CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Doctrines on
Persons & Family Relations,
Property and
Wills & Succession

Submitted to
Professor Marciano Delson

Submitted by
AGUILA, Laisa Mae
DE CASTRO, Chrissa Amistad
DELA CRUZ, Jennah Marie
ESQUIVEL, Ron Erwin
GALAPATE, Erika
SANTOS, Irene Samantha Alexis
SANTOS, Karmela

CIVREV1 4B

25 July 2013
I. PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

1. Art. 136 of the Labor Code states -- It shall be unlawful for an employer to require
as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of marriage.

Policy against marriage is precarious as that it strikes at the very

essence, ideals and purposes of marriage as an inviolable social
institution, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation, as
stated in Article 1 of the Family Code.
(Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. NLRC; G.R. No.
118978; May 23, 1997)
2. The husband is obliged to support the wife:

1. MARRIAGE; NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION. — Marriage is something more

than a contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once
formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by
agreement, and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their
agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, support,
and live with each other.

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE; ACTION FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. — The

wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on
her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance
when he has no other remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the
Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy
it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own
home the one having the right to the same.
(Eloisa Goitia Y Dela Camara vs. Jose Campos Rueda)

3. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the

failure to present it is not a proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence
may be presented to prove marriage.
(Leoncia Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals)

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4. Insurance proceeds is a community property therefore 50% belongs to the wife,
which is not subject to inheritance tax, and 50% to the estate of the deceased,
which is subject to inheritance tax.
(Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Juan Posadas, Jr.; G.R. No. L-34583; October
22, 1931)

5. The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary
because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7
consecutive years of absence is only needed.
(Valdez vs. Republic; GR No. 180863; September 8, 2009)

6. Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly states, “Laws relating to
family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad” The
Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, and
in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce
on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband.
(Tenchavez vs. Escaño; G.R. No. L-19671; November 29, 1965)

7. Where a man’s promise to marry is the proximate cause of giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, and in reality, he has no intention of marrying her,
Article 21 could justify the award of damages.
(Gashem Shookat vs. Court of Appeals; 219 SCRA 15; February 19, 1993)

8. Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a
civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in
nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently
of each other.
(Spouses Yu vs. PCIB; GR No. 147902; March 17, 2006)

9. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
(Republic vs. Cagandahan; GR. No. 166676; September 12, 2008)

10. Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement ". . . between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a
divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce."
(Ocampo vs. Florenciano)

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11. When "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be responsible. The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one‘s rights but also in the performance of one‘s duties. (Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes; G R No 154259; February 28, 2005)

12. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or

administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.
(Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. CIR; G.R. No. L-21289; 4 October 1971)

13. A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”
(Mercado vs. Tan; 337 SCRA 122)

14. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.

(Marcos vs. COMELEC; G.R. No.119976; September 18, 1995)

15. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(Lukban vs. Republic; L-8492; February 29, 1956)

16. The right of the employer to dismiss an employee should bot be confused with
the matter in which the right is ecercised and the effects flowing form it. If the
dismissal is done abusicelt, then the employer is liable for damages to the
employee.
(Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 81262;
August 25 1989)

17. Article 21, this Court is of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in

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 reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter.
(Gashem Shokat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals & Marilou Gonzales; 219 SCRA
115; G.R. No. 97336; February 19, 1993)

18. Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the rule that a marriage between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.”
A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. The
Court highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
(Garcia vs. Recio; G. R. No. 138322; Oct. 2, 2001)

19. A case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial

question on the condition that it must be proven that the petitioner’s consent to
the marriage was obtained through intimidation, violence and undue influence in
order to establish that this act in the subsequent marriage was done involuntarily.
(Donato vs. Hon. Luna; G.R. No. L-54598; April 15, 1988)

20. The property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage
(Diño vs. Diño)

21. Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law.
(De Jesus vs. Syquia; 58 Phil 866)

22. Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the rule that a marriage between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.”
A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. The
Court highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our

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 courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it
(Cui vs. Arellano University; 2 SCRA 205)

23. A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man
to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
(Carmen Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao; G.R. No. 26795; July 31, 1970)

24. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents
or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
(Antonio Geluz vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. L-16439; July 20, 1961)

25. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred
institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.
(Buccat vs. Buccat; April 25, 1941)

26. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as

long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to
be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage.
(Armas vs. Calisterio; 330 SCRA 201; April 6, 2000)

27. The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
(Aquino vs. Delizo; 109 Phil 21)

28. Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they

lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint

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 efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
(Valdez vs. RTC; 260 SCRA 211)

29. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding article.
(Malilin, Jr. vs. Castillo)

30. Burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.
(Ayala Investment & Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No.
118305; February 12, 1998)

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II. PROPERTY

1. “Parties to a contract may treat as personal property that which by

nature is real property; and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things
classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle might be considered personal property.”
(Standard Oil Co. v. Jaranilo. GR No. 20329. March 16, 1923)

2. “The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of
the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Art. 420 defines
property of public dominion as one “intended for public use”. Even if
the government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for public use”
if anyone can use it under the same terms and conditions as the rest of
the public.
(MIAA v. CA. GR No. 155650. July 20, 2006)

3. “Properties of public dominion devoted to public use are outside the

commerce of men and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU
to private person. LGU’s have no authority to control or regulate the
use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them
by Congress.”
(Macasiano v. Diokno. GR No. 97764. August 10, 1992)

4. “The fact that the machineries were bolted or cemented on real property
mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under Art. 415 (3)
and (5) as the parties’ intent has to be looked into. Even if the properties
appear to be immovable by nature, nothing prohibits the parties from
treating them as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of
estoppel.”
(Tsai v. CA. GR No. 120098. October 2, 2001)

5. “The equipment and living quarters of the crew,being permanently

attached to the platform which is also an immovable, are immovable. This
is especially so that they are intended to meet the needs of the business
and the industry of the corporation.”
(Fels Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas et al., GR No. 168557.
February 16, 2007)

6. “Where a chattel mortgage is constituted on a machinery permanently

attached to the ground, the machinery is to be regarded as personal
property as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby.”
(Makati Leasing and Financial Corporation v. Weareaver Textile Mills,
Inc., GR No. L-58469. May 16, 1983)

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7. “The special civil action of replevin is applicable only to personal
property. It cannot be filed when the subject machinery and
equipment had become immovable property.”
(Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
L-7057. October 29, 1954)

8. “The mere reclamation of certain foreshore land and submerged areas

by a government agency like the Public Estate Authority does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a
law or a presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition
or concession.”
(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, May 6, 2003)

9. “The expropriation resulting from the actions of nature as in the case

where land becomes part of the sea. The owner loses his property in
favor of the State without any compensation.”
(Republic v. CA)

10. “Damages arising from the act of the owner in building a fence within
the latter’s lot is considered damnun absque injuria since it is the
owner’s legal right to do so.”
(Custodio v. CA, GR No. 116100. February 9, 1996)

11. “When the co-ownership is terminated by partition and it appears that

the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion
pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good faith,
then the provisions of Art. 448 should apply to determine the specific
rights of the parties.”
(Ignao v. IAC, GR No. 72876. January 18, 1991)

12. “The landowner can choose between appropriating the building by

paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price
of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable
rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease,
the court must fix the terms thereof.”
(Rosales, et al. v. Castellfort, et al., October 5, 2005)

13. “The landowner may not refuse both to pay for the building or to sell
the land, or instead, seek to compel the owner of the building to
remove the building from the land. He is entitled to such removal only

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 when, after having chosen to sell the land, the other party fails to pay
for said land.”
(Ignacio v. Hilario, GR No. L-175, April 30, 1946)

14. “Should no other arrangement be agreed upon, the owner of the land
does not automatically become the owner of the improvement.”
(Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Timbang, GR No. L-12812, September 29,
1959)

15. “The option to appropriate the building or sell the land belongs to the
landowner. The only right of the builder in good faith is the right to
reimbursement, not to compel the owner of the land to sell. The option
is not to buy but to sell. The option is given to the landowner
because his right is older, and because of the principle of accession, he
is entitled to the thing attached to his land.”
(Quemuel v. Olaes, GR No. L-11084, April 29, 1961)

16. “An alluvion is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the
moment the soil deposit can be seen but the additional area does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. The riparian owner must
register the additional area.”
(Heirs of E. Navarro v. IAC)

17. “Failure to register the acquired alluvial deposit by accretion subjects said
accretion to acquisition thru prescription by third persons.”
(Reynante v. CA, GR No. 95907, April 8, 1992)

18. “A riparian owner cannot acquire the addition to his land caused by
special works (e.g. dikes) expressly intended by him to bring about
accretion (i.e. for reclamation purposes) and not to protect his property
from the destructive force of the waters of the river.”
(Republic v. CA, GR No. L-43105, August 31, 1984)

19. “Art. 457 excludes all deposits caused by human intervention. Aluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature.”
(Vda. De Nazareno, et al., v. CA, GR No. 98405, June 26, 1996)

20. “In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was
sudden, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused
by alluvium and erosion.”
(Payatas –Estate Improvement Co., v. Tuason, GR No. L-30067, March
23, 1929)

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21. “In case of uprooted trees, the owner retains ownership if he makes a
claim within 6 months. This does not include trees which remain planted
on a know portion of land carried by the force of the waters. In the latter
case, the trees are regarded as accessories of the land through gradual
changes in the course of adjoining stream.”
(Payatas- Estate Improvement Co., v. Tuason, supra)

22. “The possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be
regarded as adverse to the other co-owner but in fact beneficial to all of
them.”
(Salvador v. CA, GR No. 109910, April 5, 1995)

23. “Partition is the division between two or more persons of real or personal
property which they own in common so that each may enjoy and possess
his sole estate to the exclusion of and without interference from the
others.”
(Avila v. Sps. Barabat, GR No. 141993, March 17, 2006)

24. “An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved.”
(Balo v. CA, GR No. 129704)

25. “An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding
upon the parties.”
(Caro v. CA, GR No. L-46001, March 25, 1982)

26. “Mere receiving of rents or profits, payment of taxes, or construction of a

fence or building would not be sufficient proof of exclusive or adverse
possession because anyone in the co-ownership may do it.”
(Laguna v. Levantino, GR No. L-47386, April 18, 1941)

27. “The act of executing the affidavit of self-adjudication did not constitute
sufficient act of repudiation. In fact there was bad faith of the co-heir in
feigning sole ownership of his property to the exclusion of the other co-
heirs.”
(Galvez v. CA, GR No. 157954, March 24, 2006)

28. “While it is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. Thus,
where one registered the property in question in his name in fraud of his
co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the
time the latter discovers the fraudulent act.”
(Adille v. CA, GR No. L-46484, January 29, 1988)

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29. “Redemption of the whole property by the co-owner does not vest in him
sole ownership over the said property. Redemption duly made within the
period prescribed by law inures to the benefit of the co-ownership and
does not put an end to its existence.”
(Mariano v. CA, GR No. 101522, May 28, 1993)

30. “Possession in good faith of a movable is presumed ownership. It is

equivalent to title. No further proof is necessary.”
(Aznar v. Yapdiangco, GR No. L-18536, March 31, 1965)

31. “In a usufruct, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property are
transferred to the usufructuary. The owner of the property maintains the
jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even
destroy the same.”
(Hermedes v. CA, GR No. 107132, October 8, 1999)

32. “Corollary to the right to all the rents, to choose the tenant, and to fix the
amount of the rents, a usufructuary of the rents has the right to choose
himself as the tenant, provided that the obligations he has assumed
towards the owner of the property are fulfilled.”
(Fabie v. Gutierrez David, GR No. L-123, December 12, 1945)

33. “Easement of right of way cannot be acquired by prescription because it

is discontinuous/ intermittent.”
(Ronquillo et al., v. Roco, GR No. L-10619, February 28, 1958)

34. “The easement of right of way is discontinuous because it is exercised

only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. The
presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not change this.
It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing
the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof,
that categorizes such into continuous or discontinuous.”
(Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, GR No. 124699, July 31, 2003)

35. “Donation and acceptance may be contained in the same instrument, in

which case there is already knowledge of the acceptance, hence the
donation is already perfected.”
(Laureta v. Mata, 44 Phil. 668)

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III. WILLS & SUCCESSION

1. “Where the testimony of the attending physician is based on mere

professional speculation, such testimony cannot prevail over the positive
statements of credible witnesses.”
(Samson v. Coralles Tan Quintin, 44 Phil. 573)

2. “However if the testimony of such physician is not in the nature of mere

professional speculation, as when it is established that he attended the
testator during his last illness and saw him on the day when the will was
supposed to have been executed, such testimony shall be given more
credence.”
(Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil 444)

3. “There is substantial compliance with the requirement if the will states

elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, such as when the
acknowledgement itself states the same.”
(Taboada v. Rosal, GR No. L-36033, November 5, 1982)

4. “The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To allow such
would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will
which would be in contravention of Arts. 805 and 806.”
(Cruz v. Villasor, GR No. L-32213, November 26, 1973)

5. “An acknowledgement taken outside the territorial limits of the officer’s

jurisdiction is void as if the person taking it were wholly without official
character.”
(Guerrero v. Bihis, GR No. 174144, April 17, 2007)

6. “In a case where the testator did not read the final draft of the will, but the
lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the presence of
the testator, three witnesses, and notary public, the Court held that the
formal imperfections should be brushed aside when the spirit behind the
law was served though the letter was not.”
(Alvarado v. Gaviola, GR , No. 74695, September 14, 1993)

7. “Criminal action will not lie against the forger of the will which had been
duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
(Mercado v. Santos, GR No. 45629, September 22, 1938)

8. “The fact that the will has been allowed without opposition and the order
allowing the same has become final and executor is not a bar to the

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 presentation of a codicil provided it complies with the all the formalities for
executing a will. It is not necessary that the will and codicil be probated
together as the codicil may be concealed by an interested party. They
may be probated one after the other.”
(Macam v. Gatmaitan, GR No. 40445, August 17, 1934)

9. “To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind

that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy
the free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his
own.”
(Pascual v. De la Cruz, 28 SCRA 421)

10. “If some heirs are genuinely interested in that part of their late father’s
property which has been reserved for them in their capacity as
compulsory heirs, then they should simply exercise their action ad
supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of legitime. Such relief
must be sought during the distribution and partition stage of a case for
settlement of the estate of their father.”
(Gala v. Ellice Agro-Industrial Corp., GR No. 156819, December 11,
2003)

11. “An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms
of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the property, the disinheritance of the testator’s son, nonetheless is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of the son.”
(Seangio v. Reyes, GR Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)

12. “The actual seeing of the signature made is not necessary. It is sufficient
if the signatures are made where it is possible for each the necessary
parties, if they so desire, to see the signatures placed upon the will.”
(Yap Tua v. Yap Ka Kuan, GR No. L-684, September 1, 1914)

13. “Preterition is a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In

the case at bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot
apply.”
(Heirs of Polincronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, GR No.
165748/ GR No. 165930, September 14, 2011)

14. “Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but

she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line—her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their
name altogether , the case is one of preterition of the parents and not

14
 disinheritance. Preterition shall annul the institution of an heir. This is
annulment in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devisees and legacies.”
(Nuguid v. Nuguid et al., GR No. L-21173, June 23, 1966)

15. “Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir
or the fiduciary. A fideicommisary substitution is therefore, void if the first
heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.”
(Rabadilla v. Coscolluela, GR No. 113725, June 29, 2000)

16. “The action for rescission on account of lesion prescribes after four years
from judicial approval of the partition.”
(Samson v. Araneta, GR No. 39697, April 5, 1934)

17. “A partition agreement which was executed pursuant to a will that was not
probated cannot be given effect. Before any will can have any force or
validity it must be probated—this cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy.”
(Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, GR No. 175720, September 11, 2007)

18. “Without the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir, the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir, there
is no fideicommissary substitution.”
(Rabadilla v. CA, GR No. 113725, June 29, 2000)

20. “A fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related in the
first degree to the second heir.”
(Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez, GR No. L-27952, February 15, 1982)

21. “It must be appear from the face of the will that the testator would not
have made the institution (of heirs) had he known the falsity of the cause.”
(Austria v. Reyes, GR No. L-23079, February 27, 1970)

22. “Fair arguments, persuasion, appeal to emotions and entreaties which,

without fraud or deceit or actual coercion, compulsion or restraint do not
constitute undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will.”
(Barreto v. Reyes, GR No. L-5830, January 31, 1956)

23. “Allegations of fraud and undue influence cannot co-exist because they
are mutually opposed and exclude each other that their joining as
grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against
the validity of the will.”
(Icasiano v. Icasiano)

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24. “The date in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of
its execution. However, when there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure, and the authenticity of the will is
established, and the only issue is whether or not the date “FEB. 1961”
appearing on the will is a valid compliance with Art. 810, probate of the
holographic will should be allowed under the principle of substantial
compliance.”
(In the matter of Intestate Estate of Andres de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus, GR No. L-38338, January 28, 1985)

25. “A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and
sworn to before the notary public.”
(Azuela v. CA et al.)

26. “If the number of pages is not stated in any part of the will and the will
does not contain any notarial acknowledgement wherein the number of
pages of the will should be stated, the ruling in Taboada v. Rosal is not
applicable.”
(Azuela v. CA et al., GR. No. 122880, April 12, 2006)

27. “The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page
of a testament due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course
of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.”
(Icasiano v. Icasiano, GR No. L-18979, June 30, 1964)

28. “The location of mandatory signatures is not mandatory in character,

provided that such signatures are present in every page of the will, except
the last. The words “left margin” are merely directory.”
(Avera v. Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil. 145)

29. “The law does not specify that the testator himself must perform the act of
writing. However, Art. 810 provides that in the case of holographic wills, it
must be written entirely in the handwriting of the testator himself. Thus, it
is only in the case of ordinary wills that whoever performs the mechanical
act of writing or drafting the will becomes a matter of indifference.”
(Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 427)

30. “If the signature is only a mere cross, it is acceptable as a valid signature,
provided it can be properly established that it is the testator’s usual
signature or at least one of the ways by which he had signed his name
before.”

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 (Garcia v. Lacuesta, 90 Phil. 489)

31. “(Monetary obligations) can only be charged against the estate of the
decedent and not against his heirs.”
(Pavia v. Dela Rosa, GR No. L-30383, March 18, 1907)

32. “Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the annulment of a
will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of a will is
mandatory.”
(Gallanosa v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676)

33. “The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue
influence existed at the time of its execution.”
(Coso v. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil. 585)

34. “A necessary or forced heir, according to the system of legitimes, has, by

provision of law, from the time of his birth, a vested right to acquire the
inheritance from his ascendants after their death and such a vested right
is inherent with his legitimate filiation to which belong the obligations and
rights of the author of his being.”
(Rocha v. Tuason, 39 Phil. 976)

35. “After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the
voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.”
(Santos v. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22, 1966)

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