Joint and solidary obligations, 1207-1208

Ronquillo vs. CA, 132 SCRA 273 (1984)

Right to demand payment, 1216

PNB vs. Conception Mining, 5 SCRA 745

Solidary Debtor, 1217-1218

Wilson vs. Berkenkotter, 49 OG 1410

Defenses of the Solidary Debtor, 1222

Ynchausti vs. Yulo, 34 Phil. 978

Obligations with a Penal Clause, 1226-1230

Makati Development vs. Empire Insurance, 20 SCRA 557
Gabarroguis vs. Vicente, L-14304, March 24, 1960

Extinguishment of Obligations

Manner, definition and importance, 1231

Payment or Performance, 1231-1251

Arrieta vs. NARIC, 10 SCRA 79
Kalalo vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337
St. Paul vs. McCondray, 70 SCRA 112
PNB vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1 (1991)
G.R. No. L-55138 September 28, 1984
ERNESTO V. RONQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO P. SO, respondents.
Gloria A. Fortun for petitioner.
Roselino Reyes Isler for respondents.

CUEVAS, J.:
This is a petition to review the Resolution dated June 30, 1980 of the then Court of Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate
Court) in CA-G.R. No. SP-10573, entitled "Ernesto V. Ronquillo versus the Hon. Florellana Castro-Bartolome, etc." and the
Order of said court dated August 20, 1980, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above resolution.
Petitioner Ernesto V. Ronquillo was one of four (4) defendants in Civil Case No. 33958 of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch XV filed by private respondent Antonio P. So, on July 23, 1979, for the
collection of the sum of P17,498.98 plus attorney's fees and costs. The other defendants were Offshore Catertrade Inc.,
Johnny Tan and Pilar Tan. The amount of P117,498.98 sought to be collected represents the value of the checks issued by
said defendants in payment for foodstuffs delivered to and received by them. The said checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank.
On December 13, 1979, the lower court rendered its Decision 1 based on the compromise agreement submitted by the parties, the pertinent portion of
which reads as follows:

1. Plaintiff agrees to reduce its total claim of P117,498-95 to only P11,000 .00 and defendants agree to
acknowledge the validity of such claim and further bind themselves to initially pay out of the total
indebtedness of P10,000.00 the amount of P55,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979, the balance of
P55,000.00, defendants individually and jointly agree to pay within a period of six months from January
1980, or before June 30, 1980; (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
4. That both parties agree that failure on the part of either party to comply with the foregoing terms and
conditions, the innocent party will be entitled to an execution of the decision based on this compromise
agreement and the defaulting party agrees and hold themselves to reimburse the innocent party for
attorney's fees, execution fees and other fees related with the execution.
xxx xxx xxx
On December 26, 1979, herein private respondent (then plaintiff filed a Motion for Execution on the ground that defendants
failed to make the initial payment of P55,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979 as provided in the Decision. Said motion
for execution was opposed by herein petitioner (as one of the defendants) contending that his inability to make the payment
was due to private respondent's own act of making himself scarce and inaccessible on December 24, 1979. Petitioner then
prayed that private respondent be ordered to accept his payment in the amount of P13,750.00. 2
During the hearing of the Motion for Execution and the Opposition thereto on January 16, 1980, petitioner, as one of the
four defendants, tendered the amount of P13,750.00, as his prorata share in the P55,000.00 initial payment. Another
defendant, Pilar P. Tan, offered to pay the same amount. Because private respondent refused to accept their payments,
demanding from them the full initial installment of P 55,000.00, petitioner and Pilar Tan instead deposited the said amount
with the Clerk of Court. The amount deposited was subsequently withdrawn by private respondent. 3
On the same day, January 16, 1980, the lower court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the balance of the initial
amount payable, against the other two defendants, Offshore Catertrade Inc. and Johnny Tan 4 who did not pay their shares.
On January 22, 1980, private respondent moved for the reconsideration and/or modification of the aforesaid Order of
execution and prayed instead for the "execution of the decision in its entirety against all defendants, jointly and
severally." 5 Petitioner opposed the said motion arguing that under the decision of the lower court being executed which has
already become final, the liability of the four (4) defendants was not expressly declared to be solidary, consequently each
defendant is obliged to pay only his own pro-rata or 1/4 of the amount due and payable.
On March 17, 1980, the lower court issued an Order reading as follows:
ORDER
 Regardless of whatever the compromise agreement has intended the payment whether jointly or
individually, or jointly and severally, the fact is that only P27,500.00 has been paid. There appears to be a
non-payment in accordance with the compromise agreement of the amount of P27,500.00 on or before
December 24, 1979. The parties are reminded that the payment is condition sine qua non to the lifting of the
preliminary attachment and the execution of an affidavit of desistance.
WHEREFORE, let writ of execution issue as prayed for
On March 17, 1980, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above order, and the same was set for hearing on March
25,1980.
Meanwhile, or more specifically on March 19, 1980, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the sum of
P82,500.00 as against the properties of the defendants (including petitioner), "singly or jointly hable." 6
On March 20, 1980, Special Sheriff Eulogio C. Juanson of Rizal, issued a notice of sheriff's sale, for the sale of certain
furnitures and appliances found in petitioner's residence to satisfy the sum of P82,500.00. The public sale was scheduled for
April 2, 1980 at 10:00 a.m. 7
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Order of Execution dated March 17, 1980 which was set for hearing on March
25, 1980, was upon motion of private respondent reset to April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m. Realizing the actual threat to property
rights poised by the re-setting of the hearing of s motion for reconsideration for April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m. such that if his
motion for reconsideration would be denied he would have no more time to obtain a writ from the appellate court to stop the
scheduled public sale of his personal properties at 10:00 a.m. of the same day, April 2, 1980, petitioner filed on March 26,
1980 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the then Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-10573), praying at the same
time for the issuance of a restraining order to stop the public sale. He raised the question of the validity of the order of
execution, the writ of execution and the notice of public sale of his properties to satisfy fully the entire unpaid obligation
payable by all of the four (4) defendants, when the lower court's decision based on the compromise agreement did not
specifically state the liability of the four (4) defendants to be solidary.
On April 2, 1980, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration but the scheduled public sale in that same
day did not proceed in view of the pendency of a certiorari proceeding before the then Court of Appeals.
On June 30, 1980, the said court issued a Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
This Court, however, finds the present petition to have been filed prematurely. The rule is that before a
petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all remedies available in that court
must first be exhausted. In the case at bar, herein petitioner filed a petition without waiting for a resolution
of the Court on the motion for reconsideration, which could have been favorable to the petitioner. The fact
that the hearing of the motion for reconsideration had been reset on the same day the public sale was to take
place is of no moment since the motion for reconsideration of the Order of March 17, 1980 having been
seasonably filed, the scheduled public sale should be suspended. Moreover, when the defendants, including
herein petitioner, defaulted in their obligation based on the compromise agreement, private respondent had
become entitled to move for an execution of the decision based on the said agreement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is hereby
denied due course. The restraining order issued in our resolution dated April 9, 1980 is hereby lifted
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the aforesaid Resolution alleging that on April 2, 1980, the lower court had already denied
the motion referred to and consequently, the legal issues being raised in the petition were already "ripe" for
determination. 8 The said motion was however denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 20, 1980.
Hence, this petition for review, petitioner contending that the Court of Appeals erred in
(a) declaring as premature, and in denying due course to the petition to restrain implementation of a writ of execution issued
at variance with the final decision of the lower court filed barely four (4) days before the scheduled public sale of the
attached movable properties;
(b) denying reconsideration of the Resolution of June 30, 1980, which declared as premature the filing of the petition,
although there is proof on record that as of April 2, 1980, the motion referred to was already denied by the lower court and
there was no more motion pending therein;
(c) failing to resolve the legal issues raised in the petition and in not declaring the liabilities of the defendants, under the
final decision of the lower court, to be only joint;
(d) not holding the lower court's order of execution dated March 17, 1980, the writ of execution and the notice of sheriff's
sale, executing the lower court's decision against "all defendants, singly and jointly", to be at variance with the lower court's
final decision which did not provide for solidary obligation; and
(e) not declaring as invalid and unlawful the threatened execution, as against the properties of petitioner who had paid his
pro-rata share of the adjudged obligation, of the total unpaid amount payable by his joint co-defendants.
The foregoing assigned errors maybe synthesized into the more important issues of —
1. Was the filing of a petition for certiorari before the then Court of Appeals against the Order of Execution issued by the
lower court, dated March 17, 1980, proper, despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of the same questioned
Order?
2. What is the nature of the liability of the defendants (including petitioner), was it merely joint, or was it several or
solidary?
Anent the first issue raised, suffice it to state that while as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede
recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed, the said
rule is not absolutes 9 and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no
useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion 10 or where the error is patent
for the order is void 11 or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases where execution had already been ordered 12 where the issue raised is one purely of law. 13

In the case at bar, the records show that not only was a writ of execution issued but petitioner's properties were already
scheduled to be sold at public auction on April 2, 1980 at 10:00 a.m. The records likewise show that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the questioned Order of Execution was filed on March 17, 1980 and was set for hearing on March 25,
1980 at 8:30 a.m., but upon motion of private respondent, the hearing was reset to April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m., the very same
clay when petitioner's properties were to be sold at public auction. Needless to state that under the circumstances, petitioner
was faced with imminent danger of his properties being immediately sold the moment his motion for reconsideration is
denied. Plainly, urgency prompted recourse to the Court of Appeals and the adequate and speedy remedy for petitioner under
the situation was to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for restraining order to stop the sale. For him to wait until after
the hearing of the motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1980 before taking recourse to the appellate court may already be
too late since without a restraining order, the public sale can proceed at 10:00 that morning. In fact, the said motion was
already denied by the lower court in its order dated April 2, 1980 and were it not for the pendency of the petition with the
Court of Appeals and the restraining order issued thereafter, the public sale scheduled that very same morning could have
proceeded.
The other issue raised refers to the nature of the liability of petitioner, as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 33958, that
is whether or not he is liable jointly or solidarily.
In this regard, Article 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code provides —
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each
one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance
with the prestation. Then is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law
or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Art. 1208. If from the law,or the nature or the wording of the obligation to which the preceding article
refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many equal
shares as there are creditors and debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another,
subject to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of quits.
The decision of the lower court based on the parties' compromise agreement, provides:
1. Plaintiff agrees to reduce its total claim of P117,498.95 to only P110,000.00 and defendants agree to
acknowledge the validity of such claim and further bind themselves to initially pay out of the total
indebtedness of P110,000.00, the amount of P5,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979, the balance of
P55,000.00, defendants individually and jointly agree to pay within a period of six months from January
1980 or before June 30, 1980. (Emphasis supply)
Clearly then, by the express term of the compromise agreement and the decision based upon it, the defendants obligated
themselves to pay their obligation "individually and jointly".
The term "individually" has the same meaning as "collectively", "separately", "distinctively", respectively or "severally". An
agreement to be "individually liable" undoubtedly creates a several obligation, 14 and a "several obligation is one by which one individual binds
himself to perform the whole obligation. 15

In the case of Parot vs. Gemora 16 We therein ruled that "the phrase juntos or separadamente or in the promissory note is an express statement making each of the
persons who signed it individually liable for the payment of the fun amount of the obligation contained therein." Likewise in Un Pak Leung vs. Negorra 17 We held that "in the absence of
a finding of facts that the defendants made themselves individually hable for the debt incurred they are each liable only for one-half of said amount

The obligation in the case at bar being described as "individually and jointly", the same is therefore enforceable against one
of the numerous obligors.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16968 July 31, 1962

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONCEPCION MINING COMPANY, INC., ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for plaintiff-appellee.
Demetrio Miraflor for defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment or decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, presiding, sentencing
defendants Concepcion Mining Company and Jose Sarte to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the amount of P7,197.26
with interest up to September 29, 1959, plus a daily interest of P1.3698 thereafter up to the time the amount is fully paid,
plus 10% of the amount as attorney's fees, and costs of this suit.
The present action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover from the defendants the face of a promissory note the pertinent
part of which reads as follows:
Manila, March 12, 1954

NINETY DAYS after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of the Philippine National
Bank . . . .

In case it is necessary to collect this note by or through an attorney-at-law, the makers and indorsers shall pay
ten percent (10%) of the amount due on the note as attorney's fees, which in no case shall be less than P100.00
exclusive of all costs and fees allowed by law as stipulated in the contract of real estate mortgage. Demand
and Dishonor Waived. Holder may accept partial payment reserving his right of recourse again each and all
indorsers.

(Purpose — mining industry)

CONCEPCION MINING COMPANY, INC.,
By:
(Sgd.) VICENTE LEGARDA
President
(Sgd.) VICENTE LEGARDA
(Sgd.) JOSE S SARTE

"Please issue check to —

Mr. Jose S. Sarte"

Upon the filing of the complaint the defendants presented their answer in which they allege that the co-maker the
promissory note Don Vicente L. Legarda died on February 24, 1946 and his estate is in the process of judicial determination
in Special Proceedings No. 29060 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the basis of this allegation it is prayed, as a
special defense, that the estate of said deceased Vicente L. Legarda be included as party-defendant. The court in its decision
ruled that the inclusion of said defendant is unnecessary and immaterial, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1216
of the Deny Civil Code and section 17 (g) of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A motion to reconsider this decision was denied and thereupon defendants presented a petition for relief, asking that the
effects of the judgment be suspended for the reason that the deceased Vicente L. Legarda should have been included as a
party-defendant and his liability should be determined in pursuance of the provisions of the promissory note. This motion
for relief was also denied, hence defendant appealed to this Court.
Section 17 (g) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides as follows:
SEC. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. — Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous or
there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Where an instrument containing the word "I promise to pay" is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed
to be jointly and severally liable thereon.
And Article 1216 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also provides as follows:
ART. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some of them simultaneously. The
demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the
others so long as the debt has not been fully collected.
In view of the above quoted provisions, and as the promissory note was executed jointly and severally by the same parties,
namely, Concepcion Mining Company, Inc. and Vicente L. Legarda and Jose S. Sarte, the payee of the promissory note had
the right to hold any one or any two of the signers of the promissory note responsible for the payment of the amount of the
note. This judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Our attention has been attracted to the discrepancies in the printed record on appeal. We note, first, that the names of the
defendants, who are evidently the Concepcion Mining Co., Inc. and Jose S. Sarte, do not appear in the printed record on
appeal. The title of the complaint set forth in the record on appeal does not contain the name of Jose Sarte, when it should,
as two defendants are named in the complaint and the only defense of the defendants is the non-inclusion of the deceased
Vicente L. Legarda as a defendant in the action. We also note that the copy of the promissory note which is set forth in the
record on appeal does not contain the name of the third maker Jose S. Sarte. Fortunately, the brief of appellee on page 4 sets
forth said name of Jose S. Sarte as one of the co-maker of the promissory note. Evidently, there is an attempt to mislead the
court into believing that Jose S. Sarte is no one of the co-makers. The attorney for the defendants Atty. Jose S. Sarte himself
and he should be held primarily responsible for the correctness of the record on appeal. We, therefore, order the said Atty.
Jose S. Sarte to explain why in his record on appeal his own name as one of the defendants does not appear and neither does
his name appear as one of the co-signers of the promissory note in question. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-4476 April 20, 1953

SAMUEL J. WILSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
B. H. BERKENKOTTER, defendant-appellant.
Amador E. Gomez for appellant.
Cirilo Paredes for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In April, 1950, plaintiff Samuel J. Wilson, consigned in the Court of First Instance of Manila the sum of P625.51. In his
petition he alleged that said amount consigned was the equivalent of P37,530.40 in Japanese currency which defendant B.H.
Berkenkotter paid for him in November, 1944, to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; that he had made an
offer of payment of P625.51 to the defendant but the latter refused to accept payment without any justifiable cause. He
prayed that after due hearing the court declare the consignation as properly made.
Defendant Berkenkotter in his answer alleged that in 1938 he and plaintiff Wilson and one Paul A. Gulick obtained a loan of
P90,000 from the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China with interest at 7 per cent which was later increased to 8 per
cent payable monthly, and that they signed a promissory note wherein they jointly and severally promised to pay said loan to
the bank; that during the occupation of the Philippines during the Pacific war the Japanese Military authorities placed the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and other enemy banks under liquidation and for that purpose designated the
Bank of Taiwan as liquidator of enemy banks; that upon demand by the Bank of Taiwan he (Berkenkotter) paid the sum of
P112,591.22 (in military notes) as full payment of the P90,000 loan including interest from December 1, 1941 up to
November 4, 1944, the date of payment; that the payment to the bank by him inured to his co-debtors in the amount of
P37,530.40 each; that as subrogee of all the rights of the bank, he, in 1949, made a demand on both Wilson and Gulick for
the settlement of their shares in said obligation with a certain offer; that while Gulick accepted the offer and paid P18,902,
Wilson refused to take advantage thereof and instead tendered the amount of P625.51 as payment of his share in the solidary
and joint obligation; that this tender of payment was refused and so he made demand upon Wilson for payment of his share
of the P90,000 with interest from December 1, 1941 but Wilson refused to make payment. In his prayer defendant asked that
the petition accompanying the consignation be dismissed, and that Wilson be ordered to pay him P30,000 as his share in the
original loan with interest of 8 per cent from December, 1941, plus P3,000 as collection expenses as stipulated in the
promissory note signed by them, equivalent to 10 per cent of the share of each.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Wilson and against defendant Berkenkotter and ordered
the latter to receive from the clerk of court the P625.51 consigned by Wilson as the just and full payment of the
indebtedness. From that decision Berkenkotter is appealing to this court on questions of law making the following
assignment of errors:
I
The trial court erred in holding such payment subject the plaintiff-appellee liable to the defendant-appellant to the
full amount of his one-third share (capital as well as interest) in the solidary obligation (Exhibit 1), which they
contracted in 1938 from the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and which solidary obligation was
discharged by the payment made by the defendant-appellant to the Japanese liquidator during the Japanese
occupation.
II
The trial court erred in holding such payment subject to adjustment under the Ballantyne schedule of values in
determining the amount to be reimbursed by the plaintiff-appellee as a co-solidary debtor of the defendant-
appellant.
III.
The trial court erred in not sentencing plaintiff-appellee to pay to defendant-appellant as collection expenses
provided for in the promissory note, Exhibit "1", the sum of P3,000, which represents 10 per cent of one-third of the
principal of the solidary obligation.
IV.
The trial court erred in denying defendant-appellant's motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment.
As already stated, the defendant appealed the case to this court on questions of law. He is consequently bound by the
findings of the fact of the trial court. The plaintiff did not appeal from the decision. He is equally bound by said findings of
the trial court. For the purposes of reference we reproduce said findings of fact:
1. That on June 30, 1938, Samuel J. Wilson, plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, defendant, and one Paul A. Gulick jointly
and severally signed a promissory note in the amount of P90,000 in favor of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China payable on demand with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum payable monthly;
2. That the three debtors agreed by and among themselves to pay the obligation in equal proportions, that is, each
one would pay their creditor the amount of P30,000 plus of course, the corresponding interests;
3. That after the Philippines had been occupied by the Japanese Forces, the Bank of Taiwan became the liquidator of
all enemy banks, among which was the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China;
4. That defendant B.H. Berkenkotter, upon demand by the Taiwan Bank paid the promissory note referred to above,
plus the corresponding interests which amounted in all, principal and interests to P112,591.22;
5. That after liberation, B.H. Berkenkotter demanded payment from his co-debtors of their corresponding shares in
the obligation contracted by them jointly and severally with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China;
6. That for reasons of personal consideration B.H. Berkenkotter accepted payment from Paul A. Gulick only in the
 amount of P18,902;
7. That plaintiff Samuel J. Wilson refused to pay to B.H. Berkenkotter the full amount of P37,530.40 in Philippine
currency, and
8. That because of the refusal of B.H. Berkenkotter to receive from the plaintiff the amount of P625.51 which is the
equivalent value as of November, 1944 of the P37,530.40 in Japanese military notes, said plaintiff consigned with
this court the said amount of P625.51.
In several cases involving the application of the Balantyne schedule this court has held that said schedule is applicable to
obligations contracted during the Japanese occupation where said obligations are made payable on demand or during said
Japanese occupation but not after the war or at a specified date or period which may indicate that the parties were
speculating on the continuation or cessation of the war at the time of payment. If the obligation on the part of Wilson to pay
Berkenkotter the amount paid by the latter to wipe out their debt to the bank was created during the occupation, then the
Balantyne schedule is applicable; but if said obligation was created before the war, particularly on the date when plaintiff
and defendant signed the promissory note in favor of the bank, then the Ballantyne schedule may not be applied.
Counsel for the appellant contends that said obligation was created in 1938 because by signing the promissory note Wilson
impliedly undertook to pay anyone of his co-debtors who might pay off the whole debt. He also claims that by paying the
entire loan in 1944 to the bank, appellant became a subrogee of said bank and the entire credit was transmitted to him with
all the rights inherent therein either against the debtor or against third persons (article 1212, Civil Code). The amici
curiae who appeared in this case and who support appellant's contention, hold the theory that the obligation of Wilson in
favor of Berkenkotter was created in 1938 and has continued since then but that its payment was not demandable until 1944
when appellant made payment. They give the example of one issuing a promissory note payable after 30 days; the obligation
to pay is created at the date of the issuance of the note but the obligation to pay is not demandable until after the expiration
of 30 days. We regret to disagree to the contention of counsel for appellant and amici curiae. The obligation in favor of
appellant to pay to him what he paid in favor of Wilson was created in November, 1944 and not before. Before said payment
was made Wilson was under no obligation whatsoever to pay appellant any amount. True, as a solidary obligor or debtor
under the law, he would be under obligation to pay any of his solidary co-debtor who may be required by the creditor to pay
and who actually pays the latter the entire loan. But that obligation on the part of Wilson is contingent and conditional. If
Berkenkotter had not paid the entire loan note to the bank Wilson would never have been under any obligation to pay him
for his share of the loan. This is quite different from the example of the promissory note just mentioned where the obligation
to pay the amount of the note is created at the time of the issuance thereof because sooner or later the promissor has to make
payment. In other words, the obligation is real and existing, not conditional or contingent. Counsel for appellant himself
says in his brief, pp. 17-18, "it is the extinction or discharge of the solidary obligation by the payment made which gives
birth to that right in favor of the paying co-debtor, and which correlatively imposes on the other co-debtors the duty to pay
him their shares in the discharged obligation." We agree with him that the right in favor of appellant and the corresponding
duty on the part of Wilson were born when payment was made in November, 1944 and the solidary obligation was
extinguished.
When appellant paid the entire loan plus interests in November, 1944, the whole obligation was extinguished. The solidary
co-debtors were no longer under any obligation to the bank but a new obligation was created in favor of the appellant and
against the appellee. That is why the appellant to enforce his claim against the appellee has based his claim not on the
obligation created in 1938 in favor of the bank by virtue of the promissory note signed by the three co-debtors, but on his
having paid the entire loan. The present is not a real case of subrogation as contended by appellant because as Manresa says,
in a case like the present the original obligation is extinguished and a new one is created.
Es de notar que no hay verdadera subrogacion en el caso de que pague uno de los codeudores solidarios, puesto que
entonces, segun el articulo 1145 (por el cual y sus concordantes se rige el supuesto), queda extinguida la obligacion,
si bien el codeudor que pago y puede repetir contra los demas su reclamacion, invocara como base y titulo el pago,
en vez de la novacion. (8 Manresa, 4th ed., p. 404.)
In other words, appellant does not as claimed by his counsel step into the shoes of the bank. He cannot enforce the original
obligation created in 1938. The bank could collect the whole amount of the loan from anyone of the solidary co-debtors, and
in fact did from one of them. This, the appellant may not do just because he paid the entire loan. According to article 1145 of
the Civil Code, payment by one of the solidary debtors entitles him to claim from his co-debtors only the share pertaining to
each with interest on the amount advanced, and this is what the appellant is doing, only that he wants to collect the whole
amount paid by him for Wilson in genuine Philippine currency instead of the equivalent thereof under the Ballantyne
schedule. Moreover, on grounds of equity appellant may not be allowed to collect from the appellee more than the real value
of what he paid for him specially when the difference between the military notes and the genuine Philippine currency in
November, 1944, was so great.
In conclusion, we find and hold that the obligation in favor of the appellant to pay to him the share of the appellee in the
original loan was created during the Japanese occupation, particularly in November, 1944, and so comes under the ruling of
this court regarding the application of the Ballantyne schedule. Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. I do not agree to the statement in the opinion that "when appellant paid the entire loan plus interest in
November, 1944, the whole obligation was extinguished." I am of the opinion that the payment made to the Bank of Taiwan,
Ltd., of a pre-war obligation or debt is invalid as far as the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China is concerned, for
the reasons stated in my opinion in the case of La Orden de PP. Benedictinos vs. Philippine Trust Co., * 47 Off. Gaz., 2894,
2897.

FERIA, J., concurring and dissenting:

On June 30, 1938, a promissory note was signed by appellee Samuel J. Wilson, B.H. Berkenkotter and Paul A. Gulick, as
joint and solidary debtors in favor of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China in the sum of P90,000 Philippine
Commonwealth currency payable on demand, with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum payable monthly.
On November 4, 1944, upon demand by the Bank of Taiwan, the defendant Berkenkotter paid said bank the whole
indebtedness evidenced by the above-mentioned promissory note, in Japanese military notes. And in April, 1950, plaintiff
Samuel J. Wilson, consigned in the Court of First Instance of Manila the sum of P625.51, and in his petition he alleged that
said amount consigned was the equivalent of P37,530.40 in Japanese currency which defendant B.H. Berkenkotter paid for
him in November, 1944, to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; that he had made an offer of payment of
P625.51 to the defendant but the latter refused to accept payment without any justifiable cause. He prayed that after due
hearing the court declare the consignation as properly made.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Wilson and against defendant Berkenkotter and ordered
the latter to receive from the Clerk of Court the P625.51 consigned by Wilson as the just and full payment of the
indebtedness. From that decision Berkenkotter appealed to this court, and assigned, among others, the following assignment
of error:
The trial court erred in holding such payment subject to adjustment under the Ballantyne schedule of values in
determining the amount to be reimbursed by the plaintiff-appellee as a co-solidary debtor of the defendant-
appellant.
The amici curiae in the present case, Attorneys Ozaeta and Lichauco, contend that the Ballantyne schedule of values cannot
be applied in determining the amount the plaintiff must pay to the defendant-appellant, because said schedule is applicable
only in obligation to pay money contracted or created during the Japanese occupation, and the obligation in question was
created before the Japanese occupation. In their memorandum, said amici curiae state the following support of their opinion.
. . . We have carefully examined the pertinent cases, from Hilado vs. De la Costa, 46 Off. Gaz., 5472, to De Asis vs.
Agdamag, et al., G.R. No. L-3709, promulgated October 25, 1951. From said decisions and Justice Feria's
concurring opinion in Gomez vs. Tabia, 47 Off. Gaz., 641, wherein he set forth certain rules for the guidance of the
courts and members of the bar, it is quite apparent that the overruling considerations in the cases where revaluation
of obligations has been allowed by the court are the following:
(1) Obligation must arise from contract entered into during the occupation. — The inescapable fact invariably
present in all the cases wherein revaluation has been allowed is that the monetary obligation arose from contract
which entered into by the parties during the period of enemy occupation. In other words, revaluation or adjustments
of obligations has been confined and restricted to wartime (or occupation-time, to be exact) contracts. This must be
so for there is no conceivable legal nor moral justification to revalue pre-war monetary obligations still outstanding
after the occupation. This will become all the more plain from the next conjunctive condition patent from the
decisions.
xxx xxx xxx
It should thus be very evident that the rules advocated by Justice Feria were intended to cover only monetary
 obligations founded or arising from (1) contracts entered, and (2) executory judgment rendered, during the
occupation. The trial court, however, committed the error of concluding that the rules means that any obligation
incurred or payable during the enemy occupation may be paid with its equivalent value in Philippine currency. It
should be clear from the language employed by Justice Feria that, in order that an obligation may be revalued, it
must, among other things, have been contracted during the occupation, i.e., it must be one arising from a contract
entered into during the occupation. Thus, a pre-war obligation which may became payable during the occupation
but which remained unpaid is not subject to adjustment because it was not contracted during the occupation.
And the decision of the majority, misled by the foregoing argument of the amici curiae, held the following:
In several causes involving the application of the Ballantyne schedule this court has held that said schedule is
applicable to obligations contracted during the Japanese occupation where said obligation are made payable on
demand or during said Japanese occupation but not after the war or at a specified date or period which may indicate
that the parties were speculating on the continuation or cessation of the war at the time of payment. If the obligation
on the part of Wilson to pay Berkenkotter the amount paid by the latter to wipe out their debt to the Bank was
created during the occupation, then the Ballantyne schedule is applicable; but if said obligation was created before
the war, particularly on the date when plaintiff and defendant signed the promissory note in favor of the Bank, then
the Ballantyne schedule may not be applied (page 5.)
xxx xxx xxx
In conclusion, we find and hold that the obligation in favor of the appellant to pay to him the share of the appellee in
the original loan was created during the Japanese occupation, particularly in November, 1944, and so comes under
the ruling of this court regarding the application of the Ballantyne schedule. Finding no reversible error in the
decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed. No costs. (page 8.)
The above-quoted conclusion of the majority, based on the opinion or argument of the amici curiae to the effect that,
according to the decisions of this court and especially the concurring opinion of the undersigned in the case of Gomez vs.
Tabia,1 47 Off. Gaz., 641, adopted with approval by this court in the case of De Asis vs. Agdamag,2 G.R. No. L-3709,
promulgated on October 25, 1951, the Ballantyne schedule is applicable only to monetary obligation created and payable
during, and not those created before the Japanese occupation. The contention or argument of the amici curiae and the
conclusion of the majority is not correct, for in our concurring opinion we held the following, quoted on page 7 of the very
memorandum of the amici curiae:
An obligation incurred or payable during the occupation shall be revalued on the basis of the relative value of the
Japanese military notes in Philippine currency at the date of the obligation was payable, according to Ballantyne
sliding scale of value in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Because to compel the debtor to pay his obligation
in Philippine currency at the rate of one Philippine peso for each peso due in Japanese military notes would be to
make him pay, as damages or penalty for the delay in making the payment, the difference in values between the
Japanese military notes at the time the obligation was incurred and the Philippine currency, at the time of the
payment.
According to the above-quoted opinion, monetary obligations which shall be revalued according to Ballantyne schedule if
paid after the occupation, are those payable during the Japanese occupation, irrespective of whether they were created or
constituted before or during said occupation.
However, I concur in the conclusion of the majority that the obligation of Wilson to pay to Berkenkotter his share in the
obligation paid by the former to the bank, arose and was payable from the time the latter paid the whole obligation due from
them to the bank of on November 4, 1944.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the decision appealed from must be affirmed for the Ballantyne schedule
is applicable, not because the obligation of the plaintiff to pay the defendant his share in the obligation was created during
the Japanese occupation, but because it was payable during the said occupation.