GENERAL
Verstuyft, thus,
Municher vs. CA
Facts: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a
“buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo
in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized.
Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for damages due to
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims
that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached
to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a
true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING: YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
the United States Embassy. Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in
the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo.
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected
drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal
witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond
the scope of his official function or duties.
WHO vs. Aquino
Facts: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates,
were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC)
suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the
official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft. Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to
immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of
diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant
be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search
warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting
diplomatic immunity.
Issue: Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure
under the diplomatic immunity.
Held: Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled
to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor
General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government
as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in
this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in
disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs.
Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
Liang vs.PP
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime
in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail,
the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC
via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process
with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t. (2)
Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD: (1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly
adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It
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has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only
of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in
the name of official duty. (2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC. Hence, SC denied the petition.
Raegan vs. CIR
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public
respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner
contends that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional
power to tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax.
HELD: No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of
income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are preserved.
Estrada vs. Desierto
Facts: February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
"conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his
office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president. (2) Whether or not petitioner
Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
Held: (1) Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. (2) What leaps to the
eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.
Gonzales vs. Abaya
FACTS: On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive
devices around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support from their
Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. After much
negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an Information for coup
d’etat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court
martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the jurisdiction of the court martial,
contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not service-connected and that their
violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup d’etat.
ISSUE: Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by
court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts
RULING: The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military law is
established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility
and security of the State in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of
the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety
than a licentious and undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has
been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the
world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means
of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing
discipline both in peace and in war. The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such
violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the “service-connected” nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same – dismissal from the service – imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and
to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
TERRITORIAL
People vs.Tulin
Facts: In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation,loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and
diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates includingthe accused Roger P.
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the
vessel.The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded
transferred and sold under the directsupervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter,
the captive vessel returned to the Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter effected and
all the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of PresidentialDecree No. 532
(Piracy in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence,
this appeal.Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and
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punishing him as an accomplice when theacts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippinecourts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.
Held: Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must
be committed on the high seas byany person not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, thecoverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand,under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "apassenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of thecomplement or not, any person
is covered by the law.Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions
on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. Thereis no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpretthe law. All
the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent
to protect thecitizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As
expressed in one of the "whereas" clausesof Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of allcountries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No.
532 existharmoniously as separate laws. As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellantHiong since the crime was committed
outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attackon and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed
inPhilippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore
where its cargo wasoff-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires
that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committedin Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
People vs.Lol-lo and Saraw
Facts: On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the
midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned
by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At first,
the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves
all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of the women
by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the
two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two
women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in the Court of First Instance of
Sulu with the crime of piracy.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in
this case.
Held: Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.
Arigo vs.Swift
Facts: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed
Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the
incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the
grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue
to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
Held: The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle
of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship
entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the
coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
AAA vs. BBB
Facts: AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request
to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC. Finding good ground in AAA’s
application, the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a
Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007. BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision but ordered the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper
proceedings to determine who shall be awarded custody of the children. The CA found that
under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological,
emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA
to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF
was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which
3
did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. BBB filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging that he and AAA had
entered into a compromise regarding the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and
support of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall have the custody over both children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should determine who shall be awarded custody over the
children.
HELD: YES. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to
remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over
the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and
manner of providing financial support. The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did
not commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place
after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and
economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has
actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO
and the award to him of custody over the children. This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to
remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the children are now all
older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay with.
If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO
issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children
would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them
is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of
the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner
and amount of financial support BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded
custody over the children. Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s
resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in
determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or increased
proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support,
which is a mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now
employed as well, thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting
the best interests of the children.
Sources of Criminal Law
Ynot vs. IAC
Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedes bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.
Constitutional Limitations
Due process and Equal Protection
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila”. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels
who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private
rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the
ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered
to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence,
the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a
limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only
to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Garcia v. Drilon
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
4
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody
of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer,
the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be
raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based
on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of
the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by
not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is
so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
Freedom of Expression
Guingguing v. People
Facts:
CA affirmed with modification the decision rendered by the RTC finding Guingguing and Lim
guilty of the crime of libel. This is a petition filed by Guingguing alone. This case originated
from the case filed by Torralba. . Complainant was a broadcast journalist who handled two
programs for radio stations DYLA and DYFX. Lim caused the publication of records of criminal
cases filed against complainant as well as photographs of the latter being arrested. These were
published by means of a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly
publication edited and published by petitioner. The lower court concluded that the publication
complained of was indeed libelous. The CA modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the
RTCs finding of guilt.
Issue: Whether or not the publication subject matter of the instant case is indeed libelous.
Held: Yes. Criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Two major propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remarks were established: first, that
libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man,
and second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true. This Court has accepted the proposition
that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning
public figures.
As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner when the latter published
5
the article subject matter of the complaint. It should thus proceed that if the statements made
against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had.
From the foregoing, it is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in
the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the
complainant had indeed beenfiled.
To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be
deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the
information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public know the
character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having
been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. Wherefore, petitionis GRANTED.
Decision of the RTC and CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
Freedom of Religion
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by
a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld
the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church
and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious
ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present
danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Freedom to associate
People v. Ferrer
Facts of the Case:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other
illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing
the government under the control and domination of an alien power.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, under the decision of Hon. Simeon
Ferrer in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that
it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused.
The Government appealed.
Issue: Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law
a bill of attainder.
Held: No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative
determination of guilt.
In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary
to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the
unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of
6
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
No excessive fines, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
People v. Echegaray
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-
appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as
the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the
supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation
of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug,
and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance
Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.
Ratio:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened
and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that
define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive
agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance
with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of
whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty
remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing
therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says
that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death
penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-
imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to
pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the
Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was
not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death
penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A.
No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the
other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly
no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine
their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass
on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A.
No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial
discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised
Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the
trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are
punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the
death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty
bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that
the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if
not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of
Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there
was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to
their cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-
impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is
not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing
of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
7
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that
Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and
penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with
the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this
death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be
squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and
are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting
and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects,
repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or
aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation,
these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to
determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what
R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
Corpuz v. People
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to
sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the
expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and
the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence
rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a
material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense
was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only
when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender
or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even
be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that
it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted
to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.
8
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied
the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially
when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses,
but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence,
the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
Non-imprisonment for debt
Lozano v. Martinez
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check
Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged
did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?
2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished
by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation
to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will
be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium
of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be
perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the
usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil.
Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful”
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money;
it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power
of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of
the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It
is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check,
since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check
there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection,
the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores
the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
Bill of attainder
People v. Ferrer
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another criminal complaint was filed with before Nilo Tayag
and fiver others with subversion, as they were tagged as officers of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization instigating and inciting the people to organize and
unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
9
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it
is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denied him the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE: Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
RULING: No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
In this case, when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not
specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simple to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact
the act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
Ex-post facto laws
US v. Diaz Conde
Facts of the Case: On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracio Liaco borrowed
from Vicente Diaz-Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde the sum of P300. They obligated
themselves to pay the defendants 5% per month, payable within the first ten days beginning
on January 1916.
On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took effect.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655.
Held: No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent
legislation. The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their
agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must
govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether
it affect its validity, construction, or discharge.
In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the act complained of which had been
done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto operation.
An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless
its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.
The decision of the lower court is revoked and the complaint dismissed.
Construction and interpretation
1. Liberally in favor of the accused
Ient v. Tullett Prebon
Facts:
Petitioner Ient is a British national and the Chief Financial Officer of Tradition Asia Pacific Pte.
Ltd. (Tradition Asia) in Singapore.[4] Petitioner Schulze is a Filipino/German who does
Application Support for Tradition Financial Services Ltd. in London (Tradition London).
Tradition Group and Tullett are competitors in the inter-dealer broking business.
Sometime in August 2008, in line with Tradition Group's motive of expansion and
diversification in Asia, petitioners Ient and Schulze were tasked with the establishment of a
Philippine subsidiary of Tradition Asia to be known as Tradition Financial Services Philippines,
Inc. (Tradition Philippines).[9] Tradition Philippines was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 19, 2008
Jaime Villalon (Villalon), who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett
Mercedes Chuidian (Chuidian)... formerly a member of Tullett's Board of Directors
John and Jane Does
Issues:
On October 15, 2008, Tullett, through one of its directors, Gordon Buchan, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit... against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of the
Corporation Code.
Villalon and Chuidian were charged with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage
said company by orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for
them to join Tradition Philippines.
With respect to Villalon, Tullett claimed that the former held several meetings between August
22 to 25, 2008 with members of Tullett's Spot Desk and brokering staff in order to convince
them to leave the company. Villalon likewise supposedly intentionally failed to renew the
contracts of some of the brokers. On August 25, 2008, a meeting was also allegedly held in
Howzat Bar in Makati City where petitioners and a lawyer of Tradition Philippines were
present. At said meeting, the brokers of complainant Tullett were purportedly induced, en
masse, to sign employment contracts with Tradition Philippines and were allegedly instructed
by Tradition Philippines' lawyer as to how they should file their resignation letters.
On August 26, 2008, Villalon allegedly informed Mr. Barry Dennahy, Chief Operating Officer of
Tullett Prebon in the Asia-Pacific, through electronic mail that all of Tullett's brokers had
resigned.
Subsequently, on September 1, 2008, in another meeting with Ient and Tradition Philippines'
counsel, indemnity contracts in favor of the resigning employees were purportedly distributed
by Tradition Philippines.
According to Tullett, respondents Villalon and Chuidian... violated Sections 31 and 34 of the
Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section 144. As for petitioners Ient
and Schulze, Tullett asserted that they conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's acts
of disloyalty against the company.
Villalon and Chuidian filed their respective Counter-Affivadits.
Villalon claimed that the DOJ had previously proclaimed that Section 31 is not a penal provision
of law but only the basis of a cause of action for civil liability. Thus, he concluded that there
was no probable cause that he violated the Corporation Code nor was the charge of conspiracy
properly substantiated.
10
Chuidian claimed that she left Tullett simply to seek greener pastures.
She argued that Section 144 as a penal provision should be strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused and Tullett has failed to substantiate its charge of bad faith
on her part.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[17] petitioner Schulze denied the charges leveled against her.
she concluded that a charge of conspiracy which has for its basis Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be made applicable to the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Ient alleged in his Counter-Affidavit that the charges against him were merely filed to harass
Tradition Philippines and prevent it from penetrating the Philippine market.
Tullett filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice to assail the foregoing resolution
of the Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Ient and Schulze moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution by the Secretary of
Justice.
Ient and Schulze brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65
The main bone of disagreement among the parties in this case is the applicability of Section
144 of the Corporation Code to Sections 31 and 34 of the same statute such that criminal
liability attaches to violations of Sections 31 and 34.
Ruling:
In a Resolution... dated February 17, 2009, State Prosecutor Cresencio F. Delos Trinos, Jr.
(Prosecutor Delos Trinos), Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City, dismissed the criminal
complaints.
On the issue of conspiracy, Prosecutor Delos Trinos found that since Villalon and Chuidian did
not commit any acts in violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code, the charge of
conspiracy against Schulze and Ient had no basis.
Dated April 23, 2009, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez reversed and set aside
Prosecutor Delos Trinos's resolution and directed the latter to file the information for violation
of Sections 31 and 34 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code against Villalon,
Chuidian, Harvey, Schulze, and Ient before the proper court.
Undeniably, respondents Villalon, Chuidian and Harvey occupied positions of high
responsibility and great trust as they were members of the board of directors and corporate
officers of complainant.
the consolidated petitions are GRANTED
Principles:
The provision of Section 144 of the Corporation Code is also applicable in the case at bar as
the penal provision provided therein is made applicable to all violations of the Corporation
Code, not otherwise specifically penalized.
After a meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both sides, the Court comes
to the conclusion that there is textual ambiguity in Section 144; moreover, such ambiguity
remains even after an examination of its legislativ... e history and the use of other aids to
statutory construction, necessitating the application of the rule of lenity in the case at bar.
There is no provision in the Corporation Code using similarly emphatic language that evinces
a categorical legislative intent to treat as a criminal offense each and every violation of that
law. Consequently, there is no compelling reason for the Court to construe Section 144 as
similarly employing the term "penalized" or "penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability.
The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute.
Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on
corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their
work with concerns of litigation.
2. Spanish text of the RPC prevails over the English Text
People v. Abilong
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
Florentino Abilong, the accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve destierro during which he should not enter any
place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila for
attempted robbery, evaded the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits
made against him and commit vagrancy.
ISSUE:
Is Art. 157 applicable to sentence of destierro?
HELD:
Yes. One evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area
specified in the judgment of conviction.
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of
destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who
are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his
contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase
"sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is
a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant
by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his
sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the
City of Manila, he entered said City.
3.Retroactive application when favorable to the accused
4. Prescribed but undeserved penalties
Cahulogan v. People
Facts: On April 18, 2011, an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the
crime of Fencing, the accusatory portion of which reads:
11
That on or about January 14, 2011 [,] at about 4:00 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon, at Bugo,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or in any manner deal, Two Hundred Ten (210) cases of Coca Cola products
worth Php52,476.00 owned by and belonging to the offended party Johnson Tan which
accused know, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of Theft, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid sum of
Php52,476.00.
Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as Anti-Fencing Law of 1979.7
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman engaged
in transporting Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez
(Lopez) and Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products (subject items)
worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his
instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went
to petitioner and informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was
pulling out the subject items. However, petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the same
from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any receipt evidencing such transaction.
Tan insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as Lariosa had no authority to
sell the same to petitioner, but the latter was adamant in retaining such items. Fearing that
his contract with Coca-Cola will be terminated as a result of the wrongful delivery, and in order
to minimize losses, Tan negotiated with petitioner to instead deliver to him P20,000.00 worth
of empty bottles with cases, as evidenced by their Agreement8 dated January 18, 2011.
Nonetheless, Tan felt aggrieved over the foregoing events, thus, prompting him to secure an
authorization to file cases from Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with the crime of Fencing. He
also claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had no update as to the
status thereof.9
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty,10 but chose not to present any evidence in
his defense. Rather, he merely submitted his memorandum,11 maintaining that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment13 dated October 4, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.14
The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established the presence of all the
elements of the crime of Fencing, considering that Lariosa stole the subject items from his
employer, Tan, and that petitioner was found to be in possession of the same. The RTC noted
that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner would have been forewarned that the
subject items came from an illegal source since Lariosa: (a) sold to him the subject items at a
discount and without any corresponding delivery and official receipts; and (b) did not demand
that such items be replaced by empty bottles, a common practice in purchases of soft drink
products.15
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision17 dated November 6, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.18 It held that
Lariosa's act of selling the subject items to petitioner without the authority and consent from
Tan clearly constituted theft. As such, petitioner's possession of the stolen items
constituted prima facie evidence of Fencing - a presumption which he failed to rebut.19
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration20 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution21 dated June 8, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's
conviction for the crime of Fencing.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law."22
Guided by this consideration, the Court finds no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction for
the crime of Fencing.
Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft."23 The same Section also states that a Fence "includes any person,
firm, association, corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the
act of fencing."24
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object
12
or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (d) there is,
on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.25 Notably, Fencing is
a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the
value of the property.26
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa
sold to petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from his employer, Tan, for
his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him as a truck
helper;27 (b) petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and was in possession of the
same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner should have been forewarned that the subject
items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with Lariosa did not have any
accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items
be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft
drinks;28 and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made evident by the fact that he bought the
subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00. "[T]he
Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess
and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due
deference should be accorded to the same."29
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioner, pertinent portions of Section 3 of PD
1612 read:
Section 3. Penalties. - Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos
but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
xxxx
Notably, while the crime of Fencing is defined and penalized by a special penal law, the penalty
provided therein is taken from the nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Peralta
v. People,30 the Court discussed the proper treatment of penalties found in special penal laws
vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,31otherwise known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law," viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),
provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and
maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law
prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v.
Simon that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the
penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such
circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also
necessarily apply to the special law.32
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the
RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for
those crimes punishable under the RPC.33
Applying the foregoing and considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances present in this case, the Court finds it proper to sentence petitioner to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612 was
enacted in order to provide harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties which
are proceeds of the crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior to the enactment of said law, were
punished merely as accessories after the fact of the said crimes.34 This rationale was echoed
in Dizon-Pamintuan v. People35 where the Court held that while a Fence may be prosecuted
either as an accessory of Robbery/Theft or a principal for Fencing, there is a preference for
the prosecution of the latter as it provides for harsher penalties:
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as
the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an
accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised
Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Noting, however, the
reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of
government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become
profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers,
commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy
penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently,
the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the
Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a
mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of
robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct
offenses. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or
P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that
fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.36
While PD 1612 penalizes those who acquire properties which are proceeds of Robbery or
Theft, its prescribed penalties are similar to the latter crime in that they are largely dependent
on the value of the said properties. In fact, a reading of Section 3 of PD 1612 and Article 309
of the RPC (which provides for the prescribed penalties for the crime of Theft) reveals that
both provisions use the same graduations of property value to determine the prescribed
penalty; in particular, if the value: (a) exceeds P22,000.00, with additional penalties for each
additional P10,000.00; (b) is more than P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00; (c) is more
than P6,000.00 but not exceeding P12,000.00; (d) is more than P200.00 but not exceeding
13
P6,000.00; (e) is more than P50.00 but not exceeding P200.00; and (f) does not exceed P5.00.
However, with the recent enactment of Republic Act No. 10951,37 which adjusted the values
of the property and damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration
the present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in
1932,38 the graduation of values in Article 309 was substantially amended, without any
concomitant adjustment for PD 1612. This development would then result in instances where
a Fence, which is theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of Robbery/Theft, will be
punished more severely than the principal of such latter crimes. This incongruence in penalties
therefore, impels an adjustment of penalties.
However, while it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.39 As the
Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties is a policy matter that
belongs to the legislative branch of the government, it finds it prudent to instead, furnish both
Houses of Congress, as well as the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice, pursuant to Article 540 of the RPC, copies of this ruling in order to alert
them on the aforestated incongruence of penalties, all with the hope of arriving at the proper
solution to this predicament.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2015 and the Resolution
dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-MIN finding petitioner
Ireneo Cahulogan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Fencing defined and
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law,"
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
the indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice, the President
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
5. Suppletory application of RPC to Special Penal Laws
Ladonga v. People
FACTS:
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and
issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable to
Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo
by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the
check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the other hand,
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable
to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had
no participation in the issuance thereof.
ISSUE:
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art.
10 of RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner
as conspirator applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is
applicable?
RULING:
A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second
sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future
are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the
second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of
the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against
her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Simon
FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams,
when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.
14
Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked
up by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he
attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached
the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money
or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from
the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows
he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared
that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed
that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight
or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
ISSUE:
Was the conviction of Simon correct?
RULING:
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It
must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange
for two twenty-peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and
there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling
for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the
marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana
involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting
provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to
be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the
first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts
should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section
20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in
effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing
a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence
within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months
of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
Mendoza v. People
FACTS:
The trial court convicted accused Danilo Mendoza, petitioner herein, for homicide wherein
the victim was Alfonso Nisperos. Petitioner does not seek acquittal but merely prays that the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense be considered in his favor.
Herein petitioner narrated the antecedent facts as follows:
That during a drinking spree, he had an altercation with a certain Willy Baluyot.
Feeling bad, he slammed the table with a pitcher containing water. Then he left.
At a distance, he heard the victim calling him. When they were close to each other, the victim
blamed him for his conduct. He apologized but the victim started stabbing him with a knife.
He tried to parry the attack as he retreated. That moment, his back was against the wall. He
then grappled for the knife which he was able to wrench from the victim. They rolled over on
the ground. At that point, he repeatedly stabbed the victim with his own knife.
On the other the hand, the prosecution, to prove that the petitioner was the aggressor
presented Loreta Nisperos, mother of the victim.
Loreta said:
Alfonso Nisperos, stepped out of their house. When he returned, he told her that he saw a
person near their cow tied to a tamarind tree.
Alfonso then went out again to check on the person he saw. After a short while, Loreta
suddenly heard Alfonso screaming “Mother, help me!”
She rushed to her son. She found him lying, face down, with petitioner on top of him, stabbing
him with a knife.
She then approached petitioner, pleading to him not to kill her son. But instead of heeding her
plea, he suddenly attacked her with his knife, hitting her right arm. Petitioner then dashed
away from the scene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense
RULING:
No, the petitioner cannot be accorded with privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense.
15
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim should be clearly established to make the claim
of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, acceptable.
In the case at bar, the court found that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. This element being absent, petitioner cannot be accorded the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
II. General Principles
Omission
People v. Silvestre and Atienza
Facts: Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her
codefendant Martin Atienza.
On May 16, 1930,... Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality,
a sworn complaint for adultery... the two defendants begged... the municipal president of
Paombong... to speak to the complainant... urging him to withdraw the complaint
Domingo Joaquin acceded to it... and... the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the
adultery case commenced against the accused
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former
marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Nino, and under pretext of asking him for
some nipa leaves
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz,
were... gathered together
Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going
to set fire to it.
Upon being asked... why he wanted to set fire to the house, he... answered that that was
the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated
the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant
Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate
with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania,... as to what they had just heard
Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries
of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames
The fire destroyed ... about forty-eight houses.
Tomas Santiago... and Tomas Gonzalez,... saw Martin Atienza... going away from the house
where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against
her are:... that Romana Silvestre listened to her co-defendant's threat without raising a
protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter... set fire to the house. Upon the strength
of these facts, the court below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Issues:
which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of
arson committed by her co-defendant Martin Atienza?
Ruling:
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines
an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the... commission of the act by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the
execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions
In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or...
material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere
presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it
does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the... crime of
arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make
her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do... not constitute the cooperation
required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent;
Principles:
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do... not constitute the cooperation
required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent.
People v. Talingdan
Facts: Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house in Abra on June 24, 1967 by
Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife [whom cannot be
charged with parricide because no certificate or proof of marriage could be presented by the
prosecution]. The murder was witnessed by Corazon [12], the eldest child of Bernardo and
Teresa. She testified to the crime committed by the accused-appellants.
Story: [I want to include this so that you could get the whole thing; it is your option to write it
or not on your record books. This is the summary of Corazon’s testimony.] Prior to the violent
incident, Bernardo and Teresa have had several conflicts in their married life. She would often
withdraw from their house. The longest even for more than 3 weeks. It was suspected that
Teresa is having an illicit affair with Talingdan, a policeman who lives nearby. Two days before
the crime, Teresa was slapped several times by Bernardo after a violent quarrel. She sought
the help of Talingdan who challenged Bernardo to come down, but the latter refused. Then,
Talingdan left after shouting "If I will find you someday, I will kill you." Two days before the
commission of the crime, Corazon overheard her mother’s meeting with the other accused-
appellants about their plot to kill her father as one of them said, “Shall he elude a bullet?”
Corazon was then driven away by her mother saying, “You tell your father that we will kill him.”
On the night of the murder, Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother
talking with the other accused-appellants in their “batalan” armed with long guns. After a
while, Teresa went inside the room to put her baby to sleep. After eating supper alone,
Corazon told her father about the persons outside but he ignored her. He went to the kitchen
and sat on the floor near the door then he was fired. Talingdan and Tobias fired their guns
again. Bides threatened to kill Corazon if she would ask for help. Corazon confessed to her
father’s relatives the identities of the murderers during his burial. The trial court found them
guilty of the offense and so the five accused appealed to their conviction.
Crime Committed: Murder
16
[and the sentence of life imprisonment with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the
deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000]
Contention of the Accused: According to Teresa, there was no illicit affair between her and
Talingdan. She loved her husband. Contrary to the testimony of Corazon, they never quarreled
nor did the former maltreat her. She never left home for so long. And she was cooking for
supper, and not Corazon, on the night of the murder. She contends that her in-laws used her
daughter to testify against her because they don’t want Teresa from the start. She even added
that Bernardo had some enemies during his lifetime. Talingdan said that he escorted the
Mayor as a bodyguard, while the other three accused also claimed that they were at a certain
Mrs. Bayongan’s house during the night of the murder.
Contention of the People: The sworn statement of the 13-year old Corazon was true. She knew
the accused because they live nearby their place. Besides, the accused-appellants testimonies
are indefensible and futile. Moreover, her mother claimed to have no suspect in mind during
the investigation in their house although she was in conspiracy with the other four accused.
Ruling: The court affirmed the decision held by the trial court with costs. There are two
aggravating circumstances present, treachery and evident premeditation, with no mitigating
circumstances to offset the accused-appellants. Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and are sentenced to DEATH to be executed in
accordance with law. Teresa Domogma is guilty as accessory to the same murder, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years prision correccional as
minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law.
What about Teresa’s conviction? Teresa was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her
co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her. After Bernardo was killed, she became active in her
cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the
escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory --- paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. [Please check Art 19 on your PRC and write it down if you
wish. I strongly recommend it so.]
Deliberate Intent
Manuel v. People
Facts:
Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in 1996.
Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo
even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that
their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They were married on April 22,
1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was
“single”. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their
house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her. In January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. In August 2001, Tina became curious and
made inquiries from the NSO in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked
as a GRO. He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage
to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was “single” in his marriage
contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum,
and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00
by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He
alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at
the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral
damage when it has no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second,
there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article
2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article
2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damagesto the
private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code.
According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.” This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are:
(a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured her that
he was single. He even brought his parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made
the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to marry the him, who even stated
17
in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully
performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For
two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her, Tina had no inkling that he was
already married to another before they were married.
Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the
fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes
and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.
The Court rules that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with Tina were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter.
That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. The
Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society.
People v. Puno
Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money"
from her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento
to issue a check for P100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the
car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according
to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step
out of the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had
gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
No.
No.
Ratio:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission
of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country,
roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against
robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was
passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a
highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
People v. Delfin
Facts:
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA,[1]
a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him... to death in its decision dated August
19, 2002.[2] The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28,
2005,[3] the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate
review... pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo.[4] On October 26, 2007,[5] the CA,
although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the
civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final... bid to overturn his conviction.
Issues:
18
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of
the crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable
and positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin
Caliso (Caliso).
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not
to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of...
the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the
criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always
require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes
where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can... equally
confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v.
Gallarde,[21] to wit: (a) that by direct evidence,... through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is
last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:... xxx Positive
identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,... he
may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime.
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her
barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously
assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore,... Caliso's
conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable's
identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and
cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is...
required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her
identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means
by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral...
certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass
unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the...
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that
set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
A witness' familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification,
does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegable's testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by
a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to
generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other...
reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA's killer. Her identification of him in that manner
lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being
mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community... where the
crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso's back. Moreover, many
factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation,
her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her...
excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the
records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But
the influence of such varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is...
even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with
one another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer
view of another's back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable...
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.[23]
Amegable's recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did
not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-
a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had...
been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso
without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was
perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso
guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent
additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegable's...
identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial,
for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons
involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither... fair
nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable
raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and
he is entitled to an acquittal,[26] though his innocence may be... doubted.[27] The
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary
importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the
Prosecution.
Mistake of Fact
US v. Ah Chong
FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying
to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open
by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an
unlawful aggression) which had been placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
19
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in
the spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which
took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for
his personal protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination
if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal
intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions
of article 8 of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so
o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” - an act done by me against my will is not my
act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases,
the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent
of the doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so
construed
• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.
People v. Oanis
FACTS:
Ø Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Ø The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector.
Ø Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired
at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her
paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful
and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Ø According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the
latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the
same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson
HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
Ø ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault
or carelessness
Ø appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity
to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest
if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
Ø "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
Ø a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force
or violence in making an arrest
Ø The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
Ø 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
Ø According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than
that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
Malum Prohibitum as exception to the requirement of mens Rea
Padilla v. Dizon
20
Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release
to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting
to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank
Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit
or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines
without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take
out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary
visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank
at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or
purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations
of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and
maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he
had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business
associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and
all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his
business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon
for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts
of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented
by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to
other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.
Magno v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but he
did not have complete equipment... he lacked funds with which... to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources
International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of
Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed... car repair service
equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
(Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance for
brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum
(30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00.
unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on
condition that the same would be paid as... a short term loan at 3% interest.
petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement
After the documentation was completed, the equipment... were delivered to petitioner who
in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng.
Issues:
four counts of the aforestated charges subject of... the petition... petitioner could not pay LS
Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this
occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the
warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four
(4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."
Ruling:
finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case
Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective... amounts
reflected in subject checks
As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid
for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner
failed to continue paying possibly... due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is
lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be
refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
"warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law
(B.P. No. 22) violated.
It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he
dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was... covered by L.S. Finance
Management.
the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
21
Principles:
the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest
degree.
Garcia v. CA
FACTS:
Guevarra was the owner of a lady’s diamond ring with white gold mounting, solitaire 2-karat
diamond as well as 4 brills. It was stolen from her house. On a relevant date, while she was
talking to Garcia, an owner of a restaurant, she recognized the ring on the latter’s finger and
asked how she acquired the same. Garcia averred that she bought it from her comadre.
Guevarra made Garcia know that the ring was stolen from her place days before. It was
ascertained the ring was indeed Guevarra’s but despite written demands, Garcia refused to
return the ring.
HELD:
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the same from
the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if he has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale in which case the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefore. Guevarra who was unlawfully deprived of the
ring
was entitled to recover it from de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only
exception provided by law is when the possessor acquired the property through a public sale,
in which case, the owner cannot recover without reimbursement.
Cuenca v. People
FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that the CFI of Manila,
convicting appellant Ernesto Cuenca, who at the time of arrest of arrest on January 3, 1963
was on duty at the Philippine Savings Bank as a special watchman and security guard of the
Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm, and Ithaca .45 pistol, of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and seven rounds of ammunition and sentencing him to
imprisonment for one year and to pay the costs. Appellant's main argument for defense was
that in his employment with the above-mentioned security agency made him to believe that
the license to possess the firearm in question was with the owner of the agency, Jose Forbes.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of Jose
Forbes to comply with his duty to obtain such license, before he issued said firearm and
ammunition to his aforementioned employee.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The appellant is not guilty of the crime charged. It
should be noted that the Bataan Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as such.
Consequently, it may legally engage the services of competent persons to discharge the duties
of special watchmen and security guards and provide them, as such, with the corresponding
firearms and ammunitions. The agency is this supposed to obtain the license necessary
therefore. Had it done so, there would be no question about the absence of any criminal
liability on the part of the appellant herein for the possession of the firearm and ammunition
in question. Petition is therefore GRANTED.
People v. Dela Rosa
Ysidoro v. People
FACTS:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for thos
e suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the ho
mes of victims of calamities.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom.
And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could b
e given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, t
o seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and si
gned the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to
CSAP.
She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Go
vernment Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical
malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Res
olution 00-
133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on the ex
ecutive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehen
sive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects.
The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than t
hat for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different
from their originally intended purpose
RULING 1:
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies p
ublic funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public us
e for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they
were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate fun
ds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be
used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiarie
s of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are: 1) the
moderately and severely underweight pre-
school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose tot
al monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.
22
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Y
sidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housi
ng beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intende
d for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
STATCON AID:
* Expressio unius est exclusion alterius – The express mention of one person, thing or consequ
ence implies the exclusion of all others.
Thru the rule: Expressum facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to that which i
s implied where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by i
nterpretation or construction, be extended to other matters
> It can be seen here that the appropriation of the general funds were expressly meant for th
e 2 different beneficiaries, and should not be construed to be a general appropriation of publi
c funds interchangeably with the two. No matter if the funds are used for a public purpose, it
should be noted that these funds were explicitly allocated for 2 very different purposes, which
therefore clearly satisfies the 3rd element in technical malversation.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could
be used to augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality
RULING 2:
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ra
n throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-
June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer n
eeded. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the SFP benefi
ciaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its sto
reroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to
predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no lo
nger needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
STATCON AID:
* Words construed in their ordinary sense > General rule: In the absence of legislative intent,
words and phrases should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
ISSUE 3:
Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation
RULING 3:
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diver
ting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to anothe
r public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inhere
ntly immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission bas
ed on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act
as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or n
ot the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
STATCON AID:
* Doctrine of casus omissus
A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted int
entionally.
The maxim operates only if and when the omission has been clearly established, and in such a
case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein.
Negligence or lack of foresight
People v. Pugay
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12
years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson
to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they
used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public
plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay
after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter,
Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours
after the incident gave their written statements.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the
criminal responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony
itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be
proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the
time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the
meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the
accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay
and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective
and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him.
**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of
the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE
23
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing
qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance
that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE
JUDGEMENTS.
Ivler v. San Pedro
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition
for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy
as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article
365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
24

Transferred Intent
Villareal v. People
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa) of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The rites were
scheduled to last for three days.
The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites
included:
1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the
wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs;
3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries"
(the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites),
while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs
by two Aquilans; and
4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes.
They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays, play
rough basketball, and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans
revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they
endured on the first day of initiation.
After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened
the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the
neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could
no longer walk that he had to be carried to the carport. The initiation for the day was officially
ended. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought
he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some
of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans.
The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide. The criminal case against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.
The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal liability
of each of the accused according to individual participation. One accused had by then passed
away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated
the liability of each accused according to individual participation (NO)
2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries (YES)
3) Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide (NO)
HELD:
1) NO. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an
25
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application
for a writ of certiorari. Pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, the Court is constrained to
deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
2) YES. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the
legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion. The accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death
occurs.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the
only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have
been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny.
3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in part,
insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
Aberration ictus
People v. Guillen
Facts:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affiliated with
any particular political group, had voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential
elections held in 1946, Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of
President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the Philippine Republic.
According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and... his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas,
instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval
of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President
Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular
meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, attended by a big
crowd,... President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number
of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected
for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousands of
listeners of... the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional
amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be
adopted.
he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an Anerican soldier in the early
days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for... two bottles of whiskey.
he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the
night of March 10, 1947.
hen he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a
paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exh. "D"), in a
plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he...
stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters,
he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being
congratulated by .Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castaneda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and, without
losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards
an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,...
covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down.
The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were
standing close to the platform.
It was found... that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or
Barrela) who died on the following day as a result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments
of the grenade (Exhibits F and "F-1) Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang.
Angel Garcia, who was one of the spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and-, after the... explosion, ran away
towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda
Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was
wrestling was Julio Guillen
Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna
Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same
person who hurled towards the... platform the object which exploded and -whom Garcia tried
to hold when he was running away.
Issues:
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and... multiple frustrated murder...
the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varel... the... appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder
Ruling:
when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into
execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas,... he knew fully well that, by
throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it
to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim
from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive... nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
26
He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but
that it did not make any difference to... him if there were some people around the President
when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was
tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the
President, were identified with the latter.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The
ease before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 49 because by a single act, that
of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused... committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple
attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one
whom the... defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it.
In this connection, it should be stated that, although there is abundant proof that, in violation
of the provisions of Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed
among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts... were
directed toyjards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his
failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity
as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the... failure
of the prosecution to insert in the information the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with
the commission of said offense, we shall refrain from making a finding to that effect.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we
hereby do so by a unanimous vote.
Principles:
He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article
4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any... person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
"Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its... maximum period."
In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one
whom the... defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it.
Error in personae
People v. Sabalones
Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a shooting incident
in Cebu in 1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries
of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The victims were asked to bring the car of
a certain Stephen Lim who also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the car with
Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove the owner-type jeep along with Glenn Tiempo and Rey
Bolo to aid the group back to the party after parking the car at Lim’s house. When they reached
the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. The accused were identified as the
gunmen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Sabalones and Beronga
appealed.
Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of frustrated murder
Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores testified
about the shooting and identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the car that
is behind the jeep. He positively identified Sabalones as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen
fired at the car, driver Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan
Tiempo’s house from which they have escaped death.
Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and Beronga denied their presence
during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous witnesses who stated
that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired watching over his
brother’s wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was
fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from
place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The
defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses arguing that the place
where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.
RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.
Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible?
Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There
was positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in gunfire.
The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial confession has
no bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding though to
the co-accused because it is used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated by one witness. The
inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility of testimony.
Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does not diminish culpability; same
gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail over positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses.
Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable?
No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive identification. Using the
case of People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short
distance from the scene of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.
Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed?
27
No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion
perpetua for murder. The CA erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of
frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Because there are no
mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two accused. It does not matter that the
prosecution has failed to show who was between the two who actually pulled the trigger that
killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a conspirator becomes the
act of another regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act.
Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the crime was done
at night time and that the accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation
is also an aggravating circumstance [the accused had planned to kill the victim some days
before].
People v. Opera
Practer Intentionem
People v. Albuquerque
The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of
homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and
one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000,
with costs.
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living
children, has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and
has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he
suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters was named Maria and another, are
married, while still another one is a nun. With the exemption of the other married daughter
and the nun, of all of them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend
for support.
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate
relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then
that the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his
house. The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a
child. The appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to
such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her
godfather's house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for
delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has
appeared sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but
also because the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for
support. For some time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and
threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by
marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give
the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where
the deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both
went downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that
on that occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased,
causing his death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing
that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's
attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed
him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm,
the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death
of the deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony
the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a
permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the
hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his
plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated
this intention in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept
his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant in stabbing the
deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact
hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of
paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant.
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted
in legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by
whipping out and brandishing his penknife.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which
refers to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused,
should be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has
been interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime befalls a different person
(decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is not
the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article
249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of
28
three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower
in degree, that is prision mayor, should be imposed.
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8)
years and (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other
respects, with the costs. So ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
Causation
Bactalan v. Medina
Facts:
At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite.
While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag
until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed
passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate
and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and
duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in
her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from
Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P87,150.
After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus
P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which
was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed
the case to SC.
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the
fire that burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.
Held:
The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.
The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them,
and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help.
Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.
The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver
nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina
Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise
negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is
evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver
failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina.
The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as
he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have
occurred.
Ratio:
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
Wacoy v. People
Facts:
Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide... he saw Wacoy kick Aro's
stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from
doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him... on the stomach, causing him to collapse and
cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.
Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum...
he sustained a perforation on his ileum... that... caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire
abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro
suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the... operation... ue to financial
29
constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died
the next day.
Issues:
D... as will be explained hereunder.
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder.
ntent only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the
corresponding penalty therefor in its maximum period,[28] pursuant to Article 49 of... the RPC
Ruling:
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder.
there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died.
On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy
and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked... him repeatedly,
taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion and
tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident.
if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[30] In such... case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because
with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences... thereof.
Principles:
WHEN TO APPLY ARTICLE 49 IN RELATION TO HOMICIDE (ART. 249)
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is
different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error
in personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the...
offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem),[29] as in this case.
People v. Iligan
FACTS:
At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions Zaldy Asis and Felix
Lukban were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On
the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew Edmundo Asis and Juan
Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix quickly
said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall,
Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed. Terrified the trio ran,
pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while and even passed the house of
Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being
chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house. On the way back the three accused
suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr.
on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran. Upon returning
they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted.
The postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the victim died
of “ shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it was due to a vehicular
accident and not the hacking.
HELD: YES.
We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen from the
bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does
not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been committed and that
the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequence
of the felony committed by the offender.
It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felony committed
was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was considered superficial by the
physician is immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do away with him.
The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles pass any moment,
the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him and was run over by a vehicle. The
hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the proximate cause of the victim’s death.
Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any qualifying circumstances.
Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which
caused the flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded
Javier to pay for the soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went
to the hospital for the treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm
and tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings
showed that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised
the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.
ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.
RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and
that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended
his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs.
Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been
30
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
People v. Abarca
FACT:
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having sexual
intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two also caught
Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour
later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh usually stays and
then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died instantaneously. However, two more
persons were shot in the adjacent room. These two other persons survived due to timely
medical intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with frustrated
double murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.
HELD: No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty
of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills
any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present
in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with Koh and
the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s rage. Therefore,
Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons he shot in
the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca
has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not also committing a crime when
he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247. Abarca was however negligent because
he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be
liable for less serious physical injuries through simple negligence for the injuries suffered by
the two other persons who were in the adjacent room when the incident happened.
III. STAGES OF EXECUTION
Consummated crimes
US v. Eduave
FACTS:
Defendant Protasio Eduave is the querido of the victim’s mother. Eduave attacked the victim
from behind using a bolo creating a gash 8 1/2 inches long and 2 inches deep because the
latter accused defendant of having commiting rape against said victim. Upon thinking that he
has already killed the victim, he threw the body into the bushes and left.
ISSUE/S:
What is the crime committed by Eduave?
HELD:
Accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The fact that Eduave attacked the victim from behind,
in a vital portion of the body, shows treachery qualifying it as murder. The crime was not
consummated because the elements of the crime’s execution and accomplishment were not
complete as the victim did not die. Neither was the crime an attempted one because the
accused’s actions has already passed the subjective phase, that is, there was no external force
preventing defendant from performing all the acts of execution necessary to commit the
felony. Consequently, the victim did not die because an external element has prevented such
death after Eduave has performed all the necessary acts of execution that would have caused
the death of the victim.
Rivera v. People
Facts:
As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being
jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a
heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and his three year old
daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his brother Esmeraldo and
Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled
Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow
block on the parietal area. The Rivera brothers fled when policemen came. The doctor
declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed
had the police not promptly intervened.
Issues:
(1) WON there was intent to kill.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted
murder.
(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.
Held:
31
(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the
victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the
wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his
death, intent to kill is presumed.
(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt
when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no
opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden attack
to the victim caused him to be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend himself and
retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.
Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies
1. Theft
Valenzuela v. People
Facts: While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket,
he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent
and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then
returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent.
Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the
taxi was about to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise.
The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The
trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed
the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.
Held: No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the
following elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court
held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent
to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property
stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the
owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage,
and can only be attempted or consummated.
2. Illegal Trespass
People v. Lamahang
FACTS:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempte
d robbery.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making
an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named
street.
At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under cust
ody.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery
RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilt
y of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggrav
ating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto m
ayor.
RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete terminatio
n following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the volu
ntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offens
e. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possessi
on, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant cas
e, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by m
eans of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeed
ed in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit an
y other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the materia
l damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertain
ed, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). The r
elation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said fact
s are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts
and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under c
onsideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Aga
inst the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttim
e and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for r
obbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumst
ance of lack of instruction.
3. Physical Injuries, Homicide, and Murder
32
People v. Trinidad
Martinez v. CA
Facts:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owners of two (2) parcels
of land located in Lubao, Pampanga. The disputed property was originally owned by one
Paulino Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of
Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria
Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a
certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao, Pedro
Beltran, from restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, Garcia filed a civil
case with the Court of First Instance against Beltran to restrain the latter in his official capacity
from molesting him in the possession of said second parcel, and on even date, applied for a
writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued against said municipal president. The Court
declared permanent the preliminary injunction.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his
name, and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted
the registration.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were
acquired by the spouses.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee
on Rivers and Streams, which, after conducting an ocular inspection, reported that the parcel
was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said
parcel of land, directing the spouses to remove the dikes they had constructed, threatening
that the dikes would be demolished should the spouses fail to comply therewith within 30
days.
Issue:
Whether the spouses are purchasers for value and in good faith on the parcel alleged to be a
public river.
Held:
No, they are not.
There is no weight in the spouses' argument that, being a purchaser for value and in good faith
of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary to the law and to the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of the title which is
the core of the system of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value and
in good faith as in the deed of absolute conveyance executed in their favor.
Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the spouses did not know
exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions
thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with their project of converting
Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the
risks attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or
lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith.
The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make
inquiries as to the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to
determine if there is no lien or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against
the law and the accepted principle that rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and
not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
Mondragon v. People
FACTS:
The petitioner, Isidoro Mondragon, was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of
the crime of frustrated homicide. After trial the Court of First Instance of Iloilo found him guilty
of the crime of attempted homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of
from 4 months and 21 days of arresto mayor to 2 years, 4 months and ! day of prision
correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and the costs. Mondragon appealed to
the Court of Appeals, and the latter court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo in all its parts, with costs.
At about 5 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, while complainant Serapion Nacionales was
opening the dike of his ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, to drain the water therein
and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout from afar telling him not
to open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice shouted again,
“Don’t you dare open the dike.Then he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards
him. Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening the dike
because he would plant the next morning. Without much ado, Mondragon tried to hit the
complainant who dodged the blow. Thereupon, appellant drew his bolo and struck
complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant blacked out, unsheathed his own
bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm and between the middle and ring fingers
in order to defend himself. The appellant retreated, and the complainant did not pursue him
but went home instead. The following day, the complainant was treated Dr. Alfredo Jamandre,
Municipal Health Officer of Miagao, Iloilo with number of wounds (jaw, below the right eye,
left arm and fingers).
The Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party
when the petitioner answered in the affirmative the question as to whether he would
do everything that he could do to stop the offended party from digging the canal because he
needed the water
ISSUE: Whether Mondragon is guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide or less serious
physical injury.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, modified in the sense that the petitioner is declared guilty of the offense of less
serious physical injuries and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three months and fifteen
days of arresto mayor, with costs.
33
 SC hold that the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case
do not justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party. On the
contrary, there are facts brought out by the decision appealed from which indicates that the
petitioner had no intention to kill, namely: the petitioner started the assault on the offended
party by just going him fist blows; the wounds inflicted on
the offended party were of slight nature, indicating no homicidal urge on the part of the
petitioner; the petitioner retreated and went away when the offended party started hitting
him with a bolo, thereby indicating that if the petitioner had intended to kill the offended party
he would have held his ground and kept on hitting the offended party with his bolo to kill him.
The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the injuries
suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than 30
days, SC hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious
physical injuries.
The offense of less serious physical injuries, as defined in Article 265 of the Revised Penal
Code, is punishable by arresto mayor or imprisonment of from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals do not show any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that may e considered in the imposition of the penalty on the petitioner.
SC, therefore, sentence the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
three months and fifteen days of arresto mayor.
People v. Sy Pio
4. Robbery
People v. Salvilla
Facts:
The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with homemade guns
and hand grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office. In the office of Rodita; her
two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside. One of the accused asks Mary to get the
paper bag which contained money. All accused held victims as hostage when the police and
military authorities had surrounded the lumber yard. After the negotiation fails to proceed,
the police makes their move in assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as
well the accused also got an injury.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.
5. Rape
People v. Orita
FACTS:
• March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St.
Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her home from
a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another
boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered
her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the
inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her
neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When
they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look
for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the
wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take off
her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down
on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still
poked with a knife, she did as told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis
entered her. He then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a
small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the
floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and
climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a
window.
• Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house
and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and
knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the
door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and
wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding
house where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due
to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically
examined.
• Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.
HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated
stages apply to the crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is
his intention to perform
34
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime
and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole
basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the
genital organ of the victim.
People v. Campuhan
FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan,
went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2
children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon,
who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer
located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo
Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging
pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his
hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his
path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin
and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was
apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she
suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated
• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that
he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's
own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that
she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus,
she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim
Cruz v. People
FACTS: In December 1993, Norberto Cruz (Norberto) and his wife went to La Union to sell
plastic and glass wares. Along with them is AAA and BBB. Upon reaching their destination, they
set up a tent in order that they will have a place to sleep.
At around 1 AM, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. The
person was Norberto who was mashing her breast and touching her private parts. He fought
back and kicked Norberto twice. He was not able to pursue his lustful desires; he offered AAA
money and told her not to tell the incident to her mother. Thirty minutes later, when AAA
retured to her tent, she again saw Norberto touching private parts of BBB.
Later that day, they reported the incident to the police. Norberto was summoned to the police
station which resulted to an argument. He deined the allegations contending that there were
many people around who were preparing for the “simbang gabi”, and that once AAA and BBB
would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them.
RTC found Norberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS. CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the
petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of
lasciviousness.
ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of attempted rape.
RULING: NO. There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous desistance.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform
all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of
the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the
acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts
performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended
crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with
his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively
ended his designs on her. It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
35
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his
own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. In People
v. Bugarin, the Court said that The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness
because the intent to commit rape “is not apparent from the act described,” and the intent to
have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia.
The Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOMEguilty of ACTS
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.
Doctrine: The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Baleros v. People
FACTS:
• Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas, stayed
at Room 307 with her maid Marvilou.
• December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding bed right in
front of her bedroom door.
• December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan and Alberto
wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with stripes lent by Perla Duran
and leather shoes.
• December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-shirt with
fraternity symbols and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” from a party. He requested
permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but at that time only
Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although Chito could not produce the required written
authorization, he let him in because he will be a tenant in the coming summer break. Joseph
was awaken by Chito’s knock so he glanced the alarm clock and let him. He saw him wearing
dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt.
• December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully covered the face
of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying
effects. This awakened Malou. She struggled but could not move because she was tightly
held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked him and got her right hand free to squeeze his
sex organ causing him to let her go. She went for the bedroom door and woke up
Marvilou. She also intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko
pinagtangkaan ako". Malou proceed to Room 310 where her classmates Christian Alcala,
Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying and seeked help. She
saw her bed in a mess and noticed that her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the
window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom
which leads to Room 306 was now open.
• December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were
asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit when Rommel
Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito. It contained white t-shirt with
fraternity symbol, a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an underwear
and socks.
• Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
• 13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes,
Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something had happened
and asked him to follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag and since no one was there
they went to Room 401 where Renato Alagadan was. He left his grey bag at Room 306 the day
before.
• handkerchief and Malou’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which
causes first degree burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
• RTC: guilty of attempted rape
• CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape
HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for
attempted rape. GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto
menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
• Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
• Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while
on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
• Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part
• Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph
of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for
the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed
36

6. Arson
US v. Valdes
FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew
of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the
deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their work, the accused began to abuse the men with
offensive words. Gargantel complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult
them. The accused took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he moved towards
Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused
had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing himself in great
and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be
seen no more.
As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of
having thrown himself into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the
accused. The Judgment rendered against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of
the homicide, the accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting
serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.
HELD: The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following
doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive
and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary
artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that
person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused
compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the
accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a
mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined
resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting
him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in
qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as
the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused.”
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge
appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to
commit so great a wrong as that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)
As a manner of incurring criminal liability
People v. Aguilos
People v. De la Cerna
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the
petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using
the facial challenge.
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the
law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot
be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free
speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application
of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly
it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’
decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
Issues:
1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
37
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein,
or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that
the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds
in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What
is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—
the element of the offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
“pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder –
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4
purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It
is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
“willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites
the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite
mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among
the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications
of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context
38
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The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a the appellant with a balisong. Appellant was able to parry the blow, and overpowering Jaime, thruste the
defense.
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are knife into
Basic requirement
his body.for self-defense as a justifying circumstance is unlawful aggression against the person
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since Issue:
defending himself. It must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. W/Nlife
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unlawful aggression started when the victim started poking the appellant with a fork
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression ceases. It follows that when appellant and Jaime
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the heeded the advice of the barangay tanod, the unlawful aggression had ended. Since the aggression no
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit longer existed, appellant had no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
The defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his design to attack the appellant
Defense: continuing aggression
Gravity (Art. 9) -Whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble (refuted by the testimony of the wife)
People v. Yu Hai -Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling as he walked – the victim could not have persisted in
FACTS OF THE CASE: attacking the appellant with his current state.
On October 22, 1954, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan -Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or coached witness
of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly
permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer
thereof. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefore had already been
extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles, having
sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense respective appropriate headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are
which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months. controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions
therein.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one
Did the court err in considering the offense committed as a light felony? meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its
adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result.
No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C states that “an offense which IV. Justifying Circumstances
penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on the A. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers
matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the offense committed as a
correctional penalty, is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses. Senoja vs. People

Also, if the SolGen’s interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd
situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1 peso
will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and there is no reason for a law-maker to
raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses
Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the
prescription of a crime not the penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the
accused, it should be the one to be adopted.
HELD:
THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.
People vs. Decena
Facts:
Narration of the defense:
Ruling:
People vs. Dela Cruz
Facts:
Dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim: san anotnio’s ex live-n
partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the bedroom
adhere dela cruz was demanding him to go out. Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that
Macapagal was pointng the gun at him, he immediately went back to the room and closed the door. The
next time he went out, he was too, holding a gun. The two immediatcely grappled each other and not long
after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor. Appellant told San Antonio to call the police
and when they arrived, he surrendered the gun he used and told the police he shot Macapagal in self-

39
defense. According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds, 3 of which were not penetrating
(upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life was on the left side of
the chest penetrating his heart. Dela Cruz has no license to carry a fire arm.
Issue:
W/N the accussed is able to prove the court the elements of self defense in order to texenuate him from
the crime.
Ruling:
Three conditions must concur to exenuate him:
1. Unlawfull aggression by the person injured or killed
In this case the viictim banged at the bedroom with his gn but the appellant, upon seeing the victim
pointing the gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He
could’ve stopped. Instead, confronted the victim.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawfull aggression
The number of wonds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self defense. The four
gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant could no
longer argue that there was no provocation on his part.
Claim of self defense rejected.
People vs. Jaurigue
Facts:
Defendant/Respondent Avelina Jaurigue found guilty of homicide (for killing Amado Capiña) by Court of
First Instance of Tayabas 2. Defendant appealed to the CA contending that the lower court erred in not
holding appellant had acted in defense of honor therefore she's completely absolved by criminal liability
Issue:
W/N respondent should be completely absolved of criminal liability considering her act done in defense of
her honor.
Rulng:
Defendant Jaurigue cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability. With the
modification of the judgment appealed from, defendant is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging
from 2 months and 1 day arresto mayor minimum to 2 years 4 months and 1 day maximum with
necessary penalties of P2,000.
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court, when Amado
Capiña (deceased) sat beside the defendant near the chapel door placing his hand on the upper portion of
her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted and there were already several people.
Under these circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility for her to be raped. And so when
she struck Capiña with a knife on his neck resulting death, the means she employed to defend her honor
was excessive.
People vs. Narvaez
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and
rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking
if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issiue:
Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his
person.
Ruling:
No.
-The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed
a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue,
the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to
Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership
into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
-the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are
fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights.
Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may
not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to
be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all
since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender
and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because
treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately
chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
40
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
Sabang vs. People
Facts:
In the midst of a drinking spree on the eve of the fiesta in Liloan, Ormoc City, an intoxicated Nicanor Butad
uttered the ominous words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang, to the horror of young Sabang's father, Nilo,
and the other onlookers. Within moments, Butad himself lay dead from four gunshot wounds on his body.
Nilo Sabang, petitioner herein, who was charged with and later convicted for the homicide, admits to the
killing of Butad, but claims
that the shooting was accidental and done as a means of defending his son. An array of witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense provides a competing set of particulars as to the shooting. Ultimately, the
prosecution’s version, supported by the physical evidence, stands out as the truth.
Issue:
W/N Nilo’s act in self-defense of his son a justifying circumstance?
Ruling:
No. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries
on the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying
circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the
prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing." Thus,
petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that he
incurred no criminal liability therefor
Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the
testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner’s son
as he uttered the words "I will shoot you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether petitioner
sensed an imminent threat to his son’s life. Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even dismissed
Butad’s utterance saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled
brat." This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad’s words a threat at all.
Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body negates the claim that the killing
was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who
initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression
which Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to
shoot Butad even as he already lay defenseless on the ground.
Palaganas vs. People
Facts:
Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but later
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime
Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was
singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by
Melton that caused him to go to the latter’s table and uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand
sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to
shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a
result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.
Issue::
W/N there was a lawful defense on the part of the petitioner.
Ruling:
The defense was not lawful. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers which
justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. We also ruled that even if the Ferrer brothers provoked the
petitioner to shoot them, the latter's use of a gun was not a reasonable means of repelling the act of the
Ferrer brothers in throwing stones. It must also be emphasized at this point that both the trial court and the
appellate court found that petitioner failed to established by clear and convincing evidence his plea of self-
defense. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.54 In the present case, we find no
compelling reason to deviate from their findings. Verily, petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he is entitled to an acquittal on the ground of lawful self-defense.
Manaban vs. CA
Facts:
On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o’clock in the morning, Joselito Bautista, a father and a member of the
UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health
Center. There, the doctors prescribed certain medicines to be purchased. Needing money therefore,
Joselito Bautista, who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw
some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM).
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because he could not effectively
withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding on the machine. For said reason, the bank security
guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached and asked him what the problem was. Bautista complained that
his ATM was retrieved by the machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had checked the
receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong and advised
him to just return the next morning. This angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the
machine. Manaban then urged him to calm down and referred him to their customer service over the
phone. Still not mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking the machine. When Manaban could no
longer pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire
against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting
Bautista.
Issue:
W/N the jjustifying circumstance of self -defense is applicable.
Ruling:
There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced
by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster
and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already
pointing his service firearm at Bautista. Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when
the latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering that
Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a
policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to draw his gun which
was still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista was
41
about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg
considering that Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to
be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.38 Absent such actual or imminent peril to one’s life or
limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another
2. Avoidance of Greater Evil
People vs. Retubado
Facts:
someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette
home and placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker
exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr., The Cañons and the appellant were neighbors. The
matter was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out
that Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter closed. The
appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a
day and decided to go home after a day’s work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal
and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial Luciño
saw him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The
appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the
pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and pedaled on until he
reached his house. His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for
him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the appellant continued
following Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch. Emmanuel
suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The appellant told
Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the appellant that his son was
already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s shoulder to
pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead.
The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The
neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District
Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter.
Ruling:
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if such evidence is
weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no longer be
disbelieved.
First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch of their
house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the latter’s
shoulders. She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot the victim on
the forehead
Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the police
authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the victim. The
appellant’s claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to change his
clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed
the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea. The appellant
never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the victim in a state of necessity.
Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.1avvphi1 The victim ignored the appellant
as the latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the poblacion of Tuburan. The
appellant was incensed at the effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The appellant followed the
victim to his house where the appellant again confronted him. The appellant insisted on talking with the
victim’s son but the victim refused to wake up the latter. The appellant, exasperated at the victim’s
intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt and shot the victim on the forehead. It was impossible
for the victim to survive. With the appellant’s admission that he shot the victim, the matter on whether he
used his right or left hand to shoot the latter is inconsequential.
We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present case to
qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the
employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.17 The prosecution
failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned conditions. Thus,
the appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the
Information alleges that the appellant used an unlicensed firearm to shoot the victim, the prosecution failed
to prove that the appellant had no license to possess the same. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of the
use of an unlicensed firearm to commit homicide should not be appreciated against the appellant. The
appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned himself in to the
police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his arrest.
People vs. Ricohermoso
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales,
chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin,
Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay
harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.
Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house and asked
him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever
happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his
bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and
place, Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and
rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered
that the rifle he carried before hand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.
The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.
Issue:
W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury
Ruling:
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No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in preventing
Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was designed to
insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not an act to prevent infliction
of greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones leves,
from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.
3. Fulfillment of duty
People vs. Delima
Facts:
Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail. Some days afterwards, policeman Felipe Delima found him in the
house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his
surrender. Napilon answered with a stroke of his lance. Delima dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired
his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. Napilon ran away, without parting with his weapon. Delima went
after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. Delima was tried and convicted for
homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties.
Ruling:
The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender,
and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon
in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved
to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances. Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby
acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
People vs. Lagata
Facts:
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus,
Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they were called to
assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one.
They were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran
away because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions were also probably
scared and that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata
ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found
footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened
grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm.
Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they were assembled,
Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran
away because he also could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified
the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running far from him when
he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his
custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless already.
Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work.
Ruling:
Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical injuries.
Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance.
(Art.11 par.5, RPC)
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace
was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around him. How could anyone intending to
escape run towards and around the very guard one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties, the circumstances show
that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and
even kill one of them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize
them to fire against them.
Mamangun vs. People
Facts:
At about 8 PM, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, a certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting
“Magnanakaw… Magnanakaw.” Several residents responded and chased the suspect who entered
Abacan’s house and proceeded to the rooftop.
Policemen (Andres Legaspi, Eugenio Aminas, Rufino Mamangun, Sandiego San Gabriel, Carlito Cruz &
Hobert Diaz) were dispatched who went to the rooftop of house where the suspect was allegedly hiding.
3 policemen including Mamangun each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. They saw a
man whom they thought was the robbery suspect and that instance, Mamangun, who was walking ahead
of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras who was
not the robbery suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound.
According to Ayson, lone eyewitness for prosecution, Mamangun pointed his .45 cal. Pistol at the man who
instantly exclaimed, “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” Before Ayson
could say anything, Mamangun already shot Contreras.
Mamangun however said that the person raised a stainless steel pipe towards his head but he was able to
evade the attack. This prompted him to shoot the person on the left arm. It was only at that point that the
man told them, “hindi ako, hindi ako.”
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner with homicide attended by an incomplete justifying circumstance of
the petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as a policeman, and also the generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Petitioner appealed, insisting that the shooting was justified because he was repelling Contreras’ unlawful
attack on his person, as Contreras was about to strike him with a steel pipe.
Ruling:
The Court is not persuaded and denied the petition. The decision of Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
The justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves
that:
-The accused acted in the performance of a duty; and
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 -The injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful
exercise of such duty.
-The first requisite is present. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a
necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from
criminal liability.
-There was no reason to shoot Contreras because he was already unarmed and shouted that it wasn’t
him before petitioner fatally shot him.
-Petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him with a steel pipe is intriguing for it was only when a lead
pipe was recovered from the scene that petitioner remembered Contreras trying to hit him. Such vital
information could not have escaped petitioner’s mind.
-In the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury be the NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCE of the due performance of such duty, there can only be INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION, a
privileged mitigating circumstance.
-There was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot
instead of immediately directing the shot against Contreras.
People vs. Dagani
Facts:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln
Miran (Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of
the Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants,
who were security officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the
canteen and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair.
Dagani then held Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:
-Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to investigate a commotion at the
canteen. Upon reaching the place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former
waited outside.
-Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22
caliber revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside
the canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a
.22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier. During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing
Santiano to fire a warning shot. He heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen.
Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less than four meters.
-Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as
PNR security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.
Ruling:
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the appellants had been deliberately
adopted as a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the
opportunity to defend himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while the latter had been
struggling with Dagani over the possession of the .22 caliber gun, no other fact had been adduced to show
that the appellants consciously planned or predetermined the methods to insure the commission of the
crime, nor had the risk of the victim to retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle over the
weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had not been completely subdued. As already stated, this Court
must emphasize that the mere suddenness of the attack, or the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves make the attack
treacherous.51 It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the means employed gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been deliberately or consciously
adopted without danger to the life of the accused. For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the
helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to the attack, and that the decision to shoot Javier was made
in an instant.
4. Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
People vs. Beronilla
Facts:
Setting: After Japanese occupation
Borjal served as mayor during the Japanese occupation.
Beronilla, after being appointed as Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra, received a copy of a memorandum
issued by Lt. Col. Arnold authorizing all military mayors to appoint a hury of 12 bolomen to try persons
accused of treason, espionage or the aiding of the enemy.
He also received a list of all puppet officials of the province of Abra (Borjal included) with a memorandum
instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people
of the municipality.
Beronilla, upon the return of Borjal who left La Paz because of an attempt on his life, placed Borjal under
custody.
Pursuant to his instructions, complaints were gathered, a 12-man jury was appointed, prosecutors and a
clerk of the jury were assigned.
Trial lasted for 19 days and the jury found Borjal guilty on all counts (espionage, aiding the enemy, abuse of
authority). Death penalty was imposed.
Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review.
The records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold adding that the matter was best handled by the La Paz
Government and whatever disposition taken was approved.
Upon receipt of the letter, Beronilla then ordered the execution of Borjal. The execution was reported to
Col. Arnold and Beronilla received compliments based on the reply of his superior.
Two years after, those who were involved were indicted in the CFI of Abra for murder for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the execution of Borjal.
The defendants were convicted, thus this appeal.
Issue:
Are the defendants guilty of murdering Borjal?
Ruling:
No. The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal
were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry HQ.
The state however contends that there was a radiogram from Col. Volckmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically
noting the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence, which the prosecution claims that Beronilla was
informed about this but still pursued with the execution.
A witness, a relative of Borjal, asserts that he was present when Beronilla received the message and was
able to read it over Beronilla’s shoulder. But basing on his affidavit, it can be imported that witness was not
with Beronilla the message alleged to have arrived.
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Moreover, Beronilla would not have informed Lt. Col. Arnorld about the execution if he did it after the
receipt of the message since this would be in violation of superior orders. And more importantly, Arnold
complimented him in his reply.
The Court concludes that Lt. Col. Arnold failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. The charge
of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected because the accused had no need to
conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The accused acted as military subordinates only following superior orders, thus there is no criminal intent.
Judgement appealed from reversed and the appellants were acquitted.
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and
in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry
Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then
private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and
white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA
funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25
Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at
the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the
PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in
cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt
for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and
delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31
January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check
for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to
do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car.
Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of
the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The
receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while
Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the
combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision
dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.
Ruling:
Tabuena is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and
Marcos is clear. Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted
in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it
the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law
makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution
constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in
the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the
nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta
may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider
such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole
case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found
in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.
People vs. Genosa
Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu
Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered
Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was
found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
Ruling:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b)
The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of
violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.
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