De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February 2002

Facts:

On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty,
the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not
comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the
Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and
claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted
on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose
de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of
Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for
certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.

Held:

As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in
the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a
penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does not
exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic
Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Ratio:

Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus
an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion
contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for
disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three
co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.