Javellana vs.

Executive Exec

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to
restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by
him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit,
for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana
also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of
the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the

said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without
power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify
the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102
and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and
objective.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a

justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or
without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.

HELD:

1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon

whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance
with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the
matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled
applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the
alleged ratification of the old constitution.
 The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned
our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

2. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in

those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned
in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in
the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s
Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by
which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the
proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made
on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the
American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its
major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and
furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary,
into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the
supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code
of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure
therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of
checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted
said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the
1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest"
expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to
have ratified the revised Constitution.

3. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the

1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a
 certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the
citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on
January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of
Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments
had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies
all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the
proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that
there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and
suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.

4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on
the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in
the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases
to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond
the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando,

Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and
to give due course to the petitions.

5. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise
stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and
myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

PBA v. COMELEC
FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which
calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with
the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the
calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation”

did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions
in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position
of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is
proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after
his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting
President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention
for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted
that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and
honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and
prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an
injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986,
in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of
the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by
the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no
issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting
the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a
new mandate or to elect a new president.

Lansang v. Garcia
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party
of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8,
1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and
other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured.
Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of
habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in
order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were
filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be
applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was
issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-B was
also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces
and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces
and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7
provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose
privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did
not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended.
Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of
proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the
time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning
normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an
alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that
the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and
unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and
weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a

consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the
factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive
decision reached by majority.

Issues:
1. W/N the proclamation of Proclamation No. 889 is valid and effective.
2. W/N the president can suspend the writ of habeas corpus under the said
proclamation.
3. W/N the petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended

Held:
1. The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two
conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend
the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses
of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces,
proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the
privilege is the least harsh.
 Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the
killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater
Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and
control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major
student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations
actively advancing the CPP.
2. Yes it is valid and such suspension is limited. The President could have
declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No.
889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No.
889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons
detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the
insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith."
In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the
President had acted in good faith.
3. If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
valid — and We so hold it to be — and the detainee is covered by the
proclamation, the filing of a complaint or information against him does not
affect the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may
not be ordered by Us

AYTONA V. CASTILLO
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado
Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order
no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by
former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute
appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central
Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that
he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the
new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were
valid.

RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous
President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration.
He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the
incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would
embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use
powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended
or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The
filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of
almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.

IN RE SATURINO BERMUDEZ
Facts:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a

lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously
stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full
as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected
in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks
the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said
Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the
proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

Ruling:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a
de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under
her government.
B. Republic of the Phil as a State
1. Elements of a State; Def of a State

CIR v. CAMPOS RUEDA

Maria Cerdiera is a Spanish national (Filipina married to a Spanish citizen), lived
in Morocco and died there. In the Philippines, she left intangible properties. The
person tasked as administrator of the intangible properties is Antonio Campos
Rueda. He filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all properties
left by her. The Collector of Internal Revenue, the respondent, pending the
investigation of the tax value of the properties, issued an assessment for estate
tax worth P111,592.48 and inheritance tax worth P187,791.48 with a total
amount of P369,383.96. These tax liabilities were paid by Antonio Rueda.

Later, Campos Rueda filed an amended tax return wherein the properties worth
P396,308.90 are claimed as exempted from taxes. Respondent, still pending
investigation on the same subject, issued another assessment for estate tax
worth P202,262.40 and inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a total amount
of P469,665.24.

Issues:
Respondent’s reply to the request for exemption of taxes, etc.:

(1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the requirements mentioned in

Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality
and not a foreign country.

(Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case, grants certain exemption of
taxes provided that ‘reciprocity’ be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier
must be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122).
(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because the law of Tangier is not
reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

(3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of 239,439.49 representing

deficiency estate and inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties, surcharges,
interests and compromise penalties.

The Court of Tax Appeals ruled:

(1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of taxes. Such exemption is
sufficient to entitle Antonio Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking
of reciprocity.

The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of law:

(1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary (sine qua non) for the
acquisition of international personality.

(2) Whether acquisition of international personality is required for a ‘foreign

country’ to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.

The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Tax Appeals to
determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax
exemption required by Section 122.

Held:
(1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary.

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a

state, it is required in line with Pound’s formulation that:“it be a politically
organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by
penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through
a government functioning under a regime of law.”
(2) Tangier is a state.

(3) Section 122 does not require that the “foreign country” possess an
international personality. In other words, international personality is not a
requisite.

(4) Supreme Court affirms Court of Tax Appeals ruling. (Note: Look at the ruling
of the Court of Appeals found in the issue.)

US v. DORR
Facts

Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of
violating Section 8 of Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious
words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to
disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order
of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate
concealment of the aforementioned acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the
newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission
of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to key government
positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as "rascals"
and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil
Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt".

Issue

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview
of Section 8 of Act No. 292.

Held

No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8
of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in
general, and not of specific individuals.
Ratio Decidendi

N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did
not have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act
No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion.

As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of
the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also
specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific
government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of
its individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the
purview of Act No. 292.

2. The Doc of State of Immunity

a. “That the State may not be sued w/o its consent.”
Art XVI s3

KAWANANAKOA V. POLYBANK
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under
a mortgage executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw.
82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the
execution of the mortgage a part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by
them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of Hawaii, and was now part
of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the territory
demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was
argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of
foreclosure was made, the appellants having saved their rights. The decree
excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory, and directed a
judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were
insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92.

The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of
the mortgage land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be
entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of their
contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal
corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does not
extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia (Metr- [205
U.S. 349, 353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed.
231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been a party to suits that have
been before this court (Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
248).

The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S.
436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the
proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See act of April 30, 1900,
chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in the case at bar it did object, and the
question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have
been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit
without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before
the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy
d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.' Bodin, Republique,
1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo
suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed.
1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.

As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers
that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to
those that, in actual administration, originate and change at their will the law of
contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their
rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of
course it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the case with a
territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain from
which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the
case of a state, the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the
Constitution might. But the rights that exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349,
354] Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of
power. The District of Columbia is different, because there the body of private
rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the
District. But for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act
of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v.
Territory, 13 Haw. 478. See, further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405;
Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598.

However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to
sell all the land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to
the territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to proceed.

Decree affirmed.

Ruling: To Justice Holmes, however, the doctrine of non-suability is based not on

any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends.

Garcia v. COS
FACTS:
The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to
collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while
undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He
filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant
General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further
demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim,
alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610
which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by
plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently
disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim,
plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totaling no less than
Php 4,000 at the rate of P20 per month and suffered moral damages and
attorney’s fees the amount of Php 2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration
and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before
coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause
of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the
Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of
the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing the
complaint on ground it being the money claim against the government.
HELD:
The court affirmed the lower court’s decision on dismissing the complaint for the
simple reason that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, it being a money claim against the government. If there is a money claim
against the government should be filed with the Auditor General. Plus, under
the doctrine of state immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent.
Moreover, it is in line with the principle that the State cannot be charged without
its content as provided by the Commonwealth Act 328 Sec. 1 that in all cases
involving the settlement of accounts and claims other than those of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days.
Also, if all administrative remedies have been made and if superior administrative
officers could grant relief, it is not necessary to entertain actions against the
administrative officers as established by the rule.

THE HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO

Petitioner in this case is the Holy See (who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City in Rome Italy and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal
Nuncio. Respondent in this case is Hon. Edilberto Rosario in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

The petition started from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5A registered
under the name of the Holy See, is connected to Lot 5B and 5D under the name
of Philippine Realty Corporation. The land was donated by the Archdiocese of
Manila to the Papal Nuncio which represented the Holy See who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome Italy for his residence.

The said lots were sold to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents
Starbright Sales, Inc.

When the squatters refused to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between these
two parties because both were unsure as to whose responsibility was it to evict
the squatters from the said lots. Respondent Starbright insists that the Holy See
should clear the property while Holy See says that Starbright should do it or the
earnest money will be returned.

Since Starbright refused to clear the property, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, returned
P100k earnest money. The same lots were sold to Tropicana Properties.

Starbright filed a suit for annulment of sale, specific performance and damages
against Msgr. Cirilios, Philippine Realty Corporation and Tropicana.
The Holy See moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity of suit. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the
petitioner already shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into a business
contract.

Petitioner filed for Petition for Certiorari in the SC.

On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before the SC by the
DFA, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards
the diplomatic immunity of petitioner.

Issue: W/N Petitioner is immune from suits.

Held: YES. The Court held that the Holy See may properly invoke sovereign
immunity for its non-suability. In Article 31 (A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic envoy (a representative government who is sent
on a special diplomatic mission) shall be granted immunity from civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for
profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of
the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the
lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint

Furthermore, the DFA certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus
exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity rights of a diplomatic
mission or embassy in this Court.

US V. RUIZ
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the
proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman
land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm
its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests.
The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of
Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein
informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the
projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific
performance was filed by him against the US.

Issues: W/N the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of
its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

USA V. GUINTO
Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America
was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground
that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark
Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted their bids were
private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C.
del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private
respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine
Area Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the
private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the
concessions pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for
preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against
USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of
America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US
Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law
of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of
its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the
state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:

1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the
US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their
facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being
the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed
by the private respondents in the court below.
2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as
officers or agents of the United States. They are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved.
If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except
for the paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Court.
The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later
determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.
Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further
proceedings.

TORIO V. FONTANILLA
FACTS:
On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed
Resolution No. 156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town
fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was also
passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman.
The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages,
one for the zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the
midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died
thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages.
Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the
municipality.

1. ISSUE:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a
governmental or a corporate function of the municipality?

2. Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla?

HELD:
The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a
private or proprietary function of the municipality. The provision on Section 2282
of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to
celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. It
follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the municipality is held
liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Since it is established that the
municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it stands on the
same footing as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held liable
for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it.
Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did
not directly participate in the defective construction of the stage.

b. waiver of immunity
Express consent; general or special law

MERRITT V. GOVT OF PH
FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was
bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe
injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act
2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the
negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from
suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to
his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.

NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can
be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents.
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The
government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations
in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest.

REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA
Facts:
A MTD was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for
the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs

Arrastre Service , where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court
to pass on the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the
machinery of the national government unless consent beshown, had been
applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of
the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October
4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed.

I s s u e : W/N the respondent’s decision is valid

R u l i n g : No.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found
in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without
its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even
prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the
positivist concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates the assertion
of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which
such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give
rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it
to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance
to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability.
Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek
collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the
Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence
Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself
to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast
and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken.
Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in
the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the
 public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so manyyears, for its
continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]

***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly
enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever
counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding
force on the government

USA VS GUINTO(SUPRA)
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in
the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect
suits against it to which it has not consented.

FACTS:

1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents
wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his
bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US
Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the
generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part
of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by
the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on
the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in
this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in
the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental
acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the

concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims
against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the
record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the
court below for further proceedings.

NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN
INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS
CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US
vs Guinto)

Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign

functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO.

FACTS:
-Feb 3, 1951 - Plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan filed a complaint against
the defendant-appelant, Pan Oriental, alleging that he purchased from the
Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 and due to non-payment of installments
of chattel mortgage, the Shipping Commission took possession of the said vessel
and considered the contract of sale cancelled.

-The Shipping Commission delivered the said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan
appealed to the President of the Philippines and in its meeting, Aug 25 1950 - the
Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contact with the Shipping
Commission. He demanded from Pan Oriental possession of the vessel but the
latter refused.

-Nov 10, 1951 - The Government of the Republic of the Philippines intervened
alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance
due on the purchase price of the vessel in question and that the State was
entitled to the possession of the said vessel under the terms of the original
contract. Therefore, it prayed for Froilan to deliver the vessel to its
representative, the Board of Liquidators in accordance with the revisions of the
Chattel Mortgage Law.

-Nov 29, 1951 - Pan Oriental filed a counterclaim that the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by virtue of a
contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase. It alleged that it had made
the necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right to it. It
prayed that if the GRP was successful in obtaining the possession of the said
vessel, it should comply with its obligations of delivering it to Pan O.

-Nov 29, 1951 - Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in payment
of his balance/obligation to the Shipping Commission as claimed by the
intervenor GRP.

-Feb 3, 1952 - the lower court held that the payment of Froilan discharged his
obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines therefore the
complaint in intervention has been dismissed

-May 10, 1952 - GRP filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental
Shipping against it on the ground that the purpose of the counterclaim was to
compel the GRP to deliver the vessel to it in the event that the GRP recovers the
vessel from Froilan however since payment has already been made by Froilan,
the counterclaim is no longer feasible.

ISSUE: W/N the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit.

HELD: No

The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an
action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains:

"No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action
is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has
a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the
right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an
application to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37,
citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.)

It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it
was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in intervention was
directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in
intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the
possession of the vessel in question.

c. Immunity against Execution of Judgment: suability vs liability

PNB VS PABALAN
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of
execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds
amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
(PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint

against Judge Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed
to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore may
not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked
the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia
Tobacco deposited with the petitioner bank is valid.

Discussions:
The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this
case, Consent to be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into a
commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is deemed
to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the
level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could
properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.

Rulings:
1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome
is attributed. The government has entered with them into a commercial
business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped
down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing
ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of
PNB La Union is denied.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for
garnishment. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not
exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution be imposed
immediately.

d. suits against govt agencies

i. charted agencies

ARCEGA VS. CA
FACT:

The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name “Fairmont
Ice Cream Company,” filed a complaint before the court against the respondents
Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from
allegedly unauthorized payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on
foreign exchange.

The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds,

among others, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the action, because the judgment sought will constitute a financial charge
against the Government, and therefore the suit is one against the
Government, which cannot prosper without its consent, and in this
case no such consent has been given.

The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set
forth in the Central Bank’s motion to dismiss.

The petitioner Arcega filed a MR of the resolution to which an opposition was

filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a certification
that the balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign exchange
was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court denied the
petitioner’s MR as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines which
cannot be sued without its consent, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the suit against the Central Bank for refund is a suit against the
State?

Held: It is a suit against the State but under the charter of Central Bank of the
Philippines, is an entity authorized by to sue and be sued. The consent of the
State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given.

This doctrine was reiterated in Philippines Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines where it was pointedly stated that "sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 601 (as
amended) directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central Bank."

RAYO VS CFI OF BULACAN

FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a
sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in
Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the
respondent corporation.

Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and
contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety
functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE: W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

HELD: YES the power to sued for tort is included. It is sufficient to say that the
government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed
it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).)

As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its

own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See National Shipyards
and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.)

Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court"
is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort
claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

PNR VS IAC
Facts:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of Defendant
Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La union and
bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its
way to Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at
Calumpit, Bulacan got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing
damages to Plaintiff's bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 others
suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its
locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy
intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to
warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed
the instant action for damages against defendants. The defendants, in their
answer traversed the material allegation of the complaint and as affirmative
defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and
lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
Issue:
WON PNR being a governmental agency has immunity from suit.

Held: The PNR did not become immune from suit.

The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-
corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp.
vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593).

Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed
to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State.

In the instant case, the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it
organized the PNR, which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila
Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not
remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on
common carriers.

ii. unchartered or unincorporated agencies

NAC VS TEODORO
Facts:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224,
which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the
said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its
place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.

Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports
Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking for the period up to and
including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports
Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against the
Philippine Airlines, Inc.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the
National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served
summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged
that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the
Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third
party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and
maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant would pay
to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable
rentals for the use of their lands.”
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a MTD on
the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint,
because first, because the National Airports Corporation “has lost its juridical
personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines,
unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is
incapable of suing and being sued

Issues:
W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration is subject to suit.

Held:

Yes. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are,
under Section 3 of EO 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase
property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing
fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies,
and rentals for the use of any property under its management.

These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion,
the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on
its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have
the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports
Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and
assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports
Corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the Civil
Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair the
obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into
unincorporated agencies.

BOP VS BOP EMPLOYEES ASSO

Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the
Industrial Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General
Services and Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of
DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair
labor practices attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were
suspended pending result of administrative investigation against them for breach
of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court
sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP
are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they receives outside jobs and that
many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and
holidays, therefore consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought
the petitioners (BOP) to present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.

Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical

personality, the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid
for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not
justify the conclusion that its functions are “exclusively proprietary in nature”.
Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the service so
requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be
paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending
upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character.

Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the
rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less
over its jurisdiction.

Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders

complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against
the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court.

MOBIL INC VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

Facts:
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case
of rotary drill parts.
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the
Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling
arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the
broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not
all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant BOC as operator of
the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and
as such, can be sued by private individuals.
Issues:
Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the BOC can invoke state
immunity.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for
recovery of money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that
said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The
Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a
function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If
said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental
function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended
to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should
have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under
which money claims against the Government may be filed.

The BOC is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary
function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from
imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary
incident. As stated in the law, agencies of the government is not suable if it is
performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated government entity
without a separate juridical personality.
e. Immunity not an instrument to perpetrate injustice

SANTIAGO VS RP
FACTS:
In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the
Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should
construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by
December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot.
However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted
Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation.
The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the
government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied
by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a
beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau
of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such,
therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard.
Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to
equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.

AMIGABLE V. CUENCA
FACTS:
Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government.
Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of
the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public

Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also
sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated
sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make
due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine
just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time
of the taking.
 A. Political Law; Definition

PP V. PERFECTO

FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which

constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate
investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that
"the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe
of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain
Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by

the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial
constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal

court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated
with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
o Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory

the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating
the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the

President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the
latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private
rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of
crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in
force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect

Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with
the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a
Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position
that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article
is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American
character and system of government. It was crowded out by
implication as soon as the United States established its authority in
the Philippine Islands.

"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this

article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its
terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment
for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government
based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it
is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are
only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the
scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of
government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where
such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around
the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate
of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks."

DECISION:

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of
the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should
be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio. So ordered.

MACARIOLA V. JUDGE ASUNCION

FACTS
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola,
concerning the properties left by their common father, Francisco
Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which
became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This
project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who
assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which
was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to
Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was
sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr.
Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge
Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion
as President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed
a complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging: • that he violated Art.
1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was
one of those properties involved in the partition case; and • that he
violated Art14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA
3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private
company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was
referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice
recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or
warned in connection with the complaints filed against him.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which was
among those properties involved in the partition case.

2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the

Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer
HELD

1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices,
judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In
this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final
because none of the parties filed an appeal within the
reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy
the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from
Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs.
The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is
NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of
said lot as a consideration for the approval of the project of
partition. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, there is no
evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a
mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared
to be a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,
having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable
consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the
Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot
in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires
that judges’ official conduct should be free from the appearance
of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of
Judge Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or
had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred
to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers
at the time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause
doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of
justice.

2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits

justices of the SC, judges and officials of the department of
public prosecution in active service from engaging in
commerce, either in person or proxy or from holding any office
 or have an direct, administrative or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the
territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this
Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was
extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the
Philippines, Art14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be
no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of saidprovision.

B. The Supremacy of the COnstitution

MUTUC V. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent
COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative
of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its
prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act
provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”
COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of
the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and
was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of
the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration
being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a
candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the
phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle
of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated
in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the

statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the
constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be
laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s
constitutional rights.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual
“strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent
a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
 self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that
in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains
to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
 the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires
or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid
in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the
Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither
be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic
law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy
may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and
laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction.
Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines
or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is
a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is
to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let
the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
 Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for
its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS
is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the
bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the
purpose.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYESS ASSO ET AL VS CA

1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform:
A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
B. Secure funding for priority public health programs;
C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure
its effective performance;
D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP)
F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the
 Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being
the sole provider of health services to being a provider of
specific health services and technical assistance, as a result
of the devolution of basic services to local government units.
G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of
Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
H. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared
void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II;
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution,
which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to
protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-
being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide
guidelines for legislation.
I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102
is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a
justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring
about the development or disintegration of the health sector is
within the realm of the political department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?

Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are

considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing,
the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the
inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already
been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case
were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically,
 Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited
case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart
the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad
principles need legislative enactments before they can be
implemented. Moreover, the records are devoid of any
explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section
1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of
discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the
HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and
consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven
by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order
No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only
invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312,
Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or
transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided
under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the
appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would,
nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are
not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is
to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular
case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly
states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter
10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative
Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional
power of control over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other
statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

The Preamble
 AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional
provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in
the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a
result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the
purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the
church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims.
Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No.
4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of postage stamps as would be
advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to

religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom

and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so
far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation
of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by
any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination.
They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The
postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila,
with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The
focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of
Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the
Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally
resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

Art I- national territory

Art II Declaration of principles and state policies

BACANI VS. NACOCO

During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip
vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request
by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing
714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment
of their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of

P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required
the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of
Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government
entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For
reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount
of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10
from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a

government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense
that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted
from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

Issues:
Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which
performs certain functions of government, make them a part of the
Government of the Philippines.

Discussions:
NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted
from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the

term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”. The term
“Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out
those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing
them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to
the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of
government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute
and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds
of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society,
and are merely optional.
Rulings:
No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that
they do not come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the
better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut
by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made
subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may
sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.

ACCFA VS. CUGCO

FACTS:
ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as
amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its
named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land
Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the
ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as Union in the
ACCFA.

The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining

agreement effective for a period of one year. Few months have
passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a
complaint against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of
unfair labor practices and non implementation of said agreement.
Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from
committing further acts tending to discourage the Union members in
the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and
implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith
with the complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but it was turned
down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari.
Issue: W/n ACA is a government entity

Held: yes

Ratio:
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was
enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established
to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the
capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a
purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside
from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to
the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law
itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the
formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a
Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its
personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of
doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered

this traditional classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

PVTA VS CIR
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition
seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance
with CA No. 444.
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of
cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing
petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds
 that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is
therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and
that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No.
444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not

proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant

functions of the government has become obsolete. The government
has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present
time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to
them deserve scant consideration. There is no question based on RA
4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the
petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones
of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not
necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in
governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor
controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct
respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not
come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and

2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the
appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by
petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private
respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised
that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would
indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that
such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a
reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

3. parens patriae

GOVT VS MONTE DE PIEDAD

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in
1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the
Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of
the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a
charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the
Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de
Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to
comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands,
through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad
for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of
those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in
Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28,
1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by
the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff
(government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their
heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file
a complaint against the respondent bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute
action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the
doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of
the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce
such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has
been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the
people.

CABANAS VS PILAPIL
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance
plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if
upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits
shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was
only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then
took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the
child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and
for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms
and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens
patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the
family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member
thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his
interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as
she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed
that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle
will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this
country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence
preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

4. de jure and de facto govt

CO KIM CHAN VS VALDEZ TAN KET
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of
First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese
occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue

hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese
military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by
General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of
the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of
the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation,
and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting
such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established
during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government.
Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made

during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by
General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases
pending before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings
were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Discussions:

 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and

proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de
facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving
their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject
is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law
(Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern
the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of
the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer.
We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a
government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during
its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of
such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and
such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established
by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of
nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by
the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of
a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in
his proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on
judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the
law of nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become re-established and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines
by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th
ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending
 in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or
other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their
original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject
to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole
fibre and content.”

Rulings:

1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and
valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that
the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good
and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de
facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the
leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and
may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of
the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking
into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to
the well-known principles of international law all judgments and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of
the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation
were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it
should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the
 intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase
“processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer
to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international
law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of
the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws)
are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to
be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in
this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be
said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations
which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution
so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice
has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business
of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as
belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.

PERALTA VS DIR OF PRISONS

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was
sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No.
65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The
petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court
of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance
No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan
and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional
rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of
Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the
invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the
usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence
rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power
and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No.
65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during
Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the
Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a
crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased
to be valid.

ALCANTARA VS DIR OF PRISONS

Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court of
Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from
arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the
validity of the decision on the sole ground that said the court was only
a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during
Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?
HELD:
The court held that the sentence served by Alcantara is a criminal act
that has no political complexion.
A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of political complexion
when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal law or
acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a
new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
It cited the case of co kim chan, where the Japanese republic and the
Phil Executive Commission were governments de facto and the
judicial acts of the courts were thereof good and valid and remained
as such after the Commonwealth Government was restored those
crimes with political complexion (political crimes).
Also there was no substantial change in the jurisdiction and structure
of CA when the Japanese-initiated Republic abolished the pre-WW2
CA and reorganized it into several courts.

5. sovereignty

a) Legal
b) Political
c) Internal
d) External

“sovereign as auto-limitation”

TANADA VS ANGARA

Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other
lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our

National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO
opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits
as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our

constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not
pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general
welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit,
restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied
in the Final Act.

Discussions:

 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
“mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has
some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
 economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and
veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are
made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote
equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO
than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries.
Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to
push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the
Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances
but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles
underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing
countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of
the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to
Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions
of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the
 law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power.

Rulings:

1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground

that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into
the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit
of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
 commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute
rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered,
a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the
Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by
the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the
letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of
the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring
in.

REAGAN VS COMM OF INTERNAL REVENUE

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help

provide technical assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April
1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two
months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he
would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it
to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The
sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable
income of Reagan to be at 17,912.34 and that his income tax would
be 2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he
sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan
claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in
legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also
cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his
employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to
Philippine income tax?
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other
hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends
support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil
or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines
merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases –
this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise
noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is
derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of
US source hence taxable.
PP VS GOZO
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US
Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of
Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office
and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon
without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected
another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office
for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits
for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was
convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and
countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction
over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign
country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval
Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government
has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of
(Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty,
the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative
jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

B. section 2, Art II
1. the incorporation clause and doc of incorporation

KURODA VS JALANDONI
. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the

Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of
war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that
created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the
trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not
based on law, national and international.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of

international law of the present day including the Hague Convention
the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person
military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international
law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no

jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in
1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague
and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules
and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the
United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of
our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to
the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained
in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.

2. Conflict between international law and municipal law or local law.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national
security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among
others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, among others, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien

residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other
persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers,
from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality
of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and

deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the
title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.

Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.”
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into
two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is
a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary,
Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice
from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales,
then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn
by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive
agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may
not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which
is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at
bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as
regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative,
by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ
of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with
the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.

REYES VS BAGATSING
Freedom of Speech – Primacy of the Constitution over International Law
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-
Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the
front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The
permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The
mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated
that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued
City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the
500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was
his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such
lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere to
generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the
permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign
diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna
Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of
international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees
the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time,
the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if
the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present
danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than
the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps
to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied
yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within
the 500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or
not the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that
has not been raised an issue in this case).
Sec.4(2), sec.5(2)(a), Art.VIII
Art.13, declaration of rights and duties of states (cited in bayan vs
Zamora)
C. Section 3, Art. II (Civilian Authority)
Art. VII, Sec.18. President is Commander-in-chief
Art. XVI, Sec.5 No partisan politics. No appointment in any capacity
to a civilian position while in active service.
D. Section 4, Art. II (government to serve and protect the pp. duty of
pp to defend the state)

PP VS LAGMAN
Defense of State
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being
compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense
Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he
has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish
to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the
said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot
be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of
an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far
as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government,
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service.”

PP VS MANAYAO
Citizenship – Defense of State – Treason
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino
traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with
his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of
Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The
residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and
relatives of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was
positively identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted
with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was
sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayao’s counsel
argued that his client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao
has already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of
allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot
be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for only Japanese
courts can do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.
HELD: No. Manayao’s swearing of allegiance to Japan was not
proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese Naval,
Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino
traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court also emphasized that in
times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision
which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to render personal,
military or civil service…
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely
swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and joining the
opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even
if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also indicated that no such
person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held
guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.

E. sec5 Art II
F. sec6 Art II
Art III s5
Art VI s28(3)
Art VI s29(2)
Art IX, C s2(5)
Art XIV, s3(3)

GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION

FACTS:

1. Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June 11, 1955. The Secretary
of Education, acting upon Section 2 of said Act authorizing and
directing him to issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the
proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued Department Order No. 8
on July 21 of the same year.

2. Pertinent portions of the said department order include the directive

that pupils and teachers or students and faculty who are in school
and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. And,
said assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem with
everyone standing at attention and execute a salute. Moreover,
immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall
recite in unison the patriotic pledge (in English or vernacular
version).

3. Petitioners who are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses wrote to

the Secretary of Education allowing their children to remain silent and
stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the
sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute,
singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic
pledge.

4. Petitioners’ religious beliefs, which served as bases for this action,

state that: “thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth
beneath, or that is in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down
thyself to them, nor serve them.” They consider that the flag is an
“image within this command.”

5. Petitioners’ children were expelled as a consequence and the Sec

of Education denied the former’s petition to reinstate the children from
the school.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the

Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the
courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain
practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag
is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a

religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a
religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect;
otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there
might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a
certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or
followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on
the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for
their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute
they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally
prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey
the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens,
nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or
leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the
flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration;

rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty,
an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute
is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag
stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of
Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No.
8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8,
does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion
and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory
and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including
observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the
public school they were attending.

EBRALINAG ET AL VS THE DIVISION SUPT OF SCHL OF CEBU

FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition
were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether school
children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for
refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from

their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making
flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11,
1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is

religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and
invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The
respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of
Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine
provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state
and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve
any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot
be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no
valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of
the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The
freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their

freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the
school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute
as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger
to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has
right to prevent.

Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there
is no warrant for their expulsion.

PAMIL VS TELERON

Facts:

Petitioner/apellant is the rival candidate of Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a

priest who won asp the mayor in Albuquerque, Bohol, who filed a quo
waranto case against the latter. This is as per the 2175 Revised
Administrative Code (RAC) that states: “In no case there shall be
elected/appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastes, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial/national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality.”
Respondent-appellee is the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol.
Court of First Instance ruled that the RAC was repealed by the
Election Code of 1971, which therefore allowed the prohibitions of the
RAC.
Issue:

Whether or not the RAC is not in effect or already repealed, thereby

making the appointment of Fr. Gonzaga in mayor’s position as a
priest, constitutional.

Held:

Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court,

failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order
for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the
petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed
and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty
position. It is also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve
the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies
which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of
the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative
Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.

Dissenting Opinion:

J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and

persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or
national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective
office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or
position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This
implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an
elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two
remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised
Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for public works
of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices
under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not
included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New
Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary
qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election
code, are eligible to run for public office.
GERMAN VS BARANGAN

Political Law – Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present Danger Doctrine

One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel
Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were
barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church
because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And
considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August
Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench
fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but
rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and
pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom to worship and
locomotion.
HELD: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of
religious worship but to conduct an anti-government demonstration
since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and
shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to
religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides,
the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives
of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic
and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The
restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the
Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks
and disturbances.

(Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation

on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of
a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has
a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners.
Respondents were in full controland had the capability to stop any
untoward move. There was no clearand present danger of any
serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang.

Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure then from what
has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a
basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and
thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as
it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less
vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of
stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith
that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the
majority of mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is devoid
of meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship,
alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable
assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the
other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of
assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal
formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has
been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both
petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to
public peace and order or to the security of persons within the
premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents
has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public
disturbance or violence.
INK VS GIRONELLA

Facts:

1. Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC, charged

respondent Judge due to his opinion in the course of acquitting the
defendants-accused of Triple Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said
that, “it cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge
was resorted to as a gimmick of showing the community of La Paz,
Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo
unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem.”

2.Respondent, in so doing, was charged with ignorance of the law

and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.

Ruling:

1. The use of the word “gimmick” could offend the sensibilities of the
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that
as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It
may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade
others to take a course of action, which without it may not be
acceptable.

2. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort

to a “gimmick” to gain coverts would certainly be far from
pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one,
much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation
of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight
to either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious
sect finds support in the Constitution.

ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for
more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate

respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by

her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the
Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible
for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for

such conjugalarrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her
right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is
specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred
of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the
State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of
an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public
and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres

the benevolentneutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolentneutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus
the conjugalarrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

IMBONG VS OCHOA
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family
protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial

review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that
“the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question
of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for
partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain
the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability
clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently
as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not
be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes

the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to
refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of
the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion.
By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
“primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA

4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the
RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be

considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of

contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures
(a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects
to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right
of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b)
the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing

a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7
of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
“in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is
invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation
and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of

the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education.
Although educators might raise their objection to their participation
in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of
the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is
superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen

in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public
health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health
care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs
of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children
and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law
only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours
of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude,
for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private
and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long

as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro
bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because

medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the

U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously

alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on
the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed

through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for

prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence,
their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has
far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows
 that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2
of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and

guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which
is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added
the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives,
as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

State Policies

G. sec.7 Art II

Sec.8 Art II

H. sec.9 Art II

Sec.10 Art II
 Sec.11 art II

1. what is social justice

Art XIII sec.1 and 2

CALALANG VS WILLIAMS

The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public

Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St.
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from
7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal
Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date
of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently
passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief
of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer
challenges its constitutionality.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute
an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To
this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to
prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring
its preserving.

2) No. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a

mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,

nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

ONDOY VS IGNACIO

Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy,

an employee who worked under Virgilio Ignacio. According to the
chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the
respondent’s enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found
dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner asked for compensation,
however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the
hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for
reconsideration was also filed before the Secretary of Labor, but was
denied again due to lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is

constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role in this case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella

Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Jose’s death, 300 pesos for
burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the costs against
respondent, Ignacio.

Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in this case is

a matter of protection, and not equality. The Supreme Court
recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from the
respondent, as Jose did drown while “in the actual performance of his
duty.” To fortify this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with
accordance to the constitutional scheme of social justice and
protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with
the right of workers for compensation for personal injury, was applied.
Among them is a case where there was no direct testimony attesting
that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty,
however, the compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case,
the SC quoted that “as between a laborer, usually poor and
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal
advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter strict
compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but
protection.

I. sec.12 Art II

1. Family; protection of the mother and the life of the unborn

from conception.

IMBONG ET AL VS OCHOA (Supra)

 2. natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth

MEYER VS NEBRASKA

 (summary: The Court declared the Nebraska law unconstitutional, reasoning it violated
the liberty protected by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty, the
Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right
of a teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the
upbringing of their child as they see fit. While the state has a legitimate interest in
encouraging the growth of a population that can engage in discussions of civic matters,
the means it chose to pursue this objective was excessive. )

Plaintiff is a teacher in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska. He was

tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton country, Nebraska
on the ground that he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in
German language to Raymond Parpart, a 10-year-old child who had
not yet attained and successfully passed the 8th grade. This
conviction was based on an “act relating to the teaching of foreign
languages in the state of Nebraska (approved April 9, 1919). The said
act prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students that had
not yet completed the 8th grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, Plaintiff claimed that
education was a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected.
He further claimed that the statute infringed the liberty guaranteed to
the plaintiff by the 14th amendment.

Hence, this appeal to the US Supreme Court.

Issues

 Is control over the education of their children a fundamental

right of parents?

Holding/Rule

 Parents have the fundamental right to control the upbringing,

including the education, of their children.

Reasoning
  Liberty denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right…
o To contract
o To engage in any occupation of his choosing
o To acquire useful knowledge
o To marry
o To establish a home and bring up children
o To worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience

 This liberty may not be interfered with under the guise of

protecting the public interest.

 It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education

suitable to their station in life, and nearly all states make
education of children compulsory.
o Mere knowledge of the German language cannot
reasonably be regarded as harmful. Before the War, it
was looked upon as helpful and desirable.

 Meyer had the right to teach, and the parents of the child had
the right to engage him so to instruct their child. These actions
are within the liberty of the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
 The right is clearly infringed upon.
 The state says their interest is to foster a homogenous people
with American ideals prepared readily to understand current
discussions of civic matters.
o The means adopted exceed the limitations upon the
power of the state.
 Proficiency is a foreign language seldom comes to
one not instructed at an early age, and experience
shows that it is not injurious to the health, morals, or
understanding of an ordinary child.

PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS

In 1922 Oregon amended its compulsory attendance statute to

require that children between 8 and 16 years old be sent to public
schools in the districts where they lived. Two organizations operating
private schools in Oregon, the Society of Sisters of the Holy Names
of Jesus and Mary and the Hill Military Academy, challenged the
constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment,
alleging that it deprived them of property without due process of law.

Walter M. Pierce, the governor of Oregon, was named as a

respondent. A federal district court subsequently entered judgment
for the schools, enjoining the state from enforcing the statute and
finding that “the right to conduct schools was property” and that the
statute not only had taken the schools’ property without due process
but had also deprived parents of the right to “direct the education of
children by selecting reputable teachers and places.”

Issue: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control?

Ruling: US SC held that the statute violated the due process clause.
The two schools, as Oregon corporations and property owners within
the state, were entitled to “protection against arbitrary, unreasonable
and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent
destruction of their business and property.” Furthermore, the court
ruled that the Oregon statute “unreasonably interfered with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children.” According to the court, the state could not force
schoolchildren to “accept instruction from public teachers only.”
However, the court did acknowledge that states have wide-ranging
rights in regard to education:

“No question is raised concerning the power of the State

reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.”

Thus, the court invalidated only state action that prevents parents
from making an educational choice for their children; the court did not
prohibit states from exercising regulatory control over education,
including nonpublic schools. Finding that the Oregon statute was
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
federal district court.

Sec.4(1) Art XIV Constitution

PACU VS SEC. OF EDUCATION

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU)

assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate
the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these
laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and
operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education
the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private
schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may
ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise
said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers
that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue
delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation
because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which
the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban
books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: W/N Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy
presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the
exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him
by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the
ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all
educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private
education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that
are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of
control and regulation by the State over all schools.

J. sec.13, Art II
PD 684
PD 935
PD 1102
PD 603
K.Sec. 14, Art II

VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO

Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing

of 91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the
appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil
Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido
refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that
appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular
No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that putting women
workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and
placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and
ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and
respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out
that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the
President hence the same is no longer in effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers

should be confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioner.

HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of

Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of
what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own
personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced
that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street
sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must
be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the
exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises
power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through
which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers
therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they
are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority,
either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are
devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not
be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the
high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is
an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.
Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
This trend towards greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes
under the shelter of the equal protection clause argues most strongly
against this kind of discrimination.

L. sec.15 Art II
Sec.16 Art II

OPOSA VS FACTORAN
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the
respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the
remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental

consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with
the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to
the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the
judicial power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing violates the
requirements of due process.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power
of the Court.
 1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court.
Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the
requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by
the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint
is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and
proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens
this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means
the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.

1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

A. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found

under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to
dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice
Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would
have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20
of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that
when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested
by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.
90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
Sec. 17 Art II
Sec.5 Art XIV

GUINGONA, JR. VS CARAGUE

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation

(with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act,
or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD

No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations
of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent
and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic

appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for
education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority
to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is

unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service
our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of
our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

DEP.ED VS SAN DIEGO

FACTS:
Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the University of the
East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he
took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and
flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the
petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the NMAT rule:

H) A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY THREE (3) CHANCES TO

TAKE THE NMAT. AFTER THREE (3) SUCCESSIVE FAILURES, A
STUDENT SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE NMAT FOR THE
FOURTH TIME.

He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test.

In his petition, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
HELD:
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long
been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations is a valid exercises of governmental
power.

The Court agreed that the government is entitled to prescribe an

admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical
schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the
country.”

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit

of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors.

M. SEC.18, ART. II (LABOR as a primary social economic force)

Art. XIII, sec. 3

VICTORNIAO VS ERWU

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an

employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was
also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU,
a close shop agreement is being enforced which means that
employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU;
that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a
member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his
resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an
exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a
member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden
from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his
resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified
ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-
membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is
not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which
provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the
EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal
rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and
despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory
where he was employed, his employment could not be validly
terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further,
the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law
is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and
employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. RA
3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a
contractual right.
N. Sec.19, Art. II (self-reliant and independent national economy)

Sec.20, Art. II (role of the private sector)

1. Free enterprise vs. welfare state concept

PCD VS. PCA

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by PD No. 232

as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in
all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth
through a regulatory scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut
plant operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board
Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to
engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for
engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary
bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among
operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling,
and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association of
Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for
mandamus to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document,
have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the
present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free
enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for
the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. 12,
Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power
to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and
when the public interest so requires.

O. Sec. 21, Art II (rural devt and agrarian reform)

ASSO OF SMALL LANDOWNER VS HON. SEC OG AGRIAN
REFORM
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related
laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27
was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing
the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A.
6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke
that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not
be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for
they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In
short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program
because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws
(PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners
may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash.
Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form
of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform
program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the
law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong
to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes
of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the
courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that
Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power
lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed
upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine
just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees,
then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not
agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body,
then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring
the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of
just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a
concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

P. SEC. 22, Art. II (right of indigenous cultural communities)

Art. X, sec 15-21
EO No. 220
ORDILLO VS COMELEC
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.”

The official COMELEC results of the plebiscite showed that the

creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in
only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.

Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued

Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has
been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the
province of Ifugao.

The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-

ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain
that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that
the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: W/N the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The

keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must
join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are
not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and
functions necessary for the proper governance and development of
all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never
intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous
region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation
of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

Q. Sec.23, Art. II (ngos and community based and sectoral orgs)

R. Sec.24, Art II (role of communication and information)
PLDT CO. VS NTC

Facts: On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was enacted
otherwise known as “An Act Granting Felix Alberto and Company,
Incorporated, a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and
transoceanic telecommunications.” Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the
original corporate name, which was changed to ETCI with
amendment of the articles of incorporation in 1964. Much later,
“CELLCOM Inc.” was the name sought to be adopted before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, but this was withdrawn and
abandoned.. On May 13, 1987, alleging urgent public need, ETCI
filed an application with public respondent NTC for the issuance of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct, install,
establish, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system
and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the
Southern Luzon regions, with prayer for provisional authority to
operate phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an
opposition with MTD, however NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC
provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone system initially in Metro Manila subject to terms and
conditions, one of which is that ETCI and PLDT shall enter into an
interconnection agreement for the provision of adequate
interconnection facilities between applicant’s cellular mobile
telephone switch and the public switched telephone network and shall
jointly submit such interconnection agreement to the commission for
approval ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of
more than 40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to
Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos reacquired the shares they had sold to
the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares
to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired
their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964, ETCI had increased its capital
stock from Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in 1987, from Php360,000
to Php40,000,000.
Issue: Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares of stock to
the new stockholders amount to a transfer of ETCI’s franchise which
needs congressional approval pursuant to RA 2090.

Held: No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the grantee of the

franchise, which is the corporation itself and refers to a sale, lease or
assignment of that franchise. It does not include the transfer or sale
of shares of stock of a corporation by the latter’s stockholders.

The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by another

law, in section 20 (h) of the Public Service Act (CA 146). Pursuant
thereto, the public service commission (now NTC) is the government
agency vested with the authority to approve the transfer of more than
40% of the subscribed capital stock of a telecommunications
company to a single transferee.

In other words, transfer of shares of a public utility corporation need

only NTC approval, not congressional authorization. What transpired
in ETCI were a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until
1987. The approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been met
when it authorized the issuance of the provisional authority to ETCI.
There was full disclosure before the NTC of the transfers. In fact, the
NTC order of November 12,1987 required ETCI to submit its present
capital and ownership structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion
before the NTC, dated November 8, 1987 or more than a year prior to
the grant of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in
its capital stock from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock
transfers made by its stockholders.

A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are

owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC
approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation
as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires
congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock,
they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not,
however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its
franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had
transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the
franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the
corporation as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not
thereby invalidated by the transfer of shares. A corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has
the right to continuity or perpetual succession.

S. Sec.25, Art. II (local govt autonomy)

Art. X, sec.1-14

T. Sec.26, Art. II (Equal access to opportunities for public service)

PAMATONG VS COMELEC

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for

President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others
as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by
a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme

Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access
to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only
to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and
legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage
an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of
the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the

Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.”
The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does
not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact

positive measures that would accommodate as many people as
possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence
of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and
phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service”
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from
which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be

subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and
the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide
intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time
and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To
add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities
to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.
This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous
so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged
by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process,
most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It
would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is

both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not
before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for
the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on
whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate
as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

U. Sec.27, Art. II (honesty and integrity in the public service)

RA 3019, as amended by PD 77 and BP 195

V. Sec. 28, Art. II (policy of full public disclosure)

Art. III, Sec.7

Art. VI, sec. 20

VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names
of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for
the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply,
"(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."

ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers
to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former
First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of
policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time
the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness,
public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-
owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.

LEGASPI VS CSC

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on

matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for
mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records

to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department
employees

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of

public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and
all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records,
papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows
that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought,
i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public
interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern. This question is first addressed to the government
agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional
right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous
position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87
Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]).

To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the

government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and
in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus
Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility
are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at
all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for
their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to
confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to
cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those
who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and
licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles,
the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence
of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of
civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any
person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.

TANADA VS TUVERA

FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in
demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered
the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not. The publication
means complete publication, and that publication must be made in
the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he
claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion
and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.

ISSUE:
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of

publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be
published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of

general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared
that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.

LANTACO VS LLAMAS
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment
of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has
been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996
& 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the
years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that
he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good
faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income
tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying

his membership duesowing to limited practice of law and for being a
senior citizen.

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and

thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid
his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name
from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover,
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include
payment of membershipor association dues.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in

the pleadings he filed in court indeed merits the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his duesand plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR,
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

BALDOZA VS DIMAANO
FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began
the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was
based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty.
Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros"
subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of
Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael
Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men
were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises Padilla
is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of
Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and
family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria
Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one
"Auring" as his girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises
Padilla, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent,
demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in
the movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining,
the petitioner and private respondent executed a “Licensing
Agreement” where the petitioner agreed to pay the private
respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without need of further
demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961;
P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before
November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants
authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and
develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the
PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said
production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and
permission for the use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and
have herself portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby
 granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any
of the acts herein authorized.
After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was
shown in different theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts
pursuant to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private
respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for
judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of
P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to
render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the
corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees
equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the
life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has no
property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was
without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only
because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a
counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing
Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of
the private respondent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the
life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
2. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:

1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to

the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense
with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs
to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his
mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,”
a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person
to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the
living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own
rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy
in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a
fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public
a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises
Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.

2. No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision,

it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No
law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for recognition.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule
is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interest observable are the right to

privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances
presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement
will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern.

CHAVEZ VS PCGG
FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of
the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and
 the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten

wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it

is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information
on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage.
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general --such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information.

PART II
ART. IV
SUFFRAGE
A.Sec. 1, Art. V
B. Sec.2, Art. V

MACALINTAL VS COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity

of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He
questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among
others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant

abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a
 resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding
the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the
canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates
the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required

to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for
non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,
domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a
resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus,
an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If
the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention
of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the
winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it
that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its
power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice
presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

PART III
THE STRUCTURES AND POWERS OF THE NATL GOVT
INTRODUCTORY
A. Inherent powers of the State
A. Police Power
1. General

RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD

FACTS:
Rubi and other Manguianes residing in the Province of Mindoro
alleged that they were being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions were
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one of their fellow tribe, Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for running away from the reservation.

Manguianes, as Non-Christian tribe, were considered as very low in

culture, have shown no desire for community life and have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization. That the purpose of containing
them in a reservation, as stated by the Solicitor General, is for their
advancement, education, and to introduce civilized custom among
them.

The order was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the

Administrative Code of 1917, which reads as follow:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by

provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Hence, the validity of Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code is being

questioned.

ISSUE:
Whether Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which
may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the
peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. In general, it
may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things
which are ordinarily done by free men.

However, Liberty is not a license. Liberty is regulated by law. Implied

in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-
being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated
among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of
a class.”

2. Nat’l Security

LAO ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national
security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among
others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, among others, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other
persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers,
from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality
of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and

deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the
title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.”
US VS POMPEYA
FACTS:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney

of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of
the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally
and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty,
required under said municipal ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the

acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the
municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of
the complaint.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of
action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in
depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed

HELD:

Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of

Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-
bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and
55, as well as each householder when so required by the president,
to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving
information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The
amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon
for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is

anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine
Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental
entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and
regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government?

In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the
primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of
which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the
provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state
and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the
same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in
violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected
thereby.

Is there a cause of action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male
citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c)
that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that
conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in
calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.

"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered."

4. Public Safety
AGUSTIN VS EDU
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the
validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor
vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with
a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is
arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped
with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to
other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a
set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3)
‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . .
because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said
1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions
at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or
from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle
which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will
still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency
vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase,
rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the
police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance
of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process
and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the
latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive
scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision,
as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu
v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police
power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote
Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least
illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to
all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-
being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be
a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or
executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention,
an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point,
Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an
enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams
found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
“To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and
streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first
law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was
likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

5. Public Health
US VS GOMEZ JESUS

6. Public Morals
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS CITY OF MAYOR
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its
violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer
unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and
200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised
the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of

the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize

certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels
in doing business other than legal but also increases the revenue of
the LGU concerned. There is no violation of constitutional due
process for being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. As
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of
lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

7. Public welfare and advancement

BUCK VS BELL
Facts:
Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a
state mental institution. Her condition had been present in her family
for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual
sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the
patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure could be
performed, however, a hearing was required to determine whether or
not the operation was a wise thing to do.
Issue:
Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the
right to due process of the law and the equal protection of the laws as
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held:
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution.
Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the
medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law.
Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred
(at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the
Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had
reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months
of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to
satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the
best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law
like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with
incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

8. The Nat’l economy

RUTTER VS ESTEBAN
On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land
situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright,
and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before
August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with
interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of
said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor
of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed
upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted
an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the
attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that
this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer,
having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission
for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and
that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his
obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The
complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails
the constitutionality of RA 342.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment

clause grounds.

Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of

obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or
the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The
economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding
interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with

what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation
and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and
void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive
Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering
that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as
regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of
monetary obligations.

US VS TORIBIO
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his
carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his
carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered
his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued
and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the
other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit
to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not
a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property
as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics.
All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interests of the community.”

B. Eminent Domain
1. In general
2. What constitute taking

US VS CAUSBY
Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a
house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the
airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide path
passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the
house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree.
The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease
beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions
for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the
national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States’ four
motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property,
and have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production
had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls
from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States
had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that
the value of the property depreciation as the result of the easement
was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was
granted.

Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment?

Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value
of the easement and whether the easement was permanent or
temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land
extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that an
act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national
sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense
made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not
control the present case. The United States had conceded in oral
argument that if flights over the Respondents’ property rendered it
uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable under the
Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is
the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the
landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build
buildings, plant trees or run fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is
part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of
the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking,
unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of
Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and
whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.

Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of

Claims and hold that there has been no taking within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the
airplane, and the desire to avoid confusion.

US VS CALTEX
Facts:
1. Caltex, shell and standard vacuum oil owned terminal facilities in
Pandacan, Manila at the time of the Japanese attack upon Pearl
Harbor. These were used to receive, handle and store petroleum
products from incoming ships and to release them for further
distribution throughout the PH islands.

2. The military situation in the PH grew worse and in the face of the
Japanese advance, the Pandacan oil deposits were requisitioned by
the US army.

3. The oil companies received an order to demolish the facilities and

destroy all unused petroleum products to deprive the enemy of
valuable logistic weapon.

4. After the war, respondents demanded compensation of all of the

properties, which had been used or destroyed by the army. The US
govt paid for the petroleum stocks and transportation equipment,
which were either used or destroyed but it refused to compensate the
respondents for the destruction of the facilities.

5. Claiming a constitutional right under the 5th amendment to just

compensation for these facilities, respondents sued in the court of
claims. Recovery was allowed.

6.The US SC granted certiorari for review of this judgment.

Issue: W/N the private respondents are entitled for just

compensation.

Held: No. The judgment was reversed. The SC held that the principle
laid down by Justice Field in US vs. Pacific Railroad must govern this
case. In that case, it involved bridges which had been destroyed
during the war between the states by a retreating Northern Army to
impede the advance of the Confederate Army.
It was held in that case that the destruction or injury of private
property in battle or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in
many other ways in the war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone
as one of its consequences. The safety of the state in such cases
overrides all considerations of private loss.

Pacific Railroad case was later made the basis for the holding in
Juragua Iron Co. vs US, where recovery was denied to the owners of
a factory which had been destroyed by American soldiers in the field
in Cuba because it was thought that the structure housed the germs if
a contagious disease.

The destruction of respondents’ terminal in the face of their

impending seizure by the enemy was no different than the destruction
of the bridges in the Pacific Railroad case. The deliberation behind
the order was no more than a design to prevent the enemy from
realizing any strategic value from an area, which it was soon to be
captured.

Dissent by Justice Douglas and Justice Black: I believe that the 5th
Amendment requires compensation for the taking. It was as clearly
appropriated to that end as animals, food and supplies requisitioned
for the defense effort. As the Court says, the destruction of this
property deprived the enemy of a valuable logistics weapon. The
guiding principle should be that whenever the government determines
that one’s personal property, whatever it may be, is essential to the
war effort and appropriated it for the common good, the public purse
rather than the individual, should bear the loss.

3. Public use
4. Eminent Domain and police power

GUIDO VS RURAL PROGRESS

Justa Guido, owner of the land being expropriated by the Rural

Progress Administration (RPA), filed a petition for prohibition to
prevent RPA and Judge Oscar Castelo from proceeding with the
expropriation. Guido alleged, among others, that the land sought to
be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the
purview of the provisions of Act 539. Commonwealth Act No. 539
authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire private lands
or any interest therein through purchaser or farms for resale at a
reasonable price. The National Assembly approved this enactment on
the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which
provides that the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.

Issue: W/n the expropriation of Guido’s land is in conformity of to the

principle of Social Justice.

Held: NO. Hand in hand with the principle that no one shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law, herein invoked,
and that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people should be the concern of the
state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled,
that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the
Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy.

Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces

as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these
freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise
within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the
way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity,
feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not
propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate
equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of
one's personal needs and the giving of it to another.

The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not

supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land
by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government
instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property
or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do
guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights,
equality before the law, equality between values given and received
on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to
metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing
problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures,
ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and
house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation. light and
sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent
dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As will presently be shown,
condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to public
safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.

The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50

persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to
a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation
proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a
few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace
and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is
to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by
sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost
to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the
premises.

5. Just Compensation

REPUBLIC VS JUAN

Facts: Sps Celestino Juan and Ana Tanseco Juan are the registered
owners of the 2 adjoining parcels of land situated in LU. The
government filed a complaint for the expropriation of the said land to
be used as the site of the LU agricultural school. In negotioating for
the price of the property the Juans initially offered to sell the land for
P190k (P170k+ bank loan of P20k) with a down payment of P90k.
Subsequently, the lower court authorized the government to take
possession of the property after depositing the amount of P90793.70
as provisional value. However, the Juans increased valuation further
to P300k in his MR. the court ordered the government to deposit
P100k as provisional value until the true valuation of the lots can be
determined. Subsequently, the government deposited the amount of
P100k which the Juans withdrew that same day. Thereafter, the
government started developing the area and constructing the
buildings needed for the school. Soon after the Juans again
complained that the provisional value fixed by the court is still
inadequate, claiming that the property is worth P5k per hectre or a
total of P1693040. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the government
should pay the Juans the amount of P190k, which is the just and
reasonable compensation.

Issue: W/N the amount of P190k is just and reasonable

compensation.

Held: Yes. The amount of P190k is just and reasonable. Besides, the
unqualified withdrawal of the partial deposit of value of land by the
Juans constituted as recognition on their part of the right of the
government to expropriate the lots.

In the instant case, it cant be said that the amount is unjust to the
Juans because 1) the property was bought in 1957 for only P50k; 2)
the value of their improvements only amounted to P1712.60 as of
1963; 3) the alleged cost for leveling surveying and titling thereof from
1957-1959 amounts only to P40k; 4) the assessed value and the tax
declarations of theses lots amounts only to P42120; 5) its also
doubtful that the property would increase in value over 6x in 6 yrs
from 1957-1963; 6) the property is also 6km from the poblacion of
Bacnotan;

C. Taxation
1. In general

COMMISIONER VS BOTELHO CORP

F: Reparations Commish of the PH sold to Botelho the vessel “M/S
Maria Rosello” for the amount of P6,798,888.88. the former likewise
sold to General Shipping the vessel “M/S General Lim” at the price of
P6,951,666.66. Upon arrival at the port of Manila, the BOC placed the
same under custody and refused to give due course (to applications
for registration), unless the aforementioned sums of P483,433 and
P494,824 be paid as compensation tax. The buyers subsequently
filed with the CTA their respective petitions for review. Pending the
case, RA 3079 amended RA 1789 –the original Reparations Act,
under which the aforementioned contracts with the Buyers had been
executed- by exempting buyers of reparations good acquired from the
Commish, from liability for the compensation tax.
Invoking s20 of RA 3079, the buyers applied for the renovation of
their utilizations contract with the Commish, which granted the
application and then filed with the Tax court their supplemental
petitions for review. The CTA rule in favor of the buyers.

CIR appealed and argued upon the ground that a tax exemption must
be clear and explicit; that there is no express provision for the
retroactivity of the exemption, established by Republic Act No. 3079,
from the compensating tax; that the favorable provisions, which are
referred to in section 20 thereof, cannot include the exemption from
compensating tax; and, that Congress could not have intended any
retroactive exemption, considering that the result thereof would be
prejudicial to the Government.

I: W/N tax exemption may be applied retroactively.

H: Yes. The SC held that tax exemptions may and do exist, such as
the one prescribed in section 14 of Republic Act No. 1789, as
amended by Republic Act No. 3079, which, by the way, is "clear and
explicit," thus, meeting the first ground of appellant's contention. It
may not be amiss to add that no tax exemption — like any other legal
exemption or exception — is given without any reason therefor. In
much the same way as other statutory commands, its avowed
purpose is some public benefit or interest, which the law-making body
considers sufficient to offset the monetary loss entitled in the grant of
the exemption. Indeed, section 20 of Republic Act No. 3079 exacts a
valuable consideration for the retroactivity of its favorable provisions,
namely, the voluntary assumption, by the end-user who bought
reparations goods prior to June 17, 1961 of "all the new obligations
provided for in" said Act.

The argument adduced in support of the third ground is that the view
adopted by the Tax Court would operate to grant exemption to
particular persons, the Buyers herein. It should be noted, however,
that there is no constitutional injunction against granting tax
exemptions to particular persons. In fact, it is not unusual to grant
legislative franchises to specific individuals or entities, conferring tax
exemptions thereto. What the fundamental law forbids is the denial of
equal protection, such as through unreasonable discrimination or
classification.
Furthermore, Section 14 of the Law on Reparations, as amended,
exempts from the compensating tax, not particular persons, but
persons belonging to a particular class. Indeed, appellants do not
assail the constitutionality of said section 14, insofar as it grants
exemptions to end-users who, after the approval of Republic Act No.
3079, on June 17, 1961, purchased reparations goods procured by
the Commission. From the viewpoint of Constitutional Law, especially
the equal protection clause, there is no difference between the grant
of exemption to said end-users, and the extension of the grant to
those whose contracts of purchase and sale mere made before said
date, under Republic Act No. 1789.

2. Taxation

LUTZ VS ARANETA

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial

Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue
the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty
cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment
Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth
Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the
manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar
manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in
control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane and ceded
to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent
to the difference between the money value of the rental or
consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum
of the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is
unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the
sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action
was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are
unconstitutional.
Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional.
The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our
nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, a said objective of
the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional.
It follows that the Legislature may determine within
reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient
for its promotion. If objectives and methods are
alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may
not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made with the implement of the state’s police
power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from
those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under
the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

RP VS BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING
FACTS:
RA 632 created the Philippine Sugar Institute, a semi-public
corporation. In 1951, the Institute acquired the Insular Sugar Refinery
for P3.07 million payable in installments from the proceeds of the
Sugar tax to be collected under RA 632. The operation of the refinery
for 1954 to 1957 was disastrous as the Institute suffered tremendous
losses. Contending that the purchase of refinery with money from the
Institute’s fund was not authorized under RA 632, and that the
continued operation of the refinery is inimical to their interest,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Ma-ao Sugar Central, Talisay-Silay
Milling Co. and the Central Azucarera del Danao refused to continue
with their contribution to said fund. The trial court found them liable
under RA 632. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Are the milling companies liable?

RULING:
Yes. The special assessment or levy for the Philippine Sugar Institute
Fund is not so much an exercise of the power of taxation, nor the
imposition of a special assessment, but the exercise of police power
for the general welfare of the entire country. It is, therefore, an
exercise of a sovereign power which no private citizen may lawfully
resist. Section 2a of the charter authorizes Philsugin to acquire the
refinery in question. The financial loss resulting from the operation
thereof is no means an index that the industry did profit therefrom, as
other gains of a different nature (such as experience) may have been
realized.

B. Doctrine of Separation of Powers

BELGICA ET AL VS EXEC SEC

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines
since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the
latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The
allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to
– P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads,
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects”
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request
for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in
the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this
has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations
of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur
Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel
system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20
bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted
by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with
the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after
the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate
as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear
act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle
of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone.
(The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only
insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the
Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or
other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The
power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of
the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of
the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify
the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such
system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their
local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the
LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members
of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC
and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary
to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy.
It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork
barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the
earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created
the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993),
which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes which
the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29,
Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein
does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

1. Inherent of republicanism; purpose

Interdependence vs. independence
2. System of Checks and Balances
3. Inherent or incidental power

ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by
the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L.
Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault
refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate
adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of
Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to
answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in
carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it
must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a
query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too
long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.

IN RE DICK
R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, a
periodical published weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of
certain articles in that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of the
Philippine Islands in policies inaugurated for the prosecution of the
war between the United States and the German Empire, and other ar
ticles which have tended to create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in
the community. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the
Philippines ordered his deportation but before the Governor-
General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and
form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code.
Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be
discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila.

I: W/N the Governor-General has the power of deportation absent of

a statutory grant of authority.

H: Yes, the Governor-General has the

power to institute and maintain
d e p o r t a t i o n proceedings.

The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued

presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the
community," as an act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-
General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the
facts disclosed by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of the
Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is
the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other
tribunal is at liberty to re examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence
on which he acted.

ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Legislative Power; basic limitations

a. no irrepealable laws
 b. separation of powers
c. improper delegation of powers

Delegation of Powers
i. Tariff powers, s.28(2) art. VI;’
ii. Emergency powers, s.23(2) art. VI;
iii. Delegation to the people 1) referendum,
2)plebescite;
s.2, art. XVII
s.32, art. VI

PEOPLE VS VERA
Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He

filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila
CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request
by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No.
4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a
city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces
are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides
equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power.
Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power
of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in
effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of
legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does

not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does
not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must
be based on substantial distinctions, which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.

Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes

an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of
the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power.
Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads
as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which
 the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for

themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces
or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer.

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions

of our Bill of Rights, which prohibits the denial to any person of the
equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said
to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such
a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former
province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise
coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
benefits of probation in one province while another person
similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective
provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious
reason that probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the
provincial boards.

iv. delegation to local governments

RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to
remove their residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of
Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made
to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of
“very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan,
solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of
the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are
being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the
doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as
circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be
given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was
intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian”
it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical
area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where
they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated
among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of
a class.”

PP VS VERA supra

s.16, RA 7160, LGC of 1991: “The General Welfare Clause;

Police Power.”

s.19, RA 7160, LGC of 1991: Power of eminent domain

s.5, art. X of the Constitution: power of taxation.

v. delegation to administrative bodies. The “power

of subordinate legislation” by administrative
agencies.

PP VS VERA supra

CRUZ VS YOUNGBERG