oo Pupition “By Approved FasRelease 20003122 7K Roper 0082690070028 nco (AS 25X1A, sperm ith, Military Semester Tarkey-Gree Werkey has a clear superiorLty in the air for operativ: cyprus, not only because of muneri riority in tactical ” and figh’r/romb £t (apr ay 380 of all types against or 60) but because of the nearness of tho main TAF a ab Incirlik, near Adana, to Cyprus (1/(5 mUles as opposed to the nearest Greck base at flouda Bay on Crofe--360 mites). would give the TAP air L over Cyprus from the outset, and would seriously hamper REAF ¢: ict Turkish amphibious operations across the 40 milea that separates Gyprus from the th mainland. On the ground, Turi s high obate of combat rodineds, and are xelatively heewgfin wor, for vinteh tn Local terrain is well suited. Turkish arm: d infantry elencats now reportedly asserbled in the Corin aroa are in a position to launch a drive along the co vl road into Greace throurh Alexandropol Kavalla towned Theses: oniki. Available infommebion eumyeste that the ing Greck fore! are deployed tlefensively, and that they arc bringing POL forward from the Athens axon. atesy would probably be to launch an amphibious asnawlt with one infanley division een moving, toward the port ol Mersin on the whieh (the 39¢h, part evening of 18 November), vile tieing wm the bulk of the Greek £: with a simaltancous drive into Grock Thrace. Turkey wouli| have uiz and fround superiority in both theaters, althourh its air superiority would nee Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900280001-4Approved Per Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDPP$T00826A002900280001-4 smORE? be less preponderant in the Thraee operation. Turkish and Greek naval. foreos are roughly comparable in combat readiness, with perhaps a slight cige going to the Greck Navy. Turkey has Improved its amphibious capability significantly the 196% crisis, but even though it might be able to land » sizeable force (elonents, and perhaps all of the 39th Pivision, minus some heavy onuirment within a few days) i would experience Litticulties in maintaining this size fores on Cypruo Yor an cxtonled period, even if Greek action against its supply lines wer incffective. On Cyprus Itself, the Greck and Greck-Cyprict foress have the capability of wiping out many, and perhaps most, of the Turkish-Cypriot communities before Turkish forces coul intervene. he 3 to 1 numorieal superiority of the Greck/Grook Cypriot side over thei opponouts only tel3s part of the story, sinen the Turkion side (upart from the 650 min Turkish Amy contingent)ts made up of po ly trained and. inadequat sly armed ieregulars trying to hold onto fixed defensive positins isolated @rom cach other. Ry employing their 110 operational C-N/'s and 5 C-130's the Turks would he able to deliver over 1300 troops of their commando brigade on Cyprus within Less than ) hours of the reeciving the order. ly using oth C-lW7's and C-130's the entire comando brigade could be air lifted to Cyprus within 4 hours after the first drop. It is more likely, however, that they would use to the C-130's for moving, equipment. his would mean SmOREE Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900280001-4Approved Pef Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP7$T00826A002900280001-4 SBORET thet ando brigade could be moved to Cyprus by air within 1° hours vt CED wood ve m among th It & to MA fire, particul sy and U 1 supplics and equigment would be dam ‘TURKEY 125,000 23,0 7,000 ‘Tras Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900280001-4