 0.2 0.2 -
TABLE2.3 Ground Correction Factor (C2)

DIP CIP VP
landfill 2.6 2.3 1.1
Each paper must have an abstract. The abstract shall be no longer than 350 words. The abstract
should present the primary objectives and scope of the study or the reasons for writing the paper.
3. Reworking of Seismic Damage Estimation Model

3.1 Background
At present, Osaka City hypothesizes five types of scenario earthquakes: one ocean-trench
earthquake and four inland earthquakes. The estimated scale of these earthquakes is based on studies
conducted in 1995 ~ 1996.
TABLE3.1 Scenario Earthquakes

Classification Name
Ocean-trench Earthquake Tonankai & Nankai Earthquake
Uemachi Faults Earthquake
Ikoma Faults Earthquake
Inland Earthquake
Arima-Takatsuki Faults Earthquake
Median Tectonic Line Faults Earthquake
Based on later studies of tectonics and active faults in Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Osaka
Prefecture jointly formed a committee of academic experts and others in 2004, to rework the
hypothesized scenario earthquakes into the following year.
94
In their work, the committee selected faults of noteworthy seismic motion potential from amongst
all of the faults that could affect the Osaka Prefecture area and re-estimated the seismic motion of the
five aforementioned hypothetical earthquakes. In those estimations, they created multiple destruction
scenarios on combinations of asperity distributions and destruction start points. As a result, it was
found that seismic motion in Osaka City could greatly exceed that of the Kobe Earthquake.
3.2 Overview of Reworking
With this background, Osaka City reworked the seismic damage estimation model in 2005 ~
2006. Based on earlier research findings, PGV was again used as the parameter for expressing
seismic motion in the damage estimation model.
Moreover, in order to enhance the estimation accuracy, the following new steps were taken.
(1) To estimate damage in areas not exposed to liquefaction, new considerations were given to
seismic damage characteristics in areas hit by strong seismic motion and simulation results
were applied to the seismic damage estimation formula.
(2) To estimate damage in areas exposed to liquefaction, the degree of liquefaction was assessed
in grid cells using a liquefaction grading index and damage estimates were done by dividing
damage into that for “seismic in non-liquefaction ground” and that for “seismic in liquefaction
ground”.
4. Seismic Damage Model for Non-Liquefaction Ground

4.1 Data
The Japan Water Works Association (JWWA) has studied in detail seismic damage and
occurrences of liquefaction in the Kobe Earthquake. They divided damaged areas in Hanshin into 250
m x 250 m cells (approx. 4,800 cells in all) and collected information such as total pipe length and
occurrences of damage by type of pipe, and occurrences of liquefaction in each cell2).
Damage Ratio (failure/km)
Figure 4.1 Seismic damage in Kobe Earthquake
In the previous seismic damage estimation, a damage estimation model was built using only PGV
logged in 29 seismic monitoring points during the Kobe Earthquake and seismic damage data in a 2
km x 2 km area around those monitoring points taken from the aforementioned cells.
This study comes on the heels of the latest developments in seismological research that
corroborated seismic motion of the Kobe Earthquake by waveform, and used simulation results for
the Kobe Earthquake by Matsushima and Kawase3).
95
This made it possible to obtain seismic motion data for all of the aforementioned cells and greatly
increased the amount of data applicable for analyses of the relationship between seismic damage and
seismic motion in the Kobe Earthquake.
The peak ground velocity was corrected by applying ground conditions in the concerned cells to
the simulation results for engineering infrastructure of Matsushima and Kawase.
Figure 4.2 Simulated seismic motion of Kobe Earthquake (Corrected for PGV)
4.2 Reworking the Seismic Damage Estimation Model
(1) Sorting and Categorizing of Cell Data

In reworking the seismic damage estimation model, cell data was sorted and categorized in order
to eliminate factors other than seismic motion as best possible.
First off, data was categorized based on occurrence of liquefaction. The JWWA arranged and
recorded results of studies by Hamada et al into liquefaction occurrences in the Hanshin area during
the Kobe Earthquake into 250 m x 250 m cells2). Here, cells in which sand boils occurred across most
of the area and suffered numerous fissures were categorized as “liquefaction” cells, those without any
occurrence of sand boils or fissures were categorized as “non-liquefaction” cells, and those with some
sand boils were categorized as “semi-liquefaction” cells.
Liquefaction
Semi-liquefaction
Non-liquefaction
Figure 4.3 Occurrences of liquefaction in Kobe Earthquake
In this study, cell data was categorized as “liquefaction”, “semi-liquefaction” and

“non-liquefaction”, and analyses were done in “non-liquefaction” cells to identify the relationship
between PGV and seismic failure rate.
Furthermore, in order to eliminate the affects of damage factors other than PGV as best possible,
data was sorted from topology classifications. Here, cells categorized as “valleys or former water
areas” based on studies by the JWWA were excluded from the scope of analysis4). This is because
96
experience had shown that areas of abrupt topological changes such as valleys and former water areas
readily suffer large ground deformations in the form of lateral flows and slope collapses.
(2) Studies of Seismic Damage in Areas Hit by Strong Seismic motion

In the previous study, this City used a linear regression model as the seismic damage estimation
model.
In other words, it is hypothesized that damage begins in a pipe located in ground where
liquefaction does not occur when the PGV reaches a certain magnitude and the seismic failure rate
increases as a trend alongside the increase in PGV.
This hypothesis requires new studies in order to determine whether damage trends obtained from
regression analysis could be applied in areas hit by stronger seismic motions that ever recorded.
Studies were, therefore, launched into damage cases of the Kobe Earthquake.
The JWWA has estimated the seismic intensity distribution across the Hanshin area based on the
situation of collapsed structures in the Kobe Earthquake2).
Seismic Intensity
Over 7
7
6
5
Under 4
Figure 4.4 Seismic intensity distribution in Kobe Earthquake
If this is compared against actual seismic damage (Figure. 4.1), it is seen that areas with
widespread waterworks seismic damage and areas hit by strong seismic motion are not always the
same. Moreover, the seismic damage around JR Takatori Station where the maximum PGV (130
cm/s) was measured was 0.5 ~ 1.0 failure/km, which is not necessarily outstanding.
Next, the affect of ground binding force on buried infrastructure was investigated.
Pipe damage occurs when ground strain is transmitted to pipe and pipe becomes stressed,
however the relationship between pipe and ground strain when consideration is given to the pipe and
ground sliding against one other is nonlinear as indicated in the Guidelines on Aseismic Design and
Construction of Waterworks Infrastructure (JWWA).
k1
k2＝
Binding ForceMPa）
1000
抵抗力τ（ (MPa)
τ
k1＝
δ
相対変位δ(m)
Relative Displacement (m)
Figure 4.5 Ground strain and pipe stress model with consideration for sliding between pipe and ground
97
Moreover, experiments have confirmed existing research findings that the affect (ground binding
force) of ground displacement on pipe has a maximum limit.
From this information, it is thought that the ground binding force looses its affect on pipe if the
ground collapses under strong seismic motion and, as a result, pipe damage does not progress above a
certain point.
Let us focus on the pipe for a moment.
If pipe with couplings succumbs to damage because of stress formed in the pipe, the stress in the
pipe is released at the fracture point. Accordingly, subsequent damage does not occur in that same
spot as long as stress does not newly form in the pipe.
Because of this, there is little chance in all reality that all couplings in a series of pipe would be
damaged. Failure rate does not uniformly increase alongside the increase in PGV; instead, it is
viewed more appropriate to set a PGV value where pipe damage converges.
Based on these observations, this City adopted a nonlinear model as opposed to a linear model to
estimate seismic damage including areas hit by strong seismic motion.
Moreover, the PGV value at which pipe damage converge was set based on results from
earthquake response simulations done by the Takada Lab at Kobe University. By quantitatively
evaluating the convergence tendency for damage to increase in pipe with couplings under strong
seismic motion, it was possible to build a damage model.
From the results of the aforementioned investigations, the following seismic damage models
were set. The seismic damage models of DIP and CIP are shown in figure 4.6 and 4.7.
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0 50 100 150 200

PGV (cm/s)
Figure 4.6 seismic damage model (Non-liquefaction ground, DIP)

8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0 50 100 150 200

PGV (cm/s)
Figure 4.7 seismic damage model (Non-liquefaction ground, CIP)
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5 Seismic Damage Model for Liquefaction Ground
5.1 Seismic Damage Characteristics in Liquefaction Ground
Because past records of disasters showed a tendency for seismic damage to increase in ground
where liquefaction occurs in comparison to ground where it does not occur, this City estimated
seismic damage in liquefaction ground by setting correction coefficients in the damage estimation
model. This presupposed the primary factor for causing the seismic damage in liquefaction ground
was the magnitude of seismic motion.
Nevertheless, after analyzing and comparing seismic damage in cells of the Hanshin area
categorized as “non-liquefaction” and “liquefaction” in the Kobe Earthquake by the JWWA (Figure.
4.2), the seismic damage in liquefaction ground did not show the same trends as in non-liquefaction
ground and a significant correlation between seismic failure rate and ground velocity was not
observed.
Accordingly, the average was adopted on the presumption that, when the ground completely
liquefied, seismic failure rate converged on a specific value without depending on PGV.
5.2 Setting of Liquefaction Area Factor
In this study, seismic damage is estimated on a basis of 250 m – 250 m cells, but liquefaction
across the entire area is just as imaginable as a mixture of liquefaction areas and non-liquefaction
areas.
Therefore, it was believed necessary towards basing seismic damage estimations on damage
characteristics, to quantitatively define a degree of effect of liquefaction in the cells.
In this study, the degree of ground liquefaction was evaluated as the amount of liquefied area in a
given cell.
A PL value was used as a ground liquefaction evaluation index and a liquefaction area factor was
expressed as a function of this PL value.
In building a relational formula, results from liquefaction simulations using PL values for the
Kobe Earthquake5) were first compared against actual liquefaction areas (Figure. 4.3) in the Hanshin
area recorded in the Kobe Earthquake.
PL value
Fig. 5.1 PL distribution in Hanshin area in Kobe Earthquake
When both PL values and actual liquefaction areas are compared, it can be seen that a high
percentage of cells are identified as liquefaction the higher the PL value is.
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Non-liquefaction
Semi-liquefaction
Liquefaction
PL value ~
Figure 5.2 Percentage of PL value and areas identified as liquefaction
Then, in this study, attention was turned to the increase in “liquefaction” percentage seen in
Figure 5.2, from which the following formula for estimating liquefaction area factor was built using
PL as a parameter.
1 ⎧ − (log PL − μ ) 2 ⎫
AL = ⋅ exp⎨ ⎬ （PL>0）
2π ⋅ σ ⋅ PL ⎩ 2σ 2 ⎭
AL = 0 （PL=0）
Wherein,
AL: Liquefaction area factor of cell
µ: Population mean (= 2.88)
σ : Population variance (= 0.57)
PL: PL value
6 Verification of Estimation Accuracy of Seismic Damage Estimation Model
From the aforementioned findings, the following formula was set as the seismic damage
estimation model.
DI = Cd × {DI 0 × (1 − AL ) + DI 0 L }+ DI 0 L × AL
Wherein,
DI: Seismic failure rate of cell (failure/km)
DI0: Seismic failure rate in non-liquefaction ground (failure/km)
DI0L: Average seismic failure rate in liquefaction ground (failure/km)
AL: Liquefaction area factor of cell
Cd: Correction coefficient based on opening diameter
100
TABLE 6.1 Seismic failure rate in non-liquefaction ground (DI0)
Pipe type Seismic failure rate estimation formula
DIP-S DI0＝0
DIP DI0＝0.0056（PGV－15）（PGV<150）
DI0＝0.7560 （PGV>=150）
CIP DI0＝0.0232（PGV－15）（PGV<120）
DI0＝2.4360 （PGV>=120）
VP DI0＝0.0177（PGV－15）（PGV<120）
DI0＝1.8585 （PGV>=120）
SP DI0＝0.0043（PGV－15）（PGV<150）
DI0＝0.5805 （PGV>=150）
TABLE 6.2 Seismic failure rate in liquefaction ground (DI0L)

Pipe type Seismic failure rate
DIP-S DI0L=0
DIP DI0L=2.56
CIP DI0L=4.00
VP DI0L=1.83
SP DI0L=0.97
TABLE 6.3 Correction coefficients based on opening diameter (Cd)

Diameter DIP,SP CIP VP
～75 2.1 1.7 1.1
100～150 1.0 1.2 0.8
200～250 1.0 1.1 -
300～450 1.0 0.6 -
500～ 0.2 0.2 -
The accuracy of the seismic damage estimation model developed in this study was verified from
the reproducibility of the number of seismic failures that occurred in the Hanshin area in the Kobe
Earthquake. Table 6.4 gives seismic failure estimates obtained with the new estimation model and
actual failures. The table also lists estimates obtained with the previous estimation model developed
by this City and the estimation model of the JWWA.
TABLE 6.4 Simulations

Actual failures New estimation model Previous estimation JWWA
Liquefaction category
(a) (b) b/a ( c) c/a (d) d/a
Non-liquefaction 1,274 1,441 1.131 691 0.542 1,116 0.876
Semi-liquefaction 562 473 0.842 295 0.525 374 0.665
Liquefaction 336 228 0.679 105 0.313 146 0.435
All area 2,172 2,142 0.986 1,091 0.502 1,539 0.709
It can be seen from this table that the reproducibility of the new model was improved with respect
to the previous model for all types of pipe.
101
Moreover, when looked at by ground definition, similar to the previous model, the new model
reproduced slightly less incidents of failure in liquefaction ground than actually occurred, while in
semi-liquefaction ground, it improved the reproducibility of seismic failures, which suggests that
consideration for cell liquefaction area factor is an effective feature of the estimation model.
From these results, the new damage estimation model is believed to be more accurate than the
previous model.
7 Conclusions
Worried that seismic motion could greatly exceed hypothesized levels of the existing waterworks
seismic damage estimation model, this City launched a new study to develop a more accurate
estimation model. Using existing research results for both areas where liquefaction occurred and did
not occur and new methods of estimation, the new model proved to be more accurate in estimating
seismic damage caused by seismic motion, including in areas hit by strong seismic motion. As a
future topic of research, detailed studies into seismic damage in liquefaction ground are believed one
possible way to enhance the estimation accuracy of this new model even further.
The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to Prof. Takada and Associate Prof.
Kuwata of Kobe University for their generous advice and guidance in this study.
References
1) K.Toki: Estimation of seismic damage of water system, Disaster Prevention Research Institute
Annual vol.22 B-2, 1981.
2) Japan Water Works Association: Analysis of seismic damage of waterworks by 1995 Kobe
earthquake, 1996.
3) S.Matushima, and H.Kawase: Multiple asperity source model of the hyogo-ken nanbu earthquake
of 1995 and strong motion simulation in Kobe, Journal of structural and construction engineering
transactions of Architectural Institute of Japan, 2000.
4) Japan Water Works Association: Seismic damage estimation of distribution pipes, 1998.
5) Geo-Database Information committee of Kansai: Shin Kansai Jiban (Ground of Kansai area
especially Kobe to Hanshin), 1998.
102
Challenges of the Claremont Tunnel
Seismic Upgrade Project
David F. Tsztoo
ABSTRACT
The Claremont Tunnel is a 9-foot diameter, 18,065-foot long water tunnel located under the
Oakland-Berkeley Hills and conveys up to 175 million gallons per day of treated water to over
800,000 East Bay Municipal Utility District customers in the San Francisco East Bay, California.
The tunnel crosses the Hayward Fault and would be vulnerable to significant structural damage
and blockage of water flow in a major earthquake.
This paper describes the seismic improvements that were designed and constructed to allow
the tunnel to survive the challenge of a magnitude 7.0 earthquake, and deliver without
interruption an indispensable water supply for consumption and fire-fighting. The tunnel would
have to do this despite anticipated earthquake offset displacements of up to 7.5 feet, and
breakage and fallout of the tunnel lining at the fault. The paper will also discuss how the project
addressed challenges of protecting nearby residences from construction damage and noise,
unforgiving tunnel outage constraints resulting from the need to maintain water service during
construction, and hazardous ground conditions in the tunnel excavation.
David F. Tsztoo, Senior Civil Engineer, Engineering and Construction Department, East Bay Municipal Utility
District, 375 – 11th Street, Oakland, CA 94607-4240.
1 103
INTRODUCTION
The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) serves over 1.2 million water customers
located in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, east of San Francisco Bay in California.
EBMUD’s main water source comes from the pristine snow-melt waters of the Mokelumne
River stored in Pardee Reservoir in the Sierra Nevada foothills. Three large diameter aqueducts
convey the water over 90 miles westward from the reservoir to the EBMUD service area where
the raw water is purified at water treatment plants located in the cities of Walnut Creek,
Lafayette, and Orinda. The treated water from Orinda passes through the Claremont Tunnel
under the Oakland-Berkeley Hills to the Claremont Center in Berkeley, where it enters the water
distribution system. The Claremont Tunnel is the main water lifeline for over 800,000 customers
residing in cities from Richmond to Oakland and San Leandro. See Figure 1.
SOBRANTE
SOBRANTE
WALNUT
WALNUT
CREEK
CREEK
ORINDA
ORINDA
LAFAYETTE
LAFAYETTE
SAN
SAN PABLO
PABLO
UPPER
UPPER
SAN
SAN
SAN
SAN
LEANDRO RAMON
RAMON
LEANDRO
Sa
n
Fr
an
cis CASTRO
CASTRO VALLEY
VALLEY
co SAN
SAN LEANDRO
LEANDRO
Ba
y
Figure 1. EBMUD Service Area.
IMPETUS FOR SEISMIC UPGRADES
On October 17, 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake struck the greater San Francisco Bay Area.
The earthquake had a magnitude of 6.9 and was centered in the Santa Cruz Mountains 60 miles
south of San Francisco. Although the event was relatively distant, significant damage was
suffered by buildings, highway structures, and utilities as far away as San Francisco and
Oakland. The widespread damage caused EBMUD to evaluate the potential risk of damage to its
water system from major earthquakes along more local faults, including the Concord Fault, the
Calaveras Fault, and the Hayward Fault, which is located approximately along the center of the
EBMUD service area. See Figure 1.
2 104
The results of the studies indicated that approximately 63% of EBMUD customers would be
at risk of having inadequate water service for consumption and fire fighting after a magnitude 7.0
earthquake along the Hayward Fault. Damage to the water system would be widespread:
• 5,500 pipeline breaks, particularly near the fault
• Four of six water treatment plants out of service
• One out of every three water storage reservoirs out of service
• Two out of three pumping plants out of service
• Claremont Tunnel out of service
• $1.9 billion in economic damage to East Bay businesses and residences [1]
In 1994, EBMUD Board of Directors approved a $189 million, ten-year Seismic

Improvement Program (SIP) to protect its water system from the damaging effects of major
earthquakes. The program was forward-looking. Rather than waiting for the inevitable
earthquakes to occur and then repair the damage, the SIP would upgrade the water system and
mitigate the potential damage before it occurred. The SIP was completed in June 2007. The
Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade was the final key element of the SIP.
SEISMIC CHALLENGE FOR CLAREMONT TUNNEL
The Claremont Tunnel was originally constructed between 1927 and 1929. It has a 9-foot
diameter horseshoe shaped cross section, and runs 18,065 feet long between the EBMUD Orinda
Water Treatment Plant and the Claremont Center in Berkeley, where the tunnel connects to the
west of hills water distribution system. The tunnel conveys from 110 to 175 million gallons of
treated water each day to customers.
The west end of the tunnel crosses the Hayward Fault, near the Claremont Center in
Berkeley. The 1994 seismic evaluations estimated that in a magnitude 7.0 earthquake, up to 7.5
feet of horizontal offset and 0.5 feet of vertical offset displacement would occur within a 60-foot
wide primary zone of the Hayward Fault, and sympathetic movements of up to 2.25 feet would
occur within a 920-foot secondary zone straddling the primary fault. See Figure 2. The
magnitude of these displacements would cause the tunnel to be severed at the fault and
significant areas inside the tunnel would be clogged by collapsed lining and ground fallout. The
tunnel would be out of service for up to six months for removal of debris and repairs.
Built to 1920’s construction standards, the tunnel was lined with one-foot nominal thick
unreinforced concrete. The lining was also not grouted to the surrounding ground with the
modern-day practice of grout injection, or contact grouting, to fill voids between the lining and
the surrounding earth. An inspection conducted inside the tunnel in February 2002 revealed the
presence of holes and significant voids measuring several inches to several feet deep behind the
liner, and lining as thin as one-half inch in some crown locations. The inspection identified
numerous locations of weakened or deteriorated tunnel lining that would be at risk of spalling
and fallout during major earthquake shaking, unless repaired [2].
CLAREMONT TUNNEL UPGRADE DESIGN
The Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project was developed in response to the seismic
challenge. The project purpose was to maintain full service after a moderate earthquake and
lifeline service after a magnitude 7.0 or major earthquake.
3 105
Upstream
tie-
tie-in
Lining repairs &

contact grouting
in existing tunnel
Bypass
Tunnel
Thickened Liner
2 1/4 ft
Enlarged Offset
Vault
Existing Tunnel 7 1/2 ft
Offset
Downstream
tie-
tie-in
Access
Tunnel
Figure 2. Claremont Tunnel Upgrade at the Hayward Fault.
At the time of its conception, the project design was one of a kind innovation. Rather than
building a new tunnel, as conventional engineering rationale recommended, it was decided to
renovate the existing tunnel, and build a shorter bypass tunnel to replace the most vulnerable
section of the tunnel at the Hayward Fault, as shown in Figure 2. The project included:
• a 1,570-foot long bypass tunnel at the Hayward Fault, and
• liner repair and contact grouting for the remainder of the existing tunnel.
This bypass tunnel innovation was estimated to save over $50 million, or over 50%, of the
cost of building a new tunnel. It could be constructed in as few as two or three years, and require
only two outages of the tunnel, during the low water demand winters, to connect the new bypass
to the existing tunnel, and to complete repairs and grouting inside the existing tunnel [3].
The project design criteria included the following:
• Withstand primary fault zone offset of up to 7.5 feet plus 1.0 foot of creep
• Withstand secondary fault zone offsets of up to 2.25 feet
• Provide at least 175 million gallons per day (MGD) flow after a moderate earthquake
• Provide at least 130 MGD flow after a major, magnitude 7.0 earthquake
As shown in Figure 3, the bypass tunnel design featured a 17 feet wide, enlarged vault cross
section which will accommodate up to 8.5 feet of fault offset displacement, without interruption
of the water flow. A six-foot diameter, 85 feet long, structural carrier pipe, with a three inch
thick steel wall, was positioned in the center of the vault to allow passage of at least 130 MGD of
water flow through the debris that would fall into the tunnel at the primary fault offset. The
walls of the bypass were also thickened to ten feet at the enlarged vault by the addition of
concrete side drifts and to at least 2-1/2 feet in the secondary fault zones to avoid earth intrusion.
4 106
Before EQ
8.5 ft. Side Drift
backfilled
with concrete
Carrier pipe inside enlarged

vault maintains water flow
8.5 ft.
After EQ 10 Feet
Figure 3. Enlarged Bypass Tunnel Vault for Fault Offset.
PROJECT CONSTRUCTION CHALLENGES
Aside from the challenge of designing the tunnel to remain operational following a
magnitude 7.0 earthquake, the project construction faced three main challenges:
• Nearby residences – how does the project construction protect neighboring homes from
damage and noise?
• Unforgiving tunnel outage constraints – how does the project maintain continuous
water service for customers while work occurs inside the tunnel?
• Hazardous ground conditions – how does the project keep mining operations safe from
known hazards of gas intrusion, highly variable geology, squeezing ground, and
serpentinite?
Nearby Residences
As shown in Figure 4, the new bypass tunnel construction was located underneath many
nearby residences. The residents did not hesitate to express their concerns about potential
From Orinda WTP
Existing Tunnel
Repairs & Grouting
East Tie-In
Tunnel Road Vicente Road

Ha
yw
ar
d
Bypass Tunnel
Existing Claremont
Fa
Tunnel
ult
Li
ne
West Tie-In
Roble Road Berkeley
e City of
on Oakland
lt Z City of
El Camino F au
Real
Access Tunnel
Claremont Center
BART Tunnel Portal

Golden Gate Ave.
Chabot Road
Figure 4. Nearby Residences.
5 107
structural damage to their homes and properties from the possible use of explosives during
project construction. The primary concerns included scenarios of homes and large trees sinking
into holes caused by the explosives, and houses destroyed by landslides triggered by the
vibrations of the explosions or by the mining equipment. Others were concerned that noise from
the around-the-clock tunneling work may wake their sleep at night.
The challenge posed by nearby residences was addressed by the following measures:
• The construction contract required that tunnel excavation had to be completed by
mechanical equipment to the extend possible, and allowed limited, controlled
detonations only as a last resort to fracture and remove rock that was too difficult to
excavate by mechanical means. Over 95% of the mining was completed by a Voest-
Alpine AM75 roadheader mining machine. See Figures 5 and 6.
• Extensometers or sensitive geotechnical instruments were used to measure vertical
displacements or movements in the ground above the tunnel excavation and allow for
preventative measures to be undertaken before surface settlements occurred.
• Vibrations from the use of explosives and from mining equipment were limited to 0.5
inches per second of peak particle velocity (PPV), measured at 100 feet from the
source. This is 25% of the 2.0 inches per second PPV criterion commonly used in the
mining industry for avoiding any structural damage to buildings [4].
• Specialty consultants were hired to conduct pre-construction surveys to document
existing cracks and the structural condition of neighboring homes, to establish a
baseline for determining if any damage had occurred as a result of the construction. No
claims were filed.
Figure 5. Roadheader Mining Machine. Figure 6. Roadheader Excavating Tunnel.
• A tall, sound wall was erected around the tunnel entry and equipment staging area to
block noise away from nearby residences. See Figure 7.
• Noisy equipment at the job site were wrapped in heavy insulation or retrofitted with
large, noise damping mufflers. See Figure 8.
• Noisy outdoor work and truck deliveries were limited between the hours of 7:00 a.m.
and 7:00 p.m. to avoid the generation of noise when neighbors may be sleeping.
• New noise-insulated windows were provided to the homes directly facing the tunnel
construction at Claremont Center.
6 108
Figure 7. Sound Wall Around Tunnel Entry. Figure 8. Equipment Noise Insulation.
• A community affairs representative was assigned to the project to assuage local

community concerns about the construction. Throughout the construction and prior to
each use of controlled detonation, the neighbors were kept informed about construction
activities by meetings, newsletters, personal letters, and phone calls.
Unforgiving Tunnel Outage Constraints
As shown in Figure 9, the seasonal curves of water demand trace a very consistent pattern
each year. Water use rises in the warm months between March and November, and decreases
during the winter months from December to March. The Claremont Tunnel can only be taken
out of service during the winter months when water demand falls below 150 MGD—the
maximum sustainable water supply without the tunnel in service. Two winter outages of the
tunnel were needed to complete repairs and grouting of the existing tunnel, and to connect the
new bypass tunnel to the existing tunnel. While this work was being completed inside the tunnel,
the 800,000 customers normally served by the tunnel still needed their water service to continue
without interruption.
Gross Demand - West of Hills
250
230
210
190
mid-November mid-March
150 MGD max supply
with Claremont
170 Tunnel O/S
MGD
150
130
1997
1998
110
1999
2000
90 2001
2002
2003
70
2004
Outage
50
Jul- Jul- Jul- Aug- Aug- Aug- Sep- Sep- Oct- Oct- Oct- Nov- Nov- Dec- Dec- Dec- Jan- Jan- Feb- Feb- Feb- Mar- Mar- Apr- Apr- Apr- May- May- Jun- Jun- Jun-
01 13 25 06 18 30 11 23 05 17 29 10 22 04 16 28 09 21 02 14 26 09 21 02 14 26 08 20 01 13 25
Figure 9. Yearly Water Demand of West of Hills Customers.
7 109
The tunnel outage constraints challenge was addressed by careful planning, facility
improvements elsewhere in the water system, and operational efforts.
• A detailed tunnel outage plan was prepared to guide the EBMUD staff in preparations
and the procedures for taking the Claremont Tunnel out of service.
• Extensive hydraulic modeling was performed to analyze different scenarios of how
water supply and operations could meet customer water demand.
• Contingency plans were developed to ensure that all west-of-hills customers would
have adequate water. For example, in the event of a system malfunction or other
emergency, additional maintenance staff and a professional diver were placed on-call to
respond to any necessary treatment plant or water facility repairs.
• Preventative maintenance was completed at the Sobrante, San Pablo, and Upper San
Leandro Water Treatment Plants (WTPs) to minimize the potential for WTP
breakdowns or service disruptions while the Claremont Tunnel was out of service.
• The filters, instrumentation, and control systems at all three WTPs were upgraded to
provide additional water production capacity and assure that the plants could maintain
high capacities during the entire tunnel outage of three months. See Figure 10.
• At Sobrante WTP, plate settler equipment and cable controlled, solids handling vacuum
system were installed to improve removal of high wintertime turbidity, or suspended
solids, in the untreated water. See Figure 11.
Plate Settler
Equipment
Solids Handling
Cable-Vac
System
Figure 10. WTP Filter Improvements. Figure 11. Plate Settler and Solids Handling.
• The Southern Loop Pipeline was completed in the southern portion of the EBMUD
service area to provide an additional 30 MGD of treated water pumped from the
EBMUD system east of the Oakland-Berkeley Hills.
• Portable pumps were overhauled, tested and deployed in residential communities
during the tunnel outage to redistribute water to ensure that all customers had adequate
water. See Figure 12
• The three WTPs and Southern Loop Pipeline were operated at their capacities, and the
portable pumps were deployed in the water distribution system for testing one or two
months prior to the start of the tunnel outage. The testing verified that the facilities
could generate at least a collective total of 150 MGD of water supply to meet west-of-
hills customer demand. It also allowed operations staff to practice running the water
8 110
system with simulated outage conditions, make adjustments, and optimize system
operations prior to the outage.
Figure 12. Portable Pump Installation.
Hazardous Ground Conditions
Excavation for the new bypass tunnel had to be completed through an area known for its
history of methane gas intrusion. The original construction of the Claremont Tunnel experienced
several gas-fed fires, including one that burned for 30 days. The geology of the Hayward Fault
includes highly fractured and variable ground called “mélange”, intermixed with hard silica-
carbonate rock, soft fault gouge, and groundwater. The inconsistency of the material required
constant vigilance by the miners for material fallout or collapse of the tunnel crown. The fault
zone was also an area of “squeezing ground”, where the ground had the inclination to quickly
close up any holes or excavation and create instability for the tunnel. Additionally, the local
geology included significant areas of serpentinite, a rock formation with natural asbestos content
and a health hazard [5].
This challenge was met by the combination of safety requirements and tunnel support
systems included in the project design and construction documents, and the contractor’s means
and methods of construction:
• The contractor was required to comply with all California Occupational Health and
Safety Administration, Mining Section, safety regulations and requirements regarding
monitoring of explosive vapors, ventilation, and the prohibition of ignition sources in
the tunnel.
• Tunnel safety training was required for all contractor and EBMUD project staff.
• All the equipment used inside the tunnel were required to be explosion-proof; free from
electrical sparks or ignition sources.
• A high volume, overhead ventilation system was used along the entire tunnel
excavation to evacuate dust and any explosive vapors or gases from the tunnel heading
and induce air flow into the tunnel at the tunnel entry. See Figure 13.
• Heavy steel rib reinforcement on four or five-foot spacing, blocking, and shotcrete
between the steel ribs were used along the tunnel excavation to protect the tunnel
excavation and miners from fallouts of fractured, variable ground. See Figure 14.
9 111
• In areas of crushed and sheared material, spiling was used as pre-excavation support.
This support consisted of drilling and placing steel rods in the crown area of the tunnel
heading in advance of the excavation to form a reinforced canopy under which the
excavation would take place.
Figure 13. Overhead Ventilation at Heading. Figure 14. Heavy Steel Reinforcement.
• Survey monitoring was used inside the tunnel to measure any changes in cross-
sectional geometry and detect the onset of squeezing ground.
• The above noted steel rib reinforcement, blocking and shotcrete methods were used to
stabilize and maintain the tunnel opening from squeezing ground.
• Shotcrete was also used as an immediate support to strengthen and prevent fallout of
the tunnel face and sidewalls when the tunnel excavation was not advanced in any
mining shift. These periods occurred during breakdowns and repairs of the mining
equipment, or when work was temporarily halted for work holidays.
• Whenever the excavation occurred in rock materials that contained serpentinite,
workers were required to wear personal air packs and face masks to avoid inhalation of
air-borne dust containing serpentinite. See Figure 15.
• Water mist spray was used to dampen the serpentinite to lessen the generation of dust.
• All excavated materials were temporarily quarantined in a materials classification area
for sample testing and identification of hazardous material content, and determination
of proper handling and disposal prior to leaving the site. See Figure 16.
Figure 15. Air Packs Worn for Serpentinite. Figure 16. Materials Classification Area.
10 112
• As a final measure, the new bypass tunnel construction was finished with a thick lining
of reinforced concrete and contact grouting. The lining measured as thick as ten feet
along the enlarged vault section of the bypass. See Figure 17.
Figure 17. Finished Bypass Tunnel Lining. Figure 18. Old Tunnel Section at Fault.
EXISTING TUNNEL REPAIRS AND GROUTING
The dramatic difference between the newly finished bypass tunnel and the old tunnel section
that it replaced can be seen by comparing Figures 17 and 18. Figure 18 is a photo of the existing
tunnel at the Hayward Fault taken during EBMUD’s February 2002 tunnel inspection. The new
bypass replaced 1,500 feet of the existing tunnel at the Hayward Fault as this section of the old
tunnel was not deemed economical or feasible to repair. It was also not strong enough and wide
enough to absorb 7.5 feet of fault offset in a magnitude 7.0 earthquake and still continue to
transmit a minimum of 130 MGD of water flow. It was better to replace this section with the
new bypass tunnel.
In 1967, galvanized W4x13 steel sets were placed on two or four foot spacing with steel tie-
rods between the sets to reinforce a 42-foot length of the existing tunnel at the Hayward Fault, as
shown in Figure 18. The trace of the Hayward Fault is highlighted by the red lines across the
tunnel floor. The offset due to annual creep along the fault trace is highlighted by the sudden
stagger in the red dots on the steel joints along the tunnel crown. Despite the added
reinforcement, the lining at this location suffered significant cracking and spalling, and the steel
sets and tie-rods experienced notable deformation just from an estimated 5.6 inches of fault creep
from 1966 to 2002. However, the rest of the existing tunnel was still structurally sound, despite
numerous cracks, holes and larger cavities in the lining. These defects were all repairable [2].
The existing tunnel repairs consisted of sealing cracks with grout, patching holes with
concrete mortar, and placement of shotcrete supplemental lining in those sections of the tunnel
requiring structural reinforcement to prevent potential fallout of the lining in a major earthquake.
Loose or deteriorated concrete was removed or routed back to sound concrete and backfilled
with 4,000 pounds/square inch (psi) concrete mortar. The supplemental lining shotcrete was also
4,000 psi strength, six-inch thick, and covered approximately 800 feet of the tunnel with spring-
line cracks and offsets out of the wall plane, indicating that the cracks had progressed through
the wall thickness. The repairs ranged from two-inch diameter holes to larger patches of lining
11 113
measuring up to ten feet long and up to three feet wide, and depths of two inches to over one
foot, where the hole penetrated the wall thickness. See Figure 19.
Figure 19. Concrete Lining Repairs. Figure 20. Contact Grout Injection.
After patching and repairs, the lining was injected with 6,000 psi contact grout to fill voids
behind the lining. The grout was placed with portable grout pumps and injection tubes inserted
into two-inch holes drilled through the liner crown. Other holes drilled in the sidewalls served as
relief holes for the grout and allowed for visual verification of the grout coverage behind the
liner. See Figure 20. Approximately 130,000 cubic feet of grout mix was used in rehabilitating
over 16,500 lineal feet of the existing tunnel [6].
CONCLUSION
EBMUD dedicated the successful completion of the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade
Project on May 30, 2007. This culminated a collaboration of EBMUD staff, consultants, and
contractors on addressing the challenges associated with this project. The upgraded tunnel offers
the assurance that a vital water supply will be available for EBMUD customers after the next
major earthquake. The author would like to acknowledge and thank the EBMUD staff, Jacobs
Associates Engineers/Consultants, and Atkinson Contractors, Inc. for their participation and
support on this essential project.
REFERENCES
[1] G & E Engineering Systems, Inc., Seismic Evaluation Program Final Report, Appendix A, prepared for
EBMUD, April 1, 1994.
[2] Jacobs Associates, Claremont Tunnel Inspection of February 2002, Volumes 1 and 2, prepared for EBMUD,
April 2002.
[3] Orion Environmental Associates and Environmental Science Associates, EBMUD Claremont Corridor
Seismic Improvements Project, Alternatives Analysis Report, prepared for EBMUD, June 2003.
[4] Environmental Science Associates, EBMUD Claremont Corridor Seismic Improvements Project, Draft
Environmental Impact Report, prepared for EBMUD, June 2003.
[5] Jacobs Associates and Geomatrix Consultants, Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project Geotechnical
Baseline Report, prepared for EBMUD, January 2004.
[6] Communication with Tom Shastid, EBMUD construction manager for Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade,
July 24, 2007.
12 114
Earthquake Countermeasures in Nagoya
Yukio Mabuchi
ABSTRACT
Generally, waterworks measures taken against earthquakes combine two measures: one
is preventive maintenance and the other is emergency response. Nagoya has been proceeding
with three additional measures: construction of strong facilities that can withstand an
earthquake, flexible facility operations that do not cause breaks in water service even if
damaged, and establishment of a system in which smooth emergency activities can be
conducted.
Since Nagoya is an area requiring intensified measures against earthquake disaster,
specifically regarding the Tokai earthquake assumed to have a high probability of occurring
within 30 years, taking measures against earthquakes is an urgent topic. However, converting
all of the enormous waterworks systems to be earthquake-proof requires a massive amount of
funds and many years of labor.
Therefore, Nagoya has been working toward achieving maximum effects with available
funds as soon as possible by clarifying the facilities required to be earthquake-proof and
upgrading them intensively.
Moreover, while implementing conversion of the facilities to be earthquake-proof,
Nagoya is also proceeding with the building of a system resistant to earthquakes from three
viewpoints of dispersion of risk, provision of a backup function, and enhancement of a
purified water stock function in terms of facility operations.
In contrast, the provision of facilities such as emergency water supply facilities required
for emergency activities, and equipment and material warehouses for disasters, ensures
sufficient quantity and has now reached the point where measures to better quality must be
developed. This paper introduces examples of efforts that promote residents’ “self help” in
case of disaster.
______________________________
Yukio Mabuchi, Chief of Planning, Waterworks Planning Division, Planning Department, Technical Headquarters,
Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, 3-1-1, Sannomaru, Naka-ku, Nagoya, 460-8508, Japan
115
1. GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE NAGOYA CITY WATERWORKS
The Nagoya City waterworks began supplying water in 1914 with surface water of the
Kiso River as the water source. The water supply capacity in the early days of the system’s
establishment was 51,200m3/day. Since then, expansion projects extending over eight phases
were repeated as the population and the social and economic situation of Nagoya expanded;
Nagoya’s facility scale now has a water supply capacity of 1,424,000m3/day.
Nagoya takes in water from the Kiso River at two locations: the Inuyama Intake, located
in Inuyama City; and the Asahi Intake situated in Ichinomiya City. Water taken in at the
Inuyama Intake is conveyed to the Kasugai and Nabeyaueno Water Purification Plants, while
water taken in at the Asahi Intake is transferred to the Oharu Water Purification Plant.
Drinking water produced at the water purification plants is supplied to residents directly
or via 11 distribution stations and pump stations. The positioning of those facilities is as shown
in Figure 1.
Ri ver
Kiso
Inuyama Intake
Kasugai Purification
Asahi Intake Plant
Plain Sedimentation Basin
Shidami D.S.
Nagoya
Nabeya-ueno
Purification Plant Idaka D.S.
Oharu Purification
Plant
Heiwa Park D.S.
Higashiyama D.S.
Mizuho D.S.
Nakagawanishi D.S.
Narumi D.S.
Kasugano D.S.
Distribution Station : D.S.
Booster Pumping Station
Intake System Name of Water Purification Plant Water Supply Capacity （

m3 /day）
Kasugai Water Purification Plant 590,000
Inuyama System
Nabeya-ueno Water Purification Plant 290,000
Asahi System Oharu Water Purification Plant 544,000
Total 1,424,000
Figure1. Map of Water Facilities
116
As for Nagoya’s geographic features and ground properties, the eastern part of it forms a
moderate hilly terrain and has relatively stable ground, while the western part is flat land and
its ground is soft.
In the eastern area where the difference in altitude is large, water distribution areas are
divided according to the ground height to achieve equalization of the water distribution
pressure, and water is distributed from the distribution stations located on an area basis. On the
other hand, the western area is provided with relatively wider water distribution areas because
there is little or no difference in the altitude of the ground.
When the overall Nagoya waterworks facilities are viewed in terms of measures taken
against earthquakes, it can be said that the weakness of earthquake resistance is concentrated
in western Nagoya, where the ground is soft.
2. ESTIMATED EARTHQUAKE AND PREDICTION OF DAMAGE
Some investigation results regarding earthquake disaster prevention that have recently
been released by the Central Disaster Prevention Council contain much information that
influences the directions Nagoya’s measures against earthquakes take. To be specific, these
results include:
In 2002, the estimated epicenter of the possible Tokai earthquake was reviewed and Nagoya
was specified as an “area requiring intensified measures against Tokai earthquake disaster.”
In 2003, Nagoya was specified as a “region for promotion of earthquake disaster prevention
measures” with regard to the Tounankai and Nankai earthquakes.
In 2006, the seismic intensity distribution assumed that if a near-field earthquake happens in
an inland area was publicized, and it was announced that shaking with a seismic intensity
of 7 (on the Japanese scale of intensity) caused by a magnitude 7.6 quake occurs in
Nagoya.
Therefore, Nagoya must tackle measures against earthquakes recognizing that they are
subjects of more importance and urgency than ever before, to prepare for large-scale
earthquakes of a high probability of occurrence.
TABLEⅠshows Nagoya’s estimated earthquakes and the transition of their estimated
seismic intensities. As seen from the table, the seismic intensity scales of the estimated
earthquakes and the maximum ground acceleration have been gradually modified to higher
values by learning from past earthquake damage.
TABLEⅡ is a summary of damage assumption in Nagoya based on the estimated
earthquakes.
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TABLEⅠ TRANSITION OF ESTIMATED EARTHQUAKE
Transition of Estimated Earthquake Strength Earthquake History
1891 Nohbi Earthquake
1914 Kanto large 　　
　　　　　　 Earthquake
1944 Tounankai Earthquake
1946 Nankai Earthquake
1948 Hukui Earthquake
1979 Underground Structure Ground Structure 1964 Niigata Earthquake
Design seismic intensity = “0.2G” or more Corresponds to Nohbi Earthquake ( M:8.4 ) 1978 Miyagi Prefecture
( Consider Region, Ground and ( Using Static analysis and Dynamic analysis ) offing Earthquake
Structural characteristic )
1981 Nohbi Earthquake Tokai Earthquake

Seismic Intensity 6 5
Max. G (gal) 400 250
1984 Nohbi Earthquake Tokai Earthquake Tounankai Earthquake

Seismic Intensity 5－ 7 about 5 5－ 6
Max. G (gal) 440 260 370 1995 Kobe Earthquake
1996 Nohbi Earthquake Tokai Earthquake Tounankai Earthquake
Seismic Intensity 5 or more － 7 4 － 5 or more 5 or less － 6 or less
Max. G (gal) 880 220 350
“Epicenter regi on of Tokai
region
2002 Specified Earthquake” was reviewed
Specified “Area
“Area requiri ng intensified
requiring intensi fied measures
measures against
against Tokai
Tokai Earthquake
Earthquake disaster
disaster ””
Specified
Specified “Region
“Region for
for promotion
promotion ofof earthquake
earthquake disaster
disaster prevention
prevention measures”
measures” with
with regard
regard to
to the
the
Tounankai
Tounankai && Nankai
Nankai Earthquake
Earthquake
Nohbi ①Tokai ②Tounankai

2003 Earthquake Earthquake Earthquake ①＋②
2004 Niigata-Tyuetu
5 or more － 4－ 5 or less － 5 or less －
Seismic Intensity Earthquake
7 6 or less 6 or more 6 or more
Max. G (gal) 880 329 542 542
2007 Noto Earthquake
TABLEⅡ DAMAGE ASSUMPTION IN NAGOYA

1 2
Nohbi
Tokai Tounankai 1&2
Earthquake
Earthquake Earthquake
Complete Destruction 23,400 2,700 16,000 21,000
Building damage
Partial Destruction 99,000 15,000 50,000 59,000
Burnt Down 180 30 200 260
The fire damage
Fire Occurrence 86,000 40 2,200 6,200
Death Toll Max.2,500 Max.30 Max.310 Max.420
Human damage
The Persons Injured Max.44,000 Max3,800 Max.17,000 Max.21,000
Refuge Dweller 390,000 24,000 110,000 170,000
【 Damage Prediction of Distribution Pipelines 】

Immediately afterWater Failure 420,000 90,000 230,000 280,000
occurrence Water Failure Rate (%) 38.7 8.0 20.6 25.0
4 days after Water Failure 190,000 3,600 120,000 150,000
occurrence Water Failure Rate (%) 19.1 3.5 11.6 14.7
Damage Rate (point/km) 0.25 0.072 0.14 0.17
3. OVERVIEW OF CONVERSION OF WATERWORKS FACILITIES TO BE

EARTHQUAKE-PROOF
(1) Conversion of Main Facilities to be Earthquake-proof
Nagoya has pursued the conversion of main facilities to be earthquake-proof so that the
estimated earthquakes can be dealt with by “strengthening of facilities,” and by “strengthening
118
of the system.” In “strengthening of facilities,” construction and improvements are
implemented based on earthquake-proof design standards. In “strengthening of the system,”
a backup system is planned to be built in which the water supply can be maintained even if
damage occurs, such as conversion of important distribution mains to multi-pipelined and
mutual connections, an increase in the service reservoir capacity, and installation of emergency
stop valves. (Figure 2)
Strengthening of Facilities Strengthening of System
Earthquake-proof design condition Decentralization arrangement of main facilities
Earthquake-proof Estimated earthquake Two or more affiliations of main pipe

design standard movement
Mutual connection of main facilities
Past earthquake damage Review of disaster An increase in capacity of distribution reservoir

prevention planning
and Installation of emergency stop valve
Advancement of
quake-proof engineering
Power failure measures
Change in earthquake-proof design standard

Backup system construction in emergency
Review of estimated earthquake
Figure2. Basic Philosophy of Making to Earthquake-proof
In The Secondary Waterworks Main Facility Improvement Project now in progress,

improvements are being pursued with emphasis on conversion of the main facilities located in
the soft ground area of western Nagoya to be earthquake-proof by assuming a high probability
of the Tokai and Tounankai earthquakes.
(2) Conversion of Distribution Pipeline Network to be Earthquake-proof
Nagoya began adopting earthquake-resistant pipes in 1980 on a full-scale basis. In the

early days of adoption, southwestern Nagoya, where the ground is soft, was designated as an
“earthquake resistant area” and earthquake-resistant pipes were installed limited to this
designated area. Afterwards, the “earthquake resistant area” was gradually expanded, and in
2002 or after, earthquake-resistant pipes have been adopted in all other water supply areas.
From now on, it is necessary to give priority to implementing the conversion of pipelines
extending the total length to approximately 8,000 km. In The Secondary Distribution Pipeline
Network Improvement Project now in progress, conversion of pipelines to be
earthquake-resistant is being implemented giving priority to pipelines from the distribution
mains to emergency water supply points.
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(3) Provision of Emergency Water Supply Facilities
Nagoya began providing emergency water supply facilities in 1977. Currently, these
facilities are provided at 200 locations and a certain sufficiency has been met in terms of the
number of facilities. Current efforts are to achieve functional improvements in which the
emergency water supply facilities are upgraded to be more practicable and easy for residents to
use in case of disaster.
4. CONCEPT OF EARTHQUAKE-PROOF CONVERSION PLAN
As described above, taking measures against earthquakes is an urgent topic for Nagoya
because of the high probability of large-scale earthquakes occurring. However, converting all
the massive waterworks systems to be earthquake-proof requires an enormous amount of funds
and many years of labor. Thus, the conversion plan for making the waterworks facilities
earthquake-proof has been drawn up considering the following two concepts:
Facilities required to be earthquake-proof have been selected and work on them is

intensively being carried out.
The weakness of earthquake resistance is covered by giving thought to facility operations.
(1) Conversion of Facilities to be Earthquake-proof by Selection and Concentration

Nagoya has been working toward achievement of maximum effects with limited funds
as soon as possible by clarifying the facilities required to be earthquake-proof and intensively
upgrading them. The following introduces three examples of this:
(a) Intensive Earthquake-proof Conversion of a Water Transmission System with a High
Risk
When the amount of water to be secured in case of a large-scale earthquake is calculated
through the overall systems consisting of water intake, water transmission, water purification,
water supply and water distribution, the Asahi Intake system (Asahi system) especially was
revealed to be largely damaged, comparing with Inuyama Intake system (Inuyama system).
The Asahi system (Figure 3) consists of the Asahi Intake, Asahi transmission pipes (φ1800 mm,
3 lines), and the Oharu Water Purification Plant. This facility has been in operation for 60
years, since 1946.
If the Tokai and Tounankai earthquakes strike, serious damage is predicted to occur to
civil engineering structures and raw water transmission pipes in this system, and an average of
only 42% on a clean water purification volume basis is estimated to be secured. Therefore, in
The Secondary Waterworks Main Facility Improvement Project, upgrading has been pursued
so that the amount of water secured from the Asahi system reaches a level of the maximum
water supply volume achieved even in case of a large-scale earthquake.
Figure 3 is a flow diagram of the secured amount of water calculated for each system in
case of the predicted Tokai and Tounankai earthquakes. It is shown that conversion of the
120
facilities to be earthquake-proof with concentration on the Asahi Intake, Asahi raw water
transmission pipes, and Oharu Water Purification Plant results in a situation where the total
secured amount of water, including from the Inuyama system, exceeds the maximum value
achieved even in case of earthquake.
Influence on main facilities due to Tokai and Tounankai Earthquake

Securing
amount of water
Asahi Intake Inuyama Intake
157,000m3 or more 565,000m3 or more 722,000m3 or more

Asahi raw water Inuyama raw water transmission pipe
transmission pipe
157,000m3 or more 565,000m3 or more 722,000m3 or more
Plain Sedimentation
Basin
Oharu purification plant Nabeya-ueno Kasugai purification plant

purification plant
127,000m3 or more 124,000m3 or more 395,000m3 or more 646,000m3 or more
Higashiyama Shidami
77.3% 59.7%
Distribution Station Distribution Station
Idaka 836,161m3 1,082,516m3

Mizuho (average) (maximum)
Daily water consumption
Heiwa Park
Nakagawanishi Kasugano Distribution Station
Narumi
Distribution Station Maintenance necessity
Effect of earthquake measures

Securing
amount of water
Asahi Intake Inuyama Intake
673,000m3 or more 881,000m3 or more 1,554,000m3 or more
Asahi raw water

transmission pipe Inuyama raw water transmission pipe
458,000m3 or more 881,000m3 or more 1,339,000m3 or more
Plain Sedimentation
Basin
Oharu purification plant Nabeya-ueno Kasugai purification plant

purification plant
341,000m3 or more 190,000m3 or more 590,000m3 or more 1,121,000m3 or more
134.1% 103.6%
Higashiyama Shidami
Idaka
836,161m3 1,082,516m3
Mizuho Distribution Station (average) (maximum)
Distribution Station
Daily water consumption
Heiwa park
Nakagawanishi Kasugano Distribution Station
Narumi
Distribution Station Maintenance completion
Figure3. Evaluation of the Securing Amount of Water (before and after of measures)
Improvement work of intake facilities must be carried out without stopping the raw
water intake. Since the Asahi Intake comprises two independent intake systems, it is possible
121
to conduct the work by stopping the service of one system for a long period of time. Also for
raw water transmission pipes, because the Asahi Intake and the water purification plant are
connected using three transmission pipelines, one of the pipelines can be stopped for a long
duration for the replacement work.
Details of the main conversion work to be earthquake-proof are as shown in the table
below.
TABLEⅢ MAIN CONVERSION WORK OF ASAHI SYSTEM

Name of Facilities Content of Work
Intake ----- Undecided -----
Intake Underdrain Rehabilitation & Expansion joint improvement
Facilities Sand Basin No.2 Ground improvement & Structural reinforcement
Pumping Well No.2 ----- Undecided -----
Raw Water Transmission Pipe Replacement & Mutual connection
(b) Intensive Conversion of the Oharu Water Purification Plant to be Earthquake-proof

The Oharu Water Purification Plant supplies water mainly to western Nagoya, taking
charge of 38% of the water supply volume of all of Nagoya City. It also has the function of
partial distribution station. This plant was constructed in 1946 and its facilities have since aged,
and the results of an earthquake resistance analysis revealed that many of its facilities are
insufficient from the viewpoint of earthquake resistance. Moreover, the ground underneath its
foundation is very soft and it is known that the ground has a high risk of liquefaction in case of
an earthquake. Therefore, converting the facilities to be earthquake-proof is being intensively
implemented in a five-year plan that started in 2006.
Improvement work of the water purification plant must be carried out while its facilities
are in operation. Because the Oharu Water Purification Plant has four independent treatment
systems and has a sufficient reserve capacity of 56% average amount of purified water at
maximum purification capacity, it is a water purification plant where upgrading can be done
with the facilities shut down for a long period of time. Therefore, conversion work to make the
facilities earthquake-proof has been progressing relatively smoothly. Details of the main
earthquake-proof conversion work are as shown in the table and figure below.
TABLEⅣ MAIN CONVERSION WORK OF OHARU W.P.P
Name of Facilities Content of Work

Raw Water Open Channel Structural reinforcement
No.1 Sedimentation Basin No.2 Ground improvement & Impervious wall installation
Line Filtration Pond No.2 Ground improvement & Impervious wall installation
Distribution Reservoir No.1 Expansion joint improvement
No.3 Raw Water Open Channel ----- Undecided -----
Line Connecting Pipe Ground improvement & Replacement
Main Building ----- Undecided -----
122
Structural reinforcem ent Structural reinforcem ent
Ｎ
Receiving w ell Raw w ater open channel

Raw w ater open channel
Inflow pipe reinforcem ent

Sedimentation basin No.4
Sedimentat ion basin No.3
Sedimentat ion basin No.1

Structural reinforcem ent
Sedimentation basin No.2 Inflow pipe reinforcem ent

Liquefaction
m eas ures
Outflow pipe reinforcement
Distribution reservoir No.3

Distribution reservoir No.2
Structural reinforcem ent Filtration pond No.2 Filtration pond No.3
Structural reinforcem ent
Distribution
reservoir No.1
Pu mping station Main building
Outflow pipe reinforcement

W ater supply capacity ：127,000 m 3/day W ater supply capacity ：214,000 m 3/day
Figure4. Oharu Water Purification Plant
Distribution Sta tion
Distribution Mai n
Earthquake-resistant
Emergency Water Supply Piping Lines
Securing for Refuge Lines
pe
pi
on
uti
Elementary Emergency　 Water

ib
School Supply Station

s tr
Di
Figure5. Emergency Water Supply Route
(c) Priority Conversion of the Emergency Water Supply Route to be Earthquake-proof

Nagoya has specified distribution pipes up to emergency water supply facilities as
“earthquake-resistant pipelines” and has been replacing them with earthquake-resistant pipes.
In The Secondary Distribution Pipeline Network Improvement Project, improvements are
being pursued on a schedule to complete the conversion of distribution pipes up to the
emergency water supply facilities located in 200 locations by 2010.
In addition, although elementary schools are important facilities that are used as
evacuation sites and as regional disaster preventive centers in case of earthquakes, the schools
with emergency water supply facilities totaled only 52 out of 260 schools. Therefore,
distribution pipes leading to these elementary schools have been specified as “lines of
123
emergency water supply for refuges,” and a plan has been pushed forward to convert the
pipelines to earthquake-resistant piping by 2008.
(2) Covering the Weakness in Terms of Earthquake Resistance by Facility Operation

While proceeding with earthquake-proof facility conversion, Nagoya has also been
pushing forward, in terms of facility operation, with building of a system resistant to
earthquakes from three viewpoints: dispersing risk, securing a backup function, and enhancing
the purified water stock function.
(a) Dispersing Risk

To disperse risk in the event of an earthquake, the most important facilities are multi-line
systems. For raw water transportation, two systems, the Inuyama and Asahi systems, are
provided and three raw-water transmission pipes are provided for each system.
Moreover, for purified water transportation from the water purification plants to the
distribution stations, water conveyance mains are under construction to secure
multi-transmission routes.
(b) Securing a Mutual Facility Backup Function

To provide a backup from another water purification plant in case of functional stoppage
of a water purification plant, the purification plants were connected with each other using main
pipes. Further, the two purification plants are equipped with an emergency power generator to
prepare for a power failure.
(c) Enhancing the Water Stock Function

To secure a readily available volume of water in case of disaster, the capacity of
distribution reservoirs has been increased and earthquake-resistant water storage tanks and
emergency water supply centers have been provided. Moreover, outflow pipes of the
distribution reservoirs and water towers are equipped with emergency stop valves. The total
purified water storage capacity totalizing the capacities of the distribution reservoirs, water
towers, and water storage tanks is now 649,103 m3, indicating that water supply of 12 hours or
more with respect to a design daily maximum water supply volume of 1,244,000 m3 is
secured.
5. CREATION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROMOTING RESIDENTS’

“SELF-HELP”
The provision or upgrading of facilities such as emergency water supply facilities and
equipment and materials warehouses for disasters has achieved sufficiency in terms of quantity
and has reached a time where development of the measures toward the fulfillment of quality is
required.
In 2006, Nagoya established its “Disaster Prevention Ordinances.” These ordinances
clarify the allocation of roles in the event of a disaster based on the concept of “self help,”
“mutual cooperation,” and “public help” and state that residents and businesses must propel
124
the creation of towns resistant to disasters in cooperation with municipal authorities. To
promote the residents’ “self-help” and “mutual cooperation” required in conducting emergency
activities in case of disaster, the administrative organization must create an appropriate
environment for this.
The following describes two examples that have been implemented as environmental
creation for fostering “self-help” efforts.
(1) Provision of Underground Hydrants
The conventional concept of emergency water supply has been that municipal personnel
transport temporary hydrants to emergency water supply facilities and then assemble them to
supply water. However, immediately after occurrence of an earthquake, gathering municipal
personnel is delayed and it is necessary to introduce personnel to emergency recovery. Thus,
the expectation of emergency water supply is placed on residents.
Therefore, Nagoya has developed an underground hydrant-type emergency water supply
facility (underground hydrants) equipped with emergency faucets that enable residents to
operate them by themselves to secure drinking water. (Photo) These hydrants have been
installed in locations near elementary schools (208 schools) that become evacuation sites in
case of a disaster, and video describing how to operate them have been distributed to residents.
(2) Sale of Reserve Drinking Water for Disaster
Nagoya has been selling reserve drinking water for disasters called “Meisui” that can be
stored for three years to promote actions in which residents buy and store water that can last
for three days per person in case of a disaster. (Photo)
For how to save drinking water, in the past Nagoya has encouraged residents to store
tapped water in plastic containers and replace them every three days. However, this approach
required time and effort and was also impractical due to inconvenience in terms of storage.
Thus, water savings was not widely carried out. Moreover, going to an emergency water
supply facility and bringing water back home is a significant burden for aged people or the
sick or wounded. To solve these problems and improve the rate of saving drinking water by
residents, Nagoya began selling “Meisui” from 2006.
Underground Hydrant “Meisui”
125
6. FUTURE TOPICS
(1) Viewpoint of the Facility Maintenance Plan
As described above, converting all of the massive waterworks facilities to be

earthquake-proof requires much time and expense; Nagoya has been proceeding with
upgrading them while pursuing maximization of effects by adopting “selection” and
“concentration.” However, Nagoya City waterworks is now confronted with conditions in
which facilities constructed hurriedly in response to rapid increases in water demands in the
postwar period all enter their renewal period. Moreover, Nagoya City waterworks is also in a
condition such that no increase in water demands is expected, forcing further strict restrictions
on securing funds to provide or upgrade the facilities.
Under these circumstances, facility improvement plans in the future should not be drawn
up from the viewpoint of only a one-to-one relationship of conversion of the facilities to be
earthquake-proof for taking measures against earthquakes. Rather, they must be laid out from a
more multifaceted viewpoint such as upgrading aged facilities, efficient operations of facilities,
conversion of facilities to more efficient sizes, and consideration of environmental
preservation.
(2) Change from Securing Sufficient Quantity to Ensuring Quality
Up to now, Nagoya has worked toward facility enrichment and betterment so that all
residents can reach emergency water supply facilities on foot, and has completed efforts to
provide such facilities in 200 locations. Currently, new efforts are being made to make these
facilities easy to use by and more functional for refugees and municipal personnel.
On the other hand, for stockpiling reserve purified water, a certain sufficiency has been
met in terms of the overall amount of water thanks to provision and upgrading of water
reservoirs, etc.; however, there is still a problem of resolving the regionally uneven distribution
that exists in the amount of water stored.
Future measures against earthquakes must step up from pursuing results indexes such as
the secured amount of water in case of an earthquake or the rate of conversion to be
earthquake-proof, toward a new stage of pursuing quality, in which the results cannot be
represented in numbers.
Finally, since most of the main facilities are now provided as multi-line systems,
upgrading work of the Nagoya City waterworks can be achieved without significant
interference in terms of water handling.
It is our responsibility to pass on to future generations the waterworks developed from
our predecessors’ wisdom and ideas as sustainable waterworks.
126
Fault Crossing Design of a Critical Large Diameter Pipeline.
Ahmed Nisar, and Nikolay Doumbalski
ABSTRACT
The paper describes the analytical basis used for the design of a 66-inch diameter pipeline
crossing the Calaveras Fault, a major strike-slip fault with a high probability of generating an
earthquake as large as Magnitude 7.0 in the next 30 years. The basic design criterion for the pipeline
is to withstand 5 to 6 feet of horizontal and one foot vertical displacement without failure. The new
pipeline together with three existing pipelines (69, 96 and 91 inch diameter) is an important element
of water supply system for San Francisco and surrounding communities. The overall goal for the
project is to provide 120 mgd (approximately 0.5 million cubic meters/day) within 24 hours of a
major earthquake.
A detailed nonlinear analysis of the pipeline subjected to fault displacement is performed using
the ANSYS software. The model uses nonlinear soil and material properties for the pipeline. The
pipeline response was studied using both line and shell element models. The former was used to
predict the global response of the pipeline, and the latter to study cross-sectional deformation,
ovalization and wrinkling of the pipe cross-section. The effects of seam welds on the local wrinkling
and cross-sectional ovalization were also studied. Several parametric studies were performed for the
purposes of design optimization and dealing with uncertainty associated with fault location and
backfill properties.
Ahmed Nisar, Associate, MMI Engineering, 475 14th Street, Suite 400, Oakland, CA, 94612
Nikolay Doumbalski, Project Professional, MMI Engineering, 475 14th Street, Suite 400, Oakland, CA, 94612
1 127
INTRODUCTION
The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) supplies water to over 2.3 million
people in four of the largest San Francisco Bay Area counties. The SFPUC system consists of three
regional water supply and conveyance systems that include the Hetch Hetchy system, the Alameda
system and the Peninsula system.[1] The Hetch Hetchy system is the main water supply source,
providing more than 80% of the total SFPUC system supply. The system originates in central Sierra
Nevada and is supplied by runoff from the upper Tuolomne River. The runoff is collected in three
major reservoirs: the Hetch Hetchy, Lake Lloyd and Lake Eleanor. Water from the reservoirs is
diverted through a series of tunnels and aqueducts into the San Joaquin pipelines that transport water
across the Central Valley to the Bay Area. Three large diameter pipelines called the Alameda
Siphons transfer water through the Sunol Valley, across the Calaveras Fault. This paper describes the
analytical basis for the design of a new (66-inch diameter) fourth pipe line, the Alameda Siphon No. 4
(AS4). The SFPUC water system is shown in Figure 1.
Hayward Fault
Calaveras Fault
Alameda Siphons
San Andreas Fault
Source: http://sfwater.org
Figure 1. Hetch-Hetchy Regional Water System Map
As shown in Figure 1, the Alameda siphons cross the Calaveras Fault, a major
northwest-southeast trending strike slip fault. The Calaveras Fault is one of the most active faults in
the Bay Area. The Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities has estimated an 11%
probability of a Magnitude 6.7 or greater on the Calaveras fault in the next 30 years.[2] Geologic and
seismicity studies show the fault to be segmented with the northern segment significantly distinct
from its segment to the south. The fault segment of interest to the siphons has a geologic slip rate of
6+/-2 mm/yr and is considered capable of producing an earthquake as large as magnitude 7.0.
Surface fault rupture displacement associated with such an event is estimated to be on the order of
five to six feet lateral and up to one foot vertical. [2, 3]
The three existing siphons consisting of the Alameda Siphon No. 1 (AS1), a 69-inch reinforced
concrete cylinder pipe built in 1933, the Alameda Siphon No. 2 (AS2), a 91-inch welded steel pipe
built in 1952 and the Alameda Siphon No. 3 (AS3), a prestressed concrete cylinder pipe built in 1966
were not explicitly designed to withstand large fault displacements, and are likely to fail during a
2 128
surface rupturing event on the Calaveras Fault. Out of these, the AS2 with double lap welded joints
has some potential for withstanding relatively large ground displacements. However, due to stress
concentrations caused by the presence of structural features such as valve and chemical injection
vaults within the fault deformation zone, it is unlikely that AS2 is capable of withstanding the
expected fault displacement.
As shown in Figure 1, the Alameda siphons transfer water from the east to water customers to the
west. Because of their importance to water delivery, the SFPUC has assigned a high performance
standard for the design of the new AS4. Accordingly, the performance criteria is to provide 120
million gallons per day (MGD) within 24 hours of a major earthquake.
At the time of the writing of this paper, the project is still in progress with both the design work
and the fault investigation and interpretive work ongoing. This paper describes the analytical
approach being used for the design of the new siphon, and the results from the first cycle of design
and analysis process. The paper also highlights some of the challenges in proceeding with analysis
and design tasks, to meet the project schedule, in parallel with ongoing field geologic and
geotechnical investigations and interpretive work.
PIPELINE ALIGNMENT AND PROFILE
The proposed new and existing siphons run in an east-west direction across the Sunol Valley
between the Coast Range Tunnel (CRT) to the east and the Irvington Tunnel to the west. The
siphons’ connection to each tunnel is though a 10.5 feet diameter and 53 feet long manifold pipe. The
new siphon will connect to the CRT manifold through a modification of AS2 connection. From the
manifold, the new pipeline is routed under the Calaveras Road and across the Calaveras Fault.
Further downstream, the pipeline crosses beneath the Alameda Creek and then connects to a mixing
chamber that blends water from all four siphons. The mixing chamber is then connected to the
Irvington Tunnel.
A preliminary alignment and conceptual design for the new pipeline were developed as part of
planning studies.[3] The alignment consisted of crossing the fault at a 26 degree angle to minimize
compression and bending response of the pipeline subjected to fault rupture displacement. The
proposed alignment of the conceptual design was modified somewhat to accommodate several
existing physical features in the proximity of the fault zone. The revised alignment is shown in
Figure 2.
An important consideration for fault crossing design is to maximize the tensile response of the
pipeline and minimize the presence of structural features that could result in localized compression
and stress concentrations. Therefore, within the zone of large pipe strains resulting from fault rupture
displacement, vertical and horizontal alignment changes and presence of hard points such as valves
should be avoided. In addition, use of loose backfill that allows the pipeline to deform, laterally and
axially, without significant soil resistance substantially improves pipeline response. A major
challenge for this project was to not only to include all the special design features required for a fault
crossing design but also that the design met the constraints imposed by the presence of existing
features and constructability issues. Some of the most significant constraints included: (a) the
relatively close proximity of the fault zone to the CRT manifold; (b) steep vertical grade change to
connect to the CRT manifold; (c) close proximity of the Calaveras Road to the fault zone, and hence a
requirement for dense subgrade to carry heavy traffic loads; (d) provision of an emergency shutoff
valve between the manifold and the fault zone, thereby introducing a hard point; and (e) minimizing
loads to the existing manifold, which is not designed to carry large forces. Each one of these
3 129
constraints imposes significant restrictions on the pipeline design, which must be accommodated for
the design to be viable.
PLAN 100 feet wide

Calaveras
Fault Zone
Calaveras
Road
Smoothed Bend
(5 Degree Miters)
Existing
Pump Station
Connection to Concrete Encased Alameda Creek CRT Manifold

Mixing Chamber Crossing (108 inch diameter)
PROFILE
Figure 2. Alameda Siphon No. 4 – Alignment and Profile
APPROACH
The approach used for the project consisted of design through detailed analysis. This approach
constitutes utilizing successively refined analytical models as the design evolves. The process
involves systematically developing insights into the structural response of the pipeline and using
these insights to guide subsequent design decisions, which are then included in a more refined
analytical model for the next design cycle until the design and analysis process converges. The scope
of the first cycle of analysis, presented in this paper, was to assess any fatal flaws in the design
concept while recognizing that the field investigation work was not completed. In an effort to
maintain the project schedule, the analysis work included parametric studies with reasonably
conservative assumptions so that other design tasks could proceed, with the intention of further
refining the analytical model as additional information becomes available.
To study the pipeline response subjected to fault rupture displacements, a nonlinear finite element
analysis was performed using the ANSYS[5] general purpose finite element program. The model
included large displacement, nonlinear material properties for the pipe steel and nonlinear soil
springs.
Description of Finite Element Model
Two different finite element models were developed. The first used line elements to assess the
global response of the pipeline, and the second used shell elements to model the portion of the
pipeline most impacted by the fault rupture to study the local cross-sectional wrinkling and
ovalization.
The line element model was developed using PIPE20, a special pipe element in ANSYS capable
of large displacement and plastic deformation. The element has eight integration points along its
circumference and is a better predictor of pipeline response than a simple beam element. A total of
4 130
394 pipe elements ranging in size from 6 to 12 feet were used, with the smaller element lengths used
in the vicinity of the fault zone. The geometry of the line element model is shown in Figure 2.
The shell element model was developed using nonlinear shell elements to capture the localized
behavior of the pipeline within the fault zone. Initially 24 elements across the cross section were
used, which was later refined to 48 elements across the cross section. The refinement was based on
results of the 24 element model that did not seem to capture the cross sectional deformation
adequately. The element size for the 48 element model was approximately 4.3 inch squares. The
linear extent of the shell element models was extended to the point where the results of the line
element model showed negligible pipe strain. All nodes at the endpoints of the shell element model
were assumed to move with the soil (i.e. no relative displacement between pipe and soil). A total of
28, 416 elements constituted the 48 element model. In general, the runtime associated with the model
was reasonable, however, for some analysis cases with large plastic deformations and cross section
ovalization the run time on a 64bit “AMD Opteron Dual Core” processor excided 48 hours.
Soil Modeling
The resistance to pipe movement provided by the backfill and insitu soil was included in the finite
element model through the use of bi-linear soil springs specified at each node of the model. For the
initial set of analyses, the springs were computed using established procedures.[6, 7] Four spring
values for each node were specified that included an axial spring to model resistance to deformation
along the pipe-soil interface, a lateral springs to capture the lateral resistance of backfill and a set of
up and down springs to model the, upward and downward resistance of soil to pipe displacement.
The spring formulation used for the computation of spring values are a function of outside
diameter and burial depth of the pipeline, in addition to various soil properties. Because burial depth
and the outside pipeline diameter (due to concrete encasement under Calaveras Road and Alameda
Creek) is not constant along the pipeline unique springs values were computed for each node of both
the line and shell element models.
For the shell element model a total of 56,736 nonlinear spring elements were used. Parametric
studies using 50% and 200% of the computed spring values were performed to capture the
uncertainty in computation of soil springs, the possible variation in soil properties because of ongoing
geotechnical investigations and interpretations, and possible modification to pipeline profile.
Surface Fault Displacement
Due to ongoing geologic investigations at the time of the first cycle of design and analysis a 100
foot wide zone, as shown in Figure 2, was assumed. This zone had been identified as the possible
location of the main trace of the Calaveras Fault from the initial set of geologic investigations. To
study the impact of the uncertainty in the exact fault location within the fault zone, analyses were
conducted assuming the fault to be located along the eastern and the western margins of this 100 foot
wide zone. Locating the fault at the eastern margin of the fault zone represented a conservative
interpretation with regards to pipeline response beneath the Calaveras Road and the connection to the
CRT manifold, while its location along the western margin of the fault zone represented a
conservative interpretation with regards to possible stress concentration at the change in alignment
west of the fault zone (Figure 2). For each assumed fault location, the total rupture displacement was
applied over one element length by incrementally displacing all soil anchor point nodes to the east of
the assumed fault location.
5 131
ANALYSIS RESULTS
For the first design cycle, analyses were conducted assuming 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 inch pipe thickness
in the area of influence of fault rupture, which was taken as 100 feet on either side of the 100 foot
wide fault zone (total length of 300 feet). The pipeline alignment was constrained based on
conceptual design and constructability requirements. The remainder of the pipe was assumed to have
0.5-inch wall thickness. The backfill properties were assumed to represent native soil conditions, i.e.
no special conditions such as special trench with loose backfill. Use of a special trapezoidal trench
with loose backfill within the fault zone reduces the axial and lateral restraint to pipe and allows it to
deform to accommodate large fault displacement[6]. To study the effect of variability in backfill
properties and spring computations, additional analyses using 50% and 200% of soil springs
representing native backfill conditions were performed for the pipe with 0.75-inch wall thickness. An
additional analysis using softer springs within the 300-foot long fault rupture influence zone to model
the effect of loose backfill was also considered.
The results from the various line element models show that by increasing the pipe thickness from
0.5 to 0.75 inches the maximum tensile strain decreases by about 29% and by an additional 17% if the
pipe thickness is increased to 1.0 inches (the maximum tensile strain for a 0.5 inch pipe is over 5%
while that for a 1.0 inch pipe it is close to 3%). In general, for maintaining pressure integrity
allowable tensile strains below 4% to 5% and allowable compressive strains below 2% to 3% for
similar pipeline size and diameter to thickness ratios as AS4 are recommended[7]. The results with
50% reduction in soil spring stiffness show a 41% reduction in maximum tensile strain. For the case
in which the spring stiffness was increased by a factor of two, non-convergence occurred at five feet
of fault displacement compared to 6.25 feet for the other cases. The maximum tensile strain at five
feet of displacement was close to 6%. Sample results for the 0.5-inch thick pipe and an assumed 6.25
feet of fault displacement applied at the eastern edge of the fault zone are shown in Figure 3.
Based on the results from the line element model, it appears that the 0.75 and 1.0 inch thick pipes
perform substantially better than the 0.5 inch thick pipe. However, results from the shell element
model show significantly higher localized tensile strains for the 0.75 inch thick pipe. Compared to
the line element model, the maximum tensile strain for the shell element model is close to two times
that of the line element model. The results also show close to 35% reduction in cross sectional area
with maximum compressive strains greater that 10%. The shell element model shows that by
increasing the pipe thickness from 0.75 to 1.0 inch the maximum tensile strains are further reduced by
approximately 45% and the maximum compressive strain by a factor of over three with a
corresponding reduction in cross sectional area of just 5%. The main reason for this difference in the
line element and shell element model results is the ability to more accurately capture large strains
along the cross-section in the shell element model, which cannot be captured in the line element
model.
Parametric studies to evaluate the impact of steel grade and alignment change did not show a very
significant improvement in the pipeline performance. However, the impact of loose backfill on pipe
performance was substantial. For the 0.75 inch thick pipe the maximum tensile and compressive
strains were reduced in half. The reduction in cross sectional area for this case was 25% compared to
35% that did not consider special trench. Similarly for the 1.0 inch thick pipe, the reduction in
maximum tensile and compressive strains by using the special trench were 17% and 31%,
respectively and the reduction in cross sectional area of only 2% with no wrinkling. Sample results
6 132
from the shell element model for the 0.75-inch thick pipe with standard backfill properties
representing native soil conditions are shown in Figure 4.
An important consideration for the pipeline subjected to large displacements is to minimize zones
of potential stress concentrations. Ideally for such applications, a seamless pipe would be preferred.
However, for a 66-inch outside diameter pipeline the only viable options are either longitudinal or
spiral welded pipe. A preliminary set of analysis using shell elements was conducted for the 1.0 inch
thick pipe including detailed modeling of the longitudinal seam welds. The results from the analysis
show slightly lower cross-sectional deformation (1% reduction in cross sectional area compared to
2%) and a significant reduction in compressive strains (approximately 27%). This is possibly due to
the stiffening effect of the welds that reduces the cross sectional deformation and compressive strains.
Maximum
Compressive
Strain = 0.051
Maximum
Compressive
Strain = -0.015
Legend:
Tensile
Strain
Legend:
Compressive
Strain
Applied Fault
Displacement
= 6.25 feet
Figure 3. Sample Results Line Element Model
7 133
Maximum Tensile Strain (7.4%) Maximum Tensile Strain (3.3%)
at 5 feet of Fault Displacement at 6 feet of Fault Displacement
(0.75 inch pipe) (1.00 inch pipe)
Max. Compressive Strain (8.2%) Maximum Compressive Strain (2.2%)

at 10 feet of Fault Displacement at 6 feet of Fault Displacement
(1.00 inch pipe) (1.00 inch pipe)
Figure 4. Sample Results Shell Element Model
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the analytical basis for the design of a critical large diameter water pipeline
crossing a major active fault. Due to the critical nature of the pipeline, the performance criteria calls
for continued operation and maintaining pressure integrity and providing 120 mgd within 24 hours of
a major a surface rupturing earthquake on the Calaveras Fault. Nonlinear finite element analyses are
conducted using the ANSYS software to support the pipeline design. The analytical aspect of the
work has been integrated in the early design process to provide greater insight and minimize design
iterations.
The results of the analysis show that especially for a large diameter pipe with a large D/t ratio a
detailed shell element model provides essential information regarding cross-sectional deformation
such as ovalization and local wrinkling that the typically used line element model does not.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Work presented in this paper is part of the SFPUC’s Alameda siphons project. Ms. Annie Li is
the SFPUC Project Manager for this project and Mr. Sam Young, the Project Engineer. Other key
individuals from the SFPUC include Mr. Ramon Garcia, Mr. David Hung, Mr. Joseph Buitrago, Mr.
Joseph Haas and Mr. Steven Shaw.
8 134
MMI Engineering is a part of the Black & Veatch/AGS Joint Venture (BV/AGS JV) team
responsible for the project. The work presented in this paper is part of a collaborative effort between
several key individuals on the team. We acknowledge the support of Mr. Arne Nervik and Dr. Chris
Mueller of Black & Veatch, respectively Project Engineer and Project Manager for the BV/AGS JV
supported by Mr. Paul Kneitz, Alex Christenson, and Jimmy Leong of Black & Veatch, Mr. Bahram
Khamenehpour of AGS, Inc. supported by Mr. Mikko Valkonen and Doug Herold of AGS, Mr. Keith
Kelson and Mr. Sean Sundermann of William Lettis & Associates, Mr. Andy Herlache and Michael
Boone of Fugro and Mr. Tony Dover of Geosyntec Consultants technical reviewer for the project.
REFERENCES
[1] Bay Area Water Users Association, “Water Supply Master Plan” April 2000
[2] Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities, “Earthquake Probabilities in the San Francisco Bay Region:
2002 – 2031”, USGS Open File Report 03-214, 2003
[3] Kelson, K.I., 2001, “Geologic characterization of the Calaveras fault as a potential seismic source, San Francisco Bare
Area, California”, in Ferriz, H. and Anderson, R., eds., Engineering Geology Practice in Northern California, Association
of Engineering Geologists: California Division of Mines and Geology, Special Publication 210, p. 15-28
[4] Water Infrastructure Partners (WIP), “New Irvington Tunnel Conceptual Engineering Report”, for San Francisco
Public Utilities Commission, Project No. CUW 35901, September 2005
[5] ANSYS Release 10.0, ANSYS Inc., Southpointe, 275 Technology Drive, Canonsburg, PA 15317, www.ansys.com
[6] Pipeline Research Council International, Inc. (PRCI), “Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural
Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines, Catalog No. L51927, October 1, 2004
[7] American Lifelines Alliance (ALA), “Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines”, www.americanlifelinesalliance.org,
March 2005
9 135
136
SESSION 3
Outreach, Education and Communications for Earthquake Risks
Mr. Kazuhiko Mizuguchi, Kobe Municipal Waterworks, Kobe, JAPAN – “Seismic Practices
and Strategies of Public Relations in Kobe City”
Prof. Adam Rose, University of Southern California, US – “Regional Economic Analysis of

Earthquake Losses, Mitigation and Resilience”
Dr. Nagahisa Hirayama, Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institute, Kobe, JAPAN
– “Participatory Planning in Development of Comprehensive Crisis
Management Plan for Water Supply Authorities”
Mr. Luke Cheng, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco, CA, US –
“Seismic Aspects of the SFPUC Water System Improvement Program”
Mr. Shinji Nakayasu, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, Hyogo, JAPAN – “Information
Provision to Residents on Construction of Regulating Reservoir at Landslide
Site Caused by an Earthquake”
137
138
Seismic practices and Strategies of Public Relations
in Kobe City
Kazuhiko MIZUGUCHI1
ABSTRACT
Kobe Water has been promoting various seismic practices on some lessons learned from the
Hanshin-Awaji disaster. There have been several great earthquakes since 1995. As we obtained some
new knowledge from those disasters, we are reconsidering the policy of seismic practices. Since, it
has been passed 12 and a half years, about quarter of the residents in Kobe has not experienced the
Great Earthquake. This means the lack of recognition for the terrible disaster.
Some great earthquakes are supposed to occur in the near future around KANSAI region. It is very
important to mitigate a disaster , we should make public seismic practices and correspondence after
the earthquake for the citizen for this reason.
We usually take seismic practices into consideration when the aged facilities are replaced and
reconstructed. Especially, we have promoted to install the distribution pipes connecting to the
hospitals and disaster prevention centers by priority. We have a research program for evaluation of
existing distribution pipes. By this program, we decide priority for replacement of pipes with a
limited budget. And, a similar program on transmission and conveyance facilities is under
development.
We are constructing Emergency Water Supply System, Large Capacity Transmission Main, and so
on. And we make public the progress of those seismic practices on our website and through
emergency exercises to the citizen. Despite this, the citizens do not know the actual situation. And
they are eager for seismic upgrading.
We will install a drinking fountain at some elementary schools that will become the disaster
prevention centers. Those facilities have function of emergency water supply at the time of disasters.
We call this “ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI”, which means the water supply can be served anytime even in
an early stage of disaster. We want to use this as a communication tool to the consumers.
We know it is very important to make public our practices to mitigate the effect of disaster as well
as the seismic practices. In this paper, the author describes the details of recent seismic practices and
the strategies of public relations.
Kazuhiko MIZUGUCHI , Manager, Planning and Design Division, Kobe City Waterworks Bureau
6-5-1, Kanou-cho, Tyuou-ku, Kobe, 650-8570, Japan
139
１． Introduction
Kobe City is the beautiful port city located on the north side of Osaka bay, and it is one of the famous
tourist spots in Japan. The population is about 1.53 million. But, a lot of the infrastructure suffered
terrible damage by the Great Earthquake that deprived 6,434 lives in 1995.
Kobe Water has been proceeding with seismic practices of the water supply system on “Basic Plan
for Earthquake- resistant Water Supply Facilities”. That is based on some related opinions and our
experiences during the disaster. There were so many disasters by great earthquakes all over the world
recently. Because we could get a lot of new knowledge from them, we should verify the present plan
of seismic practices.
The population of Kobe City was decreased about 100,000 right after the disaster. It took about 9
years to exceed the population before the earthquake. And that shows a tendency to increase even
now. Since it has been passed 12 and a half years, about quarter of the residents in Kobe did not
experience the Great Earthquake. This means the lack of recognition for the terrible disaster.
Our staff members who were active in the forefront at the time of the disaster did already retire in
large quantities. For those reasons, it is concerned to fade away the lessons against the disaster.
Some ocean type great earthquakes are supposed to occur in the near future around KANSAI
region. There is 50 or 60% probability of occurrence within 30 years. Therefore we should promote
the whole seismic practices of the water supply system.
It is very important to share accurate information about the seismic practices, and the
correspondence after an earthquake between water supplier and the consumers. And, we think the
training in cooperation with the citizen is very useful to mitigate the effect of disaster.
In this paper, the author describes the details of recent seismic practices in Kobe City, and about
“ITUDEMO-JYAGUTI” that is one of the strategies of public relations.
２． The Outline of Kobe Water
Kobe City has no large rivers and lakes that are reserved as water sources. Therefore, Kobe Water
is obligated to depend on about 75% of its entire water demand from the Hanshin Water Supply
Authority; that draws water from Lake BIWA and the YODO River. Since our main water source is
depends on the east side of the city area, the length of transmission and distribution pipes is about
5,000km.
And there are 3 reservoirs and 6 water purification plants. And it is a characteristic that the number
of the distribution reservoirs is 251 in 123 places because of the mountainous district. We adopt the
gravitational water supply system with those facilities.
３． The Policy of Seismic practices on the Water Supply Facilities
Kobe water started to promote seismic practices such as seismic design against the previous
earthquakes, adoption of seismic joint, construction of Emergency Storage System, before the
disaster.
Moreover, we divided a pipe network in some blocks, and connected neighboring ones, so that
each of them had a mutual backup function for disasters and accidents. But, terrible damage
especially appeared on the pipeline in coastal area and the man-made island.
140
But, the main facilities such as distribution reservoirs and purification plants suffered hardly
damage by the Great Earthquake, because those were built on the firm ground of the foot of a
mountain area. The acceleration of the earthquake wave in mountain area was relatively small, and
those facilities were designed as the watertight structures with the decreased allowable stress.
We have been promoting seismic practices on the Basic Plan. We have been carrying out the
effective investment in seismic practices with a limited budget, because a large amount of facilities
will have to be renewed in the near future.
And, we installed the monitoring and controlling system for central control, because there were a
lot of scattered water supply facilities in the city. A back-up system was built for the seismic
upgrading of those systems after the disaster. For example, we promoted a duplication of
communication network and incoming circuit, and installed private electric generators.
The outline of main seismic practices is as follows.
1) Distribution Pipes
As the distribution pipes suffered by 1,757 places, the seismic practices of distribution pipes were
carried out mainly and preferentially after the disaster. That length of replacement is about 118km.
Especially the aged pipes of the 500m-grid trunk line have been replaced for the seismic practices.
Since there was no water at the time of the disaster, there were so many troubles in the city; an
operation at the hospitals and refuse burning at the incineration plants. For that, the distribution pipes
which connect to those facilities and the emergency stations have been making seismic upgrading.
We have been making replacement of the distribution pipes, in accordance with the redevelopment
projects and the road repair works after the disaster. The rate of replacement to the whole length
(about 4,600km) is about 28% as that result. As for the 500m-grid trunk line, that is about 42%.
The rate is about 33% in the downtown area where the damage was terrible. On the other hand, the
rate is only about 25 % in the northern and western area; those were developed as new towns and
industrial parks after the 1960's. Therefore, we must replace them for seismic practices, when large
quantities of water supply facilities are renewed.
We have "the mapping system" which records type of pipe material and joint, diameter,
construction age, position of underground installation. This system has been applied since 1991.
Recently, we developed “the Pipe Network Restructuring Program” with the use of this system. The
data of accident records, ground condition such as liquefaction and corrosion soil, and substitutive
function are installed in this program. Since this program can evaluate a distribution pipe network
totally, we can decide the priority of renewal and seismic upgrading among a lot of distribution pipes.
TABLE I. THE CONDITIONS OF SEISMIC PRACTICES ON DISTRIBUTION PIPES

〔Unit : km〕
Route Seismic Pipe Total extension (A/B)
extension (B)
500m-grid line 270 650 42%
200m-grid line 320 1,060 30%
Others 690 2,890 24%
Total 1,280 4,600 28%
141
Mapping System
Database Renewal of
Investigation, Measurement Data Pipeline
・Remaining Chlorine Concentration
・Corrosion Conditions of Pipe Body
Program ・Water pressure etc.
Diagnosis of Pipe Network Function Evaluation Planning

Hydraulic Analysis
Priority of renewal
Demander service
Cost-effectiveness
Planning of Renewal,
Water Quality Analysis
Seismic Practices
Aging Analysis
Seismic Reliability Analysis Planning and

Countermeasure
Total Importance of the Emergency
Fig.-1.The Outline of the Pipe Network Restructuring Program
2) Reservoirs
The NUNOBIKI reservoir served from 3,640

1900 was carried out emergency restoration
with mortar grout, because water leakage had Full Water Level
increased after the earthquake. The expert 0
30
committee made the conclusion on the risk of R=
turnover after examining the resistance to
(Unit : m)
earthquake. Therefore, after the construction of
a temporary road and making a reservoir
33,330
empty, we reinforced with concrete "fillet" that

was increased on the dam bank inside of the
body. And an existent bank body was
upgraded structurally. The work period was
about 3 and a half years, and the construction Filet
was completed in March 2005.
There was no problem by the diagnosis as 通廊
for two other reservoirs, but we are verifying
the safety on the large-scale earthquake in this 23,693
year again.
1,000 4,547
Fig.-2. Seismic practices of the NUNOBIKI Reservoir
142
3) Distribution Reservoirs
As the seismic practices of the distribution pipes; suffering of terrible damage, did progress to a
certain extent, we decided to promote the seismic practices of the main facilities that were hardly
suffered with the disaster.
There are 123 distribution reservoir sites in Kobe City. Though each construction age of all
reservoirs is different, but we can find out some similarities among a lot of structures. We do not
think it is not necessary to analyze and diagnose for all reservoirs, so we sorted them into several
groups. We picked up the typical one in term of repair time, ground condition, structure type before
we are diagnosed them.
The following points were found out by examining the result of the analysis about the RC
distribution reservoir with four walls.
(1) The earthquake resistance ability with two-dimensional analysis is underestimated, as a result of
the three-dimensional analysis. Because the effect of four walls is not being taken into
consideration.
(2) The decay constant of the structure against the large-scale earthquake is provided 5% in the
present seismic design in Japan, but we think it should be about 15% because of the width of deck
slab. As a result, it is considered that a resistance to earthquake is underestimated.
As for the PC distribution reservoirs, we are diagnosing them at present.

The deterioration diagnosis of each distribution reservoir is being carried out about the
neutralization, the deterioration conditions of coating layer, the existence of crack, and so on, to
figure out the situation on the structures for the analysis. Moreover, we must consider "the level of
accumulated damage" to verify the analytic validity of the facilities that have suffered an
earthquake disaster.
For example, as for the distribution pipes that suffered liquefaction, their joints may separate at
the time of a large earthquake, in case that displacement of the joints has been reached almost
maximum value to an acceptable one. We must confirm the accurate displacement of the pipeline
after disasters. As for the structures that were suffered once and needed no repair work, it is not
always true to get same damage, even if an exactly same earthquake would occur.
We must figure out the structural deformation and crack information precisely after an
earthquake. When a resistance to earthquake is evaluated, the level of accumulated damage must
be taken into consideration. We need to try to evaluate the degree of influence on the repair
history.
4) Conveyance and Transmission Tunnels
The existing transmission tunnels located in the east and west of the city area may be taken some
suffering. As there were no substitutive facilities to renew the damaged tunnels, we had been
constructing “Large Capacity Transmission Main (LATM)” from right after the disaster. We
connected existing transmission tunnel and the branch line of LCTM each other this spring, based on
the result of laboratory experiment. As a result, ladder-shaped transmission network was formed.
We can make the existing transmission tunnel empty, and start internal investigation and renewal.
143
　　　　　　　　
　　　　　 ③
　　　　　Ｌｅｇｅｎｄ SANDA Prefecture SENGARI
　　　　　
City Water
　　　　　①　　　　　　　　　②＋④
②　　　　　　　　 ①＋⑤ Prefecture
　　　　②＋③ E.C.P Water ②
①＋②
　　　　
Private Water MIKI City NISHINOMIYA

Supply System City
⑤
④ ASHIYA
City
NUNOBIKI ①
KARASUHARA
HANSHIN
AKASHI Water
City
①＋River
E.P.C : Emergency contact pipe ①＋NUNOBIKI
FIG.-3.The duplication of Transmission Facilities and Water Sources
There are two different transmission facilities, one is a mountain tunnel and other is a steel pipe in a
shield tunnel, therefore the redundancy of transmission function improves greatly in terms of route
and structure type. LCTM also has a storage function, so emergency water would be supplied in the
urban area.
Like this, we promote to make the dual transmission facility and to supply water from the different
source as possible. For example, we constructed the connection pipes between downtown area and a
part of the northern area of ROKKO mountain chain. As a result, we could decrease the running cost
in comparison with the watering from the self-source in the distance.
The distribution reservoirs and other main facilities (such as reservoirs, conveyance and
distribution tunnels, purification plants and pump facilities) must have substitution function in times
of disaster and renewal. We have been creating "the water supply system reliability evaluation
program" which decides the priority of renewal and seismic upgrading by evaluating the reliability of
the water supply system. As well as the distribution pipe network, the elements of evaluation consist
of the influence degree to consumers at the time of the disaster, existence of substitution functions,
and so on.
At present, we define the accident rate and water volume of each facility as the influence degree.
We will modify this influence degree by considering the capacity of distribution reservoir or the
availability of backup system, for instance.
Moreover, we are carrying out the diagnosis on the resistance to the disaster and deterioration
about the pond-shaped structure. We are eager to improve the accuracy of this program.
144
　・Aging (Distribution block) Reservoir
　・Seismic Backup function
Upgrading
　・Flux
Pump place P P
Network Joint Well
Analysis Purification
Transmission tunnel
Plant
Distribution 　Reservoir
At Suspension
of water supply
・probability
・population
(Distribution block)
LCTM
Fig. 4.The Image of Water supply system Reliability Evaluation Program
４． Disaster Mitigation
1) Policy on Emergency Watering
We have promoted to construct the emergency storage systems, as well as the seismic practices of
the pipeline and the main facilities. There were 18 systems which had already been completed at the
time of the disaster, and emergency water of about 42,000㎥could be secured. The water supply was
carried to the emergency stations such as parks and schools by trucks. And, we received emergency
water of about 2,200㎥ per day at the end of the water pipe network, through two emergency contact
pipes between Kobe City and the neighboring water suppliers.
Since these policies were proved to be very effective, these facilities have been prepared actively in
addition to LCTM that had storage function. We have a plan on the emergency storage system that is
constructed at the rate in every 2km radius from the system because of efficient conveyance of water
supply trucks. The number of this system is 47 to cover the whole city. 37 systems are completed at
present, and emergency water is secured about 54,000㎥.
Table-Ⅱ. THE SECURING AMOUNT OF EMERGENCY SUPPLY WATER

〔㎥〕
Facilities Securing Amount at Present Reference
(㎥)
Large Capacity Transmission Pipe 17,000 L=3. 8km The final: 59,000㎥
Emergency Storage system 54,000 37 places The final: 47 places
Other Water Tank 1,700 5 places
Emergency Contact Pipe 8,800 7 places 5 cities, per day
145
As the author mentioned before, emergency watering is supposed to be done by the water supply
trucks right after the disaster. After the water pipes are confirmed restoration in series, emergency
watering is done with "An emergency hydrant" like a fire hydrant in the road near the residence. This
is prepared every 500m in the main distribution pipe of φ 300mm and more.
2) Mutual Aid
We could have an aid from the neighboring government right after the disaster, and an emergency
contact pipes between neighboring water suppliers were effective, because the suffering range was
comparatively limited. And there are 10 mutual aid agreements for disasters with other local
governments.
Suffering is predicted extensively with the ocean type great earthquake that will be expected to
occur in the near future. In such occasion, the neighboring governments also may suffer, and we may
not be able to expect an aid from them. Therefore, it is very important to have a mutual aid agreement
among 15 large cities in Japan. In case of Kobe City, Osaka City and Hiroshima City are assigned as
the mutual aid city.
５． New Strategy of Public Relations “ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI”
1) Purpose
We have promoted seismic practices of the facilities and securing of the backup function, because
we should enhance the stability of the whole water supply system. Especially, the seismic practices
of the distribution pipes toward the schools and the emergency hospitals were being carried out
preferentially.
As for the progress of those seismic practices, we make public by the public relations community
papers and our website, and so on till now. Moreover, some of our staff members have explained
those progresses to the students at schools as “a delivery service talk", and the citizen through the
emergency water training.
The water supply facilities are away from the city area, and the pipeline is installed under the
ground. Consequently, it is said that the citizen doesn't know the progress of seismic practices on the
water supply system, even though those facilities are earthquake-resistant. We investigated the needs
of customers last September. This investigation says 86% was eager for the seismic practices of the
water supply system, but only 28% recognized the actual state of them.
On the other hand, the citizen understands the seismic practices of the school building, because
they can see the reinforcement with some braces visually.
Therefore, we are planning to install "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI." as a symbol of our seismic
practices at five elementary schools every year from now. We want to make the citizen to notice the
progress state of seismic practices on the water supply system. That is a drinking fountain with a
function as an emergency water tap at the time of disaster.
The emergency water can be served right after the disaster with this facility, so we call this
"ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI", that means the faucet which supplies water anytime even though it’s the
early stage of disaster.
146
2) Outline of Plan
It is no wonder that the water usually comes out from the faucet in daily life, but the citizen never
know the worth of water till a disaster or an accident happens to occur.
We promote seismic practices on the distribution pipes toward the emergency stations. That is, we
have replaced the aged pipes to the earthquake-resistant pipes between the distribution reservoir and
the emergency stations perfectly. But, since the total extension of the distribution pipes is so long, the
rate of those pipes is only 22%.
We decided to make the distribution pipes to the elementary school earthquake-resistant. Kobe
Water constructs the earthquake-resistant pipe to "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI", that is a drinking
fountain adopted universal design at the elementary school playground. We prepare it at the corner of
the school playground to catch the notice of the students and the citizen.
A temporary water stand is stored in the emergency school warehouse. If the local residents
connect it to an emergency tap of "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI", watering becomes possible right after
the disaster. We set up the signboard explaining its purpose with the local residents cooperatively.
Distribution Reservoir
Distribution pipe
Itsudemo-
jaguchi
Fig.-5.The Outline of “ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI”
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3) Effects
The purpose of "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI" is to make the citizen to notice the actual progress state
of seismic practices on the water supply system. And, we expect to promote a risk communication
with the citizen. In addition to that, the following effects can be expected.
(1) The closer emergency water system can be built up right after the disaster, because
emergency watering is possible at the elementary school that is a close place to the residence.
Emergency watering activity by the tank cars can be mitigated.
(2) The emergency watering activities by the area inhabitant become possible, so our staff
members can devote themselves to the restoration of the water supply system. The early
restoration of the water supply system is expected.
(3) We can make the students and the residents notice the safety and freshness of the tap water,
because this tap water is supplied from the distribution reservoir directly.
(4) As most of elementary schools have water storage tanks. We can have an opportunity to
make the schools change to the water supply system without storage tanks, because Kobe
Water installs "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI" and bears the cost of it.
(5) It is expected that the maintenance of the facility and the training on the emergency watering
by the resident promote revitalization and nurturing of local communities.
(6) A suffering experience can be acceded to the next generation through the disaster prevention
education.
As the author mentioned before, we can expect a lot of effects by "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI". We

think it is a very effective and strategic means of the public information for the water supply activity.
In Kobe City, the temporary rest rooms connected with the public drain directly are been
constructing one after another, but those must use water of the swimming pool and rainwater at the
emergency stations. We should collaborate with the strategic on sewage and other emergency
policies at the elementary school. As a result, we can make the elementary schools be the integrated
emergency stations. We will have a total plan by connection with the related departments and
organizations.
６． Conclusion
Kobe Water must keep supplying safe water from the source to the faucet, for this reason, we are
making up "a water safety plan" about YODO River and SENGARI reservoir at present. In addition,
we must improve the whole stability of the water supply system, and supply water to the citizen
steadily as a lifeline, because it is predicted that large earthquakes will occur, frequently. Those are
our missions as the water supplier.
But, seismic practices do not contribute to the profit of the water supplier directly, so that we
should consider in the finite budget and take the priority for them in accordance with the renewal
systematically.
It is very most important to enforce seismic policy with the new knowledge that could be acquired
from some large earthquakes after HANSHIN- AWAJI disaster, too. If some large earthquakes
happen to occur simultaneously in NANKAI area like SUMATRA, it might be suffering such as
water salination of river around intake facilities by large-scale TUNAMI. We must keep on
enforcing a policy on the disaster mitigation with related organizations with the latest knowledge.
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We also recognize the mutual aid is very important in times of disasters and accidents. There were
only a few casualties, and the quick reconstruction was completed in some communications in those
the mutual aid of the inhabitant was active at HANSHIN-AWAJI disaster. "Communities for disaster
prevention and welfare" have been established based on that lesson by every elementary school in
Kobe city. The number of them is 190 for 169 schools.
We think it is important to announce accurate information to the citizen for effective use of the
facilities. And, the emergency training on a routine basis is indispensable for rapid correspondence
in times of disasters and accidents.
We regard "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI" as the symbol of seismic upgrading policy. We will use this
facility as a tool of the risk communication with the citizen whose experience on the disaster is fading
away. Kobe Water believes it can make the disaster mitigate further to share the accurate
information and our recognition with the citizen.
７． ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The support from the Technical Department of Kobe Water is gratefully acknowledged. Especially
Mr. M. Matsushita, Mr. M. Tanaka and Mr. H. Hayashi gave some information and helped to prepare
the data.
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EARTHQUAKE LOSSES,
MITIGATION AND RESILIENCE
by
Adam Rose*
I. INTRODUCTION
The geographic scope of the economic impacts of most natural and man-made disasters in the
United States is regional rather than local or national. This is not to diminish the individual suffering or
the national concern. It stems from the fact that even local impacts ripple spatially to the boundaries of
larger economic trading areas. It also stems from the vast size of the U.S. and the limits of man-made and
even natural forces. Thus, the appropriate geographic area for analysis is often the county or county
group, though not necessarily within the boundaries of a single state. A major earthquake on the San
Andreas Fault is no exception.
A factor that extends disaster losses beyond the area of the initial stimulus is the interdependence
of the economy. One view of interdependence is the production pyramid, which characterizes the
economy as consisting of layers of building blocks. Primary commodities, such as minerals, agricultural
crops, and forest products, are at the foundation of this economic edifice because they are at the starting
point of the production process. Intertwined with all the layers are roads, utilities, and communication
networks that provide the lifelines of logistic support for even the most basic economic activity. Thus, all
goods and services in the economy are interdependent, but infrastructure may be the most critical. But
infrastructure is not necessarily best characterized by the rigidity of road, pipeline, or transmission
networks. Instead, it possesses features of resilience, or flexibility and the ability to rebound.
The purpose of this project will be to analyze the economic impacts of a major earthquake on the
San Andreas fault. The study will utilize the results of research by geologists, geographers and engineers
on the spatial pattern of damage to the built environment. It will then translate these property damage (or
stock loss) estimates into business interruption (or flow loss) estimates at the regional level. The analysis
will be based on the use of input-output (I-O) analysis, still the most widely used tool of regional
economic impact analysis, and computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, a state of the art approach
that captures most of the advantageous features of I-O and overcomes many of its limitations. Both of
these modeling approaches are adept at tracing economic interdependencies that can cause total regional
economic impacts to be several times greater than direct impacts.
II. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
One way economists illustrate interdependence is through the simple circular flow diagram
presented in Figure 1. In factor markets, households offer labor and capital to businesses in exchange for
income payments. Businesses then use these “Primary Factors” to produce goods and services to sell to
households.
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This simple version of the economy, however, does not adequately reflect many aspects of the
interdependence of the economy, but it can be made effective in this regard by adding more detail as
presented in Figure 2. At the far left of this figure, we first acknowledge that businesses do not just use
labor and capital to produce goods and services, but also need various types of raw and processed
materials, as well as various services, which are all referred to as “Intermediate Goods.” Infrastructure is
a subset of this category of intermediate goods and in a fundamental way, since it is required by all
businesses. Purchase of infrastructure services by households would be part of the “Business Production
of Final Goods and Services,” though this implicitly includes government production of priced
infrastructure services as well.
A large amount of infrastructure, especially roads, bridges, and in some cases airports and
waterports, are not purchased in a market. These would be part of the box in the lower right hand corner
labeled “Unpriced Inputs”, and includes environmental services as well. Note that one of the advantages
of CGE models to be discussed below is the ability to calculate efficient prices for these infrastructure
services under normal and hazard-event circumstances.
Another feature of Figure 2 is an extension of the activities of households to include ways that
they can combine market goods and services with time and household resources to yield “household
production,” such as cooked meals, recreation, etc. This enables us to estimate the value of infrastructure
service to households, especially those not transmitted through the market. This is important in that
households typically purchase between thirty and forty percent of water and electricity. If they need to
cope with a disruption through the substitution of other inputs, use of their leisure time, or if they suffer
inconvenience, these responses are not normally reflected in formal economic (income and product)
accounts. However, this reflection of market failure (or the absence of markets in the first place) should
not be construed as lack of value for infrastructure services, but rather failures and biases in the way most
informal economic activities are evaluated. Again, this extended formulation enables us to find implicit
prices for infrastructure and environmental services and to measure a reduction in their service flows as a
type of household economic interruption, in addition to the lost wages/salaries, dividends, rents, and
royalties that can be computed with most existing models.
III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
In this section, we summarize the two major modeling approaches to regional economic impact
analysis. We focus on insights they yield on regional economic interdependence.
A. Input-Output Analysis
Input-output can be defined as a static, linear model of all purchases and sales between sectors of
an economy, based on the technological relationships of production (see, e.g., Rose and Miernyk, 1989).
Essentially, this is a detailed, comprehensive, double-entry bookkeeping record of all production activity.
Practically every country in the world has constructed an input-output table, usually through an
exhaustive census or at least an extensive survey, and there is a rich literature on ways to use non-survey
data-reduction, or “down-scaling,” methods to generate tables for political jurisdictions at various sub-
national levels.
Table 1 presents an aggregated version of the Los Angeles County Input-Output Table. This
table originally consisted of more than 500 sectors, but these have been aggregated for display purposes,
while maintaining infrastructure sectors at a reasonably disaggregated level.
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business revenues Markets payments
goods & services Goods & goods & services
Services
Businesses Households
Production of Consumption
Final Goods Of Goods
& Services & Services
payments to factors Markets household income

factor inputs Factors of labor & capital
Production
FIGURE 1. BASIC CIRCULAR FLOW OF THE ECONOMY
payments for goods & services

goods & services for household production
business revenues Markets payments

intermediate Goods & household
goods & services goods & services
goods & services Services goods & services
Businesses Businesses Households Households

Production of Production of Consumption Production of
Intermediate Final Goods of Goods Goods
Goods & Services & Services & Services & Services
payments
payments to factors household income
Markets
factor inputs Factors of labor & capital shadow
prices
Production labor & capital opportunity costs
service flows
payments to factors
factor inputs Unpriced Inputs
Infrastructure
&
Environment
FIGURE 2. EXPANDED CIRCULAR FLOW OF THE ECONOMY
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TABLE 1. 2002 LA INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE (in million dollars)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Row Sector Agri- Mining Construction Electric Gas Water & Manufac- Trade Transpor-
# culture Utilities Utilities Sanitary turing tation
Utilities
1 Agriculture 1.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 133.3 0.0 0.0
2 Mining 0.1 80.7 48.4 264.1 435.8 0.0 1,404.6 0.0 17.4
3 Construction 0.8 0.2 32.4 191.6 2.1 15.2 309.2 210.2 106.3
4 Electric Utilities 2.3 36.1 85.0 0.5 1.5 2.1 1,353.1 572.7 139.9
5 Gas Utilities 0.2 0.9 22.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 650.3 93.7 40.5
6 Water & Sanitary Utilities 0.1 0.2 1.8 3.7 0.1 0.0 2.0 4.7 2.2
7 Manufacturing 18.7 108.2 4,301.5 175.0 25.4 4.8 27,736.6 1,193.5 1,750.8
8 Trade 7.0 28.7 2,641.5 44.8 5.3 2.2 7,974.3 1,192.8 817.2
9 Transportation 2.9 25.8 395.0 266.6 364.9 0.8 2,774.5 960.3 2,326.5
10 Communication 0.2 1.2 110.5 2.6 0.6 0.8 262.5 283.9 172.5
11 Information 0.1 1.2 28.6 10.5 0.1 0.1 596.4 202.3 75.0
12 Finance, Ins, Real Estate 12.3 28.5 553.4 104.8 29.1 2.0 2,001.4 2,625.6 1,005.9
13 Services 5.1 323.4 2,133.4 271.3 58.3 8.4 10,258.8 6,873.6 2,872.1
14 Government 0.0 0.2 45.9 0.5 0.8 0.0 461.6 100.4 48.5
15 HH 318.9 667.0 11,197.9 1,207.6 565.3 93.0 30,994.0 29,306.3 12,035.6
16 OVA 12.8 774.4 1,161.4 6,168.9 605.2 69.7 13,306.2 21,333.1 1,937.4
17 Imports & Other 61.3 311.9 2,871.6 908.0 1,180.9 5.2 23,925.0 3,387.8 3,140.8
OUTPUT 444.4 2,388.5 25,631.6 9,620.4 3,275.5 205.6 124,143.6 68,340.9 26,488.7
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Row Sector Commun- Infor- Finance, Ins, Services Govern- Household Gov't FD Other FD OUTPUT
# ication mation Real Estate ment
1 Agriculture 0.0 0.0 1.5 12.7 0.0 48.8 2.7 242.5 444.4
2 Mining 0.0 0.0 6.3 1.2 39.1 1.2 9.8 80.0 2,388.5
3 Construction 80.1 99.4 917.9 1,036.2 411.4 0.0 3,542.3 18,676.4 25,631.6
4 Electric Utilities 66.3 149.1 851.9 1,468.2 210.1 3,256.6 767.6 657.4 9,620.4
5 Gas Utilities 13.8 17.7 135.2 366.0 7.6 1,355.6 254.3 316.3 3,275.5
6 Water & Sanitary Utilities 2.5 1.3 12.9 28.8 12.3 117.9 13.7 1.5 205.6
7 Manufacturing 482.3 2,306.3 800.7 9,390.6 561.6 29,664.6 8,033.1 37,589.9 124,143.6
8 Trade 107.4 862.0 737.0 3,631.1 156.7 37,261.7 857.6 12,013.5 68,340.9
9 Transportation 103.5 537.9 666.5 2,183.6 128.5 3,908.4 610.3 11,232.9 26,488.7
10 Communication 1,830.4 379.9 273.0 1,146.0 24.7 3,547.4 377.6 10,936.5 19,350.4
11 Information 528.6 2,617.5 209.3 1,245.2 17.4 1,941.1 322.1 31,194.1 38,989.6
12 Finance, Ins, Real Estate 303.2 1,096.5 14,953.5 9,572.3 237.8 40,626.7 1,381.9 32,589.2 107,124.2
13 Services 1,928.8 4,911.6 7,016.2 20,111.2 673.4 72,946.2 32,308.4 47,627.6 210,327.7
14 Government 27.1 132.4 197.5 518.9 242.4 1,267.6 3,091.9 7,733.9 13,869.4
15 HH 4,928.0 17,072.4 22,180.7 119,592.2 4,922.3
16 OVA 6,419.3 4,712.3 51,012.1 26,403.8 5,473.9
17 Imports & Other 2,529.1 4,093.3 7,152.1 13,619.7 750.2 49,605.1 10,035.5 33,294.7 (156,827.2)
OUTPUT 19,350.4 38,989.6 107,124.2 210,327.7 13,869.4 245,548.8 61,608.6 244,186.3 650,200.4
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The sectors of the economy are labeled in the left-hand column as sellers of goods and services,
and labeled at the top of the table, in the same order, as buyers. Looking across Row 4, we see a
tabulation of the dollar value of the services of Electricity Utilities sold to every other sector. Services
and Manufacturing are the two main business users of electricity, but note the largest single category of
buyers is households, accounting for more than one-third of electricity sales. The Electric Utilities
column shows the dollar value of various inputs needed to produce this valuable good.
Row 4 also intersects other infrastructure types—Water and Sanitary Services, Transportation
(there is now an electricity-driven light-rail system in LA), Communication, and Information.1
Disaggregated cells in a given row provide us with valuable, detailed information on customer usage,
which is often not available through the fairly aggregated categories reported by utilities (industrial,
commercial, and residential sales). The intersection of the various infrastructure rows and columns gives
us valuable information on the interdependence of utility lifelines and helps us identify and prevent
various types of cascading failure, as in the Northeast Electricity Blackout of 2003 and Hurricane Katrina.
One of the novel features of an I-O table is the fact that it can be readily transformed into a model
by assuming a fixed relationship between inputs and outputs. This translates into the assessment that if a
factory is cut off from 25 percent of its electricity, it will, at first pass, be forced to reduce its output by 25
percent.2
Interdependence is readily portrayed in this double-entry bookkeeping tabulation of Table 1.

Also, we can formally measure it by identifying and calculating backward and forward linkages between
all sectors. If a sector affected by the electricity outage reduces its production by 25 percent, we say this
is a direct business interruption (BI) effect. (Note also that this result can take place even if the factory
property is unscathed by an earthquake or terrorist attack, as long as its lifeline service is disrupted.)
Because the factory then reduces its order for each input by 25 percent, the firms producing those inputs
in turn will do the same, as well their suppliers, and so on, as the original perturbation ripples through the
economy. The sum total of these ripples is some multiple of the original shock; hence, the origin of the
term “multiplier” effect. We could go through a tedious process of calculating these chains of indirect
and induced3 effects. However, there is a simple matrix inversion procedure that calculates all the
interactions in a manner analogous to finding the sum of an infinite series. This “total requirements”
matrix consists of entries that tell us the total amount of each sector’s output needed directly and
indirectly per net unit of production of a given good or service. The column sum for every good is its
output multiplier. This helps determine the ripples that electricity outages can cause. By examining
individual cells, we can see how much of this is caused by disruption to other types of infrastructure. Of
course such computations need to be complemented by sound engineering analyses of infrastructure
networks (see, e.g., O’Rourke et al., 2004; Shinozuka and Chang, 2004). This is enhanced by GIS
overlays of the networks onto the economy (see, e.g., French, 1998; Rose and Liao, 2005).
I-O models thus provide a great deal of basic information, insight, and computational ability.
They also have significant limitations, such as linearity, absence of behavioral considerations, absence of
markets and prices, and lack of formal constraints. Still, I-O models are useful in providing ball-park
estimates of very short-run responses to infrastructures disruptions. They can readily be transformed into
LP models for optimization analysis (see, e.g., Cole, 1995; Rose et al., 1997), extended to CGE models to
capture behavioral considerations and the role of markets (see, e.g., Rose and Liao, 2005) and
incorporated into integrated systems models, where, because of model scale and computational
manageability, a simplified economic model may be preferred (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2003; Gordon et al.,
2005). Sophisticated versions of I-O models incorporating dynamic elements are very valuable as well
(see, e.g., Haimes et al., 2005).
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B. Computable General Equilibrium Analysis
Computable General Equilibrium can be defined as a multi-market, non-linear model of

individual behavioral response to price signals, subject to limitations of labor, capital and natural
resources (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Essentially, CGE incorporates all of the best features of I-O
models (e.g., comprehensive accounting of all inputs, interdependence of economic agents and activity)
and overcomes most of their limitations (linearity, lack of behavioral content, absence of markets of
prices, and lack of constraints) (Rose, 1995). Of course, these advances come only at the expense of
increased theoretical complexity, heightened data needs, and more demanding operation. Thus, the use of
CGE models, though increasing rapidly, is still nowhere as extensive as I-O models, especially at the
regional level, where data are especially sparse (Partridge and Rickman, 1998).
CGE models have at their heart an I-O table, such as Table 1, that depicts the role of all inputs
into production of economy. However, this extends one dimension further to a social accounting matrix
(SAM) that provides sets of accounts for households (often disaggregated by socioeconomic category,
such as income or race/ethnicity) and various other types of institutional accounts relating to savings,
government taxes and transfers, and trade with the outside world. Production relationships are more
flexible than in an I-O model, allowing for the substitution of at least major aggregates of inputs in
response to price changes.4 Household behavior can be modeled in a number of ways that are superior to
the fixed shares of consumption in the I-O model. This includes the household production function
formulation, which portrays households combining purchased goods and services along with time to
provide final products for consumption, such as cooked meals, recreation, etc. (Pollak and Wales, 1992;
Oladosu, 2000). This provides a basis for estimating the value of unpriced infrastructure services as
noted in Section II (see also Rose and Oladosu, 2007). CGE models can also incorporate relatively more
sophisticated government sector and interregional/international trade components than can I-O models.
CGE models are best suited to long-run analyses (at least one year or more) during which all
factors of production can adjust to a new equilibrium. They need to be modified to be applicable to the
short run, and even more so for the very short run of adjustments to disasters. This is done in a number of
ways (see, e.g., Rose and Liao, 2005).5 First, the ease at which one input can be substituted for another
can be reduced to reflect the more limited options available in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake
or other disaster. It can also be supplemented by explicit disequilibrium closure rules, which reflect key
account balances in labor, capital and goods markets, government activity, and trade. Examples include
explicit constraints on infrastructure service availability, allowing less than full employment equilibria,
government deficit spending, and trade imbalances (see Rose et al., 2007).
CGE models provide unique insight into infrastructure interdependence. Not only can they reveal
quantity interdependence, as in how the loss of electricity services might reduce the availability of water
services, but they can also provide insights into basic pricing and price interdependence. Some
infrastructure services (e.g., highways and bridges) do not have market prices associated with them, but a
CGE model can impute “shadow,” or efficient value of use, prices to them. Many other infrastructure
services (especially water, and, still to some extent, electricity) are priced but by regulatory bodies and
not by markets. These prices would not or could not normally be adjusted according to market conditions
of increased scarcity in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. CGE model results, however, could be
used to guide any short-term price adjustments to promote efficient allocation of resources explicitly
through markets or implicitly through non-price rationing. More generally, the CGE model can compute
the extent to which the quantity and price change in one type of infrastructure can affect the quantity and
price of another type, as well as the quantities and prices of all goods and services in the economy (see,
e.g., Rose and Liao, 2005).
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Overall, CGE models are able to estimate a broader set of indirect effects of external shocks than
are I-O models. In addition to ordinary (quantity interdependent) multiplier effects, CGE models can
capture the associated effects of cost and price adjustments of interdependent markets—this is the essence
of the meaning of the term “general equilibrium.” These models are also much more adept at analyzing
an even broader set of effects relating to “tipping points,” or discrete changes associated with reaching
threshold values. One example would be the shutdown of marginal (weak) businesses following an
earthquake. This might be associated with a given level of property damage or loss of function (say, 80%
of either indicator) that would lead to the permanent closure of the enterprise. CGE models can also
incorporate the positive effects of resilience, as well as the dampening effects of the erosion of resilience
(see below).
Yet another category of losses may stem from behavioral linkages (see Rose, 2006). They relate
to the social amplification of risk through media hype or rumor about such things as the spread of disease
from contaminated water. This spreads fear and can lead to such things as averting behavior (e.g.,
employees staying home rather than journeying to the workplace). This phenomenon can be formally
incorporated in the production function of businesses and the utility functions of households within a
CGE model by using abounded rationality approach (see Burns et al.). In contrast to the tipping point
phenomenon, which relates primarily to longer-run impacts, risk amplification effects are of a shorter
duration. The CGE model can capture both, given accurate input data.
In essence, CGE models reflect all of the components and workings of the economy depicted in
Figure 2. In contrast, I-O models do not include the unpriced infrastructure and environmental services,
and the “workings” are through a mechanistic set of fixed proportional requirements rather than the full
interplay of market interactions.
IV. DEFINING, MEASURING AND MODELING RESILIENCE
Resilience refers to the ability of individuals, markets, and the economy as a whole to continue
functioning when shocked by a disaster (see, e.g., Holling, 1973; Perrings, 2001; Rose, 2004; Rose
2007b). A more general definition that incorporates dynamic considerations, including stability, is the
ability of a system to recover from a severe shock.
Resilience emanates both from internal motivation and the stimulus of private or public policy
decisions (Mileti, 1999). Also, resilience, as defined in this paper, refers to post-disaster conditions and
response, which are distinguished from pre-disaster activities to reduce potential losses through
mitigation. In disaster research, resilience has been emphasized most by Tierney (1997) in terms of
business coping behavior and community response, by Comfort (1999) in terms of non-linear adaptive
response of organizations (broadly defined to include both the public and private sectors), and by Petak
(2002) in terms of system performance.6 These concepts have been extended to practice. Disaster
recovery and business continuity industries have sprung up that offer specialized services to help firms
during various aspects of disasters, especially power outages (see, e.g., Salerno, 2003). Key services
include the opportunity to outsource communication and information aspects of the business at an
alternative site. There is also a growing realization of the broader context of the economic impacts,
especially with the new emphasis on supply chain management. One company executive recently
summarized the situation quite poignantly: “In short, companies have started to realize that they
participate in a greater ecosystem—and that their IT systems are only as resilient as the firms that they
rely on to stay in business” (Corcoran, 2003; p. 5). Experience with Y2K, 9/11, natural disasters, and
technological/regulatory failures, as well as simulated drills, have sharpened utility industry and business
resilience (Eckles, 2003). Similar activities of public agencies have improved community resilience.
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Resilience can take place at three levels:
Microeconomic--individual behavior of firms, households, or organizations.
Mesoeconomic--economic sector, individual market, or cooperative group.
Macroeconomic--all individual units and markets combined, including interactive effects.
Examples of individual resilience are well documented in the literature, as are examples of the
operation of businesses and organizations. These include the ability to substitute for inputs in short
supply, conserve, use inventories, and reschedule lost production for a later date by working overtime or
extra shifts.
What is often less appreciated by disaster researchers outside economics and closely related
disciplines is the inherent resilience of markets. Prices act as the “invisible hand” that can guide
resources to their best allocation even in the aftermath of a disaster. Some pricing mechanisms have been
established expressly to deal with such a situation, as in the case of non-interruptible service premia that
enable customers to estimate the value of a continuous supply of electricity and to pay in advance for
receiving priority service during an outage (Chao and Wilson, 1987).
The price mechanism is a relatively costless way of redirecting goods and services. Price
increases, though often viewed as “gouging,” serve a useful purpose of reflecting highest value use, even
in the broader social setting. Moreover, if the allocation does violate principles of equity (fairness), the
market allocations can be adjusted by income or material transfers to the needy. CGE models are capable
of decomposing a price increase into that portion that is warranted by increased scarcity and that portion
that is simply gouging.
Will an X percent loss of electricity result in an X percent direct loss in economic activity for a
given firm? The answer is definitely “no” if economic resilience is present. For the purpose at hand, we
use as our measure of direct resilience, the deviation from the linear proportional relation between the
percentage utility disruption and the percentage reduction in customer output (see Rose, 2004).
Will a Y percent loss in direct output yield much larger general equilibrium losses? Here market-
related adjustments suggest some muting of general equilibrium effects, if we measure market, or net
general equilibrium, resilience as the deviation from the linear multiplier effect that would be generated
from a simple I-O analysis of the outage (Rose, 2004). Adjustments for lost output of goods and services
other than electricity include inventories, conservation, input substitution, import substitution and
production rescheduling at the level of the individual firm, and the rationing feature of pricing at the level
of the market.
How significant is resilience in practice?7 Rose and Lim (2002) in their interpretation of
Tierney’s (1997) survey of businesses following the Northridge earthquake inferred a direct business
resilience of 77.1 percent to electricity disruptions. Various studies by the author using both I-O and
CGE models in cases of utility service disruptions (water in the aftermath of a hypothetical earthquake in
Portland, Oregon, and electricity disruption in a hypothetical New Madrid earthquake and the Northridge
Earthquake in Los Angeles) found direct business resilience to be between 85 percent and 95 percent.8
These same studies found market resilience to range between 50 percent and 80 percent. This means that
omission of resilience factors can lead to an overestimate of BI losses by factors as high as five to ten.9
Resilience can be enhanced in several ways: increasing inventories, contracting with back-up IT
providers, holding emergency planning drills to enhance experience in adapting to crisis situations, etc.
On the other hand, resilience can be significantly eroded, as evidenced by the recent Hurricane Katrina
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experience. For example, production rescheduling may not be feasible if functionality is not restored
within 6 to 9 months, owing to a permanent loss of customers.
As noted above, resilience can be incorporated into both I-O models (see Rose and Lim, 2002;
FEMA, 2005) and CGE models (see Rose and Liao, 2005; Rose et al., 2007). In the CGE model,
incorporation is less ad hoc, in that resilience adjustments relate directly to production function
parameters (e.g., elasticities of substitution and productivity terms). Moreover, CGE models are able to
include a broader range of resilience responses than I-O models, including input substitution and market
resilience as a whole.
V. DATA UNDERPINNINGS
No model is any better than the data on which it is based. An obvious issue then is the data
intensity of the models just described. Unlike most conventional economic approaches that simply relate
output to primary factors of production—capital, labor, and sometimes natural resources—I-O and CGE
models account for all inputs, including intermediate, or processed goods and services. Moreover, they
do so at a level of sectoral detail that exceeds that of more standard econometric models. Fortunately, the
developer of I-O, Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, placed a great emphasis on sound empirical
construction of these models. He insisted they be based on primary data collection, and he championed
such efforts at the federal and later the state and local levels. In fact, the U.S. I-O Table is prepared by the
U.S, Department of Commerce from the voluminous data collected in the Census of Manufacturers and
the censuses for other major sectors of the economy.
Regional level tables present a great challenge, because it means collecting similar, though less
extensive, data 50 times over at the state level and more than 2,500 times at the county level. It is not
sufficient to take national data and simply apportion it to smaller geographic areas, because the origin and
destination of the flow of goods is critical. A regional economy can only be stimulated by increases in
demand for its own products, rather than for imports, so two types of flows need to be distinguished. The
expense of constructing a regional I-O table from primary data would cost several million dollars for even
a small state.
Accordingly, data reduction methods (also known as non-survey or down-scaling) are the typical
approach used to generate state and county tables. These methods usually involve four steps: 1)
specifying control totals for sectoral production, assuming the structure of production (input coefficients)
are the same in the region as for the nation as a whole, 3) estimating intra-regional production vs.
imports, and 4) various ad hoc adjustments for differences between regional and national technologies.
The U.S. Department of commerce produces county and state tables through its Regional Input-
Output Modeling system (RIMS). However, the most widely used source of regional I-O tables these
days is the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) System (MIG, 2006). This consists of three
components: 1) a county level data base, 2) a set of algorithms capable of generating I-O tables for any
county or county group, and 3) a computational capability for calculating multipliers and performing
impact analyses. The LA I-O table above is an aggregated version of the 528 sector IMPLAN table for
that county.
Other data are critical for evaluating disaster impacts and resilience. These include data on the
built environment (factories, residences, infrastructure) and the natural environment. Also ideal would be
a set of damage functions that relate changes in underlying conditions to property damage and loss of
function. One such source is FEMA’s Hazards United States-Multi-Hazard (HAZUS-MH) (FEMA,
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2005). This is a large expert system that contains detailed data on the built environment at the small area
level, a set of damage functions, and a GIS capability. Physical damage and business down-time are
translated into direct dollar values, and an imbedded I-O capability allows the user to calculate multiplier
effects under various circumstances including resilience. HAZUS, including the Indirect Economic Loss
module (IELM), can be run at 3 level: 1) a set of default values or national averages, 2) openings for
region-specific data, including the importation of IMPLAN I-O tables, and 3) customized data.
Finally, more data are needed to evaluate economic resilience. Recent modeling innovations
have been made (see, e.g., Shinozuka and Chang, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005; and Haimes et al., 2005),
but empirical work lags behind. A strong basis in this area is the survey work by Tierney (1997), which
can be further refined for a variety of applications (see, e.g., Rose and Lim, 2002). Additional data
collection and refinement efforts by the author and his associates have helped specify resilience factors
for production rescheduling (these have even been integrated into the HAZUS Direct Economic Loss
Module as “recapture factors”), for distributed power generation, and for water storage. Publications by
the U.S. Department of Commerce on excess capacity and inventories can also be used. Expert judgment
has been tapped to evaluate “importance,” or that part of a business’s operations that require a certain type
of infrastructure service (ATC, 1990). Algorithms have been developed by Rose and Liao (2005) to use
existing data to fill in the gaps on resilience responses and to change model parameters accordingly.
Still, there is much to be done because resilience differs by type, sector and geographic location.
More recently, Rose (2007a) has pointed out how resilience differs by scope, magnitude, and duration of
a disaster, e.g., how Hurricane Katrina illustrated how resilience can be eroded. At the same time,
resilience can be enhanced by investment, information dissemination, and advanced planning. Resilience
represents a relatively low-cost way of reducing the consequences of a disaster. Several resilience actions
are low-cost or pay for themselves ( e.g., conservation and production rescheduling). In general, they are
cheaper than mitigation to a great extent because most need not be implemented (paid for) until the
disaster is certain. All of this supports the high priority that should be accorded to the collection of more
data at the regional level, and not just for businesses, but also for households, and for communities as a
whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
The models presented here are capable of estimating not only the apparent direct effects but also
the regional indirect, or interdependence, economic effects of earthquake damage. An additional
important feature of the models is their ability to calculate the full range of economic benefits (avoided
losses) of hazard mitigation and resilience. The application of these models can help identify the lowest
cost strategies for reducing economic losses. Most prior analyses have focused on mitigation, but the
newer concept of resilience warrants attention. Some resilience options are relatively low cost (e.g.,
production rescheduling), some may even be cost-saving (conservation), and most of them need not sit
idly in anticipation of an event, but can be marshaled when needed. Though many high level policy-
makers do not want to admit the fact, it is impossible to protect the general population against all natural
disasters and terrorist attacks. Analyses such as those highlighted in the previous sections provide
guidance to how individuals and firms, however, can help protect themselves from the negative impacts
of business and infrastructure disruptions.
Thus, in benefit-cost analyses of ways to reduce losses from disasters, there is a need to take a
holistic view of trade-offs between mitigation and resilient responses, both of which can significantly
result in cost-savings to society as a whole. In the same vein, it is important not to neglect regional
economic interdependence effects, including the potential negative effects of the failure of one type of
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infrastructure upon others. Such interdependencies can significantly raise the stakes at risk. The models
presented in this paper can provide reasonable estimates of these complex considerations.
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ENDNOTES
* The author is Visiting Professor of Policy, Planning and Development, and Coordinator for Economics at the
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
(on leave from the Department of Geography, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA). He wishes
to acknowledgement the support of the DHS Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events
(CREATE) and the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) in the writing of this
paper.
1
Note that Transportation can be further divided into private and public and by mode (e.g., surface, truck, rail, air,
water). Likewise, Communication networks are further disaggregated in the 500 sector classification scheme.
2
Mathematically, this is done by dividing each cell in a given column by its column sum. This provides us with a
“structural,” or normalized, set of coefficients that reflect the cents’ worth of each input needed to produce a
dollar’s worth of output of a given sector.
3
The effects stemming from the reduction of household income are referred to as “induced” effects.
4
Often, components of the material aggregate (consisting of all the intermediate goods) are assumed to be allocated
in fixed proportions, but substitution is allowed between the aggregate material category and capital and labor.
5
Interestingly, the inflexibility of I-O models makes them more appropriate to very short run analyses, though even
then they are overly rigid. The problem with ordinary CGE models is that they are overly flexible--the basic model
will allow substitution of goods (e.g., alternatives to electricity or highways) at low cost penalties. The CGE models
discussed in this paper have overcome this limitation.
6
Recently, Bruneau et al. (2003; p. 3) have defined community earthquake resilience as “the ability of social units
(e.g., organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry
out recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption and mitigate the effectors of further earthquakes.”
Further, they divide resilience into three aspects, which correspond to the concepts defined above in an economic
context. First is reduced failure probability, which we view as equivalent to mitigation in this paper. Second is
reduced consequences from failure, which corresponds to our basic static definition of resilience. Third is reduced
time to recovery, which adds a temporal dimension to our basic definition. In sum, Bruneau et al. (2003) have
offered a very broad definition of resilience to cover all actions that reduce losses from hazards, including
mitigation and more rapid recovery. These refer to how a community reduces the probability of structural or system
failure, in the case of the former, and how quickly it returns to normal in the case of the latter. We have focused on
the essence of resilience—the innate aspects of the economic system at all levels to cushion itself against losses in a
given period, or reduced consequences from failure. Bruneau et al. refer to this as the robustness attribute of
resilience but we emphasize that our definition is more consistent with the broader literature (see especially Klein et
al., 2003).
7
Note that we are focusing on resilience on the customer side in terms of reduced consequences of infrastructure
failure. Some analysts use the concept of resilience in the context of the operation of utilities, such as creating
redundancies and sharing of flows between providers (see Lave et al., 2005). In the Bruneau et al. (2003)
framework this refers to reducing the probability of failure. This strategy has great potential, of course, but in the
context of this paper is viewed as mitigation rather than resilience.
8
The main reason for higher estimate than Tierney’s is the likelihood of under-reporting of production
rescheduling, or business “recapture,” effects.
9
Note, however, the potential of resilience decreases as the disaster becomes more extensive and complex, such as
the recent experience in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (see, e.g., Rose, 2006).
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166
Participatory Planning in Development of Comprehensive
Crisis Management Plan for Water Supply Authorities
Nagahisa Hirayama, Haruo Hayashi, and Sadahiko Itoh
ABSTRACT
It is indispensable that water supply authority staff should participate in the development of risk
and crisis management plans and crisis emergency response manuals in order to increase awareness
of impending crisis and develop faculties for crisis emergency response. Participatory planning in
development of crisis management plan for water supply authorities is purposed in this study. For
this purpose, the comprehensive risk and crisis management plan for Hanshin Water Supply
Authority was developed with a participatory planning process known as the consensus workshop
method.
In a case study on the Hanshin Water Supply Authority, the risk and crisis management plan
features a systematic structure in which a single goal is elaborated into five objectives, along with
policies, actions and procedure while also taking into account the disaster management cycle. As a
result, a sense of ownership should develop in participants so that they will take active roles in
implementing the comprehensive countermeasures to reduce risk of multihazards.
_____________
Nagahisa Hirayama, Research Scientist, Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution, 1-5-2
Wakihamakaigan-dori, Chuo-ku, Kobe 651-0073, JAPAN
Haruo Hayashi, Professor, Research Center for Disaster Reduction Systems, Disaster Prevention Research Institute,
Kyoto University, Gokasyo, Uji, Kyoto 611-0011, JAPAN
Sadahiko Itoh, Professor, Department of Urban Management, Graduate School of Engineering, Kyoto University, Kyoto
University Cluster C, Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto 615-8540, JAPAN
167
INTRODUCTION
In Japan, the Waterworks Law stipulates an emergency shut down of water supply [1]. An
establishment of Business Continuity Management is required for public works: Business Continuity
Guidelines 1st ed. -Reducing the Impact of Disaster and Improving Responses to Disasters published
by Japanese Companies- published by Central Disaster Management Council, Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan [2], and Guidelines for Business Continuity Plans created by Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry [3].
Natural disasters frequently hit water supply facilities: the great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in
1995, the 2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake, the Noto Hanto Earthquake in 2007, and
Miyazaki Flood Disaster caused by typhoon No.14 in 2005. The water leakage incidents due to
deterioration of water supply facilities are frequent. The risks of catastrophes have been pointed out:
the Tokai Earthquake, the Tonankai Earthquake, the Nankai Earthquake, and the earthquake disaster
in the Tokyo Metropolitan area. The water supply system is a lifeline upon which citizens’ lives and
the economy rely on. The pressure on water supply utilities to address issues of risk and crisis
management are increasing. Thus, water supply authorities should establish effective emergency
response and risk and crisis management for incidents, emergencies, crises, disasters, and
catastrophes.
In thee process of carrying out risk and crisis management, it is necessary for stakeholders to
participate in discussion. In addition, it is indispensable that the staff of water supply authorities
should participate in developing risk and crisis management plans and crisis emergency response
manuals in order to increase awareness of impending crisis and develop faculties for crisis emergency
response. Participatory planning in developing a risk and crisis management plan for water supply
authorities is purposed in this study. For this purpose, the comprehensive risk and crisis management
plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was developed using the consensus workshop method,
a participatory planning process. This paper describes the participatory planning process of crisis
management for water supply authorities, and the characteristics of the Risk and Crisis Management
Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority. A questionnaire survey for participants was conducted
to evaluate the effect of the planning process on participants in the workshop.
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN
Crisis Management Plan
Many water supply utilities have outlines, guidelines, reference books, manuals, water supply
control and management plans to prepare for and manage disasters and crises. Many outlines and
guidelines deal with multihazards. On the other hand, a reference books and a manuals focus on a
crisis such as earthquake disaster, typhoon and flood disaster, and water quality accident. Some water
supply utilities systematically prepare guidelines, manuals and reference books based on disaster
prevention planning for local governments. However, these usual documents for disaster and crisis
preparation share some common weakpoints. They include:
• Goals of risk management were not determined;

• Sense of impending crisis and achievement targets of risk and crisis management are not
shared;
168
Broad/Abstract
Goal
Objectives
Targets
Policies/Strategies
Programs/Projects
Focused/Specific
Figure 1. Structure of “strategic plan”
• Many usual risk and crisis management plan are not organized in a hierarchy of means and
ends;
• Implementation of these plans could not complete PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Action) Cycle.
Structure of the Plan and Strategic Planning
The Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority is a “strategic
plan”, which sets a goal and develops objectives, policies/strategies, programs/projects, and actions,
to accomplish this goal. This is one of the distinctive characteristics of the Risk and Crisis
Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority compared to the past risk management
plans of water utilities in Japan.
In recent years, an action plan based on the framework of a strategic plan was required for the
Central Government of Japan [4], [5]. In the field of disaster reduction and prevention, techniques of
participatory planning in developing an earthquake disaster reduction plan were examined [6], [7]
and [8]. Strategic planning is essential in the public sector. Strategic planning and decision processes
should end with objectives and a roadmap of ways to achieve the mission, vision, and objectives [9].
The Goal, Objectives, Policies/Strategies, Programs/Projects, which gradually become more focused
and specific, comprise the “strategic plan”, as indicated in Figure 1. Objectives are more specific and
narrower in scope than the goal and they elaborate how the goal will be achieved. Objectives
encompass Policies/Strategies to attain the identified goal. Policies/Strategies are actions that support
achieving goal and objectives. Programs/Projects are specific countermeasures and implementation
actions under Policies/Strategies. Thus, we introduced this structure in order to adopt the strategic
plan as hierarchical structure of the risk and crisis management plan in this research.
Process of Crisis Management Planning
In the process of implementing crisis management, it is necessary that stakeholders, who might be
affected by the plan or whose support will be needed to carry out the plan, participate in planning and
building consensus; strategic management is an ongoing process in whose implementation
stakeholders can become involved. Water supply utilities should introduce strategic management
into preparing for disaster and crisis; they should determine their mission, vision, and goal, and then it
is indispensable to approach the implementation of risk and crisis management from the viewpoint of
long-term goals.
169
Risk and crisis management of water utilities would demand a new approach that water supply
authority staff participate in process of developing risk and crisis management plans and crisis
emergency response manuals. Therefore, according to risk assessment, analysis of the present
conditions, and best practice in case studies, the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority, which have the framework of strategic plan, would be draw up. A approach
to the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority has three parts
which are 1) participatory planning process by the consensus workshop method, 2) assessment of the
risk and the crisis emergency response, and 3) case study in measures to prepare for disaster and crisis
in other water utilities and survey of best practice of measures. This approach has the following
merits:
• A comprehensive and coherent plan – involving stakeholders, who are various

independents;
• Implementation – formulating actions necessary for implementing the plan;
• Increasing awareness of impending crisis among staff – participating in the process of the
risk and crisis management planning;
• Improvement of faculties for crisis emergency response – experience the consensus
workshop method, which is an effective tool supporting consensus building and decision
making;
• Sense of ownership in participants – involvement in planning and willingness to take active
roles in implementing the plan.
RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANNING FOR THE HANSHIN WATER SUPPLY
AUTHORITY
Purpose of the Risk and Crisis Management Planning
The Hanshin Water Supply Authority has been improving its guidelines for measures against
disasters and crises since the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Moreover, establishment of its
manuals for crisis emergency response, it has encouraged the development of countermeasures
against earthquake for water supply facilities and earthquake disaster prevention for water facilities,
and preparedness for [10]. However, in recent years natural disasters, water leakage incidents, and
water quality accidents are on the increase, both in frequency and scale. In order to implement
disaster reduction and emergency response effectively, it is necessary for the Hanshin Water Supply
Authority to expedite crisis management and to establish a comprehensive risk and crisis
management plan. Thus, the program of the Risk and Crisis Management Planning for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority was carried out for 2 years starting in 2005. Figure 2 shows the outline of
this project.
There were three purposes of this program, stated as follows:
1. To increase awareness of impending crisis among staff;

2. To present an opportunity for brainstorming idea about risk and crisis management on their
own initiative;
3. To improve the practical faculties of individuals and sections for crisis emergency response.
170
2005
Analysis of Risks and
Assessment of the the situation Crises
organization Case study in
measures to prepare
Strategic Intent for disaster and crisis in
Assessment of water other water utilities
supply facilities
Goal and Targets
2006
Assessment of the
Collection of best
crisis emergency Objectives
practice
response
Case study in the past

Policies/Strategies
Analysis of workflow crisis emergency
Programs/Projects
response
The Risk and Crisis Management Plan for Hanshin Water Supply Authority
Data Model Task Model Function Model
Figure 2. Outline of the project of the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Suppy
Authority; Central workflow is a participatory planning with workshop method; Left flow is assessment of the
risk and emergency response; Right part is survey the best practice and the past emergency response
Preparedness Response
Risk Crisis
Management Management
Recovery and
Mitigation
Reconstruction
Figure 3. The disaster management cycle
To archive these purposes, we adopted strategic plan as the hierarchy for the Risk and Crisis
Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority. This risk and crisis management plan
has four features, which are 1) participatory planning with workshop method, 2) implementation of
risk management with long-term goals, 3) strategic planning, and 4) coherent and comprehensive
planning including disaster management cycle. As indicated in Figure 3, there are mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. A possible new approach is to apply participatory planning
through workshop methods in risk and crisis management planning for water supply utilities; in this
study, participants would consist of staff from the Hanshin Water Supply Authority.
Planning Process with Workshop
We designed the planning workshop so that extraction, classification, and structure of idea would
be carried out based on strategic planning. Figure 4 illustrates the process of the planning workshop.
171
1st Workshop
Assessment of the present situation
Identification of Risk
Estimation of the external factors
Extraction of risk
Estimation of the internal factors
Identification of potential risk
2nd Workshop
Risk Evaluation Risk Analysis
Goal of risk and crisis management
3rd Workshop
Social demands
Social
Targets to achieve goal Responsibility
Organization and Capacity Information Facilities and Recovery and

system development management Logistics reconstruction
Figure 4. Process of the workshop for

Objectives, development of the comprehensive
Policies/Strategies, risk and crisis management plan
and Programs/Projects
35 staff members from each sections of the Hanshin Water Supply Authority were chosen to
participate in the planning workshop. Among the participants are technical staff, others are
administrative officials. Participants were divided into five groups comprised of both engineers and
administrative officials mixed.
In this study, there were six steps in the workshop procedure:
1. Introduction of the strategic plan framework;

2. Extraction of ideas through verbalization on cards;
3. Structuring extracted ideas within the strategic plan hierarchy;
4. Sharing the structural contents with participants;
5. Evaluation of contents from the viewpoint of the strategic plan framework;
6. Building consensus among participants.
In order to develop the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply
Authority, the planning process involved five actions which are 1) identification of crisis, 2) risk
evaluation, 3) social responsibility in crisis management, 4) establishment of objectives, and 5)
strategic planning; To achieve a successful conclusion to the planning workshop end, we carried out
the planning process while repeatedly taking these six steps throughout the workshop.
Identification of Crisis
In the first workshop in December 2005, the workshop participants assessed the present situation
with SWOT analysis, in which they identified internal and external factors. The participants
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TABLE I. Identified potential threats against the Hansin Water Supply Authority
Risk and Crisis Probability Magnitude
Delay of crisis emergency response Medium Catastrophic
Water suspension caused by natural disaster Low Catastrophic
Shortage of experts and people with experience High Moderate
Water transmission trouble by disaster Low Catastrophic
Shortage of distributed amount by disaster Low Catastrophic
Crisis due to deterioration of facilities High Moderate
Accidental water resource pollution Medium Catastrophic
Unavailable water resource by man-made hazards Medium Catastrophic
Financial crisis due to budget squeeze High Moderate
Business discontinuance caused by power failure Low Catastrophic
Deficiency measures due to lack of finances High Moderate
identified the importance of each of the internal and external factors in each group, and five external
factors and five internal factors were extracted.
Using the matrix of internal and external factors, the identification of potential risks and crises for
the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was carried out in each workshop groups. The next step was to
share the identified crises with all workshop participants. Then 20 potential risks and crises, which
the Hanshin Water Supply Authority should take any and all steps to overcome, were identified. An
example of the identification of potential threats is shown in TABLE I.
Risk Evaluation
The second action was to evaluate the identified risks and crises. First, the likelihood that the
identified crisis would occur was estimated in each workshop groups. This estimate would be
expressed in an occurrence over time, for example once every ten years. In turn, these estimates
could be grouped and expressed on a grading scale as ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ risk. Efforts were
made to ensure that estimates were accurate and based on available and objective information from
experts and professionals who participated as workshop table manager in the planning workshop.
Secondly, the impact or magnitude of damage associated with each crisis was evaluated in each
workshop groups. A rating scale was developed that reflected the organization’s view of the
magnitude of risk, from the catastrophic to the insignificant.
The scores for both probability and magnitude could be combined and displayed on a risk matrix.
All participants in the planning workshop shared risk matrices with other workshop groups. Then,
with the consensus of participants, a result of evaluation of the identified crises in the Hanshin Water
Supply Authority was displayed on a risk matrix. The result of the risk evaluation is shown in Figure
5.
It is indicated that the Hanshin Water Supply Authority would have two different crises. One
crisis that score in the bottom right cell or middle right cell would be a rare or likely event with
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Magnitude
Insignificant Moderate Catastrophic
Financial Crisis
Insufficiency of
High expert
Deterioration of
facilities
Probability
Medium Man-made
Hazards
Natural
Low Disaster
Figure 5. Risk evaluation on a risk matrix
potentially catastrophic results. Among possible crises are natural disasters and man-made hazards.
In order to overcome such a crisis, it is necessary to carry out Business Continuity Management that
should aim to provide continuity in customer service at a minimum acceptable level. On the other
hand, another crisis, that has been rated as ‘high’ in the top middle of the matrix, would be a event that
is almost certain to occur, but is considered moderate in its impact. These are financial crises,
insufficiency of experts and people with experience, and deterioration of water supply facilities. The
reduction of these risks and crises would require implementation of business strategies and asset
management.
Social Responsibility of the Hanshin Water Supply Authority
In the third workshop in March 2006, each group discussed the social responsibility of the
Hanshin Water Supply Authority. After sharing the discussion with all workshop participants, a goal
of the strategic crisis management for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was established. As a
result, the goal is “to supply secure and reliable water in any crisis emergency”.
Establishment of Objectives
In the fourth action, objectives of the risk and crisis management plan were established. First, the
workshop participants furnished ideas about what they should do what to achieve the goal of the
Hanshin Water Supply Authority crisis management plan. Using the affinity diagram method, 218
pieces of idea cards were structured according to the framework of the strategic plan. As a result,
these idea cards could be classified into six categories which were 1) preparation of the emergency
response manual, 2) organization and system, 3) capacity development, 4) information management,
5) water supply facilities and logistics, 6) recovery and reconstruction.
Preparation of the emergency response manual is an important stage of the crisis management
process and one way of the implementing the risk and crisis management plan. Therefore, in the Risk
and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority, we set five objectives in the
classified categories with the exception of `preparation of the emergency response manual` category
to attain the identified goal. The framework of the risk and crisis management plan was illustrated in
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Goal To supply secure and reliable water in any crisis emergency
Social Responsibility, Objectives, and Targets

Objectives
Targets Organization Capacity Information Facilities and Recovery and
and system development management logistics Reconstruction
To establish To clarify To develop teaching

Policies organization for responsibility on materials and tools
sharing information emergency for education
Information sharing in Incident commander Arrangement of

staffs documents
Information sharing in Analysis of emergency To collect the past

Actions sections tasks and procedures incidents and
experience
cooperation between To clarify responsibility

technical staffs and of sections on
administrative officials emergency
Figure 6. Framework of the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for Hanshin Water Supply Authority
Figure 6. Actually, the idea cards grouped into five categories other than `preparation of the
emergency response manual` were structured according to strategic plan hierarchy and classified into
the content levels as ‘Objectives’, ‘Policies/Strategies’, and ‘Programs/Projects’. Then, the
‘Objectives’ idea cards were organized and elaborated into a complete sentence.
Strategic Planning
To accomplish the goal of this project, the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority was developed and systematically structured according to a hierarchy of
means and ends using the workshop method. Participants were divided into five workshop groups
that one workshop group would deal with one classified category such as ‘organization and system’,
‘information management’.
In order to increase the effectiveness of the crisis management plan and clarify the roles and
responsibilities, ‘the person and the section of charge’ and ‘period of time of actions’ were decided.
In this plan, ‘duration of action’ was expressed on a scale as ‘long-term’, ‘medium-term’, or
‘short-term’ action. For example, a ‘short-term’ program is an action to be achieved in three years.
Implementation of the plan
According to the above, the comprehensive Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority was developed with a participatory planning process using the consensus
workshop method. In the future, mitigating and reducing the impact of crisis on the Hanshin Water
Supply Authority requires the implementation of this risk and crisis management plan. Therefore, it
175
is important to push forward the arrangement and documentation of the crisis emergency response
manual and to drive the completion of the PDCA cycle in crisis management by using contingency
simulations, training, and education.
To accomplish the goal of the risk and crisis management plan, that is to supply secure and
reliable water in any crisis emergency, it is necessary to promote the reinforcement of preparation and
mitigation of risk in cooperation with stakeholders including customers and concerned organizations.
ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF PARTICIPATORY PLANNING
In this section, we evaluate the effect of the planning process on participants in the workshop.
Figure 7 shows the look of the workshop that participants were encouraging creative thinking. A
questionnaire survey for participants in the workshop was conducted in May 2007 after the project of
developing the risk and crisis management planning. In this survey, a survey sheet was composed of
Figure 7. Look of the workshop that participants were encouraging creative thinking
Figure 8. Changes of crisis imagination before and after the participation
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Figure 9. Sense of ownership of the crisis management
three parts: ‘How much do you feel that a difference of risk perceptions with before and after
participation in this planning?’; ‘How concerned do you feel about the risk and crisis management
plan?’; ‘How interested are you in the consensus workshop method?’ Each questions was answered
on a five-rating scale. 32 participants returned completed data, yielding an overall response ratio of
91.4%.
Figure 8 shows the changes of crisis imagination before and after the participation. More than
60% participants likely appreciate their own capacity development of the crisis imagination and the
supposition of crisis emergency response. This result clearly validates participatory in the planning
workshop for development of the risk and crisis management plan is effective for improving their
crisis imagination capacity.
Also, Figure 9 shows a sense of ownership of the crisis management. Most of participants
probably recognize the awareness of ownership of the risk and crisis management. This result
indicates that a sense of ownership should develop in participants so that they will take active roles in
implementing the comprehensive countermeasures to prepare and mitigate the risk of multi hazards.
CONCLUSION
This study attempts to develop a participatory planning in development of comprehensive risk

and crisis management plan for water supply authorities. For this purpose, the Risk and Crisis
Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was developed using a participatory
planning process. In the Hanshin Water Supply Authority case study, the risk and crisis management
plan features a systematic structure in which a single goal is elaborated into five objectives, along
with policies, actions and procedures while also taking into account the disaster management cycle.
It is our belief that in comparison with other risk and crisis management plans in Japan, this Risk and
Crisis Management Plan is one of the most comprehensive crisis management plans ever compiled.
In addition, a questionnaire survey for participants was conducted to evaluate the effect of the
177
planning process on participants in the workshop. Hence, it is concluded that a participatory planning
in development of crisis management plan should create a sense of ownership in participants so that
they will take active roles in implementing the comprehensive countermeasures to reduce risk of
multihazards.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In this study, the Hanshin Water Supply Authority staff actively participated in the planning
workshop. This risk and crisis management planning project was managed by Kenichi Kobayashi,
Kenji Komiyama, Masakazu Mihara, and Tomohisa Okamoto of Hanshin Water Supply Authority.
The planning workshop was conducted by Head Researcher Kenji Koshiyama, Chief Researcher
Kenji Harada, Chief Researcher Kiyomine Terumoto, Chief Researcher Shinya Kondo, Research
Fellow Kunihiro Fukutome, Research Fellow Makoto Yasutomi, and Research Fellow Shingo
Nagamatsu of Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution, Masayuki Mori, Yukihito
Nakagawa, and Hiromi Takeishi of Nihon Suido Consultants Co., Ltd. serving as workshop table
managers. The support provided by all stakeholders of the Risk and Crisis Management Planning for
the Hanshin Water Supply Authority is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] A Society for the Study of Waterworks Law. 2003. “Explanation the Waterworks Law Article by Article,” Japan
Water Works Association.
[2] Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2005. “Business Continuity Guidelines 1st ed. -Reducing the Impact of
Disaster and Improving Responses to Disasters published by Japanese Companies-,” Central Disaster Management
Council.
[3] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2005. “Guidelines for Business Continuity Plans,” Research Institute of
Economy, Trade and Industry.
[4] Center for Accountability and Performance, American Society for Public Administration. 2001. “Performance
Measurement Concepts and Techniques,” edited by S. Ueyama, Tokyo Horei Publishing Co. Ltd.
[5] Norio Maki. 2006. “Development of Disaster Prevention Plan based on Strategic Planning,” Disaster Reduction
Management, 1: 40-43.
[6] K. Tamura, H. Hayashi, S. Tatsuki, N. Maki, S. Tanaka, T. Kondo, K. Horie, M. Banba, Y. Karatani, K. Hasegawa,
and Y. Fukasawa. 2004. “Development of Participatory Strategic Planning in the Process of Disaster Reduction
Planning: A Case Study in Marikina City, Philippines,” Journal of Social Safety Science, Institute of Social Safety
Science, (6): 129-138.
[7] N. Maki, T. Kondo, K. Tamura, H. Hayashi, K. Topping, S. Tatsuki, K. Hasegawa, K. Horie, M. Banba, S. Tanaka, Y.
Fukasawa, and N. Yoshitomi. 2004. “A Comprehensive Earthquake Disaster Reduction Planning with Stakeholders;
Development of Marikina Comprehensive Earthquake Disaster Reduction Program(CEDR) and Action Plan,”
Journal of Social Safety Science, Institute of Social Safety Science, (6): 111-120.
[8] N. Maki, H. Hayashi, and K. Tamura. 2006. “Action Plans for Disaster Reduction Based on Strategic Planning
Framework; Contents and Planning Process of Disaster Reduction Plans in Prefecture Governments,” Journal of
Social Safety Science, Institute of Social Safety Science, (8): 197-206.
[9] Yoshiaki Ryu and Ryo Sasaki. 2002. “Practical Guide to Strategy Formulation and Management for Public and
Not-for-profit Organizations,” Taga Publishing Co. Ltd., pp.53-60.
[10] Tomohisa Okamoto, Kenichi Kobayashi, Kenji Komiyama, and Masakazu Mihara. 2006. “Program for Risk and
Crisis Management on Hanshin Water Supply Authority,” Proceedings of 50th Annual Conference on Kansai Branch
JWWA, pp.176-178.
178
SEISMIC ASPECTS OF THE SFPUC WATER
SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
Luke Cheng1, Brian Sadden2
ABSTRACT
The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) manages a complex water
supply system stretching from the Sierra to the City and featuring a complex series of
reservoirs, tunnels, pipelines, and treatment systems. Many of the critical facilities are in
a highly seismic active area underlain by three active faults: San Andreas, Hayward and
Calaveras faults. A recent USGS study also indicates that there is a probability of 62%
for one of major earthquakes in the area. In 2002, the SFPUC, together with its 28
wholesale customers launched a $4.3 billion Water System Improvement Program to
repair, replace, and seismically upgrade the system’s aging pipelines, tunnels, reservoirs,
pump stations, storage tanks, and dams.
This paper discusses the seismic aspects of the program including level of service
objectives after a major earthquake, system reliability before and after the program is
completed, and major seismic projects in San Francisco City, San Francisco Peninsula,
San Francisco Bay Division and Sunol Valley regions.
INTRODUCTION
The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) has started one of the largest
water system improvement programs ($4.3 billions) in the United States since 2002. The
primary driving forces behind the program are the high seismic vulnerability and the old
age (almost 100 years old) of the San Francisco water system.
The objective of the program is to improve the water supply, the water quality, and the
San Francisco water system’s seismic resistance capability. The paper covers mainly the
seismic aspect of the program, and the following topics are discussed.
• An overview of the San Francisco water system
• Level of service goals that SFPUC would like to achieve after the program is
completed
• A brief discussion on the system reliability studies performed for the system with
and without the seismic upgrade program
• Descriptions of some of major seismic retrofit projects in the program
1
Manager, Structural Section, Engineering Management Bureau, San Francisco Public Utilities
Commission, 1155 Market St. 7th Floor, San Francisco, California, USA 94103
2
Bureau Manager, Engineering Management Bureau, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, 1155
Market St. 7th Floor, San Francisco, California, USA 94103
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SAN FRACISCO WATER SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The SFPUC manages a complex water supply system that is geographically bounded
between Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park and the San Francisco Bay
Area. The distribution system is driven wholly by gravity except where local watershed-
treated waters are introduced. The system provides high quality water to the City and
County of San Francisco as well as southern regions of the Bay Area.
The SFPUC provides water to 2.4 million residential, commercial, and industrial
consumers in the San Francisco Bay Area through direct retail deliveries to San Francisco
customers and through wholesale deliveries to 28 suburban customers (Figure 1).
Approximately two-thirds of the delivered water is supplied to suburban agencies in the
counties of Alameda, Santa Clara, and San Mateo, and close to one-third is used by
customers in the City of San Francisco. Figure 2 provides a view of the SFPUC system
from Hetch Hetchy Valley to the City of San Francisco.
Figure 1 – SFPUC Water System Retail Customers
Figure 2 – SFPUC Water System
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Water for the system is supplied from two primary sources: 1) Upper Tuolumne River
Watershed; and, 2) Local surface water from the East Bay and Peninsula watersheds. The
regional water system delivers an annual average of approximately 260 million gallons of
water per day to a population of 2.4 million water users. The regional system consists of
over 280 miles of pipelines, over 60 miles of tunnels, 11 reservoirs, 5 pump stations, and
2 water treatment plants. The City Distribution System (local system) consists of a
network of more than 1,250 miles of pipeline within the City, 12 reservoirs, 9 storage
tanks, 12 pumping stations, 8 hydropneumatic stations, and 17 chlorination stations.
The SFPUC regional water supply system consists of five major regions:
• The Up-country Facilities – from Hetch Hetchy Reservoir to Alameda East Portal;
• Sunol Valley Region – from Alameda East Portal to Irvington Portal;
• Bay Division Pipelines – from Irvington Portal to west side of the San Francisco Bay;
• Peninsula Region – from Bay Division Pipelines to City of San Francisco; and,
• San Francisco Regional Facilities – various locations in the City of San Francisco.
LEVEL OF SERVICE OBJECTIVE
The vulnerability of the system to a major seismic event is well known. An USGS study
states that there is a 62% probability for one or more magnitude 6.7 or greater
earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay from 2003 to 2032. They are the prime drivers for
the placement of the system upgrade responsibilities on SFPUC by the California
legislatures.
During the early stage of the program, desired Level of Service (LOS) objectives after
earthquake were established and approved by the SFPUC Commission.
LOS objectives are divided into three categories: (1) delivery after a major earthquake,
(2) percent of turnouts that receive water, and (3) post-earthquake recovery. The major
earthquakes are defined as M7.9 or larger for the San Andreas Fault event, M7.2 or larger
for the Hayward Fault event and M6.8 or larger for the Calaveras fault event.
Delivery After a Major Earthquake
The LOS objective for delivery after a major earthquake is stated as:
“Deliver basic service to all customer groups within 24 hours, equivalent to 96, 37, and
82 MGD delivery to the Santa Clara/Alameda/South San Mateo County, the Northern
San Mateo County, and City of San Francisco customer groups, respectively.”
This objective provides basic service, defined as winter-time delivery, to each customer
group after an earthquake. The winter flow is 215 MGD to the Santa
Clara/Alameda/South San Mateo County, the Northern San Mateo County, and City of
San Francisco customer groups. Up to 24 hours may be required after the earthquake to
isolate damaged facilities, such as leaking pipelines, from the system and to ramp up
supply from sources that are operational.
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There is a level of uncertainty associated with the impacts of earthquakes, such as the
level of shaking, site-specific conditions, and exact locations where pipeline breaks may
occur. Therefore, there is always the possibility that the damage to the system and the
delivery that can be achieved may be more or less than estimated. There is a 10 percent
probability that deliveries will be less than estimated.
Percent of Turnouts That Receive Water
The LOS objective for percent of turnouts that receive water after a major earthquake is
stated as:
“Deliver basic service to at least 70% of turnouts within each customer group, to improve
uniformity of reliability across a customer group.”
This objective provides basic service to at least 70% of the turnouts within each customer
group after an earthquake. This objective helps to improve seismic reliability over the
entire customer group, and reduces the possibility of cases in which the seismic delivery
quantity objective is met, but delivery of all of the water is only to a small percentage of
turnouts.
Because there is a level of uncertainty associated with the impacts of Earthquakes as

stated in the previous section, there is always the possibility that the damage to the
system and the delivery that can be achieved may be more or less than estimated. There is
a 10 percent probability that percentage of turnouts that receive water will be less than
estimated.
Post-Earthquake Recovery
The LOS objective for post-earthquake recovery is stated as:
“Make temporary repairs to restore delivery of 300 MGD (average day demand) to each
customer group within 30 days, assuming resources and infrastructure are available.”
This objective provides average day demand 30 days after a major earthquake.
Temporary repairs to facilities would be made to achieve this objective, assuming
resources, repair materials and access are available. Permanent repairs to facilities would
take longer to complete.
For all seismic reliability LOS objectives, delivery is evaluated on a customer group
basis, and delivery to individual turnouts within a customer group may vary. There is
inherent uncertainty associated with the potential impacts of seismic events, including the
uncertain nature of the seismic hazard, seismic response of facilities, and less likely but
potentially catastrophic damage scenarios. Damage to other critical lifelines beyond the
control of the SFPUC, such as roads and bridges, may also impact the ability to access
and repair facilities after an earthquake.
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SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The reliability of the Regional Water System is analyzed using a System Reliability
Model. This model is specific to the SFPUC’s system, and includes all of its major
pipelines, treatment plants, pump stations, valve lots, and dam/reservoirs. The System
Reliability Model determines system reliability by combining the probabilities of failure
of individual facilities using the Monte Carlo method. The model itself is a complex set
of spreadsheet modules that utilize input from the system hydraulic model.
The Monte Carlo method is a statistical method of analyzing the behavior of complex
physical or mathematical systems. It involves the use of statistical sampling techniques to
obtain approximate solutions in terms of a range of values each of which has a
probability of occurring. The capabilities of this method make it ideal for evaluating the
SFPUC system in that it captures key factors such as:
• Individual facility vulnerability
• Systemic reliability and redundancy
• Seismic reliability
The Monte Carlo method was designed to aggregate probability data for complex systems
with large numbers of components. Isoyama and T. Katayama developed this method to
evaluate the seismic performance of large Japanese water supply systems over 20 years
ago. In particular, they examined the performance of the Tokyo Water Supply System.
The system reliability model is a statistical tool intended to provide a quantitative

estimation of reliability and risk of the system. It cannot predict the response of the
system after an earthquake. The model is intended for planning-level analysis and utilizes
regional/screening-level hazard and vulnerability data.
The process is comprised of 4 key components:

• Model Input Data: Probability of failure of pipelines and facilities
• Generation of Multiple Outage Scenarios (Monte Carlo Simulation)
• Calculation of System Delivery Capability
• Generation of Model Output in the Form of Reliability Curves (Delivery Capability &
Probability)
The results of the System Reliability Model analysis are described in the following
sections.
Post-Earthquake Delivery 24 Hours after a Major Earthquake
The post-earthquake delivery analysis evaluates how much water the system can deliver
after a major San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras earthquake, and the percentage of
turnouts that receive that water.
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Figure 3 shows how much water the system can deliver, in MGD, to South Bay,
Peninsula, and City of San Francisco customer groups after a major San Andreas,
Hayward, and Calaveras earthquake. The blue bars show the performance of the existing
system and the red bars show the improvement provided by the WSIP. The yellow bars
represent basic service, which is the LOS objective.
Figure 3 –Delivery 24 Hours After a Major Earthquake
Figure 4 shows the percentage of turnouts within each customer group that receive at
least basic service following a major San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras earthquake.
The blue bars show the performance of the existing system, the red bars show the
improvement provided by the WSIP. The yellow bars represent 70 percent of turnouts,
which is the LOS objective.
Figure 4 – Percent of Turnouts hat Receive Water 24 Hours After a Major Earthquake
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As discussed before, seismic hazards and levels of facility damage from earthquakes have
an inherent uncertainty and cannot be “predicted” in an exact manner. The estimated
values in Figures 3 and 4 have a probability of 10 percent chance that the actual delivery
or percentage of turnouts that receive after an earthquake will be less than shown.
Post-Earthquake Recovery 30 Days after a Major Earthquake
The post-earthquake recovery analysis evaluates how much water the Regional Water
System will be able to deliver 30 days after a major San Andreas, Hayward, and
Calaveras event. The estimated delivery reflects the ability of the system to recover after
an earthquake when temporary repairs are made in the first 30 days. A two-step process
was used to determine the recovery capability of the system. The first step involved
developing a facility outage scenario for a San Andreas, Calaveras, and Hayward
earthquake. The outage scenarios were based on the assumption that facilities with a
probability of failure greater than 25% would be out of service after these earthquakes
occur. In the second step, estimated repair times were used as a basis to determine how
many of the damaged facilities could be brought back to service after 30 days, assuming
that resources are available and facilities are accessible. The repair times for facilities
were based on repair times in the Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (ERRP) with
additional input from SFPUC Operations. The delivery capability of the system was then
estimated based on the facilities that could be returned to service in 30 days. Figure 5
shows the post-earthquake delivery for the system after 30 days.
Figure 5 - Post-Earthquake Recovery: Delivery 30 Days After a Major Earthquake
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SEISMIC PROJECTS
In order to meet the level of service as defined in previous sections, several of the SFPUC
facilities need to be seismically upgraded to the present code standard. The following is a
brief description of some of the major seismic projects, grouped by region:
Sunol Valley Projects
Calaveras Dam Replacement
Calaveras Reservoir is the largest local reservoir in the Regional Water System. The
Calaveras Dam as originally designed allows for retention of 96,850 acre-feet of local
runoff in Alameda County. Because the dam is located in a seismically active fault zone
and was determined to be seismically vulnerable, the California Department of Water
Resources Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) has limited the reservoir to a maximum
level corresponding to 31,000 acre-feet. A new dam will be rebuilt immediately
downstream of the existing dam to restore the reservoir’s historic capacity. The project
will provide for planning, design and construction of a replacement dam that can be
expanded in the future. It will include new or rehabilitated outlet works (for seismic
safety, improved operations and maintenance, and to facilitate releases for fish). A
second pipeline from the new dam to Sunol Valley Water Treatment Plant (SVWTP) will
also be included to provide the additional 70 million gallons per day (mgd) of capacity
needed to supply the full SVWTP treatment capacity from Calaveras Reservoir.
Irvington Tunnel
The Irvington Tunnel is essentially a continuation of the Coast Range Tunnel. At its
eastern end the tunnel connects to the Alameda Siphons and at its western end connects
to the Bay Division Pipelines at Irvington Portal. The Irvington Tunnel and Alameda
Siphons carry water from two of the three SFPUC sources, Hetch Hetchy and SVWTP.
These facilities have been determined to be seismically vulnerable, and because all water
to 2.5 million people pass through them, they cannot be shut down for inspection and
maintenance. This project is to construct a new tunnel parallel to, and just south of, the
existing Irvington Tunnel to convey water from the Hetch Hetchy system and the
SVWTP to the Bay Area. The new tunnel will be a redundant water transmission facility
to the existing Irvington Tunnel to ensure continued delivery of water after a seismic
event and to allow preventive maintenance of the existing tunnel. This project also
improves delivery by allowing existing facilities to be taken out of service for
maintenance while continuing to meet demands and replenish Crystal Springs Reservoir.
Bay Division Projects
Seismic Upgrade of Bay Division Pipelines (BDPLs) at Hayward Fault
186
This project will provide for planning, design and construction of shutoff and crossover
facilities on both sides of the Hayward fault, and seismically improved sections of pipe
between the two shut-off and crossover facilities. This project will result in a seismic
resistant design for BDPL Nos. 3 and 4 where they cross the Hayward Fault.
This is a particularly difficult project to construct in that the fault traces are under a major
freeway intersection.
Bay Division Pipeline Reliability
The BDPLs (four pipelines that were built in 1925, 1936, 1952, and 1973) transport water
from the Irvington Tunnel Portal to users in the East Bay, South Bay and Peninsula
systems as well as supplement the supply in the Crystal Springs and San Andreas
Reservoirs. This project consists of constructing a 21-mile Bay Division Pipeline No. 5
(BDPL No. 5) from Irvington Tunnel Portal in Fremont to Pulgas Tunnel Portal near
Redwood City, including a tunnel under San Francisco Bay and adjacent marshlands.
This project improves seismic reliability of BDPLs across San Francisco Bay after a
major earthquake. It also improves delivery reliability by allowing existing facilities to be
taken out of service for maintenance while continuing to meet day-to-day demands and
replenish Crystal Springs Reservoir.
Bay Division Pipeline (BDPL) No. 4 Slip Lining Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
(PCCP) Sections
Based on preliminary condition assessment and evaluation of rehabilitation needs of the

Bay Division Pipelines, it was determined that rehabilitation of PCCP sections of BDPL
No. 4 have to be rehabilitated to meet the system performance standards. This project will
be for slip lining reaches of BDPL No. 4 that are constructed of PCCP: from Irvington
Tunnel to Calaveras Valve Lot and from Stanford Tunnel West Portal to Pulgas Portal.
The slip lining will improve seismic performance and improve delivery reliability of
BDPL No. 4 and the entire Bay Division Pipeline system.
Peninsula Projects
Baden and San Pedro Valve Lot Seismic Evaluation & Upgrade
Baden and San Pedro Valve Lots are critical points in the Regional Water System. All the
Peninsula Pipelines run through Baden Valve Lot and all of the Peninsula High Zone
pipelines pass through the San Pedro Valve Lot. Disruption of flow at these valve lots in
an earthquake would isolate Peninsula and San Francisco customers from all three of the
SFPUC’s water sources; therefore, it is critical that these facilities remain operational
after a major seismic event. The valves, vaults, and piping at these facilities will be
evaluated and upgraded for seismic reliability. This project provides for construction of
the upgrades to ensure the reliability of deliveries to Peninsula and San Francisco
customers following a major earthquake.
187
Capuchino Valve Lot Capacity Improvements
This project provides for upgrade of a pressure-reducing station, which will allow flow
from a high-pressure pipeline to supply a low-pressure pipeline. This project increases
seismic reliability by improving capacity to deliver HTWTP water to City, Peninsula, and
South Bay customers after a major earthquake that may result in the loss of East Bay and
Hetch Hetchy water supplies. It also improves delivery reliability by continuing to meet
day-to-day demands to Peninsula and South Bay customers in the event of planned
maintenance or unplanned outages that may result in the loss of East Bay or Hetch
Hetchy supplies.
Crystal Springs Pump Station and Crystal Springs-San Andreas Pipeline

(CSPS and CS-SA PL)
Components of the system that moves water from Crystal Springs Reservoir to the Harry
Tracy Water Treatment Plant were constructed at various stages form the late 1800s to
1968. The components include the Crystal Springs Outlet facilities, Crystal Springs Pump
Station, Crystal Springs-San Andreas Pipeline, and Outlet Facilities from San Andreas
Reservoir to the Harry Tracy Water Treatment Plant (HTWTP). These facilities are to be
evaluated and upgraded. This project is to provide for seismic improvements of facilities
that convey water from Crystal Springs Reservoir to HTWTP. This project would also
increase the transmission capacity of raw water from Crystal Springs Reservoir to San
Andreas Reservoir in order to reliably supply 140 mgd of raw water for treatment at
HTWTP – a necessary operating situation after a major seismic event with the resulting
failures in the main system.
Crystal Springs Bypass Tunnel No. 2
The existing Crystal Springs Bypass Pipeline (CSBP) is a critical line between Hetch
Hetchy supply and the Peninsula, and is the only pipeline carrying water north from the
Crystal Springs Balancing Reservoir. The CSBP is a 96-inch diameter prestressed
concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP) that was installed in 1969 below a hillside along Polhemus
Road in the City of San Mateo. Currently, the CSBP cannot be shut down for an extended
period of time for inspection or maintenance due to its role in supplying water to the
Peninsula. This project provides for construction of a 4500 –foot long, 9 feet diameter
tunnel to provide redundancy to the CSBP and improve delivery reliability.
Harry Tracy Water Treatment Plant (HTWTP) Improvements
HTWTP was constructed in 1971 and subsequently expanded in 1988 and 1990 to a
maximum capacity of 160 mgd, although initially it was designed and approved for a
maximum capacity of 180 mgd. This project provides for seismic retrofit and
rehabilitation of the building/facility, including upgrade of the ozone system, process
piping and other related equipment. At the completion of this project, the plant will have
a sustainable operating capacity of 140 mgd. This is necessary for delivery reliability
such that the treatment plant can deliver water from local reservoirs (San Andreas,
188
Crystal Springs) to the Peninsula and San Francisco if Hetch Hetchy and/or Sunol water
is unavailable.
San Francisco Regional Projects
Crystal Springs Pipeline (CSPL) No. 2 & San Andreas Pipeline (SAPL) No. 3
These projects provide for repair and replacement of sections of Crystal Springs and San
Andreas pipelines. The seismic improvements to the pipelines provided by these projects
are needed to meet the seismic reliability levels of service goals and providing
redundancy to high zone customers along the Peninsula and in San Francisco.
Sunset Reservoir – North Basin
Sunset Reservoir is one of three terminal reservoirs in the Regional Water System that is
located in San Francisco. The reservoir was constructed in 1938 and is seismically
vulnerable. This project provides for seismic upgrade of the reservoir roof on the north
basin of Sunset Reservoir and strengthening of the reservoir’s roof, columns and beams.
In addition, it provides for surrounding site stabilization and water quality improvements
for sampling and disinfection.
University Mound Reservoir Upgrade
The North Basin of the University Mound Reservoir was constructed in 1885 and
reconstructed in 1924. The reservoir is the terminus of the “low zone” water in the
SFPUC’s City Distribution Division, and is seismically vulnerable. This project provides
for seismic upgrades to one of the two largest treated water storage reservoirs to meet the
California Division of Safety of Dams requirements. The project will also provide water
quality improvements to facilitate continued compliance with state and federal
regulations.
Various Locations
Standby Power Facilities Various Locations
This project provides for standby power at various facilities to keep them operating
during power outages, thereby reducing the potential for interruption of supply to
customers. The locations identified in the needs assessment include the following
facilities: San Pedro Valve Lot, Capuchino Valve Lot, Millbrae facility, San Antonio
Reservoir and Turner Dam, Alameda West, HTWTP and Calaveras Reservoir.
Pipeline Repair Readiness
This project will improve seismic reliability by implementing planning efforts to improve
the SFPUC’s readiness to respond to pipeline failures following an earthquake. A
pipeline repair plan will be developed, with a list of potential areas of vulnerability
189
(possible locations of pipe breaks or leaks), equipment and personnel needed to effect the
repairs. As part of readiness improvement, SFPUC will investigate contracting options to
allow for quicker delivery of materials and quicker repair, in order to reduce costs of
potentially stockpiling all needed material and equipment.
CONCLUSIONS
SFPUC is embarking on a mega-water supply improvement program. The seismic

component of the program is a major task to insure that the system can meet the system’s
delivery goals after a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area.
The delivery goals consist of three parts: (1) deliver winter day demand of 215 MGD to
the customers, and deliver basic service to at least 70% of the turnouts 24 hours after a
major earthquake; and (2) make repairs to ensure delivery of average day demand of 300
MGD 30 days after the major earthquake.
A system reliability study was done to evaluate how much water the system can deliver
and what percentage of turnouts will receive water after a major San Andreas, Hayward,
and Calaveras earthquake. The study shows significant improvements for the system with
the program’s implementation.
In order to achieve the desired improvement, several projects in the Sunol Valley, the
Bay Division, the Peninsula and the San Francisco regions were identified and are under
planning, design, or construction. In addition, standby power facilities at various
locations were added to reduce the potential for supply interruption, and a pipeline repair
plan was developed to improve the SFPUC’s response to pipeline failures after an
earthquake.
REFERENCES
Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities (2003), “Earthquake Probabilities

in the San Francisco Region: 2002-2031”, USGS Open-file Report 03-214, U. S.
Geological Survey
Isoyama, R. and Katayama, T. (1982), “Reliability Evaluation Method of Large-Scale

Water Supply Net Works During Seismic Disaster”, Proc. of JSCE, No 32, pp. 37-48 (in
Japanese); and Transactions of JSCE, Vol. 14, 1982, pp.422-423 (in English)
190
Information Provision to Residents on Construction of
Regulating Reservoir at Landslide Site Caused by Earthquake
Shinji Nakayasu, Masao Kadowaki, and Toshiaki Hashimoto
ABSTRACT
Hanshin Water Supply Authority (HWSA) planned construction of a regulating reservoir at a

landslide-devastated site. In this case, the residents near the construction site had a heightened sense
of concern for the earthquake protection of the reservoir.
Therefore HWSA considered the seismic design of the reservoir and also the prevention of a
second disaster in the neighboring residential area. In order to further reassure the residents, it was
necessary to inform the residents about the measures taken.
In this paper, the measures at each construction process in communicating with the residents are
presented as follows:
• Design phase: Earthquake effect assessment and measures taking into account social and natural
environment
• Construction phase: Verification of the effect of the measures and proper execution of the
construction
• Completion and after (maintenance): Monitoring the stability of the effect of the measures
_____________
Shinji Nakayasu, Waterworks Engineer, Construction division, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, 3-20-1 Nishiokamoto,
Higashinada, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan 658-0073
Masao kadowaki, Waterworks Engineer, Construction division, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, 3-20-1 Nishiokamoto,
Higashinada, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan 658-0073
Toshiaki Hashimoto, Waterworks Engineer, Construction division, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, 3-20-1
Nishiokamoto, Higashinada, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan 658-0073
191
1. Introduction
The Hanshin Water Supply Authority (HWSA) is a municipal utility that supplies drinking water
to 2.4 million consumers living in the 719 km2 Hanshin area, southern Hyogo Prefecture, and has a
capacity of 1,128,000 m3/day and a pipeline length of 186 km (Fig. 1).
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that occurred in 1995 devastated a major portion of the
Hanshin area. Our waterworks facilities also suffered severe damage mainly to the aged pipelines
and structures, and therefore, sufficient water could not be supplied immediately after the earthquake
[1]. Learning from this experience, we are now improving the seismic capacity of existing facilities
and establishing a backup system on the basis of the “Seismic Capacity Improvement of Facilities
plan” that was formulated after the disaster [2].
In this paper, as part of the plan, we report the efficacy of the provision of information on
earthquake disaster countermeasures to gain the understanding of the local residents, who have
earthquake disaster experience, regarding the construction of a regulating reservoir (Kabutoyama
regulating reservoir) to improve the water supply stability.
Figure 1. Arrangement of facilities of Hanshin Water Supply Authority.
2. Outline of Kabutoyama Regulating Reservoir
Kabutoyama regulating reservoir is a pure water subterranean regulating reservoir with a

reinforced concrete structure and an effective capacity of 80,000 m3. It is located at the base of
Kabuto Mountain (Kabutoyama-cho, Nishinomiya City), which is at the eastern end of the Rokko
Mountain Range. This was the site of a water treatment plant that was shut down in 2001.
192
This site is the starting point of a transmission tunnel and has good geographical conditions for
transporting water by gravity flow (Fig. 2 and 3).
After the completion of this regulating reservoir, an approximately 1.5-fold increase in the
capacity of the pure water reservoir managed by HWSA has been obtained.
Figure 2. Aerial view of Kabutoyama regulating reservoir (May 2007).
Figure 3. Plan view and cross section of Kabutoyama regulating reservoir.
193
3. Disaster Damage at Construction Site and Residents’ Feeling concerning Construction of
Regulating Reservoir
3.1 Landslide disaster
The construction site is located next to a quiet residential area within an educational district,
which is distinguished by several universities. During the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a
large-scale landslide occurred around this site. This landslide first occurred on the lower slopes at the
eastern end of the site, and slope surface soils, as well as a part of the pure water treatment plant,
swept through part of residential area below, causing 34 casualties. The surface soils of the slope,
which was a gentle slope with a gradient of approximately 12-13 degrees, rapidly slid for a long
distance simultaneously with the occurrence of the earthquake. On the basis of post-test results,
experts on landslide disasters pointed out that part of the slope, which contains a large amount of
moisture from the abundant groundwater in the area, was liquefied by the effect of the seismic motion
and caused the landslide.
Since the disaster, the slope has been maintained by landslide control construction, such as the
installation of landslide prevention piles. Moreover, although the existing water treatment plant is
located next to the upper area of the slope, it would be determined that the regulating reservoir was
constructed at a certain distance from that part of the slope (Fig. 4).
Figure 4. Geological section of the construction site.
3.2 Residents’ feelings concerning construction of regulating reservoir
Considering the severity of the landslide damage, we began explanations of the construction to
local residents in 2001 during the design phase, with the aim of reaching an agreement before the start
of construction.
At a briefing, it was explained that the regulating reservoir is designed to ensure the seismic
performance capable of resisting seismic motion as severe as that of the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake (seismic motion level 2) in accordance with the guidelines “Seismic Design and
Construction of Water Supply Facilities” (1995) (hereafter, Guidelines), and hence the seismic
capacity would be greatly improved compared with the existing water treatment plant designed in the
1950s. In addition, it was also explained that the groundwater drainage system, which will be
194
installed to prevent any increase in the amount of groundwater flow into the slope during the drilling
process, can suppress the groundwater level to lower than the present level, ensuring the safety of the
ground.
However, the residents who experienced the earthquake and landslide expressed strong anxiety
regarding the possibility of water leakage caused by earthquake damage and requested the abolition
or a considerable reduction of the scale of the plan. The opinions (requests) of the residents were as
follows.
• There are active faults around the construction site (Fig. 1). Intraplate earthquakes have
continued to occur since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and damage to structures has been
reported. It cannot be guaranteed that the structures will not be destroyed.
• Since the large-capacity water facility is to be constructed on the upper end of the slope on which
the landslide occurred, there would be the possibility of increased danger to residents, including
the occurrence of landslides, even though damage to the regulating reservoir may be small.
• The safety of the area must be ensured during the service life of the regulating reservoir.
Nishinomiya City, where this regulating reservoir is located, enacted the “Regulations for the
Creation of an Earthquake-Resistant City” in 1995 and began designating the area within 100 m of
either side of an active fault as a building regulation area. This regulating reservoir is beyond the
regulation area because it is 300 m or more from an active fault. However, to remove the deep-rooted
anxiety of the residents, it was decided that not only an evaluation of the effects of neighboring active
faults but also measures to reduce the risk of secondary disasters in the event of damage to concrete
structures should be examined. Moreover, we also decided to ask academic experts for their advice
and evaluation as well as to endeavor to disclose information to residents in order to achieve an
objective evaluation of the safety of the reservoir.
4. Measures for Reducing Risk Involved in Construction
4.1 Design Phase

1) Verification of antiseismic design based on Guidelines
First, the effectiveness of the antiseismic design, to which the Guidelines were applied, was
verified with respect to the effects of neighboring active faults. The projected seismic motion
obtained on the basis of the Guidelines and two cases of seismic motion, calculated on the assumption
that one of the two faults that are considered to have a potentially severe effect on this construction
site becomes active, were compared. It was found that the projected seismic motion takes into
account the seismic motion due to either of the two neighboring active faults, and therefore it was
confirmed that sufficient seismic performance in line with the Guidelines can be ensured (Table 1).
Table 1. COMPARISON OF DESIGN AND ASSUMED SEISMIC MOTION.

Maximum ground surface
acceleration (gal)
Projected seismic motion based on Guidelines 1,200
Assumed seismic motion due to active fault (Arima-Takatsuki fault) 811
Assumed seismic motion due to active fault (Koyo fault) 766
Maximum seismic motion during the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 818
195
Furthermore, in the report on the investigation of damage due to the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake [3], it is reported that no cracks would have been generated due to the lack of strength of
the structure in the waterworks constructed on the basis of the 1979 Guidelines if the earthquake had
not been accompanied by deformation of the ground. Also, on the basis of the performance of other
similar reservoirs, it is considered that there is little possibility of the foundation ground under the
regulating reservoir, which is mainly granite soil, being greatly damaged by earthquake.
2) Effect of ground surface displacement

However, in the Kocaeri Earthquake in Turkey and the Ji-Ji Earthquake in Taiwan, which
occurred successively in 1999, damage to structures caused by several meters ground surface
displacement of the faults was observed. Because concrete structures may be damaged depending on
the amount of ground surface displacement, academic experts have pointed out the necessity of
predicting this effect and preparing countermeasures.
Although the developmental mechanism of ground surface displacement has not yet been
completely clarified, the amount of displacement can be quantitatively determined by a calculation
using fault parameters [4]. As a result, the amount of displacement of the ground under the regulating
reservoir has been estimated to be, at most, 0.5 m. This is considerably smaller than that (several
meters) observed in the above-mentioned cases of damaged structures and is considered not to lead to
structure failure, although this amount of displacement was evaluated to present a possibility of the
generation of cracks.
3) Examination of measures for preventing water leakage

Cracks generated in the regulating reservoir will cause water leakage, and when the water
penetrates into the ground, a landslide may occur. Therefore, we decided to include measures in the
design for mitigating damage caused by water leakage.
As measures for preventing water leakage, we examined mitigating measures by assuming crack
occurrence, in addition to preliminary measures aiming at preventing and suppressing cracks, such as
increasing the number of shear reinforcements, preventing differential settlement at pipeline-structure
joints, and reducing expansion joints which are conventional measures. The mitigating measures
adopted in the construction are described below.
• Providing a drainage channel

In the construction, to remove the groundwater flowing into the site, collection channels were
installed around the regulating reservoir to discharge the groundwater into neighboring rivers.
Figure 5. Schematic of seepage control sheet and drainage channel.
196
Similarly, a drainage channel was provided for unexpected water leakage to prevent the water
from penetrating into the ground. The main components of the facility are seepage control sheets
installed at the bottom and along the sides of the regulating reservoir and special pipelines to drain the
water collected in the sheets into the channels (Fig. 5).
• Monitoring system installation

It is difficult to always be aware of the current condition of the regulating reservoir because it is
an unmanned facility. To solve this problem, areas of concern are continuously monitored by
measurement equipment. The following five items that are considered to be related to the occurrence
of landslides at the slope of concern are monitored: ground water level, soil slope, pore water
pressure, rainfall, and amount of groundwater drained. These data are compiled in a PC in the on-site
control room and alarms are transmitted to jurisdictional stations.
4.2 Response after start of construction
We explained the measures for preventing water leakage to residents over approximately one
year of meetings and gained their understanding. As a result, an agreement was achieved on the start
of construction under the condition that these measures were included. However, even after the start
of construction, we held meetings and provided information regarding the progress of the
construction and the water leakage prevention measures, aiming at “ensuring reliability during the
service lifetime”, which was one of the requests from the residents.
1) Construction phase
• Tours of construction site
Focusing on the construction and measures for preventing water leakage, tours of the construction
site were held to highlight the progress so that the residents could confirm whether the construction
was being properly conducted (Fig. 6). The tours were held during the process of equipping the
facility with antiseismic measures, including seepage control sheets and the groundwater drainage
system, as well as during the process of installing reinforcements. Information on the progress of the
construction and safety management was regularly reported to local residents in writing in the form of
leaflets.
Figure 6. Scene of construction site tour.
197
• Verification of effects of measures and construction conditions
Academic experts confirmed whether the effect of the measures for preventing water leakage
were appropriate to the conditions of the construction site and whether the site was in a sufficiently
functionable state (Fig. 7). The items confirmed were as follows.
♦ Seepage control sheet: condition of installed sheet
♦ Monitoring system: installation position of measurement equipment, operating condition
♦ Foundation ground: soil property, condition of groundwater drainage, ground condition before
and after construction (future schedule)
♦ Structure of regulating reservoir: condition of bar arrangement of shear reinforcements,
completion test
Figure 7. Scene of construction confirmation by academic experts.
2) Completion and after (maintenance)

• Disclosure of monitoring data
One of the requests from the residents was to be able to confirm the ongoing monitoring of the
regulating reservoir and the ground on-site. As a response to this, we displayed changes in the data
with time in the local control room whenever requested (Fig. 8). In addition, we provided a large
junction well to display the pipeline used to drain leaking water so that people could easily enter and
observe the drainage .
Figure 8. On-site monitoring system and monitoring data.
198
• Emergency discharge of standing water
Because this regulating reservoir is far from the manned jurisdictional facility (pump station),
concern was expressed by the residents about the initial response to an emergency. It was basically
considered that there would be no problem in carrying out the measures to be taken immediately after
an accident because the drainage pipe will be effective, but we also proposed to reduce the water level
of the regulating reservoir by the emergency discharge of standing water as a more reliable strategy
for reducing damage.
In such an emergency discharge, water flow into the regulating reservoir will be stopped by
stopping the pump located upstream, and at the same time, a motor-operated valve attached to the
outlet pipe will be opened by remote control to forcibly discharge the standing water. Although the
actual effect of this discharge will greatly depend on the water level and the condition of the
downstream water reception area at that time, the anxiety of the residents was alleviated because a
concrete methodology was presented.
5. Conclusions
Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, residents living around active faults have
continuously lived in fear of further activity. Regarding our construction in such an environment, we
consider that our relationship of trust with the residents has been successfully, though slowly,
established by not only presenting concrete safety measures against the possibilities of accidents but
also enabling the residents to confirm the effects of the measures and by providing information on the
progress of construction and on monitoring after the completion of the facility.
The construction of this reservoir started in 2003 and was completed on schedule in March 2007.
At present, the data accumulated during the construction that will be used for setting the critical
values in the monitoring system are being analyzed. In addition, the examination of methods of
sending and receiving warnings (voice information, E-mail, FAX, and others) and of sharing data
with the disaster prevention agency are being discussed.
In the case presented in this paper, it was essential to strengthen earthquake disaster
countermeasures to ease the concerns of the residents because the area had previously been a disaster
site. In Japan, which has a small land area and where houses are concentrated even around active
faults, it is difficult to find new land suitable for constructing waterworks facilities. Moreover, most
regulating reservoirs and drainage reservoirs are established at higher elevations in local areas into
which housing developments are advancing owing to urbanization. Therefore, it is becoming
increasingly important to ensure the safety of residents living near such facilities.
When constructing public facilities, including waterworks, agreement with residents is
indispensable. It is important for developers to establish a partnership with residents by, for example,
actively providing information in consideration with local characteristics and residents’ needs.
199
(REFERENCES)
[1] Mishima, K. 2000. "Restoration and Anti-Seismic Measures of Water Supply Facilities of Hanshin Water
Supply Authority," U.S.-Japan Anti-Seismic Measures Workshop, 2000.
[2] Planning and Examination Committee for Improving the Earthquake Resistance of Hanshin Water
Authority, 1995. "Proposal for Improving the Earthquake Resistance of Hanshin Water’s Facilities,"
[3] National Institute of public Health, Japan Pipe Systems Research Center, Kokusai Suido Consultants Co.,
Ltd. 1996. “Research Report on Seismic Damage of Water Treatment Facilities by Great Hanshin
Earthquake,”
[4] Takada, S. Kitamura, I. 2001. “Simulation Model of Surface Fault Dislocation and Its Application to
Recent Earthquakes,” Memoirs of Construction Engineering Research Institute, vol.43-B: pp.153-166.
200
SESSION 4
Seismic System Evaluations
Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura, Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, JAPAN – “A Case Study
on How PIs Should Be Applied in Evaluating Seismic Performance Along
with the Water Works Guidelines”
Mr. Yasuhiko Sato, Japan Water Research Center, Tokyo, JAPAN – “Function Diagnosis
Method to Improve Earthquake Resistance of Water Supply Facilities”
Mr. Noboru Murakami, Hachinohe Water Supply Authority, Hachinohe, JAPAN – “Nejo
Purification Plant Water System Facilities Today”
Mr. Hidehiko Aihara, Yokohama City Waterworks Bureau, JAPAN – “The Quakeproof
Diagnosis of Waterworks Facilities in Yokohama City”
Ms. Crystal Yezman, Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, US – “Santa Clara
Valley Water District Reliability Program, Implementing Improvements for
Seismic Response”
201
202
A case study on how PIs should be applied
-In evaluating seismic performance along with
the water works guidelines-
Kazutomo Nakamura
ABSTRACT
Japan Water Works Association (JWWA) published the drinking water supply
service guidelines (the water works guidelines) in January 2006. The water works
guidelines based on the concepts of the ISO/TC224 (Guidelines for the management
and assessment of a drinking water supply service) that will be established as one of the
international standards in 2007.
The water works guidelines can be used to provide customers or council with
information on the water works and to explain their situations in an easy way to make
them understand logically. However, water utilities differ in their backgrounds such as
geological, historical conditions and characteristics of their cities as well. Many of the
water utilities are going to make their performance indicators (PIs) calculated by the
water works guidelines open to the public.
One hundred water utilities have released their PIs in the past three years. Almost
of all water works can compare their PIs with other similar scale water utilities.
This paper introduces practical examples for the seismic performance evaluation in
particular with selected PIs of the water works guidelines.
Kazutomo Nakamura, Senior Engineer, Training and International Department, Japan Water Works
Association、8-9,4-Chome, Kudan-Minami,Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo , 102-0074, JAPAN
203
1. INTRODUCTION
The Japan Water Works Association published “ Guideline for the management and
assessment of drinking water service (JWWA Q 100)” [1](the water works guidelines)
as a standard in January 2005. This standard is based on the concept of ISO/TC224
(Guideline for the management and assessment of a drinking water supply service) that
will be established as one of the international standards in 2007.
The water works guidelines consist of 137 items of PIs that can inform consumers
of management data, keeping waterworks activities transparent, helping water utilities
carry out accountability of a business, then consumers are being satisfied with their
requests.
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, administrating water utilities in Japan,
made the water works vision [2] open to the public that indicates the future of Japanese
water works and necessary measures for them to realize the vision. Every water utility is
required to make its own water works visions [3].
The water works guideline is composed of the concept of the water works vision.
Every water utility is recommended to make use of the water works guideline to
compile its own vision. This paper reports practical examples for an earthquake
resistance evaluation with PIs of the water works guidelines.
2. PRESENT STATUS OF JAPANESE WATER WORKS
Water utilities in Japan have supplied safe and hygienic drinking water to their
consumers and the population served stands at 97.2% as of March 2005. However, it is
necessary for them to have to solve many problems in order to succeed the present
safety and hygienic water supply systems into a next generation.
2.1 Necessity of facilities renewal
Along with the number of population served has increased, in the period of high
economic growth, most of Japanese water supply facilities had to be constructed from
1960s to 1980s. After 1990s, the advanced purification plants were installed to treat
mainly polluted raw water.
Forty years have passed since the facilities have constructed in the period of high
economic growth era and some of the facilities are unable to adapt themselves to
required performances. Water utilities have their aged facilities renewed in the near
future.
204
180
155
160
140
120 110
100
75 73
80
60
38
40 30
20 10 8
0
94
5 49 59 69 79 89 99 0-
-1 19 19 - 19 - 19 19 19 20
0
00 4 5- 5 0- 60 70 80
-
90
-
19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Figure 1. Number of purification plant to start operation [4]

(more than 10,000m3/d of treatment capacity)
2.2 Retirement of staff
The number of employees in water utilities nationwide comes up to about 56,000

[5] and about 40% of them are over fifties who will retire in ten years. The number of
young generation is very few, due to management efficiency policy to reduce number of
employees.
Up to now, engineers and skilled workers of water works are in charge of operation
and maintenance of their facilities. As the results of the staff have decreased to half,
water works have to sort jobs they used to take care of themselves and to entrust to
out-sourcing. In addition, it is necessary for water utilities to introduce a solid training
system to help transfer technology, skills, and accumulated knowledge from shortly
retiring staff to the next generation.
12,000
10,000
skilled
8,000 w orker
engineer
6,000
4,000 clerical
w orker
2,000
0
5
29
34
39
44
49
54
59
<
<2
=
-
60
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
age gro u p Statistics of Japanese W ater W orks in 2005
Figure 2. Number of water works employees classified by age
205
2.3 Decreasing of water demand
The trend of water demand is decreasing by the spread of water conservation

activity of customers, the effect of economic depression and increasing of water-reuse in
industrial water. By the decrease of water demand, the income of water utilities is
decreasing and the budget scale also became shrunk.
With financial difficulties, some water utilities have to postpone the renewal of
facilities, which have to be renewed, so that their earthquake resistant abilities should be
decreased.
2.4 Requirement of water supply in disaster
In case of the disaster happens, to supply water to the medical facilities, to the
center of urban activities and to daily life of the citizen is essential. Especially in large
city, if there is no water source as substitute for the water supply system, dependence on
the water supply should be very high. Water utilities should be required to supply water
the same as normal situations, even if in disaster as earthquake hits.
It is known facts from many experiences that citizen can bear 3L of water in one
day during a couple of days just after disaster happened, but gradually more amount of
water for toilet, wash cloths and wash their body should be required.
The earthquake proof water supply facilities and emergency water supply system
are required to shorten the period of suspended time, and to supply water almost the
same as usual conditions.
2.5 Stabilization of water service management
According to the water supply law, the water works is principally administered on
the municipality basis. There are 9,400 water works in Japan [5] and number of water
works supplying to less than 5,000 populations are about 8,000 and more than
50,000 are only 422. Most of water works are categorized as small scale and are facing
fragile business situations.
Table１. Number of water services classified by scale （in 2005）

5,000
Under Under Under Under Under -- 101
More Under
Popula- 500,000 100,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 (Small
than constru Total
tion -- -- -- -- -- scale
500,000 ction
served 100,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 5,001 water
Service)
Number 24 190 208 209 506 454 11 7,794 9,385

of
Water
services 422 1,169 7,794
(4.5%) （12.5%） 83.0%
3. WATER WORKS VISION AND REGIONAL WATER WORKS VISION
3.1 Water works vision
Japanese water works have many challenges as described above. The Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare shows the desirable future and indicates the necessary
206
measures which the water works should address to realize the goals indicated by the
water works vision.
The goals of Japanese water works are represented in five keywords that are safety,
security, sustainability, environment and globalization. Sustainability means the
improvement of countermeasures against disasters.
It was revealed [4] that only 20% of water purification plants and 23% of clear
water reservoirs are equipped with earthquake resistant, according to the seismic
diagnosis examined by water works themselves. In addition, ductile cast iron pipe with
restraint joint, steel pipe and polyethylene pipe are installed with 13% of main pipelines
(including raw water conveyance, transmission and distribution pipe) and 34% of water
utilities compile water supply plan for the emergency. Based on these facts, three targets
are set as specific countermeasures against earthquakes.
a) All of purification plants, clear water reservoir and main pipeline should be
earthquake resistant
b) Every water utility should secure stable water supply depending on the area
conditions, and to compile the emergency water supply plan in disaster, including an
emergency repairing systems.
c) Two goals mentioned above should be realized as soon as possible in the Tokai,
Tou-nankai and Nankai areas where huge earthquakes being predicted.
3.2 Regional water works vision
The water works vision shows the common goals and measures to be realized for
all water utilities. Each water utility is requested to set own water works vision, namely
the regional water works vision. Each water utility should analyze own business, and
sets the goals fitting to their characteristics so that they have measures to reach their
goals.
When water utilities try to make out the regional water works vision, they are
advised to make use of the water works guideline in order to analyze the present
conditions, to evaluate a future prospect, to consider methods in reality and to set up the
target.
4. THE WATER WORKS GUIDELINES
4.1 Necessity of water works guideline
Water utilities in Japan are restricted to operate by public enterprises and their
service areas to operate are fixed. In many countries, public sector takes charge of water
supply. In recent years, many private companies show dynamic activities in the field of
the water supply and those activities are expanding beyond country borders.
Taking consideration of this kind of global business movements and water supply
law permitting outsourced operation and maintenance, we can say that it is very difficult
for only Japanese water works to keep isolating from global activities.
In order to evaluate the water works based on the unified international standard,
ISO/TC224 will be used as one of the international standards in 2007. This international
standard stipulates and covers of the standard; it consists of element of structure of
water supply system, methods of evaluation and basic concepts as well. However, the
performance indicators are attached as an appendix, which has no restriction, due to
environment of water works differ from each country.
207
4.2 Performance Indicators (PIs)
The PIs are classified into six categories in total by adding a category of
management to the existing 5 categories of the water works vision to show the present
situation. The structure of the water works guidelines follows the ISO/TC224, the
benchmarks are not set. The guideline contains the PIs that can show the problems of
Japanese water works to solve as mentioned earlier and the future water works should
be.
4.3 Evaluation by making use of the PIs
The water works guideline evaluates the conditions of water works through
calculation of 137 PIs. However, it is necessary to pay attention that the PIs are unable
to express in numbers on natural and social environment of water works. The water
works should not evaluate the conditions of water utilities only by using individual
value but have to evaluate them by taking the mutual relations of another value into
considerations.
The purpose or usage of PIs differs by its positions. Water utilities use PIs to
compare with similar water works and to analyze and to evaluate a series of variation of
PIs. The PIs are useful tools to set the goal of project and to explain the process to reach
or the benefit of project. By calculating PIs, it will be possible for us to explain the
present status and target to the customer or the assembly in logically and clearly,
because the water works can indicate its service activities in numerical values.
In the field of water supply, industries, consulting farms and the competent
authorities will be able to make use of the PIs for their purposes. Customers also make
use of PIs to help them understand information on what water business situations stand,
including about stable water supply and countermeasures against disasters. Customer
can request specific information about the PIs that they want to know more.
4.4 PIs related to earthquake resistant
One third of PIs relates to the evaluation of earthquake performance. The definition
of some PIs relating to earthquake shown below;
(1) 2103 ratio of aged pipeline:
ratio of aged pipeline = ( length of pipeline exceeding statutory service life / total
pipeline length) * 100 ( unit: % )
The length of pipeline exceeding statutory service life (km) is the full length of pipeline
older than 40 years, the statutory service life (iron pipe) defined by the Municipal
Enterprise Law.
The total pipeline length (km) is the full length of conveyance, transmission and
distribution pipe in use except for the decommissioned.
(2) 2210 ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline:
ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline = ( length of earthquake resistant pipeline / total

pipeline length ) * 100 ( unit: % )
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The earthquake resistant pipe includes ductile cast iron, steel and high-density
polyethylene pipes which are used for water conveyance, transmission and distribution,
and which have earthquake resistant joints. The earthquake resistant joints used for
the ductile cast iron pipe refers to various types of earthquake resistant joints, such as S,
SII, NS, UF, KF, and PII. The steel pipe is limited to that having welded joints. The
polyethylene pipe is limited if having thermal fused joints. Pipe in pipelines (PIP) and is
shields are included anti-seismic structure.
The length of earthquake resistant pipelines (km) is the full length of conveyance,
transmission and distribution pipes having any type of anti-seismic joints mentioned
above.
(3) 5013 number of pipeline failures:
number of pipeline failures = ( number of pipeline failures / total pipeline length ) * 100
（number/100km）
The number of pipeline failures (accidents) is the annual sum of accidents occurring in
conveyance, transmission and distribution pipe (including aqueducts) in use, for
example, ruptures, damage, coming off and leaking from fittings. Regardless of the
causes (for example, another utility induces an accident) and the occurrence of water
leaks, the accident includes failures in auxiliary equipment including valves and trouble
with the pipes due to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides and typhoons.
5. APPLICATION OF THE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Three years have passed since the guideline had been published. About one
hundred water works have made their regional water works vision open to the public.
Many PIs can be calculated directly from existing data, but some of PIs should be
calculated from data gained by collected or arranged. In some water works, their basic
data of PIs are not kept filed or classified, in case, data of facilities got lost or the
reliability of data is kept low. Therefore those water works are unable to release their
vision.
Many water works should use PIs to analyze the present status, to set target and to
explain logically. By using PIs, two types of examples can be summarized to evaluate
the earthquake resistance improvement projects; one in self-evaluated, the other in a
mutual relation of PIs.
5.1 Example of A water works
A water works locates in southern part of the Kannto region and it released their
ten-year management plan [6], which includes the improving projects for the
countermeasures against disasters. The water works shows the present status and its
goal in the form of PIs. Provided for predicted earthquake, existing pipelines have been
209
reinforced with seismic resistance ability based on a seismic diagnosis. The restraint
joint pipes are installed in areas where liquefaction will be supposed to occur when the
Kanto earthquake hits, and designated preparing areas against the Tokai earthquake.
The concrete structures have been reinforced based on the diagnosis with the
assumption of ground motion caused by the Tokai earthquake. Improving the seismic
resistant ability of transmission and distribution pipeline, the restraint joint pipe are
installed in the whole supply area from 2006 to 2015 and the ratio of earthquake
resistant pipeline will increase from 9.5% to 16.6%.
Table 2. The PIs of A water works

code Performance indicator (PIS) 2004
2103 Ratio of aged pipeline (%) 6.3
2104 Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%) 0.49
2107 Newly installed pipeline (%) 1.3
2202 Trunk main failures（number/100km） 3.0
Water supply points density in emergency
2205 4.7
（number/100km2）
2210 Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%) 9.5
5103 Number of pipeline failures（number/100km/year） 16.1
5107 Leakage rate (%) 5.9
5.2 Example of B water works
B water works locates in southern part of the Kannto region. It released data of PIs
[7] from 2003 to 2005 and compares its PIs with average PIs gained from six similar
scale water works listed in the long period plan. Although the utility has been preceding
the seismic resistant upgrade for large diameter pipeline, the ratio of earthquake
resistant pipelines is kept lower than the average. The utility carries out the project for
all pipelines to upgrade to earthquake resistant.
Table 3. The PIs of B water works

Average of
Code Performance indicator 2003 2004 2005 Six similar
waterworks
2103 Ratio of Aged pipeline (%) 4.7 4.8 5.7 －
2104 Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%) 0.83 1.19 1.39 1.0
2107 Newly installed pipeline (%) 0.32 0.66 0.51 －
2202 Trunk main failures（number/100km） 0.49 0.9 1.6 －
Water supply points density in emergency
2205 36.0 36.3 36.3 －
（number/100km2）
2210 Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%) 7.1 9.9 10.4 16.0
Number of pipeline failures
5103 11.3 11.0 10.0 9.3
（Nnmber/100km/year）
5107 Leakage rate (%) 5.1 5.4 6.2 －
The number of pipeline failures indicates the improvement, but still being kept
lower than the average. Therefore, the utility announces to continue renewal of pipeline
and to prevent from pipeline accidents happen.
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5.3 Mutual relationship of PIs
Some PIs should be considered individually, but almost of all PIs are related to
each other. When pipelines are renewed to earthquake resistant pipelines, many effects
are expected, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Example of relationship of PIs

Code Performance indicator Unit Expected effect
Ratio of earthquake resistant Improving earthquake resistant
2210 %
pipeline ability
decrease amount of leakage and
1001 Resources availability ratio %
to get a margin
Violation ratio of water quality decrease violation of turbidity and
1104 %
standard color
2202 Trunk main failures number/100km decrease accidents
Ratio of revenue on water
3009 % increase, when to issue bond
supply and bond interest
3
3015 Cost of water supply yen/m increase
3016 Water charge for domestic yen increase
3018 Ratio of revenue water % improve by decreasing leakage
3206 Complaints for water quality munber/1000 decrease
number/100km/
5103 Number of pipeline failures decrease
year
5107 Leakage rate % improve by decreasing leakage
5109 Hour of water interruption or decrease
hour
supply turbid water
5.4 Application of mutual relationship of PIs
By gaining co-relationship of PIs based on yearly data or other similar water works,
it will be possible that formula of PIs could be indicated.
As for the application of co-relationship of PIs, Mr. Ishii [8] describes the method
on how PIs should be applied as a case study of the middle-scaled water utility, and he
introduced necessity of renewal of aged pipelines in numerical values. He showed
renewal of aged pipelines as a PI models, but I can say that new pipelines should be
replaced with earthquake resistant pipelines, so that this model can be said as an
evaluation of earthquake resistant pipelines.
The service life of pipelines differs from soil conditions, traffics and grade of
construction work. But the service life in the guidelines defined for 40 years the same
years as depreciation periods in the accountings. In other words, the rate of aged
pipeline increases at 2.5% every year. If annual renewal rate is lower than 2.5%, the
aged pipelines would increase year after year.
To explain the necessity of pipelines renewal (earthquake resistant) project with PIs
logically, two cases of the cost versus benefit are calculated; one, the renewal project
that starts immediately, the other, project that starts 10 years later.
To keep reality in values, the PIs of existing C water works are calculated. The
water utility has 57,000 of population served, with an average supply of 24,400m3/day,
having 420km of pipeline length. The related PIs are shown in the Table 5.
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Table 5. PIs of C water works
Code Performance indicators value
2103 Ratio of aged pipeline (%) 19.8
2104 Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%) 1.7
2210 Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%) 0.1
1117 Ratio of lead service pipe (%) 86.0
3015 Cost of water supply (doller/m3) 1.46
5103 Number of pipeline failures（number/100km/year） 25.7
5107 Leakage rate (%) 10.0
(1) Assumption
The annual renewal rate is supposed to increase from 1.7% to 3.0% for 15 years of
project periods. Existing cast iron pipe, steel pipe with screw joint, asbestos cement and
hard PVC pipe would be replaced with the high performance ductile iron pipes as
earthquake-proof pipes.
By replacing existing pipes with high performance ductile iron pipes, the yearly
aging ratio of replaced pipeline would be reduced to 1.5%. The cost of renewal project
is estimated based on the construction cost classified by diameters. Along with renewal
of distribution pipelines, customer meters also would be renewed. The leakage rate and
the number of pipeline failures should be estimated from the formula of correlation with
the ratio of aged pipelines.
(2) Calculation result
If the cost of this project should be paid only by the water tariffs, water charge
would be increased by 0.46 doller/m3. As shown in Table 6, the ratio of earthquake
resistant would increase to 45.1% and the leakage rate would be improved from 10.0%
to 5.8%. And the ratio of lead service pipe and the number of pipeline failures are
improved as well.
Table 6. PIs of 15 years later

15years
Code Performance indicator start
later
2103 Ratio of aged pipeline (%) 19.8 7.3
2104 Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%) 1.7 3.0
2210 Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%) 0.1 45.1
1117 Ratio of lead service pipe (%) 86.0 38.7
3015 Cost of water supply (doller/m3) 1.46 1.92
5103 25.7 7.6
（number/100km/year）
5107 Leakage rate (%) 10.0 5.8
In addition, the number of customer complaints on water quality decreases in the

process of pipelines renewal, and expenses of water intake and purification can be
estimated to decrease in the process of leakage rate improvements.
212
(3) Effect of postpone project
The assumption is that the renewal project should be postponed by 10 years. And
estimated goal is set as the same performance level of the project that starts immediately
without 10 years delay. According to 10 years delay, the aging of facilities has
progressed, based on these conditions, PIs of initial values are set for granted and to
estimate of 15 years renewal project. The annual renewal rate of pipeline has to rise to
3.8%. The PIs of each year are listed in Table 7.
Table 7. PIs of 25 years later

10years 25years
Code Performance indicator start
later later
2103 Ratio of aged pipeline (%) 19.8 27.8 8.7
2104 Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%) 1.7 1.7 3.8
2210 Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%) 0.1 17.1 74.7
1117 Ratio of lead service pipe (%) 86.0 68.1 7.6
3015 Cost of water supply (doller/m3) 1.46 1.46 2.19
5103 25.7 27.1 4.0
（number/100km/year）
5107 Leakage rate (%) 10.0 11.5 6.0
The cost of water supply can be added by 0.73doller/m3.
(4) The cost versus benefit analysis
The calculation period covers for 55 years from now on, and the 1.7% of annual
renewal rate should be kept constant except for 15 years of renewal project periods. The
total cost consists of two expenses; operation and maintenance cost for 55 years and
renewal project cost for 15 years. The benefit would be the decease of the leakage water
volumes and the reduction of operation and maintenance expenses.
The benefits of this project can be expected as the decrease of intake, raw water
conveyance and purification cost, in addition to that the number of customer complaints
on water quality would be declined and risk for earthquake would also be lessened, but
they are not accounted. Table 8 shows the results of cost-benefit analysis.
Table 8. The results of cost - benefit analysis

start start 10years
item unit
immediately later
Million
Renewal+O&M 53.0 91.8
Cost Dollar
Total 〃 53.0 91.8
Present value cost C 〃 40.9 48.4
Decrease of leakage 〃 26.3 17.4
Benefit
Decrease of O&M 〃 47.7 61.0
Total 〃 74.0 78.4
Present value benefit B 〃 26.3 20.8
Ratio V=B/C ― 0.64 0.43
The differentiate rate of cost versus benefit comes up to at around 50%. The total
investment cost reached 2 times as big as initial estimation. Water supply cost increased
213
from 0.46 doller/ m3 to 0.73 doller/m3.
Although there are many tasks such as very simplified assumption, incomplete data
and unable to calculate all related PIs, that would be solved but we can say that the
results are useful enough for practical purposes.
6. CONCLUSION
Three years passed since the water works guideline has been published as one of
the standards of Japan Water Works Association. One hundred water utilities have
calculated and made their regional water works vision open to the public by the year
2007.
At present, PIs are released to compare with other similar water works and they
became important tools to explain factors in their future goals. I think that from now on
PIs should not be used as individual values but the important tools for analyzing and
evaluating the project by taking co-relationship of PIs into considerations. This PIs
method should be very useful for us to explain the necessity and future goal of the
project in a way of clear and logically as well.
This paper summarizes information described on the web sites of some water
works and released papers. I prepared this paper to introduce how the water works
guidelines should be applied into compiling the countermeasures against earthquakes in
Japan, in particular, for “The Japan - U.S. Workshop on Water System Seismic
Practices”.
REFERENCES
[1] Japan Water Works Association, 2005,“Guidelines for the management and assessment of a drinking
water supply service (JWWA Q 100)” (in Japanese)
[2] The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2004, “The water works vision”, (in Japanese)
[3] The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2005, “The regional water works vision” (in Japanese),
[4] The workshop of water works vision, 2005, “The Manual for water works vision”, Suidou sangyou
sinbunsya (in Japanese)
[5] Japan Water Works Association, 2007, “Statistics of Japanese water works in 2005” (in Japanese)
[6] Waterworks and Electric Power Bureau, Public Enterprise Agency, Kanagawa Prefecture Government
Home Page (in Japanese)
[7] Yokohama City Waterworks Bureau Home Page (in Japanese)
[8] Kenei Ishii, “Evaluation of the pipeline replacement project for drinking water system using
performance indicators”, Journal of Japan Ductile Iron Pipe Association, No.79, 2006.10 (in
Japanese)
214
Function Diagnosis Method to Improve Earthquake
Resistance of Water Supply Facilities
Yasuhiko Sato
ABSTRACT
Japan is one of the most earthquake prone countries in the world. In recent years, large scale
earthquakes occurred in various locations. On the other hand, problems of lack of financial and
technical resources in small drinking-water utilities have led to a situation where a significant
number of facilities are decrepit and vulnerable to earthquake and other disasters. Survey in
FY2004 shows the ratios of earthquake proofing were 20% for water treatment plants, 30% for
distribution reservoirs and 14% for distribution mains.
Water supply facilities must not only ensure a stable supply of water at normal times, but also
minimize the risk of accidents and malfunction, especially in case of disasters. Preventive
maintenance of the facilities is an important aspect in this regard. In addition to conventional
maintenance procedures, function diagnosis to evaluate earthquake resistance should be
implemented, in order to ensure that the facilities respond to the needs of society and its citizens.
For these reasons, the Japan Water Research Center conducts various research studies to
construct earthquake-resistant water supply facilities. This report will consist of 1) the evaluation
of current function and diagnosis of water distribution facilities earthquake resistance from the
“Waterworks Facilities Function Diagnosis Evaluation Manual”, which was created in order to
effectively plan the functional improvement of facilities; and 2) Performance Indicators (PIs) in
relation to earthquake resistance taken from the 137 items of the “Guidelines for the Management
and Assessment of a Drinking Water Supply Service” published as a standard by the Japan
Waterworks Association in January 2005.
_____________
Yasuhiko Sato, Senior Researcher, Pipeline Engineering Dept. Japan Water Research Center, Toranomon Denki Bidg,
Toranomon Minato-ku Tokyo, 105-0001, JAPAN
215
PURPOSE OF FUNCTION DIAGNOSIS AND EVALUATION MANUAL
This manual has been prepared to facilitate the implementation of performance improvements
to enable drinking-water utilities to independently evaluate the performance of their water supply
facilities and decide what improvements are necessary. It outlines specific methods and procedures
for managing the performance of facilities focusing on the following.
1) Evaluating the current performance of existing water supply facilities.

2) Preparation of plans for improving facilities that performance has declined.
FUNCTION DIAGNOSIS AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES
Function diagnosis and evaluation are divided into evaluation of current function, evaluation of
function satisfaction, and formulation of improvement plans. These three types of evaluations are
performed according to the procedures shown in Figure 1.
Evaluation Category Evaluation Procedures Outline of Evaluation

Current function level of each
[Evaluation of current Overall function diagnosis
system is evaluated using indexes.
function]
Individual function Current function of each individual
To quantify the current
diagnosis facility that makes up the system is
function level of facilities.
evaluated.
[Evaluation of function
Required and current function of
Determination of function
the system and the facilities that
Function satisfaction] diagnosis results
make up the system are compared
diagnosis To make decisions as to the and disparities considered;
need for performance
improvements, taking into evaluation of scope for function
Has required level of Yes improvement is evaluated.
account those performance
elements for which current function been met? If the required function has been
performance evaluations and met, the function diagnosis and
quantification would be No evaluation ends at this step.
difficult.
The system/facility to be improved,
[Evaluations of improvement planning Setting of function
the necessity, target, and outcome
formulation] improvement targets
of improvement.
To determine improvement plans
After the effectiveness of
concerning the systems and facilities
improvements, their consistency
that require performance improvements.
Setting of function with requirements, and the
improvement methods reasonability of the improvement
project are considered, the method
of improvement is selected.
(Preparation of function
End improvement plans)
(Implementation of function
improvement project)
Figure 1. Function Diagnosis and Evaluation Procedures
216
Overall Function Diagnosis
The overall function diagnosis measures the current function level of each system as a whole
using a fixed scale (evaluation indexes) in order to evaluate capacity relative to the facilities’
particular role and the state of maintenance. Overall function diagnosis is performed in the
following order: completion of data sheet, calculation of system evaluation score, indication of
results and consideration. The results of the calculations of system evaluation indexes and system
evaluation points are tabulated with the individual function diagnosis results, and then the outcome
is considered. The evaluation of earthquake resistance is performed apart from the data sheet
according to the method described in “Diagnosis of facilities earthquake resistance”.
Evaluation indexes during an overall function diagnosis shown in TABLE I.
TABLE I. EVALUATIN INDEXES ON AN OVERALL FUNCTION DIAGNOSIS

Function Category Evaluation Indexes
1) Securing ratio of optimal hydrodynamic pressure (%)
Hydraulic function 2) Securing ratio of optimal hydrostatic pressure (%)
3) Distribution reservoir storage time (hr)
Basic
Performance 4) Total storage time (hr)
5) Water quality retention ratio (I) (%)
Water quality function 6) Water quality retention ratio (II) (%)
7) Ratio of optimal residual chlorine (%)
8) Water distribution facilities earthquake resistance (-)
9) Available water capacity in emergencies (L)
Earthquake resistance 10) Ratio of installed emergency stop valve (%)
Structure 11) Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline (%)
Redundancy 12) Distribution water capability in emergencies (-)

13) Rationality of pipe configuration (-)
14) Ratio of coloring trouble (-)
Comfort 15) Incidence of complaints (-)
16) Direct supply from distribution main (%)
17) Aging of mains (%)
Operation 18) Aging of water distribution facilities (%)
19) Ratio of accidents of service pipe (%)
Reliability 20) Ratio of pipeline failures (No./100km)
21) Ratio of interruption in supply (%)
22) Leakage rate (%)
23) Adequacy of water for firefighting (%)
24) Adequacy of drawing management (-)
Maintenance Certainty 25) Saving of maintenance (-)
26) Adequacy of maintenance (%)
Please see below for the calculation methods and the scoring criteria for evaluation points for the
following earthquake resistance items on the overall function diagnosis and evaluation: water
distribution facilities earthquake resistance, available water capacity in emergencies, ratio of installed
emergency stop valve, and ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline.
● Water distribution facilities earthquake resistance

The earthquake resistance of distribution reservoirs and other structures is evaluated using the
results (or points) calculated in the structure with the weakest earthquake resistance after
conducting an earthquake resistance diagnosis on major facilities except pipelines that frame
217
water distribution facilities (clear wells, distribution reservoirs, pre-stressed concrete tanks,
ductile cast-iron pipes and cast-iron water pipe bridges, steel water pipe bridges, pump
facilities, etc.) using the method detailed in 3) Diagnosis of Facilities’ Earthquake Resistance.
● Available water capacity in emergencies
Calculation method:
Available water capacity in emergencies (L/person) = {(Capacity of emergency storage tanks
(m3)) + (Other available Capacity of all service reservoirs in emergencies (m3)} ÷ (Service
population (person)) × 1000
Scoring criteria:
3 points : more than 10(L/person), 2 points : 5 or more – less than 10(L/person),
1 point : not 0 – less than 5(L/person), 0 point : 0(L/person)
● Ratio of installed emergency stop valve
Calculation method:
Ratio of installed emergency stop valve (%) = (Number of distribution reservoir with
emergency stop valve (unit)) ÷ (Number of all distribution reservoirs (unit)) × 100
Scoring criteria:
3 points : more than 70%, 2 points : 50 or more – less than 70%,
1 point : not 0 – less than 50%, 0 point : 0%
● Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline
Calculation method:
Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline(%) = (Length of earthquake-resistant
pipeline (m)) ÷ (Total pipeline length (m)) × 100
Scoring criteria:
3 points : more than 30%, 2 points : 15 or more – less than 30%,
1 point : 5 or more – less than 15%, 0 point : other than those above
Diagnosis of Distribution Facilities Earthquake Resistance
The following is a description of a method of diagnosis of distribution facilities earthquake

resistance using an overall function diagnosis.
The major facilities that make up the system about an overall function diagnosis are selected
and entered on the check sheet of TABLE II. In the diagnosis method given in the table, the
applicable category for each facility and each characteristic to be evaluated is selected, and the
earthquake resistance to seismic intensities of 5, 6, 7 are evaluated (High, Medium, Low) by
multiplying each of their respective weight functions.
(Diagnosis example using the check sheet of TABLE II)

Water pipe bridge made with ductile cast iron pipe or gray cast iron pipe
For seismic intensity scale of 6: ground 1.4×ground deformation 2.0×foundations
1.0×Materials 1.4×height 1.4×beam construction 2.0×pipe type 1.0×span 1.0×shoes
1.0×width of crest 0.8×joints 0.5×seismic intensity scale 2.2 = 9.66.
Earthquake resistance is thus within the range 14 or less, or “High.”
Notes:
1) The seismic intensity scale used is determined taking into account the size of earthquakes considered destructive,
which is the basis of the disaster precaution plans of the area in question, as well as the importance of the facilities,
and other factors.
218
2) This diagnosis cites the evaluation method stated in the books given below and has been partially modified.
(1) Report on Survey of Earthquake Countermeasures (March 1981), Japan Waterworks Association
(2) Report on Technical Research and Development Concerning Prediction and Investigation of Waterworks
Damage Due to Earthquake (March 2000), Japan Water Research Center
3) When diagnosis of the earthquake resistance of facilities are performed by means other than by the method
described here, decisions may be based on those results.
TABLE II. CHECK SHEET FOR DIAGNOSIS OF EARTHQUAKE-RESISTANCE

(For water pipe bridges with ductile cast iron pipe or gray cast iron pipe)
Facilities Water Pipe Bridge with Ductile Cast Iron Pipe or Gray Cast Iron Pipe
Category Category Weight Points Remarks
Function (example)
Type I 1.0 Type I: Diluvial and rocky ground in
good condition
Ground Type II 1.4 1.4 Type II: Diluvial and alluvial ground that
does not belong to Type I or Type III
Type III Type III: Alluvial ground that is soft and
1.2 weak
No 1.0 Effect on bridge foundations due to ground
Ground 2.0 deformation and slope failure caused by
deformation Possible 2.0
Yes 3.0 ground liquefaction
Construction of With piles 1.0 1.0
foundations No piles, pile bend 2.0
Materials for Bricks, plain concrete 1.0
bridge abutment 1.4
and supports Other than those above 1.4
Height of bridge ＜5m 1.0 The height of the bridge abutment is
abutment and 5～10m 1.4 1.4 measured from the ground, and the height
of the supports is measured from the river
supports ＞10m 1.7 bed.
Beams fixed on both ends, arches, 1.0
rigid frames
Beam construction Beams fixed on one end, 2.0 2.0
continuous beams
Simple beams 3.0
Pipe type Ductile cast iron pipe (DIP) 1.0 1.0
Gray cast iron pipe (CIP) 2.4
Span 1 1.0 1.0
≧2 1.8
With device to prevent bridge 0.6
failure
Shoes 1.0
Regular 1.0
Movable ends 1.2
Wide A/S≧1 0.8 A: width of crest, S: distance of edge
Width of crest 0.8 (S= 0.5L+20m, however, the length of the
Narrow A/S<1 1.2 bridge, L, is less than 100m.)
Expansion, anti-slip-out 0.5
Joints mechanism type 0.5
Other joints 1.0
5 1.0 Levels according to the Japan
Seismic intensity 2.2 Meteorological Agency.
scale 6 2.2
7 3.6
High 14＞ No damage
Earthquake Water supply possible despite partial
resistance Medium 14 - 28 9.66
damage
Low 28＜ Severe damage or water suspension
219
Individual Function Diagnosis
The major facilities that make up the system are diagnosed using the facility evaluation points
based on the individual function diagnosis sheet. The current state of facilities is examined through
various questions concerning the state of facilities’ functionality, maintenance, decrepitude, and
technical level, with points from the evaluation column answers added to obtain a facility evaluation
score.
INDICATION AND EXAMINATION OF EVALUATION RESULTS
An overall function diagnosis and an individual function diagnosis are performed and a table of
results is prepared as shown in TABLE III. The system evaluation scores in the overall function
diagnosis is calculated from the evaluations, expressed as indexes, of the current level of the
individual facilities of each system, and provide an overall evaluation of function levels by
component system. Considered together with the evaluation scores of the individual facilities of
the system in the individual function diagnosis, the current performance level of the facilities is
ascertained.
In the case of the three distribution systems A – C as shown in TABLE III, for example, the
overall function diagnosis result is indicated by entering the sum of the points assigned to each of
the evaluation indexes (i.e. System A, 54 points; System B, 81 points, System C, 79 points). The
individual function diagnosis results are indicated by entering scores representing the evaluation
of the state of function, maintenance, aging, and technical level of each of the facilities that make
up each system, along with the overall facilities evaluation score. Then a chart as shown in Figure
2 is prepared based on this data.
These tables and charts can be interpreted to mean that the higher the system evaluation scores
are, more reliably the system as a whole functions; and that the higher the individual facilities
evaluation scores are, the better the performance of each facility.
220
TABLE III. EXAMPLE OF RESULT OF FUNCTION DIAGNOSIS
Overall Function Diagnosis
Evaluation Index System A System B System C
Securing ratio of optimal hydrodynamic pressure 1 3 2
Securing ratio of optimal hydrostatic pressure 2 2 3
Distribution reservoir storage time 2 3 2
Total storage time 2 3 2
Water quality retention ratio (I) 1 2 3
Water quality retention ratio (II) 2 1 3
Ratio of optimal residual chlorine 2 1 2
Water distribution facilities earthquake resistance 1 2 2
Available water capacity in emergencies 2 3 2
Ratio of installed emergency stop valve 2 3 2
Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline 1 3 3
Distribution water capability in emergencies 2 2 3
Distribution Rationality of pipe configuration 1 3 2
Facilities Ratio of coloring trouble 3 3 2
Incidence of complaints 2 3 2
Direct supply from distribution main 0 2 3
Aging of mains 1 2 2
Aging of water distribution facilities 1 2 2
Ratio of accidents of service pipe 1 2 3
Ratio of pipeline failures 2 3 2
Ratio of interruption in supply 2 2 3
Leakage rate 1 2 3
Adequacy of water for firefighting 2 3 2
Adequacy of drawing management 3 3 3
Saving of maintenance 1 2 2
Adequacy of maintenance 2 3 2
System evaluation points 54 81 79
Individual Function Diagnosis

System State of State of State of Technical Facilities
Distribution Facilities
Function Maintenance Aging Level Evaluation
Distribution reservoir A 60 50 30 50 30
System Distribution reservoir B 70 60 50 70 50
A Distribution reservoir C 90 90 80 80 80
Distribution pump A 70 70 50 60 50
Distribution reservoir D 70 60 70 80 60
Distribution reservoir E 100 90 90 100 90
System
Distribution pump B 80 80 80 90 80
B
Emergency generation facilities 90 80 80 80 80
Power control facilities 80 70 70 80 70
Distribution Reservoir F 70 80 70 80 70
Distribution pump C 70 80 80 60 60
System
Emergency generation facilities 70 70 80 70 70
C
Power control facilities 80 90 70 70 70
Instrumentation equipment 80 80 90 80 80
221
Ａ系統
System A 配水池Ａ
Distribution Reservoir A 配水池Ｂ
Distribution Reservoir B
施設
Facilities 施設
Facilities
Securing ratio of optimal hydrodynamic Evaluation
評価 Evaluation
評価
pressure 適正動水圧確保率
100 100
適正静水圧確保率
Securing ratio of optimal hydrostatic pressure 80 80
Distribution reservoir storage time
60 60
配水池貯留時間技術機能技術機能of
Technical 40 State of Technical 40 State
Total storage time 総配水貯留時間水準
Level 20 状況
Function 水準
Level 20 状況
Function
0 0
水質保持率（Ⅰ）
Water quality retention ratio (Ⅰ)
水質保持率（Ⅱ）
Water quality retention ratio (Ⅱ)
最適残留塩素割合
Ratio of optimal residual chlorine State of
老朽化 State
管理 of 老朽化
State of 管理
State of
Aging Maintenance Aging
状況 Maintenance
状況
Water distribution facilities earthquake
配水施設耐震性
状況状況
resistance
緊急時利用可能容量
Available water capacity in emergencies
緊急遮断弁設置割合
Ratio of installed emergency stop value
Distribution
配水池Ｃ Reservoir C 配水ポンプＡ
Distribution Pump A
Facilities
施設 Facilities
施設
Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution
配水管耐震化率 Evaluation
pipeline Evaluation 評価
評価
Distribution water capacity 緊急時配水対応度
in emergencies 100 100
80 80
配管形態合理性
Rationality of pipe configuration
60 60
Ratio of coloring trouble 着色障害発生割合技術
Technical 40 機能of
State 技術
Technical 40 機能of
State
水準
Level 20 状況
Function 水準
Level 20 状況
Function
Incidence of complaints 苦情発生件数割合 0
0
直結給水率
Direct supply from distribution main
Aging of mains 配水老朽管構成割合
老朽化
State of State
管理 of
配水施設老朽度
Aging of water distribution facilities 老朽化
State of 管理 of
State
Aging Maintenance
状況
Aging Maintenance
状況状況状況
Ratio of accidents of water supply equipment
給水装置事故発生率
Ratio of pipeline failures 配水管事故発生割合
Ratio of interruption in supply断水発生件数率配水施設個別診断結果

Results of Individual Diagnosis of Distribution Facilities
Leakage rate 漏水率 100
消火用水確保充実度
Adequacy of water for firefighting 90
Points
80 Score of overall function

全体機能診断評価得点
図面管理充実度
Adequacy of drawing management diagnosis points
70
System Evaluation
Saving of maintenance 管理省力度 60

得点
Adequacy of maintenance 保全管理充実度 50

40
0 1 2 3 30
20
Results of Overall
全体機能診断結果 10
Function Diagnosis 0 Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
配水池Ａ
Reservoir A 配水池ＢB
Reservoir 配水池ＣC
Reservoir 配水ポンプＡ
Pump A
施設名
Distribution Facilities
Distribution facilities System A supplies water to an old urban district. Asbestos cement pipe and lead pipe
remain and lead to low earthquake resistance, water leakage, and many complaints. The system is also connected
to the performance of water treatment plant C, and distribution pipe, consisting of many dead end pipes, often
become detente, causing a low water quality maintenance ratio (I). Earthquake resistance is particularly low in
distribution reservoir A, and because pipe serves both as transmission and distribution pipe, the priority for
improvement of this reservoir is considered higher than other distribution reservoirs. From periodic inspections,
the insulation resistance of distribution pump A was judged to be declining and aging was scored lower than in the
previous performance evaluation. Although priority had to be given to measures against residual chlorine in
distribution facilities System B, as for System A as a whole, it is necessary to consider replacement of pipeline and
improvement of distribution reservoir A and distribution pump A.
Figure 2. Example of Results of Function Diagnosis System A
222
GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF A DRINKING
WATER SUPPLY SERVICE
Undertakings of the Japan Water Research Center
The Japan Water Works Association (JWWA) published “Guidelines for the management and
assessment of a drinking water supply service” in January 2005 as JWWA standards (Q 100). The
JWWA Guidelines define 137 PIs, including indicators specified in Japan, that is, those concerning
earthquake countermeasures. In addition, statistical data on Japan’s drinking-water utilities, such as
population served, amount of water supplied, and financial indicators, are published every year, from
which 49 drinking-water utility PIs can be calculated.
The Japan Water Research Center determined these PIs based upon which distribution histograms
of each PI were prepared and analyses were performed.
HISTOGRAMS
About the Histograms
The guidelines define 137 PIs that are categorized under six objectives — reliability, stability,
sustainability, environment, management, and international.
The histograms here show four PIs — the ratio of earthquake-resistant treatment facility, the ratio
of earthquake-resistant pumping station, the ratio of earthquake-resistant service reservoir, and the
ratio of earthquake-resistant pipeline — regarding the earthquake-resistance of 41 drinking-water
utilities that have announced provisional values.
Percentile values are shown on the right of each histogram. To obtain a percentile of a group of
data values, first sort the data in order of value from the lowest to the highest. If there are 100 data
values, the 5th percentile is the 5th value in order, 20th percentile is the 20th value in order, and any
other percentiles can be found in the same procedure. The 50th percentile is the median. As these
figures show, drinking-water utilities differ substantially in a degree of progress.
Ratio of Earthquake-Resistant Treatment Facility
In the JWWA Guidelines, the ratio earthquake-resistant treatment facility is given by the
following formulas.
Ratio of earthquake-resistant*1 treatment facilities (%) = (capacity of earthquake-resistant

purification facilities (m3/day)/ capacity of all purification facilities (m3/day)) × 100
Figure 3 shows the histogram of ratio of earthquake-resistant treatment facility. It is clear that the
earthquake-resistance efforts are not progressing by looking at the ratio of the earthquake-resistant
treatment facilities as approximately 60% of all utilities fall under less than 5%, and approximately
90% of all utilities fall under less than 50%.
*1) Designed according to level 2, rank A earthquake-resistance standards as prescribed in the Seismic Design Guideline
for Waterworks.
223
20 100%
18
16 80%
14
of utilities
12 60% 95th percentile 56.8

事業体数
10 80th percentile 28.4

Median 0.0
Number
8 40%
20th percentile 0.0
6
5th percentile 0.0
4 20%
0 0%
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60
60-65
65-70
70-75
75-80
80-85
85-90
90-95
95-100
5以下
2207 浄水施設耐震率（
Ratio of earthquake-resistant ％）facilities (%)
treatment
Figure 3. Ratio of earthquake-resistant treatment facilities (Number of utilities: 32)
Ratio of Earthquake-Resistant Pumping Station
The ratio of earthquake-resistant pumping station is given by the following formulas.
Ratio of earthquake-resistant*1 pumping station (%) = (capacity of earthquake-resistant pump

stations(m3/day) / capacity of all pump stations(m3/day)) × 100
Figure 4 shows the histogram of ratio of earthquake-resistant pumping station. Just as same as the
treatment facilities, by looking at the ratio of the earthquake-resistant pumping stations, it is clear that
the earthquake-resistance efforts are not progressing as approximately 40% of all utilities fall under
5%, and that 70% of all utilities fall under less than 50%.
20 100%
18
16 80%
14
of utilities

事業体数
10
80th percentile 60.4
Median 15.7
Number
8 40%
20th percentile 0.0
6
5th percentile 0.0
4 20%
0 0%
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60
60-65
65-70
70-75
75-80
80-85
85-90
90-95
95-100
5以下
2208 ポンプ所耐震施設率（
Ratio of earthquake-resistant ％）
pumping station (%)
Figure 4. Ratio of earthquake-resistant pumping station (Number of utilities: 37)
224
Ratio of Earthquake-Resistant Service Reservoir
The ratio of earthquake-resistant service reservoir is given by the following formulas.
Ratio of earthquake-resistant service reservoir (%) = (capacity of earthquake-resistant service

reservoirs (m3) / capacity of all service reservoirs (m3)) × 100
Figure 5 shows the histogram of ratio of earthquake-resistant service reservoir. In regards to the
ratio of earthquake-resistant service reservoirs, approximately 70% of all utilities occupy less than
50%. However, approximately 20% of all utilities fall under less than 5%, and, while it is still an
insufficient amount, the earthquake-resistance is progressing compared with the purification facilities
and the pump stations.
10 100%
8 80%
7
of utilities

事業体数
5 80th percentile 54.7

Median 24.2
Number
4 40%
3
20th percentile 8.2
5th percentile 0.1
2 20%
0 0%
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60
60-65
65-70
70-75
75-80
80-85
85-90
90-95
95-100
5以下
2209 配水池耐震施設率（
Ratio of earthquake-resistant service％）
reservoir (%)
Figure 5. Ratio of earthquake-resistant service reservoir (Number of utilities: 37)
Ratio of Earthquake-Resistant Pipeline
The ratio of earthquake-resistant pipeline*2 is given by the following formulas.
Ratio of earthquake-resistant pipeline (%) = (length of earthquake-resistant pipelines (km)/ total

pipeline length (km)) × 100
Figure 6 shows the histogram of ratio of earthquake-resistant pipeline. As this figure show,
drinking-water utilities differ substantially in a degree of progress they have achieved in pipeline
improvement measures. Because Japan’s water pipeline system still includes asbestos cement pipes
and grey cast iron pipes, replacement of the pipes is a major component of measures to improve
earthquake resistance and to prevent water leakage and interruption of water supply.
*2) Ductile cast iron pipes with earthquake-proof joints, steel pipes with welded joints, and high-density polyethylene
pipes with fused joints are considered high performance earthquake-proof pipe.
225
10 100%
9 90%
8 80%
7 70%
of utilities
6 60%
95th percentile
Number 事業体数
25.8
5 50%
80th percentile 17.4
4 40% Median 9.4
1 10%
0 0%
1以下
30超
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
7-8
8-9
9-10
10-11
11-12
12-13
13-14
14-15
15-16
16-17
17-18
18-19
19-20
20-21
21-22
22-23
23-24
24-25
25-26
26-27
27-28
28-29
29-30
Ratio of2210 管路の耐震化率（％）
earthquake-resistant pipeline (%)
Figure 6. Ratio of earthquake-resistant pipeline (Number of utilities: 39)
CONCLUSION
Water supply facilities must not only ensure a stable supply of water at normal times, but also
minimize the risk of accidents and malfunction, especially in case of disasters. Preventive
maintenance of the facilities is an important aspect in this regard.
In order to steadily resolve the current functionality issues with water supply facilities,
considerations must be given to the functions in demand, and thereafter, optimal and concrete
functional improvement plans must be drafted and implemented with efficiency. In order to
accomplish this, the function diagnosis prescribed in this manual must be utilized in addition to the
existing regular maintenance, and the efforts must be made to realize a higher function.
It is also extremely important for drinking-water utilities to calculate PIs themselves so that it can
be objectively discerned where the utility is positioned amongst other utilities nationwide. Moreover,
in line with improving services, it is also necessary to actively publicize and explain PIs to the diet
and consumers in order to gain their understanding and ensure business transparency. Publicizing and
providing explanations of PIs in this manner will make it possible to explain about the current
operations and technology situation of drinking-water utilities, and is an effective step in promoting
future business plans such as the earthquake-resistance of facilities.
REFERENCE
[1] Japan Water Works Association. March 1981. “Report on survey of earthquake countermeasures”
[2] Japan Water Research Center. March 2000. “Report on technical research and development concerning prediction and
investigation of water works damage due to earthquake”
[3] Japan Water Works Association. January 2005. “JWWA Q 100 Guidelines for the management and assessment of a
drinking water supply service”
226
Nejo Purification Plant Water System Facilities Today
KEN-ETSU KOJIMA, NOBORU MURAKAMI
ABSTRACT
The results of the quakeproof diagnosis for the 40-year old Nejo purification water system facilities
were reported during the 1st US and Japan Workshop on Seismic Measures for Water Supply. The diagnosis
made on the intake facility, water conveyance facility, purification plant, transmission pipes and service
reservoir was that all these were inferior in quakeproof performance. However, at that time, no conclusions
were given that could either be implemented, or that should reinforce existing institutions, or build new
ones.
According to the diagnosis, the water conveyance pipes and tunnels needed to be rehabilitated,
together with the route and transmission pipes. All civil engineering structures and architectural building
could, however, be reinforced against earthquakes.
Extending the life and strength of the 40-year old plant against earthquakes by way of reinforcements
may be difficult at this stage. This is because each component system has its own strength, such as the
accelerator, or the heart of a purification plant. What is needed, instead, is to consider how to keep a
balance among all purification plant water system to function properly against earthquakes. It was decided,
therefore, to unify the institutions, such as intake tower, water conveyance pumping station, water
conveyance pipes and Nejo purification plant, with Hakusan purification plant water system.
Together with this decision, is the preservation of the Nejo service reservoir by adding a reducer valve
and other mechanical equipment to reduce the risk of an accident because its service area is in the
downtown area and its distribution pipes are quite aged.
The Nejo service reservoir was examined for quakeproof reinforcement and rehabilitation, by
considering its ground condition, its neighboring residential area and a steep slope of its north side. It was
decided that the existing service reservoir was to be utilized as sand guards and a new 7,200m3 stainless
steel one be built.
Seven years has passed since 2000, and this report outlines the processes on the decisions made for
each facility, together with the details of the examination made on Nejo service reservoir.
Noboru Murakami, Management Planning Division, Leader of General Policy, Hachinohe Regional Water
Supply Authority, 1-11-1 Minami- Hakusandai, Hachinohe, Aomori Japan 039-1112
227
INTRODUCTION
After the Tokachi-Oki Earthquake in 1968, the Hachinohe Regional Water Supply Authority
(Hereafter “the Authority”) started to actively work on the issue of making its water facilities quakeproof
especially when the emergency water supply by feed water tank lorries was found out to be quite
inefficient, Among the water facilities found to be the weakest and most vulnerable were its water pipes.
The Authority likewise reported the results of its studies to the Japan and U.S. Workshop on Seismic
Measure for Water Supply that has since been already held four times.
In 1995, the Hansin-Awaji Earthquake struck, and the water facilities again were damaged affecting
the lives of the residents in the water service area. The necessity of making the water treatment facility
system quakeproof was urgently recognized. In this connection, therefore, the Authority undertook the
diagnoses of the existing water treatment facilities, including the water pipes, in 1998.
It should be noted that the Nejo Water Treatment Plant facilities were constructed over 40 years ago.
The quakeproof diagnoses for these facilities were much awaited, and were subsequently reported on in the
1st Japan and U.S Workshop on Seismic Measure for Water Supply.
The result of diagnoses revealed that the intake facility, transmission facility, water treatment facility
and waterline had insufficient quakeproof abilities. However, the full courses of action on the result of the
diagnoses for the water system have not been decided, except for the expansion plan for the facilities.
After seven years, the expansion plan is almost completed. In addition, water demand and supply have
been stabilized enabling the quakeproof analysis to be made for each facility. This will become the basis
whether an existing facility will be rehabilitated, or if a new facility needs to be constructed. The result of
the study, which includes the rehabilitation of the service reservoir with the construction of a stainless
structure, is the subject of this paper.
RESULTS ON QUAKEPROOF DIAGNOSIS OF NEJO WATER TREATMENT

PLANT FACILITIES
There were several approaches in studying the structural strength of the water treatment facilities.
These were through visual observation, concrete compression test, concrete neutralization test, Schmidt
hummer test and drilling survey. The documents referred to or utilized in quakeproof diagnosis were the
following: for architectural buildings, referral document was the “Total quakeproof diagnosis for
government office – rehabilitation standard and its description” (Minister for Construction Government
Office Building and Repairing Department, 1996); for civil engineering buildings, it was the “Guideline
and description of quakeproof design criteria for waterworks facilities” (Japan Water Works
Association ,1997); and for water pipes, data was studied from test drilling, site survey and drawings.
Tategami Intake Tower (Intake) Photo 1
The Tategami intake tower has been found to have quakeproof ability. While the structure lacks
stability and may fold up, sway or move if struck by a severe earthquake, it can be strengthened by
installing an anchor behind it unto the bedrock.
228
Photo 1 Tategami Intake Tower (Intake)
Tategami Pump Station Photo 2
The Tategami Pump Station was built using both spread and independence foundation techniques,
thus the building is deeply penetrated into the ground giving it extra stability in the event of an earthquake.
However, the entire building is still assessed to have insufficient quakeproof ability because the girders at
the superstructure are bent and have cracks.
The building has also a shortage of ultimate lateral strength, so that applying X-type steel braces and
K-type steel braces on the walls and openings and at the intermediate walls and columns will help increase
shearing force.
Photo 2 Tategami Pump Station
Tunnel/Water Transmission Pipe Photo 3
The tunnel was built using 25 cm thick plain concrete. The result of structural analysis on the
tunnel/water transmission pipe reveals that the structure only functions to prevent a landslide but not to
receive stress from the ground. To remedy this situation, the structure can be back-filled since the natural
ground properties and balance allow for this type of quakeproof method.
The thickness of the water transmission pipeline, which was checked in the areas where this was
visible, confirmed that the pipes do have the necessary thickness although the pipe joints are not
quakeproof. The survey revealed that the bolts at the A-type joints are corroded and that pipe replacement
229
must be done.
Photo 3 Tunnel/Water Conveyance Pipe
Nejo Water Treatment Plant Photo 4
The construction of the Nejo Water Treatment Plant utilized spread foundation resulting in deep
ground penetration. Since differential settlement did not occur, problems such as folding and sliding are
not expected. The building structure, however, has large openings which result in a shortage of ultimate
lateral strength. In addition, the bending stress caused cracks particularly on the girders at the
superstructure where it was modified, such as the roof deck which was used as a warehouse or a break
room. It can be concluded, therefore, that the building has insufficient quakeproof ability.
As the seismic retrofitting method, carbon fiber reinforcement was applied for girders, while the
X-type steel braces were applied on the 1st floor since it has the required ultimate lateral strength; and
K-type steel braceswere applied on the lower ground floor.
Photo 4 Nejo Water Treatment Plant

Transmission Main
There was no corrosion observed on the surface of the main transmission pipe, neither were there
issues related to the result of the soil analyses. However, since the A-type joints, which do not have
quakeproof ability, were used, it would be best that said water pipes are to be replaced.
230
Nejo Distribution Reservoir Photo 5
In the Nejo Distribution reservoir, the stresses on girders walls, the walls of pipe gallery, slabs and
foundation slabs exceeded the allowable stress. It means that the structure has been kept by its material
strength and it is not entirely safe.
Photo 5 Nejo Distribution Reservoir
The result of liquefaction study validates that no ground damage will occur because the reservoir sits
on a geologic stratum consisting of the sandy soil layer.
The slope upon which the reservoir was constructed was made by banking material (see Fig.1) that
has the necessary safety ratio for normal times and during earthquake situations.
(South – North)
Fig.1 Stratum Sectional Assumed Illustration for Nejo Distribution Reservoir
The reinforcing methods for the structure are Placing Concrete Method, Carbon Fiber Reinforcement
Method and Adding Concrete Method. Among all these methods, the best is the “placing concrete method”
because of the cost advantage; the water shut performance, and its ease of use or workability.
QUAKEPROOF DESIGN IN VIEW OF INTEGRATION

TO OTHER FACILITIES
Quakeproof analysis was done for each facility at the Nejo water treatment plant system. While it is
possible for those facilities except water pipes to undergo seismic retrofitting, this might not extend the
231
durability of the buildings because of its age. The quakeproof study therefore considers the entire water
system, not only the individual facility.
As illustrated on Fig.2, the Mabechi River is the water resource for Nejo water system but there is
Kawanakajima Intake (see Photo 6) 350 meters upper stream.
HWL 104.57
Hakusan Hakusan
reservoir purification
V=40,000m
3
plant
HWL 71.25
water conveyance pipe

Nejo
reservoir
V=10,700m
3
Nejo
purification
φ1200
water conveyance pipe
plant
downtown
φ800
　　
neighboring areas
Tategami 350m Kawanakajima

intake pumping intake pumping
station station
Mabechi River
Mabechi River
Fig.2 Water Supply System by the Mabechi River
Photo 6 Kawanakajima Intake
The Kawanakajima Intake facility has an actual pump capacity of 165,000m3/day. If a pump that has
the intake capacity of Tategami Intake is installed here, then the operations of the Tategami pumping
station facility can be halted.
The 1,200 millimeters steel water transmission pipe from Kawanakajima Intake facility to Hakusan
Water Treatment Plant has quakeproof ability. This pipeline transmits raw water. There is also the issue
about the alternative water treatment plant, constructed in 2005, which receives water (50,000 m3/day)
from another water source. Raw water is purified at both the new and existing water treatment plants. (see
Fig.3).
232
Since the new facility has not yet been built, both the new and the existing facilities are presently
utilized for water purifying which is equivalent to the water right (80,520 m3/day) in the Nejo Water
Treatment Plant. The existing facility (50,000 m3/day) is being studied for improving the water purifying
ability to match the water right from the Mabechi River (80,520 m3/day). It is also being studied for
quakeproof ability.
　 Yomasari Dam
Korekawa receiving receiving Kawanakajima

pumping station well flow meter well pumping station
P M P
4.5km 3.7km
Niida Mabechi
River purification purification River
water right: plant plant water right:
58,074m3/D (in 2005) (in 1975) 80,520m3/D
r eser voi r
under construction
Fig.3 Mutual Flexibility of Raw Water
The Hachinohe old city is provided with stable water pressure from the Nejo Distribution Reservoir
service area. However, the changing water head causes the old pipes to leak. The study recommends that
the water reservoir be rehabilitated and be utilized as a water facility instead.
But insofar as the Nejo Water Treatment Plant is concerned, utilizing it as water purifying facility will
need large-scale reinforcement. Therefore, it is best to utilize the facility as a warehouse or a water pipe
training facility so that only small reinforcement will be required to match its use.
As a result of the study, Nejo Water Treatment Plant water system facility is modified as follows:
The facilities to be abolished or demolished and integrated
Tategami Intake Tower (Intake Port), Tategami Pump Station, Water Conveyance Pipe, Tunnel,
Transmission Main
The facility to be converted to another purpose
Nejo Water Treatment Plant
The facility to be rehabilitated
Nejo Distribution Reservoir
233
STUDY ON NEJO DISTRIBUTION RESERVOIR TO BE REHABILITATED
Total capacity of the distribution reservoir (see Fig.4) is designed at 10,700m3 (8,200m3 for No.1 &
No.2 and 2,500m3 of No.3). However, it is necessary to perform the renewable construction works and stop
utilizing the existing reservoir because the construction of reservoir with an equivalent capacity in the
empty space within the existing site is impossible due to land constraint. Consequently, only No.1 and
No.2 were considered as the renewable reservoirs from the viewpoint that a secondary disaster can occur
considering that both sites are around a steep edge of banked up surface which reduces the incidental risks
taking into account the change in the distribution method (water-distribution by pressure reducing valve on
the Hakusan Distribution System). Both reservoirs of No.1 and No.2 will be left without additional
reinforcement and renewal. After completion, however, No.3 reservoir will provide continuous supply
during the construction period.
To keep pace with the reduced capacity, it is necessary to install a partial pressure reducing valve to
the renewed reservoirs as a counterbalance.
Fig. 4 Plane View of the Distribution Reservoirs
Overview of Structural Type to be Studied
Newly-constructed RC Structure Newly-constructed SUS Steel Replaced RC Structure Overview

Overview (see Fig. 5) Structure Overview (see Fig. 6) (see Fig. 7)
The reservoir with RC structure Demolishing the top plate and Demolishing the top plate and
will be newly built by keeping the column, the rectangular SUS column, the reservoir with RC
side wall at the reservoir’s distribution reservoir will be structure will be rebuilt within the
northern side as a retaining wall newly built within the old old building frame by retaining
and demolishing the other building frame by retaining the the sidewall/bottom plate as an
members of framework to side wall/bottom plate as an exterior frame to mitigate impact
maintain slope stability. exterior frame to mitigate impact on the surrounding ground and/or
on the surrounding ground and/or maintain slope stability.
maintain slope stability.
234
existing outer wall
Fig. 5 Newly-constructed RC Structure Overview
existing outer wall
Fig. 6 Newly-constructed SUS Steel Structure Overview
existing outer wall
Fig. 7 Replaced RC Structure Overview
Capacity
Newly-constructed RC Structure Newly-constructed SUS Steel Replaced RC Structure

Structure
7,860 m3 7,220 m3 6,960 m3
Seismicity, Water Tightness, Corrosion Resistance, Durability
<RC Structure>
- The rigidity of the structure is excellent for seismicity and corrosion resistance. However, an
earthquake causes internal dynamic water pressure, and its horizontal force can also cause cracks
because of weak bending and shearing stress. Durability and water tightness can be strengthened by
235
executing the internal coating water-resistance.
<SUS Structure>
- The use of stainless steel products can improve corrosion resistance and durability even if chlorine
resistance is inferior to the same RC structure. The mechanical property of steel products or materials
is also excellent for seismicity and water tightness, thus providing the SUS structure with elasticity.
Maintenance
<RC Structure>
- Verifying the conditions of crack and deterioration/exfoliation of internal coating water-resistance, and
repair/recoating is necessary. The cracks found on the external sides cannot be verified by reason of
semisubterranean structure.
<SUS Structure>
- The internal environment of the cistern can be maintained by regular cleaning, In addition, it is
possible to verify the conditions from the internal and external sides because of the presence of
maintenance space between the side wall and SUS cistern.
Constraints of Construction
<RC Structure>
- There will be longer period of time allotted for field operations because will of the following activities:
bending of the reinforcing bar, step-by-step concrete placing, up to the appearance of concrete etc.,
Therefore, supervision (placing, curing, jointing, temperature regulation and drying shrinkage etc.) to
ensure water tightness is important.
<SUS Structure>
- SUS steel member (t = 1.5 - 6 mm) can be welded and fabricated on the spot. This, therefore,
contributes to shortening the days spent working onsite.
Construction Period

Structure
16.5 month 13.0 month 14.0 month
(Demolition : 3.0 months) (Demolition : 1.5 months) (Demolition : 1.5 months)
Economy (Total Cost)

Structure
Cost Ratio : 1.08 Cost Ratio : 1.00 Cost Ratio : 0.98
236
Effect to the Surrounding Environment
Item Newly-constructed RC Newly-constructed SUS Replaced RC Structure

Structure Steel Structure
Noise & Vibration Maximum impact due to Minimum impact due to Medium impact due to
long duration for shortest duration for short duration for
demolition and field works demolition and site demolition and long
welding execution duration for field works
Slope & Ground Liquefaction of Slope Less impact is expected Less impact is expected
during the construction is during the construction, during the construction,
concerned because of and the impact is however, empty weight
excavation to the negligible because empty gains and settling may
foundation ground. weight saving was also occur.
considered.
Excellence and Deficit on Structural Type
Evaluation Newly-constructed Newly-constructed Replaced RC

Items RC Structure SUS Steel Structure Structure
Reservoir’s Capacity ○ ○ ○
Seismicity ○ ○ ○
Water Tightness ○ ◎ ○
Corrosion Resistance ◎ ○ ◎
Durability ○ ○ ○
Maintenance △ ◎ △
Constraints of Construction ○ ◎ ○
Construction Period △ ◎ ○
Economy ○ ○ ◎
Effect to the Surrounding Environment ○ ◎ ○
Evaluation ○ ◎ ○
Adoption of Structural Type
The renewal construction method by SUS Steel Structure was adopted in comparison with the
above-mentioned construction methods.
Adoption Reasons
- Capacity reduction can be sufficiently covered by the shifting (alternating) of distributing area etc.
- Construction costs for excavation, backfill and demolition can be reduced by retaining the bottom
plates and side walls. In addition, the impact to the surrounding ground including the slope surface and
impact by noise/vibration to the neighboring residences can be reduced during the construction period.
- The stability of surrounding ground can be sustained into the future because the lightness of empty
weight of distribution reservoir’s body.
237
- Problems can be easily verified because of the installation of maintenance space between the side wall
and SUS reservoir. In addition, the prevention of runoff to the ground surface is possible because
leakage can be stored in the said space in case of water leaks from the cistern.
- It is excellent on the maintenance point of view because of small maintenance cost in spite of the most
expensive construction price. In addition, it is also very excellent at water tightness.
- Reservoir’s early utilization can be expected since this can be completed without constraints.
Construction Overview to be Decided (see Fig. 8)
Fig.8 Cross Section
[Construction Overview]
Specification on Reservoir made of Stainless Steel Plate
Dimension ≤ 49,600 × ≤ 33,600 × > 4,944 (Available : 7,200 m3)
Main Body Roof Plate　SUS329J4L-1.5t
Wall Material Using SUS329J4L for the range from HWL till -1.0m,
　　 Otherwise, use SUS316.
Bottom Plate SUS316A-3.0t
Annular Plate SUS316A-6.0t
Flow uniforming baffle is based on the side plate.
Step Inner (Inside of Tank) : 20A RB-φ16 SUS329J4L,SUS316
Inner (Outside of Tank) : 20A RB-φ16 SUS304
Outer : 20A RB-φ16 SUS304
Handrail Outer : 20A RB-φ16 SUS304
Passageway CKPL-3.0t SUS304
Receiving Table 49,140×33,140×100H SUS304
(Bolt Set) C-100×50×5
Flange Waterworks F (7.5K) Standard Product SUS329J4L,SUS316
(Plate Flange) Parts in water uses SUS lining (Material should like the plumbing material or over).
Finishing SUS Welding Portion with Pickled Surface
Structure Welded Structure Type
Special Note Quakeproof : Level 2 (in case of 2nd type ground)
Field Assembly
Snow Cover 0.85 m (30 N/m2/cm)
The pitch of roof is as designed greater than 1/50.
The rectangular distribution reservoir with the stainless steel plate will be fabricated by complete
welding within the old RC building frame after retaining some parts (bottom plate/side wall) of the existing
distribution reservoir as an exterior frame. Concrete (t=400mm) will be poured as the foundation on the
bottom plate, while RC will be placed on the bottom portion of the side wall, In addition, SUS329J4L
which has excellent corrosion resistance will be used on the vapor portions, such as the roof and upper side
238
plate etc. to counteract condensation of chlorine within the cistern. On the other hand, SUS316 will be
utilized for the portion of liquid phase without condensation to improve corrosion resistance and durability.
Furthermore, the aging distribution main with low seismicity will no longer be used when the reservoir
will be rehabilitated. Finally, the effluent pipes will be replaced by quakeproof pipes on the southern side
to simultaneously mitigate the disaster risk caused by leakage etc.
CONCLUSION
The Authority faces a severe management condition where water demand is decreasing due to the
change of population structure and population decrease caused by low fertility and aging. In addition, there
is the conversion to the private water supply of commercial-scale utility customers. However, the authority
should respond to the residents’ request for safe, stable, reliable drinking water any time and any place by
performing the seismic diagnosis, additional strength/renewal for the deteriorated water supply facilities.
Nejo Water Treatment Plant facilities continue to contribute to the development of Hachinohe City.
The facilities are being rehabilitated and made more resistant to earthquakes. The efficiency and
management rationalization can be smoothly carried out through the quakeproof design by integrating the
water supply system of Hakusan Water Treatment Plant by way of “Scrap & Build” without continuous
facility utilization.
Moreover, the start of construction for the Nejo Distribution Reservoir was scheduled on September
this year. The stainless steel structure is being recommended because it is economically feasible as it aims
at the highest level and longest life span for the facility.
The Authority was inaugurated by integrating ten water supply utilities in 1986. Many deteriorated
facilities, however, still remain even if some of the facilities were abolished and/or merged. At present, a
long-term planning on the restructuring of such facilities is being prepared for implementation in 2008.
Accordingly, explaining the residents’ responsibility will be required to realize the planned targets and
goals.
239
240
The Quakeproof Diagnosis of Waterworks Facilities in
Yokohama City
Hidehiko Aihara
ABSTRACT
Yokohama Waterworks Bureau made the quakeproof standard of bureau unification. This standard considers
adaptability of diagnosis technique and economy of quakeproof reinforcement each in waterworks facility. And it
reflects regionality [such as] ground characteristics of Yokohama City.
_____________
Hidehiko Aihara, Manager of Engineering Supervision Division, Water Works Bureau, the City of
Yokohama, 1852 Bukkou-cho, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama, Japan 240-0044.
241
1. BASIC POLICY OF SEISMIC DIAGNOSIS
In Japan, there is "Guideline for Aseismic Construction Methods of Waterworks Facilities, and Description -1997-
Japan Water Works Association" (hereinafter referred to as "JWWA Guideline"). This guideline is the standard
aseismic design for waterworks facilities. Each water utility should aseismic-design on the basis of this JWWA
Guideline.
Yokohama city is located in the South Kanto region where the seismicity is very active, and has undergone many
massive earthquakes. In “Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan - Earthquake Countermeasures” which was
established in 2005, the following three earthquakes are assumed: (1) Earthquake in the South Kanto area, (2)
Yokohama Epicentral Earthquake and (3) Tokai Earthquake. Additionally, as a reference, Earthquake in
Kannawa/Kouzu - Matsuda earthquake fault zone, Earthquake in Miura Peninsula fault zones and others are shown.
The land forms of Yokohama are classified into the hilly area, the plateau/terrace, the low land and the reclaimed land,
and according to these land forms and the geotechnical conditions, the earthquake motion changes - such as local
amplification. Therefore, in the seismic diagnosis, the earthquake motion to be considered should be determined after
comparing the earthquake motion based on these assumed earthquakes and the design earthquake motion in "JWWA
Guideline".
In the seismic diagnosis, it is necessary to understand the structure characteristics based on the completion
drawings and the filed investigation. In addition, it is necessary not only to evaluate and understand the health of
structure based on the survey of existing conditions but also to examine the history of repair and reinforcement of
facilities and the locational conditions such as neighboring land form.
The procedure of seismic diagnosis is basically the same as that of design of new facility. Considering the
importance of facilities, the probability that secondary damage occurs when it is visited by an earthquake and
others, Yokohama city decided to implement the seismic diagnosis based on the quantitative diagnosis
calculation which is relevant to the secondary diagnosis in principle. The concept will be shown.
1 - 1 Input Earthquake Motion Used in The Seismic Diagnosis
The relationship between an earthquake and earthquake motion is shown in Figure 1-1. The earthquake motion
depends on the type of fault and its rupture condition (source characteristics), the propagation condition in the
crust of the wave generated by the fault rupture (propagation path characteristics) and the condition of soil
structure of the neighborhood of target point (site characteristics). Therefore, even if the same earthquake is
assumed, the propagation path characteristics and the site characteristics are different, and accordingly the
earthquake motion is different if the investigated point is different. Furthermore, it is usual to consider the
earthquake motion including consideration of vibration characteristics of the structure.
In the design earthquake motion defined in “JWWA Guideline,” the source characteristics and propagation
path characteristics which are shown in Figure 1-1 are common throughout the nation, the design seismic
coefficient and the velocity response spectrum according to the site characteristics and the vibration
characteristics of the structure are defined.
Vibration characteristics of aboveground structure
Site characteristics
Propagation path
characteristics
Source characteristics
Figure 1-1 Characteristics of earthquake motion
242
On the other hand, in “Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan” different source characteristics (fault models)
are assumed, and furthermore, the earthquake motion distribution (Instrumental seismic coefficient maximum
acceleration/maximum velocity) on the ground surface of the whole city according to the propagation path
characteristics and the site characteristics is calculated.
In earthquake motion level 1, it is based on the design earthquake motion in “JWWA Guideline.” In
earthquake motion level 2, basically the larger earthquake motion in the comparison between the design
earthquake motion in “JWWA Guideline” and the earthquake motion of the earthquake which is assumed in
“Yokohama city Disaster prevention plan” is adopted.
And as for the design seismic coefficient which is used in the seismic coefficient method of aboveground
structure, the above standard horizontal seismic coefficient Kh02 and the structure characterization factor Cs are
considered as shown in Formula 1-1. This indicates that the structure is generally damaged and the absorption
of energy due to the entry of member stiffness into the plastic field is expected. The value of Cs can be
obtained based on the attenuation characteristics and plastic deformation capacity of structure as shown in
Formula 1-2.
K h 2 = Cs ⋅ K h 02 ···································································································································································· (Formula 1-1)

Cs = Dh ⋅ Dη ···································································································································································· (Formula 1-2)
Kh2: Design horizontal seismic coefficient which is used in earthquake motion level 2
Kh02: Standard horizontal seismic coefficient in the barycentric position of the structure
Cs: Structure characteristic coefficient
Dh: Correction coefficient according to the attenuation characteristic of the structure
Dη: Response depression coefficient based on the plastic deformation capacity
In the earthquake assumed in “Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan”, the earthquake source fault model is
assumed. Each data of earthquake intensity, ground level maximum acceleration, ground level maximum
velocity and liquefaction risk in the assumed earthquake is required in a distribution map by 50m mesh unit in
the whole city.
If the ground level maximum acceleration in the assumed earthquake exceeds the design horizontal seismic
coefficient in “JWWA Guideline,” the input earthquake motion is set in the following method.
(1) Design seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic coefficient method of
aboveground structure
As the ground level maximum acceleration is the value of acceleration on the ground, it is corrected to the
response acceleration spectrum of structure based on Formula 1-3.
K h 02
K h 02 S = K h 2 S × ···························································································································································· (Formula 1-3)
K h2
K h02 S : Design seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic coefficient method
of aboveground structure in the assumed earthquake
K h 2 S : Design horizontal seismic coefficient on the ground level in the assumed earthquake. The value
obtained by dividing the ground level maximum acceleration by the gravity acceleration g (=
980Gal)
K h 02 : Standard horizontal seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic
coefficient method of aboveground structure in “JWWA Guideline”
Kh2 : Design horizontal seismic coefficient on the ground level in “JWWA Guideline”
(2) Design seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic coefficient method of
underground structure
The value (= Kh2S) which is obtained by dividing the value of ground level maximum acceleration by the
gravity acceleration g (= 980Gal) may be used. As the embedment of underground structure is usually
shallow, the ground level maximum acceleration is directly converted as seismic coefficient in the ground
on the safe side.
(3) Design earthquake motion which is used in the design based on the seismic deformation method of the
underground structure
The ground level maximum acceleration can be used as velocity response spectrum for design, Sv. In this
case, as the ground level maximum velocity is calculated as response speed in which the response of
243
subsurface ground is considered, this value is directly used as Sv.
As for the earthquake input which is used in the dynamic analysis, the value which is adapted to the design
response spectrum of “JWWA Guideline” with using the past observation records, and the observation
records and others in Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake should be used basically.
In Figure 1-2, the acceleration waveform which is adapted to the upper limit of earthquake motion Level 2
is shown as an example.
The case that the observation record (Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake Hukiai Y direction) is the original
waveform: maximum 649.2 [gal]
Amplitude [gal]
Time [s]
Figure 1-2 Example of ground level acceleration waveform of earthquake motion level 2 (upper limit)
(adapted to the acceleration response spectrum [Type II Ground] in “JWWA Guideline”)
In “Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan”, the ground level waveforms in 150 strong-earthquake
observation points in the city are required. However, as the target facilities are not always located near the
observation points, we decided to use the above adapted waveforms.
And also, if the acceleration waveform in the assumed earthquake is created, based on the ground level
acceleration waveform (adapted waveform and others) in “JWWA Guideline” shown in Figure 1-2, the
amplitude of the waveform is uniformly increased. The amplification factor is the ratio between the ground
level maximum acceleration in the assumed earthquake and that in “JWWA Guideline”, and it is used after
correcting as shown in Formula 1-4.
Kh2S
u&&s(t ) = u&&(t )× ······························································································································································· (Formula 1-4)
Kh2
u&&s(t ) : Ground level acceleration waveform in the assumed earthquake
u&&(t ) : Ground level acceleration waveform in “JWWA Guideline” (adapted waveform and others)
K h 2 S : Ground level design horizontal seismic coefficient in the assumed earthquake. The value which is
obtained by dividing the value of maximum ground acceleration by the gravity acceleration g (=
980Gal)
Kh2 : Ground level design horizontal seismic coefficient in “JWWA Guideline”
1 - 2 Aseismic Capacity of Facility
Yokohama city sets the importance of facilities at Rank A, and the fundamentals of aseismic capacity of each
structural site of the target facility is shown in Table Ⅰ. In earthquake motion level 1 (L1), the check based on
so-called allowable stress method is mainly conducted, and in earthquake motion level 2 (L2), the aseismic
capacity depends on the function of facility. As for the facility in which water-tightness is required and RC
member in the bar arrangement where the toughness is not provided against bending, the aseismic capacity is
one that the cross-section power is kept within the elastic limit (yield resistance) and the damage of member is
not allowed basically. Therefore, the seismic calculation in earthquake motion level 2 of water tank structure
and others may be basically implemented based on the linear analysis (elastic analysis).
And as for the foundation, if it is judged that there is no problem in the stability of superstructure which the
244
foundation supports even if the generated cross-section power exceeds the maximum proof stress in
earthquake motion level 2, the damage of the foundation can be allowed.
TABLE Ⅰ FUNDAMENTALS OF ASEISMIC CAPACITY

OF EACH STRUCTURAL SITE OF FACILITY
Earthquake
motion level
L1 L2
Importance
• The cross-section power which is • The cross-section power which is generated
generated in the member should be kept in the member should be kept under the
within the elastic limit, and the check is maximum proof stress. However, as for the
conducted based on the allowable facility in which water-tightness is required
and the member whose toughness is not
stress.
provided, the cross-section power which is
• The response displacement of structure
generated in the member should be kept
and foundation should be under the within the elastic limit, and the check is
design displacement. conducted based on yield resistance.
Rank A • The stability of foundation should be • The response displacement and the residual
within the given safety factor. displacement of structure and foundation
• The stability of ground should be within should be under the limit value.
the given safety factor. • As for the stability of foundation, the damage
can be allowed if there is no problem in the
stability of superstructure which the
foundation supports.
• The stability of ground should be within the
given safety factor.
1 - 3 Items and Contents of Seismic Diagnosis
The basic is to check the damage of members of each structure, the stability of foundation, and the
displacement and deformation of structures. However, as for the structure (such as a tunnel) which is
constructed in the mountain district and hilly district earth and in which earth covering is sufficiently deep, not
the aseismic capacity of the main body but the influence of landslide on the opening has to be diagnosed.
The contents of earthquake motion level 1 is basically the same as those of earthquake motion level 2.
However, as for the superstructure in the aqueduct bridge, the water pipe bridge and the pipe in the slope, the
diagnosis of earthquake motion level 1 is usually omitted.
And if the liquefaction of the ground is concerned, the judgment of liquefaction and that of fluidization are
implemented. Especially, as for the water tank structure and channel structure in a basement or a
semibasement, the judgment of rise of skeleton and the examination of unequal settling are required.
2. SEISMIC CALCULATION METHOD
In the seismic diagnosis, it is the principle to understand the focus in the earthquake resistance based on the
structure of the target facility, the landform and the geotechnical condition, and use the analysis model and
analysis method with which these can be expressed quantitatively. However, if the structure or the ground
condition is special, it is necessary to apply the calculation method suitable for them.
This time, we will explain the basin-like structure such as a distribution reservoir and others which are
extremely important in Yokohama city.
2 - 1 Seismic Calculation of Basin-like Structure
The procedure of seismic calculation of basin-like structure is shown in Figure 2-1. Most of the water utility is
the basin-like structure and the types are various kinds.
245
START
Seismic diagnosis of Seismic diagnosis of

Level 1 earthquake motion Level 2 earthquake motion
Yes
Is the dynamic analysis required?
Calculation based on the No
seismic coefficient method
Is only the seismic coefficient method No
required? (Is the setting depth of the
skeleton into the ground less than 10m?)
Setting of design horizontal seismic Yes
coefficient (Refer to 2.3 Input earthquake Setting of velocity response spectrum
motion used in the seismic diagnosis) (Refer to Input earthquake motion used in
the seismic diagnosis)
Calculation of ground
response displacement
Yes Is the inter-story deflection

angle 1/100 and below?
Calculation based on the
seismic coefficient method No
Setting of velocity response spectrum The calculation based on the

(Refer to Input earthquake motion used in seismic deformation method
the seismic diagnosis) is also examined
Judgment of liquefaction Judgment of liquefaction
Yes Yes Calculation of seismic load

To liquefy To liquefy (Earth pressure in the earthquake,
No No Spherical surface shear force)
Calculation of subsidence
due to liquefaction
Judgment of Reduction of the subgrade reaction

skeleton rise coefficient of foundation which is used in
the seismic coefficient method
Check of the
opening
Setting of design load Setting of design load

- Resistance against water - Resistance against water
pressure in the earthquake pressure in the earthquake
- Inertia force in the earthquake - Inertia force in the earthquake
Yes Yes
Is the stereo analysis required? Is the stereo analysis required?
No No
Calculation of cross- Calculation of cross- Calculation of cross- Calculation of cross-

section power in the section power in the (Including the superposition with section power in the section power in the
earthquake using earthquake using continuous cross-section power) earthquake using earthquake using
3-D model 2-D model 2-D model 3-D model
Check of the allowable stress Check of the proof stress based on

Check of the opening the limit state design method
Check of the opening
END
Figure 2-1 Procedure of seismic calculation of basin-like structure
246
As it is impossible to analyze such various structures with one analysis method, in the seismic calculation in
earthquake motion level 2, the structure whose setting depth is more than 10m (in the case of basement type,
the height of skeleton is more than 10m) is considered to be greatly influenced by the ground displacement
and we decided to implement the seismic calculation with the seismic deformation method in addition to the
seismic coefficient method.
Generally, as shown in Figure 2-2, as the basin-like structure such as a distribution reservoir is built near the
surface of the earth, the relative displacement which contributes to the deformation of structure is small even if
the ground displacement amplitude in the earthquake is great. Therefore, as for the structure whose setting
depth into the ground is shallow, we decided to adopt the seismic coefficient method in which the inertia force
is main as an analysis method.
Distribution reservoir
配水池and 等others
Relative
構造物displacement
の変形 which
contributes
に寄与する相 to the対
deformation
変位 of
structure
Distribution地
of 震時
ground
displacement
地盤変in位 the
分布
earthquake
Engineering
工学的基盤 bedrock
面 surface
Figure 2-2 Distribution of ground displacement in the earthquake

which contributes to the deformation of structure
The setting depth into the ground in this situation indicates the setting depth into the original ground which
spreads planarity as shown in Figure 2-3, and the embedment into the part of cover soil of the underground
structure in appearance due to cover soil and others and the structure which is set on the sectional terrace is not
recognized as setting depth.
Even if the setting depth into the ground is more than 10m, the influence by the ground displacement is
regarded as small one and the calculation based on the seismic deformation method can be omitted if the
inter-story deflection angle which is obtained based on the distribution of ground displacement as shown in
Figure 2-4 is smaller than 1/100.
247
Distribution
配水池 reservoir
等
Distribution Setting
根入れ深 depth
さ
配水池等 Setting
根入れ深 depth
さ
reservoir
Sectional terrace surface

局(no所embedment)
的な台地面
Cover soil
覆土（根入れなし）
Distribution
配reservoir
水池等
Distribution
配reservoir
水池等
Setting
根入れ深 depth
さ
Figure 2-3 Definition of setting depth
⊿U h ⊿U h
Uh0:
U h 0Ground
：上床 displacement
版位置のof the
position
地盤of変 upper floor
位 (m ) slab (m)
Df: Setting depth

D f：of structure
構造物(m) の
(Height of skeleton) θG
根入れ深さ (m )
（躯体高）
UUhB:
h B Ground
：下床displacement
版位置の of the
position
地盤of変bottom
位 (m floor
) slab (m)
Relative displacement
相対変位：⊿U h ＝U h 0 －U h B
層間変形角
Inter-story deflection angle ： θ G ＝ ⊿ U h ／D f
Figure 2-4 Calculation method of Inter-story deflection angle
If the structure calculation is implemented, the typical cross-section is often extracted and 2-D framework model is
created. Some real structures have the side wall (so-called in-plane wall) which runs parallel to the loading direction,
some earthquake-resisting walls or training walls. If the existence of these walls is not considered, the diagnosis result on
the safe side may be brought excessively. Therefore, it is necessary to create the appropriate analysis model such as stereo
analysis model according to the selection method of analysis model which is shown in 2-2.
2 - 2 Selection of Analysis Model
In the analysis model, the ability of accurate simulation of behavior in the earthquake of the structure is
required. For example, as shown in Figure 2-5, in the case of a beam - column structure distribution reservoir,
the main members of the skeleton of the distribution reservoir are side wall, beam, column, upper floor slab
248
and bottom floor slab. And the secondary member is training wall. And also, in a large-scale distribution
reservoir, joints are set and the skeleton is divided into some blocks.
Even in the distribution reservoir whose structure is relatively simple, there are many issues to be considered
in setting the analysis model - for example, as to whether 2-D model in which the cross-section is simply
extracted is proper.
Sid側
e壁wall
Beam, Co梁lu、
m柱n
Side 側
wa壁ll
Training
導w流a壁
ll Jo地int
目
J目o地
int
J目o地
int
J目o地
int
J目o地
int
Figure 2-5 Example of constructional elements of distribution reservoir

(Nogeyama new distribution reservoir)
(Condition in which the upper floor slab is removed)
In the 2-D model, modeling is easily conducted, but the existence of the in-plane wall is not easily considered.
So, the deformation and cross-section power of the structure are often estimated excessively. And also, if the
cross-section changes along the depth direction, each cross-section which changes should be modeled.
Therefore, it is unfit for the analysis of the structure which has complicated shapes.
On the other hand, in the 3-D model, basically, almost all types of structures can be easily modeled. However,
modeling, accumulation of cross-section power and check of members require lots of efforts.
The 3-D model should be applied basically.
2 - 3 Seismic Calculation Based on The Seismic Coefficient Method
In the basin-like structure, the following load is considered as concrete load.

a. Continuous load elements
c Own weight of skeleton d Hydrostatic pressure due to internal water eLoad of covering of earth and
sand f Hydrostatic pressure due to groundwater
b. Load elements in the earthquake
g Inertia force due to own weight of skeleton h Inertia force due to the load of covering of earth and
sand i Active earth pressure in the earthquake j Dynamic water pressure in the earthquake due to
internal water
In the analysis model, it is popular to install the subgrade spring and to trigger the subgrade reaction on the
bottom surface and the side wall of receiving side. If there is pile foundation, the two methods of modeling are
used: the method to model by replacing the pile foundation with the spring and the method to model the pile
itself. In the case of direct check of aseismic capacity of pile foundation, it is desirable to conduct it with using
the latter one.
(1) Inertia force caused by own weight of structure and others
In the estimate of the inertia force caused by own weight of structure and load of covering, the response
characteristics of structure, earth covering and others should be considered. In principle, it is the value
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which is obtained by multiplying each weight by the design seismic coefficient. If the target facility exists
in the ground, not only the earth pressure in the earthquake from the side but also the inertia force caused
by covering of earth and sand should be handled as spherical surface frictional force.
(2) Earth pressure in the earthquake
If it assumes a great earthquake, in the ground near the underground structure, strength of the soil softens
by the localization of the soil distortion. And, as a general rule, it applies the earth pressure in the
earthquake (The corrected Monobe-Okabe method) that considered the influence of falling from the peak
to the residual strength.
(3) Dynamic water pressure and water surface movement in the earthquake
The dynamic water pressure which is generated in the basin-like structure is classified into two types: the
one that acts as inertia force and the one that acts due to the movement of free water surface. After
calculating these, they are superposed on the continuous hydrostatic pressure.
In the seismic diagnosis of the existing facility, it is thought that the application of regular operating water
level as water level of internal water is rational. However, in the light of the future operation plan and
others, in principle, two types of water level (H.W.L and L.W.L) as a target is analyzed.
(4) Influence of liquefaction
If the ground near the basin-like structure liquefies, it is necessary to reduce the subgrade reaction
coefficient of pile foundation according to the degree of liquefaction.
And also, if the liquefaction occurs, it is possible that the ground near revetments and the sloping ground
are influenced by the lateral flow, and the skeleton may rise due to the increase of excess pore pressure. It
is also necessary to investigate them. Additionally, the compression may occur after dissipation of the
excess pore pressure in the liquefied layer. If unequal settling of skeleton in the spread foundation is
expected, the examination of opening is required.
2 - 4 Seismic Calculation Based on The Seismic Deformation Method
In the basin-like structure, the following is considered as concrete load.

a. Continuous load elements
c Own weight of skeleton d Hydrostatic pressure due to internal water eLoad of covering of earth and
sand f Hydrostatic pressure due to groundwater g Earth pressure at rest (Active earth pressure)
b. Load elements in the earthquake
h Inertia force due to own weight of skeleton i Earth pressure in the earth j Spherical surface shear
force k Dynamic water pressure in the earthquake due to internal water
If there is pile foundation, the two methods of modeling are used: the method to model by replacing the pile
foundation with the spring and the method to model the pile itself. In the case of direct check of aseismic
capacity of pile foundation, it is desirable to conduct it with using the latter one. And in this case, the earth
pressure in the earthquake should act to the end of pile.
(1) Earth pressure in the earthquake
In principle, the earth pressure in the earthquake is calculated based on Formula 2-1. And as for the earth
pressure in the earthquake, continuous earth pressure element (earth pressure at rest and others) should be
considered additionally because it is the load which is generated due to the influence of the earthquake.
p ( z ) = k H ⋅ {U h ( z ) − U h ( z B )} ··············································································(Formula 2-1)
2 ⎡π ⋅ z ⎤
U h (z) = ⋅ Sv ⋅ TG ⋅ cos ⎢ ⎥ ··········································································· (Formula 2-2)
π 2
⎣ 2H ⎦
p(z): Earth pressure in the earthquake per unit area at the depth z(m) from the ground level (kN/m2)
Uh(z): Ground displacement in the earthquake at the depth z(m) from the ground level (m)
kH: Subgrade spring constant in the earthquake per unit area (kN/m3)
z: Depth from the ground level (m)
zB: Depth from the ground level to the bottom of skeleton of structure (m)
Sv: Velocity response spectrum on the bedrock surface (m/s)
TG: Proper period of subsurface ground (s)
H: Thickness of subsurface ground (m)
(2) Spherical surface shear force in the earthquake

In principle, the spherical surface shear force is calculated based on Formula 2-3.
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Gi ⎡π ⋅ z ⎤
τ= ⋅ Sv ⋅ TG ⋅ sin ⎢ ⎥ ··········································································· (Formula 2-3)
π ⋅H ⎣ 2H ⎦
τ: Spherical surface shear force in the earthquake per unit area at the depth z(m) from the ground level
(kN/m2)
Sv: Velocity response spectrum on the bedrock surface (m/s)
Gi: Dynamic shear modulus of rigidity in the ith layer (kN/m2)
(Convergence rigidity which is obtained based on the dynamic analysis of ground)
(=γi*VsDi2/g)
TG: Proper period of subsurface ground (s)
z: Depth from the ground level (m)
H: Thickness of subsurface ground (m)
(3) Influence of liquefaction

In the application of the seismic deformation method, the influence of ground liquefaction is not
considered. Because the relationship between the decrease of ground rigidity in the liquefaction and the
ground displacement is complicated and unambiguous determination is difficult. Therefore, the
examination of the influence of liquefaction should be conducted based on the dynamic analysis with
using the seismic coefficient method or the effective stress analysis.
2 - 5 Calculation of The Opening
Referring to the past cases of seismic damage of distribution reservoirs and others, the damage in joint parts is
outstanding and the number of that in the skeleton of structure is much smaller. This actual condition indicates
that the joint part is a weak point in the basin-like structure.
The typical deformation pattern of joint is shown in Figure 2-6. In fact, it is thought that, in addition to this,
rotational component and torsion element add and they create a complicated deformation pattern. If adjacent
skeleton blocks have the same behavior, the deformation of joints does not occur. So, in the past damage cases,
it is thought that the damage occurred by the combination of complicated factors such as the difference of
ground conditions, the relationship between the wavelength of seismic wave and the scale of skeleton, the
influence of residual deformation due to ground deformation ( landslide, liquidation, unequal settling and
others).
However, we must say that it is difficult under the present situation to obtain the behavior in the earthquake of
these complicated skeleton accurately and analytically. We can say that it is appropriate to obtain them with
simple methods.
(a) Stretching and

(a )伸縮 shrinking
(b)(b )水平方向ずshear
Horizontal れ (c )鉛直方向ずれ
(c) Vertical shear
Figure 2-6 Typical deformation pattern of joint
So, the possible method is as follows: Assuming that one skeleton block remains stationary, the horizontal
displacement of another skeleton block is regarded as opening. The displacement of skeleton block is one
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which is obtained based on the said aseismic analysis.
As the aseismic analysis is basically implemented in the log side direction of the structure and the narrow side
direction of that, the elasticity and the horizontal shear are checked based on the horizontal displacement. As
for the vertical direction, if the rise of skeleton and the settlement of foundation ground which are caused by
the liquefaction do not occur, there is no problem, and if the liquefaction occurs, it is desirable to examine the
installation of flexible joint whose allowable deformation is great to be prepared for unforeseen circumstances.
The subsidence after dissipation of the excess pore water pressure in the liquefied layer after the earthquake is
5% of the thickness of liquefied layer below the bottom of skeleton as shown in Formula 2-4. In the
calculation of subsidence, it is important to understand the distribution condition of liquefied layers, so the
collection of drilling data and geology profile of neighborhood and the understanding of relative positional
relationship with the structure are required.
S l = 0.05 ⋅ H L ··········································································································(Formula 2-4)

Here,
Sl: Subsidence due to the liquefaction of skeleton (m)
HL: Thickness of liquefied layer below the bottom of skeleton (m)
2 - 6 Check Method of Aseismic Capacity
The check of aseismic capacity of basin-like structure should be conducted as shown in Table Ⅱ. The
allowable deformation of joint is set after hearing with the manufacturer of used joint.
As for the pile foundation, if it is judged that the damage in foundation does not cause the trouble in the safety
of superstructure in earthquake motion level 2, the damage in foundation can be allowed.
Table Ⅱ CHECK OF ASEISMIC CAPACITY OF ABOVEGROUND WATER TANK

Part Check item Earthquake motion level 1 Earthquake motion level 2 Abstract
Bending:
Generated bending moment ≤
Damage of
Generated stress ≤ Allowable stress Yielding bending moment
Skeleton member
Sear:
(RC)
Generated shear ≤ Shear capacity
Deformation Generated deformation Generated deformation
of joint ≤Allowable deformation ( Allowable deformation
Side wall Circumferential direction:
Prestressed concrete steel
Damage Only side wall:
Skeleton Generated stress ≤ Yielding stress
of Generated stress
(PC) Side wall Vertical direction:
member ( Allowable stress
Ultimate bending moment
Skeleton Damage of
Generated stress ≤ Allowable stress Generated stress ≤ Yielding stress
(Steel) member
Vertical subgrade reaction
≤ Allowable vertical bearing
capacity
Direct Stability of
Action position of resultant No conducted
foundation foundation
≤ 1/3 of foundation breadth
Shear force of bottom face
≤ Allowable shear resistance force
Bending:
Damage of Ultimate bending moment
Generated stress ≤ Allowable stress
member Shear:
Pile Generated shear force ≤ Shear
foundation capacity
Pile axial force
Stability of ≤ Allowable bearing capacity
Pile axial force ≤ Limit bearing force
foundation Planned grade displacement of pile
≤ Allowable displacement
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3. CONCLUSION
As stated above, Yokohama city established its own seismic diagnosis criteria based on various guidelines and
data based on “JWWA Guideline” for the existing water utility, and provides the seismic strengthening
measures based on this concept.
We are sure that, based on this seismic diagnosis criteria, by understanding the geology and topography in each
area and the characteristics of potential earthquake in the harsh economic conditions, the seismic strengthening
measures in which safety and cost effectiveness are considered sufficiently can be provided.
4. REFERENCES
[1] 1997. Guideline for Aseismic Construction Methods of Waterworks Facilities, and Description.: Japan Water
Works Association.
[2] 2005. Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan - Earthquake Countermeasures.: Yokohama City Disaster
Prevention Council.
[3] 1998. Guideline for Design and Construction of Water Supply Prestressed Concrete Tank, and Description.:
Japan Water Works Association.
[4] 2006. Guideline of Countermeasures Against Earthquake for sewerage Facilities, and Description.: Japan
Sewage Works Association.
[5] 1996. Design Criteria for Container Structures, and Description.: Architectural Institute of Japan.
[6] 2002 Specifications for Highway Bridges, and Description - Ⅴ Aseismic Design.: Japan Road Association.
[7] 2002 Specifications for Highway Bridges, and Description – Ⅳ infrastructure.: Japan Road Association.
[8] 1992 Guideline for Design and Construction of parking facilities, and Description.: Japan Road Association.
[9] 2004 Guideline for Aseismic Design of Land Improvement Facilities.: Japanese Society of Irrigation.
253
254
The Santa Clara Valley Water District’s Infrastructure
Reliability Program – Implementing Improvements for
Seismic Response
Crystal J. Yezman, P.E., David E. Hook, P.E. and M.ASCE, Carol Fredrickson and
Richard L. Volpe, G.E. and F.ASCE
ABSTRACT
Past earthquake activity and potential for future earthquake events makes seismic improvements
an essential part of the Santa Clara Valley Water District’s (district’s) planning efforts. The district
completed the Water Infrastructure Reliability Project Report in 2005, which determined both the
current reliability of its water supply infrastructure with regard to major and minor hazards events and
enabled the district to appropriately select a portfolio of recommended improvements that balance
reliability (level of service) with cost.
This report details the seismic analysis, implementation, and emergency planning being done at
the district under the Water Utility Enterprise and Infrastructure Reliability Program. The results
from the largest modeled earthquake event, the 7.9ML earthquake on the San Andreas Fault,
indicated that the district’s water supply system could experience up to a 60 day outage from an
estimated 18 pipe breaks, 20 pipe leaks, and damage to water treatment plants and pump stations.
Less severe earthquakes, flooding and regional power outages were shown to have less of an impact
on the district, with outage times ranging from 1 to 45 days.
Portfolio 2 (which includes Baseline and Portfolio 1 components) stood out as the superior option
after re-running the reliability model and performing cost/benefit analysis. This recommendation led
to funding for capital projects and forecasting for operational improvements. Portfolio 2 is estimated
to cost $150 million and reduces the outage period for the San Andreas event down from 45-60 days
to 7-14 days and for the Hayward and Calaveras events, down from 45 days to 1 day. The cornerstone
of Portfolio 2 is the addition of groundwater wells to both sides of the treated water system.
Stockpiling pipes and life safety projects were considered highest priority projects under Portfolio
2, along with emergency planning. Construction of district-owned wells on the west and east sides of
the district’s treated water system, while an integral reliability component, requires significant
coordination with district operations staff, stakeholders, and executive management. Therefore, these
capital investments are considered long-term and are being moved forward under the Development
Phase of the Infrastructure Reliability Program
Santa Clara Valley Water District, 5750 Almaden Expressway, San Jose, CA, USA 95118-3614
Crystal J. Yezman, P.E., Senior Civil Engineer, Water Utility Operations Division
David E. Hook, P.E and M.ASCE, Engineering Unit Manager, Infrastructure Planning Unit
Carol Fredrickson, Emergency Support Unit Manager, Emergency Services Unit
Richard L. Volpe, G.E. and F.ASCE, Senior Geotechnical Engineer, Infrastructure Planning Unit
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The Santa Clara Valley Water District’s Infrastructure
Reliability Program – Implementing Improvements for
Seismic Response
Crystal J. Yezman, P.E., David E. Hook, P.E. and M.ASCE, Carol Fredrickson and
Richard L. Volpe, G.E. and F.ASCE
BACKGROUND
The Santa Clara Valley Water District (district) is the primary water resource agency for Santa
Clara County (population 1.7 million) in California. It acts not only as the county’s water wholesaler,
but also as its flood protection agency and environmental steward for its streams and creeks,
underground aquifers and district-built reservoirs. Its wholesale Water Utility Enterprise (WUE)
includes contracting for imported raw water from the delta of the Sacramento River through the State
Water Project (the nation’s largest state-built water and power development, and conveyance system)
and the Central Valley Project (a long-term U.S. Bureau of Reclamation endeavor to provide water and
hydroelectric power for farms, protect residents and property from floods, improve the navigability of
the Sacramento River, and develop water supplies for the cities and towns of the Central Valley). The
WUE efforts include capturing and storing rainfall in 10 local reservoirs, recharging the county’s
groundwater basins, transporting raw water by means of a network of large-diameter pipelines and
three pump stations, producing treated water at three water treatment plants (current maximum
capacity 222 MGD), delivering the treated water to retailers via pipelines to 27 wholesale turnouts,
encouraging water conservation, and supporting water recycling. The ages of the facilities vary; some
dams were built as early as the 1930s, and some pipelines and canals date from the 1950s. The first
water treatment plant and pump station were built in the1960s.
Recent earthquakes in the region include the 1957 Daly City earthquake on the San Andreas Fault
(ML1 5.3); the Coyote Lake and Morgan Hill earthquakes of 1979 and 1984 on the Calaveras Fault (ML
5.9 and 6.1, respectively); the 1980 Livermore earthquake on the Greenville Fault (ML 5.8); and the 1989
Loma Prieta earthquake on the San Andreas Fault (ML 7.1) or a parallel subsidiary fault. Of these
earthquakes, the strongest shaking and most damage resulted from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. The
1989 earthquake ruptured on or southwest of the Santa Cruz Mountains segment of the San Andreas Fault
and produced MMI VII effects2 per the Mercalli intensity scale in San Jose.
The Rinconada Water Treatment Plant (RWTP) experienced 44 percent gravity acceleration in the
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. It suffered significant damage to the reactor/clarifier baffles in the three
basins that were in use at the time (see Figure 1). Two of the four clarifier units were rendered unusable. A
third unit was damaged; however, it was usable in combination with the fourth unit. The fourth unit was
empty and was not affected by the sloshing that damaged the other three units. It survived with no
damage.
The District also experienced some pipeline damage in the 1989 earthquake. One major leak required
repairs at the time, with 2 other pipe joints experiencing damage which did not cause leaks and was not
detected until internal visual inspections occurred between 2004 and 2007.
1
ML (or sub L) is reference to the Local Magnitude and the original scale developed by Richter. It is based on intensity of
shaking in the area immediately surrounding the earthquake.
2
MMI VII effects include non-structural damage, very strong shaking, difficult to stand, felt by all; furniture broken;
damage negligible in building of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures;
considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. noticed by persons driving
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motor cars. small slides and caving in along sand or gravel banks
Figure 1 - Inlet pipeline damaged on clarifier at RWTP during 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake.
Following on the heels of the federally mandated vulnerability assessment, the district launched the
Water Infrastructure Reliability Project in 2002 to assess potential hazards, current baseline survivability
and recommended improvements. Working collaboratively with its retailers and other stakeholders, the
district developed level of service goals following a major seismic event, and packaged recommended
projects into portfolios that could be evaluated for cost benefit as a factor of reduced outage times. This
paper details some of the technical analysis that was completed for the project as well as the progress that
has been achieved towards implementing the recommended improvements.
WATER INFRASTRUCTURE RELIABILITY PROJECT REPORT
The district initiated the Water Infrastructure Reliability Project Report (IRP Report) [1], to determine
both the current reliability of its water supply infrastructure with regard to major and minor hazard events
and to enable the district to appropriately balance reliability (level of service) with cost.
Major components of the IRP Report included coordinating with stakeholder to develop “level of
service” goals following a major hazard event, identification and quantification of hazards, modeling to
determine impact, portfolio development, and cost benefit analysis. The level of service goal that was
established for evaluating the baseline reliability of the district’s system became the ability to provide
potable water service at average winter flow to a minimum of one turnout per retailer within seven
days, with periodic one day interruptions for repairs. This goal was considered preliminary because the
process was considered iterative until a balance was established between the final system reliability
and an acceptable rate impact (program cost).
Hazard identification included a multitude of potential hazards with the greatest impact stemming
from flooding, regional power outage and earthquakes. Figure 2 shows an excerpt from potential hazard
maps that were generated during the project. The hazard maps showed such hazards as susceptibility to
settlement and spread from liquefaction, fault rupture, flooding damage, and landslides. Shaking from
peak ground acceleration controlled the magnitude of impact for many hazards. Calculations for peak
ground acceleration for modeled earthquake events took into account spatial relationships of each system
component to potential epicenters and underlying soil type and groundwater interactions.
257
Figure 2 - Excerpt from Potential Hazard Maps Generated During the Infrastructure Reliability Project [2]
258
Once the effects were know, the team developed fragility factors for system components to determine
the impacts. These fragilities were based on an evaluation of the facility’s or pipeline’s original design
criteria and the associated intent of the seismic code in place at the time of design, the type of construction
and materials, and the performance of similar types of construction in historic earthquakes. Performance
of district facilities during the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake provided a baseline for fragilities,
particularly for those located in the western region of the service area. Lastly, the fragilities were
compared against those developed for HAZUS, a nationally-applicable, standardized earthquake loss
modeling software program developed by the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Multiple earthquake events were modeled based on probability of occurrence. The probability to
provide flow was predicted based on the affect of peak ground acceleration on each system component,
which differed with geographical location to the epicenter and fragility of the component. Modeled
earthquake events included a 7.9ML earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, a 6.67ML earthquake on the
Southern Hayward Fault, and a 6.23ML earthquake on the Central Calaveras Fault. The results from the
largest modeled earthquake event, the 7.9ML earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, indicated that the
district’s water supply system could experience up to a 60 day outage from an estimated 18 pipe breaks,
20 pipe leaks, and damage to treatment plants and pump stations. Less severe earthquakes, flooding and
regional power outages were shown to have less of an impact on the district, with outage times ranging
from one to 45 days.
Restoration times for repairs were based on stockpiled material, staff levels, contract availability, and
time estimates for making repairs. If sufficient spare pipe and materials were available, however, the
outage time for the San Andreas event could easily be brought down to 30 days with minimal investment,
and outage time for the smaller hazard events down from a maximum of 45 days to 14 days. The project
team developed reliability improvement projects (capital and operational projects, grouped into
portfolios) to protect district staff, assets and the public from the results of these hazard events.
The decision making process for determining the best portfolio began with setting level of service
goals with district retail customer input, and included analysis of cost, benefit, social, environmental, and
other key objectives The portfolios were designed to be cumulative, with no stranded assets. Below is a
summary of some of the key objectives up to Portfolio 3. Additional Portfolios, beyond Portfolio 3, are
not shown.
Baseline Portfolio – Programmatic improvements and smaller system fixes that bring the District up to
the assumed baseline level of performance after a hazard event by improving emergency preparedness
and creating reliable material stockpiles (such as spare pipe) for response efforts.
Portfolio 1 –Programmatic improvements and smaller fixes that will ensure life safety and allow the
District to respond and communicate more efficiently after a hazard event.
Portfolio 2 – Increase the reliability of the District system, with at least one reliable source of
groundwater available from District-owned wells for an emergency period of up to two weeks.
Portfolio 3 – Increase the redundancy of the District system, with at least two reliable sources of water
available for each customer for an emergency period of up to two weeks.
Cost benefit analysis stemmed from estimates of economic disruption from water loss. The amount of
disruption varies according to the importance of water to a particular industry, as well as concurrent
impacts due to loss of function of other utilities (power, gas, etc.), transportation, and damage to the
particular facility from fire damage (exacerbated by loss of water supply). The IRP Report assumed that
55% of economic activity would cease in the event of lack of water. The 55% value is a blended average
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over types of economic activity. For example, lacking water, refineries must shut down whereas an office
building may continue to partially function. This reduction factor was consistent with prior studies by the
Bay Area Economic Forum, ATC-25, and assumptions made by other water utilities (e.g. East Bay
Municipal Utilities District).
Portfolio 2 (includes the Baseline and Portfolio 1 components) stood out as the superior option after
re-running the reliability model and performing cost/benefit analysis. This recommendation led to initial
funding for capital projects and forecasting for operational improvements. Portfolio 2 is estimated to cost
$150 million and reduces the outage period for the San Andreas event down from 45-60 days to 7-14 days
and for the Hayward and Calaveras events, down from 45 days to 1 day. The cornerstone of Portfolio 2 is
the addition of groundwater wells to both sides of the treated water system. The district is in the enviable
position of having a large groundwater basin that can be used in the short term with a high level of
reliability, until the transmission and treatment system can be restored. Portfolio 2 takes advantage of this
reliability asset.
With the analysis and planning stages complete, the Water Infrastructure Reliability Project has
entered the Development Phase. The Development Phase coordinates stakeholder interests in finding
opportunities to reduce costs, determine funding options, and prepare an implementation strategy to move
the recommended projects into planning and design.
IMPLEMENTING IMPROVEMENTS FOR SEISMIC RESPONSE
As indicated earlier, modeling results from the IRP Report indicted that the district could be faced
with up to 60 days of outage time resulting from a major earthquake on the San Andreas Fault. In
response, a CEO interpretation was created for Board Policy E-2.1.2, the water supply is reliable to meet
current demands, and was based on suggested baseline improvements that were presented in the IRP
Report. The CEO interpretation reads [3]:
By December 31, 2007, the District will be able to meet retailer agreed-upon preliminary level of
service goals of providing current average winter day demands to at least one treated water
turnout for each retailer, and promote public safety within 30 days for potable service and fewer
days for non-potable service following a major catastrophe at a cost of $2 million for spare pipe
Purchase requests for spare pipe and appurtenances were awarded in June 2007, with delivery of
materials scheduled for the end of the year. By stockpiling this pipe, the district will be in a much better
position to respond to pipe breaks following a major, unplanned, multiple outage, and regional
event. The reduction in estimated outage time from stockpiling this material is a valuable investment;
however, additional investments are recommended under Portfolio 2 to bring the outage time down
further, from 30 days to 7-14 days for the San Andreas event.
Below is a summary of the specific project recommendations for Portfolio 2 with 2005 cost estimates,
which includes operation and maintenance costs as well as an inflation factor though a ten year project
schedule. Check marks indicate which items are included in the district’s current funding forecast. It
should be noted that current cost estimates have increased by up to 100% due to inflation, schedule for
implementation, and increased construction costs.
260
Figure 3 - Implementation Progress for Recommended Improvements up to Portfolio 2 from the Water
Infrastructure Reliability Project Report
In addition to planning for the projects indicated in the funding forecast above, staff has engaged a
consultant to provide planning, engineering and outreach services for the IRP Development Phase. The
IRP Development Phase has been designed to develop a project implementation strategy for the
remaining unfunded project recommendations by working collaboratively with project stakeholders to
identify cost savings and financing opportunities with the greatest mutual benefit. The consultant will
prepare a final report summarizing the project implementation plan and perform general public outreach
in the form of an exploratory committee to disseminate project objectives and determine public opinion
regarding preferred financing. A 2007 Community Awareness Survey conducted by the district for Santa
Clara County showed that 84% are in favor (51% strongly and 33% somewhat) of infrastructure reliability
improvements to reduce outage times to 7 days, even if they would have to pay $4.30 more a month
(margin of error of +/- 3.5%).
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OTHER SEISMIC IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS
Dam Seismic Improvements
The district is a responsible dam owner, committed to ensuring public safety and operational
availability. One of the elements of a comprehensive Dam Safety Program is the completion of periodic
studies. The 2005 Dam Safety Program Report by Senior Engineer Richard L. Volpe and co-authors
included recommendations for a number of measures to deliver a state of the art Dam Safety Program; one
of these is the completion of an updated seismic stability evaluation for all 11 district dams. The district
has initiated a Phase 1 seismic stability evaluation (SSE) of the first 4 dams, including Almaden,
Anderson, Calero and Guadalupe Dams. It’s been over 20 years since seismic stability evaluations were
completed on three of these dams; a detailed dynamic stability analysis has never been completed for
Anderson Dam. Following the destructive 1994 Northridge earthquake, there is new information about
fault activity for similar buried thrust faults, new predictions for earthquake accelerations likely to occur,
and new and more realistic analytical tools available to perform seismic stability analyses. These dams
were selected for the first phase to address regulatory concerns. The results of the Phase 1 SSE are due in
2008, when we will know which if any of these 4 dams require a seismic retrofit. Capital improvement
projects will be initiated to address deficiencies if needed after we receive the results. Updated seismic
stability evaluations for the rest of the district dams are recommended as well but not yet budgeted and
scheduled. As a result of these seismic concerns, the district has proactively decided to impose reservoir
restrictions at three of the dams in order to significantly increase the freeboard to safely accommodate
more room for earthquake-induced settlement of the crest should a major earthquake occur before
appropriate seismic retrofits, if found to be needed, can be completed.
Treatment Plant Operations Improvements
In addition to the recommendations from the IRP Report, the district is working on several seismic
improvement projects for increasing the structural integrity of treatment plant processes to improve the
reliability of operations following a major seismic event. This includes upgrades to chemical tanks and
retaining walls as well as retrofitting existing clarifier and filter basins during other planned construction
for treatment processes improvements. All new construction or upgrades for these efforts are being
designed to meet a designed seismic event as follows [4]. Applicable loading combinations for equipment
and structures will be determined using the 2000 edition of the International Building Code or the current
local governing building code, whichever is more stringent.
• The recommended design level earthquake for the project is one with a 10 percent probability of being
exceeded in 50 years (i.e., a return period of 475 years).
• The peak horizontal ground acceleration (PHGA) for the design level earthquake is 0.67g.
• The peak vertical ground acceleration (PVGA) for the design level earthquake is 0.67g.
Specific upgrades that are planned for structures that were damaged at RWTP during the Loma Prieta
earthquake include [5]:
• Strengthening of the clarifier basins’ walls and base slab

• Replacement of the clarifier mechanisms with units designed and installed according to the
project’s seismic design criteria
262
• Strengthening of walls between filter basins and their adjacent galleries. Also, thickening of
the floor to resist the walls’ seismic load.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING
Office of Emergency Services
The district maintains a full-time Office of Emergency Services (OES) to coordinate emergency
response and recovery for the district. During any emergency, the district must continue its primary
mission of providing clean, safe water and flood protection to the people of Santa Clara County. The
district’s OES ensures that critical services are maintained and emergency response is centralized. To
accomplish this, it operates a comprehensive program that includes multi-hazard emergency response
planning, training and exercising, and the operation and maintenance of the district’s emergency
operations center (EOC).
The district’s EOC is a multi-stationed communications center that serves as the hub for district
emergency response and recovery coordination. The EOC houses modern equipment to support situation
analysis, decision-making, response prioritization, resource allocation, media relations and emergency
communications. Communications to other agencies and jurisdictions are supported by two-way radios,
satellite phones and wireless messaging systems. The district is currently working on a communication
interoperability project, which will allow seamless voice and data interoperability between emergency
responder agencies in Santa Clara County.
Currently the district is working on complying with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
presidential directives. DHS created the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as required under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 "Management of Domestic Incidents". NIMS
provides the framework for organizations to work together to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and
recover from the entire spectrum of all-hazards events. The NIMS system was developed using the
California (CA) Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) model, which created a
SEMS/NIMS integration program for agencies in CA, with several compliance dates for 2007. This
integration is an all-inclusive emergency operations program and includes emergency plans, training,
business continuity plan, public information system, interoperability communications and national
response plans.
The district’s Office of Emergency Services provides the leadership, expertise and support for
collaborative disaster response and recovery operations using the SEMS/NIMS model.
Post-Earthquake Dam Assessment Program
Another element of the district’s comprehensive emergency response planning resides under the Dam
Safety Program as the Post-Earthquake Dam Assessment Program (PEDAP). PEDAP is comprised of
trained staff volunteers who self-initiate dam assessments after a magnitude 5.0 or greater earthquake
within 20 miles of one of our dams. Rather than waiting to hear exactly what magnitude of earthquake has
occurred, volunteers are encouraged to self activate for their inspection if they have felt strong shaking for
at least 10 seconds or longer. Organizing, training and deploying a team for these kind of critical yet
somewhat rare events is a challenge. Our dam safety experts manage this team. These experts will
mobilize to the district’s EOC if the event is significant enough, or manage the information gathering from
their offices for smaller events. Due to the fact that these events do not happen that often, we have chosen
to staff this under an internal “volunteer fire department” model. The team is overstaffed by about a factor
of 3, to account for the unpredictability of who might actually be available when an event happens at a
263
time that is inconvenient – say, on a holiday weekend when it’s raining. The volunteers are provided with
both a binder with information on all the dams and what to look for, and a kit of resources is located at
each dam for their use. They are nominally trained to inspect a specific dam, but are expected to be able to
inspect any of our 11 dams if needed. Communications and “command and control” remains a concern –
communications and travel in large earthquakes is problematic, and we are still working on how to best
communicate with them in the context of ensuring the dams are all covered, finding out what they know,
confirming their status and location, etc. For a modest cost, the district has installed repeater boosters at
all dams with poor radio signals that has significantly improved critical communication requirements
during emergencies.
Emergency Pipeline Repair/Response Training
Another component of the district’s emergency response planning is the training and development of
pipeline repair and response teams. Bi-annual workshops are planned and teams identified, including
staff from maintenance, engineering, and project management. Their roles and responsibilities include
post-event inspections and management of contract labor for repairs. The district is creating
comprehensive guidelines that detail stockpiled pipe inventories and engineering specifications for
making repairs under various repair situations and pipeline materials. At the workshops staff will be
updated on administrative policy for contracting under emergency declarations and engaged in mock
demonstrations. A GIS system has been created which ties into ground level photographs of vault
locations and equipment numbers. The equipment numbers assist work order processing in Maximo and
obtaining equipment specifications via the district’s Asset Management Database. Lastly, the emergency
pipeline repair and response teams report into the EOC SIMS/NIMS model for situation control.
CONCLUSIONS
The district is fully committed to implementing recommended improvements for seismic response
under the Infrastructure Reliability Program. This program follows the recommendations from the IRP
Report, which was based on expert technical analyses as well as coordination with stakeholders.
Implementation of the IRP Report recommendations will be one of the district’s most significant
programs over the next decade and will require significant scheduling and coordination.
The cost of Portfolio 2 (including operation and maintenance costs and inflation) is estimated to be
$150 million, which is in the middle range of what other west coast utilities have recently spent on seismic
and reliability improvements. Portfolio 2 is the project team recommended portfolio because:
1. It provides the greatest benefit cost ratio of all the portfolios.

2. It provides a level of service close to the level of service goals originally established for the
project.
3. It reduces the outage period for “other events” significantly to one day or less.
4. It provides a reasonable balance of cost versus improved system reliability.
5. It provides significant opportunities for re-operation of the groundwater, raw water and
treated water systems.
6. It provides significant operational flexibility to perform required maintenance while
minimizing scheduled outages.
7. It results in less construction-related environmental impact than higher portfolios.
264
Stockpiling pipes and life safety projects under Portfolio 2 were considered the highest priority, along
with emergency planning. Construction of district-owned wells on the west and east side of the district’s
treated water system, while an integral reliability component, requires significant coordination with
district operations staff, stakeholders, and executive management. Therefore, the well field capital
investments are considered long-term and are being moved forward under the Development Phase of the
Infrastructure Reliability Program.
Additional seismic work and emergency response planning that is being done at the district outside
Portfolio 2 project components include the Dam Safety Program, EOC coordination under the Office of
Emergency Services, development of pipeline repair and response teams, and capital projects for seismic
upgrade of treatment plant processes.
265
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Santa Clara Valley Water District Board of Directors
Rosemary Kamei, District 1; Joe Judge, District 2; Richard P. Santos, District 3; Larry Wilson,
District 4; Patrick S. Kwok, District 5; Tony Estremera, At Large; and Sig Sanchez, At Large.
Preparation of the IRP Report would not have been possible without the considerable contribution of
many key individuals and agencies, including the following:
Santa Clara Valley Water District
David Hook, Crystal Yezman, Sandy Oblonsky, Heinz Haase, Ray Yep, Water Infrastructure
Reliability Technical Team, and Operations and Maintenance Staff.
District Retailer Stakeholders
California Water Service Company, City of Cupertino, City of Gilroy, City of Milpitas, City of
Morgan Hill, City of Mountain View, City of San Jose, City of Santa Clara, City of Sunnyvale, Great
Oaks Water Company, and San Jose Water Company.
Other Stakeholders
Alameda County Water District, Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency, California
Department of Water Resources, City of Palo Alto, Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, San
Benito County Water District, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, United State Bureau of
Reclamation, and Zone 7 Water Agency.
Professional Consultants
RMC Water and Environment, ABSG Consulting, Geomatrix Consultants, Inc., and GE
Engineering Systems, Inc.
REFERENCES
[1] Santa Clara Valley Water District. 2005. Water Infrastructure Reliability Project Report. Santa Clara Valley Water
District, San Jose, CA.
[2] Traubenik, M.L and T. Crampton, Geomatrix Consultants, 2004 “Geologic and Geotechnical Hazard Assessment for
the Santa Clara Valley Water District Reliability Report”, Vol 2. Water Infrastructure Reliability Project Report,
Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA
[3} Santa Clara Valley Water District. 2007 “V. CEO Interpretations, ” Governance Policies of the Board of Directors,
Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, pp. V-3.
[4] Camp, Dresser & McKee Inc, 2000 “Final Technical Memorandum 3.11 Structural and Seismic Design Criteria”,
Water Infrastructure Improvement Project, Phase 11, Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA.
[5] EQE International, 1995 “Seismic Evaluation of Existing Structures Technical Memorandum”, prepared under Task
9.4 of the Water Quality Regulation Compliance Project (WQRCP). Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose,
CA.
266
SESSION 5
Earthquake Studies and Evaluations
Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka, University of California, Irvine, US – “A Sensor Network for
Real-Time Damage Location and Assessment”
Mr. Munetaka Abe, Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, JAPAN – “Damages to Water
Supply Facilities by the Noto Peninsula Earthquake in 2007 and Restoration
Works and Issues”
Mr. Jianping Hu, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles, CA, US –
“Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System Using
GIRAFFE”
Dr. Gee-Yu Liu, National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering, TAIWAN –
“Seismic Repair Rate Analysis and Risk Assessment of Water Pipelines”
Mr. Kuniaki Nakamura, Fukuoka City Waterworks Bureau, Fukuoka, JAPAN – “Emergency
Measures - A Study of the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake”
267
268
A Sensor Network for Real-Time Damage Location and
Assessment
Masanobu Shinozuka, Chulsung Park, Pai H. Chou and Yoshio Fukuda
ABSTRACT
This paper is a slightly modified version of a paper under the same title and by the same authors,
which was presented at the Third International Workshop on Advanced Smart Materials and Smart
Structures Technology, May, 29 and 30, 2006, Lake Tahoe, USA. This modified version is presented
here for the purpose of information and discussion.
This study demonstrates a sensor-based real-time monitoring and condition assessment system
for urban lifeline infrastructure. Rapid detection of damage caused by natural and manmade hazards
enables an efficient and effective emergency response minimizing human and property losses as well
as societal disruption. In this paper, focusing on water supply networks, we will demonstrate a
monitoring system consisting of a wireless network of power-efficient sensors for a rapid
identification of the extent and location of pipe damage immediately after a disastrous event. The
highlight of this paper lies in taking advantage of sharply transient change in hydraulic parameters
such as the water head due to the damage, and in verifying the simulation result by experiments. The
result suggests that a simple inverse analysis can locate the damage in a pipe segment between two
neighboring sensors among the pervasively installed along a pipe at which the absolute values of
water head are observed to be local maxima. Separate experiment and analysis show that the sharp
transient change in water head in the pipe flow induces a correspondingly sharp change in the
acceleration of pipe vibration. This fact is used for damage identification in this study.
Masanobu Shinozuka, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612
Chulsung Park, Graduate Student, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California,
Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612
Pai H. Chou, Assistant Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California,
Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612
Yoshio Fukuda, Researcher, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Irvine, Irvine,
CA 92612
1 269
INTRODUCTION
Urban water delivery network systems, particularly the underground components such as pipeline
networks, can be damaged due to earthquake, pipe corrosion, severely cold weather, heavy traffic
load on the ground surface, and many other man-made or natural hazards. In all these situations, the
damage can be disastrous: water leakage at high pressure may threaten the safety of near-by buildings
due to scouring of their foundations; flooding could create major traffic congestion if pipe ruptures
under a busy street; and above all, after a severe earthquake, pipe damage may result in reduction in
the water head, degrading post-earthquake firefighting capability of the community, while at the
same time force the human consumption of water to drop below unacceptably low level. Yet, the
current technology is not capable of accurately identifying the location and extent of the damage
easily or quickly, especially immediately after a major earthquake. As a result, even if full resources
are available for damage repair, failure to locate damage can still lead to loss of post-earthquake
firefighting capability, widespread human suffering and outbreak of diseases after a major
earthquake.
This paper summarizes most recent papers by the authors ([1], [2] and [3]) and demonstrates
potential use of a sensor network for identification of location and extent of damage in real-time.
DAMAGE DETECTION AND LOCALIZATION OF PIPE NETWORK
Hydraulic Transients
A hydraulic transient represents a temporary, often violent, change in flow, pressure, and other
hydraulic conditions in a water delivery system from an original (first) steady state to a final (second)
steady state the system achieves after the effect of the disturbance that caused such a transient is
absorbed into the second state. The disturbance includes such events as a valve closure or opening, a
pump stopping or restarting depending on power supply, and pipe damage or break leading to water
leakage. The transient can produce a significant change in water head and pipe pressure. In fact, as
described in more detail in what follows, it is envisioned that the sudden change of such pressure will
generate a measurable pressure wave and can be used for detection and localization of pipe damage.
If the magnitude of this transient pressure is beyond the resistant capacity of system components, it
can induce disastrous effects on the water system. Therefore, it is important to simulate the transient
behavior of the water system under various adverse scenarios in order to understand the magnitude of
these effects. In this study, the industry-grade computer code HAMMER (Haesead 2003) is
employed to generate time histories of key hydraulic parameters (primarily water head and flow rate).
The analysis is carried out for a hydraulic system as shown in Figure 1 which appears in HAMMER
User’s Guide. This water system consists of two reservoirs, one pump, one valve, thirty-eight nodes
and fifty four pipe links. In the following, we consider a case in which a pipebreak occurs at the mid
point of link 111. In this case, a new node can be added in this link (double circle in Figure 1), and the
numerical analysis continues. For another case in which pump station stops, waterhead transient
behavior is quite dramatically time variant as shown in Figure 2. Appropriate physical parameters of
nodes and pipes are used for the analysis [1].
2 270
Figure 1. Distribution of water head gradient due to pipe P111 break
(a) J9 (b) J11
(c)J13 (d) J20

Figure 2. Nodal water head time histories under event scenario 2 (pump stops)
Damage Detection
A method of damage detection and localization, including the identification of malfunctioned

equipment, is described here that is based on the comparison of the hydraulic parameters (the water
head in this case) before and after the event. For the primary purpose of a rapid detection and
3 271
localization, it is most effective to catch the sign of change at the outset of the event. Fortunately for a
sudden change such as a pipe break and pump stoppage, the response of the network is rapid
particularly in the neighborhood of the source. This suggests that some measurable signature that
indicates the rapidity of this change can be used for this purpose. One convenient quantity that serves
this purpose is the water head gradient as defined below.
H 2 − H1
D= (1)
t 2 − t1
Here H2 and H1 are the water head of a node at the time t2, t1 respectively and t2-t1=0.2 second in this
study.
During the steady state normal operation, D is usually negligibly small. In this paper, the water
head gradient measured at the observation nodes are integrated into the GIS platform for real-time
visualization and for other advantages. Figure 1 shows the water head gradient distribution in a
contour plot in extended network space for the convenience of visualization. The contour plot
indicates that the damage location can be identified to be in Pipe 111 between nodes J9 and J11 where
water head gradients are locally maximum.
PROPOSED DAMAGE INDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY
Non-Invasive Detection
In this section, a damage identification method based on wireless MEMS-sensor network is

proposed which is different from the Water Head Gradient-Based approach mentioned above in that
the proposed method measures the acceleration change at pipe surface and therefore it is not invasive.
To accurately locate the damage at a reasonable cost over a vast lifeline network, we must, however,
support adjustable monitoring granularity through trade-offs among deployment density, sensor
accuracy, wireless communication range, and costs.
Real-Time Monitoring
Increasing demand for rapid damage detection and assessment necessitates real-time monitoring
capabilities. Real-time monitoring poses many challenges to designing sensor nodes, including fast
communication links, fair and efficient media access protocols (MAC), and low-latency routing
protocols. In our monitoring system, we use two different wireless interfaces. For short range
communication, the Eco node uses a 2.4GHz custom radio with a data rate of 1Mbps. For longer
range communication, DuraNode uses the 802.11b WiFi interface, whose maximum data rate is
11Mbps. Also, Eco and DuraNode use Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and 802.11b MAC,
respectively, as their MAC protocol. Comparing with other wireless sensor platforms such as
MICA2, Telos, and Stargate, Eco and DuraNode have higher or equivalent radio performance of in
terms of maximum bit rate and radio range when used with the proper antenna.
WIRELESS SENSOR NODES DESIGN
4 272
Both Eco and DuraNode can support the proposed real-time monitoring damage localization
methodology. Although both of them can collect tri-axial acceleration data and transmit wirelessly,
they are totally different platforms with complementary features, as shown in TABLE I. Eco is
ultra-compact, low power, low cost, and is suitable for dense deployment with a short wireless range.
In contrast, DuraNode is equipped with three high-end, high-accuracy accelerometers and a long
range wireless interface (802.11b), in addition to the same type of radio as Eco. At the same time,
DuraNode consumes over ten times the power as Eco. We take advantage of their characteristics and
deploy a mix of these two types of sensor nodes by adapting the choice to the specific requirements
on the spatial granularity of the water delivery network. Two sensor nodes can communicate each
other via the available 2.4GHz wireless radio or RS232 serial interface. This combination is expected
to make the proposed real-time monitoring methodology accurate and cost effective. For the detail,
see Shinozuka et al., 2006.
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF ECO AND DURANODE

Eco DuraNode
Size (mm) 13 x 11 x 8 140 x 80 x 20
Sensor One H34C Three SD1221, Gyroscope
Power Consumption Max. 100 Max. 1000
Max. Air Data Rate (bps) 1M 11M
Battery 30mAh Li-Polymer 4000mAh Li-Ion
Wired Interface Serial, SPI Fast Ethernet, Optical
Wireless Interface 2.4GHz Custom Radio WiFi / 2.4GHz Radio
Radio Range (m) 10 ~ 20 200 ~ 300
Cost ($) @ 1000 50 400
DuraNode
(a) Top View (b) Side View

Figure 3. Photos of DuraNode
Figure 3 shows the picture of the DuraNode hardware. It consists of two boards: main board and
daughter board. The main board has everything a wireless sensor node may need, including
microcontrollers, sensors, and a wireless communication interface. On the other hand, the daughter
board, as shown in Figure 3(b), has only a microcontroller but two wired communication interfaces,
namely Fast (10/100 Mbps) Ethernet and Optical. Another daughter card can provide the wireless
link to a short-range network of Eco nodes. In addition, DuraNode can also use both wired and
wireless interfaces in dual mode.
5 273
Eco
The Eco sensor node shown in Figure 4 consists of four subsystems:MCU/Radio, Sensors,
Power, and expansion port.
(a) On the finger (b) Side View (c) Top View

Figure 4. Photos of Eco Sensor Node
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
To show the effectiveness of our MEMS sensor-based real-time monitoring system, we set up a
small water delivery network using 1-inch diameter PVC pipes. We installed four DuraNodes onto
the network and collected vibration data in real-time. This section describes the details of our
experimental setup and presents the 3-axial vibration data collected under two different levels of
water pressure.
Experimental Setup
The water delivery network consists of seven pieces of 62-inch PCV pipes (with a 1-inch
diameter), one PCV pipe cap, and one valve. As shown in Figure 5 (b), we construct a
rectangular-like pipe network, whose lengths on the two sides are 124 inches and 62 inches. Also, one
valve is installed in the middle of the network (marked as VALVE in Figure 5b) and one Cap (marked
as CAP in the same figure) on the top-left corner of the network. The VALVE and CAP function as
possible damage locations in the pipe network. We can increase the water pressure inside the pipe
network by injecting water at WATER INPUT in the experiment. At low water pressure, the VALVE
remains closed as it initially is. This status represents ``No Damage in the Network.'' However, when
the pressure increases so that it is high enough to force the VALVE open, the pipe between nodes A
and B is network can be considered ``Damaged.'' In this experiment, CAP is kept closed throughout.
Four DuraNodes are installed onto the pipe network, as shown in Figure 5b. They keep
transmitting 3-axial vibration data to a host computer via an access point in real-time. The sampling
rate is set to 1KHz.
The CAP is used to vary the overall water pressure inside the pipe network. By manually setting
to three different states, (CLOSE, HALF-OPEN, OPEN), we can adjust the maximum water pressure
inside the pipe network (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW).
6 274
CAP
Node A
Node D
DuraNode 31”
DuraNode 62”
62”
Valve
DuraNode
x
62” 62”
DuraNode
Water Pipe 9.5”
Node C Node B
Network
Water Input
Diameter of the pipe: 1”
(a) Photo of Water Pipe Network. (b) Dimension of Water Pipe Network and locations where 4
DuraNodes are installed.
Figure 5. Experimental Setup
Results
The results are 3-axial vibration data from four DuraNodes. Recording of the data begins when
we start injecting water to the pipe network, and stop after a few tens of second when the VALVE is
forced to open. Also, we repeat the same experiment at various levels of water pressure (HIGH,
MEDIUM, LOW). In this section, we present only the X-axis vibration data in the high pressure
condition (Figure 5). Each graph in Figure 6 shows the vibration data from each of the four
DuraNodes labeled A, B, C, and D. The sudden change of vibration in each graph is developed when
the VALVE is forced open by increasing water pressure.
Upon closer examination of Figure 6, we find that the amplitude of each peak is different: Nodes
A, B, C, and D have amplitudes of 0.5g, 0.28g, 0.35g, and 0.75g, respectively. These differences can
be used to locate the damage in the pipe network.
This result shows that the sharp change in acceleration is recorded in real-time by all the four
DuraNode and transmitted to host computer at the same time. It is important to note that the
accelerations recorded before and after the opening of the valve is not only constant but also identical
in this case. This verifies that change in the water pressure due to damage can be identified by the
change in acceleration on the pipe surface not invasively. Having mentioned this, however, we are yet
to find the way in which the observed values of amplitude of change in acceleration can identify the
damage location.
0.28g
(b)
7 275
0.75g
Figure 6. Acceleration Data of 4 DuraNode under High Pressure
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Obviously, some more experiments must be carried out under more well equipped laboratory
conditions for quantified detection of damage location. In addition, future work includes field
experiments on a water network that is more realistic in scale than the one tested in the preliminary
experiments described here. We plan to install Ecos and DuraNodes on a subset of a regimal water
supply network such as City of Westminster and Irvine Water Ranch District systems. This will be
done in conjunction with their existing SCADA measurement locations as available.
The main technical challenge will be to install these sensor nodes on the pipe surface. Observing
that there are a large number of hydrants in these systems, it appears best to install them on the pipe at
the hydrant locations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was done under National Science Foundation Grant # CMS 0509018 and Grant #
CMS 0112665. Their supports are immensely appreciated.
REFERENCES
[1] Shinozuka, M. and Dong, X. 2005a. “Evaluation of Hydraulic Transients and Damage Detection in Water System
under a Disaster Event”, The 3rd US-Japan Workshop on Water System Seismic Practices, Kobe, January.
[2] Shnozuka, M. and Dong, X. 2005b. “Damage Detection and Localization for Water Delivery Systems” Proceeding of
the 5th International Workshop on Structural Health Monitoring, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, September, pp.
1267-1273.
[3] Shinozuka, M., Park, C., Chou, P. and Fukuda, Y. 2006. “Real-Time damage localization by means of MEMS sensors
and use of wireless data transmission,” in Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Smart Structures & Materials/NDE,
San Diego, CA, February.
[4] Park, C. and Chou, P.H. 2006. “Eco: Ultra-Wearable and Expandable Wireless Sensor Platform,” Proc. Third
International Workshop on Body Sensor Networks, April.
[5] Park, C. Chou, P.H. and Shinozuka, M. 2005. “DuraNode: Wireless Networked Sensor for Structural Health
Monitoring,” to appear in Proceedings of The 4th IEEE International Conference on Sens, Irvine, CA, October.
8 276
DAMAGES TO WATER SUPPLY FACILITIES BY
THE NOTO PENINSULA EARTHQUAKE IN 2007

AND RESTORATION WORKS AND ISSUES
Munetaka ABE
ABSTRACT
In Japan, there were many big earthquakes over a past decade. The nearest disaster
was the Noto peninsula earthquake occurred in April 25 th, 2007. The seismic scale was
the Mg.6.9 and it damaged the infrastructure and houses of 3 cities and 4 towns. One
person died and about 550 people were injured.
The Noto peninsula, in the Ishikawa prefecture, is facing to the Japan Sea at the
middle of Japanese archipelago. This area has many sightseeing places. But on the other
hand, this areas has been rapidly losing population like other rural areas of Japan.
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare organized the survey team composed of
various experts including JWWA staffs to investigate the damages and how to make
recovery using many other aids.
This paper takes up countermeasures against the seismic disaster occurred in the
non-urban area referring to this Noto Peninsula earthquake.
Fig .1 A map of Noto peninsula in Japan
Wajima City
Anamizu Town
Shika Town
Nanao City
Munetaka Abe, Assistant Chief of Engineering Division, Japan Water Works

Association 4-8-9, Kudan Minami, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 102-0074
277
1. AN ABSTRACT OF SEISMIC INTENSITY
1.1 General condition of earthquake
At 9:32 a m. on March 25th 2007, A big earthquake occurred in 11km deep in the
offshore of Noto peninsula. This earthquake was over Mg.6 in Nanao, Wajima city and
Anamizu town, and observed a little under Mg.6 in Shiga, Nakanoto and Noto town.
Fig. 2 shows them.
This earthquake was named “Heisei 19 year (2007) Noto peninsula earthquake.”
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of after shocks occurred in a period of March 25th to April
3rd. After shocks were distributed in the rectangular zone which was shaped with about
40 km length and 15km width and it was inclined by about 60 degree from the
horizontal surface.
Fig. 4 shows the seismic activities of this time and the past. This earthquake was not so
active like the Niigata Earthquake occurred in 2004 and was changing with the level of
a little under the Fukui Earthquake occurred in 1948.
Table 1 shows seismic intensity and maximum acceleration which were observed at the
places where the intensity level was bigger than 5. These observation values are based
on The Meteorological Agency Monthly Report.
The maximum acceleration was composed value of three components for the different
direction.
In the places where the seismic intensity over 6 was observed, both of seismic
intensity and maximum acceleration tends to be large. At observation point in Wajima
(JMA Wajima), the maximum acceleration was relatively small in spite of the seismic
intensity observed. At Wajima points, this suggested that a tremor of longer cycle was
stronger than that of short cycle which was distinguished in a acceleration.
A professor of Kanazawa University, Dr. Miyajima said about the seismic character
of Noto Earthquake as follows.
They take notice of the earthquakes in the boundaries of crustal plates in the Pacific
Ocean and active faults of inland in Japan. But I could assume this earthquake occurred
at active faults in the ocean floor. So in this meaning, we were taken aback by this
happening.
We could know that there were some causes that a seismic intensity and frequency
characteristics at the observation points, which are only 500m or 1km away each other,
were remarkably different. So it became clear that the local ground condition had a large
influence on the earth tremor.
278
Fig. 2 A center of earthquake and distribution of Seismic intensity
WAJIMA
MONZEN
ANAMIZU
CENTER OF
EARTHQUAKE Seismic intensity
NANAO ● 6 over
▲ 6 under
▼ 5 over
■ 5 under
Fig. 3 The distribution of after shocks
25 March 2007 - 3 April 2007
Fig. 4 The comparison of number of after shocks

9:00A.M. 4 April 2007, Present
Mikawa EQ (M6.8) 1945
Niigata Pref. EQ (M6.8) 2004

Count Number
South Hyogo Pref. EQ (M7.3) 1995

Fukui EQ (M7.1) 1948
Noto Peninsula EQ (M6.9) 2007
East Tottori Pref. EQ (M7.3) 2000

Fukuoka Pref. East Offing EQ (M7.0) 2005
Noto Peninsula EQ (M6.6) 1993
(days)
279
Table 1 Seismic intensity and max acceleration measured at several point
(*measured by Prefecture)
Seismic Seismic intensity Max acceleration

Observation point
intensity measured (cm/s/s)
Wajima city, Monzen town 6.4 1304
K-NETAnamizu (ISK005) 6.3 901
6 over
Nnao city, Tazuruhama town* 6.2 746
JMA Wajima 6.1 474
K-NET Fugi (ISK006) 5.9 945
Nakanoto town, Notobushita* 5.7 352
JMA Shiga 5.6 544
JMA Noto 5.6 278
K-NET Wajima (ISK003) 5.5 548
6 under
Shiga town, sueyoshisenko* 5.5 274
Nakanoto town, suezaka* 5.5 331
Noto town, matunami* 5.5 555
K-NET Nouto (ISK004) 5.5 666
KiK-net Yanagida (ISKH02) 5.5 380
JMA Nanao oartly 5.3 258
K-NET Nanao (ISK007) 5.2 221
5 over
K-NET Shoin (ISK002) 5.1 183
KiK-net Tamasu (ISKH01) 5.1 360
1.2 The general condition of damages
Table 2 shows the human sufferings according to the Ishikawa prefecture

government in June, one person died and 341 peoples were slightly or seriously insured.
The missing was none.
The woman who was 52 years old was buried under garden lantern and died. And a few
people were injured in neighboring prefectures, Toyama, Niigata.
Table 3 shows the number of houses destroyed in Ishikawa prefecture. 638 houses were
completely destroyed, 1,563 houses were half destroyed, 13,553 houses were partly
destroyed and 4,196 non-residential houses were damaged.
280
Table 2 Human sufferings in Ishikawa
Human suffering (person)

Ishikawa
Serious and
prefecture Dead Serious Slight
slight
Nanao city 127 17 110
Wajima city 1 110 41 69
Shiga town 45 4 41
Anamizu town 39 2 37
Noto town 12 2 10
Other 8 3 5
Total 1 341 69 272
Table 3 Houses destroyed in Ishikawa prefecture
Ishikawa
Houses destroyed Non-residence
prefecture
Completely Half Part
Nanao city 50 230 2141 311
Wajima city 496 1,008 7,622 2,770
Shiga town 10 200 2,181 768
Anamizu town 72 91 981 221
Noto town 1 10 190 18
Other 9 24 438 92
Total 638 1,563 13,115 4,104
The road along the coastline and mountain were blocked by landslides or falling
rocks. Right after the earthquake, impassable places came to 24 points in 18 lines.
But as of April 27 th, impassable ones were 4 points in 4 lines. And Noto toll road was
blocked right after the earthquakes. But it was completely resumed until April 27 th.
As concerns the life line system, there were a lot of damages in their facilities. In
waterworks, the water supply was cut off right after the earthquake in 3 cities and 5
towns, the total suspension were 13,290 houses.In Wajima city and Anamizu town,
because of the lack of alternative supply water, the supply water to general hospital was
cut off and some patients received the dialysis were forced to move to another hospital.
But the suspension finished about 10 days after.
As concerns the sewerage, the manholes stuck out from the roads and some pipes
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snaked away. But the big accident did not occur because they used temporary pumps to
secure the sewage flow.
As concerns the gas supply service, since people used gas cylinders, the damages
were nothing. In the gas supplying areas including Kanazawa city, the micro-computer
meter (the device to intercept the gas at a gas meter) worked well at the time earthquake
occurred.
Many calls inquiring the restoration rushed to the company, so they were very confused.
The standstills were completely restored until that evening.
The damages of telephone lines were nothing. But since many people made a call at
the same time right after the earthquake, the telephone lines were suspended for a while.
2. THE MAIN DAMAGES OF WATER PIPE AND FACILITIES
There are a lot of characteristic differences in the facilities of water supply system
comparing to other infrastructure.
For example, the quality of water changes while being treated and transported. And with
the formation, the almost of all facilities are chained with each other and they also make
multiple systems.
Therefore, in case we will make the seismic measures, it is very important to know the
special qualities of facilities in advance.
In case of Noto’s, to investigate the damages of facilities and to make the
anti-seismic measures in the future, we must correctly analyze the basic data on
damages of each facility. And then we must to investigate the reference to damages.
2.1 Anti-seismic measures against the pipe damages
This time, concerning to the characteristic damages of water pipes, most of them
had occurred near rivers, edges of seaside, bank and so on. On the other hand, with the
difference of the pipe material, there were a lot of damages of vinyl pipes in the first
place, and the second was asbestos pipes, the third was on steel pipes (with screw
joints).
And in ductile pipes, it was reported that some types of joints got detached in the bad
soil conditions. The other hand, damage was nothing in the ductile pipe using the
anti-seismic joints. According to these results, it is important to take the ground
condition into account in order to select the type of joint and material of pipe.
282
Fig.5 shows topographical divisions and points where main pipes were injured.
There were some damages at the bridges of water supply including ones hanged on
the bridges which are not exactly constructed based on the technical guidance published
by Japan Water Works Association or WSP (Water Steel Pipe Association). We must
estimate the anti-seismic measures including the consequence of daily maintenance
work.
In the damages of aqueduct, the pipe of 250mm diameter made of reinforced
concrete were injured at several places in the mountainous area of Anamizu town. There
was a suspension of water supply because of the damages.
By the damages of main pipe line and an aqueduct, they could not also supply
enough water to the general hospital in Wajima city and Anamizu town. It showed a
significance of the anti-seismic measures on water main pipe line. It should be notable
that they had not used the national subsidy to strengthen pipelines until now.
Table 4 Numbers of damages on pipe material and statesof damages

in Nanao city where pipes were mostly injured
Material of un-
DIP CIP ASP SP PE VP Other known
total
pipe
Slip-out joint 1 5 1 15 1 23
Leak of joint 6 2 5 11 2 26
Breakage of
10 6 16
Figure of pipe
damages
Attachment 5 1 6
Other 2 2
Total 12 2 20 12 0 26 0 1 73
Pipe length (km) 280.8 11.5 89.8 6.8 3.9 172.4 0.3 565.4
Ratio of damages
0.04 0.17 0.22 1.78 0 0.15 0 0.13
(number/km)
DIP: Ductile iron pipe CIP: Cast iron pipe ACP: Asbestos cast pipe SP：Steel pipe
PE: Polyethylene pipe VP: Vinyl pipe Other: Stainless steel
283
Fig. 5 Topographical divisions and points where main pipes and joints were damaged
in Nanao city
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2.2 Anti-seismic measures against the damages of facilities
It was a feature in this earthquake that two stainless panel tanks had been used as
service reservoirs were injured. This type of water tank has some advantages, for
example, anti-seismic, watertight, cost performance, maintenance free and so on.
For those reason, they have many tanks like this in water supply services in Japan. (A
company built 600 basins and B company built 2,000 basins). In the past case, we had
some great earthquakes such as Hyogo prefecture earthquake (1995), Niigata prefecture
284
earthquake (2004). But there had been no damage to the tanks like above at the time.
In this time, one of 30 tanks that a company had constructed was injured.
I consider those are as follows.
(1) Loading over the design value of earthquake movement
(2) Lack of cross section size and strength of the material
(3) Bad construction
There were many clacks and sinking around the facilities where damages occurred and
we could see uneven sinking of the foundation, we think the facilities were damaged by
many multiple factors due to the earthquake.
3. THE SUGGESTION REGARDING TO BASIC IDEAS OF THE ANTI-

SEISMIC MEASURES IN THE FUTURE
3.1 Basic ideas of the anti-seismic measures for small waterworks

The almost water works in the Noto peninsula area are small-scale. In case of
emergency, they could not exchange water with each other and the facilities would
easily go off line. As the result, the suspension of the water supply would extend widely
and rapidly, so we have to make the emergency water supply plan by combining the
concentrated water supply system and the dispersed one according to the scale of water
source, the topography and so on. The definition of these two types of water supply
system is as follows.
The concentrated water supply system means it supplies water to every town or
village through long raw water main and distribution pipes from remote water sources.
The dispersed one means it supplies water to towns or villages from their own water
sources.
As one example of dispersed supply systems, we could show the small membrane filter
equipments that were easy to convey and were leased by a membrane maker.
3.1.1 Anti-seismic measures in case of one water supply system
If there is just only one supply system, we would absolutely encounter the overall
suspension of the water supply and it will take a long time to be restored.
Therefore, the basic facilities have to be more earthquake-proof than any other facilities
based on the seismic-capacity evaluation. And it is necessary to take measures as below
on the assumption of the damages.
285
(1) A dual system of aqueduct and water main for risk dispersion.
(2) A wide area backup system like building connecting pipes that can send or get
water to from neighboring towns and cities.
(3) A survey on spare and alternative water source and listing of those.
(4) Having a simple purification plant to avoid the risk of suspension.
And in case we renew the facilities based on the measures like above, we have to build a
water system combining the concentrated and dispersed type.
3.2 The issues and problems of anti-seismic measures for small waterworks in
Japan
3.2.1 Administer the water works in a wide area
Small and medium-scale waterworks in Japan are converting their business to that in
wide area thorough integrating other smaller-scale waterworks under the assistance of
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. They think they could get the benefit from
the business by that. But in this case, since the history of the business in a wide area was
not so long. They could not keep the enough staffs to maintain the facilities that were
widely scattered in that area.
3.2.2 Entrusting the business to private sector
In Japan, we have a basic principle that that municipalities like cities and towns
should run the water supply business by themselves according to the Waterworks Law.
Therefore, based on the self-supporting account system, public enterprises have done
the main business and private companies have just played supplementary works until
now.
By the amendment of the Waterworks Law which was approved in July 15th 2003,
the private sector could have been able to participate in the administrative work in the
facilities of water supply services. But the private sector generally does not have enough
experiences on the aspect of water supply service.
In Noto’s case also, it was pointed out that they could not work in adequate
cooperation with the employers to cope with the emergency at that time. In the future,
we have to make sure that the mutual responsibility, a chain of command and so on in
emergency are clearly described on a contract.
In addition we should carry out the joint exercises to raise the awareness of
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crisis-management for emergency situations. The main aim in this exercise is to
materialize the role of both sides with effective measures in an emergency.
References
[1] http://www.seisvol.kishou.go.jp/eq/shindo_db/shindo_index.html
(The meteorological agency)
[2] http://www.eri.u.tokyo.ac.jp/jhome.html
(Tokyo university seismic institution)
[3] http:/www.jishin.go.jp/main/chousa/07apr_noto/p03.htm
(The committee for seismic research)
[4] http://www.seisvol.kishou.go.jp/eq/gaikyo/monthly200703/200703index.html
(The meteorological agency)
287
288
Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water
System Using GIRAFFE
Craig A. Davis, Jianping Hu, Thomas D. O’Rourke
and Amanda L. Bonneau
ABSTRACT
This paper describes a decision support system currently under development at Cornell
University to plan operations, emergency response, and new system facilities and
configurations for optimizing water supply performance during and after earthquakes and
how it is being implemented for use by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(LADWP). The system is generic, and the architecture of its computer programs is
adaptable to any water supply network. The system works in conjunction with an easily
accessible hydraulic network model, EPANET, and a special program for damaged
network flow modeling, known as Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow
Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE). The decision support system was developed using
the LADWP water supply and distribution system as a test bed. Simulation results are
presented for a 1994 Northridge earthquake repeat scenario. The seismic performance,
measured as the ratio of post- to pre-earthquake water supplied at demand nodes, is
provided for the entire water network and different water service zones both immediately
after and 24 hours after the earthquake. Losses associated with disruption of the Los
Angeles Aqueducts, loss of electric power, and/or earthquake-induced pipeline damage
are modeled and compare well with actual earthquake performance. The decision
support system and GIRAFFE are in their final stages of development, and the results
presented herein are representative of modeling capabilities and system performance but
are not definitive results of the final modeling process. The 1994 Northridge earthquake
repeat scenario represents the initial implementation steps for calibrating results against
the actual Northridge earthquake and obtaining practical results useful for making
seismic related decisions on how to proceed with significant on-going system-wide
modifications necessary for water quality improvements. The LADWP plans to continue
support for developing GIRAFFE and implementing the decision support system to aid in
long-term seismic vulnerability assessments and planning capital improvement project
developments.
Craig A. Davis, Waterworks Engineer, Geotechnical Engineering Group, Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, 111 N. Hope Street, Room 1368, Los Angles, CA, 90051.
Jianping Hu, Civil Engineering Associate, Geotechnical Engineering Group, Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, 111 N. Hope Street, Room 1368, Los Angles, CA, 90051.
Thomas D. O’Rourke, Briggs Professor, Cornell University, 273 Hollister Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853
Amanda L. Bonneau, NSF Graduate Research Fellow, Cornell University, 267 Hollister Hall, Ithaca, NY
14853
289
LADWP WATER SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) is the largest
municipally owned utility in the United States. The LADWP provides water and electric
service to more than 4 million Los Angeles City residents and businesses in a 120,435 ha
(465 mile2) area. The Water System provides the City of Los Angeles about 813,775,000
m3 (215 billion gallons) of water annually through 11,633 km (7,230 miles) of
transmission and distribution lines.
The LADWP has developed many water supply sources to allow redundancy for
normal and emergency operations [1]. Figure 1 shows the supply sources from the First
and Second Los Angeles Aqueducts (hereinafter referred to as the Los Angeles
Aqueducts), Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) connections, and
the Los Angeles River groundwater and other basins. The numerous tanks and reservoirs
contained in the water system store water from these various sources for distribution
throughout the City. The numerous MWD connections throughout the City provide
water from the Colorado River Aqueduct and California Aqueduct for distribution. In the
event of an earthquake, the water system draws upon the many available sources to
provide a reliable water supply. Following an earthquake, these supply redundancies
allow water to be provided to unaffected areas of the City with little or no interruption,
and also significantly aid in post-earthquake recovery to severely damaged portions of
the water system. Within the severely damaged portions of the system, the redundant
supplies and in-City storage significantly reduce the outage time an average resident
experiences following an earthquake.
Terminal storage for the Los Angeles Aqueducts was developed at the City’s
northern limits, in an area now called the Van Norman Complex (VNC), as shown in
Figure 1. The VNC is an important site for collecting water supply and distributing it to
the city because it serves as the Los Angeles Aqueducts terminus and also receives the
majority of MWD water. As the main water supply hub for the entire City, about 75
percent of the City’s annual water supply passes through the VNC before it is distributed
throughout the City. In order to provide a reliable water supply throughout the system,
numerous large diameter [up to 3048 mm (120-inches) in diameter] supply trunk lines
originate from the VNC and other supply sources and extend to various reservoirs and
tanks throughout the City. Other trunk lines interconnect the main supply lines to allow
for distribution of different water sources to many parts of the City. The trunk lines are
also equipped with many valves that allow isolation of the water supply. The trunk line
interconnectivity and isolation capability provides great versatility in the ability to supply
water to many parts of the system from a variety of sources. In many cases, damaged
trunk lines can be isolated for repair without a significant water outage. At the same
time, water can still be supplied to damaged portions of the distribution system from
other sources in order to provide the needed water surcharge for finding and repairing
pipe breaks. The supply line redundancy is a significant component in creating a system
resilient to severe earthquake effects, which was proven to be effective in the 1971 San
Fernando and 1994 Northridge earthquakes [1][2][3].
290
Los Angeles Aqueducts
Van Norman Complex
Figure 1. LADWP water supply and transmission system showing the first and second Los Angeles
Aqueducts entering the City from the north, major trunk lines (solid bold lines), MWD supply lines
(dashed lines), reservoirs (labeled), major tanks (solid circles), other LADWP water facilities as
labeled, freeways (labeled solid lines), within the City boundaries.
291
WATER SYSTEM MODIFICATION AND CHALLENGE
The LADWP is presently undertaking an extensive capital improvement program
to meet the requirements of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and
California State Department of Health Services requirements stipulated in the Surface
Water Treatment Rule and Disinfection Byproducts Rule. Significant water system
changes are necessary to meet their requirements. System changes include the removal
of Encino, Hollywood, and Stone Canyon Reservoirs from normal operating service (see
Figure 1), which places a much greater importance on the VNC and Los Angeles
Reservoir for water supply throughout the City on a daily basis. These three reservoirs
will retain storage for emergency supply purposes. Silver Lake Reservoir is planned to
be permanently removed from service in the near future and replaced with alternate
covered storage of reduced capacity. The Los Angeles Reservoir is planned to be divided
in half with a new embankment dam to allow for greater system flexibility and each side
will be covered with a floating cover. In addition, many miles of new large diameter
trunk lines are being installed to allow greater system flexibility for the water quality
projects and also as a part of a trunk line replacement program. The replacement
program was initiated following a study of older trunk lines which identified several that
were in need of repair and replacement.
Although in-City storage capacity is being significantly reduced, the increased
number of trunk lines being constructed will provide greater redundancy and flexibility.
It is becoming more important to understand the Los Angeles Water System’s ability to
withstand seismic hazards as the water quality and other needed improvements are being
implemented. The system changes necessary for water quality purposes leave ambiguity
and questions concerning how the system may perform in future earthquake scenarios
similar to or greater than what the City experienced in 1971 and 1994. Will the modified
Los Angeles Water System perform equally as well today as it did in 1994 if subjected to
a repeat earthquake? What is the adequate water storage for the post-earthquake
recovery if a similar or larger earthquake is experienced in the future? In order to answer
these and other questions it is necessary to use advanced computer modeling techniques
incorporating a wide range of parameters effecting water system seismic performance
and recovery capability. Using the advanced modeling, the entire Los Angeles Water
System can be evaluated and assessed for vulnerabilities to a large number of reasonable
earthquake scenarios.
Unfortunately, assessing the entire Los Angeles Water System within the complex
and complicated seismic environment in which it is located is a difficult and time
consuming process. As a result, comprehensive seismic assessments cannot be
practically performed to meet the high priority and demanding water quality
improvement schedules. At the same time, seismic risk concerns cannot be disregarded
while undertaking the system modifications. For the Los Angeles Water System, a 1994
Northridge earthquake repeat scenario serves as a tangible benchmark for assessing how
the water quality improvements affect the system’s current earthquake performance and
recovery capability and can be used for making initial decisions on additional
modifications needed to improve system seismic performance. A Northridge earthquake
repeat scenario can also help guide on-going capital improvement project developments
to ensure seismic hazards affecting the over-all water system performance is properly
292
considered in relation to water quality and other hazard concerns (e.g., dam safety). The
actual Northridge earthquake and associated system performance also serves to calibrate
the computer models and ensure they are being properly implemented. The remainder of
this paper describes an advanced decision support system models currently under
development and how they are being implemented to assess the Los Angeles Water
System and provide preliminary system performance results for a Northridge earthquake
repeat scenario. Following final model development and implementation, the LADWP
plans to perform more comprehensive system-wide seismic evaluations and implement
prudent seismic improvements beyond that associated with a repeat of the Northridge
earthquake.
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM MODEL

Research supported by the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research (MCEER) at Cornell University and the LADWP has focused on the
development of a decision support system to plan operations, emergency response, and
new system facilities and configurations to optimize water supply performance during
and after earthquakes. The system is generic, and the architecture of its computer
programs is adaptable to any water supply. The system works in conjunction with an
easily accessible hydraulic network model, EPANET, and a special program for damaged
network flow modeling, known as Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow
Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE). For details on the development and evaluation of
GIRAFFE, refer to dissertations by Wang [4] and Shi [5].
The decision support system was developed using the LADWP water supply as a
test bed. As applied to the LADWP network, the computer model simulates all 11,633
km (7,230 miles) of water trunk and distribution pipelines and related facilities (e.g.,
tanks, reservoirs, pressure regulation stations, etc.) in the LADWP system. The decision
support system accounts for the aggregated seismic hazard in Los Angeles through an
ensemble of 59 scenario earthquakes. The 59 scenario earthquakes also provide a library
of seismic scenarios, from which engineers can select specific scenarios or combinations
of scenarios to assess system performance. The decision support system works with risk
and reliability assessment tools to provide metrics of system performance. The computer
simulations account for the interaction of the water and electric power supplies, and
model output can be used to evaluate the regional economic and community impacts of
water losses. All system input and output can be visualized through GIS with advanced
query logic and web-based features. The simulations are dynamic in time, and can
account for loss of service as tanks and local reservoirs lose water over time through
leaks and breaks in pipelines.
WATER SYSTEM SEISMIC PERFORMANCE SIMULATIONS

The Northridge earthquake repeat scenario was selected for the implementation
phase to provide benchmarking of actual system performance during the 1994 Northridge
earthquake. LADWP Water System performances due to loss of water supply, loss of
electric power, and/or earthquake induced pipeline damage are modeled with GIRAFFE
293
for the Northridge earthquake repeat scenario. It should be noted that the decision
support system and GIRAFFE are in their final stages of development, and the results
presented herein are representative of modeling capabilities and system performance but
are not definitive results of the final modeling process.
System Modeling
The Northridge earthquake repeat scenario consists of a Mw 7.0 that is one of the
59 scenario earthquakes [6] used to assess the aggregated seismic hazard for the LADWP
system. This event is similar to the actual Mw 6.7 1994 Northridge earthquake and hence
familiar and meaningful for operators and customers. The Mw 7.0 scenario earthquake is
slightly stronger than its 1994 counterpart, but sufficiently similar to provide results that
can be assessed relative to experience with actual system performance during the
Northridge earthquake.
System simulations have been performed to show the aggregated effects during an
earthquake of loss in functionality of the Los Angeles Aqueducts, loss of electric power
due to earthquake effects, damage from local permanent ground deformation to trunk and
distribution pipelines, system-wide damage from transient ground deformation effects,
and damage to facilities. The damage can also be de-aggregated to show the most
important sources and quantify their ramifications on the system. System performance is
expressed in terms of system Serviceability Index (SI), which is the ratio of flow at
demand nodes before and after the earthquake. There are 1,052 demand nodes that are
geographically distributed throughout the system. The SI can be determined for the entire
system or for any part of the system so that the spatial variability of SI can be evaluated.
The system response was evaluated for 15 water service areas, shown in Figure 2.
Water service areas are geographic groupings of pipelines, pumps, valves, tanks,
reservoirs, and demands that can be analyzed individually. From north to south the water
service areas are: Granada Hills (GH), Foothills (FH), Sunland-Tujunga (ST), Valley
Floor A, B and C (VF A, VF B, VF C), Encino Hills (EH), Santa Monica (SM),
Hollywood Hills (HH), Mount Washington (MW), Highland Park (HP), Santa Ynez
(SY), Westside (WS), Central City (CC), and Harbor (H). The Valley Floor, Central
City, and Westside water service areas serve the highest demands in the system,
delivering water to the densely populated San Fernando Valley, downtown Los Angeles,
and western Los Angeles communities, respectively. The remaining water service areas
sit at higher elevations in the mountains surrounding Los Angeles, except for the lower
elevation Harbor water service area. By showing the results for the 15 water service
areas, one is able to understand the spatial variability of the system performance as
expressed in terms of SI.
294
GH FH
ST
VFB
VFC
VFA
EH HP
SM HH
MW
SY WS
CC
Figure 2. Water Service Areas in the LADWP system.

System Performance due to Los Angeles Aqueduct Outage
The Los Angeles Aqueducts transport water from the Eastern Sierra Nevada in
Northern California to the City of Los Angeles and account for nearly 50% of the annual
LADWP water supply. During the 1994 Northridge earthquake, seismically induced
damage to the Los Angeles Aqueducts disrupted aqueduct water at the same time that
damage in the Foothill Feeder curtailed availability of water from MWD. In planning for
a Northridge earthquake repeat scenario, it is appropriate to assume disruption in the Los
Angeles Aqueducts without inter-tie backup from MWD. Figure 3 presents the SI for the
15 water service areas at 24 hours with the Los Angeles Aqueducts not contributing to
the LADWP water supply and with no other supply supplementing the Los Angeles
Aqueducts. The system SI is 85% 24-hours after the earthquake without the Los Angeles
Aqueduct supplies. Comparatively, an analysis performed with the Los Angeles
Aqueducts in operation produces a 24 hour system SI of 100%. As shown in Figure 3,
the water service areas most affected by the loss of the Los Angeles Aqueducts are the
GH, FH and VF C areas in the upper San Fernando Valley. FH and VF C have a SI of
53% and 41%, respectively, while GH suffers a substantial decrease in SI to only 2%.
295
Water Service Area Serviceability at 24 hrs
LA Aqueducts Off, No Damage
(Entire System Serviceability: 85.0%)
1
0.9
0.8
Serviceability Index (SI)
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
H CC W SY SM VFA HH MW HP EH GH ST FH VFB VFC
Wate r Se rv ice Are a (WSA)
Figure 3. 24-hour Serviceability Index for 15 Water Service Areas with Los Angeles Aqueducts off,
no other damage, and no other supply supplementing the Los Angeles Aqueducts.
System Performance due to Electric Power Outage
Figure 4 shows the de-aggregated results for the loss of electric power, which
mainly affects the operation of pump stations. In the event of power loss, pump stations
with secondary sources of power, such as back up generators, will continue to operate
with a modified number of pumps. Electric power outage data from the actual 1994
Northridge earthquake were used to simulate the configuration of pumps for various time
increments following the earthquake event. It was found that using the configuration of
pumps operating 2 hours following the earthquake for the entire 24 hour simulation
produced nearly identical results (differed by less than 1%) to an analysis where power
was incrementally restored to pump stations at 2, 6, 12, 18 and 24 hours. Thus, the 2
hour configuration of operational pumps was used as an equivalent power state for the 24
hour simulation. As shown in Figure 4, the system SI at 24 hours is 90.5%. The GH, ST
and FH water service areas have the lowest SI of 20%, 62% and 54%, respectively.
Similar results are seen for both of the single parameter studies presented in
Figures 3 and 4, with water supply to the upper San Fernando Valley, primarily the GH
and FH water service areas, becoming compromised. In the electric power outage case,
the Van Norman Pump Station 2 loses power and does not have a back-up power source.
Although water is available, this station is not functioning and cannot pump water to the
upper San Fernando Valley. When the Los Angeles Aqueducts are disrupted, water flow
is curtailed to the upper San Fernando Valley. This lack of water produces similar
results as those for the electric power outage scenario where water is available, but the
means to distribute it is compromised.
296
W ater Serv ice Area Serviceability at 24 hrs
LA Aqueducts On, Electric Power Outage at 2hrs
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
H CC W SY SM V FA HH MW HP EH GH ST FH VFB V FC
Figure 4. 24-hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas with electric power outage, Los
Angeles Aqueducts on, and no other damage.
System Performance with/without Emergency Storage Reservoirs
Since the 1994 Northridge earthquake, 3 large reservoirs have been taken out of
normal operational service. The loss of the Encino, Hollywood and Stone Canyon
Reservoirs has reduced the LADWP water storage by 30 x 106 m3 (8 x 109 gallons)
within the City. However, these reservoirs remain for emergency operational use.
Simulations were performed for the 2007 LADWP water system configuration with and
without these 3 reservoirs supplying water to the system, when subject to transient
ground deformation effects from the Mw 7.0 Northridge earthquake repeat scenario,
permanent ground deformation to trunk and distribution pipelines, electric power loss,
and the Los Angeles Aqueducts out of service. The purpose of these simulations is to
obtain a better understanding of the emergency storage reservoirs’ importance to post-
earthquake operations. Figure 5 shows the serviceability results at 0 hours (immediately
following the earthquake) for the 3 reservoirs closed. The 0 hours system SI is 79.4% and
14 of the 15 water service areas have a SI of above 75%. Figure 6 shows the
serviceability results at 24 hours after the earthquake for the 3 reservoirs closed. The 24
hours system SI is 39.1% and 8 of the 15 water service areas have a SI below 25%. The
SI results for 0 hours after the earthquake for the 3 reservoirs open is not shown, as they
are very similar to those shown in Figure 5. Figure 7 shows the serviceability results at
24 hours after the earthquake for the 3 reservoirs open. The 24 hours system SI is 51.3%
and 5 of the 15 water service areas have a SI below 25%. Figure 8 highlights that in both
cases, water service is largely compromised in the upper San Fernando Valley and Santa
Monica regions, but when the 3 reservoirs are open they improve the WS, HH and WS
water service area SI to levels above 25%.
297
Repeat NR EQ Scenario, Distribution and Trunk Line Damage,
Electric Power Outage
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
H CC W SY SM V FA HH MW HP EH GH ST FH V FB V FC
Figure 5. 0-hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas when Encino, Hollywood and Stone
Canyon Reservoirs are closed with system pipeline damage, electric power outage, and Los Angeles
Aqueducts off.

Repeat NR EQ Scenario, Distribution and Trunk Line Damage,
Electric Power Outage
1.0
0.9 (Entire System Serviceability: 39.1%)

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
H CC W SY SM VFA HH MW HP EH GH ST FH V FB V FC
Canyon Reservoirs are closed with system pipeline damage and electric power outage, and Los
Angeles Aqueducts off.
298
Repeat NR EQ Scenario, Distribution and Trunk Line Dam age,
Electric Pow er Outage, 3 Reservoirs Open
1.0
0.9
(Entire System Serviceability:
51.3%)
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
H CC W SY SM VFA HH MW HP EH GH ST FH VFB VFC
Water Service Area (WSA)
Canyon Reservoirs are open with system pipeline damage and electric power outage, and Los
Angeles Aqueducts off.
Hollywood
Reservoir
Encino Reservoir
Stone Canyon
Reservoir
(a) Encino, Hollywood and Stone Canyon (b) Encino, Hollywood and Stone
Reservoirs Closed Canyon Reservoirs Open
(Entire System Serviceability: 39.1%) (Entire System Serviceability: 51.3%)
Figure 8. Comparison of 24 hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas when Encino,
Hollywood and Stone Canyon Reservoirs are open and closed with system pipeline damage and
electric power outage, and Los Angeles Aqueducts off.
299
To check the validity of the analyses, the 2002 LADWP system configuration
response to Mw 6.5 and Mw 7.0 Northridge earthquake repeat scenarios was simulated for
the effects of system-wide ground wave effects, electric power loss, permanent ground
deformation, and the loss of the Los Angeles Aqueducts. The 2002 LADWP system
configuration had network characteristics more closely resembling that during the Mw 6.7
1994 Northridge earthquake, with Encino and Stone Canyon Reservoirs open. Winter
water demand conditions were modeled because the 1994 earthquake occurred in
January. The winter demand is approximately 43% of the summer water demand. The
system SI after 24 hours for the Mw 6.5 and Mw 7.0 Northridge scenario earthquakes
varies from 78% to 65%, which compares favorably with a system SI of approximately
70% after the actual Northridge earthquake.
CONCLUSION
The Los Angeles Water System is currently undergoing significant system wide
changes to improve the quality of the water supplied to customers. In order to understand
the post-earthquake performance of the modified water system, the LADWP has
undertaken a cooperative program with MCEER to perform a systems analysis, which
will help identify vulnerabilities in the supply and distribution systems. Studies on the
Los Angeles Water System with the decision support system to date have focused on a
Northridge earthquake repeat scenario. The studies show the great importance of
dynamic behavior over time, especially during the first 24 hours after the earthquake
when leaking water through damaged pipelines diminishes local tank and reservoir
levels, thereby reducing system Serviceability Index (SI). The studies show the
importance of disruption in flow from the Los Angeles Aqueducts and electric power
losses. Each of these effects has similar consequences for the Los Angeles Water
System, resulting in low SI for water service areas in the northern part of the Los
Angeles. The studies also show the effects of lost storage capacity. Over the past 10
years three large reservoirs (Encino, Hollywood, and Stone Canyon) have been taken out
of normal operational service because of water quality concerns, resulting in a reduction
of approximately 30 x 106 m3 (8 x 109 gallons) of readily available water and placing
greater dependence on the Los Angeles Reservoir. For peak summer demands, the SI for
the entire network 24 hours after the earthquake is increased by approximately 30% if
these three reservoirs are returned to service on an emergency basis. The decision support
simulations explicitly demonstrate the most important local and system-wide effects on
the Los Angeles Water System seismic response and recovery and provide an initial
quantification on how the use of Encino, Hollywood, and Stone Canyon Reservoirs in
emergency conditions improves the overall system serviceability. The decision support
system and GIRAFFE are in their final stages of development, and the results presented
herein are representative of modeling capabilities and system performance but are not
definitive results of the final modeling process.
300
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Support from the National Science Foundation, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research, and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power are gratefully
acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] Lund, L., and C. Davis, 2004, “Multihazard Mitigation Los Angeles Water System A Historical
Perspective,” ASCE Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Multihazard
Monograph, Craig Taylor editor, in preparation. Presentation at ASCE TCLEE Workshop, 6th US
Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Long Beach, CA, August 10, 2003.
[2] Davis, C. A., 1999, “Performance of a Large Diameter Trunk Line During Two Near-Field
Earthquakes, Proc. 5th U.S. Conf. on Lifeline Earthquake Engr, ASCE, Seattle, Aug., pp. 741-750.
[3] Davis, C. A. and J. P. Bardet, 1995, “Seismic Performance of Van Norman Water Lifelines,” Proc.
4th U.S. Conf. on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, ASCE, San Francisco, Aug., pp. 652-659.
[4] Wang, Y., 2006, “Seismic Performance Evaluation of Water Supply Systems”, PhD Dissertation,
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
[5] Shi, P., 2006, “Seismic Response Modeling of Water Supply Systems”, PhD Dissertation, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York.
[6] Lee, J., Graf, W., Somerville, P., O’Rourke, T. D., and Shinozuka, M., 2005, “Development of
Earthquake Scenarios for Use in Earthquake Risk Analysis for Lifeline System,” Report for the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles, CA, 34p.
301
302
Seismic Repair Rate Analysis and Risk Assessment of Water
Pipelines
Gee-Yu Liu, Chin-Hsun Yeh, Hsiang-Yuan Hung, and Ban-Jwu Shih
ABSTRACT
Seismic risk assessment of water pipeline systems is a very important task in proposing effective
disaster preparedness and mitigation plans. In the literature, the individual relationship between the
number of earthquake-induced pipeline repairs and ground motion parameters such as the peak
acceleration, peak velocity, or strain has been studied before. With reference to the data compiled
after 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake, regression analyses were conducted in this investigation for
obtaining empirical water pipeline repair rate formulae considering the effects of ground shaking and
permanent ground deformation simultaneously. The widespread observational data of strong motion
and ground deformation make the attained formulae very unique when compared with the ones from
other earthquakes. Accordingly, seismic scenario simulation and risk assessment of water pipeline
system in the Taipei metropolitan area were performed. Tentative scenarios based on the maximum
probable earthquakes have been determined for disaster reduction plans.
Gee-Yu Liu, Associate Research Fellow, National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering (NCREE), 200, Sec. 3,
Xin-hai Rd., Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Chin-Hsun Yeh, Research Fellow, NCREE, 200, Sec. 3, Xin-hai Rd., Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Hsiang-Yuan Hung, Assistant Researcher, NCREE, 200, Sec. 3, Xin-hai Rd., Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Ban-Jwu Shih, Associate Professor, National Taipei University of Technology, 1, Sec. 3, Chung-hsiao E. Rd., Taipei 106,
Taiwan.
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INTRODUCTION
The seismic performance of water systems is by all means a pivotal factor to the resilience of a
community for confronting earthquake disasters. The pipeline network of a water system is usually
very large and geographically distributed that lend themselves very vulnerable to various seismic
hazards including strong motion, ground deformation and soil liquefaction. In order to enhance the
community preparedness and mitigate the water pipelines more effectively, it is necessary to have
adequate damage assessment models and risk management strategies.
This article serves as an introduction to the recent advance in the seismic repair rate analysis and
risk assessment of water pipelines at the National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering
(NCREE), Taiwan. Regarding the repair rate of buried water pipelines, the pipeline inventory and
damage data collected after the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake offer a good opportunity for
developing new empirical formulas through regression analysis. It is highly desired if the combined
effect of ground shaking and deformation to the number of pipeline repairs could be expressed in a
single formula. Secondly, with the Taipei metropolitan area as a testbed, the seismic risk assessment
of its pipeline system has been performed, and the results have been employed for deciding the
protection standards in local disaster reduction plans.
WATER PIPELINE REPAIR RATE ANALYSIS
Background Information
The catastrophic Chi-Chi earthquake with a main shock of Richter magnitude 7.3 took place in
central Taiwan on September 21, 1999. The earthquake was caused by the rupture of Chelungpu fault
with rupture length greater than 90km and permanent displacement larger than 10m. As a result, more
than 2,400 people died, 11,000 wounded, and 100,000 were left homeless. The earthquake also
caused severe damage and disruption to lifeline systems. Regarding the water supply systems, the
damage to Shihgang Dam alone reduced 40% of water supply to Taichung area. A major
water-treatment plant at Fengyuan was severely damaged and a nearby main that crossed the fault
was deformed and blocked [1]. The widespread damage to facilities and pipeline systems made water
unavailable to many cities for long period of time. A full restoration of the water supply in Taichung
City took nine days. For some rural areas, it took an even longer time to resume.
GIS Database Grid System
Displacements at Time Histories of

LSB Control Points Strong Motion at
Water Pipelines CWB Stations
and Damage Data PGD Value at Each
Grid Cell by PGA Values at
Interpolation CWB Stations
No. of Pipeline
Pipeline Length
Repair Points in
in Each Grid Cell Ground Strain Value at PGA Value at Each
Each Grid Cell
Each Grid Cell by Grid Cell by
Numerical Differentiation Interpolation
Repair Rate and the Corresponding Ground

Motion/Displacement/Strain by Moving Average Method
Regression Analysis
Figure 1. The analysis framework for seismic repair rate of buried water pipelines
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Figure 1 depicts the analysis framework for studying seismic repair rate of buried water pipelines
in this study. At first, the study area was split into uniform 0.5 km×0.5 km grid cells to create a grid
system. The grid cells were employed as the basic geographic units for spatial analysis of pipe
inventory, repair points and seismic parameters. Secondly, the strong motion records, from the
Central Weather Bureau (CWB), Ministry of Transportation and Communication were used to
estimate the distribution of PGA. Similarly, the global position measurements at control points,
before and after the Chi-Chi earthquake, by the Land Survey Bureau (LSB), Ministry of the Interior
were used to estimate the distribution of permanent ground displacement (PGD). The attained PGD
distribution was further used to estimate the distribution of ground strain. Then, the water pipeline
inventory and the associated repair data were splitted into each grid cell. After partition of various
kinds of data into grid cells, it became ready to carry out the spatial analysis of pipeline repair rate and
the further regression analysis.
The Study Area, Water Pipeline and Repair Data
A total of 11 cities and towns whose pipeline inventory including location, diameter, material,
etc., and the data of earthquake-induced pipe repairs have been collected, digitized and imported into
a GIS-based database. These cities and towns include Fengyuan, Jhuolan, Dongshih, Shihgang,
Wufong, Lugang, Huatan, Fusing, Puli, Mingjian and Douliou, see Figure 2.
Figure 2. The study area of 11 cities and towns in central Taiwan
The nominal diameters of water pipes in the database vary between 20mm and 2,400mm. Table 1
summarizes the diameter range, total length and number of repairs of large, medium and small pipes
in the database. It is noted in Table 1 that the average repair rate for small pipelines was several times
larger than those of medium and large pipes. The small pipes, with nominal diameter less than 65
mm, are often used to connect distribution pipes to the customer ends. Many researchers do not
include small pipes in their study as the corresponding data may be incomplete in the database. For
this reason, small pipes are excluded from the analyses in this study.
3 305
More than 90% of the pipes and repair points in the database belong to ductile pipes, such as
PVC, PE, DI and steel pipes. Although the pipe material is one of the factors that influence the repair
rate after earthquakes, we will not distinguish the pipe material for simplicity, in the following
regression analysis.
Table 1. The pipeline information in the study area

Type Diameter Range Length No. of Repairs
Large d > 150mm 745km 159
Medium 150mm ≥ d ≥ 65mm 1,989km 854
Small d < 65mm 740km 1,801
Distributions of Ground Motion Intensity and Deformation
More than 400 sets of three-component free-field ground motions were recorded during the
Chi-Chi earthquake. Here, the PGA value at each CWB strong motion station referred to the
geometric mean of PGA values in the east-west direction and north-south direction. The PGA value
at each grid cell is then calculated through numerical interpolation (and extrapolation). In order to
prevent the undesired peaks and dips that might be artificially generated, the algorithm of minimum
curvature is employed for the numerical interpolation.
While for the PGD, the high precision GPS survey data before and after the Chi-Chi earthquake
by the LSB has been well compiled by Chang et al. [2]. It serves as a good basis for finding out the
actual change in topography in Taiwan caused by the earthquake. Similar to the numerical
interpolation for attaining the PGA distribution, each component of the displacement field can be
separately estimated from the measured value at each LSB control points. The only difference here
would be that the displacement field in the hanging wall area and the corresponding one in the
footwall area have to be estimated separately to preserve its discontinuity along the Chelungpu fault.
Finally, we may have the PGD distribution by calculating the magnitude of displacement vector at
each grid cell. From the attained distribution of PGD values in three directions, the ground strain can
be derived through direct calculation.
The calculated distributions of PGA, PGD and ground strain are depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The distributions of PGA (left), PGD (middle) and ground strain (right) in Taiwan caused
by the Chi-Chi earthquake
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Regression Model and Analysis Approach
Based on the grid system mentioned above, the pipeline length and number of repairs in each grid
cell, the estimated PGA, PGD and ground strain of each grid cell have all be calculated and prepared
as GIS layers. Overlaying these layers, it is ready to obtain the empirical relationship between
pipeline repair rate and various seismic parameters. Here, the pipeline repair rate is defined as the
number of repairs divided by the pipeline length.
Conventionally, the pipe repair rates were counted based on an equal interval value of ground
motion intensity and/or deformation. The defect of this approach, as has been pointed out Hwang et
al. [3], is that the pipeline length may be quite different in each interval and the computed pipe repair
rate may vary significantly depending on the selected interval value. To confront this defect, they
have instead proposed an alternative approach: the repair rate data points used for regression analysis
are computed from the pipeline data of approximately equal length and may associate with different
interval values of seismic parameters. In order to further increase repair rate data points for a better
description of pipeline vulnerability, a moving average method was used in this study. Using this,
data points at the same interval value can be attained.
In order to simplify the analysis, Yeh et al. proposed that the pipeline repair rate is a function of
two seismic factors: the ground shaking and the permanent ground deformation. It is further assumed
that the two factors are not correlated and the pipeline repairs caused by them can be superposed. In
other words, the pipeline repair rate can be expressed as [4]:
RR = RR shake + RR deform (1)
where RR shake and RR deform are the repair rates caused by the ground shaking and the permanent
ground deformation, respectively.
The Chelungpu fault is a thrust fault and its fault plane has a small dip angle. As a result, the
severity of ground deformation in the hanging wall area was much greater than the one in the footwall
area. For this reason, the regression analysis was divided into two stages. In the first stage, we
excluded the pipeline data from regions with ground strain greater than 0.001 and derived the
regression formula for the first term in the RHS of Eq. (1), i.e. RR shake. Then, after deducting from the
observed data the contribution from RR shake, the regression formula for the second term in the RHS of
Eq. (1), i.e. RR deform, was derived in the second stage.
Regression Results
The repair rate data points and regression results for RR shake have both been depicted in the left
sub-figure of Figure 4. A pipeline length of 200km was employed for each data point, which
separates from each other at 10cm/sec2. The R2 values in the regression analyses were both found to
be greater than 0.9, which means that PGA can be a suitable estimator for the seismic vulnerability of
buried pipelines in the PGA-dominate region.
Similarly, the repair rate data points and regression results for RR deform have both been depicted in
the right sub-figure of Figure 4. A pipeline length of 150 and 200km was employed for each data
point of large-size and mid-size pipelines, respectively. The data point separates from each other at a
strain interval of 0.002. Here, the R2 values in the regression analyses, though less than those for PGA,
were both found to be greater than 0.7. Taking into account the randomness of repair data caused by
the deduction of contribution from ground shaking, the pipeline repair rates seem well correlated with
the ground strain.
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Finally, the resultant regression models of buried water pipeline repair rate under the combined
effect of PGA and ground strain can be expressed as
Large-size pipe:
RR = 8.637 × 10 −5 ⋅ PGA 1.328 + 7.849 ⋅ ε 0.701 (2)
Mid-size pipe:
RR = 1.103 × 10 −5 ⋅ PGA 1.768 + 6.634 ⋅ ε 0.381 (3)
It is worth noticing that the widespread observations of strong motion and ground deformation (up to
700gals and 0.007, respectively) make the attained formulae Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) very unique when
compared with the data from other earthquakes. They can be utilized for water pipeline loss
estimation in Taiwan without the need of undesired extrapolation.
10 10
1 1
RR (number / km)
RR (number / km)
0.1 0.1
0.01 0.01
100 300 500 700
0 200 400 600 800 0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008
Pga (gal) Strain
Figure 4. The relationships between RR shake and PGA (left) and RR deform and ground strain (left); red:
mid-size pipelines, blue: large-size pipelines
SEISMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE PIPELINE SYSTEM IN TAIPEI AND APPLICATION
Methodology for Seismic Risk Assessment
Based on the source parameters of an earthquake scenario, the distribution of ground motion
intensity and the ground failure extent can be estimated through empirical attenuation laws, site
modification factors, and soil liquefaction assessment models. Furthermore, depending on the
site-dependent ground shaking intensity and ground failure extent, the damage-state probabilities of
various lifeline components, such as buried pipeline segments, electric power substation, and
highway bridges, can be obtained also.
Two types of seismic sources are included in establishing Taiwan’s seismic scenario database
(SSD) developed at NCREE by Yeh [5]. The first type belongs to active faults that have known
geographic properties such as surface fault trace and dip angle of fault plane. The fault geometry,
characteristic of earthquake magnitude, average annual slip rate, etc. of each active fault in Taiwan
have been investigated by the Central Geological Survey Bureau (CGS), Taiwan. In this study, only
Type I active faults classified by CGS were taken into consideration, as shown in Figure 5. The
second type of seismic sources is often referred to as an area source that has unknown fault trace and
rupture direction. In order to cover all the possible earthquake events, a rectangular region
circumscribing Taiwan was divided uniformly into 500 grids, as illustrated in Figure 5, too. Six focal
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depths, which are 10, 20, 30, 50, 70 and 90 km, were chosen to represent possible future earthquakes.
In each grid and at each focal depth, earthquake magnitudes from 5.1 to 7.5 with 0.2 increments were
selected for the SSD. Finally, combining the seismic scenario database and the results of probabilistic
seismic hazard analysis, one can obtain the seismic event loss table which can be used to calculate
various kinds of risk statistics in different regions or in specific targets.
26
Keelung
25 Xincheng Fault Taoyuan
Taipei
Shitan Fault
Shenzhuoshan Fault Hsinchu
Ilan
Tunzijiao Fault Miaoli
Chelongpu Fault Taichung
Hualien
24 Changhua Meilun Fault
Nantou
Dajianshan Fault Yunlin Yuli Fault
Meishan Fault Chiayi Qimei Fault
Chukou FaultTainan Chishang Fault
23 Xinhua Fault Taitung
Kaohsiung
Pingtung
22
21
119 120 121 122 123
Figure 5. The type-1 active faults and the grid system of area seismic sources around Taiwan
In general, probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) involves four steps: The first step is to
identify and characterize probable seismic sources in the neighborhood of the study region including
probability distribution of location and direction of fault rupture. The second step is to characterize
the temporal distribution of earthquake recurrence and to determine the ultimate magnitude in each
seismic source. The third step is to select an appropriate ground motion prediction model. The last
step is the summation of individual effect due to different seismic sources considering the
uncertainties in earthquake location, size and ground motion prediction model to obtain the
probability that the ground motion parameter will be exceeded during a particular time period.
Table 2. The Contents in the seismic event loss table

Scenario ID Annual Occurrence Rate Expected Loss Standard Deviation of Loss
1 v1 L1 σ1
2 v2 L2 σ2
… … … …
k vk Lk σk
… … … …
J vJ LJ σJ
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Based on the results of PSHA, the annual occurrence rate (v k) of each scenario earthquake is
obtained. Together with the expected consequences (L k) of each scenario earthquake, they are
summarized in a table as shown in Table 1, which is named seismic event loss table and can be used
in risk assessment. In practice, given occurrence of a scenario earthquake, the standard deviation and
the upper-bound of losses may be determined by experiences and experts' opinions. The distribution
of losses may be modeled as a beta distribution with mean equal to the expected loss from scenario
simulation [6].
Once the SSD and the PSHA module have been established, various kinds of risk estimates can
be calculated from the seismic event loss table as shown in Table 2. For example, let L i,j denote the
casualties or losses in region i due to scenario earthquake j with annual occurrence rate v j. The
expected annual casualties or losses in region i can be expressed as:
Li = ∑ Li , j ⋅ v j (4)
j
The seismic sources which contribute more risk to a particular region can also be identified. This is
done by denoting L iJ as the expected annual loss in region i caused by seismic source J. If there are j
scenario earthquakes in the seismic source J, the expected annual loss in region i caused by the
seismic source J can be calculated as follows:
j
Li = ∑ Li,k ⋅ vk
J
(5)
k =1
Suppose that there are N scenario earthquakes in total which may cause losses in region i . The N
scenario earthquakes have been sorted according to losses induced in region i in descending order,
that is,
Li ,1 ≥ Li , 2 ≥ K ≥ Li ,K ≥ K ≥ Li , N (6)
The annual occurrence rate for each scenario earthquake has been calculated as v1,…,vN, respectively.
According to the definition, the annual occurrence rate with L i ≥ L i,1 is v1; the annual occurrence rate
with L i ≥ L i,2 is v1 + v2. In general, the annual occurrence rate with L i ≥ L i,K is v K, which can be
expressed as
K
νK = ∑ ν j (7)
j =1
Assuming the earthquake occurrences are stationary Poisson processes, the annual probability of
occurrence of event L i ≥ L i,K can be expressed as
P(Li ≥ Li ,K ) = 1 − exp(−ν K ) (8)
The exceeding probability (EP) curves for various kinds of losses can be calculated through Eq.
(8). Finally, combining the seismic scenario database and the results of probabilistic seismic hazard
8 310
analysis, one can obtain the seismic event loss table, which can be used to calculate various kinds of
risk statistics in different regions or of specific targets.
Seismic Risk Assessment of the Water Pipeline System in Taipei Metropolitan Area
Figure 6 depicts the spatial distribution of buried water pipeline system in the Taipei metropolitan
area. It is operated by the Taipei Water Department (TWD). This system serves the whole Taipei City
(including 12 districts) and four other cities of the Taipei County (i.e. Shin-dian, Shan-chung,
Yeong-ho and Chung-ho). The total length of the pipeline system is 7,153km (2,435km of large,
1,814km of middle, and 2,904km of small pipelines, respectively).
Based on Table 3, the probability of leak or break and the repair cost and man-hours per pipeline
damage point [7, 8], the annual pipeline repair number and repair cost of each district/city due to the
seismic hazard can be simulated. They are depicted in the left and the right sub-figures of Figure 7,
respectively. Similarly, the EP curves of this pipeline system with respect to the total repair number
and repair cost of the whole TWD service area are depicted in the left and the right sub-figures of
Figure 8, respectively.
Figure 6. Water pipelines in the Taipei metropolitan area
Table 3. The probability of leak or break and the repair cost and man-hours per pipeline damage point
Leaks Breaks
Pipe Diameter
Probability Cost* Man-hours Probability Cost* Man-hours
<65mm 0.3 10 10 0.7 16 10
65-150mm 0.3 80 50 0.7 120 70
150-300mm 0.3 160 90 0.7 240 220
300-500mm 0.3 300 120 0.7 400 400
500-900mm - - - 1.0 780 800
900-1500mm - - - 1.0 960 1,400
>1,500mm - - - 1.0 1,800 2,500
*Cost in thousand NT dollars
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Figure 7. The annual water pipeline repair number (left) and repair cost (right, in thousand NT dollars)
of each district / city due to the seismic hazard
Figure 8. The EP curve of TWD’s pipeline system with respect to the number of repairs (left) and
repair cost (right, in million NT dollars)
Application: Maximum Probable Earthquakes for Disaster Reduction Plans
Recently, Yeh has investigated the concept of maximum probable earthquakes (MPEs) and
applied it to formulating disaster reduction plans [9]. MPEs refer to the strong earthquakes which
may result in very severe damages, casualties and losses. Based on data of annual loss estimates and
the associated EP curves, it is possible to determine the suitable MPEs in a probabilistic sense.
To demonstrate this, we first assume that the TWD should be prepared for a seismic loss in
pipelines with a return period of 500 years (about 10% in 50 years), as the Taipei City is the political
as well as commercial center of Taiwan, and the people it serves consists of around one fifth of the
total population in Taiwan. The corresponding loss is equivalent to 4,000 repairs or 200 million NT
dollars according to the EP curves. Such loss could be set as a protection standard to the TWD, based
on which the utility disaster reduction plans should be formulated. Under such circumstance, the most
10 312
adequate MPEs can be determined by finding from the seismic event loss table the scenarios with
about the same loss yet the highest annual occurrence rate. Since there usually exist more than on
option that satisfies the requirements, a selection of at least two MPE scenarios is recommended for
increasing the variety of threats, see Figure 9.
On the other hand, a seismic loss with a very long return period (say 2,500 years or 2% in 50 years;
see Figure 10) is very rare and seems unlikely to take place. Even such loss takes place, the other
water utilities in Taiwan are not likely to be seriously affected at the same time. In order to survive
such loss, a wiser solution for the TWD is to sign agreement with nearby counties or cities to
cooperate and manage disaster together. All parties in the agreement could benefit by avoiding
over-investment but staying capable of confronting a very rare seismic event.
Figure 9. Two MPE scenarios (based on number of repairs; 10%-in-50-year scenarios)
Figure 10. Two MPE scenarios (based on number of repairs; 2%-in-50-year scenarios)
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SUMMARY
In this study, the damage data in the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake have been investigated
again. New formulae have been achieved for the seismic repair rate of buried water pipelines
considering the combined effect of both ground shaking and deformation. The attained formulae
cover a wide range of PGA (up to 700 gals) and ground strain (up to 0.007). These make them very
unique when compared with the data from other earthquakes. They can be utilized for water pipeline
loss estimation in Taiwan without the need of undesired extrapolation. The Taipei metropolitan area
has been employed as a testbed for performing the seismic risk assessment of water pipeline systems.
The concept of maximum possible earthquakes has been introduced and applied in formulating utility
disaster reduction plans.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Regarding the Chi-Chi earthquake data, CWB and LSB provided the strong motion records and
the GPS measurements, respectively. The Taiwan Water Supply Corporation provided the pipeline
blueprints and repair data. Some of them were further digitized, calibrated, and generously provided
by Prof. Walter W. Chen and Prof. Che-Hao Chang, National Taipei University of Technology.
Without these valuable data, it won’t be possible to conduct this study. Finally, the funding from the
TWD under Grant No. 09531065G15 is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] Schiff, A. J. and A. K. Tang. 2000. Chi-Chi Taiwan Earthquake of September 21, 1999 – Lifeline Performance, EIC,
TCLEE Monograph 18, ASCE.
[2] Chang, C.-H., Y.-M. Lin, W. Chen and B.-J. Shih. 2004. “The Damage Ratio Estimation of Water Pipelines Due to
Earthquake by Permanent Ground Deformation,” Proc. 3rd Taiwan-Japan Workshop on Lifeline Performance and
Disaster Mitigation, Taipei, Taiwan, pp.45-51.
[3] Hwang, H., Y.-H. Chiu, W. Chen and B.-J. Shih. 2004. “Analysis of Damage to Steel Gas Pipelines by Ground
Shaking Effects during the Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake,” Earthquake Spectra, 20(4):1095-1110.
[4] Yeh, C.-H., B.-J. Shih, C.-H. Chang, W. Chen, G.-Y. Liu, and H.-Y. Hung. 2006. “Seismic Damage Assessment of
Potable Water Pipelines,” Proc. 4th Int. Confer. Earthquake Eng., Paper No.247, Oct. 12-13, Taipei, Taiwan.
[5] Yeh, C. H. 2004. Development of Taiwan Seismic Scenario Database and Its Applications, Proc. Int. Confer.
Commemoration of 5th Anniversary of the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake, Taiwan, Sep. 8-9, Taipei, Taiwan.
[6] Dong, W. 2001. Building a More Profitable Portfolio – Modern Portfolio Theory with Application to Catastrophe
Insurance, Reactions Publishing Group.
[7] FEMA. 1999. HAZUS 99 Technical Manual Part II, Chapter 7 ~ Chapter 9, Washington, D.C..
[8] Shih, B.-J., C.-H. Yeh and G.-Y. Liu. 2006. Seismic Assessment of Buried Water Pipelines in Taipei, Technical Report
for the Taipei Water Department, Fund No. 09531065G15, Taipei, Taiwan.
[9] Yeh, C.-H. 2007. “Determination of Maximum Probable Earthquakes in Disaster Reduction Plans,” Proc. 10-th Int.
Confer. Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Eng. (ICASP 10), Jul. 31-Aug. 3, Tokyo, Japan.
12 314
Emergency measures - a Study of the Fukuoka West
Offshore Earthquake
Kuniaki Nakamura
ABSTRACT
Fukuoka city is located in the northern district of Kyusyu Island, and has been said
to be one of the safest area among Japan. Nevertheless, a massive earthquake measuring
6-lower of the Japanese Meteorological Agency seismic intensity scale (out of a
maximum of 7), the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake, occurred on the 20th of March,
2005. Fukuoka City was left dazed and confused due to the lack of knowledge of and
preparation for emergency situations. In this paper, I will look into how Fukuoka
waterworks responded to the disaster and how it can improve itself for future
emergencies.
Kuniaki Nakamura, Section Chief, Water Facilities Section, Water Purification Department, Fukuoka
City Waterworks Bureau, 1-28-15 Hakataekimae, Hakata-Ward, Fukuoka Japan 812-0011
315
PREFACE
Outline of the Fukuoka city
Sapporo
Sendai
Nagoya Tokyo
Hiroshima
Fukuoka Osaka
Figure 1. Location of the Fukuoka
Japan consists of four main islands and other small islands, one of which is
Kyushyu Island where Fukuoka City is located as shown in figure 1. Fukuoka City, with
a population of 1.4million, plays an important role as the gate way to the rest of Asia by
providing air and sea connections. Tertiary industry is main one in Fukuoka such as
wholesale, retail, restaurant, etc. It accounts for 90% of the all employment in Fukuoka
city. Fukuoka airport has the fourth domestic passenger volume in Japan, and Hakata
port is designated as one of the key port by the national government. Additionally,
Fukuoka City provides further domestic connection by rail and road network
Outline of the Fukuoka City Waterworks
History
Fukuoka city does not have enough water resources due to the topographical
condition, which means it is prone to water shortage. An example is the severe drought
in 1978, which brought upon a limited supply for 287days. From this experience, we
aim to develop water resources and to make the city with water conservation in order to
save water in which cost and labor have been invested.
316
Water conservation development
As the water conservation development programs, there are three main

countermeasures. First, Water supply control system has been in operation since 1981.
Supply area in the city is divided into 21 blocks, where electric valves, flow meters and
pressure gauges are located. Central monitoring and pressure control system are
operated by the Water Control Center. It allows labor saving during droughts, reduces
water leakage and adjusts the flow among purification plants. The effects of the water
pressure control are shown in figure 2. Secondly, the water leakage investigation is
conducted in a suitable circulation period based on observed data. Thirdly, the plan to
renew the old pipeline was put into action, consequently ductile iron pipe accounts for
over 99% of pipe network. Through the incorporation of these measures, effectiveness
rate meaning the proportion of the water that has been used effectively, has stood at over
95% since 1997
Without control
Water
Pressure With control
Restricted Water Supply

Severe drought season
(Day time) (Night time)

Time
Figure 2. The effects of the Water Pressure Control
317
FUKUOKA WEST OFFSHORE EARTHQUAKE
Outline of the Earthquake
Located in the northern part of Kyushu, Fukuoka City was regarded as safe in
comparison to other areas of Japan with frequent earthquakes. However, an earthquake
of seismic intensity of 6 lower and magnitude 7.0 occurred in Fukuoka on March 20th,
2005. It is the largest ever earthquake recorded since the establishment of the Fukuoka
Meteorological observatory. Aftershocks, following main tremor, hit 360 times by the
end of May 2005.
Main tremor (20／Mar．)
Largest aftershock (20／Apr．)
The Kego fault
※Circles represents the magnitude of the tremors by 31st May 2005.

※This figure is originated from the Institute of Seismology and Volcanology, Kyusyu University
Figure 3. The Epicenters of the Fukuoka West Offshore earthquake
318
Frequency
Elapsed days
※ Numbers of earthquakes measuring higher than scale one on the seismic intensity scale
※ quoted from the report on the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake by Fukuoka Prefecture Government.
Figure 4. Number of West Offshore Fukuoka Earthquakes

20/3/2005～31/5/2005
Damage Due to the Earthquake
1,003 people were injured and one was dead. 141 houses were completely
destructed and those in Genkai Island near by the epicenter, which was hit directly by
the earthquake, accounted for 107. 5,199 houses were partially destructed or slightly
damaged in the whole city. The harbor and the fishing port facilities were heavily
damaged, and the total cost of damage to public facilities, including roads and schools
cost 24.2 billion yen. The areas with most damage were the areas with a lot of
liquefaction, and the areas east of the active Kego fault. Regarding the liquefaction, the
area along the seashore has the potential of liquefaction because Fukuoka city has been
developed through land reclamation. In fact, the areas damaged by the liquefaction were
concentrated on the seashore. With regard to the active Kego fault, there was a lot of
damage on the east side of the fault (refer to figure 5). As can be seen in figure 6, the
depth of the soft layers on the east side of the fault measures 60m above the deepest
bedrock, whereas the depth of the other side measures 20m. As a result, it is guessed
that the shock of the earthquake was amplified in proportion to the thickness of the soft
layers.
319
K K
Damaged
buildings
Kego fault
※quoted from the 2nd prompt damage survey report by the Civil Engineer Association
Figure 5. Plane figure showing location of damaged buildings in downtown area
Light damage Heavy damage
Hakata Station.
Airport
Akasaka City Hall
Sandy Clay layer
Granite
Hakata Clay Layer Sandy Gravel
Gravel、Sandstone、Shale
Kego Fault
※quoted from the report on the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake by Fukuoka Prefecture Government.
Figure 6. K-K Section（Length/Depth=1/50）
320
Damages to the Waterworks Facilities
The key function of the waterworks facilities such as purification plants,

conveyance, transmission facilities and distribution basins survived with only minor
negligible damages. The damage to distribution and service facilities such as pipes and
attached equipment were comparatively heavy in the vicinity of the fault and the coast
zone. Concretely speaking, 61 distribution facilities, 101 service facilities in public
areas and 1,641 of those in private areas were destroyed or had water leakage. The
damages were not as heavy as expected in an earthquake of such a scale. One of the
reasons why damages were reduced was the usage of ductile iron pipe with chain type
joint to replace old ones in the reclaimed area, where irregular subsidence of land was
expected. Sites of facility damage are shown in the figure 7, and as can been seen,
damages to facilities are concentrated in the east side area of the active Kego fault and
in the latent liquefaction areas.
Main tremor
Repairing　spots　of　distribution　pipe 31
Repairing　spots　of　service　pipe　within　public　area 101
配水管等被災状況
Repairing 　spots　of　distribution　pipe’s　appurtenant 30
Kego fault
Figure 7. Damages to waterworks facilities
321
Volume of Water Leakage due to the Earthquake
The amount of the water supply in the city increased rapidly immediately after the
earthquake and it reached a stable state after a while. It is speculated that this is not an
influence from the leakage but from the sloshing effect described after. The leak volume
is calculated by comparing water supply volume of the day after the earthquake with
that of a normal day, both at 4～5 A.M when the water usage is at the lowest. From this,
the leak volume due to the earthquake was assumed to be 50,000m3 per day (refer to
figure 8).
The Sloshing Effects
Water supply increased instantaneously after the earthquake and reached a steady
level 17 minutes later. This phenomenon of rapid change of the water supply can not be
explained by increase in leakage. It seems appropriate to suppose that a lot of water run
out all together in a short period of time from the distribution pipe network. The
dominant cause is considered the sloshing effect in receiving tanks of buildings.
Sloshing induces the ball taps attached in the receiving tanks to malfunction. The figure
8 shows the 24-hour data of the water supply since the earthquake occurred.
24hours data of pressure and flow rate after the earthquake Pressure(MPa)
0.6
After Earthquake
Pressure in the rural areas
Before Earthquake
Pressure in the downtown area

Flow rate
(m3/h) 0.3
Leak rate
Flow rate
0.2
on the earthquake day
Flow rate 0.1

on a usual day
Elapsed time
Figure 8. 24-hour data of water pressure and flow rates after the earthquake
322
Inquiries
Fukuoka City Waterworks Customer Center handled inquiries, In addition, the

Maintenance Center, which was set up by the Fukuoka pipe work union luckily from
2months prior to the earthquake, took in inquiries of the service facilities in the private
area around-the-clock. The above responded to approximately 1,200 cases within 32
hours after the quake. Afterwards calls were also taken at 3 Maintenance Offices and 7
Business Branch Offices. After a month, the total inquiries added up to 2,200, out of
which inquiries on service pipe leakage accounted for 80%.
Emergency Water Supply
An emergency water supply is indispensable to support the disaster victims.

Especially hospitals with a dialysis treatment facilities and social welfare facilities for
the socially vulnerable should have top priority receiving emergency water supply.
However there were no requests for emergency water supply from the above facilities
during the disaster. It was fortunate that the waterworks pipe network was slightly
damaged during the disaster, so the emergency water supply was only provided to six
sites, including Kyusyu Memorial Gymnasium, which was a major evacuation center.
Emergency Recovery
Ordinarily, the repair system is as follows: The city area is divided to 3 blocks, four
units with repair equipment and wireless radio standing by in each block. These units
were called upon to repair damages immediately after the earthquake. Meanwhile, the
registered repair service companies conducted repair work in private areas. Repair work
progressed rapidly, and the volume of water leakage reduce gradually as can been seen
in figure 9. The Water Control Center found from water supply data analysis that leaks
occurred largely in the central and coastal areas, so it concentrated its repair works in
these areas. The Water Control Center greatly assisted in reducing the volume of
leakage.
323
Water supply
Leak vol. Supply vol.
（ｍ３）（ｍ３）
Leak
Mar． Apr．
Figure 9. Leak volume due to the earthquake
Victim support
Various support measures were provided to the disaster victims, of which the
water-related supports provided were specified below
1. Exemption from water charges
2. Leaked volume deducted from the water charge
3. Deferred payment
4. Amount of water used for tank cleaning deducted from the water charge
5. Exemption from service charges
RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FUKUOKA WEST OFFSHORE

EARTHQUAKE
Review of the Earthquake Probability and Scale
An investigation in 2001 showed that an earthquake of 6.5-7.1 on the magnitude

scale may hit the center of Fukuoka City as a consequence of the active Kego Fault. The
recurrence interval of an earthquake was 15,500 years and the probability of an
earthquake within 30 years was 0.4%. Fukuoka City Waterworks relied on this
324
investigation in planning its emergency response system. After the earthquake, another
investigation is being conducted by Investigation Advisory Committee of Fukuoka City.
On the other hand, it has already been announced by the National Earthquake
Investigation Committee in March 2007 that the probability of an earthquake of 7.2 on
the magnitude scale in the next 30 years is 0.3-6.0%, so Fukuoka City Waterworks has
decided to review its existing earthquake response plan with new data.
Pipe Construction Connecting Emergency Refuge Bases
In the case of a disaster, 300 evacuation centers have been designated by the city
authority, including hospitals, schools, public halls and parks. Construction of
earthquake-resistant pipes between the core distribution pipes and these evacuation
centers should take top priority, especially the pipes in the vicinity of the active Kego
Fault, elapsed pipes, and pipes with numerous leaks.
Reinforcement of the Cooperation with Other Cities
Strengthening the ties among the waterworks bureau of other cities is important in
the case of the disasters. If neighboring cities are prepared to provide assistance, supply
water to each other in emergencies, and hold joint training sessions, we could be better
prepared for an emergency. Fukuoka City Waterworks exchanged memorandum with
15city waterworks bureaus nationwide, and has exchanged memorandum with nine
cities in Kyusyu regarding providing assistance in emergencies.
Raising Awareness of Emergencies
Data clearly shows the changing attitude of the Fukuoka City Waterworks Bureau
workers during the earthquake. Three hours after the first tremor on March 20, 25% of
the workers were at their desks. Three hours after the largest aftershock on April 20,
45% of the workers were at their desks. This shows that workers became more aware of
the emergency situations. In order for the workers to be able to react appropriately in
emergencies, it is important to conduct regular simulation training programs, seminars
on mutual aid, seminars on established disaster response programs, and emergency
assembly training. For the residents, it is important for them to be prepared for water
shortage by preparing water containers, being aware of the nearest evacuation center
and checking their route to the center. In short, the residents’ awareness must be raised
in order to prevent them from being defenseless in emergencies.
325
CONCLUSION
Though Fukuoka City was thought to be safe against earthquakes, as can been
seen from the heavy earthquake striking Fukuoka, there is nowhere safe against
earthquake in Japan. Anti seismic facilities’ constructions are carried on in
accordance with the original anti-earthquake plan. However this plan ought to be
reviewed in the face of new data of probability of a next earthquake and its scale.
Further, as a lesson learned from the earthquake, the emergency response system
needs to be improved through training with other waterworks to enhance awareness
and management abilities to emergency. Fukuoka City Waterworks is a financially
–independent system and income has not been increased in recent years. Though the
maintenance cost has tended to be tight due to the budget shortage, it is one of the
important missions of our generation to hand over the water supply system with good
condition to the next generation. Much more efforts to get enough budget and
manpower should be continued patiently and steadily. Water supply system should be
kept in a safe and stable condition, seeing that a city cannot withstand disasters
without solid social infrastructure, which of course includes waterworks.
AKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all, I deeply appreciate both of Fukuoka Waterworks Bureau staffs. Mr.
Tooru Yarimizu in the Engineering Administration Section gave various data and
reports concerned about the earthquake. Mr. Hideo Kashima in the Water Control
Center submitted the data and suggested the contents of this report. Materials they
provided were greatly contributed to this report. In addition, I appreciated the staffs
of the International Section in City Hall to make the English version report.
REFERENCES
(1) Fukuoka Waterworks bureau. “Waterworks activity on Fukuoka West Offshore

Earthquake” November 2005.
(2) Fukuoka Waterworks bureau. “Anti-earthquake plan for waterworks facilities”
March 2003.
(3) Earthquake Investigation Committee, Fukuoka Pref. Government. “Report on
the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake ” July 2005.
326
SESSION 6
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Mr. Ken-ichi Koike, Kanagawa Water Supply Authority, Yokohama, JAPAN – “Water
Supply Control and Management in Emergency in the Wide Area Water
Supply – Using the Mutual Communication Raw Water Conveyance
Facilities”
Mr. Michael Ambrose, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US – “Multi-
Hazard Emergency Preparedness at East Bay Municipal Utility District”
Dr. Siao-Syun Ke, National Science & Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, TAIWAN
– “The Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness of Water Supply System
in Taipei City under Earthquake”
Mr. Steve Welch, Contra Costa Water District, Concord, CA, US – “Earthquake Response
Planning – Gaining Control of Disaster”
Prof. Tatsuo Ohmachi, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, JAPAN – “Near-field

Earthquake Displacements of the Non-liquefiable Ground Relevant to
Damage to Buried Pipelines”
327
328
Water Supply Control and Management in Emergency
in the Wide Area Water Supply.
Using the Mutual Communication Raw Water Conveyance Facilities
Ken-ichi Koike
ABSTRACT
Kanagawa Water Supply Authority (KWSA) is requested the stability of water supply in case
of a disaster such as earthquakes. Our two water resources were connected by the inner diameter
1,650mm raw water transmission main. Since it is effective measure for the water supply control and
management of the wide area water supply in the emergency, it introduces as an emergency
correspondence.
_____________
Ken-ichi Koike, Section Chief, Division of Water Supply Control and Management, Kanagawa Water Supply Authority
(KWSA), 1194 Yazashi-cho, Asahi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 241-0811
329
OUTLINE OF KWSA
Kanagawa Water Supply Authority (KWSA) is a bulk water supplier that supplies to the
waterworks of Kanagawa Prefecture, Yokohama City, and Kawasaki City and Yokosuka City
(hereafter, it is called the constituent bodies of KWSA). KWSA was established in 1969 to supply
purified water to these large-scale waterworks and utilize effectively the water resource. The Sakawa
River in the western part of Kanagawa Prefecture was developed at the time of foundation (The
Sakawa River Intake Project), and the Sagami River (The Sagami River Intake Project) in the center
part was developed with construction of Miyagase Dam. These rivers are our main water resources.
KWSA has two water intake facilities, four water purification plants, and 40 supply points to supply
purified water to the constituent bodies of KWSA. The supply capacity of 2,625,800m3/day is, and
the rate of occupying to the total water supply of the constituent bodies of KWSA has became about
50%.
One of the water resources of KWSA is different from the water resource of the constituent
bodies of KWSA. It plays a major roll in the emergency, so-called, the role of back-up system for the
constituent bodies of KWSA as a wide area water supply system. Moreover, the reciprocal
connection and the duplex water pipe are positively executed, and it greatly contributes to the stability
of water supply.
Figure 1. Water Supply Facilities of KWSA
330
MEASURES AGAINST EARTHQUAKE OF KWSA
KWSA has designed and constructed for the earthquake resistance since the Sakawa River
Intake Project (the foundation project), the anti-earthquake criteria for the water supply [1] revised
severe after Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake. According to the criteria, the facility of KWSA
correspond to the facilities importance (rank A), request to keep the function of facilities and the
minimal damage in case of the ground vibration level (level 2). New facilities are designed based on
this latest anti-earthquake criteria, the seismic diagnosis for the existing facilities is executing, and the
earthquake resistant reinforcement is sped up especially intake weir, water channel, water pipe
bridge, and office building, etc.
Seismic Diagnosis
z First Seismic Diagnosis (1982)

z Seismic Diagnosis for Building (1996)
z Seismic Diagnosis for Structure (1997)
z Seismic Diagnosis for Raw Water Conveyance Facilities (2000)
z Seismic Diagnosis for Other Facilities (1995 - 2004)
Earthquake Resistant Reinforcement
Building (1998 to 2002)
It executes such as the reinforcement with carbon fiber, the installation of bearing wall,
power-proof brace and beam and pillars.
Aqueduct Bridge and Water Pipe Bridge (1995 to 2004)
It executes such as the reinforcement with the ferroconcrete for Sagamigawa Aqueduct
Bridge and other water pipe bridges.
Water Purification Facilities (2001 to 2004)
It executes such as the reinforcement with a restraint joint.
Iizumi Intake Weir (2004)
It executes such as the reinforcement with a steel board, carbon fiber for the pillars of intake
mouse and operators room.
Moreover, "Earthquake Resistant Measures Committee" has been inaugurated to investigate

and verify the earthquake resistance of current facilities in KWSA.
331
Understanding and Planning for Restoration of Damage Situation Earthquake Based on
"Kanagawa Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan"
In the Earthquake Resistant Measures Committee, the seismic diagnosis in the future and the
plan of earthquake proof measures are considered, on the other hand, the seismic hazard that
influences the water supply of KWSA is specifically assumed, and discuss the water supply control
and the restoration plan at the earthquake disaster. This paper is based on the result of committee.
INFLUENCE ON FACILITIES AND SCENARIO EARTHQUAKE
Scenario Earthquake
In "Kanagawa Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan - earthquake disaster measures

plan -" (March, 2005) [2], "The Tokai Earthquake", "The South Kanto Earthquake", "The Western
Kanagawa Prefecture Earthquake", "The Miura Peninsula North Fault Earthquake", and "The
Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake" are assumed as an earthquake that influences on
Kanagawa Prefecture.
TABLE I. EARTHQUAKE INFLUENCES KANAGAWA PREFECTURE
Name of Earthquake Hypocenter Scale Imminence
Tokai Earthquake Suruga Trough 8 Yes
South Kanto Earthquake Sagami Trough 7.9 Before for 100 to 200 years
South Kanto regional

South Kanto Inland Earthquake 7.0 Some degree
right under
Western Kanagawa Prefecture Western Kanagawa

7.0 Yes
Earthquake Prefecture
Same fault zone and

Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Within 100 years in the
sea area extension 7.5
Earthquake future including present
part
Within 100 of years when
Miura Peninsula North Fault Earthquake This fault county 7.0 to 7.2 the future including
present.
The earthquake size is especially "Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake" large,
it is as an earthquake with the imminence, and the inner diameter 3,100 mm raw water transmission
main that convey raw water from the Sakawa River that is the water resource of KWSA crosses on
this fault. The Sakawa River is not intaked by the constituent bodies of KWSA, and it is also an
important water resource for the main constituent bodies of KWSA.
332
Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake
The Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake has many unidentified things in the
seismology, and the investigation of earthquake size and damage were delay. This earthquake was
pointed one of three large-scale fault belt earthquakes in the future by Science and Technology
Agency in 1997. A quantitative calculation of damage became clear by the investigation report of
"Kanagawa Prefecture Earthquake Estimation of Damage Investigation Committee"[3] in 1999.
According to the report, the feature of damage is as follows.
z Possibility of maximum damage more than the South Kanto Earthquake.

z Assumed earthquake with a seismic intensity of 6 in the whole area of Kanagawa
Prefecture.
z Assumed occurrence of large-scale sediment disaster.
z Assumed occurrence of big damage to structures such as Shinkansen and expressways
where the fault get across.
z Possibility of occurrence of big tsunami.
z Possibility of occurrence seismic ground motion with length cycle, and damage in long
and big structure.
TABLEⅡ. ASSUMPTION OF DAMAGE

Kanagawa Kanagawa Kannawa and
Assumption Prefecture Tokai South Kanto Prefecture Kozu-Matsuda
Item West Earthquake Earthquake East Part Fault Belt
Earthquake Earthquake Earthquake
Human
Suffering
Dead 600 230 16,000 2,700 7,600
Seriously Injured 670 1,200 6,400 2,900 6,600
Building
Damage
Large 33,700 20,100 319,000 95,000 410,000
Middle 68,000 54,200 397,000 258,000 569,000
Fire damage
Burnt Down 5,300 2,200 220,000 120,000 －

Buildings
Damage to the facilities of KWSA in Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake
The inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main is the conveyance pipeline to
transmit raw water from Iizumi Pumping Station (P.S.) at the Sakawa River to Isehara, Sagamihara,
and Nishi-nagasawa Purification plants (P.P.). The Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt is crossed
in about 4.7km point from Iizumi P.S. to Soga Junction Well. In case of the action of Kannawa and
Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt, the raw water transmission to Isehara, Sagamihara, and Nishi-nagasawa
P.P. is main water resource is broken and the occurrence of extensive damage is expected.
333
Soga Junction Well Raw Water Transmission Tunnel
Kannawa and Kozu

– Matuda Fault
3,100mm Raw Water
Transmission Main
Sakawa
River
Iizumi
3,100mm Raw Water
Transmission Main
L = 4,696.25 m
Figure 2. Position of Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault
and Inner Diameter 3,100mm Raw Water Transmission Main
According to the latest investigation of Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake,
the average displacement speed is calculated about 3m in 1,000 years, for there is a gap of about 20m
in the stratum of about 6,000 years ago. And the average activity cycle is guessed to be 1,100 years
from 1,000 years, therefore the displacement is assumed to be about 3 to 3.3m.
Expectation of Damage to Raw Water Transmission Main (Inner Diameter 3,100mm Raw Water
Transmission Main) in the Part of Fault
If the part of fault moves a few meters, the crossed raw water transmission main is greatly
transformed, it breaks in the worst case, and it is likely to leak. Moreover, the expansion pipe at the
part of the fault is broken or damaged.
In addition, the following are the proactive measures of fault part.
z Installation of Pipe for Discharge as Temporary Pipe.

z Laying of By-pass with High Density Polyethylene Pipe.
However, the width of fault amounts to 600m with congestion, the clear position is not
confirmed, and the parallel faults are identified. Therefore KWSA cannot take the proactive
measures.
334
Fault
21,500
200
21,000
18,600 15,600
Expansion
Raw Water Main
Side of Soga Junction Well

Expansion
Side of Sakawa River
Steel Stake
Figure 3. Displacement of expansion pipe for inner diameter 3,100mm raw water
transmission main in case of fault displacement
Expectation of Damage of Other Fault Part
The distortion of straight part of pipe is occurred by the seismic ground motion, the maximum
distortion of 0.064% in the seismic ground motion level 2 is, and it is safe compared with the
permissible distortion of 0.336%.
Expectation of Damage of Raw Water Transmission Main by Liquidizing
The stratum composition of this region has the clay layer, sandy soil, and gravel bed, and
liquidizing is caused easily. However, it is not easy to think liquidizing to the whole line of raw water
transmission main road, and there is no damage because of surfacing of the pipe.
INFLUENCE WATER SUPPLY
There is a possibility that the inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main is broken
when the fault acts by the Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake. The restoration period
is settled on aiming within one week on the basis of "Earthquake-Proof Plan Decision Guidance for
Water Supply"[4] (January, 1997), when the breaking or the functional maintenance of raw water
main becomes impossible. KWSA set the emergency restoration plan and maintain the stockpile.
However, it is necessary to control and management water supply in the emergency, for the
raw water transmission to Isehara, Sagamihara and Nishi-nagasawa P.P. can not work during the
emergency restoration. When the stockpile for the emergency restoration is unavailable, the
335
emergency correspondence for 160 days is requested as temporary restoration, for 190 days as
complete restoration.
The supply points to supply purified water from three purification plants of Sakawa River
Water System to the constituent bodies of KWSA, which have not the backup system such as
reciprocal connection transmission pipe will hold the risk of water suspension. The amount of water
of each purification plant that has not the backup systems in Sakawa River Water System is shown in
Table Ⅲ. These many supply points have not the backup systems and the buffer such as the
distribution reservoir etc, directly supply purified water to the customer. When the raw water
transmission is cut by the breaking of inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main, there is
strong possibility of the water suspension in the early stage. It is guessed that the influence of water
suspension reaches as much as 960,000 households in Kanagawa Prefecture.
The avoidance of water suspension to 960,000 households is the obligation of KWSA at the
earthquake occurrence. It is requested to secure the water of 546,100m3/h that is an impossible to
intake from Iizumi P.S.
TABLE Ⅲ TRANSFER OF EACH PURIFICATION PLANT IN SAKAWA WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM

Available Transfer Not Available Transfer
Supply Area of
to another water resource to another water resource
Purification Plant
(m3/D) (m3/D)
Isehara Purification Plant
14,400 81,500
Area
Sagamihara Purification Plant Area 100,300 198,300
Nishi-nagasawa Purification Plant

Area 111,000 266,300
Total 225,700 546,100
Make from application for amount of water from each constituent bodies of KWSA in 2006.
OPERATION OF 1,650mm INNER DIAMETER RAW WATER MAIN IN EMERGENCY
Outline of Operation of Inner Diameter 1,650mm Raw Water Main
The inner diameter 1,650mm raw water transmission main was constructed for the stability of
water supply in the center of Kanagawa prefecture by the Sagami River Intake Project. It connects the
raw water transmission tunnel from the Sakawa River and Shake P.S. to intake raw water from the
Sagami River, and it has the role of the mutual communication raw water conveyance facilities.
There are two kinds of operations for the inner diameter 1,650mm raw water transmission
main. On the one hand, the amount of water flow from the Sagami River to the purification plants in
Sakawa River Water System (Isehara P.P., Sagamihara P.P., Nishi-nagasawa P.P.) is the maximum
of 12,000m3/h by the pumping. (hereafter, it is called the Regular Raw Water Transmission). On the
other hand, the amount of water flow from the Sakawa River to the direction of Sagami River
purification plant (Ayase P.P.) is maximum of 9,000m3/h by the gravity. (hereafter, it is called the
Inversion Raw Water Transmission) Additionally, the Inversion Raw Water Transmission can be a
raw water transmission with the pumping discharge by Ayase Lines Pumping Facilities in Shake P.S.
336
it can convey raw water from the Sakawa River and the Sagami River to the direction of the Sagami
River purification plant (Ayase P.P.) (It is called the Combined Raw Water Transmission)
The test run begun in 2005, and the official operation in 2006. By the completion of these
facilities, even if one of the water resources suffers caused by a water shortage and a water quality
accident, it is possible to supply from the other safety water resource, and the backup function in the
emergency will be achieved.
The connecting point of this raw water transmission main to Sakawa River Water System is
Isehara Junction Well in Isehara P.P., where is situated on about 20km the downstream of inner
diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission that crossed Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt.
Therefore, by using the 1,650mm inner diameter raw water transmission main, even if the inner
diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main breaks the cause of Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda
Fault Belt Earthquake, the water supply from the Sagami River to the purification plants in Sakawa
River Water System (Isehara P.P., Sagamihara P.P., Nishi-nagasawa P.P.) is possible, and the risk of
the water suspension can be reduced.
Regular Raw Water Transmission

(Shake P.S. → Isehara Junction Well → IseharaP.P., Sagamihara P.P. & Nishi-nagasawa P.P.)
The way of raw water transmission is usually operate and transmit raw water from the Isehara
Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. to the filtration plants in Sakawa River Water System.
z Specification of Isehara Line Pumping Facility

Flow Rate 84m3/mim, Total Head 69m, Rotational Speed 985rpm, Motor Output
1,300kW, 2units
z Specification of the 1,650mm raw water transmission main
Ductile Iron Pipe (U type, L=7,839.33m) Coated Steel Pipe (STW400, L=1,145.71m)
z Specification of Isehara Junction Well>
RC, 1Stories Below, Diameter10.40m, Depth 56.24m
Inversion Raw Water Transmission

(Iizumi P.S. → Isehara Junction Well → Ayase P.P.)
This way of the raw water transmission is operate in case of accident. The amount of
transmission raw water depends on the amount of one from Iizumi P.S. It conveys raw water to
Ayase P.P. by the gravity.
Combined Raw Water Transmission

(Iizumi P.S. → Isehara Junction Well → Ayase P.P. )
Ayase Line Pumping Facility →
This way of the raw water transmission conveys raw water from Iizumi P.S. with Ayase
Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. to Ayase P.P.
z Specification of Ayase Line Pumping Facility

Flow rate 139m3/mim, Total Head 49m, Rotational Speed 575rpm, Motor Output
1,500kW, 4units
337
Sakawa River Water System
Isehara P.P. Sagamihara P.P. Nishi-nagasawa P.P.
3,100mm Raw Water

Transmission Main
P.S. Mutual Communication Raw Water

Conveyance Facilities
Iizumi
P.S.
Ayase P.P.
Sakawa
River P.S.
Shake
P.S.
Sagami River Water System
Sagami
River
Figure 4. KWSA Facilities System
Water Supply Control and Management in Case of Kannawa and Kozu - Matsuda Fault Belt
Earthquake
The supply points that have not the backup systems such as inter-connecting pipe in Sakawa
River Water System are 17. Isehara Line Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. is able to supply to 10 supply
points that can not be supplied from the other water resources in emergency situations. And 7 supply
points in the Nishi-nagasawa P.P. supply area can be supplied from the other water resource.
Therefore, it is possible to avoid the water suspension to Isehara P.P. and Sagamihara P.P.
The amount of the Regular Raw Water Transmission, because the number of installation of
Isehara Line Pumping Facility is two units, even 288,000m3/d is possible under the present situation.
However, it is necessary to supply the amount of water 546,100m3/d to avoid the water suspension for
17 supply points that have not the backup function in Sakawa River Water System, therefore the
Regular Raw Water Transmission of the present specification can not correspond to avoid the water
suspension for all supply points.
Nishi-nagasawa P.P. can be supplied the raw water from Numamoto Dam that is the water
resource of Sagami River System by the 2nd Raw Water Tunnel. Therefore, a part of the supply point
that is supplied from Nishi-nagasawa P.P. is possible the evasion of water suspension in the
emergency by just the Regular Raw Water Transmission of present specification. The breakdown of
transfer of water in three purification plants in Sakawa River Water System is shown in the TABLE
Ⅴ.
338
Numamoto
Dam 2nd Raw Water Tunnel
Isehara P.P. Sagamihara P.P. Nishi-nagasawa P.P.
Fuchinobe
Junction Well
3,100mm Raw Water
Transmission Main Isehara
Junction Well
P.S. Mutual Communication Raw Water

Conveyance Facilities
Iizumi
P.S.
Sakawa P.S.
River Shake Ayase P.P.
P.S.
Sagami
River
Figure 5. Supply Raw Water from 2nd Water Tunnel
TABLE Ⅴ. BREAKEDOWN OF TRANSFER OF EACH FILTRATION PLANT

IN SAKAWA RIVER WATER SYSTEM
Raw water transfer to
Transfer by Regular
Supply Area of another water
Raw Water
Purification Plant resource
Transmission (m3/D)
(m3/D)
Isehara P.P. Area 81,500 0
Sagamihara P.P. Area 198,300 0
Nishi-nagasawa P. P. Area
0 266,300
Total 279,800 266,300
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AFTERWORD
Even if the inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main in Sakawa River Water
System is broken by the Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake, the restoration period is
required at least about one week. It is assumed that the raw water transmission from Sakawa River
Water System is cut during the restoration period. In this case, all amount of the water suspension is
expected to be reaching about 50 percent or more of all amount of waters supplied from KWSA, and
an influence on 960,000 households. The operation of existing mutual communication raw water
conveyance facilities can back-up about half, and the remainder should depend on another water
resource.
Another water resource for backup is the allocation of water rights of other water supplier
including the constituent bodies of KWSA, and it needs to elaborately adjust. Furthermore it is
absolutely essential that the flexible operation which is not fixed on the existing water rights in a
large-scale earthquake like this case.
In this paper, it is assumed that the inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main in
Sakawa River Water System is broken by the Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake,
and the supply to the constituent bodies of KWSA stagnates. It describes that the water supply control
and management as large area water supply try to evade the water suspension by the Regular Raw
Water Transmission with the mutual communication raw water conveyance facilities and the transfer
to another water resource. If Isehara Line Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. installed more, the
continuation of supply for purification plants in Sakawa River Water System would be possible
without the transfer to another water resource.
REFERENCES
[1] JWWA. 1997. “Anti-earthquake Criteria for Water Supply,”
[2] Kanagawa Prefectural Government. March, 2005. “Kanagawa Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan -
Earthquake Disaster Measures Plan,”
[3] Kanagawa Prefecture Earthquake Estimation of Damage Investigation Committee. 1999. “Kanagawa Prefecture
Earthquake Estimation of Damage Investigation,”
[4] Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. January, 1997. “Earthquake-Proof Plan Decision Guidance for Water
Supply,”
340
Multi-Hazard Emergency Preparedness at East Bay
Municipal Utility District
Mike Ambrose and Steve Frew
ABSTRACT
The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) is a large water and wastewater utility in the
eastern part of San Francisco Bay Area in California. EBMUD operations are exposed to a number
of hazards. As such, the District has experienced a number of emergencies and developed an
extensive emergency preparedness program. This paper provides an overview of emergency
preparedness at EBMUD including significant events that impacted the development of the
program, how emergency preparedness and business continuity are handled within the organization,
the emergency response organization, specific facilities and equipment dedicated to emergency
response, and future initiatives to bolster existing programs.
Mike Ambrose, Manager of Regulatory Compliance, Operations and Maintenance Department, East Bay Municipal
Utility District, 375 Eleventh Street, MS 704, Oakland, California, USA 94607-4240
Steve Frew, Manager of Security and Emergency Preparedness, Operations and Maintenance Department, East Bay
Municipal Utility District, 375 Eleventh Street, MS 409, Oakland, California, USA 94607-4240
341
INTRODUCTION
Background
The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD or the District) is a water and wastewater
utility based in the eastern part of San Francisco Bay in northern California. EBMUD is a
publicly owned utility created in 1923 to provide water service. In 1944, EBMUD's Special
District No. 1 was created to treat wastewater discharged into the Bay. EBMUD's water system
serves approximately 1.3 million people in a 331-square-mile area (see Figure 1). The
wastewater system serves approximately 642,000 people in an 88-square-mile area [1].
About 90 percent of EBMUD's water supply comes from the Mokelumne River watershed in
the western slope of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The watershed covers an area of 627 square
miles. Water is transmitted 90 miles to the East Bay via 3 steel aqueducts. The remaining
10 percent of water supply originates as runoff in watersheds in the East Bay [1].
The water service area encompasses incorporated and unincorporated areas in two counties.
The City of Oakland is the largest entity served with a population of nearly 400,000. The
western portion of the service area is a plain running north-south along the Bay. The
Oakland/Berkeley Hills rise to about 1900 feet above sea level and run roughly through the
middle of the service area from north to south. Much of the central, hilly portion of the service
area is undeveloped watershed lands of EBMUD’s local reservoirs. Urban land uses in the
service area include residential (low density single family homes and multi-family residences),
commercial, and industrial development.
The District employs approximately 1900 people. The District’s Administration Building
has about 800 employees and is located in downtown Oakland. There is a large maintenance
facility in Oakland. The Main Wastewater Treatment Plant is located at the edge of San
Francisco Bay in west Oakland. Other occupied and unoccupied facilities are scattered
throughout the East Bay and along the aqueducts up to the Mokelumne Watershed.
Hazards
Due to the extent of operations and the diverse areas served, EBMUD is exposed to a number
of hazards including:
• Earthquake
• Tsunami
• Wild land and urban wild land fires
• Flood
• Freezes
• Terrorist events
• Cyber crime
• Pandemic
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Figure 1. EBMUD Service Area
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Earthquake is the biggest threat due to the expected probability and potential for extensive
damage. A total of 5 faults cut through the District’s service area (See Figure 2). The Hayward
fault is the most active and has the potential to cause the most damage. The fault runs
north-south along the Oakland/Berkeley Hills. There is a 32 percent chance of a magnitude 6.7
or greater quake on the Hayward fault before the year 2030 [2].
Figure 2. Faults in EBMUD Service Area

(Courtesy of USGS)
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DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AT EBMUD
Oakland Hills Fire
On Saturday October 20, 1991, a small fire erupted in the Oakland Hills. The Berkeley Fire
Department quickly doused the fire. However, hot winds from the east fanned a hot spot into
flames again on Sunday morning. The fire burned for several days, destroying 3354 single
family homes and 456 apartments, injuring 150 people, and killing 25 persons. More than
1600 acres were burned at a cost of $1.5 billion. It was the worst residential fire in California
history [3].
After the fire, the District created an Office of Emergency Preparedness and hired the first
Emergency Preparedness Officer in 1992. A group of employees were designated to the
Emergency Operations Team (EOT) and a comprehensive emergency operations plan was
developed. The EOT was trained on the plan and exercises simulating disasters were completed.
EBMUD also led the formation of a permanent organization called the Hills Emergency
Forum consisting of East Bay agencies, counties, and cities to reduce the potential for another
firestorm. The group assessed hill area fire hazards, and developed fire-related codes,
ordinances, equipment needs, and training exercises.
The District also created the Water Agency Response Network (WARN) with water agencies
in 16 coastal counties. The WARN created an omnibus mutual aid agreement to help respond to
emergencies like the firestorm. The WARN program was expanded to agencies all over the
state.
Standardized Emergency Management System
During the Oakland Hills fire, the home of State Senator Nick Petris was destroyed.
Consequently, Senator Petris introduced legislation directing the California Governor's Office of
Emergency Services (OES) to establish the Standardized Emergency Management System
(SEMS) [4]. The framework of SEMS includes the Incident Command System (ICS) and the
Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS).
SEMS is required by California Government Code for managing emergencies involving
multiple jurisdictions and agencies. Local governments must use SEMS to be eligible for
funding their response-related personnel costs under state disaster assistance programs. SEMS is
intended to facilitate the flow of information within and between levels of the system, and
coordination among all responding agencies. The intent of SEMS is to improve the mobilization,
deployment, utilization, tracking, and demobilization of needed mutual aid resources. SEMS is
designed to be flexible and adaptable to the varied disasters that occur in California and to the
needs of all emergency responders.
ICS is a basic function of SEMS. The intent of ICS is to create an emergency management
system that is organizationally flexible to meet the needs of incidents of any kind and size; able
to use the system on a day-to-day basis for routine situations as well as for major emergencies;
and sufficiently standardized to allow personnel from a variety of agencies and diverse
geographic locations to rapidly meld into a common management structure.
MACS is a system that allows agencies and organizations to coordinate response to several
incidents, allocate critical resources, and share information.
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National Incident Management System
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S.
Government sought a comprehensive national approach to incident management that was
applicable to all jurisdictional levels and across disciplines. The intention was to improve
coordination and cooperation between public and private entities in a variety of domestic
incident management activities including acts of terrorism, wild land and urban fires, floods,
hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.
On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
(HSPD-5), which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a
National Incident Management System (NIMS). According to HSPD-5, the goal of NIMS is to
provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work
effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic
incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.
The NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology covering the incident
command system; multiagency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification
and management of resources; qualification and certification of personnel; and the collection,
tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources to provide for
interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local entities.
EBMUD has incorporated SEMS and NIMS into all emergency preparedness policies, plans,
training, and exercises.
EBMUD EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM FEATURES
Emergency Preparedness/Business Continuity Policy
The District has a policy on emergency preparedness and business continuity to ensure an
active Emergency Preparedness Program is implemented in accordance with the guidelines of the
NIMS and SEMS to help manage the District's critical functions during any emergency and
protect the safety of staff. The policy also supports a business continuity program to minimize
disruptions of critical business functions and enhance recovery operations following an event
that causes a business interruption. The policy defines a District emergency, describes the
purchasing authority of the General Manager in the event of an emergency, management
succession, and the Emergency Operations Director (EOD). The EOD may direct all human or
material resources of the District to combat the effects of a threatened, declared or actual
emergency.
Emergency Preparedness Staff
Two staff members are dedicated full-time to emergency preparedness and security. The
District hired a Security Operations Officer in 2002 to centralize security operations at the
District. This position was combined with the Emergency Preparedness Officer and changed to
the Manager of Security and Emergency Preparedness. The Manager of Security and Emergency
Preparedness plans, develops, evaluates, and manages District-wide security operations and
emergency preparedness and response programs.
346
A Security and Emergency Preparedness Specialist works under the direction of the Manager
of Security and Emergency Preparedness. The Specialist implements and maintains assigned
elements of the District’s security operations, emergency preparedness, and business continuity
programs including developing emergency plans, training District staff, developing and
implementing exercises of emergency plans, completing after action reports, and coordinating
with outside agencies.
Emergency Operations Plan
The District’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) outlines the District's overall emergency
management program for response to natural disasters and malevolent acts. The plan is designed
to help the District organize, manage, respond, and recover quickly and effectively. The plan
identifies potential hazards, explains activation of the plan, describes the Emergency Operations
Team organization, identifies responsibilities during disaster response, and gives guidance on
emergency preparedness including education and training.
Emergency Operations Team
The Emergency Operations Team (see Figure 3) identified in the EOP is staffed by EBMUD
employees. The team is lead by the Emergency Operations Director as per District policy. The
Emergency Operations Director receives legal authority and guidance from a Policy Group
which is comprised of the Board of Directors, General Manager and a Legal Advisor from the
General Counsel’s Office. The group is organized in accordance with NIMS and SEMS (i.e., a
Command Staff, which includes the Director of Emergency Operations, a Safety Officer, a
Regulatory Compliance Officer, a Liaison Officer, and an Administrative Scribe; and a General
Staff, which consists of the Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance Sections). A primary,
alternate and backup employee for each EOT position has been identified to ensure sufficient
staff can initially respond and two 12-hour shifts can be implemented during the emergency.
Training and Exercises
Using SEMS and NIMS is an efficient way to respond to, work through and recover from an
emergency incident, but it does require a detailed process, proper forms to document planning
and response, and coordination between responders. During a fire, a water utility may simply
serve as an advisor or liaison from the utility to a fire incident commander to assist with
necessary water supply. This is a relatively easy role to fill for most water agencies. However,
when an incident like a regional earthquake occurs, or when a water district like EBMUD loses a
major facility due to fire, flood, or some other emergency, our response planning must include all
such potential hazards.
Training staff to be competent in managing an emergency using the same (SEMS/NIMS)
system that fire and police agencies use, certifying key staff as emergency supervisors and
managers, and practicing a coordinated response with other agencies takes a significant
commitment. In California, all emergency response personnel must be trained in the SEMS. At
EBMUD, all employees are deemed to be Disaster Service Workers as per California law, so all
new employees receive an overview of SEMS as part of their orientation to the District.
347
EBMUD Board of Directors POLICY
GROUP
General Manager Legal Advisor
Emergency Operations
Director
Operations Planning Logistics Finance

Section Section Section Section
Figure 3. Emergency Operations Team
The Federal Government under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed
national standards for training in emergency management (i.e., NIMS). NIMS certification is
required to receive DHS grant funding. Field emergency response personnel, supervisors and
managers all receive specific training and certificates to prove that they are competent at the
necessary levels. Depending on the role the employee fills, this training could cover anywhere
from one day to a week or more. To meet this requirement, the District has staff trained and
certified as trainers to deliver the training at the required levels to the EOT and emergency
response staff.
Once trained, the District exercises this training at least twice each year. The District
participates in a statewide exercise called Golden Guardian each fall, and conducts another
exercise, usually in concert with other first responder (police/fire) agencies and with local,
regional or state Offices of Emergency Services.
Coordination with Other Agencies and Government
Since 1991, fire agencies in the East Bay meet and work closely with EBMUD through the
East Bay Hills Fire Forum to continually improve our working relationship and preparedness to
respond to a fire in the Oakland Hills area. These meetings help fire agencies understand the
District’s distribution systems, and is critical to coordinating our efforts during firefighting in
their areas.
The California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA) is located at the Office of
Emergency Services State Operations Center (SOC) in Sacramento. The CUEA provides
348
structure for efficient communications and coordination among government agencies and public
and private utilities throughout the state. CUEA is the contact point for emergency managers
representing all types of utilities in California including water, wastewater, energy (gas and
electric), and telecommunications, and petroleum pipelines. CUEA provides a network to
discuss emergency preparedness issues with other utilities. CUEA also serves as the primary
contact for all utilities in the state during a regional emergency.
Formed shortly after September 11, 2001, the Bay Area Security Information Collaborative
(BASIC) is a network of Security and Emergency Preparedness professionals who work for the
9 larger water utilities, both public and private, around the San Francisco Bay Area, as well as
the California Department of Health Services (CDHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). This group meets regularly to discuss security and emergency preparedness issues of
concern. BASIC has developed a potable water distribution plan for the State of California, to
assist the Office of Emergency Services following a regional earthquake. The purpose of the
plan is procure and distribute water to the public when water treatment and distribution facilities
are not functional due to damage. BASIC has also developed a forum to communicate and
assess response to any increase in the local, regional or national threat level as defined by the
Department of Homeland Security.
The Water Agency Response Network (WARN) is a network developed by EBMUD, to
connect water agencies in California with one-another when they need resources in an
emergency. Through this web-based network, a water or wastewater agency can offer or obtain
necessary resources such as an emergency generator, portable pump, forklift or operators.
Through the network, the resource can be requested as a mutual aid/assistance resource, from
one water agency to another. This concept has been expanded to several other states across the
U.S.
District security staff have been trained in a course called the Terrorism Liaison Officer
(TLO) by the East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group (EB TWEG). The EB TEWG is a group
of law enforcement officers and deputies from the two counties in the EBMUD service area.
TLO’s are cleared to receive confidential information from law enforcement that may impact
District operations. District staff provide the EB TEWG information on potential terrorist
activities. Investigators take such data from all agencies in the region to compare notes and
identify patterns.
Facilities and Equipment
The District has a dedicated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in its Administration
Building in downtown Oakland. The EOC is located adjacent to the operations control center for
the water distribution system. The EOC provides work stations for the Emergency Operations
Team, computer terminals, analog telephones, printers and plotters, fax machines, and satellite
telephone and ham radio communications to facilitate information sharing, satellite TV monitors
to track developing news from multiple sources at one time.
The District recently procured a Mobile Command Post Vehicle using $120,000 in grant
funding from the Department of Homeland Security. The vehicle is a 28 foot trailer, equipped
with 6 networked workstations, a conference room, satellite receiver and monitor, Telular®
telephones, satellite phones, fax machine, kitchenette, restroom and storage. It is designed to
work alongside police/fire or any other emergency response agency in unified or joint command
349
of an emergency event, and gives the District the ability to manage a prolonged event in comfort
regardless of location or weather conditions.
The District has equipped Incident Bases (IB’s) at key facilities. The IB’s house personnel
and equipment to support operations at multiple incident sites. The IB’s can activate on their
own or under the direction of the EOC. This gives EBMUD the ability to manage large-scale
response regionally as well as functionally, and to ensure continuity of operations to the highest
degree possible during the response and recovery period.
Business Continuity Program
As important as its response to an emergency, the District must be able to ensure its ability to
maintain its critical business functions and recover important business functions to support
employee care, customer needs, financial services, legal responsibilities and regulatory issues
following an emergency or disaster. To meet this demand, each department has developed a
Business Continuity Plan (BCP) that outlines the critical functions that must be performed
before, during and after an interruption, the personnel responsible for completing the necessary
actions, and the records, equipment and systems required to accomplish the identified tasks. The
departments are responsible to ensure that the BCPs are maintained, employees trained, and the
vital records necessary to maintain operations are available.
FUTURE ELEMENTS OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
Alternate EOC
An alternate EOC is currently in the design phase. The District’s Administration Building
that contains the EOC is subject to damage from a major earthquake. The building has been
structurally upgraded, but it may not be occupiable following a severe event. The District will
construct an alternate EOC with limited capabilities at a facility east of the Oakland/Berkeley
Hills. The probability is that a single event will not damage both facilities, and the District will
have the ability to manage emergencies at different EOC locations.
Alternate Data Center
The District has a data center in its Administration Building that supports the Information
Technology (IT) needs of the entire District. Information systems including communication
systems (phone, email, and internet) and access to specific network applications like work
management, materials management, and electronic timesheets are high priority systems with
recovery time objectives ranging from 12 to 72 hours. The existing data center is susceptible to
fires, insider threats, and earthquakes. Consequently, the District entered an agreement with a
similar agency in Sacramento, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, to share some space in
each other’s data center. In addition, a study of other alternatives is being completed that would
provide a more robust solution for a greater number of District applications.
350
Emergency Response Plans
As a supplement to the EOP, several Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) are being developed
that provide general strategies for responding to specific events. ERPs for a failure of a raw
water aqueduct, an earthquake west of the Oakland/Berkeley Hills (probably a Hayward Fault
event), and a pandemic have been drafted. ERPs are planned for an earthquake east of the
Oakland/Berkeley Hills and a water quality event.
Mutual Assistance
EBMUD has negotiated an agreement with the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
for providing mutual assistance in the event of a disaster that effect one, but not the other agency.
As large water utilities that work in a similar fashion, such an agreement provides these agencies
the ability to obtain significant staff and equipment resources through one agency, and to deploy
them quickly. The District has begun discussing expansion of this agreement to other large
water and wastewater utilities in the Western United States.
REFERENCES
[1] Jain P., E. Szczepankowska, and J. Tam. November 2005. “Urban Water Management Plan 2005,” East Bay
Municipal Utility District.
[2] Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities 1999. Earthquake Probabilities in the San Francisco
Bay Region: 2000 to 2030 – A Summary of Findings, U.S. Geological Survey, Open-File Report 99-517.
[3] McClendon, I. 1999. “Its Name Was M.U.D., A Story of Water,” East Bay Municipal Utility District: 261-267.
[4] SEMS Guidelines, Standardized Emergency Management System, September 2006.
351
352
The Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness of Water
Supply System in Taipei City under Earthquake
Ban-Jwu Shih, Siao-Syun Ke, Wei-Sen Li, and Pei-Chung Hsu
ABSTRACT
In Taipei City with more than 2.5 million populations, earthquake is one of common natural
threats to public infrastructures and utilities. Tap water supply system containing huge and
complicated underground pipelines is the fundamental infrastructure of urban city. For increasing the
post-quake survival and function of modern city, evaluating and strengthening of the seismic capacity
in existing water supply system will contribute to improving daily safety.
Besides introducing the emergency preparedness of water supply system in Taipei , this paper
estimates the population be affected and emergency quantity of water to prepare after earthquake in
metropolitan Taipei City according to damage estimation of the water pipeline system and population
distribution. And base on the losses estimation, the countermeasures and strategies of emergency
response will be designed to make fundamental suggestions toward pipeline system under major
earthquake attack.
INTROCTION
Water supply system containing complex and huge underground pipelines is the important and
fundamental infrastructure of urban city. But water supply system is vulnerable to earthquake damage
and difficult to be examined and repaired fast after the earthquake. Even the function of the overall
system be stopped to work cause of some damages on partial pipelines or facilities.
The damages on the water supply system not only caused the inconvenience of major people in
the disaster area but also delayed the disaster rescue, such as water shortage would delay the
post-earthquake fire rescue or injure sanitation in disaster areas, resulting in the spread of infecting
diseases. Therefore, it’s necessary for safety of the city to improve the post-earthquake emergency
response capacity of the water systems.
Based on the “The plans of Taipei district disaster prevention and rescue (2005)”, the
post-earthquakes emergency response and preparedness of water supply should be planned by Taipei
Water Department (referred to as TWD) in duty. “Water Supply Project Taipei Area Tap-Water 5th
Phase Construction”[1]（hereinafter referred to as Taipei Water 5th Project）is a project proposed by
Taipei Water Department and approved by the Executive Yuan in 1991, for satisfying the water
demand of Greater Taipei Area till 2030 as well as the safe and steady supply of water and water
_____________
Ban-Jwu Shih, Associate Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, National Taipei University of Technology, No.1,
Sec. 3, ChungHsiao E. Rd., Taipei City 106, Taiwan,
Siao-Syun Ke, Assistant Researcher, National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, 9F., No.200, Sec. 3,
Beisin Rd., Sindian City, Taipei County 231, Taiwan.
Wei-Sen Li, Associate Researcher, National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, 9F., No.200, Sec. 3,
Beisin Rd., Sindian City, Taipei County 231, Taiwan.
Pei-Chung Hsu, Secretary general , Water Works Association of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 7F., No.106, Sec. 2,
ChangAn E. Rd., Taipei City 104, Taiwan.
quality. However, it has been more than a decade since Taipei Water 5th Project was established,
there are quite some difference in water supply and demand from the basis of earlier planning. In
1 353
order to fulfill the needs in water supply up to 2030, promote safety of water supply system, establish
system backup and capacity reservation mechanism and divide into Water Supply Zones for effective
management, TWD hence review the execution of Taipei Water 5th Project and drafted the basic
planning of the subsequent project to be the baseline for the continuous project of Taipei Water 5th
Project.
Besides introducing the emergency preparedness of water supply system in Taipei, this paper
estimates the population be affected and emergency quantity of water to prepare after earthquake in
metropolitan Taipei City according to damage estimation of the water pipeline system and population
distribution. And base on the losses estimation, the countermeasures and strategies of emergency
response will be designed to make fundamental suggestions toward pipeline system under major
earthquake attack.
THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN TAIPEI CITY

UNDER EARTHQUAKE
In recent years, the water supply frequently be suspended in Taiwan due to various natural
disasters. In view of this, Taipei Water Department actively improved the disaster prevention and
rescue based on three strategies : strengthen facilities, emergency restoration, and emergency water
supply. TWD also improve the plans to avoid or reduce damage cause of any possible factors
endangering the safety of water supply such as the earthquake, the drought, the rainstorm, the high
raw water turbidity and the facilities accident, etc.
For satisfying the water demand of Taipei metropolitan as well as the safe and steady supply and
quality of water when water supply facilities damaged after earthquakes, Taipei Water Department in
recent years actively strived for emergency preparedness and related trainings in the following
sequence:
Upgrade the Capacity of Purification Plants
The 5th and 6th purification facilities be added in Zhitan purification plant. In addition to supply
Taipei County, improve reserve rate of the purification plant from 0.6% up to 29%. TWD also
improve safety and stability of regional water supply by adding four boost stations in service area.
Upgrade the Capacity of the Support
• The establishment of the second running-water main pipeline forms the double-pipeline water
supply system with the first running-water main pipeline. It can substantially improve the
stability and safety of water supply in Taipei. Moreover, the second raw water transportation
pipeline is under construction. It will also be served as spare system at the abnormal situation
of the first raw water transportation pipeline or at annual service and maintenance in the
future.
• The double power supply system be set up in each purification plant and large-scale boost
stations. And rented generators in reserve be set up in mid-scale and small-scale boost
stations.
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Strengthen Capability of the Water Supply System
Besides the annual maintenance of the first running-water main pipeline and the first raw water
transportation pipeline, TWD actively replaced the old or leaking pipelines and comprehensively
installed the new pipes used for seismic resistance material such as the flexible stainless steel pipe.
And water supply zones be divided for effective management.
Improve Capacity of Emergency Water Supply
13 emergency water supply points including 11 points located in the boost stations and 2 points
located near running-water main pipeline (shown as figure 1) have be currently set in Taipei
metropolitan. The total volume of reserving water is about 220,000 tons and 2.4 million residents can
be supplied 30 days based on the daily requirement of 3-liter per person.
Adding emergency water supply points located near running-water main pipeline be mainly
planned in future. TWD has two running-water main pipelines with 2,400 mm in diameter and total
length of main pipelines is about 34km. Besides, the total length of branch pipelines with 2,000 mm
in diameter is about 5.6 km. The storage water in the main pipelines and branch pipelines can be
provided for post-disaster emergency water supply in full or partial suspension.
17 points have been planned by TWD and the location be chose based on the following
conditions :
• Located near existing airing valves or working wells.

• Enough space to set up the temporary water supply equipment.
• Located near main traffic line or shelters.
In addition, 12 seismic resistance storage tanks in disaster-prevention parks and 22 temporary

water supply points formed with stainless steel buckets, water supply vehicles and temporary
hydrants have been planned.
Figure 1. Emergency water supply points located near running-water main pipeline
(printed by Taipei Water Department).
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Promote Popular Capacity of Emergency Response
Taipei Water Department promoted popular capacity and willingness of emergency response
through various public disaster drills that residents directly participate and practically operated
facilities. And TWD regularly investigated the opinion of populace about the demand of
post-earthquakes water supply including daily consumption and quality of water. The results will be
helpful to improve the plans about disaster prevention and emergency response. TWD also provided
related information for disaster prevention to the populace by the publicity containing operation
descriptions of facilities, locations of the emergency water supply points and procedures for
emergency water supply, etc., shown in figure 2.
Figure 2. The publicity printed by Taipei Water Department
ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCY WATER SUPPLY IN TAIPEI METROPOLITAN
Taipei Water Department supplied 4 million people in Taipei metropolitan with tap water of 3.1
million tons per day. Safety, health and convenience are three important goals for TWD. After
earthquakes, TWD had distributed the tap water to the residents in disaster area in duty. To estimate
the demand for emergency water supply, this paper estimates the affected population, the quantity of
emergency water supply, working-hours and manpower for repair according to the basic statistical
data such as population in each district, population density, number of households, pipeline density
and the scale of earthquake (return period of 500 years). And base on the result, the countermeasures
and strategies of emergency response will be designed to make fundamental suggestions toward
pipeline system under major earthquake attack.
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Analysis of Distribution of the Population in the Service Area of Taipei Water Department
The service area of Taipei Water Department covers with 16 districts which 4 districts (SanChong
city, YongHe city, JhongHe city and SinDian city) are part of Taipei County and 12 districts are part
of Taipei City. Based on the latest population statistics (October, 2006)[2], the population in each
district were between 200,000 to 300,000 except DaAn (over 300,000 people), NanGong, DaTong,
ZhongShan and WanHua (less than 200,000). The current average population density of Taipei City
were 9,667 people per square kilometer. Because of the difference in geographical conditions and
development , the population density of every districts were not equal, more than 27,000 people per
square kilometer in DaAn but less than 5,000 people per square kilometer in BeiTou, ShiLin and
SinDian for example. The detail is shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.
TABLE 1. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE SERVICE AREA OF TAIPEI WATER DEPARTMENT
Population
Area Population number of
District density
( km2 ) (person) households
(person/ km2)
SongShan 9.29 208,788 22,480 75,646
XinYi 11.21 230,943 20,606 84,934
DaAn 11.36 313,628 27,605 113,784
ZhongShan 13.68 219,091 16,013 86,950
ZhongZheng 7.61 158,393 20,822 59,496
DaTong 5.68 126,901 22,336 45,349
WanHua 8.85 194,652 21,989 72,271
WenShan 31.51 260,863 8,279 93,027
NanGang 21.84 112,992 5,173 38,992
NeiHu 31.58 264,154 8,365 90,114
ShiLin 62.37 287,918 4,616 96,713
Beitou 56.82 249,151 4,385 84,951
SanChong 16.32 383,524 23,505 128,920
YongHe 5.71 235,407 41,200 86,889
JhongHe 20.14 410,203 20,364 145,046
SinDian 120.23 288,495 2,400 109,075
Total 434.20 3,945,103 16,883 1,412,157
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Beitou Beitou
ShiLin ShiLin
NeiHu
ZhongShan ZhongShan
NeiHu
SanChong
DaTong DaTong
SanChong SongShan SongShan
ZhongZheng NanGong ZhongZheng NanGong

Xi nYi Xi nYi
WanHua DaAn WanHua DaAn
YongHe Popul at i on YongHe
WenShan densi t y WenShan

JhongHe JhongHe
Uni t : per son/km^2
Popul at i on
Uni t ：per son > 40,000
> 400,000 > 20,000
> 300,000 Si nDi an Si nDi an
> 10,000
> 200,000 > 5,000
< 200,000 < 5,000
Figure 3. Population distribution in the service area of Taipei Water Department
The Estimation of the Affected Population and the Amount of Emergency Water Supply after
the Earthquake
Based on the repair rate of water pipelines, the dry rate and affected population after earthquake
could be estimated preliminarily. In this paper, the local formula of repair rate referring to large GIS
databases compiled after 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake in Taiwan be adopted[3].This empirical formula be
obtained by the approach of regression considering the effects of ground shaking and permanent
ground deformation simultaneously.
The estimation of the affected population were shown as table 2. However, the rate of aged
people (more than 65 years old) and youth people(less than 14 years old) is higher in JhongHe city,
SanChong city, DaAn, WenShan and SinDian city. Therefore, more temporary water supply points
should be set in these districts and emergency water bags with suitable capacity should be designed.
Meanwhile, in accordance with the restoring rate of water supply and the required quantity per
person per day, the total quantity of emergency water supply within 10 days after the earthquake can
be estimated. This paper assumed that the required quantity of water per person is 3-liter within 4
days, 10-liter on 5th day, 12-liter on 6th day, 16-liter on 7th to 9th day and 20-liter on 10th day after
the earthquake[3]. According to the demand, the total quantity of emergency water supply is about
6,000 tons on the first day. And 1,200 vehicle trips will be dispatched based on the carrying capacity
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of the vehicle of 5-ton. The daily required quantity of water supply within 10 days after earthquake is
shown as Table 3. The peak quantity of water supply will be on the 5th and 10th day. Therefore, the
vehicle scheduling must to be planned in advance. But the daily water supply for unaffected residents
still have to be considered.
TABLE 2. AFFECTED POPULATION AFTER EARTHQUAKE
Affected < 14 15-64 > 65

District population years old years old years old
(person) (person) (person) (person)
SongShan 102,185 18,538 71,766 11,881
XinYi 122,811 19,028 88,743 15,041
DaAn 162,895 27,831 113,529 21,535
ZhongShan 107,189 16,115 78,521 12,553
ZhongZheng 82,162 15,009 56,265 10,888
DaTong 63,388 9,921 45,596 7,871
WanHua 102,683 14,382 73,898 14,404
WenShan 141,634 25,930 100,761 14,943
NanGang 55,010 9,244 40,197 5,569
NeiHu 120,259 22,957 87,967 9,335
ShiLin 111,835 18,033 81,651 12,150
Beitou 94,537 15,973 68,738 9,826
SanChong 213,725 35,920 161,866 15,940
YongHe 115,214 19,374 84,951 10,888
JhongHe 227,948 34,154 175,855 17,939
SinDian 156,131 23,876 117,491 14,764
total 1,979,605 326,284 1,447,795 205,526
TABLE 3. THE ESTIMATION OF REQUIRED QUANTITY AND VEHICLE TRIPS WITHIN

10 DAYS AFTER EARTHQUAKES
District 1st day 2nd day 4th day 5th day 6th day 7th day 10th day
SongShan 307 252 207 656 750 956 1,053
XinYi 368 303 249 788 902 1,150 1,266
DaAn 489 402 330 1,045 1,196 1,525 1,679
ZhongShan 322 264 217 688 787 1,003 1,105
ZhongZheng 246 203 166 527 603 769 847
DaTong 190 156 128 407 465 593 653
WanHua 308 253 208 659 754 961 1,058
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WenShan 425 349 287 909 1,040 1,326 1,460
NanGang 165 136 111 353 404 515 567
NeiHu 361 297 243 771 883 1,126 1,240
ShiLin 336 276 226 717 821 1,047 1,153
Beitou 284 233 191 606 694 885 974
SanChong 641 527 433 1,371 1,569 2,001 2,203
YongHe 346 284 233 739 846 1,078 1,188
JhongHe 684 562 461 1,462 1,674 2,134 2,349
SinDian 468 385 316 1,002 1,146 1,461 1,609
Total 5,939 4,882 4,007 12,699 14,536 18,529 20,404
Vehicle trips 1,188 977 801 2,540 2,908 3,706 4,081
The Estimation of Manpower for Repair after the Earthquake
The Estimation of Working Hours for Repair
The total working hours for repair of water pipelines in each diameter should include excavation,
drainage, replacement of the pipe, washing the pipe and restoring water supply and was shown in
table 4 [4]. But working hours may be added because of the special environment, damages on the
traffic lines and other reasons.
TABLE 3. THE REQUIRED WORKING HOURS FOR REPAIR OF PIPELINES IN EACH DIAMETER
Diameter Working hours for repair Working hours for replace

< 65 mm 10 (person-hour) 10 (person-hour)
65mm~150mm 50 (person-hour) 70 (person-hour)
500mm~900mm 800 (person-hour)
900mm~1500mm 1,400 (person-hour)
> 1500mm 2,500 (person-hour)
The Estimation of Manpower for Repair
To distribute the existing manpower effectively, the required manpower in each district should
be estimated further based on the estimation of working hours. In this paper, the repair efficiency be
analyzed according to 282 data about the repair of pipelines on database established by Taiwan Water
Corporation after Chi-Chi earthquake. Each datum included that how many manpower and working
8 360
hours be cost in each damage on pipelines. This paper assumed that the repair efficiency equal
manpower divided by working hours.
Therefore, the estimation of required manpower in each district could be counted based on the
average repair efficiency and the required working hours in each district.
However, the actual manpower for repair of pipeline must be adjusted from the estimation
because the loss of the existing manpower caused of earthquakes should be considered. Therefore,
the actual required manpower equal the estimation multiplied a factor. This safety factor was
tentatively set at 1.25 in this paper. The estimation of actual required working hours and manpower in
each district was shown in table 5.
TABLE 5. THE REQUIRED WORKING HOURS AND MANPOWER IN EACH DISTRICT
Working hours (hour)

Total
District Diameter (mm)
Working
<65 65-150 150-300 300-500 500-900 900-1500 >1500 manpower
hours
SongShan 1,232 777 1,585 689 995 889 2,187 8,354 1,392
XinYi 1,823 1,121 1,400 705 502 2,321 0 7,872 1,312
DaAn 2,760 1,518 2,025 871 1,361 4,981 5,048 18,563 3,094
ZhongShan 2,727 1,226 1,861 942 2,642 1,756 3,095 14,250 2,375
ZhongZheng 1,841 987 1,245 1,128 2,420 2,000 3,910 13,531 2,255
DaTong 2,011 506 734 569 1,097 306 0 5,223 870
WanHua 2,285 752 1,029 573 1,555 348 2 6,543 1,091
WenShan 2,536 1,479 1,696 766 1,440 698 2,168 10,784 1,797
NanGang 867 476 1,020 533 1,150 218 0 4,265 711
NeiHu 1,306 870 1,794 1,174 1,488 1,026 0 7,657 1,276
ShiLin 3,093 1,441 1,754 720 2,305 815 1,199 11,327 1,888
Beitou 2,254 1,103 1,523 1,854 303 2,010 0 9,047 1,508
SanChong 2,458 1,885 2,251 1,834 1,280 1,606 8,173 19,487 3,248
YongHe 2,934 1,118 2,145 949 1,200 1,336 0 9,680 1,613
JhongHe 2,620 1,591 2,108 881 1,650 1,156 1,927 11,933 1,989
SinDian 1,957 920 978 465 850 253 1,566 6,988 1,165
Total 34,704 17,768 25,148 14,651 22,238 21,719 29,274 165,502 27,584
The Estimation of required quantity in each emergency water supply point
The affected population and restoring rate of water supply must be considered to estimate the
daily vehicle trips per day per Li ( the government organization under the district ). The carrying
capacity of 5 tons of each vehicle used for water supply is fixed, but the population serviced by each
vehicle is different by the day, each vehicle can supply about 1,300 people within 4 days, 500 people
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on the 5th day, 400 people on the 6th day and 250 people after the earthquake for example. The detail
is shown as table 6.
TABLE 6. THE AVERAGE AFFECTED POPULATION AND REQUIRED VEHICLE TRIPS PER LI BY THE DAY
1st day 2nd day 4th day 5th day 6th day 7th day 10th day
District No. of Li
(person) (person) (person) (person) (person) (person) (person)
SongShan 33 3,097 2,545 2,089 1,986 1,895 1,811 1,596
XinYi 41 2,995 2,462 2,021 1,922 1,833 1,752 1,544
DaAn 53 3,073 2,526 2,074 1,972 1,881 1,798 1,584
ZhongShan 42 2,552 2,098 1,722 1,637 1,562 1,493 1,315
ZhongZheng 31 2,650 2,179 1,788 1,700 1,622 1,551 1,366
DaTong 25 2,536 2,084 1,711 1,627 1,552 1,483 1,307
WanHua 36 2,852 2,345 1,924 1,830 1,745 1,669 1,470
WenShan 39 3,632 2,985 2,450 2,330 2,222 2,125 1,872
NanGang 19 2,895 2,380 1,953 1,857 1,772 1,694 1,492
NeiHu 37 3,250 2,672 2,193 2,085 1,989 1,901 1,675
ShiLin 51 2,193 1,803 1,479 1,407 1,342 1,283 1,130
Beitou 42 2,251 1,850 1,519 1,444 1,377 1,317 1,160
SanChong 119 1,796 1,476 1,212 1,152 1,099 1,051 926
YongHe 62 1,858 1,528 1,254 1,192 1,137 1,087 958
JhongHe 93 2,451 2,015 1,654 1,572 1,500 1,434 1,263
SinDian 69 2,263 1,860 1,527 1,452 1,385 1,324 1,166
Average 2,647 2,175 1,786 1,698 1,619 1,548 1,364
Average vehicle trips
2 2 2 4 4 6 6
per day per Li
CONCLUSION
Taipei Water Department has planned the locations of the post-disaster emergency water supply
points. This paper provided the quantitative results in required quantity, working hours, manpower
and vehicle trips, etc. However, currently the capacity of emergency response and preparedness of
TWD may not be enough to handle disaster prevention and rescue. Therefore, we suggested TWD to
improve the emergency response plan and preparedness of water supply system reference to the
quantitative results in this paper. Furthermore, TWD should send the information about the
emergency response and preparedness to residents actively through various media.
10 362
REFERENCES
[1] Website of Taipei Water Department, http://www.eng.twd.gov.tw/english/Construction/latest.asp. (in Chinese)
[2] Website of Department of Civil Affairs, Taipei City Government, http://www.ca.taipei.gov.tw/civil/page.htm. (in
Chinese)
[3] “ The study on the seismic vulnerability function for water pipelines in Taipei metropolitan (2006),” Report, National
Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering, Taiwan. (in Chinese)
[4] “Reconnaissance Report on Earthquake in Taitung on April 1, 2006,” Report, National Science and Technology
Center for Disaster Reduction, Taiwan. (in Chinese)
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364
EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING – GAINING CONTROL OF DISASTER
Walter J. Bishop, Thomas J. Linville, Stephen J. Welch
Contra Costa Water District
INTRODUCTION
The Contra Costa Water District (CCWD, District) provides raw and treated water service to
over 550,000 customers in Contra Costa County, California. Its primary water conveyance
system is a 70-year old, 85-kilometer long, open, concrete lined canal which serves two CCWD
water treatment plants, and various cities, municipalities, industries and agricultural customers.
In 1994, following the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes, CCWD undertook a
comprehensive seismic assessment of its water conveyance, treatment and distribution systems.
The study focus was to identify strategic improvements throughout the CCWD system to
minimize water service interruption after a maximum credible earthquake. The study identified
over $185 million (2007 U.S. dollars) of improvements required in the system, including
improvements to existing pumping and piping, as well as construction of additional pumping,
piping and canal improvements. Over the last decade CCWD has implemented various
improvements to complete the important task of readying its water conveyance, treatment and
distribution system for earthquakes. Nevertheless, CCWD realizes that the threat of major
earthquake or other natural or manmade damage is ongoing, and therefore prepares for such
events and the necessary response.
This report describes how lessons learned from past disasters such as the Northridge and Loma
Prieta earthquakes in California, and the Hurricane Katrina disaster in Louisiana, United States
can better prepare response teams for disaster response and recovery following a major disaster.
CCWD’s critical event for planning purposes is a major earthquake, but the response plan is
applicable for terrorist or natural disasters alike. This report summarizes key lessons learned
from past disasters, and presents a framework for a response plan based on these lessons. The
report also provides an overview of the importance and key aspects of training and practice for
emergency response, as well as outlines the importance of re-evaluating the emergency response
plan, and incorporating updates and new lessons to ensure that the plan is current and responsive.
OUTLINE OF CONTRA COSTA WATER DISTRICT
CCWD was established in 1936 to provide water to the central and northeastern regions of
Contra Costa County, California. CCWD headquarters is in Concord, California, approximately
56 kilometers east of San Francisco, located in Central Contra Costa County, one of the fastest
growing counties in California. (See Figure 1)
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Figure 1 – Vicinity Map
CCWD draws its water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta under a contract with the U.S.
Central Valley Project (CVP). As part of the CVP, the 85-kilometer Contra Costa Canal was
built in 1937. By means of the canal, water is diverted from Rock Slough (13-kilometers east of
Antioch, California) through a 7-kilometer unlined channel into a 78-kilometer concrete-lined
canal. Four stations lift water 37.8-meters above sea level to the canal's Antioch summit, after
which gravity flows the water to its terminus in Martinez. The canal runs through Oakley,
Antioch, Pittsburg, Concord, Walnut Creek, Pleasant Hill, Pacheco, ending at a terminal
reservoir in Martinez, California (see Figure 2).
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Contra Costa Water District
Service Area Map
Figure 2 – CCWD Service Area
CCWD has 4 raw water storage reservoirs: Martinez, Contra Loma, Mallard, and Los Vaqueros,
totaling a storage capacity of 1,233,487-litres (103,070 acre-feet). It also has two treatment
plants; the Ralph D. Bollman Water Treatment in Concord, with a capacity of over 300 million
litres per day; and the Randall-Bold Water Treatment Plant in Oakley, with a capacity of 200
million litres per day. CCWD is also in the process of constructing a new water treatment plant
in Brentwood, California with an initial treatment capacity of 60 million litres per day. Roughly
half of CCWD customers receive treated water directly from CCWD, the remaining from 6 local
agencies who treat and distribute CCWD water.
Today, Contra Costa Water District serves a population of over 550,000 and includes treated
water distribution facilities with 33 pump stations, 45 storage reservoirs, and 1,252-kilometers of
pipelines. CCWD is managed by a General Manager appointed and governed by a 5-member,
publicly elected, Board of Directors. CCWD’s 325 employees serve customers that include the
municipalities of Antioch, Pittsburg, Brentwood and Martinez, commercial and industrial
companies, agricultural entities, and the residential communities of Clayton, Concord, Pleasant
Hill, and Walnut Creek
The greatest challenge CCWD faces today is continuing to provide high-quality water with an
ever-increasing customer demand in an environment with an extremely limited water supply.
Such increasing demands are continuously increasing the consequences of damage from an
367
earthquake or other disaster, further increasing the importance of CCWD’s duty to provide
reliable water. CCWD is committed to ensuring adequate water resources, high water quality,
and reliability for the present and future, particularly in times of emergency.
LEARN FROM THE PAST
CCWD has had a long interest in being well prepared for emergency response. The District has
had several smaller level emergencies over the past several years, such as extended power
outages, but has not had to respond to a significant event. However, CCWD has studied the
response of others for major events such as the California Northridge and Loma Prieta
earthquakes, and more recently, the Hurricane Katrina disaster in Louisiana. In fact, CCWD sent
considerable resources to the Hurricane Katrina disaster recovery in an effort to not only assist
those in need, but bring back meaningful disaster recovery lessons for use at CCWD.
Each disaster has its own specific intricacies. Every effective emergency response plan should
be prepared with this understanding in place to ensure the plan includes flexibility. Study of past
disasters and the ensuing response allows a plan provider the opportunity to leverage off past
lessons to ensure a plan provides the overall breadth of thinking necessary to ensure the plan is
inclusive, yet flexible. In studying past disasters, CCWD has identified the following key
difficulties in response:
• The ability to communicate is greatly reduced. Almost all disasters place a significant
strain on communication infrastructure. Not only is there the direct impact of the disaster
on facilities such as utility poles, wires, underground infrastructure, towers and
electronics, but there is the added “crisis” communication demand on the systems.
Communications systems “lock-up” from the added demand on a damaged system.
Response by other public services then face the added difficulty of responding without
normal levels of communication. This fact increases the need and importance of pre-
planned response without normal communication.
• Contacts with outside support agencies and resources are difficult to establish. In the
above noted disasters, the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) was the primary federal support agency. In addition, local state Office of
Emergency Services (OEM) support was available at the state level. The support from
these agencies tends to be slow. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the response was
significantly slower than other past U.S. disasters, and possibly resulted in the loss of
lives, and increased hardship to the victims. Any emergency response plan must focus on
self-sufficiency as reliance on outside agencies and resources is unpredictable, and very
likely insufficient.
• Transportation systems are greatly restricted. Roads and bridges, railways, traffic
signals, and vehicle inventory itself is almost always greatly impacted by disasters. In the
event of an earthquake, it is a good assumption that many bridges will be damaged
beyond safe use, thereby blocking normal thoroughfare. In the case of Katrina, there was
also the added impact of major flooding (an over 4 meter high storm surge) which almost
entirely destroyed the vehicle inventories of most the response agencies, and impacted
the private and commercial supply. The lesson for an emergency response plan is that
movement of people and supplies will be greatly limited. Response plans need to
consider this result by pre-staging supplies and people in strategic locations.
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• Power distribution is unreliable. Similar to the damage to communications, power
distribution through poles and underground is vulnerable to many forms of natural and
man-made disaster. Given that so much of business and infrastructure is tied to electrical
power, loss of this utility has a significant impact to response. Utilities generally have
some redundancy for power, and core systems have been hardened for loss of power.
Though not as integral to the response as communication and transportation (assuming
the primary systems requiring power have redundant supply), loss of power for a long
period of time needs to be a part of response planning. The impact to living conditions
such as lighting, heat and ventilation, computers and communication equipment must be
considered with any response plan.
• Monetary supply is greatly reduced; ATM and credit cards do not work, and cash is
limited. Banks and financial institutions are closed in the early stages of the emergency
response. Even if stores are open, they generally only take cash. An effective emergency
response plan needs to consider the ability to transact for services and supplies in the
absence of electronic financial institutions and services.
• Commerce is greatly reduced. Not only is there the direct impact of materials, supplies
and distribution (stores and transportation) being damaged and destroyed, but there is a
shortage of individuals willing to conduct commerce. Individuals provide immediate
support to their families. The result is that even if commerce has the infrastructure in
place to function, staffing and other resources necessary to conduct business are greatly
reduced. Because everyone is busy meeting basic needs, there is less availability of
resources for infrastructure recovery.
• Safety and Security is a greater concern than normal. Unfortunately, though most people
respond in a time of crisis by greater generosity, caring and giving, some individuals look
at disasters as an opportunity to prey. In the above events studied, all the disasters had
significant incidents of looting, theft, and even physical harm. Given the above noted
impacts, police, fire and military response is greatly hampered immediately following the
event. The emergency response plan should keep this fact in mind, and ensure
responders will be safe and secure. Threats from crime, as well as safety impacts such as
downed power lines, leaking hazardous materials and chemicals, and structural damage
risks, all should be a part of response planning.
Using these impacts as guidelines, an effective emergency response plan should prepare a
response that addresses the impacts, yet allows for flexibility necessary to respond to variations.
The plan should consider necessary actions, responsibilities and assignments, needed resources
(both human and physical), needed information, and the overall organization of a response.
PREPARING THE PLAN
As with any plan, an emergency plan needs to be prepared with the end purpose in mind. The
purpose of an effective emergency response plan is to provide the necessary framework to direct
an effective response to various likely emergency situations. The plan is not only the guideline
for actual emergency response, but also the template for developing and facilitating training and
practice as well . It needs to outline who is responsible for what, and provide an overall structure
in the possible chaotic response following the emergency event.
An effective emergency response plan contains the following key elements:

369
• Purpose of the plan clearly defined;
• Definition of key resources (staff, supplies, equipment, including checklists);
• Definition of key responsibilities of responders, including any contract support response;
the plan should define the default responsibilities (standing orders) in the event of no
defined leader;
• Definition of expectations for responder preparation (for example, supplies that should be
on hand, home preparation, equipment needs);
• Response staging areas (locations) clearly defined;
• Organization chart (including any back-up assignments);
• Any necessary forms, or standard procedures (for example building inspection
procedures and forms).
Knowing the variety of difficulties likely to be faced in an emergency (as identified above), the
plan should include consideration of the following objectives.
• Be prepared to be self-sufficient, and include provisions for
o Repair parts and supplies

o Fuel, power, oils
o Water, food, shelter, safety supplies and equipment
o Personal care items: towels, toothpaste, sunscreen, etc…
o Pre-contracted response support (for example fuel)
o Drinking water
o Safe and secure housing
o Basic medical care, shots, medicines
• Develop redundant, reliable communications
o Satellite phones
o Low band radios
o Walkie-talkies
o Reporting structure for physical person-to-person contact
o Establish pre-determined meeting locations and protocol
• Be prepared for a reduced work force - employees will take care of themselves and
family first
o Develop plans for addressing employee family needs (possible shelter, food and
water)
o Employee phone “hotline” for assignments and response information
o Standing orders for employee response (possibly staggered over time)
o Contracts in place for additional support
o Pre-planned prioritizations to assist operations with less staff
Note: In the Hurricane Katrina event, emergency response staffing was often as low as 20-
percent of normal staffing. Staff fled the disaster with their families, and did not return for
emergency response. Such low response is not likely in an earthquake response as there will be
no lead time to flee the disaster, but an employer should prepare for a moderate level of
absenteeism immediately following an earthquake event.
370
• Pre-plan compliance with local, state and federal response requirements and guidelines
o Be a signatory to any state or regional office of emergency services compacts,

mutual response plans or agreements
o Plan with state or regional emergency services offices, practice response with
exercises that dovetail with these agency protocols
o Pre-plan with state or regional emergency services for water and food distribution
to key locations for employee assistance
o Develop emergency assistance agreements with similar agencies (agencies out of
the area provide redundant support that possibly will not be impacted by the
disaster)
• Pre-plan business system continuity – electronic commerce will not function or be

accepted
o Keep enough cash on hand and secure for response for critical needs
o Ensure procurement accounts are in place and active for purchase of critical needs
(repair parts, materials, fuel, response supplies)
o Provide adequate identification (for example, procurement cards)
o Assure billing can be issued to customers and payment accepted
The above key elements are consistent needs for each emergency response. Ensuring these
elements are addressed in the plan, and are consistent with the purpose ensures a workable
structure for a response.
TRAIN AND PRACTICE
One of the significant benefits of any emergency response plan is its value as a foundation for
training and practice. The plan not only becomes a solid starting point for training and practice,
but then can also be the memory of the practice exercises through continuous modifications and
updates. As the response team uses the plan for exercises, lessons learned from the practice
sessions then are recorded in the plan through modifications to the plan. Needs such as a
different organization, additional or different team members and responsibilities, resources (both
human and physical), shelter, and equipment can be identified and addressed.
Each agency and each event will clearly require its own specific response (as noted above, the
reason the plan should ensure a framework that includes flexibility.) However, there are a few
key aspects of training and practice that should be included in development of exercises.
• Develop practice scenarios that simulate likely actual conditions during the emergency
response (for example loss of power, loss of communications, etc…)
• Practice actual deployment of resources (for example delivery and hook-up of emergency
power)
• Keep mapping and reference information organized, easily accessible (including ability
to print in the absence of primary power) and current
• Keep phone lists (for example home and cell numbers) current with regularly (monthly)
updates and distributions
371
• Conduct actual table-top exercises on a regular basis (quarterly); strengthen key team
members through exercises specific to these team member responsibilities (emulate
pressure as much as possible)
• Form sub-teams in the response team to practice key responsibilities (for example records
research, or power deployment, etc…)
• Keep exercises practical, applicable and realistic. Exercises need to focus on creating as
much of the actual demands and pressure of a foreseeable actual event
• Lessons learned from each exercise should be defined, summarized and recorded for
future response improvement
• Keep the emergency response plan current. The plan should be updated at least annually,
and all key lessons learned from exercises should be incorporated into the plan to ensure
the plan is continuously improving and adjusting to the changing organization and
environment.
While practice provides the best approach to simulating the actual emergency response,
improving the skills of responders, and learning lessons for future improvement, training outside
of practice is also important to ensure that industry-wide lessons and advancements are
incorporated into the emergency response plan. In looking for training opportunities, training
should include:
• Study recent disasters and responses, and inform response team members of the key
lessons learned
• Send key response team members to assist in response of actual emergencies, battle test
the team. Ensure lessons learned by these response team members are incorporated into
the emergency response plan
• Develop contacts outside the area, and send team members to these contact training
exercises, seminars and conferences
• Attend federal, state and regional training opportunities, and ensure the latest information
is incorporated into the emergency response plan
• Ensure key managers are trained in standard response approaches (for example the State
of California Standardized Emergency Management System), as well as the specific
customized response of the emergency response plan
• Bring experienced responders and trainers (individuals with actual experience leading
and responding to an emergency) to assess the emergency plan, develop exercises based
on this plan, and oversee practice sessions.
Through continuous practice and training in the use, development and revision of the emergency
response plan, an agency ensures it will be as prepared as possible for the actual emergency,
whether large or small. By looking outside the organization as well, the agency in addition can
ensure it makes use of the most recent knowledge available for effective response.
CONCLUSION
The threat of disaster is present for almost every major urban area in the world. The result is that
almost all utilities face a future need to respond to an unplanned emergency event. The
importance of gaining control of conditions to speed recovery following a disaster is the primary
responsibility for any organization charged with the public’s well being. CCWD plans for this
primary duty by continuously studying the lessons of past disasters, formalizing response plans,
and practicing and training staff for effective response in the face of pressure and confusion
372
This report provided an overview of lessons CCWD has learned from past disasters. The report
provided an overview of how a utility can develop a response plan to gain control of disaster
level conditions as quickly and as effectively as possible. The report identified how effective
plans can be prepared by focusing on response objectives such as:
• Communications
• Outside Support
• Transportation
• Monetary Supply
• Ability to Carry out Commerce
• Safety and Security
Additionally, in meeting the above objectives, an effective response plan needs to include
consideration and planning for key elements such as:
• Purpose of the plan

• Key resources
• Key responsibilities
• Expectations
• Response locations
• Organization
• Forms and procedures
Response plans need to also be sure responders have prepared:
• To be self-sufficient
• Develop redundant, reliable communications
• Work with reduced work force
• Compliance with regional, state and federal response requirements
• Business system continuity
An added value of the response plan, beyond providing the framework for the actual response, is
the fact that the plan is a template for practicing effective response as a team. Practice is an
essential aspect of a response plan to ensure the team is familiar with the plan and its application,
and has opportunities to test and “fine tune” the plan. And, while practicing the response plan
assists the team improve its likelihood of success in an actual response, training to advance the
team in the lessons of the latest emergency response practices and information also is an
important aspect of readying for disaster. Lessons learned from past disasters, other industry
experts, and internal experience are critical in ensuring a response plan that is comprehensive,
yet flexible for unpredictable events and resulting conditions.
Identifying the lessons of past disasters and addressing those lessons in a plan with clearly
identified objectives is the first step in a successful disaster response. A response plan that
incorporates the above discussed approach in its development is not going to eliminate the
problems and pressures of a disaster response, but it will ensure a working and comprehensive
framework to gain control of the multitude of unforeseen conditions following a major disaster.
The result is an organization ready to make a difference when the public needs such leadership
and stewardship the most.
373
REFERENCES
1. Contra Costa Water District, “Water Facility Supply and Reliability Improvement
Strategy – Development of Seismic and Reliability Criteria Final Report – Volume 1,”
August 1994
2. Contra Costa Water District, “Seismic and Reliability Improvements Project, Volume 2”,
September 1996
3. Contra Costa Water District, “Seismic and Reliability Improvements Project, Volume 3”,
September 1996
4. Contra Costa Water District, “2002 Treated Water Master Plan Update, Final Report”,
December 2002
5. Contra Costa Water District, “Hurricane Katrina Disaster Response Assistance and
Recovery,” June 2006, AWWA 2006 Annual Conference and Exposition
6. Contra Costa Water District, “Emergency Operation Plan”, August 2006
7. Contra Costa Water District, “Engineering Response Plan”, December 2006
8. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System”, March
2004
374
Near-field earthquake displacements of the non-liquefiable
ground relevant to damage to buried pipelines
Kimiyasu Ohtake, and Tatsuo Ohmachi
ABSTRACT
The damage to buried water supply pipelines in the non-liquefiable ground caused by the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake was first compared with calculation results from relevant seismic codes
showed that damage occurred even if there was a margin of safety factor of about 2.
The earthquake-induced displacement of the non-liquefiable ground was next evaluated using
results from survey, strong motion observation and numerical simulation in the near-field of the 1995
earthquake. It was found that the dynamic displacement and the permanent displacement were
significant not only on the surface layer but also at the engineering bedrock.
_____________
Kimiyasu Ohtake, Engineer, Nippon Jogesuido Sekkei Co., Ltd. 7-20-9, Nishi-Gotanda Shinagawa, Tokyo Japan
141-0031
Tatsuo Ohmachi, Professor, Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology,
4259 Nagatsuta-cho, Midori-ku, Yokohama Japan 226-8502
375
INTRODUCTION
Following the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake, better known as the Kobe earthquake, the
Level 2 (L2) earthquake motion has been introduced in seismic design of civil engineering structures.
The L2 motion addresses input motions of extremely high intensities like that experienced in Kobe
City during the 1995 earthquake.
Among various seismic design codes, those for buried pipelines of such as water supply, sewage
water, and high pressure gas were also revised after the 1995 earthquake, with a main focus on
introduction of the L2 motions［1］. As a result, intensity of the seismic design spectra of velocity on
the engineering bed rock was upgraded to about 4 times as large as the previous ones, as shown in
Figure 1. Most parts of the seismic codes except the design spectra, however, were kept the same as
the previous codes. For example, the revised codes also apply the so-called seismic deformation
method, which has traditionally based on an assumption that ground displacement on the engineering
bed rock is negligible during earthquakes, and that the earthquake-induced ground displacement
associated with the damage to pipelines is produced in the surface ground layered above the
engineering bedrock, as shown in Figure 2.and Figure 3.
The detailed contents of this paper is found elsewhere [2].
1000
Response velocity　SV (cm/s)
(100cm/s)
100
(80cm/s)
(24cm/s)
10
water supply, high pressure gus (L2)

sewage water(L2)
before the 1995 earthquake(L1)
1
0.1 1 10
Natural period of surface ground layer TG(s)
Figure 1. Design response spectra of velocity on the engineering bedrock
376
Groud surface
wa
ve
len
gth
U(
x')
=U
h ･s
Engineering in(
2 π
bedrock x'/ y'
L)
Vs≧300m/s
x'
Figure 2. The seismic ground displacement in seismic code of buried pipeline.

D pr
ire op
ct ag
io a
n tio
of n
wa
ve
Usx
Ｌ
Us Usy
Usy=Us･cosθ
θ x
Us Buried pipeline
X’
Usx=Us･sinθ Lx=L/cosθ
Figure 3.The ground displacement distribution in the horizontal plane and relations of buried
pipelines
377
CASE STUDIES IN THE NEAR FIELD OF DAMAGING ERTHQUAKES
The damage to the water supply pipelines in the non-liquefiable ground from the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake and the 2004 Niigata-ken-chuetsu earthquake was compared with
calculation results using the seismic design code of buried pipeline.
Figure4 shows location of the water supply pipelines damage (only Ductile Cast Iron Pipe) from
the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake[3], and the circles are the focus areas of this study. In these
areas, the damage ratio of DCIP was high, and the damage mode was mainly the joint pull-out.
Figure5 shows the calculation results of the joint displacement using the seismic design code and
that allowed for joint displacement. Figure 6 shows the calculation results of the stress of the pipe
material using the seismic design code and that allowed for the pipe material. The results showed that
the joint pull-out occurred even if there was a margin of safety of about 2. In addition, it was the
similar results in 2004 Niigata-ken Chuetsu Earthquake.
It was estimated that the contradiction between the calculation results using the seismic design
code revised after the 1995 earthquake and the damage to the water supply pipelines was in the
evaluation of the ground displacement.
Figure 4. Locations of the pipelines damage (only Ductile Cast Iron Pipe) in the non-liquefiable
ground during the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake
378
5
　allowable vale
　Takatori station
　Daikai station
　Sannomiya staion
4 　Rokko-michi station
Joint displacement(cm)
　Konan-yamate station
0
100 200 300 400 500
Pipeline diameter(mm)
Figure5. Calculation results of joint displacement
300
250 　allowable vale

2
　Takatori station
Stress of pipe (N/mm )
　Daikai station
　Sannomiya staion
200 　Rokko-michi station
　Konan-yamate station
150
100
50
0
100 200 300 400 500
Pipeline diameter (mm)
Figure6. Calculation results of stress of pipe material
379
NEAR-FIELD EARTHQUAKE DISPLACEMENT OF THE NON-LIQUEFIABLE
GROUND
The seismic displacement of the non-liquefiable ground was computed using results from survey,
strong motion observation and numerical simulation in the near field of the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu
earthquake and the 2004 Niigata-ken-chuetsu earthquake.
The 1995 Hogoken-Nanbu earthquake
In order to estimate the seismic ground displacement of the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake,
we performed the numerical simulation of the near fault area. The numerical simulation utilizing the
boundary element method was done on 3 dimensions.
The results of the seismic ground displacement calculations are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
The maximum ground displacement was more than 1 meter in the near-field.
TABLE I shows a comparison of the seismic ground displacement at the study area in Kobe city.
The dynamic displacement of the numerical simulation subtracted the permanent displacement from
the maximum displacement.
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF THE GROUND DISPLACEMENT ON ATTENTION AREA IN

KOBE CITY
Displacement Permanent Numerical simulation
Location of seismic displacement of
survey Maximum Dynamic Permanent
design code
displacement displacement displacement
1. Takaroti
10 25 63 49 14
station
2. Daikai
16 26 68 43 25
station
3. Sannomiya
8 10 44 32 12
Station
4. Rokkomichi
2 41 77 41 36
station
5. Kounan-yamate
6 46 114 72 42
station
380
Liquefaction area ( 100%)
Liquefaction area (50%)
The projection line of fault
Figure7. Maximum ground displacement from numerical simulation
Liquefaction area ( 100%)
Liquefaction area (50%)
The projection line of fault
Figure8. Permanent ground displacement from numerical simulation
381
The 2004 Niigata-ken-chuetsu earthquake
Figure 9 shows the permanent ground displacement obtained from the strong motion observation
[4] and numerical simulation in the near field of the 2004 Niigata-ken-chuetsu earthquake. Because
both of the permanent displacement yielded almost the same results, the accuracy of strong motion
observations and numerical simulation was high.
TABLE II shows comparison of the seismic ground displacement at K-net stations during the
2004 earthquake. The seismic displacement of the strong motion observation was computed using
double integration of digitally recorded ground acceleration [5]. The dynamic displacement of the
strong motion observation was more than 10 times compared with the displacement of the seismic
design code.
Strong-motion records
Numerical simulation
Figure9. Comparison of the permanent displacement obtained from strong-motion records,

numerical simulation in the near field of the 2004 Niigata-ken Chuetu earthquake
TABLE II. COMPARION OF THE GROUND DISPLACEMENT AT K-NET STATION

Displacement Strong-motion
Condition of surface ground
of seismic observation (cm)
Location
Layer thickness Velocity of design code Dynamic Permanent
(m) S-wave (m/s) (cm) displacement displacement
OJIYA 3 100 0.2 46 10
NAGAOKA 3 100 0.2 14 5
KOIDE 4 118 0.3 11 26
TOKAMACHI 3 164 0.1 12 9
382
Characteristic of the ground displacement in near-field
In near field, the seismic displacement of non-liquefiable ground based on actual survey became
larger than the displacement using the seismic design code of the buried pipeline. It was found out
that the dynamic displacement and the permanent displacement are large not only on the surface layer
but also at the engineering bedrock, as shown in Figure10.
On the other hand, in some cases, the ground displacement of the seismic design code is smaller
than the actual ground displacement in near field, because it is not taken into account the ground
displacement at the engineering bedrock
Usmax
Usp Usd
Usr
surface
Vs＜300m/s
engineering bedrock
Vs≧ 300m/s
Ubp Ubd
Ubmax
sismic bedrock
Usmax:Maximum ground displacement on the surface

Usp :Permanent ground displacement on the surface
Usd :Dynamic ground displacement on the surface
Ubmax:Maximum ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
Ubp :Permanent ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
Ubd :Dynamic ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
Figure10. The schematic explanation of the seismic ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
and the ground surface.
383
CONCLUTIONS
In this study, based on earthquake damage to water supply pipeline, we tried to find the reason
followed by evaluation of the near-field earthquake displacement of the non-liquefiable ground and
comparison with the displacement given by the seismic design code. As a result, the following
findings were obtained:
1. The earthquake damage to the water supply pipeline occurred even if there was a margin of
safety factor of about 2.
2. According to actual survey, strong motion observation and numerical simulation, the seismic
displacement of non-liquefiable ground in the near field is larger than the displacement given by
the seismic design code of the buried pipeline.
3. The contradiction in terms of the seismic ground displacement is attributed to the fact that the
ground displacement at the engineering bedrock is not as negligibly small in the near field as
assumed in the seismic design code .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
K-net strong motion data used in this study was provided by NIED.
REFERENCES
[1] Earthquake resistant design codes in Japan, JSCE, 2000

[2] Kimiyasu Ohtake, Tatsuo Ohmachi and Shusaku Inoue: The displacement of non-liquefiable ground in near field
related to the damage of buried pipelines, Jour. JSCE, Vol. A63, No.1, pp. 93-107, 2007. (in Japanese)
[3] The database of the water supply pipeline damages by 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake, Japan Water Works
Association, 1997(in Japanese)
[4] National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention:K-net,http://www.k-net.bosai.go.jp
[5] Emmanuel H. Javelaud, Gota Kubo, Tatsuo Ohmachi and Shusaku Inoue: Coseismic ground displacement due to the
2004 Niigata-ken Chuetsu Earthquake, Japan, Proceeding of the 4th Annual Meeting of Japan Association for
Earthquake Engineering, pp.312-313, 2005.
384
DISCUSSION SESSION AND CLOSING REMARKS
385
386
5th AwwaRF and JWWA Workshop Discussion Session Results
August 16, 2007
The discussion session held on August 16, 2007 focused on three primary subjects: cost-
benefit analysis, water storage and supply, and future directions. The discussion session
provided useful and valuable information for advancing water system seismic practices.
The main points derived from the discussion session are:
• Cost-Benefit
o Cost-benefit analysis is good to use as part of a water system seismic
program to help show value in the improvements
o It is important to use direct and indirect costs
o Include initial and life cycle costs
o Consider environmental factors and include the environmental costs
o Need a means to properly asses life safety with due consideration that
local governments are held to a high standard for protecting life
o Avoided losses are benefits
• Water Storage and Supply
o Safeguarding water supply is an important issue for waterworks
o Need a good definition on adequate water storage volume for earthquakes
o There are several competing factors regarding water storage and supply
Water storage vs. water quality
Land and environmental impacts vs. area needed for storage
Volume needed for firefighting vs. ability to supply the water in a
damaged system
o There are concerns and differing opinion on how rapid emergency
drinking water can be distributed shortly after an earthquake
o Long-term recovery should be a primary focus for planning because it is
too difficult to develop high system reliability for large earthquakes
o Need to define an expected level of service for water transmission from
wholesale agencies
o Citizens expect pressurized water to be available
o Need direction for decision making on when to, or if one should, isolate
post-earthquake storage instead of feeding it into a damaged system
This is an issue of competing demands for post-earthquake
firefighting water vs. longer-term drinking water
• Future Directions
o Agreement to continue workshop series every 1.5 to 2 years
o The next workshop will be hosted by the Japan Water Works Association
at a time and location to be determined, a suggestion was made to
coordinate timing with the 8th International Symposium on Water Supply
Technology
o Developing water system seismic practices is a work in progress and
continued communications is needed
387
o We hold the responsibility for our Cities and Countries to prepare water
systems to resist earthquakes
o We need to take the responsibility to disseminate the workshop
information to other organizations, and staff within organizations
o Need to identity ways to help smaller waterworks organizations
implement seismic improvements
o Suggested future topics include:
Asset management
Finances, manpower, and associated trade-offs for seismic
improvements and earthquake response
How to work with political leaders on seismic aspects
Guidelines for seismic resistant measures (Japanese are working
on)
o Suggested improvements include:
Three areas of focus: technical, policy, multi-hazard
Include other participants such as fire fighters, emergency
managers, primary water users, sewage companies/departments,
etc.
An overview of the discussions that transpired is presented below. As part of the water
supply segment of the discussion, Craig Davis gave a PowerPoint presentation
summarizing results of the pre-workshop survey. The presentation slides are included
with this discussion summary. A summary of the survey results is also provided as part
of these proceedings.
Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Adam Rose commented on the good use of cost-benefit analysis in seismic programs and
specifically made note of Santa Clara Valley Water District.
Crystal Yezman stated that cost-benefit analysis was identified as part of the Santa Clara
Valley Water District scope of work and was performed by consultants.
David Lee noted that FEMA requires a hazard mitigation plan to get Federal grant
money. Most are not met the planning requirements. The Association of Bay Area
Governments (ABAG) has prepared a hazard plans for cities. Twelve years ago the East
Bay Municipal Utility District performed cost-benefit analysis and considered two
categories, direct and indirect. For the East Bay Municipal Utility District a cost-benefit
analysis using only the direct costs was not adequate justification to perform
strengthening; it was cheaper to repair than to strengthen. However, when including
indirect costs, such as impacts to the community, cost-benefit analysis showed a 6 to 1
payback. The total of direct and indirect costs was $1.2 billion. Use of indirect costs is
worthwhile.
The total mitigation cost is compared to the product of benefits times the probability of
damage occurring. When mitigation cost is lower the mitigation is considered
388
worthwhile. This was found to only work out when the total of direct and indirect costs
were considered.
A rebuttal by Professor Shinozuka to this concept is that there may be an impression that
mitigation for low probability earthquakes may not be worthwhile. Even when a discount
rate of return is included, the mitigation may not seem worthwhile unless indirect costs.
Therefore, indirect costs must be included in the benefit stream. The latest analysis
procedures can factor additional events (who 50 year, 100 year, etc. recurrence). Also,
the avoided losses are considered benefits.
Life safety and the cost of human life are difficult for to quantify.
Hidehiko Aihara suggested when planning, consider the initial cost in the cost-benefit
evaluate. Yokohama also considers the durability and long term performance. This is not
just the seismic issue, but a normal part of facilities planning.
In some areas of Japan, the historical record shows they should expect great a earthquake
in the next 30 years.
In many places water systems are ran by local government. Local government must pay a
higher price for life safety, they are held to a high standard for protecting life. The
question is how to use cost-benefit analysis under such consideration.
When considering the seismic upgrade strategy you must also take into account the
vulnerabilities of other local facilities. When an earthquake hits it would not be a good
situation if the only thing left is the water system. The implication is that seismic
mitigation should be applied appropriately to call community aspects.
Kazuhiko Mizuguchi stated that the City of Kobe local government is looking at
buildings, life cycle costs, financial statements, and applying principles of asset
management. Buildings are an asset. It was noted by others that some Cities in the
United States are performing similar work. Also, in some cases environmental
considerations are taken into account.
Bill Cain pointed out the East Bay Municipal Utility District considered two types of
earthquakes, a probable earthquake and a maximum earthquake. Previously, life cycle
costs were not considered. However, now for evaluation of the aqueducts life cycle costs
are being considered.
David Pitcher gave a specific example of a dam for the Central Utah Water Conservancy
District where the work needed to be completed was not found to be worthwhile on its
own. However, when they included benefits to the environment, in this case fish, the
project was justified and they even got $6 million in government funding.
389
Professor Shinozuka noted that there is a tremendous emphasis on energy and natural
environment in the United States today. He now also emphasizes the built environment as
part of the overall environment.
Masaru Oneda commented that in Tokyo, citizens not only consider earthquake but also
the environment. The citizens also approved the upgrading of a dam using their own
funds, no support for local of national government, for the purpose of seismic
improvement.
Shingeru Hataya noted that cost/benefits are an economic analysis of facilities and life
safety. Water systems in Japan are driven by either seismic upgrade or structure
maintenance. Pipelines are embedded and hard to replace, they can be fixed when
broken. Water treatment plants and other facilities can be upgraded as part of the
Japanese level 2 seismic criteria.
Water Storage and Supply
Shingeru Hataya stated that the main issue is how to safeguard water supply and that
should be our focus.
Professor Hosoi commented that the United States is much larger than Japan; both have
large and small cities. In Japan, if one city is struck by an earthquake then other cities
move in to help. Professor Hosoi asked Craig Davis, with consideration of the workshop
survey results he compiled, if the United States cities are more self contained and self
sufficient.
Craig Davis responded that he does not know if United States cities are more self
sufficient than those in Japan. He cannot speak for other cities, but in Los Angeles the
idea has historically been to attempt to store as much water as possible for use in times of
emergency. Results of the survey show that Los Angeles has the largest volume per
person of storage. However, Los Angeles is still concerned if they have enough storage
for a large earthquake. What is inappropriate storage volume and how does the volume
support recovery?
A gentleman stated, in Japan if the in-reservoir water quality decreases over time, in
twelve hours or so, you could run out of storage without time for restoration.
An alternate Japanese opinion, a chlorine residual must remain and therefore water
quality does not really decrease over time. In Japan 3 liters per person per day is a
standard for earthquake response. After the second or third day only 3 liters per person
creates a problem because they can’t bath or have water for other sanitary purposes. How
much water per person is acceptable?
David Lee stated on that drinking water does not seem to be a problem after an
earthquake. This seemed to be the case even after the disastrous Kobe earthquake. This is
because bottled water is available and many, including large corporations such as beer
390
and soda suppliers, provide aid with bottled water. The only problem is water for fire
fighting.
Bill Cain noted an additional issue: when water is stored for a long time and it is not
turned over it goes bad. This goes against emergency preparedness goals. There is a
balance to be considered.
Mr. Kirkpatrick pointed out that when you look at maximizing storage a set of conflicting
priorities and dilemmas manifest themselves related to water quality and supply.
Raw/non-potable water has problems when developing environmental permits and with
land space. Portable water is subject to water age degradation. Firefighting is another
dilemma, if you assume a fair amount of pipelines are broken then you cannot distribute
the water anyway and therefore how do you consider the fire fighting volume needed for
storage. Long term recovery is the problem and where we have to focus on planning.
Mankind will not step up, in general, to provide the financial backing for this high level
of reliability.
Ahmad Nisar raised a question about how much does each need? 250 liters per day?
People are looking for pressurized water. Need to store a satisfactory level to meet citizen
needs.
Wholesale suppliers are not responsible for fire fighting water supplies. However, is there
a mechanism for calculating a transmission level of service?
In Japan some cities provide for emergency stop valves to retain and save water for
emergency use. The rest of the storage will be used in the distribution for domestic or
firefighting purposes and may leak out of broken pipes. The emergency water is isolated.
The problem arises with having to make the decision to stop the water from flowing into
the leaking distribution system and retain it for later emergency use.
David Lee commented that maybe we cannot answer some of these questions because we
do not separate drinking and fire fighting water. However, twenty liters per day is not
much to us in the United States.
Craig Davis commented on the differences in thoughts and strategies being discussed. If
we look at the variations in different strategies perhaps both the Americans and Japanese
can better learn from each other. The Japanese strategy is to isolate and save half of the
storage for post earthquake emergency purposes and use the remainder through the
distribution system. Is this a lesson learned from the Kobe earthquake? If you have a
reasonable storage but loose most of it to leakage than it is useless. In Los Angeles a
strategy is to keep large volumes of water for immediate use in the distribution system to
help locate leaks for rapid repair and for fire flow. At this point, in the severely damaged
areas water quality is not an issue until at least two or three days on after the earthquake
and therefore non-potable emergency water supplies can be utilized.
Professor Hosoi asked for the opinion of the Japanese delegates.
391
Kizahiko Minaguchi stated that in 1995 Kobe City lost many people because there was
inadequate water supply for firefighting purposes. Also water could not be supplied as
quickly as needed due to administrative issues. This led to installing automatic isolation
valves on many tanks for emergency water storage. Also, Kobe Waterworks Bureau
installed the large diameter transmission tunnel for additional storage. Kobe has also
established water recycling programs which provides more access to firefighting water.
The transmission tunnel provides 60,000 cubic meters of volume in an emergency. After
an earthquake the transmission can be isolated and used as a large underground storage
tank. Deep shafts provide means for pumping out the water and distributing it in
containers to residents. People in the community practice this for emergency preparation.
A question was asked by Fred von Hofe if there are adequate chemicals for treating
stored water after an earthquake. Can this be a problem? Kobe responded that they have
adequate chemical storage.
Question for Dr. Siao-Syun Ke: when you published your results that Taipei was not
ready for an earthquake what was the reaction?
Dr. Ke responded by stating he did not tell this fact to the people broadly. There is
enough water but not enough emergency equipment. Taipei Water Department can get
additional supply from adjacent areas in a catastrophic event, but distribution would be a
challenge.
Future Directions and Closing
There was unanimous agreement to continue having seismic workshops approximately

every 1.5 to 2 years.
The next workshop will be hosted by the Japan Water Works Association at a location to
be determined. Considerations will be given for having the workshop in the Fall of 2009.
Roy Martinez requested input on future workshop topics and improvements that can be
made to the workshop.
The number of new topics discussed during this workshop shows how this process is a
work in progress and there is a need for continued communications to help improve water
system seismic practices. (Bill Cain, East Bay Municipal Utility District)
Future workshops can include asset management and other topics we can teach each
other. (Kazuhiko Mizuguchi, Kobe Waterworks Bureau)
For this workshop, the Japan Water Works Association requested papers on seismic
practice and implementation; therefore all Japanese presentations were similar. Other
topics can be considered in the future. It is difficult for the smaller waterworks
392
organizations to implement seismic upgrades. The Japan Water Works Association needs
to inform the smaller organizations on how to make improvements and what others are
doing around the world. As a result, it is important to continue this workshop series.
(Kazutomo Nakamura, Japan Water Works Association)
Seismic upgrades are important but need finances and manpower and we must consider
the tradeoffs. We also need to deal with City Councils and other politicians who want to
reduce the funding, cost of water, and manpower. We need suggestions on how to deal
with this. This could be topic of future workshops. (Shigeru Hataya , Chiba Perfectural
Waterworks Bureau)
In response to Mr. Hataya’s statements, Bill Cain suggested to get more engineers on
City Councils.
1997 guidelines for seismic resistant measures were prepared as a result of the 1995 Kobe
earthquake. In March 2009 the guidelines will upgraded. This was suggested as a topic
in the next workshop.
Three tracts observed: Technical, policy, and multi-hazard. For multi-hazard there are
other participants who are missing in the discussion, for example fire fighters, emergency
managers, and other water users. We need to work closer with users to obtain a better
understanding of their water supply needs. In doing this we will learn much more than
just performing abstract engineering evaluations and discussions. (Comments from a
manager of the East Bay Municipal Utility District)
Need to spread information from this workshop to other organizations and to staff in our
organizations to be more effective. Also need to include people from other fields to
improve development.
Need to include people from other fields to learn their opinions. After the 1995 Kobe
earthquake learned we also need to work closer with sewer companies and would like to
include this topic in the future. (Nobuhiro Hasegawa, JFE Engineering Corporation)
A suggestion was made to hold the next workshop in June 2009 to allow United States
participants to take advantage of the 8th International Symposium on Water Supply
Technology to be hold in Kobe, Japan.
8th International Symposium on Water Supply Technology

Kobe, Japan
June 10th - 12th, 2009
Kobe International Convention Center
Organized by the Steering Committee for 8th International Symposium on Water
Supply Technology
Supported by International Water Association
393
Continuing this workshop will improve our earthquake know-how. We have a
responsibility to do this for our Cities and Countries.
Roy Martinez, Craig Davis, Kazutomo Nakamura, and David Lee were recognized for
their leadership and organization of this workshop. (Bill Cain, East Bay Municipal Utility
District)
Roy Martinez, on behalf of the American Water Works Association Research

Foundation, thanked the Japan Water Works Association, Taiwan Water Works
Association, all presenters and participants, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research, the Japanese interpreter, and the East Bay Municipal Utility
District for a successful workshop.
Professor Nagaoka, on behalf of Japanese participants and the Japan Water Works
Association, thanked the American Water Works Association Research Foundation,
Taiwan Water Works Association, East Bay Municipal Utility District, all participants,
the Japanese interpreter, and the keynote speakers Professor O’Rourke and Professor
Hosoi, for sharing knowledge and making a successful workshop.
394
5 th
AWWARF/JWWA Water
System Seismic Workshop
Discussion Session
August 16, 2007
1:30 – 5:00 PM
Craig Davis August 16, 2007 1

395
Purpose
¾ Share information
¾ Learn
z From Similarities
z From Differences
¾ Improve
¾ Help define areas of needed
developments and future collaboration
Crag Davis August 16, 2007 2

396
Survey
¾ Water Storage and Supply
¾ Performance Criteria
¾ 20 Responses! Thank You!!

¾ Initial results summarized in Tables (handed out)
¾ Results useful for understanding strategies
others are implementing
¾ Plan to improve and send final after workshop

397
Survey Results Summary
¾ Wide Range of Organizations and Conditions
¾ Water Wholesale Suppliers & Distributors
¾ Storage: 18,760,235 m3 LADWP
43,000 m3 Tottori City
¾ Population: 12,246,523 Tokyo

150,000 Tottori City
¾ Service Area: 1,834 km2 MLGW

211 km2 Osaka
98 km2 Tottori City

398
Supply
¾ 7 of 19 stated they have enough post-
earthquake water supply
¾ 8 do not
¾ 3 don’t know
¾ All but 4 indicated they have emergency
inter-connections
¾ All but 5 described plans for distributing
emergency drinking water.

399
Supply
¾ Fire Following Earthquake
z 1 U.S. organization (SFPUC) identified
special fire fighting water supply
z 1 Japanese organization (Nagoya) identified
special fire fighting water supply
z Some Japanese Fire Departments install
cisterns
¾ Most rely on emergency supply to assist in
fighting fires (same supply used for
people’s emergency drinking water).
400
Performance Criteria
¾ All but 2 have specified performance
criteria
z Japanese criteria similar for all organizations
¾ Most have an estimate of restoration times
¾ Mutual Aid / Assistance
z All Japanese have agreements
z Only 4 U.S. respondents have agreements

401
Preliminary Evaluation
¾ Storage volume per capita
z Post-earthquake usable storage
z Range: 0.07 m3/person (Kanagawa)
0.03 m3/person (Santa Clara)
0.26 m3/person (Fukuoka)
2.2 m3/person (EBMUD)
4.6 m3/person (LADWP)
¾ Wholesale suppliers typically have lower volume
per person
¾ U.S. typically greater than Japan
¾ Japan distributors range from 0.26 to 0.37
m3/person
402
Questions
¾ What is an adequate post-earthquake water
supply and how do we determine that volume?
¾ What is a good assumption on post-earthquake
consumption from distribution system?
¾ Are we accounting for all parameters when
estimating water supply needed?
¾ What is role of wholesale suppliers?
¾ How should fire fighting be considered in
determining post-earthquake water supplies?

403
Questions
¾ What is an acceptable minimum level system
functionality?
¾ Are we implementing the appropriate mitigations
to actually reach our performance goals?
¾ Has everyone adequately considered regional
earthquake disasters?
¾ Is the performance criteria described to the
community (residents and businesses) so they
can prepare accordingly?

404
Future Cooperation
¾ Young field – much can still be improved
in water system seismic programs
¾ Continue workshop series
¾ Any interest/ability for other types of
collaboration (committees, work groups)?
¾ JWWA implementing seismic planning
program for all waterworks.
z Is this a good area for collaboration?
¾ Multi-hazard considerations

405
406
5th AwwaRF-JWWA Water System Seismic Workshop
Information Survey
A pre-workshop survey, presented at the end of this section, was sent to all workshop
participants. The survey requested information relating to:
1. Post-earthquake water storage and supply available for use after an earthquake,
2. Water System post-earthquake performance criteria, and
3. Water system information related to earthquake performance.
The survey request presented herein is slightly modified from that originally sent out before
the workshop to reflect follow-up questions sent to respondents.
Responses were received from 19 different waterworks organizations, 8 from the
United States and 11 from Japan. In addition, the Japan Water Works Association and the
Japan Water Research Center responded with some general information. The survey results
are presented using English units in Tables 1E, 2E, and 3E and metric units in Tables 1M,
2M, and 3M. Tables 1E and 1M are identical except for the units used; similarly for Tables
2E and 2M, and Tables 3E and 3M. As a result, this description will only refer to Tables 1, 2,
and 3, leaving the reader to refer to the English or metric versions. The tables reflect
information provided as part of the original survey response and follow up requests for
information. Draft tables were handed out at the workshop to all participants for review and
comment and requests for suggested modifications were sent out immediately following the
workshop. The tables reflect all suggested modifications from the participants. A blank in a
table cell means information is not applicable or was not provided.
The survey results are useful for:
¾ Comparing different water system aspects,
¾ Defining a current state of practice in water system seismic preparedness,
¾ Understanding earthquake practices and strategies different waterworks organizations
are implementing, and
¾ Obtaining ideas on what waterworks organizations are doing to prepare for
earthquakes (especially in Table 3).
Table 1 presents system general information identifying the waterworks organization,

the person responding to the survey, if the organization is a distributor or wholesale water
supplier, service region and area, and other statistics related to the individual systems. Fifteen
distributors (6 from the United States and 9 from Japan) and 5 wholesale agencies (3 from the
Unites States and 2 from Japan) responded to the survey. The organizations were identified
as distributors or wholesalers in Table 1 based on their primary function. The San Francisco
Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is unique in that it is identified in Table 1 as a
distributor to the City of San Francisco and as a wholesaler to 28 San Francisco Bay Area
agencies due to significant dual functions that organization performs. A more detailed
justification for distinguishing between the different SFPUC functions is presented at the
bottom of Table 1. Tables 2 and 3 also present SFPUC information relating to the distribution
or wholesale functions.
Table 2 presents earthquake water supply information and identifies each
organization’s understanding if they have an adequate water supply, the basis for and how
they evaluated supply adequacy, and any special provisions for: fire fighting water supply,
additional emergency water sources, and emergency drinking water distribution. Table 3
Survey Summary-1 407

focuses primarily on performance criteria and emergency response information identifying the
general ground failure hazard, a listing of any specified performance criteria, estimates of
restoration time and bases for the estimate, number of employees expected to be available for
post-earthquake restoration, in any mutual aid/assistance agreements are in place, alternate
forms for assistance, and any stockpiled materials and equipment specifically for earthquake
purposes. The table headings are intended to summarize the information presented in each
column. Refer to the actual survey questions at the end of this section to see obtain a better
understanding for the basis of each response. Additional useful information that could be
added to Tables 1 to 3 is flow rate data (peak, annual average, maximum daily, etc.)
An overview of the survey results is given in the PowerPoint slides provided in these
proceedings and presented as part of the Discussion Session. The overview will not be
repeated here.
Data in Tables 1 to 3 are useful for performing preliminary evaluations to compare
different water system capabilities and developing metrics for earthquake preparedness.
Figure 1 presents an example of a simple evaluation of usable storage volume per capita. The
horizontal axis in Figure 1 identifies each waterworks organization using their initials in the
order presented in Table 1. As seen in Figure 1 the surveyed organizations provide a wide
range of storage per capita. Waterworks organizations in the United States generally have
more storage per person than Japan. Wholesale agencies, except for the SFPUC, generally
have less storage/person than distributors as a result of providing bulk supplies to several
large constituent agencies. The ranges are as follows:
Distribution: low 0.26 m3/person (69 gal/person) Fukuoka City WB

high 4.63 m3/person (1,223 gal/person) Los Angeles DWP
Wholesale: low 0.03 m3/person (8 gal/person) Santa Clara Valley WD

high 2.12 m3/person (560 gal/person) San Francisco PUC
The Japanese distribution waterworks storage per person fall within a tight range of 0.26 to
0.37 m3/person (69 to 98 gal/person).
5
4.63
4
Storage per Capita (m 3/person)
2.27
2.12
2.04
2
1.05 1.05
1
0.55
0.33 0.37 0.29
0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.27
0.16 0.11
0.03 0.07
0
TC
D
-d
-w
B
B
SA
SA
SB
D
SA
B
D
YW
W
PW
U
KW
W
W
VW
C
C
LG
W
KW
W
M
W
FC
D
TM
C
AC
U
EB
N
R
P
LA
SC
C
U
O
P
SF
H
C
SF
Organization
Figure 1. Storage per capita.

The simplified evaluation shown in Figure 1 provides insight into the relative abilities
to provide post-earthquake water, but is not adequate to make any determination regarding
any of the water systems’ expected seismic performance. Many more parameters must be
considered and evaluated to make that kind of determination such as seismic ground motion
level and intensities, pipeline and other component fragilities, repair capabilities, system
isolation and redundancy capabilities, etc.
A detailed evaluation of the data presented in Tables 1 to 3 is beyond the intent of this
document. The data is being presented for comparative purposes, to promote thought and
discussion, and allow others to further evaluate the data as appropriate with the intent of
fostering advances in water system seismic practices. However, the data does allow initial
observations to be made as follows:
• Tables 1 to 3 show a wide range of results differing for nearly every organization,
• The determination of an adequate post-earthquake water supply is deferent for
different organizations, and in some cases is tied to the defined performance goals,
• The minimum level of functionality varies by organization,
• Some organizations have not determined an acceptable minimum level of service,
• Few, if any, directly consider fire fighting water in their estimates for needed post-
earthquake water supplies,
• Stored water should be adequately distributed around the system; it may not be enough
to simply have enough water at a few locations,
• Japan has defined minimum storage and performance criteria, whereas the United
States does not,
• There are a wide range of practices and strategies being implemented, and all
organizations can learn from the different practices and strategies.
Review of the data, along with discussions and presentations during the workshop,
identifies areas needing further development:
• How to estimate post-earthquake consumption from the distribution system,
• The role of wholesale suppliers,
• How to consider fire fighting water in determining post-earthquake water supplies,
• Better tools to account for all parameters when estimating the water supply needed for
earthquakes,
• Methods and procedures for identifying acceptable minimum level system
functionality,
• Considerations of regional earthquake effects and reliance on local/neighboring
agencies for post-earthquake recovery support,
• Communicating defined performance criteria and level of services to communities
(residents and businesses) to allow their preparation accordingly,
• How to implement appropriate mitigations to meet the performance goals.
In summary, the survey results and discussions that transpired in response to the
survey information indicates that may organizations are implementing very good practices
and strategies for system-wide improvements. At the same time, the information reveals that
the general field of water system seismic engineering (with an emphasis on “system” referring
to a systems approach) is still young and much can still be learned and improved in all water
system seismic programs.

410
Table 1E. System General Information (English units).
Organization Service Population Service Pipe Length Pipe Total Storage Number of Storage Size
(survey Connections (miles) Diameter Capacity Tanks and Range (gallons)
responder) Range (gallons) Reservoirs
Type Region Area See Table 1a See Table 1a (inches)
(mi2)
United States
Alameda County Distributor Cities of 103 324,800 78,150 total 871 total 2 – 48 90,000,000 13 total 500.000 to
Water District Fremont, 69,000 sf 1 ci 7 tanks 21,000,000
(Threse Newark, and 2,020 mf 99 s 6 in-ground
Wooding) Union City, 3,480 c/i/g 136 p reservoirs
California 1,830 LI 629 ac
1,820 fh 6O
Central Utah Wholesaler 10 counties 1,200,000 Wholesale to 25 80 total 18 – 120 50,000,000 6 tanks 760,000 to
Water service 50 s 8 raw water 20,000,000
Conservancy providers 1.2 P301S reservoirs
District (David 4.7 RC
Pitcher) 24 tunnels
Contra Costa Distributor Central and 214 270,000 88,000 total 790 total 2 – 96 75,000,000 40 250,000 to
Water District Eastern 53,000 sf 13 ci 7,000,000
(Steve Welch) Contra 30,500 mf 26 di
Costa 4,000 c/i/g 133 s
County, 500 A/I (raw) 185 p
California 500 R 430 ac
East Bay Distributor Portions of 325 1,300,000 403,402 total 4,136 total 2 - 108 780,000,000 170 3,000 to
Municipal Alameda 320,478 sf 1,361 ci treated water 154,000,000
Utility District and Contra 29,277 mf 2 di
(Bill Cain) Costa 4,697 A/I 1235 s
Counties, 48,950 O 363 p
California 1,146 ac
10 PCCP
14 RCCP
0.7 copper
3 wrought iron
0.6 O
Los Angeles Distributor City of Los 465 4,050,000 712,351 total 7,230 total 2 – 144 4,956,469,000 108 potable 1,700 to
Department of Angeles, 614,253 sf+mf 4,740 ci potable water 3,313,718,000
Water and Power California 83,744 c/i/g 708 di 4 raw water
(Craig Davis) 631 O 1,044 s 7,945,878,000 (emergency
0.6 p raw (stored in storage only)
610 ac the distribution
83 concrete system area)
28 copper
16 O
Table 1E – page 1 411

(mi2)
Memphis Light Distributor City of 708 850,000 253,759 total 3,672 total 2 – 36 123,500,000 34 100,000 to
Gas and Water Memphis 228,656 res 3,659 ci+di 15,000,000
(Fred von Hofe) unincorpor- 19,924 c/i/g 0.8 s
ated areas of 5,179 O 4p
Shelby Co.,
Cities of
Arlington &
Lakeland,
Tennessee
San Francisco Distributor* City of San 47 770,000 Approximately 1,250 total 0.75 – 78 415,000,000 21 75,000 to
Public Utilities Francisco, 250,000 total Consisting 89,400,000
Commission* California mainly of ci,
(Luke Cheng) some ci being
replaced with di
San Francisco Wholesaler* 28 agencies 2,477 1,700,000 150 turnouts to 1,193 total 28 – 96 953,000,000 24 1,000,000 to
Public Utilities in San residential, Bay Area Water Consisting 661,600,000
Commission* Francisco commercial, Supply and mainly of s,
(Luke Cheng) Bay area, and industrial Conservation RCCP, PCCP
California users District agencies
Santa Clara Wholesaler Santa Clara 1,300 1,700,000 45 total 150 total 20 – 120 55,395,060,000 10 raw 130,000,000 to
Valley Water County, 18 A/I 37.5 s Mostly raw 1 treated 29,000,000,000
District (Erin California 27 wholesale 108 PCCP water not usable (raw)
Baker) retailer turnouts 4.5 RCCP for earthquake 15,000,000
response. (treated)
Japan
Chiba Prefecture Distributor 11 cities and 217 2,830,000 unknown 5,244 total 2 – 71 203,434,610 792,602 to
Waterworks 2 towns 4981 di 15,852,048
Bureau (Shigeru (Chiba, 105 s
Hataya) Funabashi, 11 ac
Matsudo, 147 HIPV
Ichikawa, -replaced 1,429
Ichihara, mi ac
Narashino,
Urayasu,
Shiroi, Inzai,
Narita,
Imba,
Motono)

(mi2)
Fukuoka City Distributor Fukuoka 90 1,402,200 736,380 total 2,348 total 1.6 – 71 96,723,910 45 (17 sites) 15,852 to
Waterworks City unknown sf 90 ci 5,918,098
Bureau (Kuniaki unknown mf 2,226 di
Nakamura) 64,062 c/i/g 24 s
98 A/I (other 1.8 p
system)
1,592 R
Hachinohe Distributor 1 city 308 336,276 131,642 total 1,130 total 3 – 59 29,221,136 47 14,795 to
Regional Water (Hachinohe) 122,212 sf + mf 22 ci 2,642,008
Supply 6 towns 9,430 c/i/g 926 di
Authority (Oirase, 6s
(Norbou Gonohe, 129 p
Murakami) Rokunohe, 48 ac
Hashikami,
Nanbu,
Sannohe)
Hanshin Water Wholesaler Kobe, 185 2,500,000 21 supply points 78 total 12 – 94 69,431,968 15 343,461 to
Supply Ashiya, Kobe (6), 7 ci 21,136,063
Authority (Shinji Nishinomiya Ashiya (4), 33 di
Nakayasu) and Nishinomiya (8) 24 s
Amagasaki Amagasaki (3) 0.6 ac
Cities 14 tunnel
Kanagawa Water Wholesaler Kanagawa 575 8,007,450 40 supply points 124 total 31 – 110 141,770,145 17 1,321,004 to
Supply Prefectural, total for 4 37 di 15,852,048
Authority (Ken- Yokohama constituent waterworks 67 s
ichi Koike) City, waterworks 21 di + s
Kawasaki has 50%
City, and dependence
Yokosuka on KWSA
City water
Kobe Distributor Kobe City 213 1,523,521 744,592 total 3,049 total 2 – 94 148,776,750 251 (123 7,926 to
Waterworks 700,910 sf+mf+ 874 ci sites) 10,303,831
Bureau school+hospital 1,922 di
(Kizuhiko 444 ABK 143 s
Mizuguchi) 74 pbh 110 p
43,164 o/f
Nagoya Distributor Nagoya City 137 2,316,000 793,208 total 5,006 total 0.6 – 79 167,658,917 43 7,662 to
Waterworks and 501,539 sf 142 ci 13,210,039
Sewerage 67,487 mf 3,175 di
Bureau (Yukio 224,182 c/i/g 23 s
Mabuchi) 1,663 p
2.4 O

(mi2)
Osaka Municipal Distributor Osaka City 81 2,600,000 925,000 total 3,108 total 3 – 79 202,298,547 10 132,100 to
Waterworks 411,000 sf 516 ci 26,657,860
Bureau (Hiroaki 369,000 mf 2,548 di
Miyazaki) 144,000 c/i/g+R 44 s
Tokyo Distributor Tokyo City 470 12,246,523 6,550,765 total 15,700 total 2 – 106 870,117,041 176 793 to
Metropolitan (2005 FY) 6,328,931 sf 230 ci 75,772,787
Waterworks 220,911 mf 15,232 di
Bureau (Masaru 923 pbh 221 s
Oneda) 217 O 16 p
0.6 ac
Tottori City Distributor Tottori City 38 150,000 49,000 total 696 total 0.8 – 47 11,360,634 31 52,840 to
(Prof. Yosihiko 17 ci 2,642,007
Hosoi) 465 di
15 s
199 p
Yokahama Distributor Yokahama 168 3,623,795 1,696,549 total 5,589 total 3 – 79 255,667,107 39 (23 sites) 1,532,364 to
Waterworks City 1,696,549 sf+mf 3,978 ci + di 35,931,307
Bureau (Ken 68,838 c/i/g 1,101 s
Yokoyama) 124 pbh 508 p
2.5 concrete
*
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is responsible for water distribution to the City of San Francisco and wholesale supply to suburban agencies in portions of Alameda, Santa
Clara, and San Mateo Counties represented by the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation District (www.bawsca.org). For purposes of tabulation, the distribution and wholesale portions of
SFPUC are presented separately for better comparison. Although the SFPUC system cannot be completely separated into two independent systems, for tabulation purposes information for
SFPUC wholesale for the most part does not account the City of San Francisco distribution, and vice versa. The SFPUC is tabulated in two parts because the distribution component of SFPUC is
similar to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and others who have their own aqueduct supplies but are not considered wholesalers to themselves
and the wholesale component of SFPUC is similar to Santa Clara Valley Water District, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, and others who do not distribute water directly to customers.
Table 1a. Service Connection and Pipe Type abbreviations.

Service Connection Pipe Type
sf = single family dwellings ci = cast iron
mf = multi-family dwellings di = ductile iron
res = residential s = steel
c/i/g = commercial/industrial/government p = plastic (e.g. PVC)
A/I = Agriculture/Irrigation O = Other
R = Recreational ac = asbestos cement
O = Other PCCP = Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
LI = Landscape Irrigation RCCP = Reinforced Concrete Cylinder Pipe
fh = firelines and hydrant RC = Reinforced Concrete
pbh = public bath houses P301S = Prestressed 301 Steel
ABK = Apartments sharing Bath and Kitchen
o/f = offices/factories

Table 2E. Earthquake Water Supply Information (English units).
Organization Adequate Post- Earthquake Supply? Post-Earthquake Fire Additional Emergency Water Emergency Drinking Water
Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
United States
Alameda County Don’t know No special provisions at No special provisions at this time No special provisions at this time
Water District this time
Central Utah Don’t know
Water
Conservancy
District
Contra Costa Yes (for Fragility analysis performed – No special provisions 10 emergency interconnections [with Contra Costa Water District is responsible for
Water District emergency results used to implement East Bay Municipal Utility District (2 public drinking water response. No other plans
demands seismic improvement program treated, 1 raw), Cities of Martinez (2), in place in the event Contra Costa Water
not normal focused on rapid recovery. Pittsburg (2), Antioch, Brentwood, and District’s system is insufficient.
demand) Diablo Water District] totaling 103 mgd
treated and 100 mgd untreated.
East Bay Yes East Bay Municipal Utility Terminal storage Interconnections with the San Francisco Will follow regional office of Emergency
Municipal District performed systematic reservoirs Public Utilities Commission and Contra Services directions
Utility District evaluation of distribution system 53,765,795 gal loaded by Costa Water District capable of
using Monte Carlo simulation of helicopter for fighting supplying 30-50 mgd.
4 scenario earthquakes ranging urban-wild land interface
from an operating earthquake of fires.
M6.0 on Hayward fault to
maximum credible events of
M7.0 Hayward fault, M6.75
Calaveras fault, and M6.5
Concord fault. The damage that
occurred in the simulations was
used to guide development of a
10-year Seismic Improvement
Program (recently completed) in
which facilities and pipelines
contributing to overall post-
seismic system performance
were fixed.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Los Angeles Yes No specific evaluation has been -No added fire storage -The Los Angeles Department of Water - Los Angeles Department of Water and
Department of performed. The Los Angeles volume. and Power can utilize more than 25 Power has a plan to provide drinking water
Water and Power Department of Water and Power -Inter-system connections Metropolitan Water District of Southern emergency water distribution stations. A
P has historically maintained a allow fire engine pumping California (wholesale supplier) station will consist of one or more 350-gallon
large volume of water supply in units to pump from a connections to receive additional potable water storage bladders and PVC pipe
the distribution network that lower pressure to higher supplies. manifold with dispensing spigots, set up on a
aided the system recovery pressure zone through -The Los Angeles Department of Water pair of extra strong aluminum folding tables.
during the 1971 San Fernando adjacent fire hydrants. and Power has a few small connections 50 bladder-manifold kits are stored in a sealed
and 1994 Northridge -Helistops at reservoir and other municipal water agencies (Beverly 55-gallon steel drum to keep it clean and ready
Earthquakes. The assumption is mountainous regions (e.g., Hills, Long Beach, Inglewood El for use and stand at 6 district yards around the
that this supply will be adequate Elysian Park) Segundo, Las Virgenes, Los Angeles City.
in future earthquakes. -Fire fighters take County Waterworks District No. 29), -When deployed, the stations will be
advantage of swimming primarily to provide water to them, repeatedly filled by potable water tender
pools as added supply however it may be possible for the Los tankers. Los Angeles Department of Water
(this is a usable supply, Angeles Department of Water and Power and Power plans to purchase, store and
but not specifically to receive some water from these maintain in a ready state two stainless steel
identified as an alternate agencies in an emergency. tanker trailers of 3,700-gallons capacity each,
supplemental supply for as a means of immediate first response.
fire suppression). Additional tankers will be employed as needed
through spot rental and mutual aid.
Memphis Light Yes Currently having this checked Maintain 8 - 30 mgd Have interconnections with a number of Unlike most systems Memphis Light Gas and
Gas and Water by consultant plants at different small systems that could be used on Water has 8 major plants and anticipates
locations, if one fails emergency basis. several plants will survive a major earthquake.
others can pick up load if Water from operating plants available for fire
distribution system fighting, sanitation, and drinking.
functions.
San Francisco Yes Levels of Service (LOS) Goals 400 million gallons Interconnections with East Bay Approximately 70 potable water hydrants
Public Utilities following completion of the domestic supply; an Municipal Utility District and Santa throughout the City of San Francisco are
Commission Water System Improvement additional 2 billion gallons Clara Water District allow water sharing marked with a blue water drop, and serve as
(S.F. City Program (WSIP) in 2014: non-potable fire capacity up to 70 mgd. emergency water distribution sites following
distribution, suppression reserves in an earthquake or other disaster. They will be
see * bottom of Deliver minimum system cisterns, local lakes, manned by San Francisco Public Utilities
Table 1) demand (winter month demand) untreated reservoirs, etc. Commission crews and neighborhood
within 24 hours after a major emergency response teams following a
earthquake. Minimum winter The San Francisco Fire disaster. Additionally, the San Francisco Zoo
month demand is estimated at Department maintains an Well serves as an emergency potable water
215 mgd in 2030. auxiliary water supply supply. The Zoo Well project includes a truck
system independent of the fill station, disinfection facilities, upgrade of
Deliver average demand under water distribution system the existing power system for the well, and an
the condition of one unplanned and dedicated only to fire emergency generator
outage concurrent with one fighting.
planned outage of major
facilities. Average demand in
2030 is estimated at 300 mgd.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
San Francisco Yes LOS Goals following WSIP Local lakes and reservoirs; Interconnections with East Bay Varies by wholesale customer/jurisdiction.
Public Utilities contingency plans and Municipal Utility District and Santa Some can use groundwater.
Commission At least 70 percent of the emergency storage vary Clara Valley Water District allow water
(wholesale, turnouts within each region by wholesale customer/ sharing capacity up to 70 mgd.
see * bottom of should receive flow to achieve jurisdiction.
Table 1) minimum month demand for the Other provisions vary by wholesale
region. Estimated 2030 customer/jurisdiction.
minimum month demands for
the three regions noted above
are 96 mgd, 37 mgd, and 82
mgd respectively.
Restore facilities to meet

average demand within 30 days
after a major earthquake .
Santa Clara No Modeled seismic hazard events No special provisions -Interconnection with San Francisco No special provisions
Valley Water to determine water supply Public Utilities Commission
District infrastructure reliability. -Planned future well fields for emergency
Although the Santa Clara Valley supplies
Water District (District) has
enough raw water storage, the
Infrastructure Reliability Project
found that the District would not
likely be able to treat and
deliver the water following a
seismic event due to treatment
plant damage and numerous
pipe breaks and leaks. The
District has available
groundwater and is
implementing a project that will
provide wells for emergency
water supply.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Japan
Chiba Prefecture Yes Installed emergency stop valves No special provisions Supply provided to Chiba Prefecture -10 water supply trucks with 528-1,057 gal.
Waterworks in the distribution reservoirs up Waterworks Bureau by 2 wholesale water -69 water tanks with 264 gallons
Bureau to 114 million gallon storage supply authorities totaling about 61 mgd. -50,000 aluminum canned water
capacity. The remaining 90 If the two water supply authorities remain -1,775 water tanks with 5.3 gallons
million gallons can flow for operable after earthquake, they can -60,000 water supply bags with 1.6 to 2.6 gal.
domestic and fire fighting use. supply 8 to 13 mgd more than usual. -Emergency faucets and fire hydrants in 5
purification plants and 14 treated pump
stations used to distribute water, once water
restored to those plants and stations.
-Emergency water brought to refuge places
and medical care institutions with the aid of
Water Piping Construction Cooperative
Society, before other municipal water supply
entities come to aid. Support agreement
maintained with Society for emergency water.
Fukuoka City Yes The essential water volume in No special provisions, but 2 connections with the water wholesale Anti-earthquake pipe lines used for important
Waterworks the first stage on the emergency system designed with agency, one connection with neighboring distribution lines connecting trunk line to
Bureau is estimated 0.8 gallons per seismic resistant ductile city in order to assist each other in evacuation sites. Also have two water carrier
person. It means the essential iron pipe so many emergencies. vehicles to supply drinkable water to water
total daily volume sum up to hydrants on distribution suspended areas.
740,000 gallons, which is far pipe can be available for
smaller than existing storage fire fighting.
capacity.
Hachinohe No Because maintenance of the No special provisions No special provisions Emergency water obtained from fire-plug and
Regional Water block distribution system is seismic storage tank. Drinking water
Supply insufficient, mutual flexibility is prioritized and transported to medical
Authority impossible. Therefore, when the institutions and to the elementary schools used
earthquake damage happens, for refuge. Standard is 0.8 gallons/day/person.
enough water cannot be As emergency repair advances the amount of
supplied to the customer. the water offered from distribution network is
increased.
Hanshin Water No Have not performed an No special provisions Have 4 emergency water supply facilities No plan, in the business of wholesale water
Supply evaluation because this supply, but will support customers.
Authority organization is in the business of
wholesale supply to distributing
organizations
Kanagawa Water No See Note 1. No special provisions. Have interconnection raw water main Kanagawa Water Supply Authority is a bulk
Supply Cannot prepare counter- between two different water resources. water supplier, but can supply drinking water
Authority measures for earthquake to 4 waterworks (constituent bodies) at main
scenarios because fault reservoirs. Kanagawa Water Supply Authority
positions cannot be clearly trains for emergency supply with constituent
identified. bodies every year.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Kobe No, but are Planning emergency storage of -The emergency water Emergency connections with neighboring An emergency system provides storage every
Waterworks in progress 0.8 gallons/person/day. Will storage system developed water suppliers; 7 pipes with 5 cities. Up 1.2 mile radius for efficient conveyance of
Bureau of creating soon have enough storage up to for drinking water supply to 2 million gallons of water can be drinking water supply trucks. 47 sites cover
enough 7-days. would also be used for fire delivered in emergency situation. the whole city. 37 systems are completed at
emergency fighting. present, and emergency water is secured about
storage Supply for full recovery -Fire Department built and 14.3 million gal. See also Note 2 for Table 3.
dependent upon other sources. maintain 252 earthquake
Kobe only has 25% of it own resistant water supply Store several types of carrying containers for
water sources. cisterns for emergency fire emergency use in seven branch offices.
fighting. 6.7 million -11,240 back pack water bags (1.6 gallons)
gallons total volume. -10,249 water tank container (0.5 -4.8 gallons)
Nagoya No Nagoya Waterworks has Nagoya Fire Fighting 11 Emergency connections with 7 200 emergency water supply facilities located
Waterworks and sufficient total water supply Bureau constructed 568 neighboring waterworks for total of 18 so all residents can reach on foot.
Sewerage after upgrading water reservoirs. earthquake resistance fire mgd. 208 underground hydrants installed in
Bureau The total purified water storage prevention water tanks in distribution pipes leading to elementary
capacity is 168 million gallons, 2006. schools that are used as evacuation sites.
indicating that water supply of
12 hours or more with respect to
a design daily maximum water
supply volume of 329 million
gallons is secured. However,
there is still a problem of
resolving the regionally uneven
distribution that exists in the
amount of water stored.
Osaka Municipal No Total storage capacity is 202 No special provisions Interconnection with neighboring water 2 emergency water supply plans. One is
Waterworks million gallons. Have a plan to system delivery of water cans to shelters. The other is
Bureau increase the total storage transportation by water tank truck to shelters,
capacity to 264 million gallons, medical facilities, and so on. Stockpiles of
which is equivalent to 50% of various emergency equipment and materials;
the immediate design maximum water tank truck, polyethylene bags for
daily supply. This plan is based emergency water supply, temporary water
on the direction of the Ministry tanks, and pipes, etc.
of Health, Labor and Welfare.
However, Osaka Waterworks
didn’t actually estimate how
much is necessary to supply
victims. Osaka Waterworks has
a plan to construct new
reservoirs within the City to
expand well-balanced tanks and
reservoirs to be used as
emergency action bases.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Tokyo No In the Japanese standard, the No special provisions. Yes with Saitama Prefecture Waterworks Emergency water supply bases placed
Metropolitan distributing reservoir capacity is Tokyo Waterworks doesn't and the Kawasaki City Waterworks approximately every 1.2 miles to be reached
Waterworks to secure half of the design consider fire fighting use, from any place in Tokyo to secure drinking
Bureau maximum daily supply, but because the facilities scale water in case of a disaster.
Tokyo Waterworks does not is large. Even if the fire
have enough capacity of water fighting water is taken
distribution reservoirs against from fire hydrants, the
the number of customers in the water supply isn’t
some region. influenced.
Tottori City Don’t know Total storage capacity of No special provisions 349,000 gallons of water can be stored in 3 water trucks with 528 gallon tank and 4
earthquake resistant reservoirs is earthquake resistant distribution compact membrane filtration systems each of
about 20% of daily water reservoirs which can supply 12,682 gallons of purified
supply. water per day.
440 handy water containers with volume of
2.6-5.3 gallons and 25,000 emergency water
bags with volume of 1.6 gallons are stored.
Yokahama Yes In emergency without -Fire water supply and Interconnection with neighboring water -Underground circulating type water tanks
Waterworks earthquake, we need 12 hours distribution determined utilities; Yokosuka City, Kawasaki City, used to ensure the minimum drinking water
Bureau storage water volume in each using Japan Water Works and Kanagawa Prefecture. There are 10 requirements for residents in the disaster. They
distribution reservoir. It is the Association Guideline receiving points. are installed at elementary and junior high
standard of Japan Water Works “Design Criteria for schools, and public parks. 134 total tanks.
Association Guideline. Waterworks Facilities” 15,852 gallon tanks at 118 sites, 26,420 gallon
Yokahama Waterworks Bureau -Reservoirs have tanks at 11 sites, 185,000 gallon tanks at 2
distribution system has new emergency shutoff valves, sites, 264,200 gallon tank at 1 site, 343,461
target of 15 hours long. Water automatically closing gallon tank at 1 site, and 396,300 gallon tank
volume of distribution reservoir when sensing earthquakes at 1 site. 3.5 million gallons total water
is 249 million gallons, design more than intensity 5, but volume.
maximum water supply volume continue supplying water -385 taps in the city for emergency water
is 397 million gallons. 249 for post-earthquake supply distribution.
divides by 397, and times 24 firefighting and other -All distribution reservoirs have emergency
hours is 15.1 hours. needs until reaching the shut-valves to secure 50 million gallons water
security quantity of water (security quantity of water).
needed for emergency
drinking water storage.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Japan Water The Ministry of Health, Labor The indicator of the Ministry of Health, The indicator of the Ministry of Health, Labor
Research Center and Welfare recommends the Labor and Welfare published in the and Welfare published in the manual of Japan
(Yasuhiko Sato) total minimum distribution manual of Japan Water Research Center Water Research Center is defined as follows.
and reservoir capacity equal 12 is defined as follows. 1) Amount of emergency water supply per day
Japan Water hours of planned daily 1) When securing emergency water one person (0.8 gallons or more)
Works maximum supply amount. This supply and the city water for restoration 2) Initial emergency water supply period days
Association value was announced in the long work, it is effective to perform water (about 3 days)
(Kazutomo term plan for water works accommodation for a disaster system
Nakamura) aiming 21 century on June 1, from other systems.
1991. 2) Therefore, strengthening of a widening
backup function is promoted by
maintaining wide area supply which can
accommodate water over a wide area, and
the transition pipe between drinking-
water supply utilities.
The Japan Water Works Association

guideline for anti-earthquake planning
(see Note 6 for Table 3) of water supply
system (draft) says a connection pipeline
with neighbor waterworks or another
pipe system is effective for emergency
supply and restoration activity. Therefore
the connection pipe is strongly
recommended.
mgd = million gallons per day
Table 2E Notes:
1. Kanagawa Water Supply Authority ( KWSA) does not have enough water stored and available to the local distribution network for a damaging earthquake. If the raw water main in Sakawa
water supply system is broken, KWSA cannot intake raw water to three treatment plants in Sakawa water supply system, requiring use of other water resources. As a result, KWSA doesn't have
enough ability for intaking raw water in case of earthquake. An evaluation was performed to determine a response in case of emergency as follows:
First, assume earthquakes on the Kannawa and Kozu-Matuda fault belt. In this scenario, estimate the water demand of constituent waterworks from past results.
The following amount of water is estimated in this scenario.
(1) Can supply treated water to constituent waterworks from our three treatment plants (including transfer to another water resource),
(2) Cannot supply treated water to constituent waterworks from our three treatment plants.

422
Table 3E. Performance Criteria and Emergency Response Information (English units).
Organization Ground Performance Criteria Restoration Time Estimate Number of Mutual Aid Alternate Forms Earthquake Materials and
Failure Employees and of Assistance Equipment
Hazard to Restore Assistance
System Agreements?
United States
Alameda County High None at this time No estimate has been made 36 No None None
Water District
Central Utah High Currently Developing Criteria No estimate has been made 20 No None None
Water (Wasatch
Conservancy front)
District Low (east
state)
Contra Costa Moderate -Temporary repairs to achieve full service 30 days 50 Yes None -Flexible hose
Water District within 30 days. General earthquake scenarios -Portable generators
-Water for partial service to wholesale for known faults in area. - Repair parts and valves
customers within 3 days. and piping
-Water for essential services to wholesale Based on modeling of - Emergency supplies
customers within 15 days. anticipated damage from (food, clothing, etc.)
-Water for partial service to industrial, scenario earthquake divided - Satellite radios
agricultural, landscape customers within 10 by anticipated response - Emergency fuel
days. effort to arrive at a total - Emergency cash
- Temporary service for fire service and response time.
essential services as soon as possible.
- Emergency fire service within 1.5 miles for
all customers within 8 hours.
- Full service to all functioning emergency and
critical care facilities via distribution system
within 10 days.
- Partial water service to all areas via
distribution system within 10 days.
- Essential (sanitary) service to all areas via
distribution system within 15 days
East Bay Varies See Note 1. 40 to 50 days 800 Yes None -pipe
Municipal from Low System analyzed to -flexible large diameter
Utility District to Very determine estimated return to hoses with flaking boxes
High in service times following four -valves
different earthquake scenarios -tunnel repair sets
areas of developed for seismic -boxes for Emergency
system program (see Table 2). Made Operations Team
break estimates repair time Members
to fix breaks and damaged
facilities determined by
estimating crew time to
repair using historical data.
Table 3E - page 1 423

System Agreements?
Los Angeles Moderate The Los Angeles Department of Water and Anticipate approximately 7 More than No, currently None at 5 district yards store:
Department of Power has not specified any water system days for nearly full recovery 500 working on -food packages
Water and Power seismic performance criteria after an earthquake of CALWARN -cooking utensils
magnitude on the order of and East Bay -sleeping cots
6.7 based on the 1994 Municipal -blankets
Northridge Earthquake Utility (no special pipe or fittings
recovery. District stockpiled beyond normal
agreements operation)
Memphis Light Depends Memphis Light Gas and Water is in the Work in progress, specific 32 to 40 Yes Retired Purchasing department has
Gas and Water on process of a multi-hazard risk assessment. restoration times not yet employees can worked out agreements
location Performance goals will follow from the risk available. be called into with suppliers.
assessment. service if
3 scenarios consider small, medium and large. necessary (have
Small based on smallest earthquake that can used on special
damage system. projects).
San Francisco Varies After completion of the Water System Minor damage, within 3 Unknown, Yes None Pipe segments, fittings and
Public Utilities around Improvement Program, the goals are: days, typical break, within depends on other equipment
Commission system -Deliver the winter demand (82 million 14 days. Within 30 days for severity of stockpiled at strategic
(S.F. City gallons/day) within 24 hours with 90% most major system extents; failure locations throughout the
distribution, reliability up to 90 days for bridge and system.
see * bottom of -Deliver average day demand (114 million tunnel work, depending on
Table 1) gallons/day) within 30 days with 90% earthquake location.
reliability Evaluations ongoing based
on specific earthquakes on
Hayward, Calaveras, and
San Andreas faults.
Commission system -Deliver the winter demand (215 million 14 days. Within 30 days for severity of stockpiled at strategic
(wholesale, gallons/day) within 24 hours with 90% most major system extents; failure locations throughout the
see * bottom of reliability up to 90 days for bridge and system.
Table 1) -Deliver average day demand (300 million tunnel work, depending on
gallons/day) within 30days with 90% earthquake location.
reliability Evaluations ongoing based
San Andreas faults.

System Agreements?
Santa Clara High Level of service goal is potable water service -45 to 60 days for M7.9 San Unknown No, but None, but -spare pipe in diameters
Valley Water at the average winter flow rate available to a Andreas earthquake. planning to planning to 20 – 120 inches
District minimum of one turnout per retailer within 7 -30 to 45 days for a M6.7 obtain in near secure retainer -valves and appurtenances
days. Southern Hayward future. agreements for -internal pipe joint seals
earthquake. contractors to
-7 to 10 days for a M6.2 perform
Central Calaveras infrastructure
earthquake. emergency
-earthquakes were modeled repairs
based on probability of
occurrence
Japan
Chiba Prefecture Low classified goals for water supply: 28 days 500 Yes None -aluminum canned water -
Waterworks (maybe) -0.8 gallons/day/person within 3 days after Would like to repair water -necessity for camping
Bureau earthquake supply facilities within 4 such as tents, blankets,
-5.3 gallons/ day/person from 4 days to 10 weeks, even if Hanshin sleeping bags, mats,
days after earthquake earthquake grade occurs. -radios
-26.4 gallons/ day/person from 11 days to 21 -Not sure if specific for
days after earthquake earthquake: stockpile
-66 gallons/ day/person from 22 days to 28 pipes, bends, cover joints
days after earthquake
Fukuoka City Low Essential water volume increases according to 4 weeks 19 normal Yes 12 work units None
Waterworks the elapsed days following the earthquake. M7.1 on Kego fault. 100 skilled from private
Bureau -0.8 gallons per person in 3 days Damages estimated by employees companies,
-water supply increases with passing time, dividing City into 820 ft can be Fukuoka Pipe
until almost fully recovered the water supply meshes, each mesh assigned available Work Company
system in 4 weeks. earthquake shock. Association
Hachinohe Moderate Aim for ending emergency restoration within 3 weeks 174 Yes None -water service tank
Regional Water three weeks M8.2 used to calculate days -bottled water
Supply needed for restoration -pipe material (ductile iron
Authority pipe)
Hanshin Water Moderate Emergency restoration work of damaged 1 week Yes None None
Supply facilities will be completed within one week General earthquake,
Authority restoration shorter than end
suppliers restoration process
Kanagawa Water High Goal is to restore supply water to four No estimate 433 Yes None Stockpile materials and
Supply waterworks (constituent bodies) within 7 days. equipment for post-
Authority earthquake restoration to
continue water supply at
each 40 water supply
point. (e.g., portable
generator, measure for
chlorine, etc.)

System Agreements?
Kobe Moderate Post-earthquake performance criteria are as 4 weeks 343 Yes None None
Waterworks follows. Assume similar level as the See Note 3.
Bureau a. Complete emergency restoration within 4 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Great
weeks earthquake.
b. Step-by-step provision of emergency The 1995 earthquake showed
drinking water the tolerable limit for water
c. Water distribution toward emergency system outage is
hospitals and schools approximately four weeks.
d. Deciding emergency restoration area in a See Note 2 for restoration
fair order process.
e. Stabilization of the people's livelihood
Nagoya Moderate -First 3 days provide 0.8 gallons/person/day 4 weeks targeted, but do not Do not Yes Request Equipment in 24 material
Waterworks and using mobile and central station water supply have estimate of how long it know how cooperation warehouses
Sewerage to sustain life will take to restore system to many staff from retired -264 gallon water tank
Bureau -4 to 10 days provide 5.3 gallons/person/day normal. will be staff (mobile type)
using mobile and central station water supply available to -1 KVA dynamo
for cooking and washing face and hands make -temporary hydrant (4
-11 to 21 provide 26.4 gallons/person/day repairs taps)
using central station and pipeline distribution -264 gallon emergency
water supply for washing cloths and bathing water supply tank
-22 to 28 days provide 66 gallons/person/day -polyethylene tank (1.3,
using central station and pipeline distribution 2.6, and 5.3 gallon)
water supply for regular life function. -tent
-Increase reliability of pipe distribution system -fire hydrant hose
over time until fully restore within 28 days. -Light and tools,
-pipe drawings (1/2500)
Osaka Municipal High -Within 3 days from earthquake occurrence - 1 month 2,200 Yes Emergency Various emergency
Waterworks Securing of drinking water for refugees (0.8 Restoration estimate based Mutual water supply equipment and materials;
Bureau gallons/day/person) on calculations of how many assistance agreements with water tank truck,
-Within 10 days from earthquake occurrence - teams will perform pipe or agreements the Japan Truck polyethylene bags for
Securing of eating and drinking water (5.3 facilities repairs using 5 with 14 major Association and emergency water supply,
gallons/day/person) earthquake scenarios. cities. a soft drink temporary water tanks,
-Within 15 days from earthquake occurrence - maker. and pipes, etc.
Securing of subsistence water (26.4
gallons/day/person)
-Within a month from earthquake occurrence-
Securing of daily life water (66
gallons/day/person)

System Agreements?
Tokyo High -The supply routes to the capital center 30 days 500 Yes Constructor Tokyo Waterworks
Metropolitan organizations are restored within three days -M6.9 and M7.3 Tokyo Bay Agreements secures all the restoration
Waterworks after the earthquake occurs. Northern part Earthquakes; materials of the supply
Bureau -other water supply facilities are restored and M6.9 and M7.3 Tama routes such as the capital
within 30 days inland Earthquake. The center organizations, and
hypocenter depths were 19- provides to the
31 miles, respectively. constructors.
-The water suspension rate is
calculated for 820 ft mesh in
consideration of pipe length,
material and caliber,
liquefaction, and ground
speed.
Tottori City High After 2-3 days: Emergency water supply by 3 or 4 weeks 30 Yes Assistance None
using stored water Earthquake JMA seismic agreements with
After 4 days: Direct water supply to important intensity 6. cooperative
facilities with emergency supply pipelines Estimation by total predicted water works
After 21 to 28 days: restore system completely number of pipe damages and association in
ability of repair parties. the City.
Estimate 1.6-2.4 pipe
breakages per km, 250 of
transmission and distribution
pipes and 700 of supply
pipes.
Yokahama High See Note 4. After earthquake until third day, 28 days 300 Yes The union of Stockpile materials and
Waterworks called the confusion period, Yokahama -Yokahama Waterworks Prepares to pipe equipment at 14 sites in
Bureau Waterworks supplies water to residents by the estimates for major accept the construction the city and through
underground circulating type water tanks and earthquake based on support from company's mutual assistance
stored water in the distribution reservoirs. One earthquake disaster example cities not members repairs agreements.
person can use 0.8 gallons/day. After that until that happened in other cities. affected by broken pipes -DIP and service pipe
seventh day, called the primary restoration disaster and and will work material, bottled water,
period, the residents receive water from between these with employees. portable tank, power
emergency water supply taps. One person can cities, carries generator, fuel, emergency
use 2.6 gallons/day. After that until fourteenth out disaster water supply tap, battery
day, called the secondary restoration period, prevention charger, pump, hand
the residents receive water from emergency training twice operation pump, simple
water supply distribution stations and a year filter machine, radio
temporary water tap. One person uses 5.3 facilities
gallons/day. After that, called the revival
period, one person uses 26.4 gallons/day.

System Agreements?
Japan Water The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 28 days is in the guideline See Note 6.
Works has the standard of water works facilities that for anti-earthquake planning
Association Japanese call the performance criteria. Japan of water supply system
(Kazutomo Water Works Association published the (draft) that is supervised by
Nakamura) design criteria for water works facilities and the Ministry of Health,
and the earthquake-resistant design criteria for Labor and Welfare and
Japan Water water works facilities that most of Japanese published by the Japan
Research Center water works use for designing their facilities. Water Research Center.
(Yasuhiko Sato) The restoration goal should be within 4 weeks
(28 days) if possible, to decrease fear of
sufferer and stabilized their daily life. See
Note 5.
Table 3E Notes:
1. East Bay Municipal Utility District Service Level Goals
Service category Operating Earthquake Maximum Earthquake
General -Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public -Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public
-Limit extensive damage to system facilities -Limit extensive damage to system facilities
-All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected, using -All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected
Orinda and Walnut Creek treatment plants
-All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated -All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated
Fire Service -Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all areas -Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all high risk areas
-All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir) -All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir)
-High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire -High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire
reserves) reserves)
-Service to all hydrants within 20 days -Service to all hydrants within 100 days
Hospitals and Disaster -Minimum service to all affected areas within 1 day (water available via -Minimum service via distribution system or truck within 3 days
Collection Centers backbone distribution system near each facility)
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via -Minimum service within 10 days (water available via backbone distribution
distribution system to each facility, possibly at reduced pressures) system near each facility)
Domestic Users -Potable water via distribution system within 1 day -Impaired service within 30 days (water available via distribution system to
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures)
distribution system to each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures) -Potable water at central locations for pick up within 3 days
-Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
Commercial Industrial, -Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via -Potable water at central locations for pick up within 1 week
and other Users distribution system to each commercial or industrial user, possibly at reduced -Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
pressures) -Impaired service to 90% of customers within 30 days
2. Kobe restoration scenario is as follows: 1st run the water through the pipes to find leakage. This requires restoration to be completed one by one downstream from the transmission
tunnels branch connections, even with plenty of human resources. Using multiple sources to the distribution pipe network (such as Large Capacity Transmission Main, Emergency
Contact Pipes, and Prefecture Water), in addition to the existing transmission tunnels, we can find the leakage and repair them in several directions at the same time. 2nd isolate a pipe
block by shutting valves from others to easily find the leakage in the block. The work force leveling in every stage is concerned with reduction of the restoration period. Kobe
Waterworks Bureau is trying to simulate those processes with several assumptions on seismic practices, water sources, new transmission systems, and so on. The population distribution
and demographics in Kobe have been floating since the 1995 earthquake, but they have become stable gradually; in consideration of this the recovery period is being re-examined.

3. Kobe Waterworks Bureau has mutual aid agreements for disasters in a group of 15 large cities as well as with nearby local cities. Those agreements include both providing emergency
drinking water for customers and repairing the damaged water system. Extensive damage predicted for the great offshore earthquake expected in the near future. In such occasion, the
neighboring governments also may suffer, and Kobe may not be able to expect aid from them. Therefore, it is very important to have a mutual aid agreement among 15 large cities in
Japan. In the case of Kobe City, Osaka City and Hiroshima City are assigned as the mutual aid city.
4. Yokahama Waterworks Bureau performance criteria

Time progress 8 hrs 16 hrs 24 hrs 2 – 3 days 4-7 days 8-14 days 15-28 days
Distributed drinkable water volume 0.8 gallon/day/person 0.8 gal/d/p 2.6 gal/d/p 5.3 gal/d/p 26.4 gal/d/p
Transportation water supply by vehicle to hospitals XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Transportation water supply by vehicle to refuge places XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Share water of Distribution Reservoir’s water XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Share water of Underground Circulation Type Water Tank’s water XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX
Distribution water from Emergency Water Supply Tap YYYYY XXXXX XXXXX XXXXXX
Distribution water from Temporary Water Supply Pipeline YYYYY XXXXX XXXXXX
Distribution water from Water Supply Pipeline YYYYY YYYYY YYYXXX
5. Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare restoration performance goals published by the Japan Water Research Center:
Period Quantity Carry Distance Supply Methods
0-3 days 0.8 gallons/person/day within 3280 ft anti-seismic tank, emergency tank, water trucks
10 days 5.3 gallons/person/day within 820 ft temporary tap near trunk main
21 days 26.4 gallons/person/day within 328 ft temporary tap near lateral main
28 days normal amount as before earthquake within 33 ft temporary tap to each house
6. Japan Water Works Association has the report of emergency response for water supply system. Just after the Kobe earthquake, the committee set up and studied the emergency response
procedure. The contents of report are:
a) basic rule of assistance request
b) communication procedure
c) about expenditure and accident, etc
d) organization of assistance team
e) manual for assistance activity
f) manual for restoration
g) assistance activity in field
h) publicity and public relations
i) recording of activities
j) sample of mutual assistance agreement.

430
Table 1M. System General Information (metric units).
(survey Connections (km) Diameter Capacity (m3) Tanks and Range (m3)
responder) Range Reservoirs
Type Region Area See Table 1a See Table 1a (mm)
(km2)
United States
Alameda County Distributor Cities of 267 324,800 78,150 total 1,401 total 51 – 1,219 340,650 13 total 1,893 to
Water District Fremont, 69,000 sf 1 ci 7 tanks 79,485
(Threse Newark, and 2,020 mf 99 s 6 in-ground
Wooding) Union City, 3,480 c/i/g 136 p reservoirs
California 1,830 LI 629 ac
1,820 fh 6O
Central Utah Wholesaler 10 counties 1,200,000 Wholesale to 25 129 total 457 – 3,048 189,250 6 tanks 2,877 to
Water service 80 s 8 raw water 75,700
Conservancy providers 2 P301S reservoirs
District (David 8 RC
Pitcher) 39 tunnels
Contra Costa Distributor Central and 554 270,000 88,000 total 1,271 total 51 – 2,438 283,875 40 946 to 26,495
Water District Eastern 53,000 sf 21 ci
(Steve Welch) Contra 30,500 mf 42 di
Costa 4,000 c/i/g 214 s
County, 500 A/I (raw) 298 p
California 500 R 692 ac
East Bay Distributor Portions of 842 1,300,000 403,402 total 6,656 total 51 – 2,743 2,952,300 170 11 to 582,890
Municipal Alameda 320,478 sf 2,190 ci treated water
Utility District and Contra 29,277 mf 3 di
(Bill Cain) Costa 4,697 A/I 1,987 s
Counties, 48,950 O 585 p
California 1,844 ac
17 PCCP
123 RCCP
1 copper
4 wrought iron
1O
Los Angeles Distributor City of Los 1,204 4,050,000 712,351 total 11,632 total 51 – 3,658 18,760,235 108 potable 6.4 to
Department of Angeles, 614,253 sf+mf 7627 ci potable water 12,542,423
Water and Power California 83,744 c/i/g 1139 di 4 raw water
(Craig Davis) 631 O 1,044 s 30,075,148 raw (emergency
0.6 p (stored in the storage only)
610 ac distribution
83 concrete system area)
28 copper
16 O
Table 1M – page 1 431

(km2)
Memphis Light Distributor City of 1,834 850,000 253,759 total 5,908 total 51 – 914 467,448 34 379 to 56,775
Gas and Water Memphis 228,656 res 5,887 ci+di
(Fred von Hofe) unincorpor- 19,924 c/i/g 1.3 s
ated areas of 5,179 O 6.4 p
Shelby Co.,
Cities of
Arlington &
Lakeland,
Tennessee
San Francisco Distributor* City of San 122 770,000 Approximately 2,011 total 19 – 1,981 1,570,775 21 284 to
Public Utilities Francisco, 250,000 total Consisting 338,379
Commission* California mainly of ci,
(Luke Cheng) some ci being
replaced with di
San Francisco Wholesaler* 28 agencies 6,515 1,700,000 150 turnouts to 1,920 total 711 – 2438 3,607,105 24 3,785 to
Public Utilities in San residential, Bay Area Water Consisting 2,504,156
Commission* Francisco commercial, Supply and mainly of s,
(Luke Cheng) Bay area, and industrial Conservation RCCP, PCCP
California users District agencies
Santa Clara Wholesaler Santa Clara 502 1,700,000 45 total 241 total 500 – 3,048 209,670,302 10 raw 492,050 to
Valley Water County, 18 A/I 60 s Mostly raw 1 treated 109,765,000
District (Erin California 27 wholesale 174 PCCP water not usable (raw)
Baker) retailer turnouts 7 RCCP for earthquake 56,775
response (treated)
Japan
Chiba Prefecture Distributor 11 cities and 564 2,830,000 unknown 8,438 total 50 – 1,800 770,000 3,000 to
Waterworks 2 towns 8,015 di 60,000
Bureau (Shigeru (Chiba, 169 s
Hataya) Funabashi, 17 ac
Matsudo, 237 HIVP
Ichikawa, -replaced 2,300
Ichihara, km ac
Narashino,
Urayasu,
Shiroi, Inzai,
Narita,
Imba,
Motono)

(km2)
Fukuoka City Distributor Fukuoka 235 1,402,200 736,380 total 3,778 total 40 – 1,800 366,100 45 (17 sites) 60 to 22,400
Waterworks City unknown sf 145 ci
Bureau (Kuniaki unknown mf 3,582 di
Nakamura) 64,062 c/i/g 38 s
98 A/I (other 3p
system)
1,592 R
Hachinohe Distributor 1 city 801 336,276 131,642 total 1,819 total 75 – 1,500 110,602 47 56 to 10,000
Regional Water (Hachinohe) 122,212 sf + mf 35 ci
Supply 6 towns 9,430 c/i/g 1,490 di
Authority (Oirase, 9s
(Norbou Gonohe, 207 p
Murakami) Rokunohe, 78 ac
Hashikami,
Nanbu,
Sannohe)
Hanshin Water Wholesaler Kobe, 478 2,500,000 21 supply points 126 total 300 – 2,400 262,800 15 1,300 to
Supply Ashiya, Kobe (6), 11 ci 80,000
Authority (Shinji Nishinomiya Ashiya (4), 53 di
Nakayasu) and Nishinomiya (8) 39 s
Amagasaki Amagasaki (3) 1 ac
Cities 22 tunnel
Kanagawa Water Wholesaler Kanagawa 1,489 8,007,450 40 supply points 199 total 800 – 2,800 536,600 17 5,000 to
Supply Prefectural, total for 4 59 di 60,000
Authority (Ken- Yokohama constituent waterworks 107 s
ichi Koike) City, waterworks 33 di + s
Kawasaki has 50%
City, and dependence
Yokosuka on KWSA
City water
Kobe Distributor Kobe City 553 1,523,521 744,592 total 4,906 total 50 – 2,400 563,120 251 (123 30 to 39,000
Waterworks 700,910 sf+mf+ 1,407 ci sites)
Bureau school+hospital 3,092 di
(Kizuhiko 444 ABK 230 s
Mizuguchi) 74 pbh 177 p
43,164 o/f
Nagoya Distributor Nagoya City 356 2,316,000 793,208 total 8,054 total 16 – 2,000 634,589 43 29 to 50,000
Waterworks and 501,539 sf 228 ci
Sewerage 67,487 mf 5,108 di
Bureau (Yukio 224,182 c/i/g 37 s
Mabuchi) 2,676 p
4O

(km2)
Osaka Municipal Distributor Osaka City 211 2,600,000 925,000 total 5,000 total 75 – 2,000 765,700 10 500 to
Waterworks 411,000 sf 830 ci 100,900
Bureau (Hiroaki 369,000 mf 4,100 di
Miyazaki) 144,000 c/i/g+R 70 s
Tokyo Distributor Tokyo City 1,222 12,246,523 6,550,765 total 25,262 total 50 – 2,700 3,293,393 176 3 to 286,800
Metropolitan (2005 FY) 6,328,931 sf 370 ci
Waterworks 220,911 mf 24,509 di
Bureau (Masaru 923 pbh 356 s
Oneda) 217 O 26 p
1 ac
Tottori City Distributor Tottori City 98 150,000 49,000 total 1120 total 20 – 1,200 43,000 31 200 to 10,000
(Prof. Yosihiko 27 ci
Hosoi) 748 di
24 s
320 p
Yokahama Distributor Yokahama 435 3,623,795 1,696,549 total 8,993 total 75 – 2,000 967,700 39 (23 sites) 5,800 to
Waterworks City 1,696,549 sf+mf 6,401 ci + di 136,000
Bureau (Ken 68,838 c/i/g 1,771 s
Yokoyama) 124 pbh 817 p
4 concrete
*
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is responsible for water distribution to the City of San Francisco and wholesale supply to suburban agencies in portions of Alameda, Santa
Clara, and San Mateo Counties represented by the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation District (www.bawsca.org). For purposes of tabulation, the distribution and wholesale portions of
SFPUC are presented separately for better comparison. Although the SFPUC system cannot be completely separated into two independent systems, for tabulation purposes information for
SFPUC wholesale for the most part does not account the City of San Francisco distribution, and vice versa. The SFPUC is tabulated in two parts because the distribution component of SFPUC is
similar to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and others who have their own aqueduct supplies but are not considered wholesalers to themselves
and the wholesale component of SFPUC is similar to Santa Clara Valley Water District, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, and others who do not distribute water directly to customers.
Table 1a. Service Connection and Pipe Type abbreviations.

Service Connection Pipe Type
sf = single family dwellings ci = cast iron
mf = multi-family dwellings di = ductile iron
res = residential s = steel
c/i/g = commercial/industrial/government p = plastic (e.g. PVC)
A/I = Agriculture/Irrigation O = Other
R = Recreational ac = asbestos cement
O = Other PCCP = Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
LI = Landscape Irrigation RCCP = Reinforced Concrete Cylinder Pipe
fh = firelines and hydrant RC = Reinforced Concrete
pbh = public bath houses P301S = Prestressed 301 Steel
ABK = Apartments sharing Bath and Kitchen
o/f = offices/factories

Table 2M. Earthquake Water Supply Information (metric units).
Organization Adequate Post-Earthquake Supply? Post-Earthquake Fire Additional Emergency Water Emergency Drinking Water
Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
United States
Alameda County Don’t know No special provisions at No special provisions at this time No special provisions at this time
Water District this time
Central Utah Don’t know
Water
Conservancy
District
Contra Costa Yes (for Fragility analysis performed – No special provisions 10 emergency interconnections [with Contra Costa Water District is responsible for
Water District emergency results used to implement East Bay Municipal Utility District (2 public drinking water response. No other plans
demands seismic improvement program treated, 1 raw), Cities of Martinez (2), in place in the event Contra Costa Water
not normal focused on rapid recovery. Pittsburg (2), Antioch, Brentwood, and District’s system is insufficient.
demand) Diablo Water District] totaling 389,855
m3/day treated and 378,500 m3/day
untreated.
East Bay Yes East Bay Municipal Utility Terminal storage Inter-connections with the San Francisco Will follow regional office of Emergency
Municipal District performed systematic reservoirs Public Utilities Commission and Contra Services directions
Utility District evaluation of distribution system 203,504 m3 loaded by Costa Water District capable of
using Monte Carlo simulation of helicopter for fighting supplying 113,550-189,250 m3/day.
4 scenario earthquakes ranging urban-wild land interface
from an operating earthquake of fires.
M6.0 on Hayward fault to
maximum credible events of
M7.0 Hayward fault, M6.75
Calaveras fault, and M6.5
Concord fault. The damage that
occurred in the simulations was
used to guide development of a
10-year Seismic Improvement
Program (recently completed) in
which facilities and pipelines
contributing to overall post-
seismic system performance
were fixed.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Los Angeles Yes No specific evaluation has been -No added fire storage -The Los Angeles Department of Water - Los Angeles Department of Water and
Department of performed. The Los Angeles volume. and Power can utilize more than 25 Power has a plan to provide drinking water
Water and Power Department of Water and Power -Inter-system connections Metropolitan Water District of Southern emergency water distribution stations. A
has historically maintained a allow fire engine pumping California (wholesale supplier) station will consist of one or more 1.3 m3
large volume of water supply in units to pump from a connections to receive additional potable water storage bladders and PVC pipe
the distribution network that lower pressure to higher supplies. manifold with dispensing spigots, set up on a
aided the system recovery pressure zone through -The Los Angeles Department of Water pair of extra strong aluminum folding tables.
during the 1971 San Fernando adjacent fire hydrants. and Power has a few small connections 50 bladder-manifold kits are stored in a sealed
and 1994 Northridge -Helistops at reservoir and other municipal water agencies (Beverly steel drum to keep it clean and ready for use
Earthquakes. The assumption is mountainous regions (e.g., Hills, Long Beach, Inglewood El and stand at 6 district yards around the City.
that this supply will be adequate Elysian Park) Segundo, Las Virgenes, Los Angeles -When deployed, the stations will be
in future earthquakes. -Fire fighters take County Waterworks District No. 29), repeatedly filled by potable water tender
advantage of swimming primarily to provide water to them, tankers. Los Angeles Department of Water
pools as added supply however it may be possible for the Los and Power plans to purchase, store and
(this is a usable supply, Angeles Department of Water and Power maintain in a ready state two stainless steel
but not specifically to receive some water from these tanker trailers of 14 m3 capacity each, as a
identified as an alternate agencies in an emergency. means of immediate first response. Additional
supplemental supply for tankers will be employed as needed
fire suppression). through spot rental and mutual aid.
Memphis Light Yes Currently having this checked Maintain 30,280 – Have interconnections with a number of Unlike most systems Memphis Light Gas and
Gas and Water by consultant 113,550 m3/day plants at small systems that could be used on Water has 8 major plants and anticipates
different locations, if one emergency basis. several plants will survive a major earthquake.
fails others can pick up Water from operating plants available for fire
load if distribution system fighting, sanitation, and drinking.
functions.
San Francisco Yes Levels of Service (LOS) Goals 1,514,000 m3 domestic Interconnections with East Bay Approximately 70 potable water hydrants
Public Utilities following completion of the supply; an additional Municipal Utility District and Santa throughout the City of San Francisco are
Commission Water System Improvement 757,000 m3 non-potable Clara Water District allow water sharing marked with a blue water drop, and serve as
(S.F. City Program (WSIP) in 2014: fire suppression reserves capacity up to 264,950 m3/day. emergency water distribution sites following
distribution, in cisterns, local lakes, an earthquake or other disaster. They will be
see * bottom of Deliver minimum system untreated reservoirs, etc. manned by San Francisco Public Utilities
Table 1) demand (winter month demand) Commission crews and neighborhood
within 24 hours after a major The San Francisco Fire emergency response teams following a
earthquake. Minimum winter Department maintains an disaster. Additionally, the San Francisco Zoo
month demand is estimated at auxiliary water supply Well serves as an emergency potable water
813,775 m3/day in 2030. system independent of the supply. The Zoo Well project includes a truck
water distribution system fill station, disinfection facilities, upgrade of
Deliver average demand under and dedicated only to fire the existing power system for the well, and an
the condition of one unplanned fighting. emergency generator.
outage concurrent with one
planned outage of major
facilities. Average demand in
2030 is estimated at 1,135,500
m3/day.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
San Francisco Yes LOS Goals following WSIP Local lakes and reservoirs; Interconnections with East Bay Varies by wholesale customer/jurisdiction.
Public Utilities contingency plans and Municipal Utility District and Santa Some can use groundwater.
Commission At least 70 percent of the emergency storage vary Clara Valley Water District allow water
(wholesale, turnouts within each region by wholesale customer/ sharing capacity up to 264,950 m3/day.
see * bottom of should receive flow to achieve jurisdiction.
Table 1) minimum month demand for the Other provisions vary by wholesale
region. Estimated 2030 customer/jurisdiction.
minimum month demands for
the three regions noted above
are 363,3600 m3/day, 140,045
m3/day, and 310,370 m3/day
respectively.
Restore facilities to meet

average demand within 30 days
after a major earthquake .
Santa Clara No Modeled seismic hazard events No special provisions -Interconnection with San Francisco No special provisions
Valley Water to determine water supply Public Utilities Commission
District infrastructure reliability. -Planned future well fields for emergency
Although the Santa Clara Valley supplies
Water District (District) has
enough raw water storage, the
Infrastructure Reliability Project
found that the District would not
likely be able to treat and
deliver the water following a
seismic event due to treatment
plant damage and numerous
pipe breaks and leaks. The
District has available
groundwater and is
implementing a project that will
provide wells for emergency
water supply.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Japan
Chiba Prefecture Yes Installed emergency stop valves No special provisions Supply provided to Chiba Prefecture -10 water supply trucks with 2-4 m3
Waterworks in the distribution reservoirs up Waterworks Bureau by 2 wholesale water -69 water tanks with 1 m3
Bureau to 430,000 m3 storage capacity. supply authorities totaling about 230,000 -50,000 aluminum canned water
The remaining 340,000 m3 can m3/day. If the two water supply -1,775 water tanks with 20 liters
flow for domestic and fire authorities remain operable after -60,000 water supply bags with 6 to 10 liters
fighting use. earthquake, they can supply 30,000 to -Emergency faucets and fire hydrants in 5
50,000 m3/day more than usual. purification plants and 14 treated pump
stations used to distribute water, once water
restored to those plants and stations.
-Emergency water brought to refuge places
and medical care institutions with the aid of
Water Piping Construction Cooperative
Society, before other municipal water supply
entities come to aid. Support agreement
maintained with Society for emergency water.
Fukuoka City Yes The essential water volume in No special provisions, but 2 connections with the water wholesale Anti-earthquake pipe lines used for important
Waterworks the first stage on the emergency system designed with agency, one connection with neighboring distribution lines connecting trunk line to
Bureau is estimated 3 liters per person. seismic resistant ductile city in order to assist each other in evacuation sites. Also have two water carrier
It means the essential total daily iron pipe so many emergencies. vehicles to supply drinkable water to water
volume sum up to 2,800 m3, hydrants on distribution suspended areas.
which is far smaller than pipe can be available for
existing storage capacity. fire fighting.
Hachinohe No Because maintenance of the No special provisions No special provisions Emergency water obtained from fire-plug and
Regional Water block distribution system is seismic storage tank. Drinking water
Supply insufficient, mutual flexibility is prioritized and transported to medical
Authority impossible. Therefore, when the institutions and to the elementary schools used
earthquake damage happens, for refuge. Standard is 3 liters/day/person. As
enough water cannot be emergency repair advances the amount of the
supplied to the customer. water offered from distribution network is
increased.
Hanshin Water No Have not performed an No special provisions Have 4 emergency water supply facilities No plan, in the business of wholesale water
Supply evaluation because this supply, but will support customers.
Authority organization is in the business of
wholesale supply to distributing
organizations
Kanagawa Water No See Note 1. No special provisions. Have interconnection raw water main Kanagawa Water Supply Authority is a bulk
Supply Cannot prepare counter- between two different water resources. water supplier, but can supply drinking water
Authority measures for earthquake to 4 waterworks (constituent bodies) at main
scenarios because fault reservoirs. Kanagawa Water Supply Authority
positions cannot be clearly trains for emergency supply with constituent
identified. bodies every year.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Kobe No, but are Planning emergency storage of -The emergency water Emergency connections with neighboring An emergency system provides storage every
Waterworks in progress 3 liters/person/day. Will soon storage system developed water suppliers; 7 pipes with 5 cities. Up 2 km radius for efficient conveyance of
Bureau of creating have enough storage up to 7- for drinking water supply to 8,000 m3 of water can be delivered in drinking water supply trucks. 47 sites cover
enough days. would also be used for fire emergency situation. the whole city. 37 systems are completed at
emergency fighting. present, and emergency water is secured about
storage Supply for full recovery -Fire Department built and 54,000 m3. See also Note 2 for Table 3.
dependent upon other sources. maintain 252 earthquake
Kobe only has 25% of it own resistant water supply Store several types of carrying containers for
water sources. cisterns for emergency fire emergency use in seven branch offices.
fighting. 25,300 m3 total -11,240 back pack water bags (6 liters)
volume. -10,249 water tank container (2 -18 liters)
Nagoya No Nagoya Waterworks has Nagoya Fire Fighting 11 Emergency connections with 7 200 emergency water supply facilities located
Waterworks and sufficient total water supply Bureau constructed 568 neighboring waterworks for total of so all residents can reach on foot.
Sewerage after upgrading water reservoirs. earthquake resistance fire 68,300 m3/day. 208 underground hydrants installed in
Bureau The total purified water storage prevention water tanks in distribution pipes leading to elementary
capacity is 634,589 m3, 2006. schools that are used as evacuation sites.
indicating that water supply of
12 hours or more with respect to
a design daily maximum water
supply volume of 1,244,000 m3
is secured. However, there is
still a problem of resolving the
regionally uneven distribution
that exists in the amount of
water stored.
Osaka Municipal No Total storage capacity is No special provisions Interconnection with neighboring water 2 emergency water supply plans. One is
Waterworks 765,700 m3. Have a plan to system delivery of water cans to shelters. The other is
Bureau increase the total storage transportation by water tank truck to shelters,
capacity to 1,000,000 m3, which medical facilities, and so on. Stockpiles of
is equivalent to 50% of the various emergency equipment and materials;
immediate design maximum water tank truck, polyethylene bags for
daily supply. This plan is based emergency water supply, temporary water
on the direction of the Ministry tanks, and pipes, etc.
of Health, Labor and Welfare.
However, Osaka Waterworks
didn’t actually estimate how
much is necessary to supply
victims. Osaka Waterworks has
a plan to construct new
reservoirs within the City to
expand well-balanced tanks and
reservoirs to be used as
emergency action bases.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Tokyo No In the Japanese standard, the No special provisions. Yes with Saitama Prefecture Waterworks Emergency water supply bases placed
Metropolitan distributing reservoir capacity is Tokyo Waterworks doesn't and the Kawasaki City Waterworks approximately every 2 km to be reached from
Waterworks to secure half of the design consider fire fighting use, any place in Tokyo to secure drinking water in
Bureau maximum daily supply, but because the facilities scale case of a disaster.
Tokyo Waterworks does not is large. Even if the fire
have enough capacity of water fighting water is taken
distribution reservoirs against from fire hydrants, the
the number of customers in the water supply isn’t
some region. influenced.
Tottori City Don’t know Total storage capacity of No special provisions 1,320 m3 of water can be stored in 3 water trucks with 2 m3 tank and 4 compact
earthquake resistant reservoirs is earthquake resistant distribution membrane filtration systems each of which
about 20% of daily water reservoirs can supply 48 m3 of purified water per day.
supply. 440 handy water containers with volume of
10-20 liters and 25,000 emergency water bags
with volume of 6 liters are stored.
Yokahama Yes In emergency without -Fire water supply and Interconnection with neighboring water -Underground circulating type water tanks
Waterworks earthquake, we need 12 hours distribution determined utilities; Yokosuka City, Kawasaki City, used to ensure the minimum drinking water
Bureau storage water volume in each using Japan Water Works and Kanagawa Prefecture. There are 10 requirements for residents in the disaster. They
distribution reservoir. It is the Association Guideline receiving points. are installed at elementary and junior high
standard of Japan Water Works “Design Criteria for schools, and public parks. 134 total tanks. 60
Association Guideline. Waterworks Facilities” m3 tanks at 118 sites, 100 m3 tanks at 11 sites,
Yokahama Waterworks Bureau -Reservoirs have 700 m3 tanks at 2 sites, 1000 m3 tank at 1 site,
distribution system has new emergency shutoff valves, 1300 m3 tank at 1 site, and 1500 m3 tank at 1
target of 15 hours long. Water automatically closing site. 13,380 m3 total water volume.
volume of distribution reservoir when sensing earthquakes -385 taps in the city for emergency water
is 967,700 m3, design maximum more than intensity 5, but supply distribution.
water supply volume is continue supplying water -All distribution reservoirs have emergency
1,540,000 m3. 967,700 divides for post-earthquake shut-valves to secure 190,200 m3 water
by 1,540,000, and times 24 firefighting and other (security quantity of water).
hours is 15.1 hours. needs until reaching the
security quantity of water
needed for emergency
drinking water storage.

Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Japan Water The Ministry of Health, Labor The indicator of the Ministry of Health, The indicator of the Ministry of Health, Labor
Research Center and Welfare recommends the Labor and Welfare published in the and Welfare published in the manual of Japan
(Yasuhiko Sato) total minimum distribution manual of Japan Water Research Center Water Research Center is defined as follows.
and reservoir capacity equal 12 is defined as follows. 1) Amount of emergency water supply per day
Japan Water hours of planned daily 1) When securing emergency water one person (3 liters or more)
Works maximum supply amount. This supply and the city water for restoration 2) Initial emergency water supply period days
Association value was announced in the long work, it is effective to perform water (about 3 days)
(Kazutomo term plan for water works accommodation for a disaster system
Nakamura) aiming 21 century on June 1, from other systems.
1991. 2) Therefore, strengthening of a widening
backup function is promoted by
maintaining wide area supply which can
accommodate water over a wide area, and
the transition pipe between drinking-
water supply utilities.
The Japan Water Works Association

guideline for anti-earthquake planning
(see Note 6 for Table 3) of water supply
system (draft) says a connection pipeline
with neighbor waterworks or another
pipe system is effective for emergency
supply and restoration activity. Therefore
the connection pipe is strongly
recommended.
Table 2M Notes:
1. Kanagawa Water Supply Authority ( KWSA) does not have enough water stored and available to the local distribution network for a damaging earthquake. If the raw water main in Sakawa
water supply system is broken, KWSA cannot intake raw water to three treatment plants in Sakawa water supply system, requiring use of other water resources. As a result, KWSA doesn't have
enough ability for intaking raw water in case of earthquake. An evaluation was performed to determine a response in case of emergency as follows:
First, assume earthquakes on the Kannawa and Kozu-Matuda fault belt. In this scenario, estimate the water demand of constituent waterworks from past results.
The following amount of water is estimated in this scenario.
(1) Can supply treated water to constituent waterworks from our three treatment plants (including transfer to another water resource),
(2) Cannot supply treated water to constituent waterworks from our three treatment plants.

442
Table 3M. Performance Criteria and Emergency Response Information (metric units).
System Agreements?
United States
Alameda County High None at this time No estimate has been made 36 No None None
Water District
Central Utah High Currently Developing Criteria No estimate has been made 20 No None None
Water (Wasatch
Conservancy front)
District Low (east
state)
Contra Costa Moderate -Temporary repairs to achieve full service 30 days 50 Yes None -Flexible hose
Water District within 30 days. General earthquake scenarios -Portable generators
-Water for partial service to wholesale for known faults in area. -Repair parts and valves
customers within 3 days. and piping
-Water for essential services to wholesale Based on modeling of -Emergency supplies
customers within 15 days. anticipated damage from (food, clothing, etc.)
-Water for partial service to industrial, scenario earthquake divided -Satellite radios
agricultural, landscape customers within 10 by anticipated response -Emergency fuel
days. effort to arrive at a total -Emergency cash
-Temporary service for fire service and response time.
essential services as soon as possible.
-Emergency fire service within 2.4 km for all
customers within 8 hours.
-Full service to all functioning emergency and
critical care facilities via distribution system
within 10 days.
-Partial water service to all areas via
distribution system within 10 days.
-Essential (sanitary) service to all areas via
distribution system within 15 days
East Bay Varies See Note 1. 40 to 50 days 800 Yes None -pipe
Municipal from Low System analyzed to -flexible large diameter
Utility District to Very determine estimated return to hoses with flaking boxes
High in service times following four -valves
different earthquake scenarios -tunnel repair sets
areas of developed for seismic -boxes for Emergency
system program (see Table 2). Made Operations Team
break estimates repair time Members
to fix breaks and damaged
facilities determined by
estimating crew time to
repair using historical data.
Table 3M - page 1 443

System Agreements?
Los Angeles Moderate The Los Angeles Department of Water and Anticipate approximately 7 More than No, currently None at 5 district yards store:
Department of Power has not specified any water system days for nearly full recovery 500 working on -food packages
Water and Power seismic performance criteria after an earthquake of CALWARN -cooking utensils
magnitude on the order of and East Bay -sleeping cots
6.7 based on the 1994 Municipal -blankets
Northridge Earthquake Utility (no special pipe or fittings
recovery. District stockpiled beyond normal
agreements operation)
Memphis Light Depends Memphis Light Gas and Water is in the Work in progress, specific 32 to 40 Yes Retired Purchasing department has
Gas and Water on process of a multi-hazard risk assessment. restoration times not yet employees can worked out agreements
location Performance goals will follow from the risk available. be called into with suppliers.
assessment. service if
3 scenarios consider small, medium and large. necessary (have
Small based on smallest earthquake that can used on special
damage system. projects).
Commission system -Deliver the winter demand (309,234 m3/day) 14 days. Within 30 days for severity of stockpiled at strategic
(S.F. City within 24 hours with 90% reliability most major system extents; failure locations throughout the
distribution, -Deliver average day demand (431,490 up to 90 days for bridge and system.
see * bottom of m3/day) within 30 days with 90% reliability tunnel work, depending on
Table 1) earthquake location.
Evaluations ongoing based
San Andreas faults.
Commission system -Deliver the winter demand (813,775 m3/day) 14 days. Within 30 days for severity of stockpiled at strategic
(wholesale, within 24 hours with 90% reliability most major system extents; failure locations throughout the
see * bottom of -Deliver average day demand (1,135,500 up to 90 days for bridge and system.
Table 1) m3/day) within 30 days with 90% reliability tunnel work, depending on
earthquake location.
Evaluations ongoing based
San Andreas faults.

System Agreements?
Santa Clara High Level of service goal is potable water service -45 to 60 days for M7.9 San Unknown No, but None, but -spare pipe in diameters
Valley Water at the average winter flow rate available to a Andreas earthquake. planning to planning to 508 – 3,048 mm
District minimum of one turnout per retailer within 7 -30 to 45 days for a M6.7 obtain in near secure retainer -valves and appurtenances
days. Southern Hayward future. agreements for -internal pipe joint seals
earthquake. contractors to
-7 to 10 days for a M6.2 perform
Central Calaveras infrastructure
earthquake. emergency
-earthquakes were modeled repairs
based on probability of
occurrence
Japan
Chiba Prefecture Low classified goals for water supply: 28 days 500 Yes None -aluminum canned water -
Waterworks (maybe) -3 liters/day/person a within 3 days after Would like to repair water -necessity for camping
Bureau earthquake supply facilities within 4 such as tents, blankets,
-20 liters/ day/person from 4 days to 10 days weeks, even if Hanshin sleeping bags, mats,
after earthquake earthquake grade occurs. -radios
-100 liters/ day/person from 11 days to 21 -Not sure if specific for
days after earthquake earthquake: stockpile
-250 liters/ day/person from 22 days to 28 pipes, bends, cover joints
days after earthquake
Fukuoka City Low Essential water volume increases according to 4 weeks 19 normal Yes 12 work units None
Waterworks the elapsed days following the earthquake. M7.1 on Kego fault. 100 skilled from private
Bureau -3 liters per person in 3 days Damages estimated by employees companies,
-water supply increases with passing time, dividing City into 250 m can be Fukuoka Pipe
until almost fully recovered the water supply meshes, each mesh assigned available Work Company
system in 4 weeks. earthquake shock. Association
Hachinohe Moderate Aim for ending emergency restoration within 3 weeks 174 Yes None -water service tank
Regional Water three weeks M8.2 used to calculate days -bottled water
Supply needed for restoration -pipe material (ductile iron
Authority pipe)
Hanshin Water Moderate Emergency restoration work of damaged 1 week Yes None None
Supply facilities will be completed within one week General earthquake,
Authority restoration shorter than end
suppliers restoration process
Kanagawa Water High Goal is to restore supply water to four No estimate 433 Yes None Stockpile materials and
Supply waterworks (constituent bodies) within 7 days. equipment for post-
Authority earthquake restoration to
continue water supply at
each 40 water supply
point. (e.g., portable
generator, measure for
chlorine, etc.)

System Agreements?
Kobe Moderate Post-earthquake performance criteria are as 4 weeks 343 Yes None None
Waterworks follows. Assume similar level as the See Note 3.
Bureau a. Complete emergency restoration within 4 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Great
weeks earthquake.
b. Step-by-step provision of emergency The 1995 earthquake showed
drinking water the tolerable limit for water
c. Water distribution toward emergency system outage is
hospitals and schools approximately four weeks.
d. Deciding emergency restoration area in a See Note 2 for restoration
fair order process.
e. Stabilization of the people's livelihood
Nagoya Moderate -First 3 days provide 3 liters/person/day using 4 weeks targeted, but do not Do not Yes Request Equipment in 24 material
Waterworks and mobile and central station water supply to have estimate of how long it know how cooperation warehouses
Sewerage sustain life will take to restore system to many staff from retired -1 m3 water tank (mobile
Bureau -4 to 10 days provide 20 liters/person/day normal. will be staff type)
using mobile and central station water supply available to -1 KVA dynamo
for cooking and washing face and hands make -temporary hydrant (4
-11 to 21 provide 100 liters/person/day using repairs taps)
central station and pipeline distribution water -1 m3 emergency water
supply for washing cloths and bathing supply tank
-22 to 28 days provide 250 liters/person/day -polyethylene tank (5, 10,
using central station and pipeline distribution and 20 liter)
water supply for regular life function. -tent
-Increase reliability of pipe distribution system -fire hydrant hose
over time until fully restore within 28 days. -Light and tools,
-pipe drawings (1/2500)
Osaka Municipal High -Within 3 days from earthquake occurrence - 1 month 2,200 Yes Emergency Various emergency
Waterworks Securing of drinking water for refugees (3 Restoration estimate based Mutual water supply equipment and materials;
Bureau liters /day/person) on calculations of how many assistance agreements with water tank truck,
-Within 10 days from earthquake occurrence - teams will perform pipe or agreements the Japan Truck polyethylene bags for
Securing of eating and drinking water (20 facilities repairs using 5 with 14 major Association and emergency water supply,
liters/day/person) earthquake scenarios. cities. a soft drink temporary water tanks,
-Within 15 days from earthquake occurrence - maker. and pipes, etc.
Securing of subsistence water (100
liters/day/person)
-Within a month from earthquake occurrence-
Securing of daily life water (250
liters/day/person)

System Agreements?
Tokyo High -The supply routes to the capital center 30 days 500 Yes Constructor Tokyo Waterworks
Metropolitan organizations are restored within three days -M6.9 and M7.3 Tokyo Bay Agreements secures all the restoration
Waterworks after the earthquake occurs. Northern part Earthquakes; materials of the supply
Bureau -other water supply facilities are restored and M6.9 and M7.3 Tama routes such as the capital
within 30 days inland Earthquake. The center organizations, and
hypocenter depths were 30- provides to the
50 km, respectively. constructors.
-The water suspension rate is
calculated for 250 m mesh in
consideration of pipe length,
material and caliber,
liquefaction, and ground
speed.
Tottori City High After 2-3 days: Emergency water supply by 3 or 4 weeks 30 Yes Assistance
using stored water Earthquake JMA seismic agreements with
After 4 days: Direct water supply to important intensity 6. cooperative
facilities with emergency supply pipelines Estimation by total predicted water works
After 21 to 28 days: restore system completely number of pipe damages and association in
ability of repair parties. the City.
Estimate 1.6-2.4 pipe
breakages per km, 250 of
transmission and distribution
pipes and 700 of supply
pipes.
Yokahama High See Note 4. After earthquake until third day, 28 days 300 Yes The union of Stockpile materials and
Waterworks called the confusion period, Yokahama -Yokahama Waterworks Prepares to pipe equipment at 14 sites in
Bureau Waterworks supplies water to residents by the estimates for major accept the construction the city and through
underground circulating type water tanks and earthquake based on support from company's mutual assistance
stored water in the distribution reservoirs. One earthquake disaster example cities not members repairs agreements.
person can use 3 liters/day. After that until that happened in other cities. affected by broken pipes -DIP and service pipe
seventh day, called the primary restoration disaster and and will work material, bottled water,
period, the residents receive water from between these with employees. portable tank, power
emergency water supply taps. One person can cities, carries generator, fuel, emergency
use 10 liters/day. After that until fourteenth out disaster water supply tap, battery
day, called the secondary restoration period, prevention charger, pump, hand
the residents receive water from emergency training twice operation pump, simple
water supply distribution stations and a year filter machine, radio
temporary water tap. One person uses 20 facilities
liters/day. After that, called the revival period,
one person uses 100 liters/day.

System Agreements?
Japan Water The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 28 days is in the guideline See Note 6.
Works has the standard of water works facilities that for anti-earthquake planning
Association Japanese call the performance criteria. Japan of water supply system
(Kazutomo Water Works Association published the (draft) that is supervised by
Nakamura) design criteria for water works facilities and the Ministry of Health,
and the earthquake-resistant design criteria for Labor and Welfare and
Japan Water water works facilities that most of Japanese published by the Japan
Research Center water works use for designing their facilities. Water Research Center.
(Yasuhiko Sato) The restoration goal should be within 4 weeks
(28 days) if possible, to decrease fear of
sufferer and stabilized their daily life. See
Note 5.
Table 3M Notes:
1. East Bay Municipal Utility District Service Level Goals
Service category Operating Earthquake Maximum Earthquake
General -Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public -Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public
-Limit extensive damage to system facilities -Limit extensive damage to system facilities
-All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected, using -All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected
Orinda and Walnut Creek treatment plants
-All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated -All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated
Fire Service -Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all areas -Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all high risk areas
-All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir) -All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir)
-High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire -High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire
reserves) reserves)
-Service to all hydrants within 20 days -Service to all hydrants within 100 days
Hospitals and Disaster -Minimum service to all affected areas within 1 day (water available via -Minimum service via distribution system or truck within 3 days
Collection Centers backbone distribution system near each facility)
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via -Minimum service within 10 days (water available via backbone distribution
distribution system to each facility, possibly at reduced pressures) system near each facility)
Domestic Users -Potable water via distribution system within 1 day -Impaired service within 30 days (water available via distribution system to
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures)
distribution system to each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures) -Potable water at central locations for pick up within 3 days
-Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
Commercial Industrial, -Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via -Potable water at central locations for pick up within 1 week
and other Users distribution system to each commercial or industrial user, possibly at reduced -Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
pressures) -Impaired service to 90% of customers within 30 days
2. Kobe restoration scenario is as follows: 1st run the water through the pipes to find leakage. This requires restoration to be completed one by one downstream from the transmission
tunnels branch connections, even with plenty of human resources. Using multiple sources to the distribution pipe network (such as Large Capacity Transmission Main, Emergency
Contact Pipes, and Prefecture Water), in addition to the existing transmission tunnels, we can find the leakage and repair them in several directions at the same time. 2nd isolate a pipe
block by shutting valves from others to easily find the leakage in the block. The work force leveling in every stage is concerned with reduction of the restoration period. Kobe
Waterworks Bureau is trying to simulate those processes with several assumptions on seismic practices, water sources, new transmission systems, and so on. The population distribution
and demographics in Kobe have been floating since the 1995 earthquake, but they have become stable gradually; in consideration of this the recovery period is being re-examined.

3. Kobe Waterworks Bureau has mutual aid agreements for disasters in a group of 15 large cities as well as with nearby local cities. Those agreements include both providing emergency
drinking water for customers and repairing the damaged water system. Extensive damage predicted for the great offshore earthquake expected in the near future. In such occasion, the
neighboring governments also may suffer, and Kobe may not be able to expect aid from them. Therefore, it is very important to have a mutual aid agreement among 15 large cities in
Japan. In the case of Kobe City, Osaka City and Hiroshima City are assigned as the mutual aid city.
4. Yokahama Waterworks Bureau performance criteria

Time progress 8 hrs 16 hrs 24 hrs 2 – 3 days 4-7 days 8-14 days 15-28 days
Distributed drinkable water volume 3 Liters/day/person 3 L/d/p 10 L/d/p 20 L/d/p 100 L/d/p
Transportation water supply by vehicle to hospitals XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Transportation water supply by vehicle to refuge places XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Share water of Distribution Reservoir’s water XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Share water of Underground Circulation Type Water Tank’s water XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX
Distribution water from Emergency Water Supply Tap YYYYY XXXXX XXXXX XXXXXX
Distribution water from Temporary Water Supply Pipeline YYYYY XXXXX XXXXXX
Distribution water from Water Supply Pipeline YYYYY YYYYY YYYXXX
5. Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare restoration performance goals published by the Japan Water Research Center:
Period Quantity Carry Distance Supply Methods
0-3 days 3 liters/person/day within 1000 m anti-seismic tank, emergency tank, water trucks
10 days 20 liters/person/day within 250 m temporary tap near trunk main
21 days 100 liters/person/day within 100 m temporary tap near lateral main
28 days normal amount as before earthquake within 10 m temporary tap to each house
6. Japan Water Works Association has the report of emergency response for water supply system. Just after the Kobe earthquake, the committee set up and studied the emergency response
procedure. The contents of report are:
a) basic rule of assistance request
b) communication procedure
c) about expenditure and accident, etc
d) organization of assistance team
e) manual for assistance activity
f) manual for restoration
g) assistance activity in field
h) publicity and public relations
i) recording of activities
j) sample of mutual assistance agreement.

450
Survey Request
451
Information Survey
5th AWWARF/JWWA Water System Seismic Workshop
August 15-17, 2007
Oakland, California
During the discussion session scheduled for Thursday August 16 from 13:30 to 17:00 hours, we
would like to focus on the topics of:
4. Post-earthquake water supply in the water distribution network, and

5. Water System post-earthquake performance criteria.
These two topics are very closely related. The purpose for selecting these topics is to obtain a
better understanding on what water systems are doing to determine: (a) what is an adequate post-
earthquake water supply that can be used immediately following an earthquake, (b) how can this
water volume be determined, (c) to what level should a water system perform during an
earthquake, and (d) other related questions. It is recognized that each water system cannot
address these issues in the same manner, but understanding how different water systems address
these issues is helpful in improving water system seismic practices.
All participating water organizations are requested to prepare in advance of attending the 5th
AWWARF/JWWA Workshop in Oakland, California. Please work with the appropriate
knowledgeable personnel in your organization to provide information on the topics identified in
the following pages.
The water supply portion of this survey is oriented toward water distribution networks. If your
organization is not in the business of distributing directly to customers (for example your
organization may be in the business of wholesale supply to distributing organizations), then some
of the information requested regarding water supply may not apply or may require special
description to understand how the topic applies to your organization.
This survey is not intended to take too much time. There are 18 statements on the following
pages requesting information. The requested information is hopefully readily available. Please
provide what you can. If appropriate, additional information can be provided at a later time.
Please type all responses in English and email responses to craig.davis@ladwp.com by

Monday August 13, 2007. You can provide additional information to Craig Davis from the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power (in electronic form) on August 15.
Please provide information requested on the following pages. If necessary and appropriate please
provide additional pages of information (in English) to help others gain an understanding of your
water system as related to the requested information. If you do not have adequate information to
provide a response or you do not believe an item applies to your organization please indicate so
or leave it blank.
Please make the units of measurement very clear. See attached for recommended units.
Survey-1 452
1. The area for which you are responsible for distributing water ______________
(regional description and area in square units)
2. Total population within the distribution service area ______________

(for wholesale agencies total population of all constituent agency service areas)
3. Total number of service connections ______________

If possible please provide a breakdown of service connections in the following, or
similar, categories:
a. Single family dwellings ______________
b. Multi-family dwellings ______________
c. Commercial/industrial/government ______________
d. Agriculture/irrigation ______________
e. Recreational ______________
f. Other (please specify) __________________________________
__________________________________
For wholesale agencies provide the number of turnouts ____
4. Total length of pipe in the distribution network ______________

If possible, but not necessary, please provide a breakdown of pipe lengths by pipe type:
a. Cast iron ______________
b. Ductile Iron ______________
c. Steel ______________
d. Plastic (e.g., PVC) ______________
e. Other (please specify) __________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
5. The range of pipe diameters within the distribution network (include transmission and
distribution pipe) _______________________
6. The total storage capacity in the distribution system _______________________
7. Number of storage tanks and reservoirs in the distribution system _______________
8. What is the size range of the storage tanks and reservoirs within the distribution system?
Smallest storage volume: ____________________________
Largest storage volume: _____________________________
9. Does your organization believe they have enough water stored and available to the local
distribution network for use following a damaging earthquake? (mark one)
______ yes _____ no _____ do not know
If yes or no, how do you know, was a specific evaluation performed (please briefly
explain)?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Survey-2 453
10. Please estimate the level of total ground failure hazard within the distribution area
(including surface fault rupture, landslide, liquefaction and lateral spreading).
____low _____ moderate ____ high ____ do not know
11. In your distribution area, are there any special provisions for water supply to fight fires
after an earthquake? ____ yes ____no
If so, what is total supplementary fire water supply volume? ______________
Please briefly explain special fire provisions (e.g., cisterns, separate fire fighting water
system, etc.; attach information as appropriate):
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
12. Do you have any special provisions for obtaining additional emergency water supplies
following an earthquake? (e.g., inter-connection with neighboring water system)
___ yes ____no
Please briefly explain emergency water supply provisions (attach information as

appropriate):
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
13. What plans do you have for providing emergency drinking water for customers who may
not have water service following an earthquake (under emergency response conditions)?
Please briefly explain any emergency drinking water distribution plans and identify if you
maintain special equipment and materials for distribution and/or have contracts in place
for assisting (attach information as appropriate):
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Survey-3 454
14. Does your organization have any specific post-earthquake performance criteria such as
goals at which your system is intended to function following an earthquake? (Examples:
(a) provide a minimum level of supply to all pressure zones following an earthquake, (b)
return service to 70% of customers within 10 days following a magnitude 7 earthquake,
or (c) similar criteria).
___ yes ____no
Please briefly explain any water system seismic performance criteria and provide any
appropriate supporting information (provide attachments as appropriate):
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
15. Total number of service employees in your organization who will be available to repair
earthquake damage (e.g., broken water pipes) _____________
16. Do you have agreements in place to obtain assistance from others in repairing the
damaged water system? ____ yes ____ no
a. If yes, are these mutual aid or mutual assistance agreements?
_____ yes _____ no
b. Do you have other types of available assistance agreements? (e.g., community
members, volunteer organizations, etc.)?
_____ yes _____ no
If so, please provide a brief explanation: ________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
17. Do you have an estimate of how long it will take for your system to return to normal
service conditions following an earthquake? ____ yes ____ no
If yes,
a. Are estimates based on any general earthquake or specific earthquake scenarios?
Please provide brief explanation. ______________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
b. How were estimates made? __________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
18. In addition to materials and equipment used for normal operations and maintenance, do
you stockpile specific materials and equipment for post-earthquake restoration?
____ yes ____ no
If yes, please briefly describe (provide attachments as appropriate): _________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Survey-4 455
Recommended units of measurement:
Length: Km, meters, miles, feet
Area: hectare, square meters, square miles, square feet
Volume: liters, cubic meters, cubic feet, gallons
Please clearly specify the units used.
Survey-5 456
TECHNICAL TOUR
Walnut Creek Water Treatment Plant, Walnut Creek, CA
San Pablo Reservoir Recreation Area, El Sobrante, CA
San Francisco Public Utility Commission’s Crossover and Isolation Valves Project, Fremont, CA
457
458
WALNUT CREEK WATER TREATMENT PLANT
General Facts
Plant Capacity: 160

Million Gallons per
Day
Commissioned in
1967 with major
improvements
constructed 2002
to 2005
Systems Facts
Raw Water: In-line rapid mix
Filters: Six filters - 2,304 square feet each; 6 to 8 gallons/minute/square foot
Filter Bottoms: “Wheeler bottom” (4 filters), false floor with nozzle type (2 filters)
• Dual Media: Sand (0.55 mm size; 12-inch depth), Anthracite (1.0 mm size; 3-foot
depth)
Chlorine Contact Chamber: 4 million gallons (MG) spiral design
Clearwell: 16 MG
Chemical Systems:
• Chemicals: ammonia, polyaluminum hydrochloride, cationic, anionic, and

nonionic polymers, sodium hypochlorite, sodium hydroxid, fluorosilicic acid
• Chemical Storage: Centralized, 30 day minimum capacity
• Chemical Feed: Eductor and metering pumps; “powerless” backup feed systems.
Reclamation/Solids Handling Systems: All reclaimed water is recirculated back to

the head of the plant at ≤ 10% of the plant rate. Solids are off-hauled.
459
460
FISHING fish
EBMUD
San Pablo Reservoir is known as one of the SAN PABLO RESERVOIR RECREATION
finest fisheries in the East Bay. The AREA
visitor center offers fishing licenses for
sale and a wide array of bait and tackle. THE OAKS RESERVABLE
The lake is stocked regularly with trout, GROUP SITE
catfish and bass. Our friendly and
knowledgeable staff are available to assist A lush, beautiful park setting,
perfect for your wedding,
boat
you with all your freshwater fishing and
boating needs. They know the best reception, anniversary,
fishing spots and can help you catch the BIG ONE! birthday party or other special
event. Rustic, yet private,
B O AT R E N TA L S with lake views, The Oaks
Patio boats, deluxe and motor boats, kayaks and row boats
offers a spacious area for up to
100 guests, including parking.
hike
are available for rent ADA accessible. For additional
daily. The aluminum information, please contact
fishing boats come the recreation area at 510-
equipped with a four- 223-1661.
stroke motor, which is
ideal for fishing and picnic
cruising the waters of the
reservoir. Rent a boat six times and receive a free 1/2 day 2007 PARK FEES
weekday rental.
ENTRY/PARKING $6.00 SEASON PASS $75.00*
PICNICKING BOAT LAUNCH $4.00/$6.50 (weekends-holidays) SEASON PASS $75.00*
The main recreation area and the boat launch offer picnic ENTRY PLUS BOAT LAUNCH ANNUAL PASS $140.00* kayak
sites with tables and barbeques. All of the sites have lake DAILY FISHING ACCESS PERMIT $4.00
views. The main recreation area
has a children’s playground and CANOE/KAYAK LAUNCH $3.00 SEASON PASS $110.00*
lawn area. The visitor center and

café are conveniently located.
THE OAKS PICNIC SITE $200.00
SAN PABLO RESERVOIR
*50% OFF FOR SENIORS AND THE DISABLED
There is also a reservable picnic
site, The Oaks, that can
RECREATION AREA
accommodate 100 people.
San Pablo Reservoir
CLOSE TO NATURE...
VISITOR CENTER Recreation Area
The visitor center offers a complete 7301 San Pablo Dam Road CLOSE TO HOME
array of fishing bait and tackle, as El Sobrante, CA 94803
well as outdoor clothing, hats, Phone: 510-223-1661
sunscreen, gifts, and supplies. If
Fax: 510-223-1015
your birthday falls within one week
of your visit, you receive a free
lunch at the café. Maximum value is For additional information, please visit 461
$6.50. WWW.EBMUD.COM WWW.NORCALFISHING.COM
EBMUD TRAILS/HIKING EBMUD
WELCOME TO SAN PABLO RESERVOIR San Pablo Recreation Area has a SAN PABLO RESERVOIR RECREATION
RECREATION AREA shoreline trail for hiking and fishing AREA
access and the Old San Pablo Dam Road
trail, which runs from the boat launch,
through the main recreation area to
Kennedy Grove Regional Park. This trail
connects with several other regional
trails.
K AYA K I N G / C A N O E I N G
San Pablo offers some of the best
flat water kayaking and canoeing in
the East Bay. Come for the day or
San Pablo Reservoir Recreation Area offers a just a few hours. We offer rentals
wide variety of exciting outdoor activities, of tandem and single kayaks from
including fishing, boating, picnicking, kayaking the marina at the main recreation
area. Paddle along 14 miles of
and hiking. The park also has facilities for group
shoreline and discover sandy beaches, great fishing spots,
events, weddings and meetings. The park is and spectacular wildlife viewing.
open to the public mid-February through the
end of October. B O AT L A U N C H
San Pablo offers an eight lane boat launch facility that can
PARK HOURS
accommodate motor boats and kayaks/canoe launching.
Plenty of parking is available and bait and tackle are
FEBRUARY 6:30AM — 5:00PM
available on the weekends.
MARCH 6:00AM — 5:30PM
WILDLIFE VIEWING
APRIL 6:00AM— 6:00PM(PST) Bird watching opportunities feature flocks of
white pelicans, migratory water fowl such as
6:00AM— 7:00PM(DST) geese, ducks, and shorebirds. Along the
trails within the park, a viewer can see a
MAY 6:00AM — 7:30PM variety of upland game species, including
wild turkey, quail and dove, and an array of
JUNE 6:00AM — 8:00PM predators such as eagles, ospreys, hawks,
and owls. Also be on the lookout for deer and bobcats.
JULY 6:00AM — 8:00PM
THE CAFE San Pablo is an EBMUD
AUGUST 6:00AM — 7:30PM drinking water reservoir,
The San Pablo Café offers premium coffee,
swimming and wading are
SEPTEMBER 6:30AM — 7:00PM espresso, snacks, and sandwiches on
prohibited.
weekdays. On weekends, the full service grill
OCTOBER 6:30AM — 6:00PM is open for breakfast and lunch. We offer a For additional Rules and
visitor’s pass (no gate fee) that is valid for up Regulations, please inquire at 462
to one hour. Validation required. the Visitor Center.
Seismic Upgrade
Project Update
Background
In coordination with the California Division of Safety of
Dams (DSOD), EBMUD commissioned a study to
determine the seismic safety of San Pablo Dam. The
study was completed in October 2004. It showed that
some of the soils and foundation that make up the dam
are susceptible to liquefaction. If a maximum credible 7.5
earthquake occurred on the Hayward Fault, the study
predicted the dam would slump and decrease in height,
allowing water to flow over the top, causing flooding
downstream. Based on the study’s recommendations,
EBMUD lowered the water level behind the dam to
protect downstream communities from flooding in case
of earthquake damage.
EBMUD explored various alternatives for the permanent

retrofit of the dam and is now designing an expansion of
the downstream buttress for the dam. During
construction, the reservoir will remain in service at its
currently reduced water level. Details about the project are How will EBMUD permanently improve the
available at www.ebmud.com embankment?
EBMUD will mix concrete deep into the soil on the dry
side below the dam, which will strengthen the foundation.
EBMUD will then rebuild the buttress making it higher
and wider.
Here is the type of equipment that will be used to reinforce the dam’s
foundation. 463
View of San Pablo Dam from Kennedy Grove Sea Foam Trail Vista Point Visual simulation of proposed San Pablo Dam with the downstream buttress
looking southwest as it looks before construction. in place.
What will it look like? How long will the construction take?
The contours of the dam will change due to the larger The San Pablo Dam Seismic Upgrade will take
buttress. A visual simulation is shown in the photos above. approximately two years to construct and is expected to
begin in early 2008.
How will this affect recreation at Kennedy
Grove and San Pablo Reservoir? How to get more information?
There will be some noise, visual, and access impacts. The Draft EIR and the Response to Comments in the
EBMUD will mitigate the temporary impacts to the degree Final EIR are available for review or download at
possible. Additional information can be found at www.ebmud.com. These documents include all the known
www.ebmud.com, see Current Events/ProjectUpdates. impacts associated with this project and the measures that
The majority of visits and events at Kennedy Grove are will be used to mitigate the impacts.
on weekends. EBMUD will allow access to Kennedy
How much will it cost?
Grove via San Pablo Dam Road on weekends and for
selected special events. Weekday access to the Grove will The estimated cost of construction is $60 million, and it is
be via Hillside Drive. EBMUD is working closely with the funded under EBMUD’s existing capital improvement
East Bay Regional Park District to develop a traffic budget and rate structure.
control and community outreach plan to minimize impacts
Schedule Information
to the residents on Hillside Drive and Patra Drive.
• The Final Environmental Impact Report approved by
Recreation facilities at San Pablo Reservoir will not be EBMUD’s Board of Directors September 26, 2006
adversely affected. • Design began September 2006

Design Testing - April through May 2007
Environmental monitoring - April 2007 through
end of project
Do you have questions, concerns?
• A pre-construction public meeting is planned at
Would you like to be added to a mailing list for Kennedy Grove in October 2007.
future notices?
Call (510) 287-2053 • Construction is expected to begin in January 2008
Email mblackwe@ebmud.com • Construction is expected to be completed in 2010
or go to www.ebmud.com 464
April 2007, SPDSU, MB
Bay Division Pipelines #3 & #4
Crossover and Isolation Valves
at Hayward Fault Crossing Project
The Crossover and Isolation Valves Project is a 15-month, $20million project located in
Fremont, California. It is part of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission's (SFPUC)
$4.3billion Water System Improvement Program (WSIP) to repair, replace, and seismically
upgrade the Hetch Hetchy System's aging pipelines, tunnels, dams, and reservoirs.
The SFPUC has four main transmission/distribution pipelines in the Bay Area. Bay Division
Pipelines #3 and #4, which were built in the 1950's and 1960's, are a 2m diameter reinforced
concrete pipe and a 2.44m diameter pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe, respectively, and carry a
combined to total of up to 829ML/day at 865kPa.
This project is intended to protect neighbors and their property, prevent flooding of a major inter-
state freeway, and ensure a reliable water supply to Bay Area residents by allowing the SFPUC
to isolate a rupture at the seismically active Hayward Fault. Situated within 0.5km on each side
of the fault, the two valve vaults each contain new 2m welded steel pipe and butterfly valves, and
a 1.07m crossover. The main valves will be operated by hydraulic actuators, remotely operated
and monitored. Substantial completion is anticipated at the end of October 2007.
The SFPUC owns and manages the Hetch Hetchy water system that delivers drinking water from
the Sierra Nevada Mountains to 2.4million customers in four Bay Area counties. The SFPUC
also treats the wastewater for the City of San Francisco and generates clean hydropower that
provides electricity for San Francisco municipal services.
For more information, visit www.sfwater.org.
465
466

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Proceedings of the

Fifth AWWARF / JWWA

August 15-17, 2007

East Bay Municipal Utility District

American Water Works Association Research Foundation

East Bay Municipal Utility District

Japan Water Works Association

Taiwan Water Works Association

Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research

All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

Copies of this report may be obtained from:

American Water Works Research Foundation

SESSION 1 – SEISMIC MITIGATION MEASURES

SESSION 2 – SEISMIC MEASURES FOR PIPELINES

Mr. Hiroaki Miyazaki

SESSION 3 – OUTREACH, EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE

Mr. Kazuhiko Mizuguchi

SESSION 4 – SEISMIC SYSTEM EVALUATIONS

Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura

SESSION 5 – EARTHQUAKE STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka

Mr. Ken-ichi Koike

Discussion Session and Closing Remarks ...................................................................................385

The AWWARF/JWWA Water Seismic Conference were a series of joint workshops

The US/Japan/Taiwan interchange on water system seismic practices was initially

1997 - Informal Interchange during JWWA visit to EBMUD

1. Seismic Mitigation Measures

Roy Martinez David Lee

DAY 1 – Wednesday, August 15, 2007

9:40-10:10 Prof. Yosihiko Hosoi, Tottori University, Japan, "Earthquake

10:40-10:50 Break (10 minutes)

4. PRESENTATION PART I (15 minutes including questions & answers)

SESSION 1 Seismic Mitigation Measures

Chairpersons: Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura – Japan

JWWA-AWWARF 5th Water System Seismic Conference Page 1 of 6

12:05-13:30 Lunch – Sponsor: East Bay Municipal Utility District

SESSION 2 Seismic Measures for Pipelines

Chairpersons: Dr. Gee-Yu Liu – Taiwan

14:30-14:45 Break (15 minutes)

SESSION 3 Outreach, Education and Communications for Earthquake Risks

Chairpersons: Mr. Munetaka Abe – Japan

14:45-15:00 Mr. Kazuhiko Mizuguchi, Kobe Municipal Waterworks, Kobe, Japan –

JWWA-AWWARF 5th Water System Seismic Conference Page 2 of 6

16:00-16:10 Break (10 minutes)

SESSION 4 Seismic System Evaluations

Chairpersons: Prof. Tatsuo Ohmachi – Japan

17:30-18:00 East Bay Municipal Utility District – 1st Floor Lobby

6. CONFERENCE DINNER AT SCOTT’S SEAFOOD, Jack London Square

JWWA-AWWARF 5th Water System Seismic Conference Page 3 of 6

SESSION 5 Earthquake Studies and Evaluations

Chairpersons: Prof. Hiroshi Nagaoka – Japan

9:00-9:15 Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka, University of California, Irvine, US – “A Sensor

10:15-10:40 Break (25 minutes)

SESSION 6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Chairpersons: Mr. Yasuhiko Sato – Japan

JWWA-AWWARF 5th Water System Seismic Conference Page 4 of 6

12:00-13:30 Lunch – Sponsor: East Bay Municipal Utility District

8. DISCUSSION (With English – Japanese Translation)

Chairpersons: Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka – US

14:50-15:10 Break (20 minutes)

10. RECEPTION AT PACIFIC COAST BREWERY

JWWA-AWWARF 5th Water System Seismic Conference Page 5 of 6