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Jean-Francois Collange
To cite this article: Jean-Francois Collange (2005) Bioethics and Sin, Christian Bioethics, 11:2,
175-182
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JEAN-FRANCOIS COLLANGE
Bioethics and Collange
Jean-Francois Sin
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, the relationship between medicine, biology, and
ethics has developed quite significantly, giving rise even to a new disci-
pline, bioethics. Whole works have been devoted to what should be permit-
ted or prohibited in this area. The concept of “sin,” however, is patently
absent in these discussions. One has to count this as evidence for the pro-
found secularization, even laicization, of our life-world, of the technology
175
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developed for it, and of the ethical principles which that technology
invokes. These principles are developed quite independently of any reli-
gious concerns and of any notion of sin, grace, or forgiveness. Nevertheless,
from a theological point of view the question is well worth posing: Does the
category of sin have a place in bioethics or does it not? But immediately
another question arises: What exactly are we to understand by “sin”?
One can understand “sin” as a fault (Fr. original: faute) committed against
the godhead. This fault concerns an action or a specific incident, which is
thought to “hurt” or “offend” God’s holiness and his eminent dignity. Tradi-
tionally, this offense is seen to express itself through the symbol of an act
that renders a man unclean and hurts sainthood, and which can be ritually
cleansed (Ricoeur, 1960). As suggested by Psalm 51, “Have mercy upon me,
oh God. . . wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity and cleanse me from
my sin . . . purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean; wash me and I shall
be whiter than snow.” In this context, sin is still seen in connection with a
possible atonement or penitence, which effaces or compensates for the
transgression and which leads to God’s pardon and re-establishment of the
good order, which had been disrupted by the fault.
Considered at first as a significant transgression of a “taboo,” which
presupposes the affirmation of an order, whether social or cosmic, the sinful
act gradually came to be understood (especially in the wake of the Israelite
prophets, and then after the completion of the Torah) no longer as a trans-
gression of a specific and arbitrary prohibition, but as a moral fault, which
violated the principle of justice which ought to govern relations between
humans. But even here, sin is linked with a specific act, for which the list of
the Ten Commandments provides an overall framework.
The Apostle Paul went one step further. For him, sin is not merely a
moral fault, but it concerns the whole of humanity, which finds itself
entirely under the reign of sin (Romans 1: 18–32). “Sin” thus characterizes
humanity as separated from God, and therefore unable by itself to live in a
healthy and holy manner. Here it is exclusively God’s mercy as manifested
in Jesus Christ that is able to reconcile God with man and to reestablish a
proper order of religion and social life. This generalized state of sinfulness
is seen to express itself further through a certain number of moral perver-
sions, and the quoted passage from Paul’s letter to the Romans offers an
exemplary account of this.
This tension between the two poles of the particular sinful act and the
general state of the sinner, which from now on was perceived to exist
within the reality of sin, became theoretically conceptualized in theology, in
particular in the tradition following Saint Augustine. This latter author in fact
Bioethics and Sin 177
distinguishes between “original sin” (a state which marks the human condi-
tion in its entirety) and the “sinful act,” which actualizes the potentialities of
that state in which each human finds himself at birth (Beatrice in Sitzler-
Osing, 2001 p.392). Thus, in the life of believers only the second aspect of
the reality of sinfulness is considered, that is, sin only insofar as it relates to
daily action.
This approach is generally supported by the practical orientation of
humans by the practice of aural confession, which requires an inventory of
“sins” the priest is entitled to pardon or, once the belief in purgatory is
accepted, to sell off against “good works” offered by the sinners. It is this
understanding that motivated the Reform of the sixteenth century. In radi-
cally denying the idea of “merits” through which man was thought to be
able to “buy back” his faults, Luther returned to the Pauline position: Sin is
what characterizes the human condition in its entirety, and in its placement
vis-à-vis God (coram deo); only grace as received through faith can efface
it. It is thus God’s grace and man’s faith, which open up the path to a new
life before God, in the midst of and in togetherness with the brothers and
sisters who are equally blessed with forgiveness and saved, sola gratia and
sola fide.
Today, in a pluralistic and secularized world, the concept of sin (apart
from narrowly theological and church contexts) has just about vanished,
especially in the vocabulary and conceptual resources of bioethics. Does
one have to conclude that the reality that corresponds to that concept has
vanished as well? Undoubtedly, this is not the case. But one must be very
clear about what one might still wish to understand by that term.
In fact, today just as yesterday, one cannot understand sin but by con-
fronting it with it’s opposite, holiness. The latter concerns in a primary sense
God, as well as humans, who are called to live in the face of God, with Him
and with one another. “Holiness” here refers to the eminent dignity of the
Lord and of his creatures “created after His image and likeness” (Genesis
1:26). This dignity, which is sustained through the essential relatedness link-
ing humans to one another, calls for respect and good faith, and enjoins us
to live in openness and mutual trust. Besides, respect and faith-trust are
compatible only as based on a still more fundamental value: grace or the
graciousness of the gift (Fr. original: “gratuité”).2 It is this value, which in a
fundamental manner places dignity, whether human or divine, outside of
economic considerations, or market forces and outside of attempts at self-
serving “instrumentalization” of the other through the engagement of
power, money, or any other from of deceitful pressure. This is certainly the
fundamental intuition of the Gospel and of the Reformation. God is grace:
one cannot “buy” grace exactly because holiness has no price. And if this
holds for Him, it holds in the same way for the dignity of each human
being; this too must be kept out of the market. Thus, at the very bottom of
sin lies the attempt to “reify” or “objectify” God or the other, reducing them
178 Jean-Francois Collange
In the human world, it seldom happens that one can isolate a pure act. Ulti-
mately human actions are always caught up in a network of complex
causes, effects, and consequences. This also holds for money and bioethics.
Medical acts generally are designed to help people who are impaired in
their health or in their dignity, and are rendered fragile and vulnerable.
Their coming to the aid of patients derives from the most elementary soli-
darity. If that vulnerability can be remedied through biological technology,
nothing can be more normal and more worthy of praise. If the labor and the
investments engaged for such help are remunerated at their just price, there
is no reason for criticism. But if there are exorbitant profits or even, in cer-
tain cases, confirmed abuses, then this deserves to be vigorously
denounced. Here one has all reason to speak about sin, about proceedings
that fundamentally contradict those laws of mercy which require that one
offer others the goods and services indispensable for their life, survival, and
health.
The situation in many poor countries, in which access to certain necessary
medicines is difficult and sometimes even impossible, offers a tragic exam-
ple. Surely, an angelic behavior is not required here. However, concern
about the preservation of one’s monopoly position in the deliverance of
public health services, the lack of good will, and the indifference of markets
to doubtful cost-effectiveness calculations cannot count as serious excuses
for a scandalous state of affairs.
The same applies, if in certain countries one tolerates organ traffic, or
even organizes the sale of organs.4 The two essential principles of bioethics,
the inviolability of the human body and its nonproperty character, must be
considered as contemporary and juridical translations of the grace carried in
God’s enjoinder towards mercy.
The human being must be kept out of commerce and out of the play of
market forces, if it is not to reduce itself (or be reduced) to nothing but an
object, as opposed to being treated as a person. Now, to consider the other
180 Jean-Francois Collange
These several examples are sufficient to illustrate the way in which certain
applications of technology or certain practices, which are relevant for
bioethics, can be considered sinful. Still one should not restrict oneself to
particular cases just to point a finger at them.
It is clear the problem of sin extends to greater depths. Whatever one
thinks of this or that action, “unfortunately” one thing is certain: evil and
misfortune are always present in the midst of our world, perhaps today
even more so than ever. And this is why morals and ethics are necessary.
They serve to name, denounce, and avoid these ills.
Can one explain such dramas in any other way, so as to shun humans’
own responsibility? Can one decently claim that the existence of the misfor-
tunes invoked is nothing but the result of impersonal tragedies or of an
inexorable fate, without any relationship to human fault, whether individual
Bioethics and Sin 181
NOTES
1. My account of sin mostly follows those by Bühler (1976) and Sitzler-Osing et al. (2001).
2. Translator’s note: By the term gratuite, the author, in taking his clue from Paul Tillich, wishes to
emphasize a quality that operates on three levels: economically it denotes something that is given “for
free,” aesthetically, it connotes “graciousness,” and theologically, the fact that God’s grace is given to
man as a gift of love.
3. The theme of the face (of the other) and of one’s responsability in view of the other’s face per-
vades the work of Lévinas: “Le 'Tu ne tueras point' est la première parole du visage. Et c'est un ordre. Il
y a dans l'apparition du visage un commandement, comme si un maître me parlait. Pourtant, en même
temps, le visage d'autrui est dénué; c'est le pauvre pour lequel je peux tout et à qui je dois tout” (Lévinas,
1982, p. 83).
4. The defense of organ sale, which in this journal was offered by Torcello and Wear (2000), is not
really convincing. Their view of the human body is too reductionist and mechanist. There is no room for
a gift (without recompense) and for love as a constitutional element of humans’ humanity. Concerning
this last point see also the secular sociological perspective taken by Godelier (1996), and the contribution
by Collange (2000), especially pp. 117–128 and pp. 207–217.
5. See Cambon-Thomsen & Collange: “Blood banks with tissue from the umbilical cord are insti-
tuted for the sake of securing blood for one’s own later use or for research purposes” (2003, pp. 3–9).
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