1
CHAVEZ V JBC
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members,
an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000
and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent
contends that the phrase “ a representative of
congress” refers that both houses of congress
should have one representative each, and that
these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses
have their respective powers in performance of
their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution
provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from
congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members
from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members to be unconstitutional as provided in
Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the
court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only
one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the
constitution only intended for one seat of the
JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a
bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The
same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire
legislative department. The Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only.
Occena v comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and
Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting
proceedings against the validity of three
batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution
No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a
limited area of land for residential purposes
was approved by the vote of 122 to 5;
Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission
on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention.) The petitioners contends that
such resolution is against the constitutions in
proposing amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are
unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of
merit, the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa to propose its amendments and
how it may be exercised was validly obtained.
The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments similar with the interim
and regular national assembly. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime
Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue of such
impotence.
 2

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions

where so extensive in character as to amount
to a revision rather than amendments. To Abakada v ermita
dispose this contention, the court held that
whether the Constitutional Convention will Facts:
only propose amendments to the Constitution
or entirely overhaul the present Constitution
and propose an entirely new Constitution
based on an ideology foreign to the Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List
democratic system, is of no moment, because
the same will be submitted to the people for challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No.
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6,
people, there can be no debate about the amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
validity of the new Constitution. The fact that
the present Constitution may be revised and respectively, of the National Internal
replaced with a new one ... is no argument Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned
against the validity of the law because provisions contain a uniform proviso
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
authorizing the President, upon
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any
rate, whether the Constitution is merely recommendation of the Secretary of
amended in part or revised or totally changed Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
would become immaterial the moment the
effective January 1, 2006, after any of the
same is ratified by the sovereign people."
following conditions have been satisfied, to
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote wit:
necessary to propose amendments as well as
the standard for proper submission. The
language of the Constitution supplies the
answer to the above questions. The Interim . . . That the President, upon the
Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that recommendation of the Secretary of
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
would be an indefensible proposition to assert raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when percent (12%), after any of the following
it has been convened as the agency through conditions has been satisfied:
which amendments could be proposed. That
is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. Further, the period
required by the constitution was complied as (i) Value-added tax collection as a
follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by
percentage of Gross Domestic Product
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
which shall be held not later than three four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
months after the approval of such amendment
or revision." 21 The three resolutions were
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February
(ii) National government deficit as a
5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa
Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for percentage of GDP of the previous year
April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
period provided by the Constitution.
 3

Whether or not there was a violation of the

due process and equal protection under
Petitioners argue that the law is Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under
Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. They further argue
that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
exchange of goods and services and cannot Discussions:
be included within the purview of tariffs
Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it
under the exemption delegation since this
is not the law, but the revenue bill which is
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute
required by the Constitution to “originate
payable upon merchandise to the
exclusively” in the House of
government and usually imposed on
Representatives, but Senate has the power
imported/exported goods. They also said
not only to propose amendments, but also to
that the President has powers to cause,
propose its own version even with respect to
influence or create the conditions provided
bills which are required by the Constitution
by law to bring about the conditions
to originate in the House. the Constitution
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no
simply means is that the initiative for filing
guiding standards are made by law as to how
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing
the Secretary of Finance will make the
an increase of the public debt, private bills
recommendation. They claim, nonetheless,
and bills of local application must come
that any recommendation of the Secretary of
from the House of Representatives on the
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
theory that, elected as they are from the
President since the former is a mere alter
districts, the members of the House can be
ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is
expected to be more sensitive to the local
the President who decides whether to
needs and problems. On the other hand, the
impose the increased tax rate or not.
senators, who are elected at large, are
Issues: expected to approach the same problems
from the national perspective. Both views
Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated are thereby made to bear on the enactment
the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and of such laws.
Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution. In testing whether a statute constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power or not,
Whether or not there was an undue it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
delegation of legislative power in violation complete in all its terms and provisions
of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the when it left the hands of the legislature so
Constitution. that nothing was left to the judgment of any

other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.
The equal protection clause under the
Constitution means that “no person or class
of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances.”
Rulings:
R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the
provisions. The revenue bill exclusively
originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce
amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes.
Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution does not contain any
prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the
Senate to the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority;
in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this
matter. The power of the State to make
reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been
4
established. Whether it relates to the subject
of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to
be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the State’s power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.
Tolentivo v sec of finance
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not
originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of
HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not
pass three readings on separate days on the
Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and
26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either
House shall become a law unless it has passed

three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI,
Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to
the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It
is sufficient that the House of Representatives
initiated the passage of the bill which may
undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent
by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of
reading the bill on separate days.
Kilusang mayo v director gen
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria
Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive
Order 420 requiring all government
agencies and government-owned
5
corporations to streamline and
harmonize their Identification Systems.
The purposes of the uniform ID data
collection and ID format are to reduce
costs, achieve efficiency and reliability
and ensure compatibility and provide
convenience to the people served by
government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by
the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege
that EO420 infringes on the citizen’s
rights to privacy.
ISSUE: In issuing EO 420, did the
president make, alter or repeal any
laws?
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to
make laws and to alter or repeal them.
In issuing EO 420, the President did not
make, alter or repeal any law but
merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as
well as insures efficiency, reliability,
compatibility and user-friendliness in
the implementation of current ID
systems of government entities under
existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of
legislation.
 6

Smart communications v ntc ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that

the private respondents failed to exhaust
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and administrative remedies?
regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission issued a
Memorandum Circulars on the billing of
RULING: Administrative agencies possess
telecommunications services and on
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
measures in minimizing, if not eliminating,
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
the incidence of stealing of cellular phone
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
unit. Isla Communications Co., Inc.
power is the power to make rules and
(IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone
regulations which results in delegated
Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the
legislation that is within the confines of the
declaration of nullity of the memorandum
granting statute and the doctrine of non-
circulars, alleging that NTC has no
delegability and separability of powers.
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer
goods as stated in the subject memorandum
circulars. Such jurisdiction belongs to the
DTI under the Consumer Acts of the The rules and regulations that administrative
Philippines. Soon thereafter, Globe agencies promulgate, which are the product
Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, of a delegated legislative power to create
Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to new and additional legal provisions that
intervene and to admit complaint-in- have the effect of law, should be within the
intervention. This was granted by the trial scope of the statutory authority granted by
court. the legislature to the administrative agency.
It is required that the regulation be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law, and
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC
with, the standards prescribed by law. They
from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a
must conform to and be consistent with the
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
provisions of the enabling statute in order
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
for such rule or regulation to be valid.
remedies. The defendant's MD is denied for
Constitutional and statutory provisions
lack of merit. NTC filed a MR but was later
control with respect to what rules and
on denied by the trial court. The CA, upon
regulations may be promulgated by an
NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari
administrative body, as well as with respect
and prohibition, reversed the decision of the
to what fields are subject to regulation by it.
lower court. Hence this petition.
It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created
it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat,

the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative
or rule-making power of an administrative
agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and
to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental
to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions,
the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise
of discretion in a judicial nature.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving
specialized disputes, the practice has been to
refer the same to an administrative agency
of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts
will not determine a controversy involving a
7
question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative
body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests

the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts.
This is within the scope of judicial power,
which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
EASTERN SHIPPPING LINES V
PHILOVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an
accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern
Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the
POEA which stipulated death benefits and
burial for the family of overseas workers.
ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had
been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.
8
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation
of non-delegation of powers.
HELD:
No. SC held that there was a valid
delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is
clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of
the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise
of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation
of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found
it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the
“power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by “filling in’ the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS V BH
HOMES INC
MAGTAJAS V PRYCE
BAGIOU V MARCOS
9
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of
lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED
the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In
November 13, 1922, a decision was
RENDERED. The land involved was the
Baguio Townsite which was declared public
land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes
petitioned to reopen the civil case on the
following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were
illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file
their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr.,
F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz
opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following
grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside
the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2)
the petition to reopen the case was not
published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they
have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the
peririon was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED
on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the
reopening of cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to
Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under
Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of
Title to Parcels of Land that have been
Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial
Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years
Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.”
Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such

parcels of land, on account of their failure to
file such claims, have been, or about to be
declared land of the public domain by virtue
of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED
within the 40 years next preceding the
approval of this act.” If the title is to be
followed, November 13, 1922 is the date
which should be followed, hence, would
allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1
is to be followed, the date of the institution
of reopening of the case which was April 12,
1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable
part of a statute, and what may inadequately
be omitted in the text may be supplied or
remedied by its title.
People v Yabut
FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, the
accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner
serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treacherously, assault, beat and use personal
violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another
prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by
then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo
suddenly and unexpectedly from behind
with a wooden club, without any just cause,
thereby causing the death of the latter. Yabut
was a recidivist, he having previously been
convicted twice of the crime of homicide
and once of serious physical injuries, by
virtue of final sentences rendered by
competent tribunals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 160 of the Revised
Penal Code applies to the case at bar.
10
HELD:
Yes. Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code,
translated in English, provides that:
Commission of another crime during service
of penalty imposed for another previous
offense — Penalty. — Besides the
provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person
who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while
serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed
by law for the new felony.
The appellant places much stress upon the
word "another" appearing in the English
translation of the headnote of article 160 and
would have us accept his deduction from the
headnote that article 160 is applicable only
when the new crime which is committed by
a person already serving sentence is
different from the crime for which he is
serving sentence. The language is plain and
unambiguous. There is not the slightest
intimation in the text of article 160 that said
article applies only in cases where the new
offense is different in character from the
former offense for which the defendant is
serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of
a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor
propriety in resorting to the preamble or
headings or epigraphs of a section of
interpretation of the text, especially where
such epigraphs or headings of sections are
mere catchwords or reference aids indicating
the general nature of the text that follows. A
mere glance at the titles to the articles of the
Revised Penal code will reveal that they
were not intended by the Legislature to be
used as anything more than catchwords
conveniently suggesting in a general way the

subject matter of each article. Being nothing
more than a convenient index to the contents
of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in
any event have the effect of modifying or
limiting the unambiguous words of the text.
EUGENIO V DRILON
? obligation to Pilares amounting to
SAJONAS V CA
FACTS: The Sajonas couple are
before us, on a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, praying inter alia to set
aside the CA’s decision, and to
reinstate that of the RTC
On September 22, 1983, spouses
Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of
residential land located in Antipolo,
Rizal to the spouses Sajonas on
installment basis as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell dated September
22, 1983. The property was
registered in the names of the
Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-
79073 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Rizal.
On August 27, 1984,
the Sajonas couple caused
the annotation of an adverse
claim based on the said Contract to
Sell on the title of the subject
property, which was inscribed as
Entry No. 116017. Upon full
payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale
involving the property in question
in favor of the Sajonas couple
on September 4, 1984. The deed of
absolute sale was registered almost
a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
11
Meanwhile, it appears that Pilares
(defendant-appellant) filed a Civil
Case for collection of sum of money
against Ernesto Uychocde. On June
1980, a Compromise Agreement
was entered into by the parties in
the said case under which Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary
P27,800 and agreed to pay the
same in two years. When Uychocde
failed to comply with his
undertaking in the compromise
agreement, Pilares moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution to
enforce the decision based on the
compromise agreement, which the
court granted in its order dated
August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ
of execution was issued on August
12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City.
Pursuant to the order of execution a
notice of levy on execution was
issued on February 12, 1985. On the
same date, defendant sheriff Garcia
of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before
the Register of Deeds of Marikina
and the same was annotated at the
back of the TCT of the subject land.
When the deed of absolute sale
dated September 4, 1984 was
registered on August 28, 1985, TCT
No. N-79073 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was
issued in the name of the Sajonas
couple. The notice of levy on
execution annotated by defendant
sheriff was carried over to the new
title. On October 21, 1985, the
Sajonas couple filed a Third Party
Claim with the sheriff of Quezon

City, hence the auction sale of the
subject property did not push
through as scheduled.
On January 1986, the Sajonas
spouses demanded the cancellation
of the notice of levy on execution
upon Pilares, through a letter to
their lawyer. Despite said demand,
defendant-appellant Pilares refused
to cause the cancellation of said
annotation. In view thereof,
plaintiffs-appellees filed a
complaint in the RTC of Rizal,
against Pilares, the judgment
creditor of the Uychocdes. The trial
court rendered its decision in favor
of the Sajonas couple, and ordered
the cancellation of the Notice of
Levy from TCT No. N-109417. The
court a quo stated, thus:
…It is a well settled rule in this
jurisdiction that actual notice of an
adverse claim is equivalent to
registration and the subsequent
registration of the Notice of Levy
could not have any legal effect in any
respect on account of prior
inscription of the adverse
claim annotated on the title of the
Uychocdes.
On the issue of whether or not
plaintiffs (Sajonas) are buyers in
good faith of the property of the
spouses Uychocde even
notwithstanding the claim of the
defendant that said sale executed by
the spouses was made in fraud of
creditors, the Court finds that
the evidence in this instance is bare
of any indication that said plaintiffs as
purchasers had notice beforehand of the
claim of the defendant over said
12
property or that the same is involved in
a litigation between said spouses and
the defendant. Good faith is the
opposite of fraud and bad faith, and
the existence of any bad faith must
be established by competent proof.
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the
CA assigning errors on the part of
the lower court. The appellate
court reversed the lower court’s
decision, and upheld the annotation
of the levy on execution on the
certificate of title. The respondent
appellate court upheld private
respondents’ theory when it ruled:
The above staled conclusion of the
lower court is based on the premise
that the adverse claim filed by
plaintiffs-appellees is still effective
despite the lapse of 30 days from
the date of registration.
However, under the provisions of
Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse
claim shall be effective only for a
period of 30 days from the date of its
registration.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON
THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR
ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER
SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS
ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT
FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE
THE PROVISION IN ITS
ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE
THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY
WITHIN THE PROVISION IN

ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT
AS A WHOLE.
HELD: ACCORDINGLY, the
assailed decision of the respondent
CA dated October 17, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the RTC finding for the
cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution from Transfer Certificate
of Title No. N-109417 is hereby
REINSTATED. The inscription of
the notice of levy on execution on
TCT No. N-109417 is hereby
CANCELLED.
The question may be posed, was the
adverse claim inscribed in the TCT
still in force when private
respondent caused the notice of levy
on execution to be registered and
annotated in the said title,
considering that more than thirty
days had already lapsed since it was
annotated ? (Pilares argues that the
adverse claim ceases to have any
legal force and effect (30) days
after August 27, 1984 pursuant to
Section 70 of P.D. 1529)
In construing the law aforesaid,
care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect and a
construction that could render a
provision inoperative should be
avoided, and inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a
harmonious whole. For taken in
solitude, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually
intended and evident when a word
or phrase is considered with those
with which it is associated. In
13
ascertaining the period of effectivity
of an inscription of adverse claim,
we must read the law in its entirety.
Sentence three, paragraph two of
Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
“The adverse claim shall be effective
for a period of thirty days from the
date of registration.”
At first blush, the provision in
question would seem to restrict the
effectivity of the adverse claim to
thirty days. But the above
provision cannot and should not be
treated separately, but should be
read in relation to the sentence
following, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in
interest.
If the rationale of the law was for
the adverse claim to ipso facto lose
force and effect after the lapse of
thirty days, then it would not have
been necessary to include the
foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no
adverse claim need be cancelled. If it
has been automatically terminated
by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party
in interest to do a useless act. The
law, taken together, simply means
that the cancellation of the adverse
claim is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription
will remain annotated and shall
continue as a lien upon the property.

To hold otherwise would be to
deprive petitioners of their
property, who waited a long time to
complete payments on their
property, convinced that their
interest was amply protected by the
inscribed adverse claim.
In sum, the disputed inscription of
an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-
79073 was still in effect on February
12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff
Roberto Garcia annotated the
notice of levy on execution thereto.
Consequently, he is charged with
knowledge that the property sought
to be levied upon the execution was
encumbered by an interest the same
as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof. Such
notice of levy cannot prevail over
the existing adverse claim inscribed
on the certificate of title in favor of
the petitioners
In re: Johnson
Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H.
Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States, died
in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing
an estate with an estimated amount of
P231,800. The will was written in the
testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of
three witnesses required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. This will,
therefore, was not executed in conformity
with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants
of these Islands, and hence could not have
14
been proved under section 618. On February
9, 1916, however, a petition was presented
in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila for the probate of this will, on the
ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of
his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois,
United States of America; 2) that the will
was duly executed in accordance with the
laws of that State; and hence could properly
be probated here pursuant to section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner
alleged that the law is inapplicable to his
father’s will
Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation
of due process on the part of the petition
Held: No.
Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant
to this order of the court through the three-
week publication of the notice in Manila
Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also
asserted that in view of the statute concerned
which reads as “A will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed
in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject,
and which might be proved and allowed by
the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same
effect as if executed according to the laws of
these Islands” the “state”, being not
capitalized, does not mean that United States
is excluded from the phrase (because during

this time, Philippines was still a territory of
the US).
SJS V ATIENZA
Facts: On November 20, 2001, The
Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr.
approved the said ordinance on November 28,
2001. and it became effective on December 28,
2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date
of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called
Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies
Caltex, Petron and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila
and the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the oil
companies in which they agreed that :scaling
down of Pandacan Terminals was the most
viable and practicable option. Under the
memorandum of understanding, the City
of Manila and the Department of Energy permits
the Oil Companies to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the
limited area resulting from the joint operations
and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the
memorandum of understanding in Resolution
No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the memorandum of
understanding was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on
January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the
mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26,
2002 memorandum of understanding and the
15
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.
Held: The Local Government Code imposes
upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of
Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city. One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to put into
effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by
the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of
the memorandum of understanding were
contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding
on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force
and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the
Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as
mayor of the city of Manila to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
MECANO V COMMISIONER ON
AUDIT
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of
the NBI. He was hospitalized and
on account of which he incurred
medical and hospitalization
expenses, the total amount of which
he is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI
Director, Director Lim requested
reimbursement for his expenses on
the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of
which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury,
death, or sickness incurred in
performance of duty. — When a
person in the service of the national
government of a province, city,

municipality or municipal district is
so injured in the performance of
duty as thereby to receive some
actual physical hurt or wound, the
proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any
period of disability thereby
occasioned shall be on full pay,
though not more than six months,
and in such case he may in his
discretion also authorize the
payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the
injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first
against vacation leave, if any there
be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or
connected directly with the
performance of some act in the line
of duty, the Department head may
in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital
fees.
Director Lim then forwarded
petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary
of Justice. Finding petitioner’s
illness to be service-connected, the
Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of
Justice favorably recommended the
payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of
Justice Bello III returned
petitioner’s claim to Director Lim,
having considered the statements of
16
the Chairman of the COA to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon
was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his
claim to Director Lim, with a copy
of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then
Secretary of Justice Drilon stating
that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abregate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative
Code, including the particular
Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew
Mecano’s claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable
consideration; Secretary Drilon
forwarded petitioner’s claim to the
COA Chairman, recommending
payment of the same. COA
Chairman however, denied
petitioner’s claim on the ground
that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987, solely for the reason
that the same section was not
restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He
commented, however, that the
claim may be filed with the
Employees’ Compensation
Commission, considering that the
illness of Director Mecano occurred
after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was
returned by Undersecretary of
Justice Montenegro to Director Lim
with the advice that petitioner
“elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires”.

Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative
Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the RAC
HELD: The Court resolves to
GRANT the petition; respondent is
hereby ordered to give due course
to petitioner’s claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a
particular law has been repealed or
not by a subsequent law is a matter
of legislative intent. The lawmakers
may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing
provision which expressly and
specifically cites the particular law
or laws, and portions thereof, that
are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in
its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law,
identified by its number or title, is
repealed is an express repeal; all
others are implied repeals
In the case of the two
Administrative Codes in question,
the ascertainment of whether or not
it was the intent of the legislature to
supplant the old Code with the new
Code partly depends on the scrutiny
of the repealing clause of the new
Code. This provision is found in
Section 27, Book VII (Final
Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws,
decrees, orders, rules and
17
regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The question that should be asked
is: What is the nature of this
repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts
that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, it is an example of
a general repealing provision. It is a
clause which predicates the
intended repeal under the condition
that substantial conflict must be
found in existing and prior acts.
This latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal
by implication.
1. Where provisions in the two acts on
the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act
to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one.
2. 2. If the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it
will operate to repeal the earlier
law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is
apparent that the new Code does
not cover nor attempt to cover the
entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters
treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, such as
the provisions on notaries public,

the leave law, the public bonding
law, military reservations, claims for
sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 of the Secretary of Justice,
what appears clear is the intent to
cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to
administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because
of the many changes that transpired
in the government structure since
the enactment of the RAC decades
of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to
demonstrate that the provisions of
the two Codes on the matter of the
subject claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there
can be no such conflict because the
provision on sickness benefits of the
nature being claimed by petitioner
has not been restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not
favored. 20 The presumption is
against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws
on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.
ANTONIO V MIRANDA
18
?
FLORES V COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared
by the board of canvassers as having the
highest number of votes for kagawad on the
March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion,
Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A.
6679. However, his election was protested by
private respondent Rapisora, who placed
second in the election with one vote less than
the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and
installed him as punong barangay in place of
the petitioner after deducting two votes as
stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to
the RTC, which affirmed the challenged
decision in toto. The judge agreed that the
four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any
distinguishing first name or initial, should all
have been considered invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and
Anastacio Flores, another candidate for
kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner
was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to
second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which
dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had
no power to review the decision of the RTC,
based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that
decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to
it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections “on questions of fact shall be final
and non-appealable”. In his petition for
certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not
taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the decisions of
Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified,
but on an entirely different and more
significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section
2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the
COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the

elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials,
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal
or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under
the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
should have been appealed directly to the
COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly,
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it
provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case
should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional.
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TATAD V DOE
Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy
was created (through the enactment of R.A. No.
7638) to control energy-related government
activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180
(Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation
of the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638.
Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was
allowed to import and market crude oil and
petroleum products, and to lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the
constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180
since the imposition of tarrif violates the equal
protection clause and bars the entry of others in the
oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif
violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the
constitution requiring every law to have only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners
Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia,
Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation,
Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas
argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15
is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue
19
delegation of legislative power to the President and
the Secretary of Energy by not providing a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order
declaring the implementation of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is
arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted
due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price
Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A.
No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto
cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation
of constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, declares the
petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by the
court) and that the petitioners have nolocus
standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a
result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is
unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180
constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
Held:
1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It
violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint
of trade and unfair competition. The deregulation
act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three
major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and
unreasonable and therefore considered void. The
depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors
enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in
declaring full deregulation of the oil industry.
Therefore, the executive department, in its
declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow
faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180,
making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. A

law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions as long
as they are not inconsistent with the foreign
subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of the deregulation of the
downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180,
therefore it does not violate the one title-one
subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of legislative
power. The tests to determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power are the
completeness test and the sufficiency test. The
completeness test demands that the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions such that
when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is
enforce it. The sufficiency test demand an
adequate guideline or limitation in the law to
delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15
provides for the time to start the full deregulation,
which answers the completeness test. It also laid
down standard guide for the judgement of the
President- he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable-
which answers the sufficiency test.
Tanada v tuvera
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the
respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
20
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette
is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638
reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of
public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of
public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force
and effect.