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    This chapter examines how authoritarian regimes design constitutions to consolidate power and control political competition. The author argues that authoritarian leaders strategically craft constitutional rules to favor incumbent politicians and parties while discouraging viable opposition. Constitutions in authoritarian states are primarily used to legitimize one-party or military rule rather than limit government power or protect individual rights.

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    This chapter examines how authoritarian regimes design constitutions to consolidate power and control political competition. The author argues that authoritarian leaders strategically craft constitutional rules to favor incumbent politicians and parties while discouraging viable opposition. Constitutions in authoritarian states are primarily used to legitimize one-party or military rule rather than limit government power or protect individual rights.

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    4 views1 page

    CambridgeCore CitationExport 14may2019

    Uploaded by

    Afaq Nissoana
    This chapter examines how authoritarian regimes design constitutions to consolidate power and control political competition. The author argues that authoritarian leaders strategically craft constitutional rules to favor incumbent politicians and parties while discouraging viable opposition. Constitutions in authoritarian states are primarily used to legitimize one-party or military rule rather than limit government power or protect individual rights.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Negretto, G. (2013). Authoritarian Constitution Making. In T. Ginsburg & A. Simpser (Eds.

    ),
    Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy, pp. 83-110).
    Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107252523.007

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