Anti-Americanism History, Causes, and Themes Volume 3: Comparative Perspectives Edited by Brendon O’Gonnor Greenwood World Publishing ‘Oxford / Westport, Connecticut 2007Chapter ro Anti-Americanism in Greece Konstantina E, Botsiou Introduction: ‘Who is Afraid of the Americans?" For a variety of reasons, post-war Greece offered a laboratory of political and cultural anti-Americanism,' Having received massive economic and military aid to withstand communist domination in the civil war (1946-1949), Greece was among the first beneficiaries of Washington's European engagement. In spite ~ o¢ partly because ~ of the fact thae the country continued to depend on further US economic and military assis- tance after the end of hostilities, anti-American trends constituted an influential political and social force at the expity of the Marshall Plan. ‘The purpose of this chapter is to study the origins of anti-Americanism in post-war Greek politics. The focus is on the developments that shaped opposition co the prime Atlantic ally in the fifties and sixties and the chapter secks to provides a structural understanding of anti-Americanism across parties and political issues before the military dictatorship (1967-1974) and the Turkish invasion in Cypeus (1974), which gave birth to an axiomatic anti-American bias.’ The availability of signitieant documentation in Greek and international archival sources for the first formative decades was also a decisive parameter in this approach. The bulk of material is derived from Greek and American archives, the Greek press and the rare secondary bibliogcaphy on Greek anti-Americanism. A fundamental criterion for assessing evidence and attempting conclu- sive remarks was the classification of certain attitudes as indications of anti-Americanism by contemporary Greeks and Americans in the petiod under examina The United States became a leading factor in Greek politics after its official intervention in the Greek civil war (1947). The Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program (BRP) heralded a complex twofold mission for Washington's early cold warriors: communist defeat on the one hand and economic recovery and democratisation on the other. The exigencies of war promoted Greek-American cooperation and consensus to the highest level in the forties. Acknowledging that ayANTI-AMERICANISM American involvement had pulled Greece back from the verge of collapse, domestic political forces abided by the paternalistic aspects of the American liberalisation, US suggestions faced, therefore, no significant objections in crucial fields, such as government spending, the organisation of the army or the composition of the Athens governments. Hacmony was also a result of the prolongation of civil strife, which demanded the reallocation of economic assistance to military purposes and the avoidance of political turbulence in the anti-communist camp. When peace finally atrived, however, two distinct processes threatened to again postpone bold economic and political reforms. First, Greece was still lagging so visibly behind the rest of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) countries, that further dependence on American assistance remained indispensable for sustaining peace and stability. Second, the global shift of US strategic priorities after the explosion of the Korean War and other distressing developments in 1949-1950 (such as the Soviets manufacturing their own atomic bomb and the revo- lution in China) led swiftly to serious cuts in aid and long-term devel- opment planning. The immediate effect for Greece was that the remaining US funds would thereafter cover only the fastest attainable projects.5 From that point on, American diplomacy clashed openly in Achens with powerful anti-communist forces that felt uneasy about the unpop- ular reform agenda the United States was now urgently putting through. First ofall, the conditionality of ess aid struck at the very heart of the domestic party system. American diplomacy cast its shadow on the corrosion of old political parties — especially the Popular (PP) and Liberal (LP) parties - in favour of new political formations that seemed apt to couple stability and democracy with economic development and an unquestionable Western orientation.§ Broad social coalitions were reshuffled behind novel centre-right and centre-left political groups, which strove to geadually approximate a two-party system of the Anglo- Saxon breed for sharing power opportunities and minimising the influ- ence of the militarily defeated Left.” Established politicians, favourites of the Crown and traditional ‘personal’ factions had to fuse into new parties that were backed, at times unscrupulously, by the American ‘factor’. By the same token, American interventionism became noticeable when it was frst linked with US economic disengagement and frontal public attacks on entrenched political practices; in other words, when the fully engaged American missions of the civil war years actually prepared to exit Greek politics in 1951-1952. Hence, disapproval of the American 214ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE re-engineering was projected onto ceproaches for the ‘abandonment’ of Greece and criticism of Washington's favouritism towards ‘submissive regimes’ in Athens. Anti-American protest was generated by various ‘losers’ of the new sort of American interference: the aspiring Left, the fragmented new Centre and the fading old Right.’ Disappointment at the American methods would become a full-fledged anti-American spirit when the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue revived irreden- tise feelings across the political arena in the mid-fifties. In crisis after crisis, a basic anti-American sentiment developed into a magnet for further popular dismay at US interference in domestic affairs and US neutrality in ‘national questions’. A few years after the civil war, anti-American attitudes were no longer monopolised by the Left and fractured across the political spectrum with varying intensity. Among the non-leftist forces, anti-Americanism was characterised by ebbs and flows in both content and intensity, whereas for the Left it remained high in the ranks of its polemics. Nevertheless, the recurrent tides of cross-party anti-American protest laid the founda- tion for a collective ‘resistance’ to American policies and a ‘rejection’ of the American style of power. This view proliferated under the traumatic impact of the military dictatorship, which secured diplomatic and economic accommodation with Washington (1967-1974). Anti- Americanism became, thereafter, a universal reaction to all that was wrong in Greece.? Cross-party fertilisation of anti-American views constituted a salient feature of Greek politics in the entire post-war period. The Left certainly built upon an unyielding doctrinal foundation, which was reinforced by defeat in the civil war. The leftist anti-American case rested upon one basic premise: the asymmetric alignment with the United States and NATO turned Greece into an American dependency, where genuine democracy was impossible and economic underdevelopment inevitable.!® The core argument thrived in attacks against the unending US interference in Greek domestic affairs, particularly during election campaigns,"* and the excep- tional military facilities and diplomatic immunities granted to the United States after Greece's accession to NATO (1952}."* Accordingly, American niilitary assistance was stigmatised as an instrument of political oppression and military exploitation in neo-imperialist wars (e.g. Korea)."3 Naturally, the Cyprus question and the seven-year junta quickly became the frontrunners of leftist agitation. By championing self-determination or union to Greece (enosis) against British colonialism, the Left sought 215ANTI-AMERICANISM to escape the burden of Soviet-inspired slogans and to reach the appealing recent past of Greek irredentism, Concurrently, it tried to redeem the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) for its advocacy of an autonomous ‘Macedonia — an infamous component of the KKE’s ‘treacherous’ image since the twenties"4 — and also evoke memories of leftist ‘national resis- tance’ against the Axis and the ‘imperialist British’ alike in the forties. The rilitary coup of 1967 was simply explained as a joint project of Washington and its local authoritarian protégés,!5 who had been plotting for years to block democratisation, mute leftist criticism and facilitate the partition of Cyprus, Anti-Americanism was a set of ideas to be definitely mastered by the Left. However, it became an influencial idealogical trend in Greek politics after it captured the feelings of the ‘nationally minded’ (ethnikofrones).t® Tha issues under study were catalysts to that effect. Saying ‘No’ to (Economic) Tutelage? Ic is of importance to the security of the United States that [the Greeks] should be able to maintain their independence and territorial integrity ... legislation would permit the Government to extend financial aid to Greece for economic reconstruction ... to permit the Greek army to restore internal order, and to detail American personnel to insure effective utilization of such aid.*7 The institutional foundation of the American intervention in Greece was laid in the Greek-American Agreement for Implementation of the Aid to Greece Program of June 20, 1947. Athens soon welcomed the formationt of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), which administered the assistance programme; and the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), which was responsible for military support and planning. Aware of the erratic nature of Greek politics and the widespread corruption in public administration, Washington opted consciously for a firmly interventionist scheme, via more flexible US-patconised organisations (e.g. the Currency Committee and the Foreign Trade Agency),?° as the quickest way to eliminate the communist menace.*" The monumental difficulties of reconstruction failed to arrest, however, the curtailment of the ambitious ‘Greek Project’ after 1951-1952. Washington reconsidered its policies not only in view of its expanding international commitments, but also in order to discourage Greek 216ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE political elites and electorates from preferring the continuation of foreign aid - and economic anomaly - over the risk of sweeping reform.** From 1946 to 1952, seventeen different cabinets in Athens had bet on the bargain that the United States would hardly risk a new period of turmoil by pressing for reform, as Greece provided the first post-war ‘showcase of US determination and ability to assist nations ... to cesist communist aggression or subversion’.*3 The price for ‘politics as usual’ was, however, the poor performance of these cabinets in economic and political liberalisation.*4 Direct American assistance stopped officially in 1964%5 ~ seventeen years after the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine.* In the first decade, Greece had received $2,565 million (May 1947-June 1956). This was aptly pointed out?? as ‘the highest per capita aid received by any under- developed country’ after 1945.28 From 1947 to 1958, military aid amounted to $1.5 billion.%? In contrast to the early post-war governments, those who took power after 1952 were endowed with modest sums of American assistance. The new centre-right parties that held power from 1952 to 1963, the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos) and ERE (Greek Radical Union), started with this irreversible reality of less dollar- patronage and pursued a shock therapy}? ‘to the extent compatible with the security of the State"! Nevertheless, the option for pressuring the United States for mote assistance or more political support in lieu of assis- tance remained tantalising for Greek cabinets of all political shades. Late in x95 1, Washington requested a comprehensive stabilisation programme for the post-ERP era from the Greek government. It also announced the first major cuts in aid: the total for fiscal year 1952 would fall from $182 million in 195x to $81 million (and $22.8 million in fiscal year 1953).3? The serving coalition government of old and new Liberals, which sensed that the reform plan ‘would make its majority evaporate’,33 called for the decrease of the Greck armed forces from 140,000 men to 120,000 as the maximum limit sustainable by state finances. This sort of ‘bluff and blackmail’s5 was symptomatic of the tension instilled in Grecek-American relations by the mutual manipulation of reduced US assistance after 1951-1952. Discontent was disseminated through party channels and affiliated press among influential ‘winners’ of the civil war, thus setting the ground for idiosyncratic anti-American prejudice ona large social scale. [t was against this psychological background that Greeek~American friction rendered ‘anti-Americanism, for which another name is neutralism ... a growing political factor on the domestic scene’.3® 207ANTI-AMERICANISM: ‘Again in 1954, just before the conclusion of the Balkan Pact and the first Greek application for the Cyprus issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Rally government of Field Marshal Alexander Papagos tried to link the Greek contribution to Western security with American support for Cyprus when he claimed that ‘if no additional American aid is forthcoming for FY 1955 ... it might be necessary to reduce the active army from 100,000 to 70,000". The Americans did not abandon their neutrality on the Cyprus question, but agreed to a reduction of military manpower from 135,006 to 105,000 and froze aid at $23 million for the following fiscal year (x95 51956) —the White House later added $19.2. million.38 The idea that American neutrality in the Cyprus debate would in turn fuel neutralist tendencies across Greek society loomed persistently behind further Greek requests for more US economic support. ERE leader Constantine Karamanlis, who had faced the Cyprus issue since his first days in office, was no exception in linkage policies. At the height of anti- American protests which surrounded the 1956 election, he also urged Washington to ‘offset harassment and failures ... in foreign affairs [with] a financial aid program’,3? and make Greek people believe that ‘the US is on their side’ in order to keep them ‘faithful to [Greece's] alliances’ «° The issue of aid resurfaced when Greece sought to participate in the process of European integration, Instead of direct aid, Washington provided diplomatic support in the negotiations for an Association Agreement with the BEC (1959-1961).4" Paris and Bona were persuaded to put aside their reservations for the Greek candidacy,4* with the argument that ‘if Greece [were] put outside the circle of Western European Nations, it would be necessary for the Greek Government and people to reconsider their policies in regard to the economic and political orientation of their country’.«3 Shortly before Greece successfully concluded negotiations (July r961), the National Security Council (NSC) insisted that ‘unless external assistance is forthcoming fom Western European sources, it appears clear that the US must continue to extend economic support to Greece, in addition to military assistance, after FY 1961744 The Politics of Aid We should and presumably will be able to continue to exercise guidance and leadership of a very important character but we should tend to become increasingly fraternal than paternal 45 218ANTICAMERICANISM IN GREECE ‘The system has ... been unable to cope with the staggering post-war economic problem, because the solution of this problem would require large scale temporarily unpopular measures ... It is possible thara determined and courageous leader could have explained the necessity for such temporacy sacrifices ... The sad fact is that none have tried.4¢ When American aid began to recede, ‘determined and courageous’ leadership was expected fom World War Il and civil war hero Field Marshal Papagos and his Greek Rally, a ‘ceaction to old parties’.47 On that account, the American mission felt compelled to estrange the old political leadership. Its intention was cpitomised in a much publicised statement of Ambassador John E, Peurifoy on March 14, 1952 against the rumoured return of the ‘simple’ proportional system, with the warning that the perpet-uation of unstable coalition governments ‘would have destructive results upon the effective utilization of American aid to Greece’.*® Popular protest mushroomed around the government's aphorism that it ‘acknowledged the right of the US Government in the adequate administration of aid, for which we are grateful’, but ‘itis up to the Greek people and their government to decide on (the country’s) electoral system’.‘9 The major newspaper of the governing Centre and Liberal forces, Eleftheria, sponsored an effective underdog mentality of ‘small’ nations versus powerful ‘protectors’. The public character of Peurifoy’s intervention fanned the flames of latent grievances towards Washington. To be sure, though, this was by far neither the first nor the most obvious case of American interference in domestic politics after 1947 Since the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, traditional Greek political forces, especially those on the conservative side, had casily put up with far more aggressive encroachments on their domestic authority and prestige. The royalist coalition, which had been built around the Popular Party in the x946 election, was persuaded by Washington to share power with the Liberal opposition after September 1947 to help silence American isolationists and Soviet harassment. This method dealt a fatal blow to the single largest group in the first post-war parliament (1946-1950); its core party, the Popular Party, practically evaporated until the 1952 elections.5° Also instrumental in this regard was the decision by King Paul to shift royal support from the Popular Party to coalition governments, despite the anti-royal predilections of many 219ANTI-AMERICANISM. Liberals. Initial American preferences for broad anti-communist cal were duly accommodated in the Palace, which needed US support to redeem itself as symbol of national unity. Again, both the military generals who had greatly influenced early post-1949 Greek politics as leaders of new political forces, Plastiras and Papagos, only received the royal mandate (1950-1951 and 1952, respectively) after heavy American pressure.5* Plastiras, head of the centre-left EPEK (National Progressive Centre Union), had been a personal enemy of the royal family since the interwar years. Papagos had fallen into disfavour with the monarchy for blocking royal intecference in the Greek armed forces after the civil war. ‘The Crown had not failed to notice apropos that Papagos served an American master plan for national subjugation,5* which passed through the reactivation of the dormant ‘regime’ question.53 After Peurifoy’s intervention, the old parties were uniformly ‘accusing [Americans] of unwarranted intervention’.54 In an ostensibly paradoxical way, the anti-American reaction merged resentment of undue US inter~ ventionism with frustration at the abandonment of Greece at a critical moment of reconstruction. Traditional parties appeared anxious to stave off the negative image of abandonment by the American protector. The efforts of the governing Liberals to save face by requesting only gradual and discreet aid reductions from Washington reflected the widespread popular belief that whoever lacked American backing had feeble political perspectives.’ It was, indeed, this explosive amalgam that rendered Peurifoy’s intervention a critical turning point in Greek-American relations. On the one hand, the accession of Papagos’ ‘strong solution’ to power under the majority representation system (November 1952) counteracted the limitation of US day-to-day guidance. On the other hand, leading Greek political figures began to attack the American ‘factor’ for having backed their ostracism from power by Papagos. Prominent newspapers, hence, regularly hammered America’s behav- ious, warning that ‘resentment at US controls will increase’ 56 Until the 1967 coup d’ etat, numerous incidents kept bringing anti- American conceptions out of the closet, especially when difficult transitions and governmental crises invited the United States to fill the power vacuum. Such overt anti-Americanism happened twice in 1955. The first happened on April 2, 1955, when American Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon issued a public statement against the electoral coalition of centce and leftist forces.57 Stirring up popular irritation, the reputable daily Ele/theria condemned the ‘ctude public intervention’ and nets 220ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE saw in Cannon a ‘common Rally agent’.58 The second eloquent occasion emerged when Karamanlis, a successful ‘new man’ of the Rally, with istries, succeeded the an imposing record in relief and reconstruction mi deceased Papagos in October 1955. The mandate came from King Paul on the basis of his constitutional prerogatives, but was attributed to American instructions - a hypothesis yet to be proved by archival evidence.59 The unholy America-royal conspiracy ~a standard version of Washington's political deviousness ~ made headlines in the entice opposition press. But government-friendly newspapers, which happened to promote other Rally MPs, also reminded their readers of Greece's recent isolation by her allies on the Cyprus question, both in the UN General Assembly and during the anti-Greek riots in Turkey in September 195 5.6 The conservative Estia gave the classic verdict that ‘the Rally had been murdered by Karamanlis and the CIA’;* the centre- right Kathimerini had declared that Greece and America were ‘no longer friends’. As a whole, the Greek press was almost uniformly demanding Greece's withdrawal from NATO. The furore released by Karamanlis’ appointment was not repeated when he was practically ousted from power under royal pressure in June 1963.63 The endless political protests of the sixties were mainly triggered by the ‘resignation’ of his successor George Papandreou, leader of the Centre Union, from the premiership, following his clash with the king, in July 1965. The populace now focused on ever-prevalent domestic issues, especially the constitutional role of the monarchy. The sixties found Greece, like most Western societies including the United States, increas- ingly engulfed in protest culture. The trend that has been generally described as the beginning of ‘mass politics"*4 was strongly connected wich the political platform of the unified Centre parties, which propa- gated democratisation, welfare economics and ideological liberalisation to overcome the austerity of the fiftics. For the emerging post-war gener- ation, provocative societal values made the difference, linking Greek youth with analogous protest movements in other Western societies. They readily adopted the idiomatic tongue of their contemporaries’ opposition to the remnants of colonialism, Vietnam War, social and political discrimination, and the conservative reactions to fresh icons like John B Kennedy or Willy Brande. These were issues many Greeks could relate to, particularly if they could distill chem through local memory and experience. In the Greek case, the antipode of the 25-year-old King Constantine was in reality not the almost 80-year-old Papandreou, but narANTI-AMERICANISM. rather young aspiring politicians of the Centre Union. Prominent among them was Papandreou’s 46-year-old son Andreas, an accomplished role model of American liberal academia and bourgeois local urban activism.* Under the powerful sixties effect, earlier estimates from the ‘Peurifoy cra’ sounded highly cclevant: ‘as memory [of] civil war fades and Greek recovery proceeds ... resentment of US controls will increase and accusations of intervention will multiply’.6 The ‘Betrayal’ of the Cyprus Issue shock and resentment at the attacks on Greeks ... and at the fancied indifference of the American government ... and of the American people, as indicated by alleged conspiracy of silence of the American press ... Behind all the events of the period has been Greek pre- occupation with the future of Cyprus.67 Until r954, anti-Americanism spread slowly and unevenly among disaffected political groups in a top-down direction, However, since the first abortive Greek effort to raise the issue of Cyprus at the UN General Assembly that year, it turned into a grass-roots phenomenon, Not aban- donment by a donor, but rather betrayal by the closest ally was the dominant emotion that awoke virulent reactions against virtually all American policies. Most unexpectedly, the decision to internationalise the Cyprus question came from Papagos, the trusted ‘stability solution’ of the American Embassy. Papagos appeared to have little choice but embrace ‘the movement for the acquisition of Cyprus with its solid popular base in Greece’, as ‘irredentism was deeply ingrained feature [of] Greek nationalism’. Athens also aimed to prevent the Greek and Cypriot Left from monopolising this major ‘national question’. The anti-colonial rhetoric provided leftists with an excellent opportunity to circumvent the ideological quarantine of the special security legislation that had been haunting them since the civil war.‘ Behind the contro- versial calls for Cyprus’ right to self-determination, it also took the opportunity to advertise a broader social unrest against the Athens ‘system’ and its foreign protectors ~ ‘the imperialist US as well as UK’,7° exploiters of the small and the weak”! who were embarrassing the pro- Western Greek government, The British intransigence towards Papagos” repeated efforts to provoke a gesture of good-will as to the future politicalANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE status of the island?* was admitted by the government to have offered a good reason for staking ‘its prestige at home and abroad on obtaining an airing of its views on Cyprus’73 But further to the Right, the patriotic sentiment for Cyprus finally put Greeek-American cooperation to the test. The Akropolis, usually friendly to both the royal cause and the United States Information Services (USIS}, came to artfully wonder in 1958 on the ‘Incomprehensible American Policy’: Why? All men of good will in our country wonder why Greece which was the first to fight in the camp of her friends and allies has now come to be reckoned as the last by them ... Britain, a colonial power, is using every means, legitimate and illegitimate, to take revenge on the Greek people because of the fire they started in Cyprus. In this case there is an explanation. But the US? ... This is all the more why [the Greeks] should be wondering and asking why the Americans have abruptly abandoned us in the middle of the road.?4 ‘The Westerners in Greece appeared helpless when they were supposed to be at the peak of their prestige and influence. But their allies now offered less aid, were granted more rights and privileges (such as the 1953 agreements for US bases and facilities) and urged them to cooperate with historical enemies (Turkey in NATO and Turkey and Yugoslavia in the Balkan Pact). After Athens first referred the issue of Cyprus’ self deter- mination to the UN General Assembly in August-December 195 4,75 the United States came to share Papagos’ fears that ‘the sympathies of the Greek people will be estranged from the US'.76 Anti-Americanism became an unmistakable ideological and physical force in Greek~American relations as soon as the United States voted against a resolution on the Cyprus issue ‘for the time being’ in December 1954.77 Even though American observers urged that the ‘Greek public should have some reassuring statement from a US source to permit the quashing of rumors in Athens that the US has been one of the principal “bad boys”,’7® and despite Athens’ official complaint to Washington, popular outrage was barely tamed. The Greek-Orthodox Church, unwilling to see the Left appropriate its pre-eminence in the Greek ircedentist cause,7? promptly joined the Cyprus campaign. The United States recognised that ‘differences between the Greek government and 223ANTI-AMERICANISM. the Greek Orthodox Church over the issue, might lead to a series of less stable governments ... subject to a varying degree of leftist influence’.®° Violent protests took place in Athens and Thessaloniki. In December 1954, the USIS in Thessaloniki was damaged and a portrait of President Eisenhower was burned. Two bombs exploded in Athens; one at the American bases in Ellinikon and the other at the USIS library. Washington was held responsible for blocking the Cyprus question on the threshold of the UN General Assembly.** The Cyprus question affected all aspects of Greek politics in the following years. As George Papandreou put it in 1957, a ‘psychological disassociation’ from the US was already a fact in Greece, even though it was ‘recognized and deplored by the Embassy as well as by responsible figures in public life in Greece’.8* According to a detailed public opinion poll ordered by USIS in 1957, 47 percent of those who participated in the survey believed that Greece should follow an equidistant policy towards the two superpowers.*3 Greek pro-Western cabinets had felt compelled to adopt a critical standpoint as early as 1955, when the anti-Greek riots in various Turkish cities led Athens to declare that ‘under such conditions farther cooperation in the Balkan alliance or in NATO was impossible’.*4 A few days after the riots, the Greek delegation experienced a second debacle in the UN General Assembly, which rejected the inscription of the Cyprus question, despite even King Paul's appeal at the highest level to Washington.85 The United States and United Kingdom voted against the inscription, whereas the Soviet Union and Poland supported Greece.** American officials readily observed that ‘there is no doubt US prestige and influence bas taken a sharp downward turn in Greece ... Behind this is a real feeling of abandonment and isolation’.'7 King Paul appointed Katamanlis.as Papagos’ successor in the hope that this staunch opponent of itredentist populism was best fitto rescue stability,2® whereas other conservative leaders and prominent newspapers were espousing a ‘third road between the blocks’,*? Karamanlis indeed managed to avert serious political repercussions through a long and tenuous diplomatic negotiation with Turkey and Britain, which finally led to the establishinent of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 through the Zurich London Agreements. But the preservation of Greece’s Western orientation did not suffice to check the long-term psychological detach- ment from the United States, Neutralism became a highly popularised dogma among anti-communist voters. Washington had no illusions aa4ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE, as to the prospects of Greek-American relations. The NSC noted . in 2957 that we have been criticized for what Greece feels to be a policy incon- sistent with our traditional opposition to colonialism, This has contributed to ... a desire for greater independence in foreign affairs, and removal of the more obvious indications of Greck dependence on the US. In its moze emotional sense it has resulted in occasional questioning of the NATO alliance and suggestions that Greece has to look elsewhere for political support ... The probable result would be further deterioration in Greeek~Turkey-UK relations and more neutralist and, conceivably, Soviet influence in Greece.%° ‘The rejection of American requests for landing rights on Greek soil during the intervention in Lebanon in July x958 was an example of unavoidable ‘resistance’ on the part of the Greek government at a time when anti- American agitation was reaching a climax, Athens actually tried to win some sort of compensation for Cyprus by comparing the American “decision to take risk in Lebanon with hesitation to intervene in the Cyprus case’ and suggested that ‘US intervention could at long last [be] offset . by active intervention for solution of Cyprus’.%* On the other hand, of course, Greece unteservedly aligned itself with the Eisenhower Doctrine and discouraged Nasser’s non-aligament advances.#* Definitely the most profound repercussion was the rise of the leftist EDA (United Democratic Left) as the second largest party in the Greek parliament in the May 1958 election, with 24 percent of votes and 58 of the 300 seats. The Centre's inability to profit from an electoral system that was designed to boost its ‘own influence? permitted EDA to become the leading opposition force until the next elections in 1961. EDA addressed popular frustration by making the Cyprus question and calls for national sovereignty the epicentre of its electoral campaign. Since anti-Americanism emerged as a winning horse, bitter comments like the following were not uncommon in non-leftist newspapers: Unfortunately there are many things the Americans cannot under- stand lately. It is as if the US had forgotten that the Greeks opened the door to hope for the Allies in 1940 and that they resisted with rivers of blood the drive of Slavism to the Mediterranean .., anti-Greek elements must not be lacking in the State Department ... But there 225ANTI-AMERICANISM is also the Cyprus question. The Americans reduce aid to Greece and constantly increase aid to Turkey ... In other words they stir up Greeks who have always proved loyal and militant friends in peace and war in order to flatter the Turks who in two world wars remained outside the camp of allies. Those are the sources of the anti-western spiritin Greece which caused blind reactions in wide masses of the Greek population and resulted in the 24 percent.9 Evidently, anti-Americanism was growing into a wholesale theory for international failures and domestic grievances. ‘The Cyprus problem re-entered a violent phase shortly after Archbishop Makarios’ request for constitutional amendments in November 1963. The new crisis soon overlapped with the destabilisation of the Greek demo- cratic order (1965-1967). The Centre Union governments (1963~1965) tied to “westernize’ the Cyprus problem by tying Nicosia’s policies to the ‘national centre’ Athens. Since Makarios turned down both versions of the Acheson Plan for a Greek - Turkish compromise 1964-65, but welcomed Soviet and non-aligned backing for independence, the Left started to celebrate the end of the ‘national centre’ ~ or the ‘neo-colonial _ trap" as they saw it.2® The governments of the so-called ‘apostates’ that split from Papandceou’s government and relied on rightist support (1965-1967) submitted a new application for a resolution on Cyprus to the UN General Assembly in December 1965. Its approval owed mainly to the favourable vote of the non-aligned countrics.97 As anti-American protest escorted Greece into the dictatorship, an earlier American observation was properly validated: there is a net feeling that we have let Greece down on what has been to her most important single issue of this critical decade. Cyprus is the key to much of our troubles with Greece. When the Greek public sees its desires with respect to Cyprus supported without stint in the UN by the Afro-Asian Bloc, by Tito, and, however tardily and hypocritically, by the Soviet bloc, and sees the US and each of its partners in NATO either thwart those desires or remain indifferent or neutral toward them, it lends an ever more receptive ear to those who in public speeches and in the daily press ask what Greece's ties with the West have gained her and why she should continue to maintain them, To many Greeks ... this seems a logical question.2¢ 226ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE The ‘Semi-Colony’ Argument: Bases, Missiles and Regional Prioritics Greece is smarting under the impact of a Cinderella complex, the most marked manifestation of which is acute sensitivity towards any marks of favor shown towards Turkey. This is almost a conditional reflex: ifa warship is given Greece, the press must point out that Turkey has received theee ... Itis probable that most thinking Greeks regard their country as the orphan of NATO, with all che repressed emotional reaction that that connotes? The 1958 parliamentary election presented a kaleidoscope of the issues that mere regularly upsetting Greek—American relations, The Cyprus question was the key for understanding the neutralist and isolationist agenda, The reduction of American aid was contrasted with the rising significance of the relentless Turkish foe. The pacifist movement organised a remarkable campaign in favour of Greece's participation in the Balkan nuclear-free zone, which was then propagated by Rumanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica!9°—a project supported as well by Greek non-communist politicians such as Spyros Markezinis of the Progressive Party.'°* In 1957-1958, anti-Americanism was further stimulated by the heated debate on the eventual stationing of IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) on Greek soil as part of a broader planning for NATO’s nuclear reorganisation, which was sponsored by Washington since early 1957 and more intensively after the ‘Sputnik alarm’ in the fall of 1957. The perspec- tive of a common Euro-Atlantic stockpile in Europe under the command of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe)! split NATO's European members and produced serious second thoughts in Washington itselfas to its impact on the ‘spirit of Geneva’ and the allied countries. The issue attracted special attention in Greece asa result of Turkey’s enthu- siastic response to the American proposal and relevant projections that she would accept ~simultaneously with Italy ~ the first IRBMs in x96. The early rejection of the project by Denmark and Norway, France's reservations under De Gaulle and the fierce Soviet reactions complicated Greece’s options. The major opposition leaders who had made the hosting of IRBMs conditional upon the participation of all European NATO members made an impressive volte-face on the eve of the 1958 clection. Dailies from the entire political spectrum were speculating on the threats entailed in a country-to-country approach, whereas EDA reiterated ‘Moscow's threats on possible nuclear repercussions on Greece.*° Huge 227ANTI-AMERICANISM. protest rallies against America’s ‘aggressive policies’ were organised. in Athens and Crete, a probable location of the missile installations.‘ The Karamanlis government reassured the opposition parties that no missiles would be installed without the consent of the Parliament.*°5 The United States, especially the constantly concerned American Embassy in Greece, declared the project indefensible ‘at the moment’ in view of the overburdened Greeek-American agenda. State Department officials warned that: the issue is potentially much more serious, If a decision were made by NATO to negotiate with the Greek Government for permission to locate IRBM bases on Greek soil and this became public knowledge, the question could be exploited by the Communists and any coalition partners they may acquire. This issue, playing on Greek tendencies toward acutralism, could be decisive in preventing establishment of a working majority by center or right-wing groups.'°6 The Karamanlis government attempted to close the subject in 1958 and pointed out to the Americans the risk of alienating communist countries that supported Greece in the Cyprus question."°7 Athens and Washington concluded finally a Cooperation Agreement in May 1959, which included a provision for stationing non-nuclear parts of nuclear weapons in Greece. Greece’s participation in Western Europe’s nuclear stockpile was further fixed in a sccret Stockpile Agreement (December 1960) for “special ammunition’, including nuclear heads. The first nuclear heads were installed in December 1960. The public debate remained open for years and the issue was an ongoing source of anti-Americanism.'9* The IRBM case underscored the leftist argument that American policies had one single purpose in Greece: the transformation of the country into an American ‘neo-colony’.*© This argument had become commonplace since the introduction of US military facilities in Greece in 1953. The bases agreement, the argument went, not only conceded sovereign security rights to Washington, butt also granted unacceptable diplomatic immunities,""° especially by recognising the American penal code for railitary US personnel.!"" Anti-American slogans proliferated every time an incident brought up the issue of immunities. A prominent example was the fatal injury caused to the former leader of the left resistance army, Stefanos Sarafis, by a member of the American air force in Greece in 1957,"" after the so-called ‘extcatecritorial rights’ had just been 228ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE amended" by the Karamanlis government.**4 In 1959, about 4,800 Americans were still residing in Greece as members and families of members of political and military missions. Washington never ceased to consider the matter, which was also brought to the attention of President Eisenhower himself during his official visit to Greece in December 1959.15 Yer, it was perpetually shelved, and remained a source of friction in the following decades. After 1974, the revision of the bases agreements was twice negotiated (1975-1977 and 1979-198n) by the centre-right governments of New Democracy (1974-1981): the former negotiation led to a new agreement that basically linked the further operation of the facilities with the maintenance of a high level of US military aid to Greece, whereas the latter was postponed by the 1981 parliamentary election. ‘The Greek socialist party (PASOK, Panhellenic Socialist Movement) under Andreas Papandreou was then systematically propagating the termination of the facilities agreement entirely. After winning the x98 election, however, they took up revision talks with the United States, not the least in order to prevent the eventual transfer of the military bases to Turkey. By the new bilateral agreement of 1983 the United States would increase direct assistance to Greece and would also side with the Greek position on the Greek-Turkish dispute about the Aegean field of operations. In return, the military facilities would stay for another five years, when the agreement would be ‘terminable upon written notice by either party’.26 ‘The leftist argument that Greece had degenerated into an American protectorate frequently addressed the side effects of the country’s Atlantic commitments: first, Greece’s lost opportunities in the name of the ‘unfaithful’ West; second, the neglect of real security threats, notably Turkey. The latter notion culminated after the x974 crises in Greece and Cyprus. It was only partially satisfied, when, in the mid- eighties, the Papandreou government reformulated the Greek security doctrine against the Turkish ‘enemy from the East’, in place of the communist ‘enemy from the North’.1"7 A recurrent theme of compromised prospects was the alleged deterioration of Greece's regional influence, which could otherwise help improve her position in the East-West confrontation. The advocates of the ‘regional-power-Greece’ theory pointed back to Greek initiatives for the formation of Balkan alliance and cooperation schemes in the first half of the twentieth century. The main regions where Greece was considered capable of becoming an important regional actoy if not impaired by Western obligations, were the Balkans and the Near/Middle East. ngANTI-AMERIGANISM For obvious reasons, the Left insisted on more contact with the ‘communist Balkan states and played up the value of Greece’s Eastern trade to economic and social stability among insecure groups such as the tobacco growers. Also, many non-communist politicians saw in ‘third way’ populism a means to advance their electoral appeal. The Near/Middle East was an area of interest for the Greeks on the grounds that large Greek communities existed in countries like Egypt and Lebanon, but their interest was also in finding a means to counterbalance ‘Turkey's influence in the region, particularly after the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the following ‘loss’ of Iraq. "9 Traditional Greek con- servatives, chiefly of the Popular Party, raised the issue quite often for the additional reason that back in their political heyday they had devoted a great deal of time and energy to the ephemeral British~American project for a Mediterranean pact (r949-r951)."2° This scenario withered away when Greece and Turkey started membership negotiations with NATO, but it remained popular among various political circles, For the Left, Greece should keep its distance from the West. For the rest, regional initiatives could produce added political value in the eyes of allies and some extra room for manoeuvre when things got tricky: in essence, making other friends was supposed to show Washington that Greece was not to be taken for granted. Regional concepts became, for the first time, full-fledged political initiatives after the collapse of the dictatorship. The Karamanlis government of the seventies revitalised Balkan cooperation through bilateral and multilateral agreements for trade, educational exchanges, transport, tourism and refreshed contacts with Arab countries.:2# PASOK’s Mediterranean policies followed from a safety position the French socialists who were publicising theic interest in the ‘South’ when Greece joined the European Communities in 198x. The Greek contacts with Libyan leader Muamar Kadafi and Yasser Arafat were quite irritating for the United States, as were also socialist suggestions that regional policies indicated a more ‘independent’ outlook in Greek foreign policy towards both the United States and the European Communities. ‘There was no practical evidence, however, that PASOK would challenge either, in the end. In the late eighties, regional moves remained partial and were easily washed away by the dramatic collapse of the communist camp. In the post-Cold War era, Greece sought to gain an important role in southeastern Europe, but chiefly as part and parcel of her position and influence in the European Union and NATO, as well. 7 230ANTI-AMERICANISS IN GREECE The Aftermath of the Dictatorship The thesis that Washington did nothing to prevent the colonels from staging the coup d’ état in April 1967, or, once in power, undermine them, constituted one part of the ‘betrayal’ by the United States, the other being the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July/August 1974. On the basis ‘of Washington’s contribution to the reorganisation of the Greek armed forces after 1947, the direct line drawn between the dictators and obscure American objectives was perceived as evidence for the ‘bankruptcy” of American democratic values. With official Greek—American relations remaining unscathed by the establishment of military rule, the anti- American mood of the public continued its escalation unabated. From that point on, the rejection of American policies applied subtly toall real or presumed American interventions around the world, From this radicalised viewpoint, the American war on Vietnam was not just another ‘unfair’ war, not even a battle of the Cold War. Ie was the emblematic reflection of the Greek suffering, the tragedy of the fellow man who resisted American coercion. In comparison with the Europeans who had ousted Greece from the Council of Europe in 1969," the Americans were unequivocally identified with authoritarianism and political cynicism. Ironically, this thesis was also shared by a substantial portion of the coloriels themselves, who considered American modernity and cosmopolitanism inimical to the chauvinistic provincialism of their ‘Greek-Hellenic civilization’ dogma."35 Looming in the political background during the repressive rule of the junta, anti-American anger came boldly to the open when the regime collapsed amidst the havoc of the Cyprus crisis. The withdrawal of Greece from the military planning of NATO in 1974 clearly sought to remove at least one thorny ideological item from the process of democ-ratization, Was it merely the newly legalised Communist parties of Greece" and, in particular, the radical socialism preached by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK that brought anti-Americanism back with a vengeance throughout the seventies? The spontancous answer would be that these actors made the biggest contribution to that effect. Yet the picture would be incomplete without the occasional upsurge of anti- Americanism chaque couleur. The torrential demands made by the Left and Papandreou’s socialists for the permanent ‘withdrawal from NATO’, or abolishment of US military facilities,7 could find anti- Western matches, for instance, in the political platform of ultca rightists, arANTI-AMERICANISM. that presented a distinctive force (EP, Ethniki Parataxi) in the 1977 parliamentary election." Anti-Americanism ~ and a rigorous Euroscepticism ~ remained a strong influence in the mixture of populism at home and neutealism abroad, which defined the first socialist cabinets in the eighties. Appeating now as a state-sponsored position, anti-Americanism tended to become a conventional obligation of every sophisticated Greek, no matter how nationalist or internationalist his outlook was. There was hardly any conflict the United States was even allegedly entangled in, from Grenada to Nicaragua, where the Greek press and public opinion would side with Washington. The Greek government played to this anti- American public spirit, for example, when it refused to join the rest of the EC members in condemning the shooting down of a South Korean jumbo jet by the Soviets in 1983. Detailed mass media accounts on the successes of anti-American forces around the world aimed to retrospec- tively compensate for the obsession with presenting US successes on the Vietnam front durig the dreary dictatorial rule."*9 But in the course of the eighties, even the classic PASOK rhetoric subsided. Occasional escalations practically offset the subterranean normalisation of Greece's Adlantic affiliation while the party was in office: Greece remained in NATO after its re-integration in the allied military planning in x980, US base rights were confirmed and the war option vis-a-vis Turkey was repeatedly excluded, despite the formation of the Turkish pseudo-state in Northern Cyprus in 1983 and the serious Greek~Turkish crisis of 198719 — to name only a few obvious cases. ‘The end of the Cold War found the Greeks on the side of the ‘winners’. Theic clear advantages in a neighbourhood where Greece was the only NATO and EC/EU member nation helped them refine Greece's image from that ofa weak Western country to one of a regional power ina broader Euro-Atlantic community. Until this became conventional wisdom in the mid-nineties, the conflict with neighbouring FYROM about the name and the symbols of the new state produced vibrating anti- American feeling in huge demonstrations both in Greece and the United States. In essence, that was the last case of protest based ona purely national argument. 5! Future mass protests would be on international issues. Anti-Americanism reached new peaks in Greece ducing the military campaign in Kosovo (1999) ~ but not the genocide in Srebrenica}? ~ and the 2003 Iraq war, when almost all Greeks were reported to ‘totally disagree’ with the war (99.5 percent and 90.7 percent, respectively, 232ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE to quote two reputable surveys). "33 Official reactions on the part of Greek MPs pointed to the absence of a UN mandate for the sake of US unilat- cralism, whereas more populist approaches drew a direct line between the war and Washington's will to lame the process of European integration, One of the most cited private criticisms made by the famous composer and ex-MP Mikis Theodorakis on March 21, 2003 was to put ‘Bush shoulder in shoulder with Genghis Khan, Attila and Hitler.’5+ The symbolic language of post-dictatorial anti-Americanism was important for its endurance. From a variety of practices, at least one stands out: the customary march before the American Embassy in Athens at the end of every protest rally even remotely associated with US policies. The ‘Embassy’ still remains today the ultimate destination of the annual celebration that commemorates the uprising of Greek students against the colonels on November 17, 1973, and is a reminder of the ‘involvement of the US” in the dictatorship.'35 The ritual is also considered to be an appeal for a ‘better world’ and a crucial tribute to the spirit of ‘resistance’ against social injustice and political oppression. Similarly, protests against American policies frequently prompt leftists or extremists to damage or pull down the statue of President Truman, which is situated in a central avenue in Athens.196 The attempt of the Athens municipality (2002-2006) to protect the statue as a piece of art"37 met with widespread irony in diverse Greek newspapers, an echo of the chronic ideological reflex regarding a ‘symbol of imperialism and subservience to Washington’.138 Conclusion Greece presents a case study of long-term anti-Americanism. Even though grateful to the American deus ex machina, which had prevented partition and communist domination after 1947, Greece was one among the first ERP and NATO countries to produce widespread anti-American campaigns in the fifties and sixties. Merging Third-World neutralism with anti-American populism, Greek policies of the seventies and eighties granted further legitimacy to an embedded underdog mentality over recent historical teaumata. Anti-American ideas neither overturned Greece's Western orientation nor provided the Left with sufficient social backing to come to power. Yet, they successfully built an endemic ideological cross-party current 333ANTI-AMERICANISM. for nearly six decades. The major issues settled on a central dual rejection of American interference and non-interference/abandonment regarding Greek affairs. The perennial fear of abandonment by the United States elaborated unfulfilled hopes for indefinite economic dependence on American funding, At first, aid limitation and political interventionism helped create hostile images that magnetised objections over American neutrality in the Cyprus question. Later, anti-American positions lay at the heart of the neutralist and isolationist agenda, which bestowed the Left the leadership of the opposition from 1958 to r96r, and weighed considerably when Greece pulled out of the military planning of NATO (1974-1980). While the Left saw in anti-Americanism a blueprint for challenging the anti-communist political order in post-war Greece, the bourgeois parties did not stay immune to the mesmerising ‘resistance image’ that anti Americanism promised even to its remote champions. Beyond the argu- ment that the social appeal of anti-Americanism was too strong to let fall in leftist hands, more immanent ideological fixations vis-a-vis foreign influence, in general, and American interventionism, in particular, were incessantly at play. To be sure, rapid democratisation after 1974, including the legit- imization of the Communist parties, limited the political effect of leftist and anti-American radicalism that was expected to prevail after the dictatorship and the Cyprus crisis. From a sociological point of view, the Greek creed of anti-Americanism fell into the mainstream European paradigm with regard to its dominant position among youth (inside and outside universities), "9 leftists and ex definitio conservative social milieus (peasants) and institutions (church). It also confirmed the pervasive influence of US-inspired political and cultural forms in the expression of anti-Americanism in post-war Europe. The Greek case furnished solid evidence to the premise that Europeanisation renders a broader manifestation of anti-American attitudes safer, hence bolder. To its rather distinctive features belong, however, frst, the social spread of anti-Americanism across the party spectrum in the entire period under discussion, and, second, its wide local recognition as a sound and legitimate ‘narrative’ of contemporary Greek history. a4ANTI-AMERICANISM 52. ‘British Reaction to Attacks on America,” September x6, 200%, httpl/www. ipsos-mori.com/polls/2001/norw-or09r4.shtml (cited December 20, 2006) 53. See hetpi//www.mori.com/polls/2002/sep r.shte 54. See heep/www.mori.com/polls/z00r/ukwgmd.sheml. 55. ‘State of Britain Survey 2003," http:/wwwzipsos-mori.com/polls/1003/ mpmo30415-top shtml (cited December 20, 2008). 556. ee http/bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfmctypezarticle8citem_idetx79. 57. Quoted in Rubin and Rubin, Hating America, 130. 58. Ziauddin Sardar and Mercyl Wyn Davies, Why Do People Hate America? {London: Icon Books, 2002), 103. 59, Forexample, in a 2000 survey, 52 percent disapproved of abortion where the woman was unmarried and 53 percent disapproved of abortion in cases whece a married couple did not want more children. See Sunday Telegraph, May 28, 1900, 3. 60. A x996 MORI poll cecorded British support for capital punishment at 76 peecent, As Jonathan Freedland noted, ‘opponents of judicial killing have hardly won the argument among the British people ... American democracy ensures the public get their way, even if the result is not always pleasant, The British system cannot say the same.’ See Jonathan Freedland, Bring Home the Revolution (London: Fourth Estate, 1998), 31-52 61, Harti, “The State of the Special Relationship.’ 62, Gamble, Between Europe and America, 107. ‘Chapter ro: Anti-Americanism in Greece 1. The terms ‘Ametica’, ‘American’, ‘Americanization’ and ‘anti-Americanism’ refer to the United States; On the cultural aspects of anti-Americanism, see Konstantina Botsiou, ‘The Interface between Politics and Culture in Greece,’ in The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy and AntieAmericanism after t945,¢d. Alexander Stephan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 277-306. 2. An early penetcating study was offered by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); for the connection of anti-Americanism with ‘frustrated nationalism’, see loannis Stefanidis, ‘Telling America’s Story: US propaganda Operations and Greek Public Reactions," journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 30, 1 (2004): 39-951 regarding foreign policy, Sotitis Rizas, Greece, the United States and Europe, 1961-1964 (Athens: Patakis, 2001), Books and atvicles that appear in this chapter have been published in Greece as Greck publications or Greek editions of foreign ones 3. On both topics, see Sotiris Rizas, The United States, the Dictatorship and the Cyprus Issue 1967-1974 (Athens: Patakis, 2002). 4. Fora rich bibliography, see Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece 1943-1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Michael Mack Amen, American Foreign Policy in Greece 1944-1949 (Feankfuct: Peter Lang, 1978); William H, McNeill, Greece: American Aid in Action 1947-1956 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1957). 5, Tloannis Stefanidis, Froma the Civil to the Cold War: Greece and the Allied factor (1949-52) (Athens: Metechmio, 1999), 208-240; Konstantina Botsiou, Griechenlands Weg nach Europa: Von der Truman Doktrin bis zur Assoziterung mit der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschajt, 1947-1961 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), 117-153. 6, See George MeGhee, The US-Tirkish-NATO-Middle Fast Connection (Hong Kong: Macmillan, r990); John O. latrides, Balkan Triangle, Birth and Decline of An Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries (The Hague: Mouton, x968). Thanassis Diamantopoulos, Greek Political Life in the 20th Century (Athens: Papazissis, 1997), 207-215. On the post-war three-party structure see George Th. Mavrogordatos, Rise of the Greer Sun: The Greek Election of 1981 (King’s College, Occasional Paper r, London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, 1983], 6-7. 349,8, Stelios Zachariou, ‘The Road co Garrison State: Relations, 1952-1963,’ Modern Groek Studies Yearbook, x4/t5 (1998/1999): 241-260. 9. Among recent critical commentaries, sce Pantelis Boukalas, ‘The Polytechnical School in the Open Market,’ Kathimerini, November 16, 2004. 10. Case-to-case analysis in Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction. 11, Spyros Linardatos, From the Civil War to the Junta, 5 volumes (Athens: Papazissis, 1986), V, 428-442. 12, Constantine Svolopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy 1945-1981 (Athens: Estia, 2001), 30-43 13. See, for example, John V. Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War (University Pack: Pennsylvania State University Press, £989); forthe influential work of prominent communist intellectual who was exccuted on charges of treason in 1952, see Dimittis Batsis, Heavy Industry in Greece (Athens: Kedros, 1947); for a representative centre-left view in the sixties, see S. G. Trianttis, Common Market and Economic Development (Athens: KEPE, 1965). 14, See Andrew L. Zapantis, Greek-Soviet Relations, 1917-r947 (Athens: New York University Press, 1982) 15, Alexis Papachelas, The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947-1967 (Athens: Estia, 1997). 16. Botsiou, K,, ‘Interface between Politics and Culture,’ 281-284; Constantine ‘Tsoucalas, ‘Idealogical Impact of the Civil War, in Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis, Edited by Joha O. Iatrides (Athens: Themelio, 1984), 321-343. 17 Dean Acheson to George C. Marshall, 3/6/1947, National Archives of the United States, Washington, DC (hereafter NA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 781.00/3 647. 18, Botsiou, Griechenlands Weg nach Europa, 103-1233 Stefanidis, From the Civil 10 the Cold War, 15-21. 19. George Stathakis, The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan: The History of. American Aid to Greece (Athens: Vivliorama, 2004), 163~3145 William H, McNeill, The Greek Dilemma: War and Afiermath (London: Victor Gollance, 1947), ¢xo~154; Dwight 2. Griswold (Head of AMAG) to Loy Henderson, 7/24/1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FR US) (1948/V), 1123 Henry & Grady to Marshall, r1/6/1948, bid. 180. 20. USAGG: Assistance to Grecce, 5/23/1948, NA-RG3119, 1946-1950, Plans and Operations Division, Box 36; Botsiou, Griecherlands Weg nach Europa, t03-1153 Stefanidis, From the Civil to the Cold War, 24-51. 21. Paul A. Porter to William Clayton (Under Secretary of Economic Affairs), afi7lig47,Ibid., 17-22. 22. See Kyriakos Varvaressos, Report on the Economic Problem of Greece (Athens: January 1952); a thorough introductory comment in the Greek edition by Kostas Kostis (Athens: Savvalas, 2002). 23, American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 9/22/1958, NA-RGs9, 781.00/9-2158. 24. Staff Study to the NSC, 2/6/1951, FRUS (1951/V), 453. 125. Rizas, Greece, the United States and Europe, 37. 126. Harry $. Truman, Speech to Joint Session of Congress, 3/12/1947, US Congress, Congressional Record, Soth Congress, rst Session, 1981. 27. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 28. 28. American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 9/18/1958, NA-RGs9, 881.00 19-1958; Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment, 112-135. 29. Operations Coordinating Board Report, r2/x7hx958, FRUS (x9 58-1960/X), 643. 30. Peurifoy to State Department, 4/to/1953, FRUS (x952-1954/VIID), 8x7-819. 44. Peurifoy to State Department, 1/23/1951, FRUS (1958/V), 525. 32, Peutifoy to State Department, 12/31/1951, ibid., 526. ueANTI-AMERICANISM. 33. Minor to Dean Acheson, 7/20/1950, NA-RG59, 781.00l7-1950; Stefanidis, From the Civil to the Cold War, 218-240. 34. Turkel (Embassy in Greece) to State Departinent, 11/10/1951, FRUS (1951/V), 518; Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 61. 435. Peutifoy to State Department, t1/21/195 1, ibid., 524-525. 36. American Embassy/Athens co State Department, 12/8/1958 NA-RGs9, 781.00/ 12-B58 also National Security Estimate, 6/26/19 6, FRUS (x95 5~1957/KXIV), 566. 37. Ambassador of the United States in Greece (Cavendish W, Cannon) to State Department, 5/8/1954, FRUS (r952—1954/VIII), 863. 38. George Allen to Allen W. Dulles, 6/19/1956, NA- Lot File 59 D3, office files of FF Lincoln. 39. Allen W. Dulles to Secretary of State, 5/26/1956, FRUS (195 5-r957/KXIV), 563 40. Memorandum of Conversation, Karamanlis and Thueston {Chargé d'Affaires in Greece}, 12/29/1955, ibid., 324 44, American Enibassy/Athens to State Depactment, 3/31/1959, NARG59, 881.00/ 3-359, Box 4895; also Botsiou, Griechenlands Weg rach Europa, 403-415. 42, American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 11/13/1957, NA-RG59, FW 881.00-Five Year/r1-13 57, Box 4894. 43.J-E.C, Cahan, Report on a Visit to Athens, February 1-2, 1957, Archive of the European Communities, Florenceiltaly, OBEC files, 187. 44: NSC 6ror, NA, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954-1960, 16. y 10 State Department, 9/25/1952, FRUS (1952-19 54/VIIl), 808. bassy/Athens to State Department, 9/28/r950, NA-RGs9, 781.00/ yo State Department, 8/1/1951, (r951/V), 492. 48. Peurifoy to State Depactment, 3/17/1952, FRUS {1952-195 4/VUN),7895 Philip Axelrod to Peurifoy, 2/3/1955, NA-RG59, 781.00/3-25 5; Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 53-55. 49. Axelrod to Ambassador of the US in Greece, 2/3/1955, NA-RG59, 781.00/2-355, 4 50. lias Nikolakopoulos, The Stunted Democracy: Parties and Elections, 1946-1967 (Athens: Patakis, 2001), 165-168 51. Secretary of Stace co Embassy in Greece, 8/24/1951, FRUS (1951/V), 502-503. 52. Secretary of Stace co Embassy in Greece, 6/25/195 1, ibid., 483-485. 53. Secretary of State to Embassy in Greece, 8/24/r957, ibid., 502-503. 54. Government communiqué, March 15, 1952, in: Axelrod to Peurifoy, 2/3/1955, NA-RG59, 781.00/2-355, 4 555. Turkel to State Department, r1/ro/r951, FRUS (x95 1/V), 518-519. 56. Peurifoy to State Department, 3/17/r952, FRUS (x952~195 4/VIM}), 789. 57. Interview in the newspaper Kathimerini, 4/2119 5; the English text fom Mary G. Crain (Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, hereafter GTI, State Department), to Baxter (GTI), 4/8/2955, NA-RGs9, 781.9914-855. 58. Eleftheria, April 3, 1955; also Linacdatos, From the Civil War to the Junta, 1, 283-286, 59. For a thorough analysis of documentation and various views, see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, The Rise of Constantine Karamanlis to Power 1954-1956 (Athens: Patakis, 200%), 39-54) 225-229. 60. See Kathimerini, the famous a September 25, 1955. 61, Estia, October 7.1955. 62. Kathimerini, September 22, 1955. 63, Constantine Karamanlis Archive: Facts and Texts, x4 volumes (Athens: Constantine G, Karamanlis Foundation, 2005), Vol, Vi, 215-3 56-Vfi, 546~595-VI, 16-37. le ‘SHAM September 22, x95 5; also ibid., 342ores 64. Diamantopoulos, Greek Political Life, 181-185. 65, Andrew Galbraith Carey and Jane Perry Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 196; Kevin Featherstone, “The Greek Socialists in Power,’ West European Politics 6 (1983): 236-262. 466, Peurifoy to State Department, 3/17/1952, FRUS (1952-195 4/VIII}, 789. 67, American Consulate/Salonica to State Department, 2/18/1956, NA-RG39, 781.00/2-1856. 68, Yost to State Department, 2/20/1951, FRUS (195 1/V), 529. 69, Nicos Alivizatos, ‘State of Emergency and Political Freedoms, 1946-1949, in Greece in the 19405, €d.latrides, 383-398. 70. Peurifoy to State Department, 3/22/1951, FRUS (r951/V), 329531; Consul in Nicosia (Wagner) to State Department, 12/7/1951, ibid., 541-543. 71. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 86-89, 106-07, X§7-163,182-185, t96-202. 72, Peurifoy to State Department, 3/17/1952, FRUS, (x9 53-195 4/VIMl), 685. 73. lbid., 707. 74. Akropolis, September 13, 1958; From the newspapers reviews sent by the American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 9/17/1958, NA-RGs9, 6rt.81/9-1758. 75. Position Paper Prepared at the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, 9/14/1954, FRUS (1952-155 4/VIM), 704. 76. Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in Turkey, 9/6/1954, ibid., 706; memorandum by the Secretary of State co the President, 11/2/1954, ibid 72, 77. Memorandum of Conversation, GTI, 12/23/1954, ibid. 748-753. 78. Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in France (Brewster) to the assistant secretary for European affairs (Merchant), r2/16l1954,ibid., 741. 79- For an insightful analysis of the role of the Greek Church, George Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case,’ West European Politics 26, 1 2003}: 117-136. 80, NSC Report: Statement of US Policy in Greece (enclosure), 8/5/1957, FRUS (195 5-1957/XXIV}, 588. 8, American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 12/17/1957, NA-RGS9, 781.00(W)f12-1757. 82, American Embassy/Greece to State Department, 11/4/1957, FRUS (1955-1957/XXIV), 599. 85, Penfield to State Department, NA-RG59, 11/4/1957, 681.81/11-457; Stefanidis, “Telling America’s Story.” 84, American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 12/17/1957, NA-RG59, 781.00(W)2-1757. 85. King Paul (0 John F,Dulles, undated, ERUS (195 5~1957/KXIV), 301. 86, Ibid., 303; see also Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 39. 87. American Emabassy/Greece to State Department, 9/13/1955, FRUS (1955-1957! XXIV), 289 (comment); counsellor of the Embassy in Greece to the dicector of GTI, gltal95 5yibid., 54x 88. American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 9/11/1959, NA-RG59, 781,00! 1, The Rise of Constantine Karamanlts to Power, 228-247 89. ‘The Third Road,’ ‘Nobody's Slave,’ Vradyni, September 20 and 21, 1955. 90. NSC 5719, August 1957, NA, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954-1960. 9x. American Embassy/Athens to Seeretary of State, 7/r8/1958, NA-RGS9, 781.00 71758. 92. Allen to Dulles, 9/0/1957, NA-RG59, 781.19541/9-1057; Riddleberger to Dulles, 7/16/1958, NA-RG59, 781.1954 1117-1658; Stefanidis, Asymmetrical Partners, 123. 93. Estia, November 22, 1954. 94. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 119-133. 343,ANTI-AMERICANISM 95. Akropolis, September 13, 19573 ee also criticism in Eleftheria, September 27, 1957. 96. Yannis Valinakis, Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy x949-1988, (Thessaloniki: Paraticitis, 1989), rosft. 97. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus; Rusk to Labouisse, 612311964, NA, NSC Histories: The Cyprus Crisis, December 1963-December 1967. 98. Amecican Embassy/Athens to State Department, 11/4/1957, NA-RGS9, 611.83/ 11-457. 99. American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 9/22/1958, NA-RGs9, 741.00/ 92258, x00. Sotiris Wallden, Greece and the Eastern: Countries r950-1967: Economic Relations and Politics, 2 volumes (Athens: Odysseas, 1991), Vol. x, 107, 124, 1295 Eleftheria, September 24, 1957 ror. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, ¢5 4; Stefanidis, Asymmetrical Partners, 1753 Spycos Markezinis, Modern Political History of Greece 1936-1975 (Athens: Papyros, 1994), 83-89. 02, Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel ill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Stefanidis, Asymmetrical Partners, 22-25, 137-190. 103. See Khrushchev's statement in August 1967 that ‘Soviet missiles will not spare either oil groves or the Akropolis’; Svolopoulos, Greek Forcign Policy, 105; Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, 112-117, 04, American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 12/24/1957, NA-RG59, 781.00{W)/22457; Linardatos, Prom the Civil War to the Junta, II, 272-273. 105. Karantanlis Archive, IM, 37-38. 106. State Department ro American Embassy/Athens, 3/13/1958, NA-RG59, 781.77 31358. 107. Riddlebergee to State Department, May 6, 1958, NA-RGs9, 781.56381/5-658. 108. American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 5/27/1958, NA-RG59, 781.99/ 22758, 109. Representative works include Linardatos, From the Givil War to the Junta; Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment; Jean Meynaud, Les forces politiques en Gréce (Montreal: Eoudes des Sciences 10, 1965); Yannis Roubatis, The Trojan Horse: American Penetration in Greece 1947-1967 (Athens, 1987). 110, Cannon to State Department, 11/9/15 5, FRUS (195 5~1957/XXIV), 522; Deputy Under Secretary of State to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, 11/25/ 1955, ibid, 557-560. 114, Axelrod to State Department, 13/5/1953, NA-RGB4, 1943-1955, Box 1333 American Embassy/Athens to State Department, 11/18/1958, NA-RG46s, Near Eastera Subject Files 1953~1959, Box 5; John W. MeDonald and Diane B. Bendahmane eds, US Bases Overseas. Negotiations with Spain, Greece and the Philippines (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 159. 112. Linardatos, From the Civil War to the Junta, Wl, 234 113, Stefanidis, Asymetrical Partners, 137-191 114. American Embassy/Athens to Secretary of State, 11/2/1955, NA-RG59, 781.00/ 11-155, 115. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 12/25/1959, FRUS (t958-1960!X), 689-691 116, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, The Symplegades of Foreign Policy: Domestic and International Pressure in the Grecek~Americars Negotiations for the Bases, 1974-1985 (Athens: Patakis, 2006) 117. Christos Rozakis, ‘Greek Forciga Policy, 1980-1991,’ History of the Greek Nation, Vol. XVI, 381-382. 344NOTES 118, This subject is thoroughly discussed in Wallden, Greece and the Eastern Countries, 119. Svolopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, 95; Evanthis Hatrivassiliou, ‘Greece and the Arabs, 1956-1958," Journal of Byzantine and Madert Greek Studies 16 (1991-1992): 49-82. 120. Among others, Botsiou, Griechenlands Weg nach Furopa, 169-175; D.R. Devereux, ‘The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948-1936 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990). 121. Svolopoulos,Greek Foreign Policy, 226-258. 122, Yannis Valinakis, With Vision and Program (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1997), 149-27. 123. Thanassis Diamantopoulos, ‘The Dictatorship of the Colonels, 1967-1974,” History of the Greek Nation, Vol. XVI (Athens: Ekdotiki, 1997), 266-286, esp. 284-285. 124. Ibid, 274. 125, Richard A. Clogg, A Concise History of Modern Greece (Athens: Kardamitsa, 1984) 274-290. 126. Mavrogordatos, Rise of the Green Sun, 6-7; Karamanlis Archive, VIL, 162-165. 127. Rozakis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy, 1981-1990," 380-382. 128, See Estia and Eleftheros Kosmos in November 1977. 129. Kostas Ifantis, ‘State Interests, Dependency Trajectories and “Europe”: Greece,’ in Exropean Union Enlargement: A Comparative History, eds Wolftram Kaiser and Jargen Eivert (London: Routledge, 2004), 70-89. 130. Konstantina E, Botsiou, ‘Greek—Turkish Relations since 1974: Efforts for Rapprochement and Co-operation,’ Mésogeios 22-23 (2004): 153-188, esp. 168-169. 331. Valinakis, Vision and Program, 252-258. 152. For a highly critical view, see Takis Michas, Unhaly Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia it the Nineties (College Station: Texas A&cM University Press, 2002). 333. Opinion poll by Metron Analysis, March x5~30, 2003: htep:l/ www, metroananalysis.ge/ge/polls, See also Anna Elizabeth Tsakona, Avti-Americanism and Opinion Makers in Greece during the War or Iraq, 2003 (Athens: BLIAMEP, 2003). 134-Ibid., 5-11. 155, In 1976, the Karamanlis government unsuccessfully tried to ban the‘march. For critical approaches, se the article of former socialist Minister George Romeos, ‘It “lives” fur does not move any more," To Vimia, November 21, 2004, 136. The statue has been pulled down on various occasions since 1974, the two most recent occasions being: the Kosovo war in May 1999 lit was restored on November 1 of the same year shortly before President Clinton's official visit co Athens), and a protest rally against the war in Lebanon on July 25, 2006. The statue was also vandalised in April 2003 ducing the war on frag, 137. Upon the request of the Greeck-American association, AHEPA, donor of the statue back in the sixties, President Truman became a member of AHEPA almost one year before the enunciation of his ‘Doctrine’, on the anniversary of the Greek Revolution of Independence (March 25, 1946); the statue was inaugurated on May 29, 1963, Voice of America, May 15, 2003, hutp:llwww.voanews.com/gteck (cited December 18, 2006). 138. Rizospastis, January 13, 2001. 139. George Theotokas, ‘Greeks and British,’ Kathimerini, December 22, 1954. Chapter r1: Anti-Americanism in China x. Chinese Youth Daily, December 21, 2005. Liu’s essay on Chinese images of the United States is widely available on various Chinese websites, See, China Institute of ‘American Politics and Law htpi/Avww.ciapl.com/news.asp?Newsid=68128crype=1000; also, http://news.xinhuanet,com/school/2005-12/31/content_3949226.htm (cited December 18, 2006}. 345