G.R. No.
167173 December 27, 2007 immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS,
SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI
CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G.
REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR,
and FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J.
ANGARA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent
Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its
Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara (respondent).
Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated in
England with limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related
operations in the Philippines. Petitioners Paul Simon Morris, Sundara Ramesh, Owen Belman,
Sanjay Aggarwal, Rajamani Chandrashekar, Marivel Gonzales, Ma. Ellen Victor, Chona G.
Reyes, Zenaida Iglesias, Ramona Bernad, Michaelangelo Aguilar, and Fernand Tansingco are
the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Country Head of Consumer Banking,
General Manager for Credit Card and Personal Loans, Chief Financial Officer, Legal and
Compliance Officer, former Trust and Investment Services Head, Country Tax Officer, Head
of Corporate Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head of Client Relationships, and the Head
of Global Markets of SCB-Philippines, respectively. Respondent, on the other hand, is one of
the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines.
The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent
from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166;
(2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify
before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15,
2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the
Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad
testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from
compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S.
Resolution No. 166.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a
privilege speech entitled "Arrogance of Wealth"1 before the Senate based on a letter from
Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities
in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was
referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S.
Resolution No. 166,2 to wit:
RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO
THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS
OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7721, otherwise known as the "Law Liberalizing the Entry and
Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the Philippines," was approved on May 18, 1994 to
promote greater participation of foreign banks in the Philippine Banking Industry that will
stimulate economic growth and serve as a channel for the flow of funds into the economy;
WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine Banking Industry, foreign banks
were accorded the same privileges, allowed to perform the same functions and subjected to the
same limitations under relevant banking laws imposed upon domestic banks;
WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign banks granted the privilege to
do business in our country under Republic Act No. 7721;
WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered Bank whose actions have
reportedly defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of billions of pesos through the sale of
unregistered securities in the form of high-risk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed
as safe investment havens;
WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank clearly knew that its actions were
violative of Philippine banking and securities laws but cleverly disguised its illegal acts
through the use of pro-forma agreements containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank;
WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of conducting these questionable
activities, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas warned and eventually fined Standard Chartered
Bank a measly ₱30,000 for violating Philippine banking laws;
WHEREAS, the particular operations of Standard Chartered Bank may constitute "conducting
business in an unsafe and unsound manner," punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No.
7653 and should have drawn the higher penalty of revocation of its quasi-banking license;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8791 or the "General Banking Act of 2000" deems a particular
act or omission as conducting business in an unsafe and unsound manner as follows:
"Section 56.2 The act or omission has resulted or may result in material loss or damage or
abnormal risk to the institution's depositors, creditors, investors, stockholders or to the Bangko
Sentral or to the public in general."
WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a clear violation of Republic Act No.
8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code of 2000" which states:
"Section 8.1 Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or distribution within the
Philippines, without a registration statement duly filed with and approved by the Commission.
Prior to such sale, information on the securities, in such form and with such substance as the
Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to each prospective purchaser."
WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly issued a Cease-and-
Desist Order (CDO) against Standard Chartered Bank for the sale of these unregistered
securities but the case was reportedly settled administratively and dismissed after Standard
Chartered Bank paid a fine of ₱7 Million;
WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that Standard Chartered Bank
actively engaged in promoting and marketing the so-called "Global Third Party Mutual Funds"
to the investing public and even set revenue quotas for the sale of these funds;
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in
preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules
intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in
preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing
public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind
the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and
representatives among other additional regulatory measures;
Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to direct the
Committee on Banks, Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, into the reported sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard
Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public.
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the
initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of
the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit
their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a
letter3 dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were
cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry,
thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who
among those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter,
Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and
that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureau’s Watch List.
Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing,
petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement4 that brought to the attention of
respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make
disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in
Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding
the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date.
However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad
testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set on
March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners are as follows:
I.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION,
BUT IN REALITY PROBING INTO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN THE
PHILIPPINES. SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL ACTIONS NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY
AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF MAKATI CITY.
II.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY
"IN AID OF LEGISLATION," BUT IN REALITY IN "AID OF COLLECTION" BY A
HANDFUL OF TWO (2) CLIENTS OF STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES
WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH
COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE
LEGISLATURE.
III.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
COMPELLING PETITIONERS, SOME OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN THE
PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY SAID CLIENTS, IN
VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS’ RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN COURT RATHER THAN
ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY – A CLEAR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS,
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND TO TRAVEL.
 IV.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULES.5
Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject
matter is the very same subject matter of the following cases, to wit:
(a) CA-G.R. SP No. 85078, entitled "Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza P.
Rosario, et al., pending before the 9th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the
petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the dismissal by the Department of
Justice of his complaint against Standard Chartered Bank and its officers accusing
them of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN
VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1869 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE
315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
(b) CA-G.R. SP No. 86200, entitled "Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael
Buenaventura, et al.", pending before the 15th Division of the Court of Appeals. In
the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the termination for lack of
probable cause by the Anti-Money Laundering Council ("AMLC") of the
investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for money laundering activities BY
SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 87328, entitled "Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza
Paglinawan Rozario, et al.," pending before the 16th Division of the Court of
Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the dismissal by the Department
of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint accusing SCB and its officers of violation of
the Securities Regulation Code by SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.
(d) Civil Case No. 70173, entitled "Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs. Standard
Chartered Bank," pending before Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City. Plaintiff seeks damages and recovery of their investment accusing the bank
of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(e) Criminal Case No. 332034, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V.
Baviera," pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.
Petitioner Morris is the private complainant in this information for extortion or
blackmail against Mr. Baviera for demanding the payment of US$2 Million with the
threat to EXPOSE THE BANK'S "LARGE SCALE SCAM" CONSISTING
[OF] ILLEGAL SELLING OF UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES
BY THE BANK, before various government offices, such as the Department of
Justice, the BIR, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Regional Trial Courts, and both
houses of Congress.
(f) Criminal Case No. 331395, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V.
Baviera," pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.
Petitioners Victor and Chona Reyes are the private complainants in this information
for perjury committed by Mr. Baviera in securing a hold departure order against the
petitioners herein from the Department of Justice for their alleged involvement in
syndicated estafa and swindling BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.
(g) I.S. No. 2004-B-2279-80, entitled "Aurelio Litonjua III and Aurelio Litonjua, Jr.
vs. Antonette de los Reyes, et al.," pending before the Office of the Prosecutor,
Makati City. This is a criminal complaint accusing SCB and its officers of estafa for
SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.6
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,7 the petitioners claim that since the
issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is
already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent,
by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners’ case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over
which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate
Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting
judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various
courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of
unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon.
However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was
without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Court’s
determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the
speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any
contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of
Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to
comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the
legislative investigation in that case.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain
in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry
to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three
Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in
preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules
intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in
preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing
public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind
the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and
representatives among other additional regulatory measures; (emphasis supplied)
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the
error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very
same Senator Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign
bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x." This fallacy is made more glaring when
we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future."
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise,
it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno 8 –
[T]he power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The
Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were
subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on
the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the
objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the
recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, "in aid of
collection." They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter a party to the
pending court cases cited by petitioners, were only seeking a friendly forum so that they could
recover their investments from SCB-Philippines; and that the respondent has allowed itself to
be used as the conveniently available vehicle to effect this purpose.
However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the petition, Atty. Bocobo
did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering his investment. On the
contrary, and as confirmed during the initial hearing on February 28, 2005, his letter-
complaint humbly requested the Senate to conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal
activities of SCB-Philippines, with the end view of preventing the future occurrence of any
similar fraudulent activity by the banks in general.9 Baviera, on the other hand, was not a
"complainant" but merely a witness in the investigation, invited to testify on the alleged illegal
sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines, being one of the supposed victims
thereof.
The Court further notes that when it denied petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a TRO to
restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005,10 respondent proceeded with the investigation. On
the said date, outraged by petitioners’ imputation that it was conducting the investigation "in
aid of collection," respondent held petitioners, together with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo
Geronimo, in contempt and ordered their detention for six hours.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution dated March
14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, alleging that their being held in contempt was without legal basis, as
the phrase "in aid of collection" partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition.
We do not agree. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt power of
Congress and its committees in this wise –
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation
of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must
have intended each department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of each
other’s authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for
every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative
body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent
by itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its authority or dignity. 11
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is
based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three
independent and coordinate branches of government.12
In this case, petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was "in aid of collection" is a direct
challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter.
In this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to
compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the
legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB-
Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of
respondent’s summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request
the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from
evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court.
The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely
delaying petitioners’ intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued
against them.13
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it
to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a
legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,14 we have held that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is
not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational
basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,15 there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state
that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.16
As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not
being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent
merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this
Court –
[An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. 17
Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal
proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned
by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party or not.18
However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be
subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot
altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when
a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.19
Petitioners’ argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a
recommendation for their prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such as the
Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman, does not persuade.
As held in Sinclair v. United States20 --
It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not
abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. x x x It
is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under
the Senate resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might
directly aid in respect of legislative action.
The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for
the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the
other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the
other Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators
even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or
initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only recommend measures to
address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although
it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such a
Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to
determine the liabilities of the offender.
Finally, petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion 21 dated June 21, 2006, the
issuance by this Court of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent respondent
from submitting its Committee Report No. 75 to the Senate in plenary for approval. However,
16 days prior to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had
already submitted the report to the Senate in plenary. While there is no showing that the said
report has been approved by the Senate, the subject of the Manifestation and Motion has
inescapably become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation
and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUAR
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE
MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ,
ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and
CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by
and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from
requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of
the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine
(39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan
Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying
the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were
impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others
that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez,
acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices,
schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J.
Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez,
Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his
law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez,
Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his
fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies
such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon,
Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of
some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the
Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing
devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the
massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or
negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of
Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior
managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose
M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of
Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the
purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable
Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that
its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion
as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week
following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with,
supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the
Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.,
V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to
conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing,
beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective
funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant
Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the
FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as
Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V.
Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported
sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional
Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila
Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc.
(PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI
Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty.
Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or
three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and
preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear
that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his
ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well
intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his
law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control
and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to
approve the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20
million as "donation" to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the
Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal
counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario
D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors
of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco
Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it
to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI
Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011
common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the
amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million
for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to
pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of
P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the
consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the
Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the
PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves
orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the
unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for
allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of
the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law
declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of
the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings
prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they
allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the
names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and
lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T.
Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon,
Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of
corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E.
Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten
wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177
shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils.
Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender
to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts
in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in
the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty
Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of
P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp.
group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said
firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective
answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the
disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various
metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms
had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who
"had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily
reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the
EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5
million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez,
and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the
firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same
price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of
SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon
"the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of
thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground
that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035
before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to
testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity
generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as
well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No.
0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed
the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after
which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be
excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its
investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a
prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of
motion for intervention, 8
which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989,
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the
petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle
the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire
into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less
cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees — like what
petitioners seek — from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are
to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of
funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is
in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr
under the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases." 13
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of
legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has
no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is
a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the
inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must
be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official
Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government
written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez,
in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his
memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when
he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order
on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials
assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were
personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A.
Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
President:
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power
in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. "Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not
heeded by management because they said another representation
was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and
requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally
the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management
under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to
make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we
statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the
accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we
Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more
4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly
of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to
stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 continue our work."
that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations
of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious. Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five,
which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13
September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said "The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President
Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez
Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now
(Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner
"malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows: is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-
in-law of the President. They even went further by telling us that
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her
privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, excellency is also interested in the ownership and management
1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which
denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez
Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated. and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us,
instead they said it will be submitted directly to this
xxx xxxx xxx Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is
 not good for this Commission and even to the President if our
dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the
government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman
Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last
September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa
himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On
Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote
him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the
PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The sale of
these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never
been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really
making baseless and malicious statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section
5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful
for the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity,
within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines,
the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government: Provided, that this
section shall not apply to any person who prior to the
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is
related, has been already dealing with the Government along the
same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application filed by him for approval of which is not
discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends
upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act
lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a
profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to
this august Body to make its own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec.
5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the
questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The
said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions
made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental
organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look
into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental
petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-
directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate
Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the
Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three
Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of
"ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has
reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three
stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick
scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of
non-governmental organization had made representations to the Senate
Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges
against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected
by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten
wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our
people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary
levels reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban
workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate
in their public and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management
of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope
and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to
true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore,
be it.
 Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in
connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3)
stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,
i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take
judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20
it was
held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the
legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our
social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress
to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis
this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to
expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the
functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly
for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those
investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its
investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been
filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its
principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the
alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of
petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the
respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before
the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's
judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its
influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not
be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt
vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since
congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially
legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government.
Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to
inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22
In another case —
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The
critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding
disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional
investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to
abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not
unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or
assembly. 23
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24
Thir right
constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused
in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are
asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable
Court of Appeals, et al. 25 thus —
 Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take
the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take
the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated
the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of
witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal
proceedings but also in all other types of suit
It was held that:
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not
a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify,
and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a
question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has
consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and
to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not
be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc
before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained
by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts,
including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a
case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the
subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners
and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly
influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are
encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding
with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative — investigations in aid of
legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real
purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of
Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter
specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the legislative power is
broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior
capable of regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret
skeins behind the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations
under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the
new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It
needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the
framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American
institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly draw also from
American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisely
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function
as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to
enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does not itself
 possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true —
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power
inherent, incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in
accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that
there are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to
intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could
possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as
the exclusive domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid
of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to
investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of
federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co, Kilbourn,
general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the
Committee and to produce certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered
jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false imprisonment and the
Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of
any intention of final action by Congress on the subject, In all the
argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the House of
Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of
remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or
even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into
the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of Representatives had
no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of
gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By fruitless we
mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the
inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many
times since that era. The same court which validated separate but equal facilities
against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar improved
labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many
other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went
beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the investigation of a
former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office.
It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and
would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the
functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the
Attorney-General and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation, and that the department is
maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as in
the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the subject was the
real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in
view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex
rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615,
where the Court of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order
by the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution
contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the
administrative of public office the duties of which were subject to
legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public
institutions under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it
is generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and
the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no
right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v.
Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S.
858 (1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the
Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its
authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of legislation and that fact is
establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American
constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be apropos.
(Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
 The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional
legislation might ensue from information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from
an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since invalid legislation
might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and
from which the indictment arose was not in furtherance og a legislative
purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have specific
legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in
fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument
is patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to
the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or recommendations
for legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a
government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative branch
of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited legislative powers.
In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect successfully,
it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information
concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In
fact, it would seem that Congress must secure information in order to
legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure
information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a
particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to
act. — (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is
explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an
essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It
is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike
in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the United State
Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is
possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited.
"It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its
inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary
that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a
proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must
be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction
of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it
can readily be seen that the phrase contributes practically nothing towards
protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can be in aid of the
broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot
effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880])
characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States
(354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure.
(Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed.,
page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the
Senate is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with
which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the
past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f
relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial
legislation becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by
the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 (1936) explaining our power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is
indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional boundaries but in the
exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of
the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to
each department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is
vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa transactions is
more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument
misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and
their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law.
Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to arrive at policy determinations
which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts
of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it
cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may
gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress
how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be
remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing
trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The
legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval
reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United States Senate. On a
finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was recommended. In other
words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually
exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel
disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but
the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees, to require
pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought
or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of
suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of
legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was
pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was
linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be
challenged on the ground that the Committee went beyond the scope of
any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions of a grand jury.
Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress
can legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional
consideration, in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be
presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons
cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative
investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative
investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the
banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is
claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness
testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his
ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views
petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where an invocation of individual
liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive
whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies.
Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to answer specific questions
directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the
Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until
the name which the Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the
imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had
changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an
answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights
are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa
is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were
so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what
PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private
but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation
being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to
presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is
capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that the contrary was
intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry
is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by
the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions
of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines.
The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how such anomalies have been
committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of
the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all
public money is na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation
of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory
legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it
"contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A. No. 3019." However,
according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is
pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation. Through it, the legislature is
able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is
not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms
expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of
proposed legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a
consideration of the entire proceedings or one in which legislation could
be had and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object
would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to
reveal their defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is
untenable. They know or should know that they cannot be compelled to answer
incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663,
where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the
ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is,
of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the
Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right
against self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is
propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the
traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive departments, the power
must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly trench on their
prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is
available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I
do not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
# Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly
influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are
encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding
with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative — investigations in aid of
legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real
purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of
Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter
specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the legislative power is
broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior
capable of regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret
skeins behind the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations
under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the
new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It
needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the
framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American
institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly draw also from
American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisely
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function
as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to
enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does not itself
 possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true —
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power
inherent, incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in
accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that
there are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to
intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could
possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as
the exclusive domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid
of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to
investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of
federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co, Kilbourn,
general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the
Committee and to produce certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered
jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false imprisonment and the
Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of
any intention of final action by Congress on the subject, In all the
argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the House of
Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of
remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or
even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into
the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of Representatives had
no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of
gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By fruitless we
mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the
inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many
times since that era. The same court which validated separate but equal facilities
against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar improved
labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many
other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went
beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the investigation of a
former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office.
It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and
would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the
functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the
Attorney-General and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation, and that the department is
maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as in
the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the subject was the
real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in
view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex
rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615,
where the Court of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order
by the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution
contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the
administrative of public office the duties of which were subject to
legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public
institutions under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it
is generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and
the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no
right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v.
Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S.
858 (1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the
Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its
authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of legislation and that fact is
establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American
constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be apropos.
(Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
 The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional
legislation might ensue from information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from
an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since invalid legislation
might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and
from which the indictment arose was not in furtherance og a legislative
purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have specific
legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in
fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument
is patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to
the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or recommendations
for legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a
government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative branch
of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited legislative powers.
In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect successfully,
it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information
concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In
fact, it would seem that Congress must secure information in order to
legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure
information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a
particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to
act. — (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is
explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an
essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It
is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike
in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the United State
Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is
possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited.
"It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its
inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary
that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a
proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must
be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction
of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it
can readily be seen that the phrase contributes practically nothing towards
protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can be in aid of the
broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot
effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880])
characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States
(354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure.
(Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed.,
page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the
Senate is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with
which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the
past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f
relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial
legislation becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by
the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 (1936) explaining our power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is
indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional boundaries but in the
exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of
the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to
each department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is
vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa transactions is
more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument
misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and
their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law.
Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to arrive at policy determinations
which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts
of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it
cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may
gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress
how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be
remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing
trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The
legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval
reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United States Senate. On a
finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was recommended. In other
words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually
exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel
disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but
the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees, to require
pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought
or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of
suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of
legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was
pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was
linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be
challenged on the ground that the Committee went beyond the scope of
any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions of a grand jury.
Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress
can legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional
consideration, in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be
presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons
cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative
investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative
investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the
banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is
claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness
testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his
ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views
petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where an invocation of individual
liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive
whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies.
Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to answer specific questions
directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the
Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until
the name which the Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the
imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had
changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an
answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights
are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa
is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were
so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what
PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private
but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation
being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to
presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is
capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that the contrary was
intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry
is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by
the Constitution.
 Standard Chartered Bank
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions
of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines.
The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how such anomalies have been
committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of
the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all
public money is na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation
of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory
v. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial
legislation to correct or strengthen that law.

The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it

Institutions and Currencies

"contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A. No. 3019." However,
according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:

Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is

pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation. Through it, the legislature is
(G.R. No. 167173)
able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is
not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms
expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of Date: July 13, 2018Author: jaicdn0 Comments
proposed legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a
consideration of the entire proceedings or one in which legislation could
be had and would be materially aided by the information which the Facts:
investigation was calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object
would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-
reveal their defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is
untenable. They know or should know that they cannot be compelled to answer Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in
incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663,
where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799) and
ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is,
of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right
against self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent
propounded.
activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Pangilinan, the
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the
traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive departments, the power speech was referred to respondent, which through its
must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly trench on their
prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial hearing and invited
available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I
do not see in the case at bar. petitioners herein to attend the hearing. Petitioners via letter
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition. stressed that there were pending cases in court allegedly

Narvasa, J., dissents.

involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry,
thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent
committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited
resource persons not being all present, Senator Enrile moved
for the issuance of subpoena and an HDO or to include such
absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During
the hearing, it was apparent that petitioners lack proper
authorizations to make disclosures and lack the copies of the
accusing documents being mentioned by Senator Enrile. Thus,
when hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with
subpoenas by respondent.
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined
from proceeding, citing Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, claiming that since the issue is already preempted
by the courts, the legislative investigation is an encroachment
upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts.
Issue:
Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent
committee encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts
Ruling: NO.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in
the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation
that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very
same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal
practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered
foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring
when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege
speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.”
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting
a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise
of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by
the respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those
invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same
critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate
 findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by
SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the
investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of
legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly
fraudulent activity.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Digest
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government
with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez
of several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law
of Pres. Aquino.
2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look
into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding
the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."
3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the
Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan,
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted
it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment
on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of
President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection
with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and
that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights
must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.
3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee
to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had
already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been
pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would
not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative
committee and a judicial tribunal.

4. Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant

limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an
individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is
extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it
partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because
the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.