GOITA VS CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

FACTS:

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the
defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order
dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in
his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at
115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The
pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on
other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them,
which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict
injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce
the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.

ISSUE:

WON the plaintiff can compel the defendant to provide her support, outside the conjugal domicile.

RULING:

Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there
reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce.
And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been
announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a
determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and,
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be
lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent
upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital
obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the
husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather
a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and
with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife
and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger
policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace
and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in
the situation of a feme sole.
RELATED LAWS:

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to
78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13,
1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's
property.)

ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the
husband removes his residence to a foreign country.

And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:

ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article.

1. The consorts.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be
fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with
her husband is not one of them.