CITIZENSHIP

IMPORTANCE OF CITIZENSHIP

Lee. V. Dir. of Lands, G.R. No. 128195, October 3, 2001

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was
intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to
acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the
property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the
initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands
has been achieved.

CARAM RULE

Chiongbian vs De Leon, G.R. No. L-2007, January 31, 1949, En Banc

It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of
herein petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of
the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the
Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a
Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having
become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with
the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his
father.

X x x it may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if
not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not
by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted
said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in
subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a
particular case, they would have so clearly stated.

Republic v. Chule Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004

The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3)
of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly
an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married.
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As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Mallare, we held:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111,
June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.

Tan versus Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993, November 8, 2017

The Court's position on renunciation and its effect lead us to conclude that once Philippine
citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one
a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is
reaffirmed. Simply stated, right after a Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is
to be considered a foreigner.

R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards
natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity
of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law would readily reveal that only
those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who
became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be
considered as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.

Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it was
lost would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a Philippine
citizen when in fact he had already renounced his citizenship. We are not about to give a statute
a meaning that would lead to absurdity as it is our duty to construe statutes in such a way to
avoid such consequences. If the words of a statute are susceptible [to] more than one meaning,
the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption and in
favor of such sensible interpretation as would avoid such result.

Llamanzares vs Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En Banc

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration
with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or

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incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Article 15 thereof
states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.

Tecson versus Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, En Banc

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,
jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per
Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis
or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established
direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of
birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was
an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F.
Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley
to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ,
would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years
old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the
birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions
that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the
age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
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Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou
was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo
Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of
the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. [Section 44, Rule 130]

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

Bengzon v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nê

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.

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The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

The petition is without merit.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of
the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

Mercado vs Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, En Banc

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition

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for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship."

This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. The disqualification of private
respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d)
Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.9 For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship.
I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a
dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship
at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional

cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what
happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers
of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is
a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the
Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the
Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative
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 Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after
several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese
were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of

allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I
also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners
yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the
lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner
Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.

Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is
of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation,
worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship
which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP
AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus: 11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual

citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted
the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in
1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei
every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated.
And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty
and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left
to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit,
in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission

was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in
R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship

7
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of
the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control."

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was
a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running
for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988.
In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his
US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his

American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age
of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority
age.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
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On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

In re Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship"

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and,
if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.
625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

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On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.

However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that
three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He

became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven
(7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election
has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are
very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of
C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution
and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the
ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary
for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a

Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.

10
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal

process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)

Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of
fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained
delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has
only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

Co vs HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or
not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.

11
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years
was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records
to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place
of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and
home.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this
time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.

The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.

Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

12
 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:

Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also
cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January
17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations
and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a
natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be
natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written
book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate
Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it
seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the
amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the
body to approve that provision of section 4.
13
 Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair
that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino
citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable

situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution,
those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However,
those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but
not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to
be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

14
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves
and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and
has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no
acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member
of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent
them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.

Villahermosa vs Commissioner, 80 Phil 541 (1948)

There are two reasons why Delfin Co must be returned to China. First, he is not now a Filipino
citizen; and second, granting that he is, at the time he entered this country from China he was a
Chinese subject to deportation, and any subsequent change in his status can not erase the taint
of his unlawful, surreptitious entry.

Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those who are citizens of the Philippines,
as follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

NATURALIZATION

Republic vs De La Rosa, G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and
direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were
limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their
marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill
allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He
attributed this to the maneuvers of his political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without
publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes
mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jampacked.

It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the
public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of
allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period
is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to

15
oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private
respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both
private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievements as a freedom
fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious.
The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering
the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the
Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It
is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes,
even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient
or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was
formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of
private Respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for
hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and
a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic,
205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must
be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak
and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship;
and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400
[1992]).

Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who
vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.chanrobles law library

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of
the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation
and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his
receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195
[1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to

16
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any
act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.

Republic vs. Liyao, 214 SCRA 748 (1992)

It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently

discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material
fact. 9 Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization
upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. 10 Moreover,
a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein,
not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgment cancelling a
certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof. 11

In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to appellant, the
lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on the sole finding that Li Yao
had committed underdeclaration of income and underpayment of income tax.

In the case entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Naturalization as Citizen of the Philippines,
Lim Eng Yu vs. Republic, 12 It was held that the concealment of applicant's income to evade
payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character is not irreproachable, thus disqualifying
him for naturalization.

Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under
P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting the
order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal
effect of payment under the decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative
liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned. Thus, paragraph 4
of the decree provides;

4. That after full settlement of the accounts mentioned herein, the taxpayer shall
be free of any civil, criminal or administrative liability insofar as his tax case is
involved (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good
moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of
payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living," 13 to strip him of his citizenship
without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.

Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of
the Government and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that
where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not
entitled to Filipino citizenship. 14 More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state:
"Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can
confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully
qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law." 15 Philippine citizenship is a pearl of
great price which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must
be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for
divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must
be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

Moya Lim Yao v. Commissioner, 41 SCRA 292

GR # L-21289, October 4, 1971

17
FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was
to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not
automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all
the qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven that
she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.

RULING:

Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso
facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473.
(Sections 15 and 4)

Dual Citizenship

R.A. No. 9225 (September 17, 2003)

Nicholas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or
dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be
allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be
ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225
which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004
national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas
absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have
yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement
prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts
abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence restriction
adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to
vote in future elections.

Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal
vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality …, it is the Commission's

position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under
the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have
merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and
18
jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements
of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the
COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner
Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the
poll body:

1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been
consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries,
subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee
voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:

"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad
exercise their right to vote;

"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;

While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust
of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be
deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18)
years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals"
may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5
of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day
"duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in
relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress
could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that
those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

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