Ar BANG ce cia. BAR REVIEW CEN EER w bet bake Cpocererccene 6 beth Cc) CIA th IPO, Survey of 2017-2018 SC Decisions in REMEDIAL LAW By: Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO JURISDICTION Jurisdiction determined by allegations tn the complaint. In Regalado v, Dela Ramo, et al, G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017, De! Castillo, j,an action for Recovery of Possession of a Real Property and Damages with Injunction was filed, The defendant maved to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction as the assessed valuie was not alleged. It was denied ruling that the area of the land is 44 hectares more or less and it is safe to presume that the value of the property is more than P20,000.00. The CA affirmed the RT's decision and dismissed the appeal, hence, a petition for review was filed with the SC, which Held; In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action lor recovery of possession of real property: !) ejectment {either tor unjawtul detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2) ‘accion pudlici9na or a plehary action for recovery at real right ot possession when dispossession has lasted for mare than one year; and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership, Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691}, the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction fof the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, of any Interest therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed 20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila). On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession ot real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value ol the property exceeds P20,000.00(r 50,000.00 in Metro Manila) Nature of the action for specific performance to execute deed of reconveyance; beyond pecuniary estimation. An action tor specific performance seeking for 2 judgment ordering the detendant to execute the appropriate deeds of conveyance was tiled. Ic alleged that as part of an agreement, his Services as architect would entitle hint to a unit for every condominium the contractor would construct with him as the architect. What 1s the nature of the action? Explatn. Held; It 1s an action beyond pecuniary estimation, not a real action. What determines the nature of the action and which court has‘jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought (Nilo Padre v. Pructosa Badillo, Fella Badillo, Presentacion Caballes, etal, 655 Phil. 52, 64). In his complaint, respondent ‘claimed that petitioners promised to convey to him the subject units to entice him to stay with their company. From this, respondent prayed that petitioners be compelled to perform their part of the alleged oral agreement. The “objective of the suit is to compel petitioners to perform an act, specically to execute written instruments pursuant toa previous oral contract. Notably, the respondent does not claim ownership of, nor tile to, the subject properties. 'Not aif actions involving, real property are real actions. In Spouses Sarazo, et al. v. Francisco, 722 Phil. 346, 357 [2013] twas clarified that: . XX Although the end result of the respondent's claim was the transfer of the subject o_ Property to Inis namie, the suit was still essentially for specitic perlormance, a personal action, because it sought the execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Transfer of unit Is a mere anticipated consequence. “That the end result would be the transfer of the subject units to respondent's name in the event that his suit Is decided in his favor is “an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause tor which the action [for specific Performance with damages] was instituted.” Had respondent's action proceeded to trial, the crux af the controversy ‘woutd have been the existence or non-existence of the alleged oral contract Irom which would flow respondent's alleged right 10 compel petitioners to execute deeds ot conveyance. The transfer of property sought by respondent is ‘but incidental for an offshoot of the determination of whether or not there is indeed, to begin with, an agreement to convey the properties in exchange lor services rendered (Specified Contractors & Dev. Inc, et al. v. Pobocan, G.R No 212472, January 11, 2016, Tijar, |) [RTC has exclusive jurisdiction involving contract of marriage, In Tar v. Tiar, eal. G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017, Peralta, |, there was an action to declare a marriage ‘void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC dismissed dhe action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction ruling that since the marriage was celebrated by a priest, the ecclesiastical tribunal should have jurisdiction. To nullify it would violate the principle ot separation of church and State. MR having been dented, petition was liled ‘with the SC where tne OSG contended that the courts have jurisdiction contrary to the RTC ruling, Agreeing with the OSG, the SC Held: The RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all setions involving the contract of marriage and ‘marital relations, thus, the lower couirt erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, 4 petition fur declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner bled betore the RTC of Baybay City, {alls within ts exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTE erred in disnatssing the petitian for lack of jurvsdiction 4) AURE2019 SCV2017- 2018 n Remedial Law teRTC has jurisdiction over cases involving RA 9165 regardless of whether private individual or public: a in De Lima v. Hon. Guerrero, etal, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017, Velasco, one ofthe issues raised 8S whether the RTC has jurisdiction over former Sec. af Justice De Lima with salary grade 31, She was charged Wit! violation of RA 9165. She argued that the Sandiganbayan not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter: RuliO that the RIC has jurisdiction over cases for violation of RA 9165, the SC Held: I is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and fonn prescribed by law (US. v. Castaiares, 18 Phil. 210, 214 (1911); Yusuke Fukuzume v. People, 511 Phil. 192, 208 (2005); Trenas v. People, 680 Phil. 368, 385 (2012)). It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the ‘conimencemtent of the action (Dela Cruz v. Maya, 243 Phil. 983, 985 (1988). Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, It fllows then that Congress may also, by law. provide that a certain class ot cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be 8 special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction nf courts (Morales v. Court of Appeals 347 Phil. 493, 506 (1997) ‘The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act o! 1972. A plain reading of RA.9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation at the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases ‘s apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned andl recognized as the only court with the authority to hear cirugerelated cases Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug- related cases. Thus, in Morales v, Court of Appeals; See also In re: Partial Report on the Results ot the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, 567 Phil. 103 (2008) the Court categorically named the RTC as the court with urisdiction over drug related-cases. BARANGAY CONCILIATION No need for barangay conciliation if party Is a juridical entity. In Uy v. Estate of Vina Fernandez, G.R. No, 200612, April S, 2037, Reyes, |. Vipa and Levi are married with children. After the death of Vipa, one of their children, Grace joy filed a complaint for untawtul detainer against the lessee over a property lorming part of the conjugal properties of their parents. The MTC rendered a judgment against the defendants. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC on the ground that there was no reterral to the barangay for conciliation. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision saying that the Estate of the Deceased is a juridical person hence, there is no need for barangay conciliation. In upholding the CA's decision, the SC Held: There was no need to reter the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay tor conciliation pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book Ill and Section $15, Title One, Book IV ot Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code). Only individuals may be patiies to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships for other juridical entities may nat be filed with, received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation (Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Heirs of Teves, 438 Phil. 26, 4 | (2002), citing Sectton 1, Rule VI of the Katarl Lng(11Jg Pambarangay Rt) | es implementing the Katarungang Pambar.ngay Law). The Estate of Vipa, which fs the complainant below, i a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy (See Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragnte, 80 Phil. 776 (1948). Thus, there 1s no necessity to bring the dispute ta the barangay tor conciation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawtul detainer with the MTCC. | No need for barangay conciliation if parties reside indifferent places; exception. ‘fre vaste question in Abagatnan, et lv. Sps. Clarita, GR. No, 211956, August 7, 2017, Del Castilo, J. whether tere ie a eed for barangay conciliation proceedings i the parties da not reside in the same place. In this Case. one of the parties resides in Laguna, the other one in Pasig City. Ruling that there 1s no need for coneiiation proceedings, the SC Held: The UGC pravides that “the lupon of each borangoy shall ave authority :o bring together the parties actually fesiding in the same city oF municipality for amicable setiement of all disputes,” subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991, Section 408). One such exception is in cases where the dispute Involves parties who actually reside in barangays of ditfereat cities of munlelpalities. unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to Submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE 011991, Sections 06(0)- In Poscualv. Poscual, §11 Phil. 700, 706-707 {2005}, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of acwal residency in the LGC pertains specially to the red partes in interest inthe case. Said requirement cannot he construed to apply t the attorney-in-tact othe party-plaintif, as doing so would abrogate the meaning ot a "real party in interest” 1s detined in Section 2, n relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 ofthe Rules of Court (Banting v. Spouses Maglapur, $31 Phil 101, 115 |2006}) RULE 2 - ACTIONS Action to recover possession based on ownership 's action reinvindicatoria, not publiciana, In Hears of Afonso Yusingca v. Busilak, etal, (.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018, Peralta, | there were tive (5) cases of uccion pubiciany and/or recovery of possession over tive (5) real properties Hled by the plaintills against defendants, It was alleged that they inherited the sald properties and have heen in possession during the war They 2 JABREZO19 SCD2017-2018 1m Reed Law (co Jndated) revised AVSAL ctsdiscovered that several persons occupied the properties hence, they filed an accion reinvindicatoria, During the endency of the action the respondents entered and occupied several portions of the property. Subsequently, the ‘cases tor remvindicatoria were decided in their favor. They demanded trom respondents/detendants the vacation of the properties but they refused who contended that they have been in possession ot the properties for more than 30 Years and that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the same. The MTC ruled in favor of the pl. Previous decision in a case for accion reinvindacatoria which became linal and e as the true and lawful owners and that respondents were merely intruders, The: atfirming the MTC decision. The issue bodied down to the basic question of whether of not the final and executory decision rendered in 3 previous accion reinvindicatoria finding petitioners as the lawtul owners of the properties is binding upon respondents. Held: Yes, because the responttents are mere intruders into the property who have no tight to possess the same. It fettled that a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of « property to another is Iv personam (Spouses Stlgrove v. Sabas, 538 Phil 282, 244 (20061). It ts conclusive, not against the whole world, hut only “between the parties and their suecessors in interest by ite subsequent tothe comimencement al the action." An action to recover 2 Parcel of tand is a real action but itis an action in personam, tor it binds a particular individual only although it cee eek the ght toa tangible thing, Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and Guly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule admits ofthe exception that even not: party Seon a he nat ine ludement ip an ejectment suitiwhere he is any of the tollowing’ (a) trespasser, squatter oF agent of the defendant traudulently occupying the property to trustrate the judgment (b) guest or oecupont of the Pe nate ce permission oF the defendant; (c) transteree pendonte lite: | d) sublesste:( e) colesse: OF (0) member ofthe family, relative or privy ol the detendant(Serdoncilo. Ss. Benairan, 358 Phil 83 |1998)) aintiffs using a xecuitory which declared petitioners ‘CAaaflirmed the judgment of the RTC Acton publiciana; Its nacre in ets of Amst v. Vallee. complaint or recovery of possession ola parce olan claiming bounce Pesan they ave hen in acta peace and continuous possesion he and aaa aon coe Tree espondent was dared the owner. The CA reverse the decision wick cane eal Se nea ana Petitioners are the owners. a ‘nes Inthe meantime, respondent ied 9 complain for quieting tile ownership and possession over the sa Property. Petitioners contended thatthe decision the ist case (CC No 8806) sresuttene wt cad ene No. 1-298. ling that he contention noe correc se Meld: No, because the caures of ation are eferem ram each ober In CC No. (298, what was sought was Tor dierent trom the property covered by the CLT in Respondent did ov ev juicane R No. 227124, December 6, 2017, Petlas-Bernabe, |, respondent filed a a declaration that the property covered by a Torrens title is rder to quiet his title and remove all adverse claims against it Question the validity af the CLT nor sought for its declaration, hence, there is no res “Res judicata literally means ‘a matter adjudged: a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter Settled by judgment.” It also refers to the "rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights ot the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal ot concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by 2 court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the lirst and second actions, identity ot parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action (Dy v. Yu, 763 Phil. 491, 509 (2015); citation “omitted. See also Republic of the Philippines (Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA) v. Yu; and Gutierrez v. CA) Parameters to determine whether an action is within or one incapable of pecuniary estimation. In Cabrera v. Francisco, G.R. No, 213863 and 214021, january 27, 2016, the Court laid down the parameters in determining an action to be one beyond pecuniary estimation or not, thus: IF it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim 1s considered capable of ‘Pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts oF in the Courts ot First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something ‘flier than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or 2 ¢ of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where ‘the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (citing De Ungria v. CA, 669 Phil. 505, 597 {2011}: Dee v. Harvest All Investment Ltd, etal, G.R. No. 224871, March 15, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, n Actions for support and recognition may be complexed. In Richelle Abella v. Cabaftero, G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017, Leonen, J, Richelle filed an action for ‘support representing her child coupled with recognition of the child. It was contended by the defendant that filiation proceedings should have been first instituted to ascertain the child's paternity and that without these proceedings having been first resolved the action for support cannot prosper. The SC ruled otherwise and Held: Filiation must be established for a child to claim support trom a putative father. When “filiation is beyond question, support follows as [a] matter of abligation." To establish fillation, an action for compulsory recognition ‘may be filed against the putative father ahead of an action for suppor. In the alternative, an action far support may 3 JABRC2019.SCD2017-2018 in Remedial Law (consohdated} revised/EVSA/crysbe directly tiled, where the matter of filiation shall be integrated and resolved (Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 499 Phil 307, 317 [2005]; Abella v. Cabaero, G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017, Leonen, J} RULE 3 - PARTIES The deceased or his estate may not be named defendant. In Gaffney v. Bulter, G.R. No, 219408, November 8, 2017, Perias-Bernabe, }, a complaint for sum of money ‘was filed alleging that respondent invested in a business of the petitioner and her husband. She advanced the Amount of P12M as her investment but due to the death of petitioner’s husband, the business did not push through. Despite demand to return the investment, petitioner failed to do so, hence, the suit impleading petitioner and the estate of her husband as detendants, Motion to dismiss was filed questioning the inclusion of the estate of her husband but it was denied by the RTC ruling that the inclusion is necessary for a complete reliel on the determination or settlement of the claim. Getore the CA on appeal, the same issue was raised contending that the RTC erred in allowing the estate to be named as defendant and tor considering respondent as the legal representative of the estate when in fact no settlement proceeclings had been liled. The CA granted the appeal and dismissed the case against the estate ruling that only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action (Rule 3, Sec. 1, Rules of Court). Affirming the CA ruling on appeal, the SC Held: A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case (Ventura ¥. Militante, 374 Phil. 573 {1999}, cited in Spouses Berot v. Siapno, 738 Phil. 675, 682 (2014]). Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules ot Court unequivocally states that “only natural ot juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may bbe parties in a civil action.” In Ventura v, Miliante, the Court declared that neither a deceased person nor his estate has capacity to be sued, explaining thus: Parties may be either plaintifts or detendants. The plaintf in an action is the party complaining, and a proper party plaintift is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court In order to ‘maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be @ person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawtully prosecuted save in the name ol such a person. ‘The rule is no ditferent as regards party defendants. tis imcumbent upon a plaintitf, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party detendant to his cause of action. In a suit or proceeding in personam ot an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction tor the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually ar legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it, It has even been held that the question of the legal personality ot a party detendant is a question ot substance going to the jurtsdiction af the court and not one of procedure. Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintitt ina court action, A deceased person does nat have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much sq that a motion t0 substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate ‘cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintitt will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued! and may not be named a party detendant in a court action Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when the deceased died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collecsion (see Spouses Berat v. Siapno}. As such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause ot action pursuant to Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because ‘a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be « party to a civil action (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 711 Phil. 451, 475-476 |2013}) ‘No juirisdctfon over deceased. ‘Moredver, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of the deceased. Summons is a writ by which the-defendant is notitied of the action brought against him and service thereof is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. In the present case, no valid service of sunvmons upon the deceased was or could have been made, precisely because he waa already dead even before the complaint against him and his wile was filed in court. In several occasions, the Court has held that the trial court fails to acquire jurisdiction over a detendant who was already dead at the time the complaint was filed against bit. In Ventura, the factual milieu of which is similar to the present case, the original complaint named the “estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura.” The Court held that as the deceased was dead at the time the complaint was filed and no special proceeding to settie his estate had been filed in court, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased or his estate. In the case at bench, the Alias Summons served upon Gina purportedly as the representative of her late husband was thus invalid In sum, impleading the deceased or his estate in the present petition was improper. The action against him must be dismissed and the same may just be tiled as a claim against his estate in a proper proceeding, The CA ths did not err in reversing the rial court. 4 JABRC-20195CD2017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA crysConcept of indispensable party. In Phit. Veterans Bank v. Sps. Sabado, G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017 Perlas-Bernabe, |. Haus Talk Project Managers, Inc. entered into a contract to sell over a parcel of land with the respondents. Thereafter it assigned its rights to PVB including the right to collect rentals and execute any act or deed necessary to enforce compliance with the contract that included the right to cancel the same in case ot non-payment of the price. Due to their failure to pay, PVB cancelled the contract and demanded payment and sued the respondents tor ejectment for non-compliance. It ‘was contended that HTPMI was an indispensable party. The lower courts ruled that if s not, but the CA reversed ruling that itis an indispensable party. I reversing the CA, the SC Held: Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a suit, when it provides that parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either 4s plaintiffs or detendants, ‘An indispensable party as “one whose interest will be atfected by the court's action in the litigation, and. without whom no final determination of the case can be had, The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the reliet sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before, the court which is effective, complete, or equitable” (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Cacayuran, 759 Phil. 145, 152 (2015), citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 486 Phil. 366, 379-340 (2004). "Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, tor want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present” (citing Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235, 265 [2004]), In Regner v. Logarta, 362 Phil. 862 (2007), the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether or not one is an indispensable party. Itis not correct to say that since HTPMI retained ownership over the subject praperty pursuant to the Deed ‘of Assignment, it is an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy which is inseparable from the interest ot the other parties, and that a final adjudication cannot be made without affecting such interest. Here, the only issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating parties has the better right to possess de facto the subject property ("Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract. express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration oF termination of the right to possess. The only issue to he resolved in an unlawul detainer case isthe physical or material possession of the property involved, independent ot any claim of ownership by any of the parties.” (Piedad v. Spouses Gurieza, GR. No. 207525, June 18, 2014, 736 Phil. 709, 715 [2014]; emphases and underscoring supplied)), Thus, HTPMI's interest in the subject property, as one holding legal title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner's rights under the Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and resultantly, the recovery of actual possession of the subject property by virtue of this case. Hence, the courts can certainly proceed to determine who between petitioner and respondents have a better right co the possession of the subject property and complete relief can be had even without HTPMI's participation. RULE 4- VENUE Venue of personal and real action. ‘in Racpan v. Barroga-Hoigh, G.R. No. 234499, June 6, 2028, Velasco, |, « complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase was filed before thee Davao-RTC over 1 property located in Carmen, Davao Del Norte. The defendant contended that venue was improperly laid since it should have been filed in Davao Del Norte not in Davao City. Furthermore, there was lack of the mandatory barangay conciliation requirement. The contention was that, the action was real, not personal action. It was dismissed by the RTC and the CA affirmed the dismissal ruling that the action isa real action and that there was no barangay conciliation requirement. The prayer for preliminary injunction was a mere ploy to avoid the requirement. Reversing the lower courts, the SC Held: The action is a personal action. The complaint did not allege that the possession and title to the property have been transferred to the respondent. Nowhere is there an allegation for recovery or reconveyance of the property. ‘The complaint was not eancerned with the title to or recover of the real property, thus, it is a personal action, hence, Davao Efty where both petitioner and respondent reside is the proper venue. Primary sbjective of case determines venue. ‘What determines the venue of a case is the primary abjective for the filing of the case (Latorre v. Latorre, 631 Phil 88 (2010}; citing Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 501 (2001) and Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v Platinum Group. Metals Corporation, GR. Nos. 178180, 190674, 181141 & 183527, May 8, 2009; Golden Arches Development Corp, v. St Francis Square Holdings, Inc, 655 Phil. 221 (2011)). On one hand, i the plaintitt seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages, his complaint is a personal action that may be filed in the place of residence of either party. On the other hand, ifthe plaintiff seeks the recovery ‘of real property, or ithe action affects title to real property or for the recavery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, oF foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, then the complaint is a real action that must be bbrought before the court where the real property is located. Thus, in Chua v. Total Office Products and Services, inc, 508 Phil. 490 {2005}, it was ruled that where the action is not intended for the recovery of real property but solely for the annulment of a contract, 1 is a personal action that may be filed in the court where the plaintit or the respondent resides. It held: Well-seltled 1s the rule that an action to annul a cantract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage 1s a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery ot personal property, the enforcement of @ contract or the recovery af damages. In contrast, in a real 5 JABRC2019.8C02017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised/EVSA/ctYsaction, the plaintiff seeks the recovery ot real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation af or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property (Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh, supra). Venue of personal actions; real actions. In Ley Construction & Development Corp. v. Sedano, G.R. No, 222711, August 31, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J, the SC once against said that Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions. Under the Rules, actions affecting title to oF possession ot real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the ‘municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. With respect to persanal action, the Rules provide that all other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintifts resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal detendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may he found, at the election of the plaintif Requisites of venue stipulation. Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which hhas jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court). As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict che filing of said actions in 9 certain exclusive venue (Section 4b], Rule 4, Rules of Court). In Briones v. Court of appeals, GR. No. 204444, January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA 240, the Court explained: Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only inthe place agreed upon, or merely permissive in thatthe parties may file thelr suit nat only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. AS in any other agreement, what is ‘essential isthe ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown hat such stipulation is exclusive, In the absence ot qualitying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place (Legaspi v. Rep. ofthe Phils, $81 Phil. 381, 386 [2008]). In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson, 472 Phil. 411 [2004), the Court held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding, provided that: (a) the Uipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in incent;(b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) itis entered into before the tiling of the suit. RULE 6 - COUNTERCLAIM Nature of compulsory counterclaim. In North Greenhills Assn, Inc. v. Atty. Narciso Morales, G.R. No. No.'222821, August 9, 2017, Mendoza, J, a complaint was filed to stap the construction ofa pavilion and rest room alongside the concrete wall af the house of respondent claiming that tor a period of 33 years he had an open, continuous, irnmediate and unhanpered access to the subdivision park through his side door. By way of counterclaim it was alleged that respondent has not been Paying association dues. Ruling on the nature of the counter-claim as permissive, the SC Held: Here, the main issues in the complaint are limited only co the propriety of barring Atty. Morales from accessing the park through the side door and whether the restroom constructed by NGA is a nuisance per se. On the other hand, the counterclaim is simply concerned with collecting from Atty. Morales his unpaid association dues for the past thirty (30) years. Suffice it to state that payment or non-payment of assaciation dues are distinct matters that do not relate to whether the main cause of Atty. Morales against NGA was proper. Whether there was payment ‘or otherwise is irrelevant to the main issues considering that the pleadings liled by the parties essentially reflected an admissio& of membership of Atty. Morales in the association. The failure to raise the issue of unpaid association ‘dues inthis case or its dismissal if properly raised will not be a bar to the filing af the appropriate separate action to collect it. A compillsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction oF occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the Jurisdiction of the court, does not require tar its adjudication the presence of third parties aver wham the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive (Bungcayao, Sr. v. Fort llocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, 632 Phil. 391 (2010), citing Cruz-Agana V. Hon, Santiago-Lagman, 495 Phil. 188 (2005)) ‘The competing test ol compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim, The Court lurther ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trlals at the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and etfort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and {e88! issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same haste controversy hetween the parties (citing Lalarge Gement Phil. Inc. v. Conunental Cement Corp., 486 Phil, 123 (2004), further cling Quintanilla v. CA, 344 Phil. BIL (1997) and Aiday v. EGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962 (2001)} {6 JABREZOIYSCD2017-2018 in Ren‘The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows: {a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata har.a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or relute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant's counterclaim? (4) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaiin? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory (citing Lafarge Cement Phil, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp, 486 Phil. 123 (2004) further citing Quintanilla v. CA, 344 Phil. 811 (1997) and Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962 (2001 J, citing NAMARCO ¥. Federation of United Mamarco Distributors, 151 Phil. 338 ( 1973)}. Otherwise, the same is permissive RULE 13 - FILING & SERVICE OF PLEADINGS Requirements in case service 's done by private courler, In PSBank v, Papa, G.R. No, 200469, January 15, 2018, Martires, |, judgment was rendered. MR was personally with the caurt, The other party was furnished with a copy through a private courier without explanation Why and without an affidavit of service, It was contended that it was not filed on time and the trial court ruled that it was not filed on time. In ruling that it was not filed on time, the SC Held: Filing by private courier as equivalent to tiling by ordinary mail (Industrial Timber Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 303 Phil. 621, 626 (1994). Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 678 Phil. 660, 674 (2011)). This pronouncement equally applies to service of pleadings and motions. Hence, to prove service by a private courier or ordinary mail, a party must attach an alfidavit of the person who mailed the motion or pleading, Further, such affidavit must show compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 ofthe Rules of Court, which provides: Section 7, Service hy mail. - Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, i known, with postage tully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days it undelivered. If no registry service 1s available in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail ‘This requirement is logical as service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no registry service exists either in the locality of the sender or the addressee (Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 678 Phil. 660, 674 (2011)). This is the only credible justification why resort to service by ordinary mail or private courier may be allowed. ‘ RULE 14 - SUMMONS Defective service of summons can be cured by the filing of MR with affirmative defenses. In Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, etc, G.R. No. 209518, june 19, 2017, Tijam, }, an action was filed seeking tor a judgment ordering Tujan-Militante to surrender certain TCTs which were al issued under the name of Nustad. It was alleged that the former has been withholding the titles. Instead of an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging, that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as there was improper service of summons. The court denied the motion, hence, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the SPA is void as the attorney-in-tact was representing a Norwegian who is not allowed to own land in the Philippines and prayed for damages. The CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of Tujan-Militante but it was cured by the filing of the MR which sought tor afirmative reliefs, an equivalent of voluntary appearance, hence, appeal was made to the SC which Held: A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, itis ‘equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may stil acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, ifthe latter voluntarily appears hefore it (Wong v. Factor-Koyama, G.R. No. 183802, September 17, 2009). Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief aside trom lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance By-seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. v-Rizal Commercial Ganking Corp. GR. No. 183370, August 17, 2015). While Tufan-Miltante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court @ quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion tor Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent withthe position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the Proper objection, necessitates submission to the court's jurisdiction (Reicon Realty Corp. v. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc, G.R. No. 204796, February 4, 2015) Requisites before resort to service of summons by publication. In Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017, Velasco, |, complaint tor toreclasure of ‘mortgage was filed. Summons was served upon defendant by publication, ‘The record shows that the sherift attempted to serve summons on the delendants at the property subject of fareclosure, After this single attempt at 7 JABRC2019.5C02017-2018 in Remedial Law (cansolidated) revised /EVSA/c19personal service there was a motion tor leave to serve Summons by publication, not even by substituted service which was granted by the lower court. Ruling that there was no proper service of summons by publication, the SC Held: There was no diligent etort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her the summons before the service by publication as allowed, Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of peutioner and her whereabouts, ‘As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by Publication can be resorted to only if the detendant’s "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Service upon corporation through a mere employee, not valid, In Interlink Movie Houses, et al. v. CA, et al, G.R. No, 203298, January 17, 2018, Martires, J, a complaint for sum ot money was filed against a corporation. Summons was served upon the attice ot the President of the corporation through a certain Jonalyn Linawan who undertook to forward the documents to her superior. A motion to declare the defendant in default was filed. The detendants entered a special appearance questioning the detective service of summons, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. ‘*he RTC denied the motion which the CA affirmed. in reversing the decisions of the lower courts, the SC Held: Ics settled that jurisdiction over a detendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or ‘through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the absence of service or when the service ‘of summons upon the person of the defendant is detective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a Judgment rendered against him is null and void (Spouses Belen v. judge Chavez, 573 Phil. $8, 67 (2008)). There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to its managing partner, general ‘manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is was undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made upon one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among thase officers enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, theretore, does ‘ot vest upon the trial court jurisdiction aver Expressions. Substituted service of summons; requisites. {tis settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place at business with a competent person in charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method ot service, and personal service of summons ts preterred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454 [2006], the Court held that before a sheritf may resort to substituted service, he must first establish the impossibility ot prompt personal service. To establish such ‘impossibility, there must be at least three (3) attempts, preferably on at least two different dates, to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one (1) month or eventually result in failure. The sheriff must further cite why such elforts are unsuccessful One attempt to serve summons not sufficient; show efforts. In this case, the impossibility af prompt personal service was not shown. The sheriff's return reveals that the Sherift attempted to serve the second summons personally only once on 11 May 2009. Clearly, the efforts exerted were insufticient to establish that it was impossible to personally serve the summons promptly. Further, the Sheriff tailed to cite reasons why personal service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina told him that Bon Huan was then attending to business matters, and that he was assured that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan, No voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court; there was special appearance questioning Jurisdiction; effect of conditional appearance. ‘The respondents filed an omnibus motion to recall the trial court's order granting Interlink’s motion for declaration of default and for allowance of ex parte presentation of evidence. ‘As a general rule, one who secks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that the filing af motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lit order of detault with motion tor reconsideration is considered Voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance ta challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over hrs person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority As held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spauses Dy, a special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance. Such special appearance, however, requires that the defendant must explicitly and unequivocably pose objections to the jurisdiction ot the court aver his person; otherwise, such faslure would constitute voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, espec where a pleading or motion seeking alfirmative rele 1s filed and submitted to the lly in instances ‘@YABRC20198CD2017-21 1 Remedial Law (cons 1d) eevined/EVSA/eryyAt first glance, the respondents may be seen to have submitted themselves to the jutisdiction of the RTC. Indeed, said omnibus motion, which is essentially a motion to litt order of default, prayed for an aftirmative reliet which would not be possible f the movant does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court. Nevertheless, said omnibus motion revealed that the respondents expressly stated that the said omnibus motion was filed on special appearance. The respondents explicitly objected, in an equivocal manner, to the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of invalid service of summons. Measures against the requirements enunciated in Philippine Commercial International Bank, the Court is convinced that the respondents never recognized and did ot acquiesce to the jurisdiction ot the RTC. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted itselt to the jurisdiction of the court. ‘No summons; answer was filed; there is voluntary appearance. The case of Uy, e al. v. Del Castillo, et al, G.R. No. 223610, july 24, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, |, is an off-shoot of a complaint for quieting of title filed by Del Castillo against Uy. Since Uy dicd, the complaint was amended and impleaded the children as defendants. Alter the death of Del Castillo, the children were also substituted as plaintiff. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of respondents declaring them as owners of the property subject of the action and nullifying the title of the petitioners holding them liable for damages. They contended that they never received the summons, despite the manifestation of their lawyer that they received it. They further contended that they were merely impleaded as substitutes of their father and hence, respondents should have proceeded against the estate pursuant fo Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court. On the issue at lack of summons, the SC Held: The claim is not meritorious since their counsel admitted that they received summons with a copy of the ‘Amended Complaint and that the Answer eariier tiled served as theit answer to the Amended complaint. Having admitted the toregoing, petitioners cannot now assert otherwise, "It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when itis shown that they have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made, neither of which was shown to exist in this case” (See Odiamar v. Valencia, GR. No. 213582, June 28, 2016, citing Josefa. Manila Electric Company, 739 Phil. 114, 129 (2014) and Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BP1/MS Insurance Corp. G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015, 745 SCRA 98, 121). Voluntary appearance. Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons tor the amended complaint, they were nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the amended complaint and actively participating in the case. In tact, one of the petitioners was presented as a witness for the defense. Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse RTC ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the Court. itis settled that tite active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, ts tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, 606 Phil. 615, 635 (2009), citing Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 411 Phil. 959, 977- 978 (2001). After al, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid service ‘of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court’s authority (Ang Ping v. CA, 369 Phil. 607, 614 [1999]; See also Rule 1, Rules of Court) Proceeding against the estate and substitution of parties. As to petitioners’ contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime’s estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in father's place as defendant; rather, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution ‘of parties takes place when the party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not extinguished. Here, Uy died before private respondents filed the Quieting of Title Case. Thus, ater Conchita tiled an Answer {informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was amended to inaplead the Uy siblings: Accordingly, the Rules of Court pravisiogs on substitution upon the death of a party do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of faime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in their personal capacities 1n this eegard, petitioners’ argument that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the satistaction of any monetary judgment or award must necessarily til (See Torres, Jr v. CA, 344 Phil. 348 (1997) Hence, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintitt tnerein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules tor Prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. A cursory reading of the foregoing provision readily shows that like Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules af Court, applies in cases where the detendant dies while the case is pending and not hefore the case was even filed in court, as in this case At this point, the Court notes that If petitioners truly believed that Jaime’s estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the earllest ‘opportunity. Obviously, they did not do $0; instead, they actively participated in the case, adupted the answer earlier ‘9 YABRC2019.5C02017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised/EVSA/c1ysfiled by Conchita, and even litigated the case all the way to the Court Petitioners cannot now question the final and. executory judgment in the Quieting ot Tithe Case because it happened to be adverse to them, RULE 15 - MOTION Fallure to include a notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is not fatal where the other party was given the opportunity to be heard. In Manila Barking Corp. v, Bases Conversion & Dev. Authority, G.R. No, 230144, January 22, 2018, Velasco, | it was once again ruled that Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires every motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to give notice of such hearing to the ather party at least three days betore the date of the hearing Section § of the same Rule mandates that the notice of hearing should be advressed to all parties concerned and should specity the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days alter the filing af the ‘motion. Where a motion has no notice of hearing is considered pro furma and does nat affect the reglementary Period for the appeal or the tiling ofthe requisite pleading (Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, GR.No, 159750, December 14, 2005) Procedural rules may be relaxed when a rigid application of these rules only hinders substantial justice (Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, GR. No. 159750, December 14, 2005). The rules of Procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, Their strict and rigid application especially fn technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court envisions ths liberality. Technicalty, when it deserts its proper olfice as an ald to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chiet enemy, deserves scant consideration (rom the courts {Julie S, Sumbilla v Matrix Finance Corporation, GR. No. 197582, June 29, 2015). Yet, the relaxation ofits rules is subject to certain Conditions and for liberality to be applied, it must be assured that the adverse party has been afforded the opportunity to be heard through pleadings fled in opposition to the motion (Magellan Aeraspace Corporation v, Philippine Air Force, G.R. No. 216566, February 24, 2016), {nthe present case, the party was given the opportunity to be heard when it filed a eomment/opposition to the motion for reconsideration. assailing the same and raising substantive arguments for its dismissal Moreover, the RTC went a step turther and directed the parties to submit judicial atfavts of thelr witnesses with dacumentary exhibits to substantiate their respective positions. Clearly, the requirements of procedural due process. were substantially complied with and such compliance justified a departure trom a literal application of the rule on notice ot hearing, Notice of MTD served upon counsel; effect. 4m Domingo : Singson, et al, G.R. No. 203287, April 5, 2017, Reyes, |, the effect of service ot MTD upon counsel was once again emphasized, It was sai: ‘That the notice of hearing is addressed to the petitioners’ counsel and not to the petitioners directly is immaterial and would not be a cause to consider the same defective. The requirement under Section 4 ot Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that the notice be addressed to the opposing party is merely directory; what matters is that adverse party had sufficient notice of the hearing of the motion (See Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation v. Judge Vallejos, 159 Phil. 886 |1975)). Further, even ifthe notice of hearing in the motion ta dismiss falled to state the ‘exact date of hearing, the detect was cured when the RTC considered the same in the hearing that was held on May 26,2011 and by the fact that the petitioners, through their counsel, were notified of the existence at the said motion (See Un Giok v. Matusa, etal, 101 Phil. 727 {1957} On the supposed lack at proof af service of the motion to dismiss upon the petitioners, sullce to state that a copy othe said motion was served upon and received by the petitioners’ counsel on April 15, 2011. The Petitioners were duly given the full opportunity to be heard and to argue their case when the RTC required them to file a comment to the motion to dismiss during the hearing on May 26, 2011, which they did on May 31. 2011. "What the law really,eschews is not the lack of previous notice o! hearing but the lack ot opportunity to be heard” (See Patricio v, judge Leviste, 254 Phil. 780, 786 {1989}) RULE 16 - MOTION TO DISMISS Preliminafy hearing on affirmative defenses allowed if no MTD was filed. In Trillones v. Hon. Evangeline Castllo-Marigomen, et al, GR. No. 223451, March 14, 2018, Tijam, J, a complaint for damages was filed against Trillanes tor having uttered detamatory statements against Antonio Tiu. He alleged thathis statements were defamatory, when Trillanes made the same to the media during gaps of committee jhearings and sessions. He attributed to Tiu the fact that he was a dummy of VP finay in bis ownership ot properties. Toillanes filed a MTD contending that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, He argued that a preliminary hearing on his special and affirmative detenses is necessary to allow him to present evidence that will warrant the immediate dismissal af the Complaint. Is the cantention correct? Why? Held: No. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed, Section 6, however, must be construed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule, which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits determent of such resolution on the ground of indubitability. Thus, Section 6 disallows a preliminary hearing of atfirmative defenses ance ‘motion to dismiss has been filed because such defenses should have already been resolved (Calitormia and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Pioneer Ins. and Surety Corp, 399 Phil. 795, 804 (2000)) In this case. however, petitioner's motion to dismiss had not been resolved when petitioner moved for a preliminary hearing The motion did not contain a notice of hearing and was not actually heard. Even 0, preliminary hearing is not warranted, 10 [ABRC2019 SCD2017-2018 in Kemedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/erynEffect If MTD alleges failure to state cause of action. In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner averred that private respondent failed to state and substantiate his cause of action, arguing that the statement he made before the media, in which he described private Fespondent as a “front” or “dummy” of former VP Binay for the so-called Hacienda Binay, was one of fact. By raising failure to state a cause of action as his defense, petitioner 1s regarded as having hypothetically admitted the allegations in the Complaint (Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al, 755 Phil. 793, 810 (2015), citing Insular Investment and Trust Corp. v. Capital One Equities Corp. et al, 686 Phil. 819, 847 (2012) and Evangelista v. Santiago, 497 Phil. 269, 290 (2005). Test to determine sufficiency of facts alleged. The test of the sufficiency of the facts stated in a complaint «ss constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the tacts so alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upan the same in accordance with the plaintit’s prayer (Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al, supra at 810, citing Insular Investment and Trust Corp. v. Capital One Equities Corp. et al, supra at 847). Inquiry 1s into the sufficiency not the veracity of the facts 50 alleged (Zuniga: Santos v. Santos-Gran, et al. 745 Phil. 171. 180 (2014)}. Ifthe allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the ‘complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the defendants (Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al, supra, citing Insular Investment and Trust Corp. v, Capital One Equities Corp. et al, supra) Lack of cause of action differs from failure to state a cause of action. {in Bueuan Dev. Corp. v. 21% Division of the CA, et al, GR, No. 197358, April 5, 2017, Reyes, |, petitioner tiled an action to declare void a mortgage contract aver a parcel of land it owned which it acquired while in the process of incorporation, It was mortgaged by the Arriolas who misrepresented themselves as owners, which was not true and. in fact not connected at all with the petitioner. As defense, the detendants contended that the action should be dismissed outright for failing to state a cause of action since at the time ol the mortgage of the property, the corporation was not yet existing and thus, it cannot claim ownership. The lower court dismissed the complaint tor failure to state a cause of action. But the SC ruled otherwise and Held: What is clear is that the issues of whether the REM constituted aver the subject property is void and whether BDC has a right to the subject property at the time of the execution of the REM woulld have been best resolved during the trial ‘The. respondents’ attirmative detense that BDC, at the time ol the execution of the REM, had no right to hold the subject property in its name being merely an unincorporated association, i! at all, amounts to an allegation that BDC has no cause of action against the respondents. However, failure to state a cause of action is different trom lack. of cause of action, Failure to state 4 cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hang, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the catise of action alleged in the pleading. The reinedy in tne first is to move for the smissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence. ‘Along the same vein, in Asia Brewery Inc, et al. v. Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro) EPCI, Inc), G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017, the SC had the occasion to say that lack or absence at c.tse of action is not a ground tor the dismissal of a complaint; and that the issue may only be raised after questions ot fact have been resolved on the basis of supulations, admissions, or evidence presented (Bank of America NT & SA v. (A, 448 Phil. 181 [2003]) In this case, the SC distinguished failure to state a cause of action from lack of cause of action, thus: Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause ot action; the terms are not interchangeable. Lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may be raised in a motion (o dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is based an Section 1 of Rule 33, which provides: ‘Section 1. Deraurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the presentation ot his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied he shall have the right to present eviderice. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive pleadings filed: and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the mation to dismiss must be filed after the plaintif! has rested ‘ts case. In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, im the second sitvation, the judge must determine the Weracity of the allegations based on the evidence presented. RULE 17 - DISMISSAL OF ACTION Effect of dismissal of an action without stating the ground. Basically, che issue in Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No. 187342, April S, 2017, Jardeleza, | is the effect if there is a dismissal of an action without pronouncement as to its nature, whether with or without prejudice as it was based on Sec. 3, Rule 17 ofthe Rules of Court. The MTC treated a belated Comment/Opposition as a motion for reconsideration and dismissed the action without stating the ground, The SC Held: A dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court has the ettect of an adjudication on the merits. Unless otherwise qualitied by the court, a dismissal under said rule is considered with Prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case (Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic... No. 188956, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 118; De Knecht v. Court ot Appeals, G.R No. LORO1S, 11 [ABRC2019 SCD2017-2018 in sal Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/erysMay 20, 1998, 290 SCRA 223, 239-240). When an order completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing to be done by the court itis a final order properly subject of an appeal. rule on counterclaim. G.R. No. 232109, March 7, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, |, a complaint lor declaration of nulity of ‘marriage was fled. The defendant tiled an answer with counterclaim. The plain lost interest in the case, hence, he filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition. In her opposition, defendant invoked Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, and braved that her counterclaim be declared as remaining for the court’ independent adjudication, Plaintift contended {hat the counterclaims are barred trom prosecution in the same action due to her failure to lile 4 manilenacey within 15 days trom the notice of withdrawal which is required by the Rules. The RTC granted the Motion to withdraw the petition but declared the counterclaim as remaining for independent adjudication and gave petitioner 15 days to answer. The CA atirmed the order. In reversing the CA, the SC Held: Section 2, Rule 17 ofthe Rules of Court provides forthe procedure relative to counterclaims inthe event that a complaint is dismissed by the court atthe plaintits instance, vat, “The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he ‘manifests his preterence to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action, Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval af the court As per the second sentence af the provision, if service upon him of the plaintif's motion Jor the dis ‘complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate Tule uses the term ‘complaint’ A dismissal of an ac reason, since only the complaint and not the prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, f the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fftern (15) days from notice f the ‘motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to tha: portion of its second sentence which States that the “dismissal shall be limited to the complaint” Evidently, the CA ignored the same proviston's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the Service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manitest his preference therefor within hifteen (15) days from tatice of the plaintif's motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may he prosecuted only in a separate action. The rationale behind this rule is aot difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further proceedings, Le. the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in arder to obviate this Finality, the defendant is Tequired to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid period: otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action @ counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the ismissal the rule is that the dismissal shall be timited to the that “Lilnstead of an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present tion is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still RULE 18 - PRE-TRIAL Effects of failure to appear at pre-trial. Tee pectic of ree appear athe pre-a have ben the sues aed in Ulre Mar Aq Resor ne Fermida Construction Services. GR. No. 191353, April 17, 2017, Tijam, J the SC Held: Section 4, Rule 18 requires the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial conterence. ‘The failure ot a party to appear at pre-trial has adverse consequences: it the absent party is the plaintiff then his case is dismissed; ifthe absent party is the defendant, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex ‘parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. ‘By way of exception, the non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused if (1) a valid cause is shown; o (2) there is an appearance of a representative on behalf of a party fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. What constitutes a valid cause is subject to the court's sound discretion and the exercise of such discretion shall not be disturbed except in cases ot clear and manitest abuse (Daaco v. Yu, G.R No, 183398, June 22, 2015), In Domingo v. Singson, ¢ al. G.R. No, 203287, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J, there was likewise non-appearance at the pre-trial conference which justifiable reason, hence, the SC once again emphasized that under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are mandated to appear at the pre-trial (Riles of Court, Rule 18, Sec. 4) Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not s mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective; the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation (See The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, 645 Phil. 166, 176, 177 (2010); Tolentino, et al. v. laurel, et al, 682 Phil 527, 536 (2012); RULES OF COURT, Rule 18, Section 5) Procedural rules are not ta be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules they are to be followed, except only when tor the ‘Most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed (See Social Security System v. Hon 12 JABR2019.5C02017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/eryyChaves, 483 Phil, 292, 301 [2004J; see also Metropolitan Bank and ‘Trust Co. v. Fadcor, inc. et al, G.R. No, 197970, January 25, 2016, Peralta, }). MODES OF DISCOVERY Request for admission is not inconsistent with Motion for Summary Judgment. In Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Rep. of the Phils, G.R. No, 213027; Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. Rep. of the Phils. G.R. No, 212253, January 18, 2017, during the pendency af the forfeiture proceedings against the Marcoses because of their alleged ill-gotten wealth, the Republic filed a partial Motion for Summary judgment involving certain Droperties of the Marcoses. In the meantime, it also filed a Request for Admission asking that there be admission that the set of jewelry known as the Malacafiang Collection was acquired during the incumbency of Pres. Marcos; that the ‘same was acquired from abroad, among others. The Marcoses contended that the filing of the Request for Admission Was tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position of the Republic that the case was ripe for summary judgment as the Request entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a material fact, hence, they moved that it be expunged from the record, Is the contention that the Partial Motion for Summary Judgment und the Request for Admission are inconsistent to one another correct? Ruling in the Negative, the SC Held: 4 request for admission can be the basis tor the grant of summary judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by the party and is requested as a result of that party's failure to respond ro the court's directive ta state what specitically happened in te case (Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA, 334 Phil. 77 (1997), Diman v. Alumbres, 359 Phil. 796 (1998), and Allied Agri-Business v. CA, 360 Phil. 64 {1998}). The resort to such a request asa mode of discovery rendered all the ‘matters contained therein as matters that have been deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Request for admission can complement motion for summary judgment. 'A request for admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the request for admission may be used as basis for filing a summary judgment” citing three cases as follows: Concrete Aggregates Carp. v. CA, 334 Phil. 27 [1997]: Diman v. Alumbres, 359 Phil. 796 [1998] and Allied Agri-Business v, CA, 360 Phil. 64 [1998]. The first case instructs that a request tor admission "should set torth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or detense. ‘The second case, on the other hand, teaches the nature of modes of discovery in this wise: Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit : (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set torth in the request, said party is bound within the period designated in the request, to file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn Statement either (1) denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit ar deny those matters. It the party served does not respond with such sworn statement, egch uf the macters of which an ‘admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist - ie, facts are assellied in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus arising from ‘the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shawn by ad admissions, depositions or admissions. Modes of discovery in administrative case; dilatory in nature. Im Norhina Sibayan v. Alda, GR. No. 233395, January 17, 2018, Velasco, J, there was an administrative investigation at the Bangko Sentral where Norlina who was then the Assistant Manager and Marketing Manager of BDO, La Union was charged administratively. She was charged with unauthorized deduction of Elizabeth's BDO account and for failure to post certain check depasits with said account. She resorted to the modes of discovery in Connection with the said administrative investigation by filing a motion for production of bank documents and ‘requested that written interrogatories be answered. The investigator denied the same, thus, she raised the question ol ts denial before the SC where it was Held: The proceeding is administrative in nature, although trial courts are enjoined to observed strict enforcement ‘of the rules on evidence, the same does nat hold true for admainistrative bodies. Technical rules applicable to judicial Proceedings are:not exact replicas of those in administrative investigations (Geronimo v. Spouses Calderon, G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014; Taclobsn |! Neighborhood Association In. v. Office of the President, GR. No. 168561, September 26, 2008; and Ottice ofthe Court Administrator v. dar; AM. No. RT|-10-2232, April 10, 2012). Recourse to discovery procedures as sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for the OGCLS-BSP. Hence, tenacious insistence for the OGCLS-BSP to strictly adhere to the Rules of Court so as not to purportedly deteat her rights: ‘The nature of the proceedings before the OGCLS-SP is summary in nature (Section 3, Rule 1 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on Administrative Cases) - ‘The rationale and purpose of the summary nature of administrative proceedings is to achieve an expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. As such, in proceedings before administrative or quast judicial bodies, like the OGCLS-BSP, decisions may be reached an the basis of position papers ‘other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the proceedings which cauld defeat its very purpose. 13 JABRE2019.5€02017-201 8 un Remedial Law ( wolidated) revised /LVSA/erysRULE 34 - JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Judgment on the pleadings in retation to summary Judgment. Un lloilo Jar Corp. v. Gomglasco Corp./Aguita Glass, G.R. No, 219509, January 18, 2017, Mendoza, |, there was a lease contract between the two (2) parties with petitioner as lessor. For failure to pay the rentals, a demand wae made and complaint was filed. In its answer, the lessee raised an alfirmative detense arguing that hy virtue of Article 1267 of the Civil Code it was released trom its obligation from the lease contract, It explained that the consideration {hereot had become so difficult due to the global and regional economic crisis that had plagued the economy. Likewise, Comglasco admitted that it had removed its stocks and merchandise but it did not refuse to pay the rontare because the lease contract was already deemed terminated, Further, it averred that though it received the demand leters, it did not amount to retusal to pay the rent because the lease contract liad been pre-terminated in the Hirst place. [The lessor filed its Motion for judgment on the Pleaclings arguing that defendant-lessee admitted all the material allegations in the complaint. It insisted that Comglasco’s answer tailed to tender an issue because its affirmative detense was unavailing The motion was granted On appeal, the CA reversed the order saying that the answer tendered an is denied its obligation or even if not specitically denied, the answer raised that judgment on the pleadings is not the proper remedy since an affirm, Held: Resort to judgment on the pleadings is improper, but the judgme Technology Corporation v. Equitable Banking Corporation (Wood Te. that summary judgment may be availed if no genuine issue for tral is Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard Would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues at Lact requiring a full-blown trial Ina summary judgnient, the crucial question is: are the Issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to ustity a summary judgment? A “genuine issue” means an issue of fact which calls for the Presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is tictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial issue since the lessee specifically an affirmative issue factual in nature, Ruling ative defense was raised, the SC nt rendered is a summary judgment. n Wood chnology). 492 Phil. 106 [2005], the Court ruled raised, vi ‘No need to answer request for admission iffact has been denied. In Duque, et al. v. Sps. Yu, et al, GR. No. 226130, February 19, 2018, Velasco, declaration of nullity of a Deed of Donation over a property was tiled alleging th torged. An answer was filed by one of the defendants admitting the torgery. The other detendants who purchased it from their co-detendant-donee controverted such admission. The respondents filed a Motion lor Admission by Adverse Party (Rule 26) requesting the admission of the Deed of Donation but the petitioners did not answer the Fequest for admission. For this reason, the respondents moved for a demurrer to evidence in view of the Pronouncement of the trial court that the Deed of Donation was deemed admitted when petitioners failed to answer the request for admission. The CA affirmed the arder due to petitioners’ failure to reply, there was an admission af the Deed of Donation. In reversing the lower courts, the SC Held: Once a party serves a request tor admission as to the truth of any material and relevant matter of tact, the Party to whom such request is served has 15 days within which to file a sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule, however admits of an exception, that is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a Fequest for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a Fesponse to the request and, thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 (Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. v, Toledo, G. R. No, 190818, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 425). The rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode ot discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading, and does not reler to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings; or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will bea useiess, pointless process which petitioner should not he subjected to” (CIR v. Manila Mining Corporation, GR No, 153204, August 31, 2005, which cited Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. CA, 334 Phil. 77 (1997)) J, a complaint tor at the signatures of the donors were Pleading fled and criminal case for forgery have the effect of controverting the Deed. Here, the respondents served the request for admission on the petitioners to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation, among other documents. The matters and documents being requested to be admitted have already been denied and controverted in the previous pleading, that is, Verified Complaint for Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of TD. In fact, the forgery committed in the Deed of Donation was the very essence of that Complaint, where it was alleged that being a forged document, the sare is invalid and without force and legal elfect. Petitioners, theretore, need not reply {0 the request for admission. Consequently, they cannot be deemed to have admitted the Deed of Donation’s genuineness and authenticity for their lailure to respond thereto, Moreover, in respondents Spouses Yu's criminal case for estafa against respondent Capacio, which they filed immediately upon receipt of a summon in relation to the Complaint of Spouses Duque, one of the allegations therein was the torgery committed in the very same Deed of Donation, which authenticity and genuineness they want Petitioners to admit in their request for admission, In support thereot, respondents Spouses Yu even utilized the questioned document report of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Olice certifying that 14 JABRC2019.5CD2017- 2018 1n Remedial Law (consaited) 1 seal AVSA Lorythe signature in the Deed of Donation is a forgery. Tins, itis then sate to conclude that their request for admission is asham, Having said that there was no implied admission of the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation, the Court, thus, held that it was also an error for the trial caurt to grant the demurrer to evidence. As there was no implied admission to speak of, the demurrer to evidence must, therefore, be denied and the Orders granting it was considered vaid. RULE 33 - DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE Consequences of reversal on appeal of a demurrer to evidence. Citing Generoso Villanueva Transit Co, Inc. v. favellana, No. L-29467, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 755, 761-762, the Court in Radioweaith Finance Company v. Spouses Del Rosaria, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 288, explained the consequences of a demurrer to evidence in this wise: The rationale behind the nile and doctrine is simple and logical. The detendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (ie, demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that upon the lacts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to reliet. Ifthe trial court denies the dismissal motion, 1e, finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufticient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains belore the trial court which should then Proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established pracedural recepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material betore them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case tor retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that it his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected ta stand on the insulficieney of plaintifis case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintil's evidence, In short, detendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs" evidence retain the right ta present their own, evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if it agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees ‘and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations. With this Court’s denial of the demurrer to evidence, it will now proceed ta rule on the merits of the Complaint solely on the basis of the petitioners’ evidence on record. It held that the Deed of Donation was void (Duque, et al. v. Sps. Yu, et al, GR. No. 226130, February 19, 2018, Velasco, J). ‘SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION In Flight Attendants & Stewards Assn. of the Phils. (FASAP) v. PAL, Inc, et al, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018, Bersamin, J, it was stressed that the rule prohibiting the fling of a second motion for reconsideration is by no means absolute. Although Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court disallaws the tiling of a second motion tor reconsideration, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) allows an exception in the higher interest of justice by the Court en bane upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration “in the hhigher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and, potentiatly capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for ‘reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered hecomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration. Jn the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court en bane (Sec. 3). ‘The conditions that must concur in order for the Court to entertain a second motion for reconsideration are the following, namely: 1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest ot justice; 2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to he reconsidered attains finality 3. IF the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one ol its Divisions, at least three members of the Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and 4. The favorable vote of at east two-thirds of the Court En Banc’s actual membership must be mustered for the second matiun tor reconsideration to be granted, Granting the motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration has the eltect al preventing the challenged decision from attaining finality. This is the reason why the secand motion for reconsideration should 1S JABKCZ019.5¢02017-2018 In Remedial Law (« tated) revised EVSA/crysPresent extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Indeed, allawing pro forma motions would indefinitely avoid the asa judgment from attaining finality. " a RULE 39 ~ EXECUTION OF |UDGMENT Action for revival of judgment is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. In Arama v. Ciubank, NA, G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017, Jardeleza, |, a judgment was rendered by the CA, but it was not executed. A petition was filed to revive the judgment and filed it with the CA contending among ater things that isthe CA that has jurisdiction since it was the one that rendered the judgment. The SC disagreed an Held: An action to revive a judgment is an action whase exclusive purpase is to enforce a judgment which co longer be enforced by mere motion (Cita v Court of Appeals; GH No. 114398 December 19°94, 219 SeRA Ise, 261), Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: oo ‘Ainal and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date at its entry. Alter the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by ‘motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and therealter by action before itis barred by the statute of limitations.” Section 6s clear Once a judgment becomes hina and executor. the prevailing party can have executed as 4 matter of right by mere motion within five years ron the date of enya hudgmen I the prevaing party tal to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of tive yeas, the sald judgment i reduced to ight action shih must be enforced by the Instation of a complaint ima reglar court within 10 yeas fron he te the judgment becomes ial (Rubio v. Alabala, GR No. 203947, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA Sot, 359°560) The action ‘being one beyond pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction, 2 Remedy of a third persons whose property is levied upon. Un Borlongun v. Banco de Oro, G.R. No.217617, April S, 2017, Velasco, | tive spouses Bortongan had a conjugal property. The wite signed a surety undertaking for and in behalt of Tancho Corp. When there was no payment of the abligation, said property was attached and levied upon and sold to answer for the judgment lability. May the other spouse flea separate and independent action tor annulment ol the levy on their conjugal property? “Answering the query in the Aflirmative, the SC Held: Yes, Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of properties under execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action with another court. The spouse can he considered a Stranger to the contract. Clearly, the availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision requires only that the claimant is a third-party or a “stranger” tothe case. The poser then is this: is the husband, who was not a party tothe suit but whose conjugal property was executed on account of the ather spouse's debt, a “stranger” to the suit? In Buado v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 145222, April 24, 2009, S86 SCRA 396, the Court had the opportunity to clarity that. to resolve the issue, it must first be determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can ie an independent separate action, distinct Irom the action in which the weit was issued, It was Fel, thus ‘third-party claim must be filed [by] a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may fie a third-party claim Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit ofthe conjugal partnership or not Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wile arising from her criminal lability is chargeable tothe conjugal partnership. We do not agree. "There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature, Article 122 ot the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil abligation afising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnersbip. "To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless seine advantage or beneht is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Hence, the fling ota separate action by respondent is proper. S years to execute; exception. In Sps. Davis v. Sps. Davis, G.R. No. 233489, March 7, 2018, Velasco, J, there was a complaint tor specific performance and damages due to the failure of the owners of the a property to execute a Deed of Sale, The judgment became final and executory. Mation for execution was filed within the 5-year period but the writ was repeatedly returned unserved. It was discovered by the plaintiff's that defendants sold it to another parties and a new title was issued, hence, they filed a complaint to annul the title and document against the new owners which was ruled in their favor. They filed a motion for execution resulting in the cancellation of the title and restoration af the title to the former owners, the defendants in the first case. The plaintiffs filed a motion for execution of the first judgment, but i ‘was contended that the 5-year periad has already expired. Plaintitts contended otherwise arguing that the period 46 JABREZO19 SCD2017-2018 4» Remedial Law (consollated) revised /EVSA/crysuring which they were compelled to tile another action involving the property just to enable & complete and effective relie in their favor should not be taken Into account inthe computation ofthe S-year period Ruling that it has not yet expired, the SC Held: Under Section 6, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5) years from the date ofits entry or from the date it hecames tinal and executory. Alter the lapse of such time, and belore itis hatred by the statue of imitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.” Nonetheless the Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execition by motion even after the lapse af five years, upon meritorious grounds, These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or uccusioned by actions ofthe judgment debtor and/or is curred for his benefit or wdvantage (Repuilic v. Court of Appeals, (.R. No, 91885, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 344), Considering that the delay was not due to the fault of the petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sald the subject property to another to avoid the autcome ot the case tiled against them, and which delay incurred to their benelit/advantage, i s only logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an action for Annulment of ttle and document was being litigated upon shall be deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running ‘ofthe five-year period tor enforcement ofa judgment by mere motion, Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for escaping the hlilment ot their obligation, Theretore in computing the thme limited tor suing out an execution the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor (lacint v. Intermediate Appellate Court. etal, No, 66478, August 29, 1986), The purpose of the law in prescribing time imitations for enforcing judgments or actions isto prevent wblgors fom sleeping on thet rights {Republic v. Court of Appeals). Moreover, the stitute of limitations has not been devised against those wh wish to Act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control (Jacinto v. Intermediate Appellate Court. e al, supra) Inthe case under consideration, there has been no indicatinn thatthe petitioners had ever slept on their nights to have the judgment executed by mere mations within the reglementary period. Res judicata; requisites. In Cruz, etal. v. Tolentino, etal, G.R. No. 210446, April 18, 2018, Leonardo: de Castro, |, two (2) deeds of sale were executed aver two (2) parcels of land, Two (2) cases were tiled, Civil Case No. MCOO-1300 betore the RTC of Mandaluyong and Civil Case No, MC-99-843. In the latter case, the RTC ruled that the Deed of Sale and SPA were valid and effective. In the former, the plaintifts sought to annul the Sale over the same properties. Civil Case No. 99-843 ‘was filed by the parents of the plaintitfs. The other case was tiled by the children atter the death of their parents. Can the second he dismissed on the ground ot itis pendentia? Why? Held: Yes. As held in City of Makati v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, 578 Phil. 773, 783 (2008), the following Fequirements must concur hefore itis pendentia may be invoked: a). identity of parties ar at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted and reliels prayed lor, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and ) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the ocher. Reasons: |. There was identity of parties in bath cases. Substantial identity is sutticient. There 1s no need for exact or absolute identity. The defendants in Civil Case No, MC 00-1300 are the plaintilis and detendant in Civil Case No. MC ‘99-843. The plaintiffs in MC-00-1300 were originally not the parties in MC-00-843 but later substituted their mother after her death. 2. There was identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both cases. In MC-99-843 it prayed for the deciaration of validity of the Deed of Sale whlch was granted. In MC-00-1300 it sought for the nulification of the Deed of Sale. When res judicata applies. For res judicata to serve as a bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have heen rendered by a court having junsdiction over the subject matter and the parties: (3) the disposition of the case must a judgment on the merits: ‘and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only Identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies (P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. [ALS Management and Development Corpoartion, 698 Phil. 47, 59-60 [2012], citing Social Security Commission v. Rizal Posltry and Livestock Association, Inc, 665 Phil. 198, 206 [2011)} Hence, the resolution of the issue in both hinge on the determination ot the issue of whether or not the Deed ot Sale is valid and legal. As such, the judgment that may be rendered in either case regarding the validity of said deed would amount to res judicata in the other case, regardless of which party is successtul, hence, the principle res judicata applies. Res judicata; two (2) concepts. {In Sps. Rosario v. Priscila Alvar, GR. No, 212731, September 6, 2017, Del Castillo, |, Agnes sold wo (2) parcels of land to Evangeline who in turn sold it to her mother, Priscilla Priscilla sent demand tor the Spouses Rosario to vacate the lots and this prompted the Spouses Rosario to file an action to nullify the deeds alleging that Priscilia deceived Agnes in selling the properties to Evangeline. Priscilla filed a complaint to recover possession alleging that she owned the lots. The two (2) cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered a judgment granting Priscilla’s complaint for recovery of possession and denied the complaint of the Spouses Rosario to nullity the contract of sale. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision ruling that the transfer tram Agnes to Priscilla was 4 mere 17 [ABRE2019.5CD2017-2018 in Kemedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/crysequitable mortgage. As no appeal or MR was tiled, the judgment became tinal and executory. Then, Priscila demanded trom Agnes the payment of her P1.M obligation. For failure to pay, Priscilla filed a complaint for torectosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Agnes. The spouses Rosario filed a motion to dismiss which was denied and affirmed with finality by the appellate court, The Spouses Rosario contended that Priscilla has no personality to ile the foreclosure proceedings. The SC did not agree with the Spouses Rosario and Held: The indebtedness has already been established with finality, hence, the principle ot res judicata bars the Spouses Rosario trom raising it again after the finality of the judgment. tn fact, the judgment recognized Priscilla’s Fight to foreclose the mortgage as she was the one who loaned the spouses Rosario the amount ot P1,8M, hence, there is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment which bars them trom challenging the same issues Unlike res judicata by prior judgment, where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action, there is only identity of parties and subject matter in res judicata by canclusiveness of judgment. Since there is ne Identity of cause of action, the judgment in the first case is conclusive only as co those matters actually and directly controverted and determined. Thus, there is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment when all the following elements are present: (2) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity o! parties, but not identity of causes of action (Navarette v, Manila International freight Forwarders, Inc, (.R. No. 200580, February 11, 2025, 750 SCRA 414, 425-426) In this case, all the elements are present: tirst, the Decision has attained finality; second, the said decision was rendered by a court having jurisdiction aver the subject matter and the parties; third, the said decision disposed of the case on the merits; and fourth, there is, as between the previous case and the instant case, an identity of patties. Since there is conclusiveness of judgment in this case, petitioner spouses Rosario are estopped from raising issues that were already adjudged in the Decision as “the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment is conclusive and continues to be binding between the parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts an Which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident betore the courtin a later case xx X-" In short, “the binding etfect and enforceability ot that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already heen resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.” Final and executory judgment; execution matter of right; exceptions. Nothing is more settled than the rule that a judgment that is final and executory is immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be moditied in any respect, except when the judgment is void, or to correct clerical ‘errors oF to make nunc pro tune entries, In the same vein, the decision that has attained tinality becomes the law ot the case, regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held tor that purpose. Accordingly. the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upan a final and executory judgment, oF ‘quash it or stay its implementation ‘Concomitantly, neither may the parties object to the execution by raising new issues of tact or law. The only exceptions thereto are when: "(i) the writ of execution varies the judgment: (i) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (ii) execution is sought to be enforced against Property exempt trom execution; (iv) it’ appears that the controversy has heen submitted to the judgment of the court; (v) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof or (vi) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, of that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or atherwise satistied, or the writ was issued ‘without autharity” (Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Borreta, 519 Phil. 637, 642-643 [2006 Salazar v. Felias, GR. No. 213972, February 5, 2018, Reyes, I. |) Final and executory Judgment cannot be modified; reason. In Mereury Drug Corp, et al. v Sps. Huang & Stephen Huang, G.R. No, 197654, August 30, 2017, Leonen, J, the SC once again had the occasion to say that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. It can neither be modified nor disturbed by courts in any manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct perceived errs of fact or law. Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the execution af the judgment ‘What cannot be done directly cannot he done indirectly and the SC Held: A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are entitled to the satistactiqn of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are barred trom modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been adjudicated upon. They have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of ‘execution to enforce the judgment. 145 a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable (National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, 731 Phil, 400, 405:-406 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division|) ‘The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law oF tact. This principle known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter ot sound public policy, which rests ‘upon the practical consideration that every litigation must come (o an end. The rationale behind the rule was further explained in Social Security System v. sip, 549 Phil. 112 (2007) [Per |. Corona, En Banc} thus 18 JABHE2019,5CD2017-2018 0 Kemedal Law [¢ slate) revised /HVSA/e1ys‘The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a tinal judgment has a two-told purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. ‘The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an ironclad rule, It is subject to several exceptions, namely: (Q) {T)he correction ot clerical errors; (2) [T]he so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party: (3) (Vloid judgments; and (4) [WIhenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and. inequitable. APPEAL The doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In Liza Maza, et al. v. Hon, Eveyn Turla, etal, G.R. No, 187094, February 15, 2017, Leonen, J, petitioners were charged with the crime of murder. Alter the information was filed, the trial judge tried to make a determination of the existence of probable cause Jor the issuance of warrants of arrest, but insiead of doing so, the court remanded the cafe to the office of the prosecutor for further investigation. Contending that the remanding was not proper as the court could have dismissed or required the prosecutor to present additional evidence, ar set the case for hearing so the court could make clarifications on the lactuial issues of the case, they filed a petition betore the Supreme Court. ‘The responclents contended that the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts as the petition should have been filed with the CA. Ruling on the issue, the SC Held: The petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy at courts The doctrine of hierarchy ot courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, Per Leonen, En Banc: ‘The dactrine that requires respect for the hierarchy af courts was created by this court to censure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and eiicient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them, They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively Perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches, Their ‘wnts generally. reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, hey mostly perf im the all- important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented belore them. in many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however. some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed betore the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the tyial courts. It is collegiate in nature. ‘This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial caurt. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have 4 nationwide scope. It s competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine. ‘This cout, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or turther reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar ~ existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition ofthe actions of the Court 9f Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. . In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to pebtect constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine inv Fespect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine, Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has “full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [aver] special civil actions for certiorari . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if watranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.” Rule 45 Is the remedy If a Forfeiture Proceeding Is dismissed. in Republic v. SB, et al, GR. No. 189590, April 23, 2018, Leonardo-De Castro, J, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Forfeiture Proceedings based on demurrer to evidence. The Republic filed a special civil action for certiorari. In ruling that the remedy availed of was not proper, the SC Held: Peutioner Republic instituted the wrong mode of review ol the Sandiganbayan’s assailed resolutions. Forteiture proceedings tiled under Republic Act No, 1379 are civil in nature (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 618 Phil. 346, 362, 363 [2009)), thus, the proper made of review being « petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, and not a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 thereot (Republic v. Gimenez, GR No. 174673, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 261, 218) 19 JABRC2019 SCU2017-2018 1 Remedial Law (« oludated) revised EVSA/erysIn Condes v. Court of Appeals, SS5 Phil. 311, 323 [2007], the nature and purpose ot a demurrer to evidence was explained thus: ‘A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground ot insufficiency ot evidence and is filed after the plainti rests his case. Its an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced, is insutfictent 1n point off law, whether true OF not, to make out a case o sustain the isste. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plainttf, by his evidence in chief, has been able to establish a prima facie case. And an order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits (Oropesa v. Orapesa, 686 Phil. 877, ‘888 [2012}), Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides ~ Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorart trom a judgment, tinal order oF resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandigabayan, the Court of ‘Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever auithor ized by law, may tile with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiurari, The petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth x x x Exception to the rule. Considering that rules of procedure are subservient to substantive rights, and in-order to finally write fins to this prolonged litigation, the Court sometimes dispenses.with the foregoing lapses in the broader interest of lustice. The Court has repeatedly favored the resolution of clisputes on the merits, rather than on procedural detects, especially where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and/or deep historical Fepercussions, certiarari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059, 1087 [2003}), Reglementary period to perfect appeal is jurisdictional; not procedural. In Garlet v. Garlet, GR. No. 193544, August 2, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J, the SC citing De Leon v. Hercules Agro industrial Corporation, 734 Phil. 652, 660-661 [2014] once again ruled that compliance with the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is not only a procedural issue, but jurisdictional, thus: ‘As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, petitioner's motion tor extension of time to file a mation for reconsideration did not coll the reglementary period to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal. As such, the RTC decision became fina as to Petitioner when no appeal was perfected after the lapse at the prescribed period, Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perlecting an appeal within the reglementary periad specified in the law musth strictly followed as they are considered Indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the pertection of appeal in the ‘manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, tailure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executary, Review on appeal before SC is discretionary. ‘Once again, in Calubad v. Ricaren Dev. Corp, G.R. No. 202364, August 30, 2017, Leonen, J, the SC had the ‘¢casion to say that a review of appeals filed before the Supreme Court is “not a matter of right, but ot sound judicial discretion” (Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 6). The Rules of Court further require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari, It is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts (Quintos v. Nicolas, 736 Phil. 438, 451 [2014], Per J. Velasco, Third Division) However, these rules admit exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asisto, jr, 264 Phil. 225 {1990}, Per J. Bidin, Third Division, listed down 10 recognized exceptions: (Q) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misappretiension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting: (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and. appellee: (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those ofthe trial court; (B) When the findings of tact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based: (9)When the facts set forth in the petition as welt asin the petitioners’ main and reply briets are not ‘disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court o! Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. Rule 45 disungulshed from Rule 65. In Albor v. CA, e¢ al, G.R. No. 196598, January 17, 2018, Martires, J, the SC once again had the occasion to say that the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45; and such is ‘ot similar to a petition for ceruorari winder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders ar resolutions of the CA in any case, Le, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be sppealed to the Supreme Court by filing 4 petition for review, which in essence is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case (PBCOM v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 218901, 15 February 2017) On the other hand, a special civil sction under Rule 65 4s a limited form of review and ts a remedy ol last Fecourse (Malayang Manggagawa ng Staylast Phils, Ine v. NLRC, 714 Phil, 500, 513 (2013). It is an independen 20 ABRC2019 5CU2017-2014 in Remedial Law (con idated) revlsed/EVSA/crysaction that lies anly where there is no appeal nar plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions ofthe lower court (People v. Chez, 411Phil.482, 492 (2001). As tong as the court a quo acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Ma v. Fuentes, et al, 778 SCRA 645, 653) Effect of appeal by any of several accused. In People v. Lidasan, etal. G.R. No. 227425, September 4, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, |, the SC once again had the ‘occasion on the effect of appeal by one of the accised it there are several of them. In this case, there were accomplices who, alter conviction did not appeal, but the judgment on appeal was in favor of those who appealed. The st Held: None of the accomplices made any appeal to the Court. This notwithstanding, the Court deems it proper to adjust their sentence as tis favorable and beneficial to them (People v. Valdez, 703 Phil 519, 528-530 [2013]; People ¥. Arondain, 418 Phil. 354, 373 {2001)}, in accordance with Section 13, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the pertinent part of which reads: Section 11. Gffect of appeal by any of several accused. ~ (2) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter Decision of CA; remedy is appeat to SC not special civil actian for certiorari; exception. In Phil. Bank of Communications v. CA, et al, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, Caguioa, Ja complaint for sum of money was filed but upon motion of the defendant, the complaint was dismissed by the RTC for failure to comply with the order of the court to pay additional filing fee. MR was filed but it was denied, hence, a notice of appeal was made to the CA, but the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that appeal was not the proper remedy. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, plaintitt tiled a Petition tor Certiorari and Mandamus. The CA ruled that the petition was a wrong made of appeal as it tailed to comply with the mandatory ‘requirement of a Motion for Reconsideration, a condition sine qua non for certiorari to prosper. Was the petition for certiorari the proper remedy? In ruling that it was not, the SC Held: PBCOM availed of the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case before the Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail a Decision and Resolution of the CA. In Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., 677 Phil. 13 (2011), it was held that: ‘The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules: of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, ie, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process aver the original case, On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, ‘Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright (Sps. Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25, 44-45 (2011), further citing Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil, 783,791 (2002)) Exception to the rule. However, under exceptional circumstances, as when stringent application of the rules will result in manitest Injustice, the Court may set aside technicalities and proceed with the «ppeal (Sps. Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25, 45-46 [2011]). In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, 573 Phil. 472 [2008], the Court recognized the broader interest of justice and gave due course to the appeal even il it was a wrong mode of appeal and was even filed beyond the reglementary period provided by the rules. The Court reasoned that: 2 «We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit Liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical {nfirnifties and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean so undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to ‘maintain a healthy balance hetween the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee ‘that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition af his cause. x xx In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve 4 litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus: ‘The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This ts in keeping with the principle that rules af procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always he avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the caurt to excuse & technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than 21 JABRCZ019.SCD2017-2018 1 Remedial Law (consolidated) revived /EVSA/c1Ysdispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a talse impression ‘of speedy disposal ot cases while actually resulting in more delay, it not a miscarriage of justice. APPEAL Private complainant cannot appeal criminal case; exceptions. In Cu v. Ventura, G.R. No. 224567, September 26, 2018, Peralta, |, appeal in a criminal case was dismissed by the CA on the ground that as a private complainant, she is not authorized to represent the State in an appeal {rom a ‘criminal action. It ruled that in criminal cases or proceedings, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions ‘on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State (Section 35|1], Chapter 12, Title Ill, Book Ii of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended) In agreeing with the CA, the SC Held: The Scate is the proper person to represent in an appeal. The rule, hawever, is nat without any exception, The two exceptions are: (1) when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State ar its agents reluse to act on the case to-the prejudice of the State and the private offended party; and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court (Heirs ot Delgado, etal. v. Gonzalez, et al, 612 Phil 817, 844 [2009)} It there isa dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it fs only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People (See Soriano v. Judge Angeles, 393 Phil. 769, 776 (2000); and Bangayan, J. v. Bangayan, 675 Phil 656, 664 (201! }). The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal ofthe criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses (Malayan Insurance Company, Inc, et al. v. Philip Piccio, et al, 740 Phil. 616, 622 (2014)}, For this reason, the Peaple are deemed as the real parties-in-interest in the eriminal case and, theretore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the GA or in this Court (Jimenez v. judge Sorongon, et aL, 700 Phil. 316, 325 (2012)). In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or delencied in the namie of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is pertorce dismissible. The private complainant or the otfended party may, however. file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG, but only insatar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned (Villareal v. Aliga, 724 Phil. 47, 57 (2014), He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, bu ont othe end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case (See Ong v. Genia, 623 Phil. 835 Harmless Error Rule 51, Sec. 6 Application of the Harmless Error Rule. In Flight Attendants and Stewards Assn,, Inc. v. PAL, Inc, et al, GR. No. 178083, March 13, 2018, Bersamin, J. the SC had the occasion to once again rule on the application of the Harmless Error Rule. No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial rights of the parties. The harmless error rule obtains during review of the things done by either the trial court or by any of the parties themselves in the course of trial, and any error thereby found does not affect the substantial rights or even the merits of the case. The Court has had occasions to apply the rule in the correction of a misspelled name due to clerical error; (See Republic v. Mercader, G.R. No, 186027, December 8, 2010, 551 SCRA 506, 516) the signing of the decedents’ names in the notice of appeal by the heirs; (Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 181, 202-203) the trial court's treatment of the testimony of the party as «m adverse witness during cross- ‘examination by its own counsel; (Gaw v. Chua, G.R. No. 160855 April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 506, 516) and the failureof the trial court to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to orally argue against a motion (Remonte v. Bonto, No. L-19900, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 257, 261). All of the errors extant in the mentioned situations did not have the effect of altering the dispositions rendered by the respective trial courts. Evidently, therefore, the rule had no appropriate application herein. RULE 47 - ACTION FOR NULLITY OF JUDGMENT Rule 42 Is the remedy if the MTC dismisses a UD case affirmed by the RTC. In Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Dev. Corp, G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018, Leonen, J, the MTC dismissed an action for unlawful detainer on the ground ct lack of jurisdiction which the RTC alfirmed. A petition for review was filed directly with the SC questioning the order of the RTC. Ruling that Petition for Review under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy, the SC Held: Petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Kules of Court to assail the Regional ‘Trial Court's ruling upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court Order instead of tiling a petition for review an certiorari under Rule 45 with the Court Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy trom an adverse decision rendered by a Regional rt exercising its appellate jurisdiction Is (a file a veritied petition for review with the Court of Appeals, Trial 22 [ABRC2019.5CD2017-2018 19 Kemedial Law (eonsohdated) eevised /EVSA/eryPetition under Rule 42 may include questions of law and facts or mixed questions of law and facts. Petitioner put in issue before this Court the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and that petitioner committed forum shaping when it failed to disclose two (2) pending cases, one filed by respondent Otfshare Construction and the other filed by respondent's group of tenants, 4H Intramuros. Both of these cases raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 42, “A question of law exists when the law applicable to a particular set of tacts is not settled, whereas @ question of fact arises when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt.” The Court has ruled that the Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a complaint and the existence of forum shopping are questions of law, A petition for review under Rule 42 may include questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law (Republic v, Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631, 637 (2010) [Per J. Villarania, Jr, Third Division]). The power to hear cases on appeal in which only questions of law are raised 1s not vested exclusively in this Court (Tan v. People, 430 Phil. 685, 693 (2002) [Per |. Vitug, En Banc]). As provided in Rule 42, Section 2, errors of tact oF law, or both, allegedly ‘committed by the Regional Trial Court in its decision must be specified in the petition for review. Violation of the principle of hlerarchy of courts. Petitioner's direct resort to the Supreme Court, instead ot to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned by the rules, violated the principle ot hierarchy of courts (Barcenas v. Spouses Tomas and Caliboso, 494 Phil. $65 (2005). Rule not absolute. ‘The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and the Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine, One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated (See also Dy v. Hon. Bibat-Palamos, 717 Phil. 776 |2013, Per J. Mendoza, Third Division). Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should nat be the case when the initial dispute-an ejectment case-ts, by nature and design, a summary procedure and should have been resolved with expediency. Moreover, the Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to the Court trom a decision ot the Regional Trial Court upon questions of law. RULE 58 ~ PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Requisites for the issuance f writ of preliminary injunction. In AMA Land Inc. v. Wack Wack Resident's Assn., Inc, GR. No. 202342, July 19, 2017, Caguioa, J, the respondent filed a petition for injunction to prevent petitioner trom constructing 2 condominium building alleging that its members right to live in a peaceful, quiet and sate environment will be violated in the event the project would be erected. The RTC denied the petition ruling that the alleged noise and dust that may be caused by the construction is the natural consequence thereot. In affirming and the ruling, the SC Held: WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and an unmistakable right that must be protected by the injunctive writ The apprehensions of its members are speculative and insufficient to substantiate the element of serious or irreparable damage. “The Court in Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, 728 Phil. 108 [2014}, reiterated the purpose and grounds for the issuance of a wrt of preliminary injunction, viz ‘To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and isreparable damage (Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, 684 Phil. 283, 292 (2012) ‘The.grant or denial of the injunctive reliet rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, sinze'the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the conclusive determination by such court; and the exercise of judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered with, except ‘upon a finding of grave abuse of discretion, InJanction does not issue to prevent Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. {In Anti, et al. v. Antipueste, G.R. No. 192396, January 17, 2018, Martirez, J, the basic issue is whether {injunction may issue to prevent the application and implementation ot the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Holding it in the Negative, the SC Held: No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or i connection with the application, implementation, entorcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agearian reform (Section 55) No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandannis shall be tssued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENA), and the Department of justice (DO}) in their implementation of the program (Section 68), In DAR v. Cuenca, 482 Phil. 208 |2004),t was ruled that: 23 JABRC2019.SCV2017-201811n Remedial Law (consolidated) revised/EVSA/erys‘All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Retorm Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Refurm (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.” “Thus, the DAR could not be ousted trom its authority by the simple expediency ot appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.” RULE 60 - REPLEVIN {In a replevin suit, if plaintiff is no longer the owner, action not proper. In Sy « Tomlin, G.R. No, 205998, April 24, 2017, Del Castillo J, Sy filed @ complaint lor recovery of possession of a motor vehicle which he owned and brought to a certain Chua, a second-hand motor vehicle seller and who in turn sold it to.a certain Ong, Chua, however failed to remit the proceeds of the sale, hence, Sy filed the action to recover possession. It was granted by the RTC, but it was reversed by the CA which the SC afirmed and Held: Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, Sy thus ceased to he the owner thereat. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, he lost his right of possession over the vehicle. His argument that Chua is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration ol the, despite having been apprised ot Sy’s earlier “Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with the PNP. HPG, is unavailing. Sy had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, tor collection of the proceeds o the sale. Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle atthe time he filed the case for replevin, Sy may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, Sy, who abtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the transter with the -TO, is the righthl owner thereal, and as such, he is entitled to its possession. Hence, the return af the vehicle to Chua is proper. “In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession. of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal Possession thereot. wrongtully detains the same.” "Rule 60 xx x allows a plaintift, in an action for the recovery of Possession of personal property, to apply for writ of replevin if it can be:shown that he is ‘the owner of the Property claimed .. or is entitied to the possession thereat’ The plaintiff need not he the owner so long as lie is able ta speeity his right to the possession of the property and his legai basis theretor ” RULE 65 - CERTIORARI, ETC. When private party in a criminal case may file petition for certiorar! in case of withdrawal of information. In Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. v. Canicon & Espeleta, GR. No. 196015, june 27, 2018, jardeleza, |, a special civil action for certiorari was filed by the complaint after the dismissal by the RTC of a criminal case alleging {grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The issue is whether the private complainant has standing to file the petition without the contormity of the OSG. The SC Held: No. The OSG has the sole authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases betore the Supreme Court and the CA (ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (1987), Book IV, Title II, Chapter 12, Sec. 3 5(1 }). The rationale behind this rule ts that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant (See Peopl v. Piccio, GR No. 193681, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 254, 261-262}. The interest af the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability (People v. Santiago, G.R. No, 80778, june 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 143, 152). In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness tor the prosecution. Thus, when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or ifthere is an acquittal, an appeal on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General, The private otfended party or complainant may not take such appeal; but may anly do so as to the ctv aspect of the case. Exceptions to the rule. ‘There are instances where a private complainant would have standing to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the dismissal of a criminal case. In Dee v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 111153, November 21, 1994, 238 SCRA 254, the Court affirmed the CA’s decision granting certiorari to a private complainant against a trial court's order dismissing the criminal case for estafa upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reiterating Perez v. ‘Hagonoy Rural Bank, inc, G.R. No. 126210, March'9, 2000, 327 SCRA 588, the SC said: The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was Issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the case of Dela Rasa v. Court of Appeals. we held that. “In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein itis alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse ot discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The camplainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he nay file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on Jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant.” 24 JABRC2019SC02017-2014 in Remedhal Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/érys‘Thus, in cases where the dismissal of the criminal case is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved parties are both the State and the private complainant. This right of the private complainant is anchored on his interest an the civil aspect of the case that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. ‘Mandamus lles only if there ts a clear duty. In Knights of Rizal v. DMC! Homes, Inc, et al, GR. No. 213948, April 25, 2017, Carpio, J, a petition for ‘mandamus was filed by KOR seeking to stop the construction ot Torre de Manila. It prayed that the construction be stopped because it completed it will stick out like a sore thumb, dwart all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometers and forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park and that would loome at the bback and overshadow the entire monument, whether close or viewed trom a distance. It argued that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled (“full protection of the law" and the national government must abate the act of activity that endangers the nation’s cultural heritage “even against the ‘wishes of the local government hosting it” DMCI contended that itis the RTC that has jurisdiction pursuant to the hierarchy of courts. It contended that. it was granted all the permits and clearance from the National Government and the LGU, which was confirmed by the City of Manila, It is 789 meters away the line of sight of the Rizal Monument, In denying the petition, the SC Held: The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed 'upon the olfice or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, andl when the party seeking mandamus has a clear right to the performance of such act. Nowhere ts it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part ofthe City of Manila “to consider,” the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119 in relation to the applications of OMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. White the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built isa privately-owned property that {is not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site, and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-beyond” the Rizal Park. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila heen designated as a “heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure.” ‘To compel the City af Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 6119 to the Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only i the officials ofthe City of Manila have a ministerial duty to consider these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty because these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. [RULE 67 - EXPROPRIATION, Determination of Just compensation. In Manila Banking Corp. v. Bases Conversion & Dev. Authority, G.R. No. 230144, January 22, 2018, Velasco, J, the Court had another occasion to rule that the determination of just compensation must be based on reliable and actual data, as explained in Republic of the Philippines v. C. C. Unsan Company, Inc, G.R. No. 215107, February 24, 2016 to wit: 1n Republic v. Asia Pacific Integrated Stée! Corporation, the Court defined just compensation “as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The ‘measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word ‘just’ used to intensify the meaning ‘of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered tor the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. Such ‘justness' of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the candemned property. Trial courts are required to he more circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, considering that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.” : ‘The Court further stated in National Power Corporation v, Tuazon, that “[t}he determination ‘of just-compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, ‘and. may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. This judicial function has constitutional raison d'etre: Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution mandates that na private property ‘hall be falien for public use without payment of just compensation.” Legislative enactments, as well as exeentive issuances, fixing or providing for the method of computing jtist compensation are tantamount to impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. They are not binding an courts, and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just compensation. Determination of just compensation. In Rep. of the Phils. V. Sps. Salvador, G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017, Del Castillo, J, there was a petition for expropriation which was granted by the trial court. The Republic however filed a partial motion for reconsideration alleging that the court erred when it directed the Republic to pay the owners consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the property. Holding thar such ruling was an error, the SC Held: “}ust compensation (is detined as} the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated.xx x ‘The measure Is not the taker’s gain but the owner's loss. [The compensation, to be just,| must be lair not only to the ‘owner but also to the taker” (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 612 Phil. 965,977 [2009}). 25 JABRC2019.SC02017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised/EVSA/crysConsequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaming property of the ‘owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value (Republic v. Court ot Appeals). In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property as a result of the expropriation More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer: o! the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents. RULE 69 - FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE Foreclosure sale of properties are void for non-compliance with publication requirement of notice of sale, In Security Bank Corp, v. Sps. Mercado, G.R. No. 192934, June 27, 2018, and companion cases, jardeleza, J, the SC once again had the occasion to emphasize the importance of publication in toreclosure ot mortgage. Said the SC, Held: Act No. 3135, as amended, provides tor the statutory requirements tor 4 valid extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Among the requisites is a valid notice ot sale, Section 3, as amended, requires that when the value of the property reaches a threshold, the notice of sale must be published once a week tor at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, Publication ot the notice is required “to give the x x x foreclosure sale « reasonably wide publicity such that those interested might attend the public sale" (Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, |r, G.R. No. 164104, September 11, 2009, 599.SCRA 394, 400). It gives as much advertising to the sale as possible in order to secure bidders and Brevent a sacrifice of the property. tn Caubang v Crisolaga, GR. No, 174581. February 4, 2015, 749 SCRA 563 it was said: The principal object of a notice of -sale in a fareclosure of mortgage is’ not so much to notify the ‘mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Therefore, statutory provisions governing publication ot notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale, at the very least, voidable. Certainly, the statutory requirements of posting. and publication are mandated and imbued with public policy considerations. Failure Lo advertise 4 morsgage foreclosure sale in compliance with the statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional detect, and any substantial error in a notice of sale will render the notice insutficient and will consequently vitiate the sale. Effect of failure to advertise; requirement cannot be waived. Failure co advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect which validates the sale (Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48278, November 8, 1989, 167 SCRA 16, 23-24). This jurisdictional requirement may not be waived by the parties; to allow them to do so would convert the required public sale into a private sale (Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, Jr, supra). Thus, the Statutory -provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and that even slight deviations therefrom will -invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable (Tambunting v. Court of Appeals). RULE 70 - FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER Possession is the only issue in a UD case; defense cannot determine jurisdiction of court. In Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018, Leonen, J, here was a contract of lease between the parties over 3 properties of the national government. The lessee however failed to pay the rentals despite demands, hence, a complaint for ejectment was filed. The defendant- respondent interposed the detense that the relationship was not one of tease but one of concession, hence, the MTC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The MTC dismissed it an the ground of lack of jurisdiction basing on the detense. In reversing the MTC. the SC Held: It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the property involved, Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who unlawtully ‘withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the right to hold possession (See Cruz v. Spouses Christensen; G,R. No. 205539. October 4, 2017). ‘To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint There is a case tor unlawtul detainer if the complaint states the following: «italy. possesion of Preperty by the detendant was by contract wth or By tolerance of she plainttt; 2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to detendant of the termination of the latter's ight of possession; 3. therealter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintlt of the ‘enjoyment thereof; and 4. within one year trom the last demand on delendant to vacate the property, the plaintitl instituted the complaint for ejectment 1 tacita recomduccion will remove the Metropolitan n, or de facto possession, is the sole by a defendant, a that the requisite Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease ‘Trial Court's jurisdiction over the complaint. To emphasize, physical posses: issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the claims ar defenses Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdicuon aver an ejectment complaint once it has been sh 26 JABRC2019.SCD2017-2018 in Remedial Lave (consolidated) revised /EVSA/e1ysjurisdictional facts have been alleged. Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace hy requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover possession of real property Possession is the basic issue in UD; ownership may be decided, In Baleares, etal. v. Espanto, GR. No. 229645, June 6, 2018, Velasco, J, the respondent is the owner of a property which he acquired by way of sale. In 1988, the petitioners mortgaged such property to a certain Arnold Which was foreclosed and sold in a public auction to Arnold. in 1998, believing that the mortgage was not enforced ‘within the 10-year period, petitioners filed an action for cancellation of the mortgage inscription on the tile, During its pendency, the certificate of title in tavor of Arnold was registered. In April 2000, respondent and his mother filed 2 complaint for Nullfcation of the Mortgage or Foreclosure. In july 2003, the RTC issued an order cancelling the ‘mortgage inscription and held that there was no valid extrajudicial foreclosure al the mortgage and auction sale for failure to comply with the notice and posting requirements and for failure to enforce it within 10 years. in 2003, ‘Arnold sold the property to the respondent, where a title was issued. The buyer did not take possession. Demand was made to vacate the premises, but petitioners refused contending that they have a better right of possession, hence, the complaint tor ejectment was filed. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that the action was one for recovery of possession and not untawkul detainer. It was further argued that there was itis ppendentia as there were two (2) pending cases involving ownership and possession over the property. The MTD was denied and ruled that the allegations make outa case for unlawful detainer and that the issue of ownership does not abate an unlawful detainer case, The RTC and the CA affirmed the decision, hence, appeal was made to the SC alleging that the CA erred in holding that the issue of ownership didnot abate the ejectment suit In essence, the pivatal issue that must be resolved here is who between the petitioners and the respondent has a better right of possession over the subject property? The petitioners who are in possession of the same continuously tor a long period of time or the respondent whose right of possession is anchored on a Torrens title obtained through purchase from someone whose right over the subject property has long ceased and he has _ knowledge of such fact? The SC Held: Petitioners have a better right: This case involved an action for unlawful detainer filed by the respondent against the petitioners. An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and the only issue that needs to be resolved is who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, passession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. Nonetheless, where the parties co an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership and such is. inseparably linked to that of possession, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. The adjudication of the ownership issue, however, isnot final and binding. The same is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, Otherwise stated, tite adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same partis involving title to the property Possession; the issue in UD. 1 Gatchalian v. Flores, et al, G.R-No, 225176, january 19, 2018, Tijam, , a complaint for eyectment was filed by petitioner alleging that lot of respondent encroached on his lot. a road lot registered under the name of his parents, He alleged that he is a co-owner of the said road lot, Respondents contended that they cannot be evicted since the said road lot has already been converted as a public property by the municipality by virtue of an ordinance and by laches due to continuous tise by the public. The MTC ordered respondent to vacate but it was reversed by the ATC and CA ruling that the private character ofthe road lot was stripped by the ordinance constituting it as a public right of way, He contended that it cannot fust be converted to public raad by an ordinance without an expropriation proceeding or sale or donation to the government. In reversing the CA, the SC Held: Iris settled that in ejectinent proceedings, the only issue forthe Court's resolution is, who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject property. Issues as to ownership are not involved, except only forthe purpose of determining the issue of possession (Mangaserv. Ugay. 749 Phil. 172 (2014)), Its ufdisputed that the road lot is registered under the name of petitioner's parents. Even the respondents did not dispute this fact. It is also undisputed that the municipal government has not undertaken any expropriation proceedings to acquire the subject property neither did the petitioner donate or sell the same to the municipal government. Therefore, absent any expropriation proceedings and without any evidence thatthe petitioner donated Or sold the:subject property tothe municipal government, the same is stil private property. Issthe case of Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co, Inc.545, Phil. 83 {2007|, this Court held that: “Anvthe case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "the road lots in a private subingot rare private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as @ public road." Otherwise, they remain tobe private properties of the owner-developer: Contrary to the position of petitioners, the use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip st ofits private character. The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's passage through it. To repeat, "the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road” As relterated in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works ‘and Highways (DPW) v. Sps. Llamas, .R. No, 194190, january25, 2017 this Court held that: ‘As there s no such thing as an automatic cessation to [the] government of subdivision road fots, an actual vanster must first be eftected by the subdivision owner: “subdivision streets 27 JAURC2019.8CD2017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/crys t re TTbelonged to the owner until donated to the government oF until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.” Since the local government of Parafiaque has not purchased nor undertaken any expropriation proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate the subject property, the latter is still a private property and Ordinance No, 88-04 did not convert the same to public property. Ownership can be decided in UD case to determine degree of possession. Once again the SC in Iglesia de Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila Phils, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 208284, April 23, 2018, Del Castillo, |, had the occasion to rule that the basic issue in an unlawful detainer js the issue of possession. The Court said when the defendant raises the defense ot ownership in her pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of awnership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession” (Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court). In other words, “where the parti to an eyectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issie to determine wha between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue ot ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose ol resolving, the issue of possession” (Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, 679 Phil, 352 [2012)). The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership 1s merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings 1s designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary praceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue of ownership arising in loreible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally tor the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession, (Penta Pacitic Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corp., 747 Phil. 672 (2014). “Indeed, a ttle issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the necessanly includes possession” (Corpus v. Sps. Agustin). Nevertheless, decided in favor ot oné who ha attributes of property ownership, which n ejectment case will not necessarily be Presented proot of ownership ot the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven” (Dr. Carbonilla v. Abjera, 639 Phil, 473 [2010}), Letter reminding possessor to vacate is an act of polite demand to vacate. In Guyamin, et al v. Flores, G.R. No.202 189, April 25, 2017, Del Castillo, |, the respondents are the owners of a parcel of land which has been occupied by tolerance by their own relatives. The awners sent a letter “reminding” them to vacate the property because they decided to sell the same, but to no avail, hence, a complaint was filed seeking to recover possession of the property. The defendants filed an answer beyond the reglementary period required by the Rules. Judgment was rendered in tavor of respondents which the CA affirmed. Befare the SC the Petitioners contended that the action was premature ay there was no “demand” to vacate, but they were merely “reminded” to vacate the premises. Is the contention correct? Explain, Held: No, because the word “remind” can be treated as an act of polite demand, As owners of the subject property who have been deprived of the use thereat for so many years owing to petitioners’ continued occupation, and after all these years af giving unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives, respondents must now enjoy the fruits of their awnership. Respondents have been more than cordial in dealing with petitioners; they have shawn ‘only respect and reverence to the latter, even to the extent of using less offensive language in their complaint for tear of generating more enmity than is required. Thus, instead of using “demand”, respondents chose “remind. The parties being relatives and the context and circumstances being the way they are, the choice of words is understandable. The Court treated respondents’ act as a polite demand; indved, the law never requires a harsh or impolite demand but only a categorical one. Case filed before the barangay is a categorical demand. ‘There could be no more categorical demand by respondents than the filing ot a case against petitioners before the Barangay Chairman to cause the latter's eviction from the property. The fact that only one of the Petitioners was made respondent in the conciliation process is of no moment; given the context, relation, Circumstances, lack of visible defense (Guyamin, etal. v. Flores, supra) ‘Automate revocation of donation reverts ownership upon donor; can eject sub-lessee. In Prov. of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware, G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017, jardeleza, |, a property was donated by the province to Camarines Sur Teacher's Association Inc. (CASTEA) to house its alfices in connection with its functions, There was an automatic revocation clause in case ot violation of the condition ot the donation. The done violated it when it leased to Bodega, hence, there was a demand for it to vacate by the province, butit refused. A complaint tor ejectment was tiled based on its ownership due to the automatic revocation, Bodega anchored its detense or right of possession on the lease contract. The MTC ruled in favor of the province which was reversed by the RTC. Appeal was made to the CA which dismissedd the appeal, ruling that the province should have first ited an action for reconveyance of the property and that the action has already prescribed because it was not filed within 10 years. Reversing the CA, the SC Held: Ita contract ot donan the donee violates 1 ar provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case ot a breach af a condition and His to comply with it, the praperty donated automatically reverts back (a the donor without heed of any judicial deciarscion. 1s anly when the donee denies the rescission oF challenges tls propriety that the court can intervene to conc iisively settic (Zamboangs Rarter Traders Kilusang Rayan, Inc v Plagata, GR No 140433, September 30. 200%, 567 SCRA 164; Dolar y. Warangay Lblub (Now P.D Mantort North) Municipality al Dumangas, G.R No. 152663, November 11,2 15,475 SCRA ASI) 28 JABRCZO19.SCL2017-2018 in Ken dal Law ( Iidated) revised /EVSA/c1 yyhis right of possession prevailed over the lessee's claim whic is anchored on its Contract of Lease with the done whose act of leasing the property, in breach of the canditions stated in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it. While a lessor need not be the owner af the property leased, he for she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out (Ballesteros v. Abion, GR. No. 143361, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 23, 33), The lessee found no basis for its continued possession ot the property. Judgment in unlawful detainer is immediately executory. Ejectment cases are governed by Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure. Its summary nature is designed to restore physical possession of a real property to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims in an expeditious and Inexpensive manner. True to its summary nature, the court's jurisdiction is limited to the issue of piysical or de facta possession; hence, adjudications made on questions of ownership are provisional. To abate losing litigants’ attempt to defer and Circumvent summary ejectment proceedings, the rules mandate that decisions involving ejectment cases are immediately executory. Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997° Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the detendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that ‘may be taken therefrom. Therefore, the decision ordering defendants to vacate the subject property pursuant to the ejectment proceedings must be immediately executed. Especially so without any substancial detense to oppose the ejectment order. the petitioners should yield possession to respondent. Hence, petitioners’ ploy that would obliterate the ‘objective of summary ejectment proceedings must fail. The order to vacate is irimediately executory (Quilo, etal. v. Bajao, GR. No. 186199, September 7, 2016, Perez, ; Santos-Vllana Realty Corp. v. Sps. Deang, G.R No, 190043, June 21, 2017, Velasco, }) SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Issue of heirship. tn Bagayos v. Bagayas, 718 Phil, 91 {2013}, the Court reiterated that courts must refrain from making a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action because "matters relating to the rights of filation and heirship must be ventilated ina special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.” Straightforwardly, the CA is precluded trom determining the issue of tiliation in a proceeding for the quieting of ttle and accion reivindicatoria, By way of exception, the SC ruled in Heirs of Ypon v. Ricgforte, 713 Phil. 570, 576-577 (2013), thus: By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and aiready presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, ‘or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened (See: Sps. Alcantara v. Sps. Animas, et al. GR No, 200204, April 25, 2017) When there is no need for administration proceedings. Ater the death of Gregorio, a petition for settlement of his estate was filed by Jesusa Buot, claiming that she 1s one of the heirs of the deceased; that he left an estate; no etfort has been done to settle the same without any justifiable reason. While there was an Extrajudicial Settlement of his estate, it did not cover all the properties. She asked that (a) an administrator be appointed; (b) final inventory be made; (c) heirs he established; (d) the net estate be distributed to the heirs. Roque Bujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss alleging that Jesusa is nat an heir of Gregorio, Jegusa on the other hand filed a comment attaching thereto a copy of the necrological services listing her ‘as one of the heirs o Gregorio. It was claimed that recourse to judicial administration of an estate that has no debts is allowed only when there are good reasons for not resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for partition. The RTC dismissed the petition. In her MR, she contended that there are compelling/good reasons like: (a) the Extrafudicial Settlement did not cover all the properties: (b) no effort to settle it extrajudicially; (c) there was a challenge of her status as heir; (d) other heirs were deprived of their shares of the estate. ‘Whose'contention is correct? Why? Held: The contention of the petitioner, Jesusa is not correct. When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however, several exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. When the deceased lelt no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration, The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, In case of disagreement: they also have the aption to file an action for partition. Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. In Rodriguez, etal. v. Tan etc. and Rodriguez, it was Section 1 jot Rule 74) does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even ifthe estate has no debts or obligation, if they da not desire to resort for good. Feasons to an ordinary action of partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs ta divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it daes not on 29 JABRCZ019 SCD2017-2018 in Remedial Law (cor ed) revised /EVSA/eryscompel then to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course af action. Said section is ot mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. I! the intention were otherwise the tramer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in ‘other provisions that are mandatory in character. Since such proceedings are always “long,” “costly,” “superfluous and unnecessary.” (Pereira v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 81147, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 154, 159-160) resort to judicial administration ot cases falling lunder Section 1, Rule 7 4 appears to have become the exception rather than the rule, Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "|w]here partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons” (Jesusa Dujali But v, Roque Dasay Dujali,G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017, Jardeleza, |) Actions that survive action for damages for injury suffered. {in Tan v. Republic of the Phils, G.R. No. 216756, August 8, 2018, Del Castillo, J, the SC once again had the ‘occasion to say that even with the death of the defendant an action for damages against survives as it is one tor recovery of damages. Rule 87, Section | of the Rules of Court enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's, executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property trom the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recaver damages for an injury to person oF property Probate court cannot decide Issue of ownership as a general rule; exceptions. In Ignacio v. Reyes. et al, GR. No. 213192, July 12, 2017, Peralta, Oliva Reyes, intestate proceeding was filed. In the meantime, whil respondents filed an action tor partition, J, alter the death of the Spouses Angel and le the intestate proceeding was pending the accounting and damages alleging that they are co-owners ofthe properties alleged to be the estate of Reyes. Subsequently they filed a motion before the intestate proceeding praying for the distribution of the heirs’ aliquot shares in the co-owned properties net income and partition of the properties which the intestate court denied, A petition was filed with the CA which reversed the RTC ruling and ordeved the partition and distribution of shares over the co-owned properties. Before the SC it was contended that the petition Was pre- mature, Ruling that the RTC’s denial of the motion for partition and distribution of the properties was a mere assertion ofits jurisdiction aver the properties which were allegedly co-owned with the Reyes eslate, the SC Held: Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settiement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate (Ongsingco, ete. v. Tan, etc, and Borja, 97 Phil. 330, 334 (1955), as cited in Jardeleza, GR. No. 167975, june 17, 2015, 758 SCRA 659, 663) The doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality” applies with equal force to an intestate Proceeding (Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Pil. 155, 179 (1997)). Thus: {AI probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory oF lst of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action fora final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so” (Ortega vs. Court of Appeals, 237 Phil. 99, 105 (1987) Power of probate court to decide ownership; merely an exception. {In In Re: Intestate Estate of Reynaldo Rodriguez v. Rolando Rodriguez, et al, GR. No. 230404, January 31, 2018, Tijam, J; there was a joint account Reynaldo and Anita, one of his children. Alter is death, the children executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Reynaldo but when Anita wanted to withdraw the amount in the joint account, the other heirs refused to sign the waiver, hence, Anita filed an intestate estate proceeding to settle the estate. The heirs submitted the issue of determination of ownership of the joint account to the jurisdiction of the probate court, ‘The heirs admitted that they knew the existence of the joint account, yet they still failed to include the same 1m the list of included properties in the inventory when they executed an extrajudicial settlement. Their failure to include said joint account in the list of the items owned by Reynaldo for the purposes ot determining his estate ‘obviously refutes their claim that Reynaldo was the sole owner of the funds in said joint account. The trial court ‘ruled that Anita is the sole owner of the funds in question. Ruling that the trial was correct, the SC Held: Even if the probing arms of an intestate court is limited, it is equally important to consider the call of the ‘exercise of its power of adjudication especially so when the case calls tor the same, to wit: While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court (now including the MTC), acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion oF exclusian of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albert, provisionally the question of title aver properties, itis no less true that such authority conterred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should he exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case (Lim 11 ol Appeals, 380 Phil. 60, 74-75 (2000)), Limited jurisdiction of probate court is a mere procedural question, 30 JABRCZO19.8CD2017-2014 1m Remedial Law (consolidated) revived /EVSA/e195Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance (now RTC and the MTC) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a spectal court (probate, land registration, etc.) is n reality nota jurisdictional question. It isin essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived. Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises limited Jurisdiction, it may settie questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment (Valera v. Inserio, 233 Phil. 552, 561 [1987)). Suich waiver was evident Irom the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief betore the court @ {quo as they claimed ownership aver the funds in the joint account of their father to the exclusion of his ca-depositor. CORRECTION OF ENTRIES RA 9048 applies to correction of clerical errors. In Republic v. Michelle Soriano Gallo, G.R. No, 207074, January 17, 2018, Leonen, j, Michelle Gallo filed a petition for correction of her namie from “Michael” to “Michelle” and her biological sex trom “male” to “female” under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, She also asked for the inclusion of her middle name “Soriano” her mother's middle ame “Anganan’; her father’s middle name “Balingao" and her parent's marriage date May 23, 1981 in her Certificate of Live Birth. As proot, she attached her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript af records, medical Certificate, mother’s birth certificate and parent's marriage certificate. She testified that the documents mentioned above indicated that her name is “Michelle Soriano Gallo’. The doctor examined her as female. She never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport. The RTC granted the petition. On appeal, the OSG contended that Rule 103 is applicable, not Rule 108. The CA denied the appeal saying that Rule 108 is the proper remedy as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless and innocuous. Is Rule 108 applicable? Why? Held: No. RA No. 9048 is the law applicable. She did not file a petition for change of name or current appellation. She was merely correcting the misspelling of her name. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error trom.” To change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that Serves as a substitute (Republicv. Mercadera, 652 Phil. 195, 204 (2010) [Per}, Mendoza, Second Division), Gallo was not attempting to replace her current appellation. She was merely correcting the misspelling of her given name, “Michelle” could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter “a” in “Michael,” and “le” at the end of “Michelle.” "Michelle" and “Michael” may also be vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo did not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as “Michelle” all throughout her life. She was merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name Rule 108 does not apply in this case either. Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. The current law, Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012. ° RA 9048 removed the correction.of clerical ar typographical errors fram the scope ot Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, ‘or changes of first name or nickname. ‘Therefore, itis the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or rnunicipal eivl registrar can the Regional Tvial Court take cognizance of her case (Republic v.Sali,G.R. No, 206023, April 3,2017, Peralta, }) ‘Middle name “Soriano” a clerical error. “Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo’ s middie name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as ‘Angangan for:her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents’ marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under elevical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048 which provides: &.:24x (3) "Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance OF clerical: work. in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place ol birth or the like, which is Visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by Felerence to other existing record oF records: Provided, however, That no correction must invalve the change of nattonality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. ‘These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. Nane of it involves any change in Gallo’s nationality, age, status, or sex. Moreover, errors “visible to the eyes ar obvious to the understanding” fall within the caverage of clerical mistakes not deemed substantial It is “obvious to the understanding,” even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth ceruficate was ever used, the correction may he made. ‘Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively betore filing a Petition under Rule 108 (Rep. v. Gallo, GR. No. 207074, January 17, 2018). [31 JABRCZ019.8CD2017-2018 in Remedial Law (cu olidated) revised /EVSA/erysChange of biological sex; substantial change. However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightlully filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the detinition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048 In Republic v. Cagandatan, 586 Phil, 637, it was held that under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical error (RA No 10172, Sec. 1 & 2 [3]: Rep. v. allo, G.R. No, 207074, january 17, 2018). ‘sffectif there was gender reassignment. However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive matter. In Cagandahan, 956 Phil. 637 [2008], it was ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex his or her Certticate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to lie a petition under Rule 108. In that case, it was held that the change did not involve a mete correction of an error in recording but a petition for a change of records because the sex change was initiated by the petitioner When Rule 103 of the Rules of Court apply; substantial correction; purpose. Apperson who would file an action in court under Rule 103 seeks for a substantial change in the given name ‘or surname for valid reasons recognized by law. Rule 108 applies ifthe corrections are clerical, ‘This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who may be atfected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these proceedings bind the whole world (Republic v, Mercadera, 652 Phil. 195, 205 [2010], Per ] Mendoza, Second Division) Applying Article 412 af the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must tile a petition under Rule'103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing date and directing the order's publication in a newspaper’o! general circulation. Atter tinding that there is proper and Feasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civil register, When Rule 108 applies; clerical corrections. On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuouis mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 ot this Rule and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of 3 person, The proceedings uncer this rule may either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors Asexplained in Republic v. Mercaderu, 652 Phil. 195 {2010} Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above-stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true tacts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves af the appropriate adversary proceeding. “Il the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed alter appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature ot the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and prot to the contrary admitted ..." “Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a Substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412-of the Civil Code and so does nat violate the Constitution” (citing Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408-422 (1986) (Per J. Gutierrez, |r, En Banc}: Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001) [Per J. De Leon Ir. Second Division}; Chiao Ben Lim v. Zosa, 230 Phil. 444 (1986) [Per |. Cruz, En Banc]), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSE: Designation of the crime in the caption Is a mere conclusion of law. In Gamaro, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 211917, February 27, 2017, Peralta court has the discretion ta read the information in the context of the tacts alleged In the case of Flores v, Hon, Layosa, 479 Phil. 1020 (2004), the Court explained the rationale behind this discretion in this manner: From a legal point of view, and In a very real sense, its of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result ts to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the adminrstration of justice by setting up the technical detense that the crime J, the SC once again said that the 32 JABRC2019.SCD2017-2018 n Re dual Lave (consollate) cevised/EYSA ferysin the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized hy the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. I he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law Genominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information trom the tacts alleged in the body of that pleading is conclusion of law made by the fiscal. Inthe designation of the crime the accused never has areal interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at al. It is of rno consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights .. It he pertormed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and rrxes the penalty therefore. Its the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named, RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION Effect of death of accused on civil Wability. ‘Once again in People , Antido, G.R, No. 208651, March 14, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, the SC had the occasion to rule that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death a! the accused (Art. 89 [1}, RPC). In People v. Culas, GR. No, 211166, lune S, 2017, the effects of the death at an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, were thoroughly explained thus: 1 Death of the accused pending appeal af his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability, based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, ie, civil liability ex delicto in senso stritiore. Corollary, the claim for civil ability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than deltct. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other Sources of obligation trom which the civil liability may arise as a result af the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) 100% e) Quasi-deliets, Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way ot tiling a separate civil action and subject to Section |, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules ‘on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by Prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-olfended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations ‘on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 ot the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription (People v. Layag, GR. No. 214875, October 17, 2016, 806 SCRA 190, 195. 196). ‘Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein far the recovery ‘of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, itis well to clarify that accused-appellant’s civil lability in connection with his acts against the victim, may be based on sources, other than delicts; in which case, the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Violation of P22; accused acquitted; can still be held civilly liable; civil deemed fited. to Bvongelista v. Screenex, Inc, G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017, accused was charged with violation of BP22, bat he was acquitted. What is the effect of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused? The SC Held: He canbe held civilly liable. In BP 22 cases, the action for the corresponding civil obligation is deemed institutes With the criminal action. The criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding, civil action, aid no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized (Supreme Court Circular S797 effective on 1 November 1997). ‘The rationale for this rule has been elucidated in this wise: Generally. no fling fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors, Because ardinarily no tiling fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes upon heing paid, the trial court is not even informed thereot. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to signiticantly lower the number of cases tiled hefore the courts tor collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, ane for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid dowa by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation al a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint Is filed in court. ‘The only instance when separate 33 ABRCZ019.5.02017-2018 in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/erysproceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead ol the criminal case, Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action far the purpose of recovering the amount ol the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and titne-constuming tor both parties and would turther delay the final disposition of the case, This multiplicity of suits must be avoided (Hyatt Industrial Manutacturing Corp. v, Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., 503 Phil. 411, 417-418 (2005). ‘This notwithstanding, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action is treated as an “independent civil ability based on contract” (Bernardo v. Penple. 770 Phil, 509, 522 (2015) Prejudicial question. In Domingo v: Singson, ec al, G.R. No. 203287, 207936, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J, Macario and Felicidad died leaving as heirs Engracia, Renato, Consolacion, Josefina, Ratael, Ramon & Rosano, Engracia filed an ejectment sit against Consolacion, Rosario, Ratael and Ramon claiming that she owned the property eft by thelr parents having bought the same. The defendants contended that they learned of the sale only when they were served with summons. They (Renato, ete) filed an action seeking to nullity the deed of sale on the ground that theit parents’ signatures were forged. In the meantime they also filed a criminal case for falsification of public document, estafa and use of falsified dacument. Engracia moved to suspend the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question, ‘When the issue reached the SC, it ruled in favor of the movants and Held: A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution ot which is a logical antecedent o the issue involved in sald case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the {ssues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed (Quiambao v. Hon. Osorio, 242 Phil. 441, 444 [1988}), The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions (Ty-de Zuvaiarregui v. Hon. Judge Villarosa, et al, 631 Phil. 375, 385 [2010)). For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension ot the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must -be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution Of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or mnocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal (Prado v. People, etal, 218 Phil 873,577 sea ‘There indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case. The detense of the Spouses Singson in the civil ‘case tor annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property trom her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts, which would be necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the ‘criminal case. If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged. Otherwise stated, a conviction in the criminal case, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside itt ‘were finally decided in the civil case that indeed the signatures of the sellers were authentic. RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION Determination of probable cause Is a power vested in the prosecutor; exception. Once mate, in Chiang, et al. v. PLOT, G.R. No. 196679, December 13,2017, Jardeleza, j, the SC had the occasion to say that it has adopted a deferential attitude towards review of the executive's finding of probable cause. This is based not only upon the respect for the investigatory and prosecutorial powers granted by the Constitution to the executive department, but upon practicality as well (ABS-CBN Corporation v. Gozon, G.R. No, 195956, March 11, 2015, 753 SCRA 1, 30-31), The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor ‘and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the filing of the corresponding information or move tor the dismissal of the case (Ty v. DeJemil, G.R. No. 182147, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 671, 684-685). However, the resolution of the Secretary ot Justice may be subject of judicial review. The review will be allowed only when grave abuse of discretion is alleged (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, GR. No. 156337, September 28, 2007. 534 SCRA 322, 331). Probable cause, for purposes of tiling a criminal infocmation, has been detined as such tacts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belie! that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereat, and should be held for trial. In determining probable cause, the average person weighs tacts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not. a crime has been committed and that st was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, but it requires less than evidence that would justily a conviction (Cla & Feather International, Ine, ¥. haston, GR No V9MU5. May 30.2011 G4 SCRA $10, 323). A linding ol probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction, It ts enough that the act oF omission complained! of constitutes the offense charged. The term does not mean “actual and posttive cause” nor does it import absolute certa n and reasonable belief. A trial 1s intended precisely for the eception of prosecution evidence in support of the charge. The court 1s tasked to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt base by the parties at a trial on the merits. 34 [ABKE2019SCD2N17- 2018 in Remedial aw (vonsolidated)RULE 113 - ARREST Arrest without warrant; when valid. 1In Villamar, et al.v. People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017, Del Castillo |, there was a warrantless arrest of the accused. A police officer received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal number game. So the police otficers proceeded to the place which was fenced by bamboo slots about 5'7" to 5'9" ull. They positioned ‘themselves about 15 to 20 meters away from the house of the accused then, they entered the house of the accused and confiscated the bets, and other things used in the illegal game numbers, and arrested the accused without warrant Was there a valid warrantless arrest? The S Held: None. Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without a warrant of arrest. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 13, two elements must concur, namely “(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, ors attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.” It was admitted that trom his position outside the compound, the officers could not determine the activities of the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally entered the compound, since he was not armed with a ‘warrant, that he supposedly saw the gambling paraphernalia. Determination of probable cause by judge; options of judge. In Liza Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla, etal, GR. No, 187094, February 15, 2017,-Leonen, J, the judge remanded the case for further investigation after the ease for murcer was filed, Petitioners contended that the act ‘was not proper. Petitioners asserted that the documents submitted along with the Informations are sufficient for Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she found the evidence inadequate, she may order the prosecutors to present additional evidence. Thus, according to petitioners, judge Turla's action in remanding the ‘ase to the prosecutors for further preliminary investigation laced legal basis. the contention correct? Why? Held: Yes. The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another preliminary investigation is improper. Rule 112, Section S{a) of the Revised Rules of Criminat Procedure provides “within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case it the evidence on record clearly tails to establish Probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the Complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable Cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days trom notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause: (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence it there is doubt on the existence of probable cause (See Ong v. Genia, 623 Phil. 835, 843 (2009)) ‘The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation of the Prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a Judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function (Napoles v.De Lima, GR. No. 213529, July 13, 2016), Determination of probable cause by prosecutor distinguished from that of the judge. During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable cause for filing an information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation whether “there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded beliet that a crime fras been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereol, and should be held for trial.” At this stage, the determination of probable cause is an executive function, Absent grave abuse of discretion, this determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers ‘On.the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a judicial function. Np less than the Constitution commands that “no... warrant of arcest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or alfirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he miay produce.” This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5 (4) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. ‘Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that for issuance of an «arrest warrant are different. Once the information is fiied in court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and “any disposition of the ease as ta its dismissal or the canviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.” When the judge held that the prosecutors’ conduct of preliminary investigation was “incomplete” and that their determination of probable cause “has not measured up to [the] standard,” she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary lnvestigation. Regardless of the judge's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was incumbent upon hher to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors’ Fepart and the supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory. and/or Fequire the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no aption for her to remand the case hack to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any legal basis, '3S JABRC2019.5CD2017-2010 in Kemedia Law (consolidated) revised/EVSA/crysQuestion on legality of arrest; prior to arraignment; otherwise waived. ‘Once again, the SC in People v. Bringcula, G.R. No. 226400, January 24, 2018, Peralta, J, had the occasion to rule that the question on the legality of arrest must he raised prior to arraignment, atherwise, accused would be ‘estopped. More speciticaly, the SC said: Held: As to the legality of his warrantless arrest, accused is already estopped from questioning such because it was never raised prior to his having entered a plea of not guilty. Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped trom assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the information against him betore his arraignment (People v. Bangalon, 425 Phil. 96 [2002]). Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made betore he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional detect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without objection. The subsequent liling of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the detect of that detention, RULE 114 - BAIL Judge conduct of judicial determination of probable cause is automatic; motion a superfluity. In Extra Excel Int. Phils. nc. v. Hon. Afable E, Cajigal, AM, No. RT}-13-2523, June 6, 2018, Del Castillo, |, accused was charged with a non-bailable offense. and filed a petition for bail, The court allowed accused to go home without bail even without hearing on the petition for bail and without making a judicial determination of probable ‘cause, Ruling that the judge was guilty of grass ignorance of the aw, the SC Held: The respondent Judge should not have waited for the accused to file an omnibus motion for a judicial determination of probable cause. As held in Leviste v. Hon, Alameda, 640 Phit. 620 [2010] "to move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere supertluity, for with ar without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence.” Thus, the failure of respondent Judge to comply with this tundamental precept constituted gross ignorance of the law and procedure, His failure to heed this precept resuilted in the said accused's arraignment, without the accused in custody of the law. {In Guillen v. Judge Nicolas, 360 Phil. 1 {1998] where it was stressed that: (Bly setting the cases for arraignment and tial, respondent judge must have found probable cause to hold the accused tor trial. [The judge] should have proceeded to examine in writing and under oath the complainants and (the] witnesses by searching questions and answers. The records do not show that the [judge] set the case for, or conducted, such examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest. Neither [was) there any subpoena or order requiring the ‘complainants or [the] witnesses to appear in court for such examination, The inevitable conclusion is that the respondent judge skipped this procedure. Bail hearing is a must; even without objection of prosecutor. Ina case Judge's failure to conduct a hearing on accused's Petition for Bail constitutes gross ignorance af the law, Its axiomatte that a bail hearing is a must, despite the prosecution's lack of objection to the same. In Boianay v. Judge White, 776 Phil. 1 [2016], it was said: It is basic, however, that bail hearing is necessary even it the prosecution does not interpose any abjection oF leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, in Villanueva v. Judge Buaya, therein respondent judge was held administratively lrable tor grass ignorance of the law for granting an ex parte motion for bail without conducting a hearing, Stressing the necessity of bail hearing, this Court pronounced that: ‘The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature at a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the gran! or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused 1s, strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence 1s strong is a matter, of judicial diseretion which remains with the judge. In oraer for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, [the judge] must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and. evaluation of the weight of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused, In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. The Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bal It is altogether of no consequence that the Order granting bail "was made in the presence of the public prosecutor, and the latter made no objection or comment to the oral manitestation of the defense counsel. RULE 116 - ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA [36 JABRC2019 SCD2017-2038 19 Remedial Law (consol sd} revived /ENSALcAySProhibition against plea bargaining under RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 Is unconstitutional. In Estipona, Jr. v. Hon. Lobriga, et al, G.R. No. 226675, August 15, 2017, Peralta, |, the accused entered a plea of not guilty in a case where he was charged with violation of Sec. 11 of RA 165. He, however, filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to enter a Plea Bargaining Agreement praying that he be allowed to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead enter a plea bargaining vnder Sec. 12, for possession of equipment, etc. and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs with a penalty of rehabilitation. It was denied by the RTC based on Sec. 23 of the law which Provides that any person charged under any provision of such law regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail ofthe provision on plea bargaining, Hence, he questioned the order and the said pravision of the law contending that: (a) it violates the rule-making power of the SC under Sec. 5{5] of Article II! of the Constitution and; (b) tt violates the principle of separation of powers, In ruling that Sec. 23 of RA 9165 invalid, as itis contrary to the rule-making power of the SC, the Court Held: It shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 18 contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not ta preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations ‘behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto for a qualiied version thereot, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules ot procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose RULE 119 - JUDGMENT Appeal or petition for certiorari may be a remedy in case of denial of demurrer to evidence, The basic issue in Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, et al. (iR. No. 220598, April 18, 2017, Bersamin, J, is whether appeal or petition for certiorari may be a proper remedy in case of denial of demurrer to evidence. It was contended that the appropriate remedy is to proceed to trial and appeal from the judgment and invoke as one of the errors of the court the denial of the demurrer. Rule 65 is available only if there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In brushing aside the contention of the State, the SC Held: To start with, the State argues’ that the cansolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in light ot Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial af their demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions for certiorar’, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners’ demurrer to evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chiet thereat; and that even if there had been grave abuse of discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners compliance with the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course ot law, which they did not establish. ‘The prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable abstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336, the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial auchority, Death of state witness before trial proper does not automatically render his testimony during discharge proceedings inadmissible. In People v. Dominguez, et al, G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018, Velasco, J, accused were charged with ‘Camapping with Homicide. There was a motion to discharge one of the accused to become a state witness, hence, the witness have his testimony and was cross-examined by the counsels for the accused, The defense manifested that the crossexanpination was jimited to the incident of discharge and reserved the right to further cross-examine the ‘witness during the trial. In the meantime, the witness died, hence, he was not able to testify during the trial. A motion ‘o expunge the testimony from the record was filed with the RTC which granted the same ruling that the purpose of the testimony was merely to substantiate the motion to discharge him to become a state witness and did not constitute evidence in chiet. The ruling was affirmed by the CA. It was contended that the accused were given the ‘portunity to cress-examine the witness when he was cross-examined during the discharge proceeding, but when they reserved the ight to further cross-examine him during the trial, they forfeited their right. Ruling that the {estimony may not be expunged, the SC Held: No, Pursuant to the Rules, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (9) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial, Either party may utilize as part of Its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be tound in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testity, given in another case of proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parues and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity ta cross- ‘examine him (Rule 115, Sec (1), One of the mast basic rights of an accused person under our justice system is the right to contront the witnesses against him lace to lace, Subsumed under this right of confrontation is the right to crass-examine the witnesses for the prosecution And as the Court has elucidated in People v. Senerts (Seneris). No, L-AfUN3, August 6, 37 JABRCZO19 5C02017-2018 in Kemeial Law (consolidated) revised /LVSA/crys1980, 99 SCRA 92, it was ruled that the right, though fundamental, miay he waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the same. As the case instructs: ‘The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross- examine may take various forms, But the common basic principles underlying the applicatian of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage oF it for reasons attributable to himselt alone. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to avail hhimselt of if, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct ‘examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. Reservation of cross-examination, a walver. Here, respondents nave Co realize that their option to not ask for a continuance and reserve the right to continue with their line of questioning for trial proper instead carried inherent risks, including their present predicament. Respondents ought to have been aware that their decision wauld pave the way not only tor the termination of the discharge proceedings, but also for the eventual application of the last paragraph ot Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court should the RTC resolve to discharge the witness as a state witness, as it in fact did, The assumption of the risk, amounted to a Waiver of any objection 1s to the admissibility af the witness’ testimony during the discharge hearing, Furthermore, Seneris elucidates that the testimony of the deceased prosecution witness shall not be expunged trom the records if the detense was able to conduct a rigorous and extensive cross-examination prior to the witness’ demise. As held: Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of private respondent of the deceased witness was extensive and already covered the subject matter of his direct testimany as state witness relating to the essential elements of the crime of parricide, and what remained for further cross-examination is the matter ot price or reward allegediy paid by private respondent for the commission of the crime, which is merely an aggravating circumstance and does not affect the existence of the offense charged, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in deciaring as entirely inadmissible che testimony of the state witness who died thraugh no fault of any of the parties before his cross-examination could be finished. Effect of reservation of right to further cross-examine, Respondents’ reservation for trial proper of the right to further cross-examine the witness did not diminish the sutficiency of the opportunity that they were given to confront the adverse witnesses, Notwithstanding the said reservation, the witness’ testimonies and admissions as regards the particulars of the crime already formed part ot the records of the case when the RTC granted his motion to be declared a state witness, Respondents’ constitutional rights were not violated since the fair hearing envisaged by criminal due process had been complied with when the counsels for the respondents conducted a rigorous and exhaustive cross-examination af the deceased witness during the discharge hearing. Rules on discharge of accused; effect. Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides: Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. - When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses tor the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (2) There is absolute necessity tor the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested (b) The is no other direct evidence available tor the proper prosecution ot the oftense committed, except the testimony of said accused (6) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (4) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. the court denies the mation tor discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. The rule ts explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness, However, the motion hearing tm this case had already concluded and the motion tor discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of the records and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule. Finality-of-acquittal doctrine: Judgment of acquittal (s nal and unappealable; to correct an error later puts accused in double jeopardy. In People v. Alejandro, GR No, 223099, January 11, 2018, Tijam, J, accused was charged with two (2) counts of rape. He was acquitted hecause of the failure of the complainant to testify because of a mix-up of orders with a 38 JABRC2019 SCU2017-2018 1» Remedial Law (convo 18) revise EVSA/erysdifferent case where accused was involved. There was a manitestation by the: prosecution that there were orders inadvertently placed in the record of the case involving the same accused but different complainant which it considered will result in a different verdict. The trial caurt issued an order rectifying the error and recalled the judgment of acquittal. Accused argued that acquittal is final and executory. Agreeing with the accused, the SC Held: To rectify and correct the error would put the accused in double jeopardy because of the tinality-ol-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable (People v. Hon, Asis, et al, 643 Phil. 462 {2010}). ‘The Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order tor double jeopardy to attach, For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court at competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent (Chiok v. People, et al., 774 Phil. 230, 247-248 (2015). ‘A judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant tailed to testity; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is tinal, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation (Villareal v. liga, 724 Phil. 47, 62 (2014)) Exceptions to the rule. The rule on double jeopardy, however, is nat without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding ot a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. Rule 65 is the remedy against judgment of acquittal ‘A mere manifestation will not sutfice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated, In People v. Laguio, jr, 547 Phil. 296 {2007}, the Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus: xxx The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted. with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack oF excess of jurisdiction, suck as where the prosecution was dented the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed, Promulgation of judgment; effect f accused falls to appear; loses right to appeal Tf accused failed to appear atthe promulgation of the judgment, he loses his right to appeal his conviction. I the judgment is tor conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in-these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fitteen (15) days trom promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave ot court to avail of these remedies. He shali state the reasons for his absence at che scheduled promulgation and if he Proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of sald remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice 'AS the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be dane in absentia, The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days from notice ofthe judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal, otherwise, the decision becomes tinal. The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment ‘of conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the fling of 44 motion for new trial oF for reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules of Court the permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation ofthe judgment conditioned upon: (a) is surrender: and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence. Should the triat court find that his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the judgment ot conviction. In the attempt to regain hi right to avail himsell of the remedies under the Rules af Court, the petitioner tiled a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached thereto the medical certificate issued by a doctor. Yet, he did not thereby establish that his absence had been for 3 justifiable cause because the purported issuer himselt direcuy impugned the credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certiicate, and to have examined the petitioner (Salvador v Chua, GR, No, 212865, July 15, 2015, Bersamin, J: Javier v. Gonzales, G.R. Ne 193150, January 23,2017) 39 JABRE.2019 SCD2017-201H un Remedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/cry'There is double jeopardy f person is charged twice (2) for a single act; delito continuado. In Navaja v. Hon. De Castro, G.R, No. 180969, September 11, 2017, Perlas-Gernabe, J, wo (2) cases lor Violation of PD 1029 charging petitioner with Obstruction of Justice committed on two (2) occasions; once on March 9, 2004 and on March 15, 2004. This isan offshoot of a preliminary investigation charging Navaja, petitioner in this case with the crime of falsification of private documents. It was found out from the material witness that (a) she ‘would have attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing were it not for the misrepresentation ot petitioner that her presence therein was no longer required: (b) she was merely told by her superior tn Garden Café to sign the alfidavit and that she did not personally prepare the same; and (c) she could not have gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Ay. rapa as she was at work on that day. This prompted the fling ofthe criminal complaints. ‘A motion to quash was filed contending that the twa (2) cases arose trom a single act thus putting the party in double jeopardy. The MTC denied the motion which was affirmed by the RTC and CA. In reversing the lower court's decision, the SC Held: While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in dillerent locations, petitioner should only be charged and held liable for « single violation of PD 1829, This is hec.use the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse ~ tha, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding which was, in fact, eventually dismissed. The foregoing conclusion is premised on tie principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising trom one criminal intent or resolution (Paera v. People, 664 Phil. 630, 636-637 (2011)). In Santiago v, Garchitorena, the Court explained the principle of delito continuado as follows According to Cuello Calon, tor delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or urpose, which means that two or more violations af the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leacing to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (11 Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed), Im ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and thus, may be tried separately, the CA cited the case ot Regis v. People (Regis), 67 Phil 43 (1938), wherein it was held that the maiversation Committed through falsitication of document pertornved on different dates constitute independent atfenses which ‘must be punished separately. However, a closer perusal ot Regis shows that its factival milieu is nat on all fours with the instant case. In Regis, the accused, then municipal treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed payrolls on two (2) different dates, ie, April 30, 1931 and May 2, 1931, making it appear that certain workers worked as laborers in a ‘municipal project when in truth, there were no such warkers and that he ane his co-accused misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The Court ruled that the accused may be held liable for two (2) separate-crimes, considering that when the accused committed the first act constituting malversation committed through falsification ‘af document, it did not appear that he was already predisposed to committing the second act constituting the same crime. Clearly, when the accused in Regis falsitied the payroll of April 3 0, 1931, and later, the payrall af May 2, 1931, hhe - though committing similar acts - could not he said ta have been niotivated hy a single criminal impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct criminal objectives, WITHDRAWAL OF INFORMATION Appeal is the remedy from an order granting withdrawal of information; no double jeopardy. In Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017, Leanen, |, ater the fling of an information for estala, the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information on the ground that there was lack of probable cause, to hold the accused liable. The trial court granted the motion, In its Petition for Certiorari betore the Court of Appeals, petitioner claimed that it resorted to a special civil acuon for certiorari as it had “no recourse {0 an appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ‘ordinary course of law" against the trial court's orders to withdraw the Information and release respondent's bail bond. Is the contention correct? Why? Held: No. Petitioner fs incorrect. Appeal was available and was the proper remedy. Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that any party may appeal rom a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. ‘An order granting a motion to withdraw an Information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the ‘emedy to question this final order is an appeal. In Santos v. Orda, 634 Phil. 452 [2010], it was sai: Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rulle 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, abviously, to make up tor the lass of his right 10 an ordinary appeal Its elementary that the special civil action of certiorari ls not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case, A special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal (Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, 6.8. No. 206958, November 8, 2017) Appeal not violative of right against double jeopardy. Appealing the withdrawal of an inlormation did not violate the right of the accused against being placed in double jeopardy In First Womens Credie Corp v. Gaybay, 542 Phil, 607 [2007] was said that the motion was granted by the MeTC helare respondents were arraigned. ‘This, the prohibition Ppeal in case eriminal case Is dismissed 4s the accused would be placed in double yeup apply. 40 JawRc2ory sever 7-201 8114 Remedial Law teansubudated) cove VSAperysThe case cited by petitioner to support its choice of remedy betore the Court of Appeals concerns the filing ‘ofa special civil action for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order. In Rodriguez v: Gqdiane, 527 Phil, 691 [2006], the order being assailed in the petition tor certiorari was an order suspending a criminal proceeding due to prejudicial question, which was not an order which dismissed the case or acquitted the accused. If the case is dismissed or if there is an acquittal, the appeal of the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State Remedy was improper; judicial economy is the reason why the Court still decided case. Despite the use of an improper. remedy, the Court proceeded to cecide the issues to pursue judicial economy. That is, the prospective opportunity cost that may be expended by the parties and the courts far outweigh the likelihood of success of the aggrieved party, Court resources will be more efliciently expended by this Court's discussion of the merits of the case. When an information 1s filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority to determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed (Ramos v. People, 639 Phil. 51, 67-68 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]}. The court is "the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it." The dismissal ofa criminal case due Co lack of probable cause protects the accused trom having to undergo trial based on insufficient evidence: ‘Although there is no general formula or tixed rule tor the determination of probable cause since the same-must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates ot reasons... The judge or fiscal theretore, should not go an with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights, So it has been before. It should continue to be so, Judges to proceed with caution. Judges must proceed with caution in dismissing cases for ack of probable cause since the evidence before them are preliminary in nature (Mendoza v. People, 733 Phil. 603, 615 (2014) {Per J. Leanen, Third Division]). When. probable cause exists, the court must proceed with arraignment and trial, But should the evidence presented absolutely fail to support this tinding of probable cause, the case should be dismissed, Whether it is to dismiss the ase oF to proceed with trial, a judge's action must not impair “the substantial rights of the accused lor] the right of the State and the offended party to due process of law” (Judge Marcas v. judge (abrera-Faller, AM. No, RT]-16-2472, January 24, 2017), EVIDENCE - DYING DECLARATION Dying declaration, reasons for admissibility. After a shooting incident, the victim was brought to the hospital and on their way to the hospital, the victim told the witness that it was Abe, a neighbor who shot him. He repeated the same to his wite, but he died, The accused interposed the detense of alibi, but the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the witness, admitting the same as dying declaration which the CA atfirmed. is the dying declaration admissible? Why? ‘ns.: Yes, For dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, tour (4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was Competent as.a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the fort part of res gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule an hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statemenks were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrencein question and its immediately attending circumstances. ‘The statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the-same under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence’of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily. because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the Point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful Considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awtul as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court (People v. Palanas, GR. No, 214453, june 17, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, ‘Statement likewise admissible as part of res gestae; test of admissibility, ‘The witness’ statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and tabrication, The test ot admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itsell, and iso whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manutacture 41 [ABRC219.SCD2017-201H in Remedial Law (consolidated) revised/EVSA/erystestimony.” In this case, his statements refer to a startling occurrence, ‘2, him being shot by the accused and his ‘companion. While on his way to the hospital, he had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling accurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it identified the accused as one at the authors of the crime. ‘Therefore, the killing of victim, perpetrated by accused, is adequately proven by the prosecution (People v. Palanas, G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, }} Privilege communication. In Gamaro, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 211917, February 27, 2017, Peralta, |, the accused in a case for estafa contended that the testimony of a lawyer who was an olficemate that he saw the accused selling pieces of jewelry and in fact offered to sell to him violated the rule on privilege communication between attorney and client for the reason that the lawyer gave advice regarding her case. The SC disagreed and Held: The factors essential o establish the existence of the privilege are: 1. There exists an attorney-client relationship oF a prospective attorne} of this relationship that the client made the communication: 2. The client made the communication in confidence; 3. The legal advice must be sought trom the attorney in his professional capacity. lent relationship and it is by reason ‘The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of contidentiality, The client must intend the communication to be contidential. A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in contidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary {or the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose tor which it was given, The communication made by a client to his attorney must nat be intended for mere information, but for the purpose ot seeking legal advice {rom his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose ot seeking legal advice, ‘SPA executed abroad, not covered by requirements of Sec. 24, Rule 132, In Tujan-Militance v. Nustad, etc, G.R. No, 209518, june 19, 2017, Tam, |, there was a complaint seeking the surrender of TCTs under the name of Nustad which were allegedly being withheld by Militante. Nustad, a Norwegian was represented by her counsel evidenced by a Special Power ot Attorney notarized abroad. Militante contended that the SPA must comply with the requirements under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules ot Court for its admissibility which requires that the same be attested by the officer having legal custody of the record or his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such ottice has the custody, citing Lopez v. CA, G.R. No, 77008, December 29, 1987, 156 SCRA 838. In brushing aside such contention the SC Held: The Lopez case is not applicable because it was decided under the old rule, It clarified in the Heirs of Sps. Arcilla v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008 that The required certification ot an officer in the.foreign service under Section 24 relers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit: written official acts ar records ot the official acts of the sovereign authority, otficial bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or fof a foreign country, Had the Court intended to include notarial documents as ane of the public documents contemplated by -the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19. As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certitication of an officer in the foreign service refers only to wnitten official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, alficial bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a. foreign country, as found in Section 19(a), Rule 12, stich enumeration does not include documents acknowledged before a notary public abroad (Director of Lunds v. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951), I there is no direct evidence circumstantial evidence can prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 218701, February 14, 2018, Del Castillo, J, the SC had the occasion once ‘again to-say that in rape cases, the credibility of the complainant's testimony is almost always the single most important issue. When the complainant's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction” (People v. Dela Torre, 588 Phil, 937, 945 [2008]), “[T]he findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great respect and even finality on appeal. However, this principle does not preclude a reevaluation of tie evidence to determine whether material lacts or circumstances have been averlooked ‘or misinterpreted by the trial court” (People v. Bermejo, 692 Phil. 373, 381 {20121} ‘The exception obtains in this case. Indeed “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is nat the only basis fram which a court may draw its nding of guilt (People v. Manchu, 59 Phil. 398, 406 {2008}). Resort to circumstantial evidence rs sanctioned by Rule 133, Section [4] of the [Rules of Court} (Bastian v. Hon. Court of Appeals. 575 Phil. 42, 56 [2008)), "Circumstantial evidence is detined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-tinder draws trom the evidence established (People v. Osianas, SHB Phil. 615, 627 [2008]). The requisites tor circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are: a) There is more than one circumstance; 1b) The facts trom which the interences are derived are proven: and, ¢) The combination of all the circumstances 1s such as to produce 4 convicion beyond reasonable doubt. 42 |ABRL20195C:D2017-2018 w Remedial Law (cunsulldatedt revised EYSA/erYSAsextensively discussed in People v. Modesto, 134 Phil, 38, 44 [1968], cited in Lonzanida v. People: the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one. fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all athers, as the guilty person, From all the circumstances, there should be a combination of evidence which in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Stated in another way, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of twa or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the accused. ‘Admission of hearsay evidence violates the right of the accused, \n People v. Ramirez, G.R. No, 219863, March 6, 2018, Del Castilt. crime oF rape because the evidence presented was hearsa unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls (Republic of Galeno, G.R No. 215009, january 23, 2017). In People v. Mamaitas, 385 Phil. 499 |2009), it was criminal case would be tantamount to a violation of t |. the accused was acquitted of the 1y which, "whether objected to or not, has no prohative value, within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule xxx” emphasized that the admission of hearsay evidence in 3 the rights of the accused, to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is « nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition Such a judgment cannot begiven any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty ofan individual Offer of evidence required before objection thereto. Once again in Lara's Gift & Decors, nc. v. PNG Gen. Insurers, Co, etal, (.R. Nos. 230429-30, anuary 24, 2018, Velasco, J, the SC had the occasion to rule that to disallow the presentation of the Questioned Documents on the offered must he specitied, Private document needs authentication to be admissible. Sec. 20 of the same Rule, in tum, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or bY evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Following Sec. 19 of Rule 132, the documents sought to be presented undoubtedly are private in character, and herice, must be identified and authenticated in the manner provided in the Rules. The failure to properly authenticate the documents would result in their inadmissibility. The court, however, can only rule on such issue upon the proponent's tormal offer af evidence, which, pursuant to Sec. 35, Rule 132, is made atter the presentation of the party's testimonial evidence. Document written in unofficial languages when admissible in evidence; Identification and authentication required, In St Martin Polyclinic, inv. v. LWV Construction Corp. GR, No. 217426, December 4, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, | there was a complaint for sum of money for the expenses incurred by respondent in deploying a contract worker, It ‘was alleged that petitioner was negligent in stating in its medical report that the contract worker as fit for employment when he was not as he was positive for HCV or hepatitis C virus. While employed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the contract worker was tested positive for HCV as reflected in a Certlication issued the General Core Dispensary of the Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which was writen in an unolficial language. The petitioner was made liabie on the basis ofthe said Certification where the trial court admitted the same in evidence. On appeal, it was contended that the Certification should not have been admitted in evidence and given probative value since it was written in unofficial language. Affirming such contention, the SC Held: Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states that documents writen in an unofficial language shall not be ‘edmitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of Proceedings: parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before tral. ‘While the subject document contained English words, the majority of itis in an unofficial language. Sans any translation if English or Filipino, the same should not have been admitted in evidence, thus their contents could not be given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof a the facts stated therein, Moreover, 'the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in accordance with Section 20, Rule 182.0f the Rules of Court ‘Section 20. Proof of private document - Betore any private document offered as authentic ts received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (2) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness ofthe signature of handwriting of the maker: {€) Any other private document need only be identitied as that which itis claimed to be Reason for Identification and authentication. The Certification does not tall within the classes of public documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and hence, must be considered as private. An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value (Huang v. Phil. Hoteliers, Inc., 700 Phil. 327 [2012]). In addition, since a medical certificate Involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given welght or credit unless the doctor who Issued It Is presented In court to show his qualifications. It is recluded because the party against whom It \s presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine 43 JABRC2019.5C02017-2018 in Remedial Lave (consnildated) revised /EVSA/1ysthe person to whom the statements or writings are attributed, Its executor or author witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author ot the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and ol no probative value" (See aiso Maritime Factors, Inc. v. Hindang, 675 Phil. 587 {2011]) asin this case. should be presented as a WRIT OF KALIKASAN Nature and purpose of writ of Kaltkasan; rule on 30-day notice. In Mayor Tomas Osmera v. Garganera, G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018, Tijam, J, there was a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan to prevent the dumping of garbage at Inayawan landiill as it causes. serious environmental damage which threatens and violates their right to a balance and healthful ecology. In the return, petitioner contended that respondent failed to comply with a condition precedent which requires 30-day notice to the public officer concerned prior to the filing of a citizen suit under RA Nos. 9003 and 8749. The CA granted the Petition tor the issuance of the wit ordering that petitioner or his representatives ta desist from dumping oF disposing ot garbage or solid waste at the landlfil. On the issue of whether the 40-day period is applicable or hot the sc Held: No. Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules ot Procedure for Environmental Cases Section S.Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others including minors or generations vet unborn may tile an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliel prayed tor, requiving ‘manifest thetr interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days plaintiff may publish the order once ina newspaper of furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and RA. No, 9003 shall he governed by their respective pravisians, (RPEC), is instructive on the matter: all interested parties to trom notice thereof. The @ general circulation in the Philippines or Section 1, Rule 7 of RPEC also provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ: The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical Person, entity authorized hy law, people's organization, nongovernmental organization, or any Public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons ‘whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthtul ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or, omission ot a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities ar provinces, A petition for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a separate and distinet action from R.A. 9003 and RA. 8749. A writ of kalikasun is an extraordinary remedy covering environmentai damage of such magnitude that will Prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed lor a narrow but ‘special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and elfective resolution of a case involving the violation of one’s constitutional right (o a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and ten-itorial boundaries, and to address che potentially exponential nature ot large-scale ecological threats (Segovia, et al. v. The Climate Change Commission, G.R No. 211010, March 7, 2017, citing Hon. Paje v. Castito, et al, 752 Phil. 498, 538 [2015}) Moreover. Section 3, Rule 7 of RPEC allows direct resort to the Suprenie Court or with any of the stations of the CA. Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct action to this Court and the CA where it is dictated by public welfare, (See Segovia, et al. v. The Climate Change Commission, supra) the prior 30-day notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8744 is inapplicable. It is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it Compliance with the requirements. Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to avail ofthis extraordinary remedy: (I) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology: (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity: and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in wo or more cities or provinces Expectedlly, the Rules do not detine the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it ‘must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope o! such damage, so as to call tor the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis, The continued operation of the Inayawan landiill poses a serious andl pressing danger to the environment that could result in injurious consequences to the health and lives of the nearby residents, thereby warranting the ‘issuance of a wrt of kalikasan, The air and quality of water posed a threat to nearby surroundings/nabitat while the water quality posed threat to water pollution Foul odur Irom the landfill has already reached the neighboring communities which have disrupted activities causing economic lass. These were just some of the reason for the grant of the petition CHAIN OF CUSTODY 44 JABRC2019 SCD2017-2014 19 Remedial Law (camsehated) revive /VSA/E4ysEffect of non-compliance with chain of custody rule. In People v. Binasing, G.R, No. 221439, July 4, 2018, Del Castillo, J, the SC once again had the accasion to rule that non-compliance with the requirements af Section 21, Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 casts doubt on the integrity of the seized items and creates reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused (People v, jaatar, G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017, 815 SCRA 19, 33). The said provision clearly requires the apprehending team to mark and conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and to photograph the same immediately atter seizure and confiscation in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel and the insulating witnesses, namely, any elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media. The law mandates that the insulating witnesses be present during the marking, the actual inventory, and the taking of photographs of the seized items to deter [possible planting of] evidence (People v. Bintaib, G.R. No, 217805, Apnil 2, 2018). Failure to strictly comply with this rule, however, does not ipso facto invalidate or render void the seizure and custody aver the items as long as the prasecution is able to show that "(a) there is ustifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b} the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved" (People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 225500, September 11, 2017). However, in case of non- compliance, the prosecution must be able to “explain the reasons behin¢ the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved x x x because the Court cannot presume what these ‘grounds are or that they even exist.” {In this case, the marking and physical inventory, as well as the taking of the photograph of the seized items ‘were not done in the presence of the insulating witnesses. And since no explanation was atfered to justify the pon- compliance, the Court finds that the prosecution tailed to show that the seized substance from the accused were the same substances offered in court. Thuis, the integrity of the corpus delicti was not properly established In addition, although the Seizure Receipt bore the signature of the accused, his presence during the marking and the physical inventory of the seized items was likewise not established as the prosecution's witnesses failed to categorically state that the marking and the physical inventory were done in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT Basic purpose of the judicial affidavit rule. The JA Rule, which took effect on January 1, 2013, was promulgated to address congestion and delays in courts. Designed to expedite court proceedings, it primarily affects the manner by which evidence 1s presented in court, particularly with regard to the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies. Consequently, in lieu of direct testimony in ‘court, the parties are required to submit the judicial affidavits of their witnesses within a given period, Nevertheless, the JA Rule was not devised to supplant or amend existing procedural rules; rather, it is designed to supplement and ‘augment them. In this regard, reference must he made to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial in relation to the Rules on Pre- ‘Trial, which, interestingly, both parties invoke in support of their respective arguments (Lara's Gilt & Decors Inc. v PNB Gen Insurers Co, et al, G.R. Nos. 230429-30, January 24, 2018, Velasco, }}. The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced. In a case, invoking the avowed objectives of the Guidelines on Pre-Trial and the JA Rule to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases, and decongest court dockets, it was contended that the submission of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit and the corresponding documentary evidence will unduly prolong the case and defeat the purposes of these rules. Is the contention correct? Why? Held: No. The parties are mandated under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule to file and serve the judicial affidavits of their witnesses, together with their documentary or object evidence, not later than five days belore pre-trial or preliminary conference. ‘The documentary and testimonial evidence submitted will then be specified by the trial judge in the Pre- ‘Trial Order. Concomitant thereto, Sec. 10 of the same Rule contains a caveat that the failure to timely submit the affidavits and documentary evidence shall be deemed to be a waiver oftheir submission. "Set, 10 does. not contain a blanket prohibition on the submission of additional evidence. However, the subratssiot£@f evidence beyond the mandated period in the JA Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that: a) the ‘court: may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the evidence profters a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced thereby. Corollary thereto, the Guidelines on Pre-Trial instructs the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three (8) days before the pretrial, containing, inter alia, the documents or exhibits to be presented and to ‘state the purposes thereof. The Rule further provides that no.evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered ‘during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than thase that had been earlier identified and pre- ‘marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown). Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural prescription, the same rule confers upon the trial court the discretion to allow the introduction ot additional evidence during trial other than those that had been previously marked and identified during the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds. Submission of judictal affidavit prior to trial not violative of due process. In Lagon v. Hon. Velasco, G.R. No. 208424, February 14, 2018, Reyes, |, the trial court required the parties to submit judicial altidavit prior to the trial af the case. Defendant contended that the resolution violated the Fight to due process as the same required him to present evidence even belore the plaintiff terminated the 45 JABRC2019 {02017-2018 in Reinedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/ eryPresentation ot its evidence. It likewise prevented him trom tiling demurrer to evidence. In brushing aside the contention of the defendant, the SC Held: The parties are required to h e and serve their judicial affidavit not later than the pre-trial date. Seeking to eradicate the scourge of long-drawn protracted litigations, and address case congestion and delays in court (Ng Meng Tam v. China Banking Corporation, 765 Phil. 979, 998 (2015)}, the Court en bane promulgated AM. No, 12-8-8-SC, or the judicial Affidavit Rute. “The judicial Alfidavit Rule was particularly created to solve the following ills brought about by protracted litigations, such as, the dismissal of criminal cases due to the frustration of complainants in shuttling back and torth to court after repeated postponements; and the learth of foreign businessmen making long-term investments in the Philippines because the courts are unable to provide ample and speedy protection to their investments, thereby keeping the people poor. At firs, the Court approved the piloting by trial courts in Quezan City of the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses. Eventually, the success of the judicial affidavit rule was unprecedented, and its implementation led to a reduction of about two-thirds of the time used tor presenting the testimonies of witnesses, Indeed, the use of judicial alfidavies greatly hastened the hearing and adjudication of cases Accordingly, the Court en bane directed the application of the judicial Alfidavit Rule to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the reception of evidence betore all tribunals ‘No conflict between the Rule & the rule in demurrer to evidence. Justaposing the Judicial Atfidavit Rule with that of the rule on demurrer to evidence, it becomes all to apparent that there exists no conflict between them. Similar to the judicial atfilavit, a demurrer to evidence likewise abbreviates judicial proceedings, and serves as an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Work, 503 Phil. 103, 120 [2005}). tis as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect tat the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue" (Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha. SS0 Phil. 571, 582-583 [2007], citing H. Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 6" ed., (1990), p. 433). All that it grants is an option to a defendant, to seek the dismissal of the case, should hhe believe that the plaintiff tailed to establish his right to reliet. The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. Thus, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely Fequired to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proot to sustain the plaintiffs complaint Both rules co-exist. Clearly, both the Judicial Affidavit Rule and Demurrer to Evidence can co-exist harmoniausly as tools for a more efficient and speedy administration of trial procedures. On the one hand, the Judicial Aftidavit Rule simply dispenses with the direct testimony, thereby reducing the time at which a case stands for trial, in the same way that the Demurrer to Evidence abbreviates proceedings by allowing the defendant to seek for an early resolution of the case should the plaintilt be unable to sufficiently prove his complaint. These rules do not conflict, and when used ‘hand in hand will lead to an efficient administration of the trial No deprivation of the right to due process. Moreover, by no stretch of the imagination may it be concluded that Lagon was deprived of due process ot law. There is nothing in the provisions of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which prohibits a detendant (rom demurrer to evidence, if he truly believes that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is insufficient, Besides, in the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, only the evidence presented by the plaintift sla be considered and weighed by the Court ‘The tact that the defendant is mandated to submit his judicial affidavit prior to the trial and betore the plaintiff has rested his case is not a cumbersome requirement or a circumvention of due process. On the contrary, this is necessary for the orderly administration of the proceeding before the courts. It must be remembered that in as early as the pre-trial canterence, the defendant is already required to submit a pre-trial briel, where he is then tasked to state the nuniber and namies of his witnesses, as well as the substance of their testimonies; the issues to be tried and resolved; and the dacuments or exhibits to be presented and the purpose thereof. Thus, the defendant 1s already required in this early stage of the praceedings to formulate his defense and plan his strategy to counter the plaintitf’s complaint. There is nothing too tedious or burdensome in requiring the submission of the judicial affidavit, In fact, this would even help the detendant in preparing his opposing arguments against the plaintiff WRIT OF AMPARO Nature of the writ of omparo, ‘A writ of ampuro is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate judicial reliet tor the Protection of a person's constitutional right ta lile and liberty (Lozada, ret al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R No. 184379-80, Apnl 24, 2012, 686 SCRA 536, 551). When a person ts consumed by fear for her life and liberty that it completely limits her movement, the writ may be issued to secure her. Note, however, that the source of this tear must be valid and substantiated by circumstances, and not mere paranoia, Thus, in resolving the necessity ot 'ssuing a writ of amparn and the corresponding protection order, the courts must look at the overall circumstance Surrounding the applicant and respondents (Lt. SG. Mary Nancy Gadian v. AFP Chiet of Staff Ibardo, et al, GR. No. 188163, October 3, 2017, Wersamin, |), While it 1s conceded that LL SG G. acknowledged (0 exist. The reso thas hereby sought pre! n'y life Was in actual danger, the possibility of danger must be 1 she claims, was her expose of the Balikatin Funds anomaly Consequently, she sntive weit of amparo. 46 |AREZOI9SC02017- 2014 19 Hemeaial Law ( wlidated) eovised ESA LAYSLU SG Gadian did not exactly know who had threatened her, and merely points towards the general direction of the military as the source of the threats. The uncertainty about the identities of the individuals who had knocked at her home, or wha had conclucted surveillance in her nelghbortioad, or who had even attempted to snatch her during her boat trip cannot he glossed over in order to immediately hold the (eadership of the AFP in suspicion of complicity. Indeed, to do so would convert the proceedings into an unwarranted witch-hunt that could unfairly implicate many in the country’s military service. Nonetheless, it becomes necessary for the Court to deal with the willingness and ability of the AMRSP to provide protection and sanctuary to persons like Lt SG Gadian who seek protection after filing their petitions for the writ of amparo. Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the persons or agencies who may provide protection to the aggrieved parties and any member of the immediate family are limited to government agencies, and accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety, but in respect of the latter, they should be accredited in accordance with guidelines still to be issued. Substantial evidence necessary in Amparo Cases, ‘Along the same vein in Republic v. Cayanan, et al, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, the SC ruled that substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ of amparo the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, it warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance. In Razon, jr. v. Tugitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 185, a case involving the propriety of the trial court's issuance of the writ of amporo, the Caurt expounded on the need for substantial evidence to support the petition for the writ of amparo, viz. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the ‘correct import of every piece of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement x x x. Sutfice it to say that we continue ta adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule ‘on the Writ af Amparn requires, with some adjustments tor flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the ‘general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did Rot thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rute; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation, This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsuy evidence with the other available evidence in the case. The C1DG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence. Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public official or employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit: Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence, ‘The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. ‘The respondent public official ar employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability. ‘The C1DG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its investigation of the disappearance of Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts, “The C1DG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary. ‘The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparoare not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The praceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the uilt of the accused, Reliefs to be granted. According to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court hearing the petition may grant the privilege of the writ of amparo“and such reliels as may be proper and appropriate.” This means that the amparo court should enable every act or move to prevent any violation of another person's right to lite, liberty and security orto deleat any threat ofa violation of suck right Under Section 9 of the ule on the Writ of Amparo, he respondent is required to also state in the return the actions that have been or will still be taken: (a) to verlly the identity of the aggrieved party; (h} to recover and 47 |ABRC2019 52017-2018 1n Kemedial Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/ETYSooo Preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the Prosecution of the’ person or persons responsible; (c) to identity witnesses and obiain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death ar disappearance; (e) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappeurance; and (I) ta bring the suspected offenders before a competent courc Good Luck and God Bless to All 2019 Bar Candidates Especially the ABRC Bar Candidates We Are Always Praying For You. ABRC Family 48 |ARC2019 $C102017-2010 an Resmechal Law (consolidated) revised /EVSA/erys