SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 75930. June 8, 1990.]

NATHANIEL ANDAYA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

JUDGE EDGAR GUSTILO and JUDGE SIMPLICIA MEDINA, Respondents.

Macababayao Agoot & Buensuceso Law Offices for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; NOT ESSENTIAL FOR CONVICTION, WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED. — Positive identification, even in the absence of any showing of petitioner’s motive, is sufficient
for conviction. It must be borne in mind that motive is never an essential element of a crime. As expressed
in the case of People v. Yurong, 133 SCRA 26 citing People v. Realon, Et Al., 99 SCRA 422," (M)otive is not
essential to conviction when the accused as in this case, were positively identified and there is no doubt as
to their identity as culprits." Evidently therefore, there is no need to prove motive where the culprit has
been positively identified by eyewitnesses. But in any event, for whatever it may be worth, evidence was
also adduced to show that the petitioner harbored resentments against the victim because the latter had
rejected the fishpond loan application of the former. The trial court aptly said: "The motive behind the
incident is very strong on the part of the accused Nathaniel Andaya. The altercation between the accused’s
brother-in-law Eliseo Somes and complainant Noel Jardeleza was only four days ago and the very cause of
the altercation was the unfavorable recommendation made by Noel Jardeleza on the very fishpond
application of the accused Nathaniel Andaya" (p 15, Decision).

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; NOT AFFECTED BY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

WITNESS AND VICTIM. — Anent the relationship of Dr. Gonzales (a relative) and Engineer Saluta (a friend)
to Jardeleza. We agree with the respondent Court that said affinity did not affect their credibility as
witnesses. Their testimonies were not only natural, clear, and spontaneous but corroborated circumstantially
by medical findings. Besides, there is nothing in the record which shows any motive which could have
impelled these two witnesses to pervert the truth or falsely testify against the petitioner. As held in the case
of People v. Canada, 144 SCRA 121," (W)hen there is no showing of improper motive on the part of
witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not render their
clear and positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in
serving the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for
otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity." (People v. Narajos, 145 SCRA 99 citing People v.
Radomes, 141 SCRA 548; People v. Jabequero, 125 SCRA 144). Truly, the defense has failed to show by
way of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated to testify against the petitioner with
partiality, bias, or prejudice.

3. CIVIL LAW; MORAL DAMAGES; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — We sustain the respondent Court of Appeals
on the civil damages due, to wit: "Due to the social standing of the victim, his employment classification and
the circumstances under which he was assaulted, the reduced amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages is
considered fair and just. We agree with the People’s counsel that considering that the complainant-victim
has been injured and medically treated and despite the absence of proof of actual damage, he is entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P2,500.00 (Necessito, Et. Al. v. Paras, Et Al., 104 Phil. 75, 85; Art.
2224, N.C.C.)." It cannot be denied that Noel Jardeleza suffered physically and that he was frightened and
humiliated socially. As the Solicitor General correctly observed: (a) he was mauled by petitioner in a public
place (a restaurant) and in the presence of Gonzales, Saluta, and others; (b) he sustained injuries requiring
confinement for seven days, and (c) he was frightened as petitioner poked a gun at him.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

Nathaniel Andaya, Accused-petitioner, was convicted in a judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch IV, Iloilo City of the offense of less serious physical injuries, the dispositive portion whereof
reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Nathaniel
Andaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt, without the attendant circumstances and hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to pay the costs.

"With regard to the civil aspect, the same is deemed instituted. Based on the facts presented and
established complainants Noel Jardeleza is entitled to P10,000.00 moral damages, he being injured in a
public place where he was placed in shame and embarrassment, just because he exercised his duties as a
faithful and honest public servant; P5,000.00 for actual damages; and P7,000.00 for exemplary damages.
(p. 3, Petition; p. 7, Rollo)

The aforequoted decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court, 6th judicial Region, Branch XXVIII, Iloilo
City which affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction.

The accused-petitioner thus filed a petition for review of the Regional Trial Court a decision with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals **), public respondent herein, which, on May 27, 1986,
affirmed the judgment of conviction but modified the accused petitioner’s a civil liability in this wise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Accused-appellant is ordered to pay Noel Jardeleza the following amounts: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘(a) P5,000.00 as moral damages;

(b) P2,500.00 as temperate damages.’"

It deleted the award of actual and exemplary damages.

On June 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, hence this petition for certiorari.

Prosecution evidence consists mainly of the testimony of the complainant Noel Jardeleza, corroborated by
those of two other witnesses, Dr. Alejandro Gonzales and Engineer Saluta. Such evidence may be summed
up as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On August 10, 1982, at around 5:30 p.m. private complainant, Noel Jardeleza and companion, Engineer
Romeo Saluta went to Drive Inn Eatery at Fort San Pedro, Iloilo City. While at said eatery, they joined the
table of Dr. Alejandro Gonzales, a relative of Noel Jardeleza and ordered beer. Subsequently, petitioner
Nathaniel Andaya arrived at the same eatery and proceeded to the place where the three were seated and
without saying a word allegedly pistol whipped Noel Jardeleza with a Caliber .45 pistol. Noel Jardeleza was
hit on the back of the head and when he slumped down, he was kicked by the petitioner. Thereafter, Dr.
Gonzales and Engineer Saluta brought Noel Jardeleza to Iloilo Doctors Hospital where he was attended by
Dr. Soriano and Dr. Muyco. Private complainant sustained physical injuries and as a result of said incident,
petitioner was charged with Less Serious Physical Injuries. This is the version of the private complainant,
Noel Jardeleza and corroborated by his relative, Dr. Alejandro Gonzales and Engineer Saluta. (p. 2,
Decision; p. 18. Rollo)

The records further show that at the time the incident took place, Jardeleza was then a Technical Loans
Inspector at the Development Bank of the Philippines. Also, according to Dr. Alejandro Gonzales, when
Jardeleza slumped down on the concrete pavement, Andaya kicked him twice, poked the gun, and uttered
"What did you do with my brother in law?" (p. 30, t.s.n. January 14, 1983). As a result of the assault, the
victim sustained injuries consisting of "2 x 2 cm V-shaped laceration at the right occipital area, abrasion,
contusion right hand, palmar surface." (Comment, p. 9; Rollo, p. 4)

For his part, the accused-petitioner offered the defense of denial and presented his own witnesses to
support him. Their theory is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Complainant, Noel Jardeleza was at the Fort San Pedro Drive Inn with his officemate, Engr. Romeo Saluta
drinking beer in the afternoon of August 10, 1982. Later, this twosome joined the group of Dr. Alejandro
Gonzales in another table and continued drinking beer (TSN of January 4, 1983, Testimony of Engr. Saluta,
pp. 25-27; TSN of Jardeleza, pp. 7-9).

"It was much later in the afternoon of August 10, 1982 when petitioner, herein accused Nathaniel Andaya
invited his friends. Hernani Sollano and Romeo Pendon for a snack.

"Upon reaching the said place, they saw the group of Noel Jardeleza drinking beer and apparently already
tipsy. At this juncture, petitioner approached the table of Jardeleza’s group in order to talk to Noel
Jardeleza, but when he came nearer, Jardeleza pointed his right hand at the face of the accused. At this
very precise moment, petitioner brushed aside and parried the hand of Jardeleza in an instinctive defensive
gesture as petitioner mistook said gesture for an oncoming attack. Said parrying act caused Noel Jardeleza
to fall on the cemented pavement, thus causing him some injuries. (TSN of August 25, 1983, Testimony of
Hernani Sollano, pp. 19-18; TSN of March 7, 1984, Testimony of Nathaniel Andaya, pp. 23-38)." (p. 2
Memorandum for Petitioner; p. 79, Rollo)

As a result of the aforesaid incident, Nathaniel Andaya was charged with the offense of Less Serious Physical
Injuries and was eventually convicted therefor.

Two issues are raised for Our determination, namely: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s guilt, for less serious physical injuries has been established beyond
reasonable doubt; and

(2) Whether or not the award of moral and temperate damages made in favor of Jardeleza was in
accordance with law.

The defense contends that Jardeleza injured himself. According to Andaya, when he was approaching the
complainant, the latter raised his right arm "in a gesture not unlike a person ready to attack." Andaya’s
instinct was to parry Jardeleza’s arm, which caused the latter to fall off from his chair and thereafter on the
cemented ground.
With two conflicting theories, the real issue in the instant case, therefore, rest on credibility.

It is undisputed that there was a physical contact between the petitioner and the victim. While Andaya
claims that he merely pushed aside Jardeleza, the latter maintains that he was pistol-whipped. In convicting
the petitioner, the trial court relied heavily on the evidence advanced by the prosecution. After a careful
review of the evidence on record, We find no plausible reason to hold otherwise.

It is the contention of the petitioner that when there are two conflicting theories, as in the case at bar,
existence of motive is essential in determining which of the two is more likely to be true. He asserts that the
prosecution has failed to show his motive in inflicting injuries on the person of the complainant on August
10, 1982. Petitioner further avers that there is no basis for the trial court’s finding that he was "hot-
tempered" and that his conviction for maltreatment in another case cannot be used against him in the
present case.

The aforesaid assertions cannot be given credence as such cannot overcome the evidence established by the
prosecution.

Petitioner’s guilt was not arrived at solely on the basis of his temperament, motive, or previous criminal
involvement. The trial court found that credible witnesses testified on the identity of the petitioner Andaya
as the assailant of the victim Jardeleza. Dr. Alejandro Gonzales, a prosecution witness, was described by the
trial court as "a person of integrity and not a drinker." He attested that "they had not been able to start
drinking when a men suddenly passed by my left side and approached Noel Jardeleza and directly hit him
with a .45 caliber pistol." In the same testimony, he identified said assailant as Nathaniel Andaya. (p. 6,
t.s.n., Jan. 4, 1983) The aforesaid testimony was corroborated by Engineer Romeo Saluta and complainant
Noel Jardeleza himself.

Undoubtedly, such positive identification, even in the absence of any showing of petitioner’s motive, is
sufficient for conviction. It must be borne in mind that motive is never an essential element of a crime. As
expressed in the case of People v. Yurong, 133 SCRA 26 citing People v. Realon, Et Al., 99 SCRA 422,"
(M)otive is not essential to conviction when the accused as in this case, were positively identified and there
is no doubt as to their identity as culprits." cralaw virtua1aw library

Evidently therefore, there is no need to prove motive where the culprit has been positively identified by
eyewitnesses. But in any event, for whatever it may be worth, evidence was also adduced to show that the
petitioner harbored resentments against the victim because the latter had rejected the fishpond loan
application of the former. The trial court aptly said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The motive behind the incident is very strong on the part of the accused Nathaniel Andaya. The altercation
between the accused’s brother-in-law Eliseo Somes and complainant Noel Jardeleza was only four days ago
and the very cause of the altercation was the unfavorable recommendation made by Noel Jardeleza on the
very fishpond application of the accused Nathaniel Andaya" (p 15, Decision).

Anent the relationship of Dr. Gonzales (a relative) and Engineer Saluta (a friend) to Jardeleza. We agree
with the respondent Court that said affinity did not affect their credibility as witnesses. Their testimonies
were not only natural, clear, and spontaneous but corroborated circumstantially by medical findings.
Besides, there is nothing in the record which shows any motive which could have impelled these two
witnesses to pervert the truth or falsely testify against the petitioner. As held in the case of People v.
Canada, 144 SCRA 121," (W)hen there is no showing of improper motive on the part of witnesses for
testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not render their clear and
positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in serving the
conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the
latter would thereby gain immunity." (People v. Narajos, 145 SCRA 99 citing People v. Radomes, 141 SCRA
548; People v. Jabequero, 125 SCRA 144).

Truly, the defense has failed to show by way of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated to
testify against the petitioner with partiality, bias, or prejudice.

On the basis of the foregoing, We find that the petitioner’s guilt has been established beyond reasonable
doubt; thus, there is no reason to reverse the judgment affirming the petitioner’s conviction.

Lastly, We sustain the respondent Court of Appeals on the civil damages due, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Due to the social standing of the victim, his employment classification and the circumstances under which
he was assaulted, the reduced amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages is considered fair and just. We agree
with the People’s counsel that considering that the complainant-victim has been injured and medically
treated and despite the absence of proof of actual damage, he is entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P2,500.00 (Necessito, Et. Al. v. Paras, Et Al., 104 Phil. 75, 85; Art. 2224, N.C.C.)." cralaw virtua1aw library

The New Civil Code provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, . . . fright, . . . social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

"Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

x x x"

It cannot be denied that Noel Jardeleza suffered physically and that he was frightened and humiliated
socially. As the Solicitor General correctly observed: (a) he was mauled by petitioner in a public place (a
restaurant) and in the presence of Gonzales, Saluta, and others; (b) he sustained injuries requiring
confinement for seven days, and (c) he was frightened as petitioner poked a gun at him. (Comment, p. 9).

The award of temperate damages in the amount of P2,500.00 is moderate and reasonable, considering that
the victim has been injured and medically treated and consequently had to spend for medicines,
hospitalization and doctor’s fees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 78529 September 17, 1987

BF HOMES, INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE WATER-WORKS AND

CONSTRUCTION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioners BF Homes, Inc., is a residential subdivision owner-operator and as such, constructed

water distribution systems at its several subdivisions so that residents would have an adequate
supply of potable water. Petitioner applied for and was granted a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity in respect of its water distribution system at its Las Piñas subdivision. Petitioner
sought authority from the respondent National Water Resources Council on 12 March 1982 to
transfer the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to its co-petitioner, the Philippine
Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC). To date, the application for transfer has yet to be
acted upon by the respondent Council.

Petitioner also has a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to operate its water distribution
system at B.F. Homes Parañaque. On 25 June 1985, petitioner sought authority from respondent
Council to increase the water rates at B.F. Homes Parañaque. Petitioner alleges that the increase in
rates was not opposed by the residents of that subdivision who, as a matter of fact, sought
immediate approval so that the increased rates would enable petitioner to meet the power bills from
the Manila Electric Company, power being essential for operation of the water distribution system.
Respondent Council similarly failed to date to act upon this application to increase rates.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the respondent appellate court to compel respondent
Council to act on the application for transfer of the franchise at Las Piñas to PWCC and also to act
upon the application for authority to increase water rates. Respondent appellate court, in two
Resolutions dated respectively 16 February 1987 and 28 May 1987 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 09135,
dismissed the petition for mandamus upon the ground that mandamus will not issue to compel the
respondent Council to act on the matters pending before it, since such acts are not ministerial in
nature.

The respondent appellate court feR into reversible error here. It is established doctrine that
mandamus will not issue to control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is,
to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or
to approve or disapproue a specific application In Mackenzie Pio vs. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, etc. et
al., 1 this Court, through then Mr. Justice Teehankee, said:

The petition must fail because under the circumstances of record, the issuance of the
injunction sought is manifestly not a ministerial duty, viz a duty which is so clear and
specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance and its
discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. The
issuance of a writ of discretion and mandamus will not lie to compel the performance
of such discretionary function. It is an established principle that the writ of mandamus
may not be issued to control the discretion of a judge or to compel him to decide a
case or a motion pending before him in a particular way — the writ being available
only to compel him to exercise his discretion or his jurisdiction. 2 (Emphasis supplied)

Again, in Philippine Airlines Employees Associations vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 3 Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera wrote:

... But while certiorari is a proper procedural remedy, this Court cannot compel
respondent Court to lift its Order of December 6, 1969 or to reconsider the same, for
this involves the exercise of judgment and discretion. It can only compel respondent
Court to act on the pending Motions one way or the other. It is an established
principle that the Writ of mandamus may not be issued to control the discretion of a
Judge or to compel him to decide a case or motion in a particular way — the Writ
being available only to compel him to exercise his discretion or jurisdiction. The law
concedes to Judges and Courts the right to decide questions according to their own
judgment and understanding of the law. 4 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, however, does not here seek to compel respondent Council specifically to approve
petitioner's applications pending before it. What petitioner seeks, and this it is entitled to, is a writ
that would require respondent Council to consider and deliberate upon the applications before it,
examining in that process whatever evidence lies before it and to act accordingly, either approving or
disapproving the applications before it, in accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence and in
the best interest of the community involved. Per the records of this case, respondent Council has
failed, for unexplained reasons, to exercise its discretion and to act, one way or the other, on the
applications of petitioners for a prolonged period of time imposing in the process substantial
prejudice or inconvenience upon the many hundreds of families living in the two subsidivisions
involved. It appears, further, that respondent Council failed to inform petitioner of a supposed need
for additional data concerning petitioner PWCC.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED due course and the Resolutions dated 16
February 1987 and 28 May 1987 of the respondent appellate court are hereby set aside.
Considering the need for prompt action, the Court resolved itself to issue directly a Writ of
mandamus against the respondent Council commanding it forthwith to act upon petitioner's
Application for Increase in Water Rates in BF Homes Parañaque (NWRC Case No. 78-037) and on
petitioner's Application for Transfer of Certificate of Public Necessity and Convenience in B.F. Homes
Las Piñas (NWRC Case No. 82-161), No pronouncement as to costs. This Resolution is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves
the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is
concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to control the performance of
discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the
exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to approve or disapprove a specific
application (B.P. Homes, Inc. v. National Water Resources Council, L-78529, Sept. 17, 1987; 154
SCRA 88). mandamus win not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer
where the law imposes upon him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in
which he is required to act (Mata v. San Diego, L-30447, March 21, 1975; 63 SCRA 170).
Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Civil case was fi led against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal acti viti es
made byEnrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle fi led a moti on to dismiss and compulsory
counter-claim. In thecounter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG
offi cials on the basis that the casefi eld agaisnt him was a “harassment suit ”. The moti on
to implead Chavez and others was granted by the Sandiganbayan.Chavez and the PCGG
offi cials raised the defense that they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive
Order NO. 1. It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga,the there are no
proof linking Enrile with the illegal acti viti es performed by Marcos. It was further averred
that the case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez.Sol. Gen. Chavez defended
himself by saying that he was acti ng as a counsel and cannot by made a defendant in a
counter-claim.
Issue:W h e t h e r o r n o t S o l . G e n . C h a v e z c a n b e m a d e l i a b l e f o r d a m a g e s i n fi l i n g
t h e s u i t a g a i n s t Enrile.
Held:The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was basedon
the malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit.It was further stated by the court that immunity from
suit is granted only because of the fact thatthe Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on
members of the PCGG and other publicofficers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith
and in the performance of their duty.If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority
they can be held liable personally for damages.In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his
authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office does
not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to theinjury of another. Thus he is made liable fro his
actions in the opinion of the court.
Similar to Chavez vs, an Digest

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea
that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without
authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 (Chavez vs Sandiganbayan) this doctrine still found application, this Court
saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor
grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police
forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to
guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as
found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 91391 January 24, 1991

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the
Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party
defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting,
restitution and damages.

After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.

The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was
opposed by respondent Enrile.

On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:

The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is
deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable.

On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz,
former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading
them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires
leave of Court to determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought.
Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this time nor may therefore, the Motion to
Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)

Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.

The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:

In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23,
1989, praying for leave to implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding
reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants
named in the counterclaim and admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with
counterclaim.

This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or
in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)

In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to

reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:

WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG
officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary
Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering these motions as in the nature of motions
to dismiss counterclaim/answers, resolution of these motions is held in abeyance pending
trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)

Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from
suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner
comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.

The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party
defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033.

It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice,
recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had
already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed
the complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:

xxx xxx xxx

 Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who assisted the
PCGG in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the incumbent
Solicitor General, he continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case.

He is sued in his personal and official capacities.

On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now Senate
President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not one of the documents left by
then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over
to the PCGG by the US State Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed
that in view of the PCGG's findings, he refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to
prosecute Defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking
Defendant to the illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
PCGG, this time composed of Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal,
Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint
against Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987.

Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners
Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing
of the utterly baseless complaint against Defendant.

Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the
filing of this harassment suit against Defendant.

In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action against
Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith, and with grave
abuse of power and in excess of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed,
defeated, violated, impeded or impaired the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . .
. . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)

On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him in his
capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case
of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:

. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such
counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of
his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any
award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The
principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation
of another — such as trustees — in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed.
Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the
case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of
the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against
said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But
as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make
the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We
have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)

Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under
the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1,
Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.

Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising
solely from occupying a public office.

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is
a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
 A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for
back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the
municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408
[1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of
Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the
mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service
to reinstate.

In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held personally liable
for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the
dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.

In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16
1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial
auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally
in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of
Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan
v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])

Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.

In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials
under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:

With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I
just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for
the members of the Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the
Commission's members immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the
Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his
Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the
immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude
of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was
immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members
of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official
discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at pp. 581-582)

Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:

It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1
was intended merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers that the
PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance
of official duty, provided that such member had acted in good faith and within the scene of
his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction
to determine whether the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable in
damages to a private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally
offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to
testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with
orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587)

Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)

Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by
the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting
respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to
persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the
Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The
issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is
whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with
malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights,
Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor
General.

In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have
been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the
same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the
private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the
counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.

To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their
representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous
consequences.

A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics
[1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re:
Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R.
Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of
Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in
the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.

The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel of the Republic, the
1âwphi1

Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for
high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite
executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent
neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel
him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise
unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the
very same cases they are prosecuting.

As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits.
However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very
same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other
causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 63216. March 12, 1984.]

THE HON. EXPEDITO B. PILAR, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and concurrently presiding officer
protempore of the Sanguniang Bayan of Dasol, Pangasinan, Petitioner, v. THE SANGUNIANG
BAYAN OF DASOL, PANGASINAN, composed of the HON. LODOVICO ESPINOSA, Municipal Mayor
and presiding officer of said body and the following members of that body: HON. AVELINO N.
NACAR, HON. LUZ B. JIMENEZ, HON. GERARDO B. RIVERA, HON. JUAN M. BONUS, HON.
APOLONIO G. ABELLA, HON. ABRAHAM BALAOING, HON. JAIME ABELLA, HON. LAURENTINO
BALAOING, HON. MA. LINDA BUSTRIA, HON. CEFERINO QUINITIO, HON. ELIFAS VIDAL, and MR.
VICTORIANO BUAGA, Municipal Treasurer of Dasol, Pangasinan, Respondents.
 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS TO COMPEL PAYMENT OF SALARIES; PAYMENT OF
SALARIES RENDERS CASE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BUT PETITIONER ALLOWED TO RECOVER DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES. — An original action for mandamus to compel the Sanguniang Bayan and the municipal
treasurer to pay the salary due petitioner Hon. Expedito B. Pilar, in his capacity as the Vice Mayor of Dasol,
Pangasinan, as provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 and as implemented by Circular 9-A of Joint
Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration and to recover actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney’s fees, is rendered moot and academic where in the meantime his said salary has
been duly paid. We find and rule, however, that petitioner is entitled to damages and attorney’s fees
because the facts show that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which was
unduly denied him for three (3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy petitioner’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code).

2. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; RESPONDENT MAYOR PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE

THEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY. — That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico
Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the miserable plight of the petitioner is clear.
Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan
appropriating the salary of the petitioner. While "to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of discretion" as
contended by respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner when
he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner
could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the
Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the
petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of
example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for
exemplary or corrective damages.

3. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES; PERSONAL LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner is likewise entitled to actual damages and costs of litigation which We reduce from P13,643.50 to
P5,000.00 and for mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury, We hold that petitioner is entitled to P5,000.00 as moral damages to be paid personally by
respondent Mayor Lodovico Espinosa from his private funds.

AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; RESPONDENT MAYOR IN CASE AT BAR PERSONALLY LIABLE
THEREFORE; BASIS. — As respondent mayor acted in bad faith in not performing his legal duty to
appropriate the requisite amount for the payment of petitioner’s salaries, he becomes personally liable for
damages. The governing law is found in article 27 of the Civil Code which makes a public servant or
employee liable for damages for his refusal or neglect, without just cause, to perform his official duty
(Javellana v. Tayo, 116 Phil. 1342, where a municipal mayor was adjudged liable to pay P100 as moral
damages and P100 as attorney’s fees for failure to sign the payrolls for the per diems of certain councilors).
Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows moral damages in an action under article 27.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS; PROPER IN INSTANT CASE. — The propriety of
mandamus, as the remedy resorted to by the petitioner, was settled in Guerrero v. Carbonell, 96 Phil. 977
and Bernardo v. Pascual, 93 Phil. 345.

3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES
RECOVERABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court allows the petitioner to recover
damages by reason of the respondent mayor’s wrongful act. The attorney’s fees and litigation expenses are
justified by article 2208 of the Civil Code.

DECISION

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an original action for mandamus to compel the Sanguniang Bayan and the municipal treasurer to pay
the salary due petitioner Hon. Expedito B. Pilar, in his capacity as the Vice Mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan, as
provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 and as implemented by Circular 9-A of Joint Commission on Local
Government and Personnel Administration and to recover actual, moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney’s fees.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. Elected with him were
Lodovico Espinosa as the municipal mayor and the following members of the Sanguniang Bayan, to wit:
Avelino Nacar, Luz Jimenez, Gerardo Rivera, Juan Bonus, Apolonio G. Abella, Jaime Abella, Laurentino
Balaoing and Elifas Vidal. All of them assumed office on March 1, 1980. Later on, the following also became
members of the Sanguniang Bayan: Linda Bustria, Abraham Balaoing and Ceferino Quinitio.

On March 4, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the
mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said resolution
did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to an
annual salary of P16,044.00 1 (Circular No. 9-A).

Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his
salary. He wrote letters to the proper authorities complaining about the matter and asking that something
should be done to correct it. The proper provincial 2 and national officials 3 endorsed compliance with
Circular 9-A of the Joint Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration in giving the
revised rate of salary for petitioner. In fact, the mayor was sent a letter by the Executive Secretary of the
Commission advising him that the Municipality should pay the Vice-Mayor the salary due him equivalent to
that of the Municipal Treasurer per Circular No. 15.

On December 12, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00
per month as the salary of the petitioner. This amount was increased to P774.00 per month in December,
1981. 4

On October 26, 1982, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P15,144.00
as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982. The
resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of this petition for a
writ of mandamus on February 16, 1983. 5

In their comment, the respondents alleged that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The filing of the petition is premature because the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies
contending that petitioner should have lodged his complaint first with the Ministry of Local Government and
Community Development; (2) that the petition involves a question of fact and, therefore, this Court does
not have jurisdiction over the case because the right of the petitioner to receive a salary depends on the
availability of municipal funds and "the availability or non-availability of municipal funds is a factual issue
which is not cognizable by the Supreme Court; and (3) that the petition is now moot and academic because
on April 20, 1983, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted an appropriation ordinance which among others
appropriated an amount of P29,985.00 as payment of salary differentials of the petitioner pursuant to the
Supplemental Budget No. 3 Gen. Fund, C.Y. 1983.

Petitioner in his reply argues that: (1) There is no violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies because only the writ of mandamus offers him an adequate and speedy remedy to his legal
problem, and the said doctrine can be dispensed with if the issue involved is a legal one and the issue to be
resolved in this case - on whether the appropriation of a salary of a vice mayor is a discretionary act or
ministerial act - is a legal issue. (2) The only factual issue involved in this case is the ascertainment of
damages inflicted to the petitioner due to the failure of the respondents to pay him his lawful salary. The
existence of municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be appropriated is not a factual
issue anymore due to the certification of the municipal treasurer as to the existence of such funds, and (3)
The issue has not become moot and academic because there is no guarantee that even though a resolution
appropriating the salary of the Vice Mayor has been enacted, actual payment shall be made to the
petitioner.

On June 1, 1983, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Petitioner admitted that at the time he submitted his memorandum, he has been fully paid of his salaries as
provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg 51 and implemented by Circular No. 9-A of the Joint Commission for
Local Government and Personnel Administration. 6

Since petitioner’s claim for salaries has already been provided for and paid, the case has become moot and
academic.

Nevertheless, We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to damages and attorney’s fees because the facts
show that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which was unduly denied him for
three (3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s
plainly valid, just and demandable claim. (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code).

That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the miserable
plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the
Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner. 7 While "to veto or not to
veto involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by respondents, respondent Mayor, however,
exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient
municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. 8 Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect
or omission in complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau
of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is
reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is
liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.

Petitioner is likewise entitled to actual damages and costs of litigation which We reduce from P13,643.50 to
P5,000.00 and for mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury, We hold that petitioner is entitled to P5,000.00 as moral damages.

All the above sums as damages including attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 shall be paid personally
by respondent Mayor Lodovico Espinosa from his private funds. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby considered moot and academic but respondent Mayor is hereby ordered
to pay petitioner from his private and personal funds actual damages and costs of litigation the amount of
P5,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00; exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P5,000.00; and attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.

Costs against respondent Mayor.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

As respondent mayor acted in bad faith in not performing his legal duty to appropriate the requisite amount
for the payment of petitioner’s salaries, he becomes personally liable for damages.

The governing law is found in article 27 of the Civil Code which makes a public servant or employee liable
for damages for his refusal or neglect, without just cause, to perform his official duty (Javellana v. Tayo, 116
Phil. 1342, where a municipal mayor was adjudged liable to pay P100 as moral damages and P100 as
attorney’s fees for failure to sign the payrolls for the per diems of certain councilors).

Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows moral damages in an action under article 27. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The propriety of mandamus, as the remedy resorted to by the petitioner, was settled in Guerrero v.
Carbonell, 96 Phil. 977 and Bernardo v. Pascual, 93 Phil. 345.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court allows the petitioner to recover damages by reason of the
respondent mayor’s wrongful act. The attorney’s fees and litigation expenses are justified by article 2208 of
the Civil Code.

However, I personally believe that the sum of P15,000 would be an adequate award for the moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman

322 SCRA 17
FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for estafa and falsification. The
Ombudsman issued several orders to petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and controverting
evidence. Petitioner failed. The Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing
petitioner from service. Petitioner claimed that he was denied due process because he was not
given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit.

HELD: The orders of the Ombudsman requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit
contained a warning that if no counter-affidavit is filed within the given period, a waiver would be
considered. Also, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard. A party who chooses not to
avail of the opportunity cannot complain of denial of due process

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No.114683. January 18, 2000]

JESUS C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and

MAXIMO ECLIPSE, respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolutions of the Ombudsman in
OMB-Adm-O-92-0020 dated November 18, 1993 and February 28, 1994 which [1] [2]

dismissed petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual
disqualification to hold office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporation, and which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of. NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the

National Irrigation Administration.

On March 21, 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal
(ADBN) wrote a letter to NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-
scale community irrigation development. [3]

On November 17, 1988, petitioner as the training coordinator of the NIACONSULT,

sent a letter-proposal requested by ABDN. Another letter was sent by petitioner on
[4]

January 31, 1989 to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the availability of
NIACONSULT to conduct the training program and formally requesting advance
payment of thirty (30%) percent of the training fees in the amount of US $9,600.00 [5]

or P204,960.00.

NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers
from February 6 to March 7, 1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche
[6]

Gesselschaft ) Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of

the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two
installments of P61,488.00 andP143,472.00. [7]

On April 1, 1991, NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a

letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN
which petitioner personally received. Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to
[8]

remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino
Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious
misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.  [9]

Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued
an order requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from
[10]

receipt with a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his
right to present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the said
order.

A year later, or on March 17, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued another

order giving petitioner another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting
[11]

evidence. Again, petitioner failed. Thus, on April 14, 1993, private respondent was
required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to present evidence to support its
complaint. [12]

Thereafter, on November 18, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed

Resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:

"Withal, for such dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and conduct prejudicial

to the service as established by overwhelming evidences, it is
respectfully recommended that respondent Jesus C. Ocampo be
 discharged from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special
perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation; without prejudice to any
civil action NIACONSULT, Inc., may institute to recover the amount so
retained by the respondent.

SO ORDERED." [13]

On February 16, 1994 petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case
claiming that he was denied due process in that the administrative case was resolved
on the basis of the complainant's evidences, without affording him the opportunity to
file a counter-affidavit and to present his evidence. Petitioner likewise contends that
he was not given access to the records of the subject transaction vital to his defense
and in the preparation of his counter-affidavit despite his verbal requests to the graft
investigator. [14]

The respondent OMBUDSMAN denied the motion on February 28, 1994. [15]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition basically reiterating his arguments in
his motion for reconsideration.

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation on May 24, 1997 stating [16]

that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the
same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by
the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997. With the dismissal of the criminal
case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own
and therefore should be dismissed. [17]

Such manifestation is not well taken.

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed
against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial
Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution
was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine
qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence
which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in
civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial
evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
[18]

procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative

proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on
the other.
[19]

Going now to the crux of the controversy, petitioner asserts that he was denied the
opportunity to be heard.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably
and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings,
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.[20]

Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to
answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of
time to submit his counter-affidavit. It took more than one year from February 17,
1992 before petitioner was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-
affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence was set. The
March 17, 1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a last chance to present his
defense, despite the private respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to comply
with the second order.

Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot
escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the
respondent OMBUDSMAN has shown forebearance, petitioner has not displayed
corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due
process was violated. We need only to reiterate that a party who chooses not to avail
of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process. [21]

Petitioner's claim that he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have
waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and of allowing the private respondent to
present evidence ex-parte is unmeritorious.

The orders of respondent OMBUDSMAN requiring petitioner to submit his counter-

affidavit and which was admittedly received by the latter explicitly contain a warning
that if no counter-affidavit was filed within the given period, a waiver would be
considered and the administrative proceedings shall continue according to the rules.
Thus, respondent OMBUDSMAN need not issue another order notifying petitioner
that he has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way, petitioner need
not be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of private respondent's
evidence. As such, he could not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.

With regard to the petitioner's claim that he made requests for the production of the
documents alleged to be material to his defense, the record is bereft of any proof of
such requests. If it were true that the graft investigator did not act on such requests,
petitioner should have filed the proper motion before the respondent OMBUDSMAN
for the production of the documents or to compel the respondent complainant to
produce whatever record necessary for his defense. Petitioner did not. It was only
after the respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed resolution of November 18,
1993 that he bewailed the alleged failure of respondent's graft investigator to require
the production of the records of the subject transaction.

The record of this case indisputably shows that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the government when he failed to remit the payment of the
training program conducted by NIACONSULT. The evidence presented sufficiently
established that petitioner received the payments of ADBN through its representative,
GTZ, Philippines the amount of US $9,600.00 and that he failed to account this and
remit the same to the corporation. All these acts constitute dishonesty and
untrustworthiness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolutions of the respondent OMBUDSMAN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

What is being resolved in this case is petitioner's liability for his acts as a peace officer. His acquittal
in the criminal case merely relieved him from criminal liability. It did not in any way carry with it relief
from administrative liability (Police Commission v. Lood, 96 SCRA 819 [1980]).

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-34230. March 31, 1980.]

THE POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Chairman, Crispino M. De Castro, Jose G. Lukban,
Jolly Bugarin, and Eduardo M. Garcia, Members, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE GUARDSON R. LOOD,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal,
GABRIEL PAILE, and REYNALDO ALANO, Respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General, for Petitioners.

Benjamin M. Grecia for Respondents.

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court sets aside respondent judge’s orders granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction that
would order the reinstatement with back salaries of respondents Gabriel Paile and Reynaldo Alano in the
service of the Makati Police Department and denying petitioner Police Commission’s motion for
reconsideration thereof, on the ground that the subsequent acquittal of respondents Paile and Alano in the
criminal action for grave coercion by the City Court of Manila does not bar their dismissal from the service
by the petitioner, as ordered in an earlier decision upon their having been found administratively guilty in
the administrative proceedings, which had proceeded independently of the criminal action for the same acts.

The case at bar arose from the following incidents: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On December 12, 1968 Nicolas Alcantara and Zoilo Maranon filed with Police Commission (Polcom) an
administrative complaint charging Captain Gabriel Paile, Corporal Reynaldo Alano and five other members of
the Makati Police Department with grave misconduct. The succeeding year, on September 26, Alcantara and
Maranon filed with the City Court of Manila twin criminal cases charging the same administrative
respondents with grave coercion based on the same acts for which they had already been administratively
charged. Four days thereafter, with the formalized criminal charges as basis and pursuant to the provisions
of the second paragraph of section 16 1 of the Police Act of 1966, Makati Acting Mayor Jose C. Luciano
issued a Memorandum Order effecting the suspension from office of the seven accused members of the
Makati Police Department effective October 1, 1969.

Due investigation by the Makati Board of Investigators of the administrative charge against Paile Et. Al.
continued and was terminated with the submission of a report, with findings and recommendation, to the
Polcom. On December 12, 1969, the Polcom rendered its decision declaring Paile Et. Al. guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the service. Paile Et. Al. moved to reconsider the decision of
the Polcom to no avail for the said Commission, on November 2, 1970, denied their motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the meantime, the City Court of Manila, under date of October 14, 1970, rendered judgment in the
criminal cases against Paile Et. Al., acquitting them of the charges for grave coercion on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.

On December 12, 1970, in implementation of the said December 12, 1969 decision of the Polcom and denial
of reconsideration order of November 2, 1970, finding Paile Et. Al. guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
their separation from the service, Acting Mayor Luciano issued Administrative Order No. 39, Series of 1970,
ordering the dismissal of the said administrative respondents from the service effective December 2, 1970.

Six days thereafter, on December 18, 1970 Paile Et. Al. filed with the Polcom their second "Motion for
Reconsideration and or New Trial." Without awaiting any response on the part of the Polcom to their second
motion, herein respondents, Paile and Alano, filed on January 30, 1971 the present action for mandamus,
prohibition and/or certiorari (docketed as Civil Case No. 14335), with an application for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch VI) presided by
respondent judge Guardson R. Lood 2 against the Polcom, the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Makati, and
the Makati Board of Investigators. Paile and Alano, sought, inter alia, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction requiring the Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate them to their former positions
in the Makati Police Department on their theory that, by reason of their acquittal of the criminal charges for
grave coercion by the City Court of Manila, the Mayor of Makati had "the duty specifically enjoined to be
performed by him by the second paragraph of Section 16, R.A. No. 4864, to immediately reinstate [them]
and order the payment of the entire salary they failed to receive during their suspension." Herein petitioner
Polcom duly opposed this petition on February 26, 1971.

After the hearings held on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction by respondent judge as
submitted for Resolution on March 27, 1971, respondent judge issued his order dated March 30, 1971
stating "that from the pleadings and the evidences thus presented it does not appear that there are factual
issues not otherwise covered and ventilated during the hearing and (that) the Court believes that the merits
of the case can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence adduced," and giving the parties
three days "within which to file their comment or manifestation thereon as to whether they would prefer to
submit the case for decision together with the resolution of the petition for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondents (as therein petitioners) filed their manifestation dated April 1, 1971 expressing their "desire
that only the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be considered" 3 while
petitioner Polcom (and its corespondents in the proceeding below) filed (after securing an extension) their
manifestation dated April 12, 1971 stating that "they prefer to submit the merits of the case for decision
together with the resolution on Petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the basis of the
pleadings and the evidence heretofore adduced, provided, however, that the parties be given a period of
thirty (30) days from receipt of the relevant court order within which to submit their respective
memoranda." 4

On April 7, 1971, respondent judge issued his order of the same date resolving in effect the case on the
merits and declared respondents’ dismissal from the service as "without authority of law, null and void and
without force and effect", and directed the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon a
P500 — bond ordering the Mayor of Makati "to reinstate them to their respective positions as Captain and
Corporal in the Makati Police Department, with all the rights and privileges thereto appertaining, including
the payment of their salaries during the period of their suspension from office."

On April 22, 1971, the Polcom sent Paile Et. Al. a communication returning to them their second "Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial" "without action" citing the provisions of paragraph 9.04, Section I of its
Memorandum Circular No. 12 which allow, in administrative cases brought before it, only one petition for
reconsideration and for the added reason that the "decision on the matter has already become final and
executory." This communication was, however, returned to the Polcom unclaimed.

Subsequently, on May 3, 1971, the Polcom sought reconsideration of the challenged order dated April 7,
1971, which reconsideration Paile Et. Al. opposed on May 22, 1971. On July 16, 1971, respondent judge
issued an order holding in abeyance his resolution of the Polcom’s motion for reconsideration, pending action
of this Court on an indorsement of the Secretary of Justice relating to administrative charges filed by Nicolas
Alcantara against him as presiding judge of the court below. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

On August 24, 1971 the Polcom moved with respondent judge for the immediate resolution of its pending
motion for reconsideration, which motion was denied on September 8, 1971. The Polcom thus filed with this
Court the instant petition for certiorari on October 20, 1971 to assail the orders of the presiding judge of the
court a quo (1) dated April 7, 1971 granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; (2) dated July 16,
1971 holding in abeyance resolution of the Polcom’s motion for reconsideration; and (3) dated September 8,
1971 denying the said Commission’s "Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." cralaw virtua1aw library

During the pendency of the petition at bar, the Court, on October 25, 1971, acting on the administrative
complaint (docketed as Administrative Case No. 211-J) filed by Alcantara against herein respondent judge,
resolved to dismiss the said complaint as premature and enjoined respondent judge to resolve the pending
motion for reconsideration as well as to report to the Court the action taken by him on the said motion.
Pursuant thereto, respondent judge resolved petitioner Polcom’s pending motion for reconsideration on
December 20, 1971 by denying the same.

Hence, the petition at bar now refers only to the setting aside of respondent judge’s orders of April 7, 1971
and December 20, 1971 granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and declaring respondents’
dismissal from the service as "null and void," and denying the Polcom’s motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.

The Court finds the petition to be meritorious and the challenged orders are therefore nullified and set aside.

As indicated above, respondent judge adjudged the dismissal from service of respondents as "without
authority of law, null and void and without force and effect" on two grounds, to wit: (1) the acquittal of said
respondents Paile and Alano of the criminal charges for grave coercion by the City Court of Manila on
October 14, 1970; and (2) the pendency of their second "Motion for Reconsideration and or New Trial" filed
with the Polcom on December 18, 1970, after the mayor had already implemented the Polcom decision of
dismissal of December 12, 1969 through the administrative order of dismissal (six days earlier) of December
12, 1970 ordering their dismissal effective December 2, 1970.

Respondent judge was in error on both counts and acted with grave abuse of discretion in adjudging
respondents’ dismissal to be "null and void" and in issuing the writ of mandatory injunction ordering their
reinstatement with back salaries.

1. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law, as reaffirmed by the Court in Philippines National

Railways v. Domingo 5 that "the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent
independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of
evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge,
as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code." 6 Here, the administrative case against
respondents did proceed independently of the criminal action and resulted in an earlier administrative
verdict of dismissal from the service rendered on December 12, 1969. Admittedly, as stated in respondent
judge’s challenged order of April 7, 1971 itself "separate petitions for reconsideration filed by the
respondents were denied on November 2, 1970" 7 and the decision was executed on December 12, 1970
with the Makati Mayor’s implementing order separating them from the service by virtue of the Polcom’s final
order of November 2 denying reconsideration. The subsequent acquittal of said respondents as accused in
the criminal case as per the City Court’s judgment dated October 14, 1970 was of no consequence since
such acquittal merely relieved them from criminal liability but in no way carried with it relief from the
administrative liability of dismissal from the service under the final order of the Polcom in the administrative
case.

The ruling of this Court in Gatmaitan v. Manila Railroad Co. 8 is wholly applicable here, mutatis mutandis:
"It is true that on September 30, 1957 appellant was acquitted in the criminal cases mentioned heretofore,
but it is not denied that said acquittal was based merely on reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. We have
heretofore held that conviction in a criminal case is not indispensable to warrant the dismissal of an
employee by his employer; it being enough that the latter had proof of the former’s guilt of breach of trust
or other sufficient reason (National Labor Union v. Standard, etc., 40 OG. 3503.) Therefore, appellant
having been duly investigated and found guilty of gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the interest of
his employer, We must necessarily conclude that his conviction in the criminal actions already mentioned
was not indispensable to warrant his dismissal from the service, nor did his acquittal on reasonable doubt in
any way affect the previous order for his dismissal." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

In City of Butuan v. Ortiz 9 the Court of First Instance had rendered judgment ordering the reinstatement of
the administrative respondent pending termination of the administrative case pending against him upon the
Court’s finding that his suspension had been continued for more than 60 days. However, respondent therein
had not asked for execution of the favorable final judgment for his reinstatement until after the
administrative case had been decided against him and he was about to be removed from the service: The
Court held that execution of the judgment of reinstatement was barred by the final administrative order of
dismissal, since "a supervening cause or reason had arisen which (has) rendered the decision of the Court
ordering reinstatement no longer enforceable." Here, it is obvious that the subsequent acquittal on October
14, 1970 in the criminal case could in no way affect or set aside the previous administrative order of
December 12, 1969 for respondents’ dismissal from the service, as reiterated in the Polcom’s order of
November 2, 1970 denying reconsideration. Respondents were found by the Polcom, upon valid and proven
charge, unfit to remain further in the service of the Makati Police Department and the Polcom’s decision has
long become final and has been executed. Respondent judge was without power to reverse or modify the
same in the absence of grave abuse, fraud or oppression and none has been alleged or shown here.

2. Respondent judge reasoned in his challenged order that "the administrative proceedings before the
respondent Polcom had not in fact been terminated, and as a matter of fact there is no showing that the
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial had in fact been resolved. The result therefore is that the
dismissal of the petitioners thus partook of the nature of a punishment even while their case is under
consideration, a clear violation of their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved."cralaw virtua1aw library

This is patent error. The proceedings in the administrative case before the Polcom bad been terminated with
its denial of respondents’ first motion for reconsideration of the dismissal verdict per its Order of November
2, 1970 copies of which had been admittedly received by them. It was not necessary for Polcom to resolve
the belated second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, as in fact Polcom returned the same unacted
to respondents per its communication of April 22, 1971, calling attention to its Rules allowing only one
motion for reconsideration and adding that the decision of dismissal had already become final and had been
executed (which communication was returned to it unclaimed by respondents).

The Court further notes that respondents themselves appear to have doubted the merit and efficacy of their
second motion, for they abandoned the same with the filing of their petition in the Court below on January
30, 1971. Furthermore, the fact that respondents did not even claim the Polcom communication of April 22,
1971 strengthens the impression that they lacked reliance on the effectiveness of their second motion for
reconsideration and abandoned the same. At any rate, the Polcom’s action was certainly a final denial and
termination of the proceeding, since its rules did not allow a second motion and its dismissal verdict had
long been executed as of December 12, 1970 — long before the filing of respondents’ petition in the court
below.

Finally, respondents question the validity of the Polcom rules allowing only one motion for reconsideration
and its authority to issue the same. Assuming arguendo that the Polcom should have considered the merits
of their second motion, the same was anchored on the fact of respondents’ acquittal in the criminal case. As
already shown above, said second motion is entirely bereft of merit since such acquittal was an entirely
separate matter and could not affect or set aside the earlier final administrative order for their dismissal
from the service.

Respondent judge had in his challenged orders addressed the core issue of law (having found no crucial
factual issues) and adjudged respondents dismissal from the service as "null and void" on the above
grounds which the Court has found to be in error and without basis in law. The mandatory injunction for
reinstatement issued by respondent judge was in excess of its jurisdiction and authority and with this Court
having now upheld the validity of respondents’ dismissal by virtue of the Polcom’s final verdict in the
administrative case, the case below has become moot. cralawnad

ACCORDINGLY, the orders of the respondent judge dated April 7, 1971 and December 20, 1971 are hereby
set aside and respondent judge’s successor as presiding judge of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal is hereby permanently enjoined from any further proceedings in Civil Case No. 14335 other than to
dismiss the same.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Guerrero, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. L-34637. February 24, 1984]

FACTS: Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the police service by the then Mayor Braulio
Sto. Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner commission finding him guilty of serious
irregularity in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee, Jr.
Respondent thereafter filed his complaint with respondent court seeking his reinstatement.
He was sustained by respondent court which rendered its decision declaring the decision of
the Police Commission as null and void and ordered the town mayor to “reinstate the plaintiff
to his former position as patrolman in the Police Department of San Juan, Rizal…” Respondent
court ruled that the decision of petitioner commission was based on incomplete records as
there was no transcript of the testimonies of witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before
the Board of Investigators and that the commission’s conclusion was without factual basis and
was in violation of administrative due process.

ISSUE: (1) WON Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission
decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings
of the case
(2) WON the findings of facts by the Police Commission, an administrative agency duly vested
by Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and authority to render decision in administrative
cases against policemen be disturbed

HELD: (1) NO.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POLICE COMMISSION; BOARD OF INVESTIGATORS; PROCEEDINGS
SUMMARY IN CHARACTER; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent court’s ruling against petitioner’s
decision as falling short of the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the
subject administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of
Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide
that the Board of Investigators shall be a “board of record,” and as such it does not provide for
office personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the
proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary
in character, in line with the principle that “administrative rules of procedure should be
construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.” The
formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative
investigation, provided that the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their
respective evidence.
The report of investigation (which contained a summary report of what transpired during the
hearing of the case), the affidavit-complaint, and respondent’s answer thereto, as well as the
memoranda of the parties were sufficient basis for the decision and resolution of the
commission, and substantially and essentially constituted the “records of the investigation”
required in Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 4864.

(2) YES
ONLY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT. — As
uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by
evidence on the record, or stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown
to be unsupported by evidence. As expounded by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Ang
Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
There are documents presented and incorporated in the records of the case that are
corroborative of the affidavit of the complainant. Some of these documentary evidence are
memorandum of the complainant, copy of the police blotter, letter of the complainant to Lt.
Bautista, reply of the Clerk of Court to Jose Lee, Jr., a copy of the decision of Cesar Cruz,
Acting Municipal Judge of San Juan, Rizal and the investigation report of Pat. Simplicio C.
Ibea. All these documents, one way or another, corroborate the affidavit of the complainant.
Hence, the allegation that the affidavit is uncorroborated does not hold water. In believing the
theory of defense by respondent Ibea, In effect, respondent court substituted its own
judgment for that of the Police Commission which is final, contrary to the prevailing principle
that “in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot reexamine the
sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence
that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. The findings of fact must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.”

EN BANC

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent
from criminal actions for the same act or omission.29 Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is
not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. 30 One thing is administrative liability;31 quite
another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.32

Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112093, 4 October 1994, 237 SCRA 353, 359, citing
30

Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 1, 10.

A.M. No. P-89-290 January 29, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania Maritima, Inc. informed this
Court that the company's lawyer filed with the Tanodbayan on 12 December 1986 a complaint for
falsification of a public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the violation of R.A. No.
3019 against herein respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and others. The said company lawyer requested that an investigation be
conducted on the administrative aspect of the case.

In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea, who later
became a member of this Court, informed the latter that as a matter of policy, the administrative
aspect of the case "will be undertaken by this Office upon the filing of a corresponding information by
the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan."

Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was filed against the respondent
with the Sandiganbayan on 6 October 1988. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12987
and was assigned to the Second Division. A copy of the Information was furnished the Office of the
Court Administrator on 17 October 1988.

On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, pursuant to this Court's en
banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the basis of the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan,
administratively charged the herein respondent with the crime of falsification of a public document
and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service committed in the manner alleged in the
said Information, to wit:
 That on or about May 12, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a public officer, being then a
Deputy Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 31, taking advantage of his official position and, committing the offense in
relation to his official duties, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
forge and falsify, or cause to be forged and falsified, Sheriff's (sic) Certificate of Sale
dated May 12, 1986, which is a public document, wherein he is legally bound to
disclose the truth, by stating therein that the payment for the properties which he
levied and sold at public auction was made on May 12, 1986, and that the amount of
P1,325,000.00, representing the bid price for the aforesaid levied properties, was
paid to him on May 12, 1986, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well
knew, the payment thereof was actually made on May 23, 1986 to Genstar Container
Corporation through its attorney-in-fact, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest.

The respondent was directed to file his answer/explanation within ten (10) days from receipt of the
charge.

Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent forwarded to the Court
Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989 informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still
pending resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent) should not be held
administratively liable.

On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence, promulgated a Resolution

granting the same and dismissing the case against the respondent "for insufficiency of evidence."
This conclusion is based on its findings that (a) the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, presented and
admitted without qualification or limitation and objection as to purpose, showed that the public
auction was held on 12 May 1986 and that the movable properties were sold to Rolando Patriarca
for P1,325,000.00; this fact was confirmed by prosecution witness Rizalina Cailian, (b) the private
prosecutor's contention that there was no public auction on that date runs counter to the Information
which is based on the fact that a public auction was held on 12 May 1986, (c) it is presumed that the
respondent regularly performed his official duty when he sold, during the said public auction, all the
properties levied upon, and (d) the fact stands in bold relief that payment was actually made;
whether the same was to the respondent or to Genstar, the fact also stands out that if the payment
was to Genstar it was because the amount was due it as a judgment creditor; if made to the
respondent "it was in effect to and intended for Genstar," — thus having the same net effect; as a
result, the assertion that the bid price was paid on 12 May 1986 to the respondent is not absolutely
false but has some truth to it. The Sandiganbayan went on to state that the rule is settled that if the
statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth to them, the crime of
falsification is not deemed to have been committed; it further declared that the records "do not show
that the rights . . . of the parties involved would not be substantially the same if the bid price was
paid on May 12, 1986, through the accused (respondent), as when the payment was done 11 days
thereafter directly to Genstar, or vice-versa." Hence, the integrity of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
was not affected.

On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the promulgation of the
above resolution and praying that "by virtue of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the
respondent before the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . . be likewise dismissed."

On 6 May 1991, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Memorandum of 11 December 1991, then Court Administrator, now a member of this Court,
Josue N. Bellosillo, opined that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 12987 by the Sandiganbayan
does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against the respondent
considering that the quantum of evidence needed to sustain a judgment of conviction in a criminal
case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative proceedings, only moral certainty is
required; by way of comment to the Sandiganbayan's statement to the effect that the records do not
show that the rights and obligations of any of the parties involved would have been substantially
affected if the bid price was paid either on 12 May 1986 or 23 May 1986, he avers that in the crime
of falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or intent to cause damage to a third person for the
reason that in contradistinction to falsification of private documents, the principal act punished in the
former is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed. 1 Court Administrator Bellosillo then recommended the referral of the case to the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Manila for investigation, report and recommendation.

Acting thereon, this Court, in the Resolution of 5 February 1992, referred the instant case to the said
Executive Judge for investigation, report and recommendation.

Thereupon, Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo conducted an investigation; after completing the
same, he submitted on 5 August 1992 his Report and Recommendation wherein, on the basis of the
following summation of evidence and findings:

In his testimony, Atty. Redentor R. Melo stated that on May 12, 1986, at 9:00 o'clock
in the morning, he personally went to El Varadero de Manila Compound in Cavite
City to attend the auction sale of property levied upon by deputy sheriff Ramon G.
Enriquez and advertised for sale at auction scheduled on said date and time. He
waited until past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon without sheriff Enriquez appearing.
Then, he left and returned to Manila. At about 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, he
was advised that Sheriff Enriquez appeared at past 4:00 o'clock but that no auction
sale was conducted.

In a sheriff's partial report dated May 23, 1986, respondent deputy sheriff Enriquez
stated that on May 3, 1986, he served a copy of a writ of execution issued by Judge
Regino T. Veridiano of the Regional Trial Court of Manila upon Gregorio Coronel at
the El Varadero de Manila dockyard at Sangley Point, Cavite City. Immediately
thereafter, he made a levy of personal property of the defendant and scheduled the
sale on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at El Varadero de Manila,
Sangley Point, Cavite City, to satisfy the writ of execution. On May 8, 1986, third
party claims were filed involving the levied property. On May 12, 1986, the judgment
creditor posted the necessary indemnity bond duly approved by the court. After the
bond was posted, deputy sheriff Enriquez conducted the sale and one Rolando
Patriarca was the highest bidder in the total amount of P1,325.000.00 and which
amount was credited to the partial satisfaction of the writ (copy of the Sheriff's Partial
Report dated May 23, 1986 as filed in the record of Civil Case No. 85-30134 is
hereto attached Annex "B" for ready reference). In the minutes of the sheriff's sale
dated May 12, 1986, it is made to appear that the bidding started at 3:55 p.m. and
was finished at 5:00 p.m. on May 12, 1986 with Rolando C. Patriarca as the highest
bidder (copy of the said minutes is hereto attached as Annex "C").

Deputy Sheriff Ramon G. Enriquez did not present any evidence during the
investigation. He submitted the case on the basis of the Sheriff's Return dated May
23, 1986. He stated that he received the bid money on May 12, 1986 on which date
he issued the certificate of sale. Respondent Enriquez admitted that he did not
require the judgment creditor to pay the sheriff's percentage of commission.

In his testimony, Atty. Jose C. Sison, counsel for judgment creditor stated that the
auction took place May 12, 1986 on which date the bid price was given to him in
check by the highest bidder Rolando Patriarca; that he would not have agreed if the
payment was made on May 23, 1986.

Much as we would like to accept the testimony of Atty. Sison as the truth, we find that
he is sadly mistaken. In its resolution dated May 15, 1989, the Sandiganbayan, on
the basis of stipulation (sic) of facts and the evidence adduced, held that on May 23,
1986, the highest bidder Rolando Patriarca offered the three (3) vessels M/V
Dadiangas, T/B Marinero and T/B Timonel out of several other personal properties
bidded (sic), to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman engaged in the sale of
scrap iron. These vessels were sold to Cailian for the price of P1,325,000.00. Cailian,
highest bidder Patriarca and his wife repaired to the Navotas Branch of the Philippine
National Bank that same day. Cailian bought cashier's check No. 273290 dated May
23, 1986 for P1,325,000.00, which, upon request of Patriarca, who said he had no
money to pay for the vessels, was made payable to the order of "Genstar Container
c/o Atty. Jose C. Sison" the judgment creditor (resolution, p. 4, p. 84, rec.). This piece
of evidence is certainly eloquent proof of the fact that there was no payment of the
bid price by the bidder Rolando Patriarca on May 12, 1986 to the sheriff amounting to
P1,325,000.00. As found by the Sandiganbayan, it was the bidder's buyer (sic)
Rizalina Ingco-Cailian who paid the bid price directly to the judgment creditor. This
 took place on May 23, 1986. Indeed, if the bid price was given to the respondent
deputy sheriff on May 12, 1986, it was his duty to deposit the amount immediately
with the court's cashier. He did not do this. He did not also require the judgment
creditor to pay the sheriff's percentage of collection.

Consequently, the inevitable conclusion is that the respondent sheriff was remiss in
his duties and that the sheriff's certificate of sale was falsified because the truth is
that the bid price was not paid by the highest bidder on May 12, 1986. In fact, there
was no auction conducted on that date because it was already past 4:00 o'clock, the
(sic) sheriff was not yet at the place of auction which was indeed scheduled at 10:00
a.m., May 12, 1896. The bid price was actually paid by a third who bought the three
(3) vessels out of several other properties levied upon. She paid therefor directly to
the judgment creditor. The sheriff 's percentage of commission was not paid.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we respectfully submit that the respondent Deputy Sheriff

Ramon G. Enriquez is guilty of the charge of falsifying the sheriff's certificate of sale
dated May 12, 1986 in Civil Case No. 85-30134 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

he recommended the following:

WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent Deputy Sheriff Ramon

G. Enriquez be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, if
any.

We find the above findings of Executive Judge Pardo to be supported by the evidence. His
conclusions and recommendation are therefore in order.

We wish to add, however, that from the facts surrounding the case, it appears that (a) no bidding
was held on 12 May 1986; even if one was conducted, the alleged highest bidder, one Rolando
Patriarca, did not have the money to pay for his bid of P1,325,000.00, thereby resulting in a failure of
the proceedings; or (b) the sale was consummated only on 23 May 1986, without the requisite
bidding, to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian to whom Patriarca allegedly "sold" what he bought during the
"bidding" of 12 May 1986. In his Notice of Levy and Sale dated 3 May 1986, the respondent
expressly stated that he "will sell at PUBLIC AUCTION to the highest bidder for CASH and in
Philippine Currency on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning or soon thereafter at El
Varadero de Manila, Sangley Point, Cavite" the vessel M/V Dadiangas, Tugboat Timonel, Tugboat
Marinero and the other properties therein described. The unrebutted testimony of Atty. Redentor R.
Melo reveals that he went to the auction site at 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 May 1986 and
stayed there until past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Respondent did not show up to conduct the
auction sale. Later, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Atty. Melo, who had by that time returned
to Manila, was advised that the respondent appeared at 4:00 o'clock but that no auction was
conducted. In his Minutes of Sheriff's Sale dated 12 May 1986, the respondent made it appear that
he started the auction sale at 3:55 P.M. and concluded the proceedings at 5:00 o'clock that same
afternoon with Patriarca submitting the highest bid in the amount of P1,325,000.00. There is no
explanation as to why he could not start the bidding at 10:00 o'clock in the morning as set out in his
Notice. In the light of Atty. Melo's unrebutted testimony, it is evident that the respondent falsified this
entry in the Minutes. In his Sheriff's Certificate of Sale also dated 12 May 1986, the respondent
certified that the highest bidder "thereupon did pay to the undersigned Deputy Sheriff the bid price of
ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P1,325,000.00) PESOS, which
amount was credited to the partial satisfaction of the Writ of Execution." However, it is a fact that as
also found by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 15 May 1989, which the respondent cannot
refute as he himself submitted the same to this Court and even asked for the dismissal of the
administrative case against him on the basis of the said Resolution:

. . .on May 23, 1986, Patriarca offered the three vessels — M/V Dadiangas, T/B
Marinero, and T/B Timonel — to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman engaged
in the buy and sell of scrap iron. Having agreed on the price of P1,325,000.00 for the
three vessels, Cailian, Patriarca, and his wife repaired to the Navotas Branch of the
Philippine National Bank that same day. Cailian bought Cashiers Check No. 273290
dated May 23, 1986, for P1,325,000.00 which, upon request of Patriarca who said he
had no money to pay for the vessels, was made payable to the order of "GEN. STAR
CONTAINER C/O ATTY. JOSE C. SISON," the judgment creditor.
 On the same day, May 23, 1986, they went to Branch XXXI, RTC of Manila, where
Cailian met the accused for the first time. Atty. Jose C. Sison, and one Judge Luz.
Atty. Sison, Judge Luz, and Patriarca with his wife brought Cailian to the canteen of
the building housing Branch XXXI. She gave the cashier's check to Atty. Sison, and
Judge Luz prepared our Deed of Sale. It was dated May 20, 1986, the figure "20"
being handwritten, and appeared to have been acknowledged on the same date.

As a result of the transaction, Patriarca delivered to Cailian M/V Dadiangas and one
of the tugboats, which was later on taken back from her. The other tugboat was the
subject of a third-party claim of Compania Maritima alleged to be different from
Maritime, the judgment debtor.

Clearly, therefore, if indeed the public auction was held on 12 May 1986 and Patriarca was the
highest bidder therein, he did not at such time have the cash, corresponding to his submitted bid, for
delivery to the respondent and eventually, the judgment creditor. Accordingly, pursuant to his own
Notice, which of course is binding on him, Patriarca could not be awarded the bid. The latter's
inability to produce cash is equivalent to a bidder's refusal to pay under Section 22, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court in which case, as provided therein, the sheriff "may again sell the property to the
highest bidder and shall not be responsible for any loss occasioned thereby." Moreover, the sheriff
may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of such person. Since Patriarca had no available cash to
pay for the bid, the respondent could neither deliver the subject articles nor execute and deliver to
the former a certificate of sale as provided for in Section 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
even granting for the sake of argument that he did conduct the public auction on 12 May 1986, the
respondent, in view of the non-payment of the purchase price, violated said Section 25.
Furthermore, he falsified his Sheriff's Certificate of Sale upon entering therein the fact that Patriarca
"thereupon did pay" to him the bid price of P1,325,000.00 which was credited to the partial
satisfaction of the writ of execution. Assuming that Patriarca truly paid the purchase price, there
could be no possible explanation for the belated Sheriff's Partial Report dated 23 May 1986.

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that Patriarca never acquired ownership over the vessel
M/V Dadiangas and the tugboats Marinero and Timonel. Neither could he then have "sold" the same
to Cailian. Hence, the latter stands on an entirely different footing and must then be considered as
the true vendee who purchased the vessels on 23 May 1986 without any public bidding. In this
regard, the respondent, together with a certain Judge Luz and Atty. Jose C. Sison, became a willing
co-conspirator to conceal this illegal act by making it appear that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian
per a deed of sale which the said Judge Luz prepared on 23 May 1986, but which was dated 20 May
1986. In his haste to cover up for his misdeeds, he even forgot to charge against the proceeds of the
said "sale" the sheriff's fee which is prescribed in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court; such an
omission certainly prejudiced the government. It is unfortunate that the Sandiganbayan failed to
appreciate these illegal acts and despicable maneuverings. Be that as it may, its dismissal of the
criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent doggedly
believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action against him or to give him a
clean bill of health in all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying
that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a
condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution
guarantee an accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence
of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. 4 Then too,
there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires in these
cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 5

Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the respondent (a) falsified the
Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court by not conducting another bidding — assuming one was held on 12 May 1986 —
after the alleged highest bidder, Patriarca, failed to pay the bid price, by executing in the latter's favor
a certificate of Sheriff's Sale and by delivering the auctioned vessels despite the failure to pay: (c)
illegally sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 May 1986 without a public bidding; and (d) maliciously
connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others to cover up such illegal acts by making it
appear, by means of an antedated deed of sale, that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian.

Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. He not only deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an
employee of the court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the Judiciary. He has
transgressed the constitutional command that as a public office is a public trust, all public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs.
Reblando, 7 We laid down the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the court of which the herein respondent is the assigned
sheriff, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else must be beyond suspicion.

While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute longer in the Judiciary, his
dismissal from the service should not end this case. In the light of the above findings of conspiracy
with other parties, including a certain Judge Luz who prepared the alleged deed of sale in favor of
Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper, in a manner of speaking, in this case. This could open the
door to the secret chambers of a rumored syndicate which is in the business of fixing attachments
and execution sales.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service, effective immediately, respondent
RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the monetary value of his leave credits, if
any, and with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to conduct a thorough inquiry into and
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the execution sale in question, more particularly the
true identity and alleged participation of a certain Judge Luz as above indicated. For that purpose, it
should avail of the records of Criminal Case No. 12987 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan
and take the testimonies of, among others, the respondent, Ms. Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, Atty. Jose C.
Sison and Mr. Rolando Patriarca.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., took no part.

In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its
case and that there is no indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent
setting aside of the trial court’s decision of acquittal will put the private respondent in double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3)
after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.11
11
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80 (1999)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123045. November 16, 1999]

DEMETRIO R. TECSON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify
the Decision dated June 30, 1995 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1995 of the
Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal Case No. 18273.Petitioner was found guilty of
violating Section 3[c] of R.A. No. 3019, in the assailed decision which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Demetrio Tecson y Robles guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime defined in Section 3[c] of Republic Act 3019 and charged in the
Information. Accordingly, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment
of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, and perpetual disqualification from public
office. No civil indemnity is awarded for the reason that Tecson and Mrs. Salvacion
D. Luzana entered into a compromise agreement waiving his/her claims against the
other.

So Ordered.[1]

Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged in the Information, the
Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Private complainant before the Sandiganbayan, Mrs. Salvacion Luzana, is a resident of
Poblacion, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor of the petitioner. She claims to be a
housewife who occasionally dabbles in farming.[2]
The antecedent facts, which gave rise to the instant case, were synthesized by the
Sandiganbayan as follows:

In the last week of September 1989, upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana
agreed to engage in an investment business.They would sell tickets at P100.00 each
which after 30 days would earn P200.00 or more. She would buy appliances and
cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the sales of tickets, and resell
them. No other details were disclosed on how the business would operate, and Tecson
does not appear to have contributed any monetary consideration to the capital. On
September 27, 1989, they began selling tickets.

Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that day early in the morning two
booklets of tickets, for which he signed the covers of the booklets to acknowledge
receipt. Before noon of the same day he returned after having already sold 40 tickets
in the amount of P4,000.00, bringing with him a Mayors Permit in the name of Mrs.
Luzana for their business called LD Assurance Privileges. He asked for a cash
advance of P4,000.00 which he would use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989,
and he would not release the Mayors Permit unless the cash advance was given
him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the due date yet, so he
was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson signed for the cash advance.

On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the
instructions of Tecson. The permit was in her name but the same was for the operation
of Prosperidad Investment and Sub-Dealership, the new name of the business. In the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on October 17,
1989 presided over by Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the business
permit at the instance of the Provincial Director of the Department of Trade and
Industry.[3]
 With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below filed an
administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section
60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. SP-90-01 and referred to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur for appropriate action.
Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private complainant below
also filed a civil case against petitioner for damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 716.
A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This complaint was docketed as
OMB Case No. 3-8-02919. It was subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took
jurisdiction. The Information filed on October 28, 1992 reads:

That on or about September 23, 1989, in the Municipality of Prosperidad, Province of

Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, while in the performance of his administrative and
official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally request and receive for his benefit the
amount of P4,000.00, for and in consideration of the issuance of a permit to operate an
investment business, in favor of one Salvacion Luzana, a person for whom the
accused has in fact received and obtained a mayors permit or license.

Contrary to law.[4]

On July 29, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the
administrative case.
On October 28, 1991, a compromise agreement was reached between the litigants in Civil
Case No. 716. The trial court approved the same on December 6, 1991.
On November 3, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued an order for petitioners arrest. He was
immediately apprehended, but after posting a property bond on December 2, 1992, was released
on provisional liberty.
On February 23, 1993, Tecson was arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then proceeded on the merits.
On June 30, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First Division rendered the assailed decision
convicting appellant of violating R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration. The respondent court denied the same in its resolution dated December 20,
1995.
Hence, this instant petition. Petitioner contends that:

THE RESPONDENT COURT/SANDIGANBAYAN (1st DIVISION) GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION

A- IN RULING UNREASONABLY THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN

PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING TESTIMONY OF THE NBI EXPERT SHOWING THAT THE
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY COMPLAINANTS AND SUBJECTED FOR
EXAMINATION BY NBI ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE HANDWRITING OF THE
ACCUSED, AND THEREFORE FABRICATED.
 B- IN PROCEEDING WITH THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE
OF JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL RENDERED BY THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN EXONERATING THE ACCUSED.
C- IN IGNORING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.[5]
Otherwise stated, the issues are:
(1) Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused
serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan;
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy; and
(3) Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The issues shall be discussed in seriatim.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that the dismissal of the administrative case before
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur is conclusive and binding upon the
parties. Relying on our ruling in B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation
Commission,[6] he theorizes that the rule, which prohibits the reopening of matters already
determined by competent judicial authority, applies to quasi-judicial bodies or administrative
offices. Having been exonerated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the
administrative case, he now submits the same is res judicata and thus bars the Sandiganbayan
from hearing his case.
Petitioners theory has no leg to stand on. First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a
doctrine of civil law.[7] It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official
or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or
omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in
damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured
party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be
punished criminally.Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or
other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the
penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar
the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.[8] We conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP 90-01 is
no bar to the criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.
As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or
misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the government and its agencies and instrumentalities.[9] The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is
that the order of the trial court dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that being tried before the Sandiganbayan
violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already cleared him of all charges.
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
 Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.[10] None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed
that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy
will not lie.
With respect to the third issue, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in merely
relying upon the alleged positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses when it rendered the
judgment of conviction against him. He theorizes that such testimony failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He further contends that it was error for the respondent court to ignore
the findings and conclusions of the NBI handwriting expert, especially as of the nine standard
signatures, five were not established to be genuine signatures. He submits that the
Sandiganbayan should have applied the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in considering the
documentary evidence against him.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 states:

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,

the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx

c. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, or other pecuniary or

material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public
officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain,
any government permit or license in consideration for the help given or to be given,
without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

The crime charged has four elements, namely:

(1) The accused is a public officer;
(2) That in any manner or capacity he secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a
person any government permit or license;
(3) That he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and
(4) That he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in
consideration for the help given or to be given.
As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, all of the aforementioned elements concur in
the instant case. Its findings on this concurrence are as follows:

First, Tecson was in September 1989 a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor
of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.

Second, in his official capacity as Mayor, he signed and issued on September 27,
1989, a Mayors Permit to and in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their investment
business in which he does not appear to have made any contribution to the capital.

Third, before he released the Mayors Permit to Mrs. Luzana, he requested and
received on that same day, September 27, 1989, at about 11:00 a.m., the amount of P4,
000.00 to be used by him in the fiesta to be held on September 29, 1989.
And, fourth, Tecson requested and received the amount of P4, 000.00 as cash advance
in consideration of the help he gaveviz, issuance of Mayors Permit which he would
not deliver to Mrs. Luzana unless she acceded to his request. Although Tecson
expected to have a share in the profits of the business as partner of Mrs. Luzana, the
same was not yet due. In fact, there was as yet no profits to speak of, for they began
operating only in the morning of September 27, 1989, the very day the cash advance
was requested and received.[11]

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts[12] and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are
conclusive upon the Supreme Court. The exceptions are: (1) where the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. [13] We have meticulously
scrutinized the records of this case and find that petitioner has shown no cause for this Court to
apply any of the foregoing exceptions. We find that the evidence on record amply supports the
findings and conclusions of the respondent court.
Petitioners assault on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is unavailing. It is a time-
tested doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight and is even conclusive and binding upon appellate courts. [14] The Supreme Court will not
interfere with the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, absent any indication
or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts or has gravely abused its
discretion.[15] Absent a showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by any improper
motive, their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [16] Recourse to the records shows that no
error of law or abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent court when it gave credence
to the positive testimony of the prosecutions witnesses as opposed to petitioners bare
denials. Denial, like alibi, is a weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of positive
testimony by prosecution witnesses.[17]Denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be
given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.[18] Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses
and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserves more credence and
is entitled to greater evidentiary weight.[19]
With regards the NBI experts testimony, the respondent court found that:

[T]he function of a handwriting expert witness is to place before the court data upon
which the court can form its own opinion. The value of the opinions of experts on
handwritings depends largely upon the ground upon which they base their opinions
and clearness with which they can demonstrate their correctness. So that in order that
opinions of experts may have weight, the experts should go into the details of their
examinations of the writings which they have compared.

In this case Cruz was not asked to testify on the grounds, data or details on which he
based his conclusion, except generally that the questioned signatures were written in a
slow drawn manner while the standard signatures were executed in a free and
continuous manner and that there is a pen stop in the questioned signatures in the
letter s. He did not testify on other different characteristics such as pressure of the pen,
loops in the strokes, general alignment, structural formation, height of the letters,
whether the letters were standing, slanting forward or backward, etc. His testimony is
therefore not of much help in determining the genuineness of the questioned
signatures.[20]

Given these circumstances, petitioners reliance on the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus will be unavailing. The maxim is a rule of evidence. In affirming a rebuttable
presumption of fact, the trier of facts, must consider all the evidence, other than that found to be
false and it is his duty to give effect to so much of it, if any, as found to be true. [21] The rule is
merely permissive and not mandatory.[22] It does not relieve the trier of facts from passing on
credibility of the whole testimony or evidence presented or excuse him from weighing the whole
of the testimony or evidence.[23] In the instant case, the records show that the Sandiganbayan, as
the trier of facts, considered the entirety of the evidence against appellant and the latters
conviction was not based solely on the genuineness of the signatures testified to by the NBI
expert. The elements of the offense charged having been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
petitioners conviction must therefore stand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 18273 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 110936 February 4, 1994

FRANCISCO A. TAN, JR., petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RENATO C. CORONA, In His Capacity as Assistant Secretary for
Legal Affairs, Office of the President, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, and ANDRES R. MENGUITO, respondents.

Cortesss & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The instant petition seeks to nullify the Resolution, dated 12 January 1993, of the Office of the
President ("OP"), denying petitioner's partial motion for reconsideration of OP Resolution, dated 30
July 1990, which exonerated the petitioner of all charges in Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF)
Administrative Case No. 278 and ordered his reinstatement to his former position. Invoking the "no
work, no pay" rule, the Office of the President did not make any award for back salaries.

The petitioner, then Fisheries Regional Director under the then Ministry of Agriculture and Food, was
dismissed from the service on 30 April 1986 pursuant to a decision of the Minister of Agriculture in
MAF Administrative Case No. 278 which found him guilty of the offense of grave misconduct,
oppression and violation of existing Civil Service laws.

From the order of the MAF, the petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
CSC, however, referred the case to the Office of the President since the petitioner was a Presidential
appointee and a Career Executive Officer (CESO) with Rank IV.

On 30 July 1990, the Office of the President issued a Resolution, signed by then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraeg, Jr., stating, in its dispositive portion, that —

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision and Order of the Minister of
Agriculture and Food respectively dated April 30, 1986 and August 29, 1986, are
hereby SET ASIDE. Appellant Francisco A. Tan, Jr., is hereby EXONERATED of all
 the charges against him. Accordingly, the Department of Agriculture to which
department the BFAR had been transferred, is hereby directed to reinstate Tan to his
former or any equivalent position. Tan, however, is not entitled to payment of back
salaries pursuant to the principle of "no work, no pay." (p. 39, Rollo.)

The petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration, praying that he should likewise be granted
back salaries.

In a Resolution, dated 12 January 1993, the Office of the President, through respondent Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, denied petitioner's partial motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit. (p. 47, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Office of the President and Renato C. Corona in denying the petitioner's claim for
back salaries. The petitioner also named as respondents the Department of Agriculture, the
Commission on Audit and Andres R. Menguito (the complainant in the administrative case).

The petition has merit.

In rejecting petitioner's claim, the Office of the President has relied on the fact that Section 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law), unlike its counterpart in the old Civil Service Law,
does not expressly provide for any payment of back salaries to government officials or employees
who are found to have been illegally dismissed and ordered to be thereby reinstated to their former
positions.

Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point. The provision refers to preventive
suspensions during the pendency of administrative investigations, and it does not cover dismissed
civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent
positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal vs.
Melchor (101 SCRA 857), is that when "a government official or employee in the classified civil
service had been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held." Such award of backwages,
however, has since been limited to a maximum period of five (5) years (San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA
258).

In this instance, the Solicitor General himself has recommended the grant of the petition for similar
reasons. In addition, he has made the following manifestation:

Public respondents Department of Agriculture and Commission on Audit have

expressed their concurrence to the recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor
General. The Office of the President has likewise expressed no objection to the
Solicitor General's recommendation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED as prayed for; however, the payment of
back salaries shall be limited to a maximum of five (5) years. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part.

Nocon, J., is on leave.