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This has been the case in China, where the payment system is almost Phone +44 20 3457 0444
exclusively run by Ant Financial’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChatPay – each
with roughly one billion active users (most of them in large cities). These two Scope Group
forms of payments are followed by cash and as a distant third by debit and
Lennéstraße 5
credit cards. Piggybacking on the mobile payments business, both fintech
giants have been offering savings, wealth management, loans, and insurance 10785 Berlin
to individuals and SMEs. It is unlikely that the traditional banks will be able to Phone +49 30 27891 0
disrupt the entrenched market positions of Ant Financial and Tencent. What is Fax +49 30 27891 100
more likely, and indeed happening, is that the two Chinese fintechs will
successfully spread their wings into other countries, especially emerging www.scopegroup.com
markets.
Bloomberg: SCOP
In Kenya, financial penetration jumped from 27% in 2007 to 77% in 2017. This
was not so much the result of traditional banks pushing for market share. It was
mostly the consequence of the growth of mobile payment systems, primarily M-
Pesa (established by Vodafone’s local subsidiary), adopted by a largely un-
This report is published by Scope
banked population. The fintech has been expanding successfully, with similar Insights, a Scope Group
strong results, in other sub-Saharan African countries. subsidiary which is separate from
Scope Ratings. The content is an
independent view not related to
Scope’s credit ratings.
1 Alvaro Dominguez contributed to this report.
In Nigeria, where half of the population lacks access to financial services, MTN, a large local mobile operator with 163
million users, is aiming to replicate M-Pesa’s business strategy.
Latin America, another region with relatively low banking penetration, offers financial-services opportunities to new
entrants. Mercado Libre, a large e-commerce company, is successfully growing its mobile payments and financial
services business to the un-banked. With over 12 million customers, Brazil’s Nubank is one of the world’s largest
neobanks.
In recent years, serving the under-banked has been viewed as an opportunity for US fintechs and neobanks, which
could operate on a lower-cost base than traditional banks. Making full use of technology and lacking the legacy cost
burden of physical branches and back offices, the new players have been able to offer products and services that
would be economically less viable for traditional banks, such as payday loans at more affordable rates, savings, and
personal financial management (PFM) services.
In general, the large banking groups, which have massive IT budgets annually (ca. USD 10bn for each of the largest
groups), are finding it easier to compete with fintechs and neobanks and access population segments aimed at
financial inclusion without incurring losses. This push includes establishing low-cost neobanks with a different brand
to compete with fintechs (e.g. Marcus by Goldman Sachs, Finn by JP Morgan Chase, or Greenhouse by Wells
Fargo). But many second-tier traditional banks are finding it more difficult to keep the same pace.
Similar to Europe and other markets with developed financial systems, however, the financial ecosystem is changing
fast through the adoption of open API platforms, cloud storage for data, artificial intelligence usage, and blockchain
transactions.
Equally, the proportion of the banked population is very high –not far from 100% in Western Europe. Lack of financial
inclusion is also less of an issue (though it remains more of a problem in Eastern Europe).
On the one hand, the European banking sector remains in pole position to avoid outside disruption on a mass scale.
On the other hand, its Achilles’ heel remains its high and relatively rigid cost structure, which with the fast adoption of
mobile banking becomes a critical threat.
Europe is fast becoming a vibrant ground for the growth of financial technology, especially in cities like London, Berlin,
Paris, Amsterdam, or Stockholm. Neobanks like Revolut, N26, Monzo, or Starling are becoming better adopted, with
the number of clients climbing. More than a third of all European neobanks and fintechs are UK-based, with Germany
coming second.
Nevertheless, profitability for most of these new players is still not proven, and this detracts from full credibility to their
business model. Their market position compared to the incumbent banks is also very marginal.
In general, for these reasons many of the large European banks have viewed fintech penetration as an opportunity
more than a real challenge. Inability to develop credible digital strategies, platforms and product offers remains a clear
and present danger for the banking sector, but many have made significant progress. Buying successful fintechs
which can fill specific digital gaps remains a valid strategy for the banks, one which will very likely continue.
Overall, banks’ image with customers remains positive across Europe (an improvement from the post-crisis years).
According to a recent Mastercard survey, 63% of banking apps used by European consumers are from traditional
banks – vs. 26% from social media and 20% from digital-only banks. As long as customers do not become
dissatisfied with the mobile offering of their bank, they will probably find no reason to switch to other providers – banks
or non-banks.
Nevertheless, a recent BI Intelligence UK survey revealed that for 87% of bank customers mobile devices are the
main banking channel they use, and for 68% a sub-par mobile experience would be the main reason for switching
banks. There is no reason to believe that elsewhere in Europe bank customer focus will evolve differently, especially
with the increasing reach of the younger generations.
This is also true with respect to the supposed threat coming from big tech firms. While a couple of years ago the
assumption was that GAFA companies (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) had much stronger brands more trusted
by consumers than banking brands, this is no longer the case, at least not to the same extent – notably for Facebook.
People will continue to use big tech companies for their technology, e-commerce, knowledge and social-media needs,
but not many will hand in their financial wealth and needs to them.
Besides, the current regulatory dynamics in Europe (and elsewhere) are not moving in the direction of encouraging
more GAFA penetration – especially in financial services. It is very likely that the European Commission’s growing
antitrust focus, and the openly negative view of Facebook’s Libra project for a global virtual currency to compete
against traditional fiat currencies, will not make it easy for GAFA to make significant inroads in Europe’s financial
industry.
… but the emerging ecosystem will be threatening for incumbents unless they cut further their legacy costs
It bears repeating this: in Europe the incumbent banks can remain in the driving seat, but only to the extent that they
are able to adjust to the evolving digital requirements of individual and business customers. This is still not within
reach for all institutions, especially the smaller ones with fewer resources for massive IT investment, a more rigid cost
structure, and less of an ability to diversify revenue streams. Traditional second-tier branch-based retail banks heavily
dependent on lending-based revenue generation fit this definition.
New regulations across Europe, notably the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), are pushing banks to move
to open APIs and to a higher degree of transparency in their customers’ financial needs (with prior customer
agreement and relying on secure customer authentication). Some of the more advanced players, like ING, BBVA and
some of the Nordic banking groups, are creating platforms that they are opening to third-parties (fintechs, neobanks,
other banks) which can bring their own clients and services – while the host bank covers compliance needs, such as
KYC.
This business, known as banking-as-a-service (BaaS), is taking off in the US even in the absence of a PSD2
equivalent (see Appendix). And it should make traditional bank M&A (especially cross-border) even more obsolete:
why buy or merge with a cost-heavy legacy bank when clients can be secured far more efficiently indirectly via open
platforms?
In fact, building a digital offering and infrastructure, essential as it is, is European banks’ second-most difficult
challenge. The first is and will be for some time cutting legacy costs – related to both branches and back offices.
Barring this, banks will remain burdened with high and gradually less productive overhead – made worse by sub-par
revenues driven by negative rates and other headwinds – and thus in a less enviable competitive position vis-à-vis
fintechs and the nimbler banks across the system.
Banks are fully aware of this challenge. Branch networks are being cut and will continue to be so – in the UK (the
sector’s branch network has shrunk by one third in the last five years), Netherlands, Nordic region, France, Germany,
etc. Back-office over-capacity is being reduced. But the pace of cost cuts is still far too slow in too many countries,
challenged by prevailing social and political constraints.
While spending the lunch break at the branch is indeed becoming a mercifully rare experience, the high-street bank
branch landscape is not yet going the drive-in cinema route.
Appendix:
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