1) United States vs Adriano Panlilo GR no 9876 12/8/1914

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant.

Pedro Abad Santos for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga
convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from
dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos
belonging to the above-named accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious
disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the
Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico,
Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and
voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos
was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were
then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the
accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from
one place to another for the purpose of working them."

The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not
constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not
guilty.

From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the
defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of
agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga
Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos
were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an
agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the
Director of Agriculture.
It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the defendant fully
understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the
animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been
placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of
the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals
thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined.

The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do
not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.

We are forced to agree with this contention. 1awphil.net

The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760
committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in
quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An
amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760 alleged to
have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial.

The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5.
This case does not fall within any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for
any person, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any
animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the
effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine
Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it shall be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation
knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport from one island, province, municipality,
township, or settlement to another any domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable
diseased or to expose such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may
come in contact with other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever the Secretary of the
Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island,
province, municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by
shipping, driving or otherwise transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality,
township, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified from such locality
except when accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the Director of Agriculture stating
the number and the kind of animals to be shipped, driven, taken or transported, their destination,
manner in which they are authorized to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their brands
and distinguishing marks.

A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within any
of them. There is no question here of importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in
question were suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior
had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said
animals from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged
had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that they had been placed in a corral
in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken
them from the corral and worked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor
moved from one municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda,
where they were quarantined, and there worked by the servants of the accused.

The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable
to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of said Act is not applicable. This section provides:
"Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in quarantine in accordance with
the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at the place
designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance. Should
the owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish
supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance shall be
collectible from the owner or his agent."

We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section, as
we are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to
refuse to comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant
the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which
the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may call it
punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal
provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does not compel
an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under
which punishments may be inflicted are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and
section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by the law.

The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar.
Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph
(c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have
been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed
by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided
any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of
the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau
of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are
statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense
unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is
such violation punished in any way therein.

Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and proved
upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does
constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It provides:

A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be
imposed upon: . . .

2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with
reference to any epedemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any
other similar plague.1awphil.net

It alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had ordered a
quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed
and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in violation of
such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the
quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his plantation. We consider
these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal Code as above quoted. The fact that the
information in its preamble charged a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the
accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follows: "The
undersigned accuses Adriano Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follows:" Then
follows the body of the information already quoted in this opinion. We would not permit an accused
to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change from
one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a
different defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760
include those required under article 581. The accused could have defended himself in no different
manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581.

In the case of United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the facts upon
which the charge was founded terminated with his expression: "In violation of section 315 of Act No.
355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect on the 6th of February, 1902."

In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the information and
proved on the trial did not constitute a violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 as alleged in the
information, but did constitute a violation of article 387 in connection with article 383 of the Penal
Code, and accordingly convicted the accused under those articles and sentenced him to the
corresponding penalty.

In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of
credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of
doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection with article 383 of
the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that
section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same
recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished
in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code." (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs. Jeffrey,
15 Phil. Rep., 391; U. S. vs. Guzman, 25 Phil. Rep., 22.)

The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code,
and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., dissents.
 2) Avelina B. Conte vs CA BR no 116422 11/4/1996
3) EN BANC
4) [G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]
5) AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.
6) D E C I S I O N
7) PANGANIBAN, J.:
8) Are the benefits provided for under Social Security System Resolution No. 56 to
be considered simply as financial assistance for retiring employees, or does such
scheme constitute a supplementary retirement plan proscribed by Republic Act
No. 4968?
9) The foregoing question is addressed by this Court in resolving the instant petition
for certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside Decision No. 94-
126[1]dated March 15, 1994 of respondent Commission on Audit, which denied
petitioners request for reconsideration of its adverse ruling disapproving claims
for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56.
10) The Facts
11) Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of
the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service on May
9, 1990 and September 13, 1992, respectively. They availed of compulsory
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660.[2]
12) In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also
claimed SSS financial assistance benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56,
series of 1971.
13) A brief historical backgrounder is in order. SSS Resolution No. 56,[3] approved on
January 21, 1971, provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS
employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as
amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by
giving them financial assistance equivalent in amount to the difference between
what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to
under RA 660. The said SSS Resolution No. 56 states:
14)RESOLUTION NO. 56
15)WHEREAS, the retirement benefits of SSS employees are provided for under
Republic Acts 660 and 1616 as amended;
16)WHEREAS, SSS employees who are qualified for compulsory retirement at
age 65 or for optional retirement at a lower age are entitled to either the life
annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, or the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as
amended;
17)WHEREAS, a retirement benefit to be effective must be a periodic income as
close as possible to the monthly income that would have been due to the retiree
during the remaining years of his life were he still employed;
18)WHEREAS, the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, being closer to the
monthly income that was lost on account of old age than the gratuity under
R.A. 1616, as amended, would best serve the interest of the retiree;
19)WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Social Security Commission to promote and
to protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a view to providing for their
well-being during both their working and retirement years;
20)WHEREAS, the availment of life annuities built up by premiums paid on
behalf of SSS employees during their working years would mean more savings
to the SSS;
21)WHEREAS, it is a duty of the Social Security Commission to effect savings in
every possible way for economical and efficient operations;
22)WHEREAS, it is the right of every SSS employee to choose freely and
voluntarily the benefit he is entitled to solely for his own benefit and for the
benefit of his family;
23)NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That all the SSS employees who
are simultaneously qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional
retirement at a lower age be encouraged to avail for themselves the life annuity
under R.A. 660, as amended;
24)RESOLVED, FURTHER, That SSS employees who availed themselves of the
said life annuity, in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful
service, be granted financial assistance equivalent to the gratuity plus return of
contributions under R.A. 1616, as amended, less the five year guaranteed
annuity under R.A. 660, as amended;
25)RESOLVED, FINALLY, That the Administrator be authorized to act on all
applications for retirement submitted by SSS employees and subject to
availability of funds, pay the corresponding benefits in addition to the money
value of all accumulated leaves. (underscoring supplied)
26) Long after the promulgation of SSS Resolution No. 56, respondent Commission
on Audit (COA) issued a ruling, captioned as 3rd Indorsement dated July 10,
1989,[4] disallowing in audit all such claims for financial assistance under SSS
Resolution No. 56, for the reason that: --
27)x x x the scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS is similar to
those separate retirement plan or incentive/separation pay plans adopted by
other government corporate agencies which results in the increase of benefits
beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws. In this regard, attention
x x x is invited to the view expressed by the Secretary of Budget and
Management dated February 17, 1988 to the COA General Counsel against the
proliferation of retirement plans which, in COA Decision No. 591 dated August
31, 1988, was concurred in by this Commission. x x x.
28)Accordingly, all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No.
56 dated January 21, 1971 should be disallowed in audit. (underscoring
supplied)
29) Despite the aforequoted ruling of respondent COA, then SSS Administrator Jose
L. Cuisia, Jr. nevertheless wrote[5] on February 12, 1990 then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., seeking presidential authority for SSS to continue
 implementing its Resolution No. 56 dated January 21, 1971 granting financial
assistance to its qualified retiring employees.
30) However, in a letter-reply dated May 28, 1990,[6] then Executive Secretary
Macaraig advised Administrator Cuisia that the Office of the President is not
inclined to favorably act on the herein request, let alone overrule the
disallowance by COA of such claims, because, aside from the fact that decisions,
order or actions of the COA in the exercise of its audit functions are appealable
to the Supreme Court[7] pursuant to Sec. 50 of PD 1445, the benefits under said
Res. 56, though referred to as financial assistance, constituted additional
retirement benefits, and the scheme partook of the nature of a supplementary
pension/retirement plan proscribed by law.
31) The law referred to above is RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law), which took
effect June 17, 1967 and amended CA 186 (otherwise known as the Government
Service Insurance Act, or the GSIS Charter), making Sec. 28 (b) of the latter act
read as follows:
32)(b) Hereafter, no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be
created by employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore
in force in any government office, agency or instrumentality or corporation
owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or
abolished; Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire
thereunder shall not be affected. (underscoring supplied)
33) On January 12, 1993, herein petitioners filed with respondent COA their letter-
appeal/protest[8] seeking reconsideration of COAs ruling of July 10,
1989 disallowing claims for financial assistance under Res. 56.
34) On November 15, 1993, petitioner Conte sought payment from SSS of the
benefits under Res. 56. On December 9, 1993, SSS Administrator Renato C.
Valencia denied[9] the request in consonance with the previous disallowance by
respondent COA, but assured petitioner that should the COA change its position,
the SSS will resume the grant of benefits under said Res. 56.
35) On March 15, 1994, respondent COA rendered its COA Decision No. 94-126
denying petitioners request for reconsideration.
36) Thus this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
37) The Issues
38) The issues submitted by petitioners may be simplified and re-stated thus: Did
[10]

public respondent abuse its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners

claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56?
39) Petitioners argue that the financial assistance under Res. 56 is not a retirement
plan prohibited by RA 4968, and that Res. 56 provides benefits different from and
aside from what a retiring SSS employee would be entitled to under RA
660. Petitioners contend that it is a social amelioration and economic upliftment
measure undertaken not only for the benefit of the SSS but more so for the
welfare of its qualified retiring employees. As such, it should be interpreted in a
manner that would give the x x x most advantage to the recipient -- the retiring
employees whose dedicated, loyal, lengthy and faithful service to the agency of
government is recognized and amply rewarded -- the rationale for the financial
 assistance plan. Petitioners reiterate the argument in their letter dated January
12, 1993 to COA that:
40)Motivation can be in the form of financial assistance, during their stay in the
service or upon retirement, as in the SSS Financial Assistance Plan. This is so,
because Government has to have some attractive remuneration programs to
encourage well-qualified personnel to pursue a career in the government
service, rather than in the private sector or in foreign countries ...
41)A more developmental view of the financial institutions grant of certain forms
of financial assistance to its personnel, we believe, would enable government
administrators to see these financial forms of remuneration as contributory to
the national developmental efforts for effective and efficient administration of
the personnel programs in different institutions. [11]

42) The Courts Ruling

43) Petitioners contentions are not supported by law. We hold that Res. 56
constitutes a supplementary retirement plan.
44) A cursory examination of the preambular clauses and provisions of Res. 56
provides a number of clear indications that its financial assistance plan
constitutes a supplemental retirement/pension benefits plan. In particular, the fifth
preambular clause which provides that it is the policy of the Social Security
Commission to promote and to protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a
view to providing for their well-being during both their working and retirement
years, and the wording of the resolution itself which states Resolved, further, that
SSS employees who availed themselves of the said life annuity (under RA 660),
in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful service, be granted
financial assistance x x x can only be interpreted to mean that the benefit being
granted is none other than a kind of amelioration to enable the retiring employee
to enjoy (or survive) his retirement years and a reward for his loyalty and
service. Moreover, it is plain to see that the grant of said financial assistance is
inextricably linked with and inseparable from the application for and approval of
retirement benefits under RA 660, i.e., that availment of said financial assistance
under Res. 56 may not be done independently of but only in conjunction with the
availment of retirement benefits under RA 660, and that the former is in
augmentation or supplementation of the latter benefits.
45) Likewise, then SSS Administrator Cuisias historical overview of the origins and
purpose of Res. 56 is very instructive and sheds much light on the controversy: [12]
46)Resolution No. 56, x x x, applies where a retiring SSS employee is qualified to
claim under either RA 660 (pension benefit, that is, 5 year lump sum pension
and after 5 years, life time pension), or RA 1616 (gratuity benefit plus return of
contribution), at his option. The benefits under RA 660 are entirely payable by
GSIS while those under RA 1616 are entirely shouldered by SSS except the
return of contribution by GSIS.
47)Resolution No. 56 came about upon observation that qualified SSS employees
have invariably opted to retire under RA 1616 instead of RA 660 because the
total benefit under the former is much greater than the 5-year lump sum under
 the latter. As a consequence, the SSS usually ended up virtually paying the
entire retirement benefit, instead of GSIS which is the main insurance carrier
for government employees. Hence, the situation has become so expensive for
SSS that a study of the problem became inevitable.
48)As a result of the study and upon the recommendation of its Actuary, the SSS
Management recommended to the Social Security Commission that retiring
employees who are qualified to claim under either RA 660 or 1616 should be
encouraged to avail for themselves the life annuity under RA 660, as amended,
with the SSS providing a financial assistance equivalent to
the difference between the benefit under RA 1616 (gratuity plus return of
contribution) and the 5-year lump sum pension under RA 660.
49)The Social Security Commission, as the policy-making body of the SSS
approved the recommendation in line with its mandate to insure
the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and
purposes of this Act. (Section 3 (c) of the Social Security Law).
50)Necessarily, the situation was reversed with qualified SSS employees opting to
retire under RA No. 660 or RA 1146 instead of RA 1616, resulting in
substantial savings for the SSS despite its having to pay financial assistance.
51)Until Resolution No. 56 was questioned by COA. (underscoring part of original
text; italics ours)
52) Although such financial assistance package may have been instituted for noble,
altruistic purposes as well as from self-interest and a desire to cut costs on the
part of the SSS, nevertheless, it is beyond any dispute that such package
effectively constitutes a supplementary retirement plan. The fact that it was
designed to equalize the benefits receivable from RA 1616 with those payable
under RA 660 and make the latter program more attractive, merely confirms the
foregoing finding.
53) That the Res. 56 package is labelled financial assistance does not change its
essential nature. Retirement benefits are, after all, a form of reward for an
employees loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying
about his financial support or upkeep.[13] On the other hand, a pension partakes of
the nature of retained wages of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice
competent people to enter the government service, and to permit them to retire
from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their
vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. [14]
54) Is SSS Resolution No. 56 then within the ambit of and thus proscribed by Sec. 28
(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968?
55) We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no
uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other
than the GSIS -- for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the
undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56
contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no
effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every
 other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement
benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance.
56) We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and the
positive results it must have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses on the
part of the SSS in connection with the pay-out of retirement benefits and
gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for scores of retirees. But it is
simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement
such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS
cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render
them nugatory.
57) It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail.[15] A rule or regulation must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid.[16] The rule-making power of a public administrative body is
a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the
scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to
what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are
in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. [17] Though well-settled is the
rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the
retiree,[18] nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret in either RA 4968 or
Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the ultra-
vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule against
petitioners.
58) As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute
abuse of discretion of any sort to respondent Commission for denying petitioners
request for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July 10, 1989. On the
contrary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision acted with
circumspection in denying petitioners claim. It reasoned thus:
59)After a careful evaluation of the facts herein obtaining, this Commission finds
the instant request to be devoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial
assistance contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS
employees who opt to retire under R.A. No. 660. In fact, by the aggrieved
parties own admission (page 2 of the request for reconsideration dated January
12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted by the SSS management to its
employees, in addition to the retirement benefits under Republic Act No.
660. (underscoring supplied for emphasis) There is therefore no question, that
the said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement benefit that
has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws particularly R.A. No. 660.
60) Petitioners also asseverate that the scheme of financial assistance under Res.
56 may be likened to the monetary benefits of government officials and
employees who are paid, over and above their salaries and allowances as
 provided by statute, an additional honorarium in varying amounts. We find this
comparison baseless and misplaced. As clarified by the Solicitor General: [19]
61)Petitioners comparison of SSS Resolution No. 56 with the honoraria given to
government officials and employees of the National Prosecution Service of the
Department of Justice, Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and even
in the Office of the Solicitor General is devoid of any basis. The monetary
benefits or honoraria given to these officials or employees are categorized as
travelling and/or representation expenses which are incurred by them in the
course of handling cases, attending court/administrative hearings, or
performing other field work. These monetary benefits are given upon rendition
of service while the financial benefits under SSS Resolution No. 56 are given
upon retirement from service.
62) In a last-ditch attempt to convince this Court that their position is tenable,
petitioners invoke equity. They believe that they are deserving of justice and
equity in their quest for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56, not so
much because the SSS is one of the very few stable agencies of government
where no doubt this recognition and reputation is earned x x x but more so due to
the miserable scale of compensation granted to employees in various agencies
to include those obtaining in the SSS.[20]
63) We must admit we sympathize with petitioners in their financial predicament as a
result of their misplaced decision to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660,
with the false expectation that financial assistance under the disputed Res. 56
will also materialize. Nevertheless, this Court has always held that equity, which
has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. [21] In
this case, equity cannot be applied to give validity and effect to Res. 56, which
directly contravenes the clear mandate of the provisions of RA 4968.
64) Likewise, we cannot but be aware that the clear imbalance between the benefits
available under RA 660 and those under RA 1616 has created an unfair situation
for it has shifted the burden of paying such benefits from the GSIS (the main
insurance carrier of government employees) to the SSS. Without the corrective
effects of Res. 56, all retiring SSS employees without exception will be impelled
to avail of benefits under RA 1616. The cumulative effect of such availments on
the financial standing and stability of the SSS is better left to actuarians.But the
solution or remedy for such situation can be provided only by Congress. Judicial
hands cannot, on the pretext of showing concern for the welfare of government
employees, bestow equity contrary to the clear provisions of law.
65) Nevertheless, insofar as herein petitioners are concerned, this Court cannot just
sit back and watch as these two erstwhile government employees, who after
spending the best parts of their lives in public service have retired hoping to
enjoy their remaining years, face a financially dismal if not distressed future,
deprived of what should have been due them by way of additional retirement
benefits, on account of a bureaucratic boo-boo improvidently hatched by their
higher-ups. It is clear to our mind that petitioners applied for benefits under RA
660 only because of the incentives offered by Res. 56, and that absent such
 incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead. We likewise
have no doubt that petitioners are simply innocent bystanders in this whole
bureaucratic rule-making/financial scheme-making drama, and that therefore, to
the extent possible, petitioners ought not be penalized or made to suffer as a
result of the subsequently determined invalidity of Res. 56, the promulgation and
implementation of which they had nothing to do with.
66) And here is where equity may properly be invoked: since SSS employees who
are qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional retirement at a
lower age are entitled to either the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, or
the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as amended,[22] it appears that petitioners, being
qualified to avail of benefits under RA 660, may also readily qualify under RA
1616. It would therefore not be misplaced to enjoin the SSS to render all possible
assistance to petitioners for the prompt processing and approval of their
applications under RA 1616, and in the meantime, unless barred by existing
regulations, to advance to petitioners the difference between the amounts due
under RA 1616, and the amounts they already obtained, if any, under RA 660.
67) WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, there having
been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission. The
assailed Decision of public respondent is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No.
56 is hereby declared ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO EFFECT. The SSS is hereby
urged to assist petitioners and facilitate their applications under RA 1616, and to
advance to them, unless barred by existing regulations, the corresponding
amounts representing the difference between the two benefits programs. No
costs.
68) SO ORDERED.
69) Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
70)

71)
72) [1]
Rollo, pp. 12-14; signed by Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria and Comms. Rogelio B. Espiritu and
Sofronio B. Ursal.
73) [2]
Rollo, p. 3.
74) [3]
Rollo, pp. 16-17.
75) [4]
Rollo, pp. 18-19.
76) [5]
Rollo, pp. 23-26.
77) [6]
Rollo, pp. 27-29.
78) [7]
Casibang vs. Phil. Tobacco Administration, 128 SCRA 87, March 5, 1984.
79) [8]
Rollo, pp. 30-33.
80) [9]
Rollo, p. 34.
81) [10]
Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5. Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 64-65
82) [11]
Rollo, pp. 8-9.
83) [12]
Letter to Exec. Secretary Macaraig, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
84) [13]
Aquino vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 118, February 11, 1992.
85) [14]
Cena vs. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179, 186, July 3, 1992.
86) [15]
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386, December 23, 1994.
87) [16]
Lina, Jr. vs. Cario, 221 SCRA 515, April 23, 1993.
 88) [17]
De Leon and De Leon, Jr., Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1989 Edition, p. 65, citing 73
C.J.S. 413-414, 416-417.
89) [18]
Tantuico, Jr. vs. Domingo, 230 SCRA 391, February 28, 1994.
90) [19]
Memorandum for the Respondent, pp. 10-11.
91) [20]
Rollo, p. 68.
92) [21]
Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615, July 4, 1994.
93) [22]
Second Whereas clause of Res. 56.

3) Romeo J. Gamboa Jr. vs Marcelo Aguirre Jr. GR no 134213

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 134213 July 20, 1999

ROMEO J. GAMBOA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., and JUAN Y. ARANETA, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The query herein is purely legal. May an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting
Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?

The facts are not in dispute. 1âw phi1.nêt

In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents
Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor
and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as
Acting Governor for the duration of the former's official trip abroad until his return. When the SP held
its regular session on September 6, 1995, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to
preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair.
The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, seven (7) members of the SP voted to
allow petitioner to continue presiding while four (4) others voted against with one (1) abstention. On
September 22, 1995, respondents filed before the lower court a petition for declatory relief and
prohibition. In the meantime, on October 2, 1995, the Governor re-assumed his office. Later, the trial
court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as "temporarily legally incapacitated to preside
over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor." 1 Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is dismissible for
having become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the
local officials involved herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy
but novel issue under the existing laws on local government.
Sec. 49(a) and 466(a) (1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the
SP.2 In addition to such function, he "become(s)" 3the Governor and "assume(s)" 4 the higher office
for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of "permanent vacancy" therein. When the
vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor "shall automatically exercise the powers
(subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions" 5 of the Governor. It may be
noted that the code provides only for modes of succession in case of permanent vacancy in the
office of the Governor and the Vice-Governor (whether single or simultaneously) as well as in case
of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case of
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor, just like the 1983 Local Government Code. 6

It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the "powers and duties" of the Office of the
Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only "acts" as the Governor but does not
"become" the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial Chief
Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor.
Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely
becoming an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the
higher officer. But the problem is, while in such capacity, does he temporarily relinquish the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over the
sessions of the SP?

Sad to say the new Local Government Code is silent on this matter, yet this query should be
answered in the positive. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a
quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers,
he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial
Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the
provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority
vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of
Congress. 7 Unlike under the old Code, where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief
Executive, 8but also the presiding officer of the local legislative body, 9 the new Code delineated the
union of the executive-legislative powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in the
Barangay. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is
no longer considered a member thereof. 10 This is clear from the law, when it provides that "local
legislative power shall be vested in the
SP," 11 which is "the legislative body of the province," and enumerates therein membership consisting
of the:

1.) Vice-Governor, as presiding officer,

2.) regular elective SP members,

3.) three elective sectoral representatives, and

4.) those ex-officio members, namely:

a.) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay,

b.) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang

kabataan,

c.) president of the provincial federation of sangguniang members of

municipalities and component cities. 12
None being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded applying the rule in legal
hermeneutics that when the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. On the contrary, local
executive power in the province is vested alone in the Governor. 13 Consequently, the union of
legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the former Code has
been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official
personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system
of check and balance between the two.

It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the contrary is considered "effectively absent", the Vice-
Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latter's absence. 14 This doctrine should
equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it is
difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet this term should be reasonably
construed to mean "effective" absence, 15 that is, one that renders the officer concerned powerless,
for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office. 16 There is no vacancy
whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a
vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of
the office. 17By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or
assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency. Considering the silence of the
law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code,
in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy
occurring in the same office. 18 This is so because in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was
elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-
Governor.

Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties
of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time
occupant to discharge them. 19Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear
rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already
been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter
acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an "inability" on the
part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus
calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code —
concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's
(Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such
capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside
at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer." 20

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 RTC Decision (Branch 62, Bago City) dated May 8, 1998 penned by Judge Edgardo L.
Catilo, p. 10; Rollo, p. 29. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as in full as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court hereby declares that the
respondent Negros Occidental Vice Governor Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr., is the temporarily
legally incapacitated or disqualified to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental during the period that he is Acting Provincial Governor of
the said province, exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Governor who is
abroad or incapacitated temporarily pursuant to Section 46 of the Local Government Code of
1991, and prohibiting the respondent from presiding over the sessions of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental in the future during such circumstance. In such event
and under such circumstance, the highest ranking Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of
Negros Occidental is hereby declared to be entitled to preside over the sessions of the said
body in conformity with the rules provided for under Section 44 (a) of the said code. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

2 Sec. 49. — Presiding Officer. —

(a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; the
city vice-mayor, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the
Sangguniang Bayan; and the Punong-Barangay, of the Sangguniang Barangay. The
presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.

(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves
a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from passage of
ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he
temporarily presided.

Sec. 466. Powers, Duties, and Compensation. — (a) The vice-governor shall: . . .

(1) Be the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on
the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan;

3 Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Officer of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and
Vice-Mayor. — If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the
highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other Sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein.1âwphi 1.nêt

4 Sec. 466. Powers, Duties, and Compensation. — (a) The vice-governor shall:

xxx xxx xxx

3.) Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of
permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of this Code;
5 Sec. 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. — (a) When the
governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to
perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence,
travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city of municipal vice-mayor, or
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers
and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive concerned, except the
power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period
of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.

Sec. 466. Powers, Duties, and Compensation. — (a) The vice-governor shall:

xxx xxx xxx

4.) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the governor in cases of
temporary vacancy and provided for in Section 46, Book I of this Code;

6 Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337.

7 Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606.

8 B.P. Blg. 337, Section 203. Provincial Governor as Chief Executive of the Province. — (1)
The Governor shall be the Chief Executive of the provincial government . . . .

9 B.P. Blg. 337, Section 206 (3) The governor, who shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, shall not be entitled to vote except in case of a tie.

10 B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 205. Composition. — Each provincial government shall have a
provincial legislature hereinafter known as the sangguniang panlalawigan, upon which shall
be vested the provincial legislative power.

(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan
and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines. (emphasis supplied).

11 Sec. 48. Local Legislative Power. — Local legislative power shall be exercised by the
sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; . . ..

12 B.P. Blg. 337, Section 467. Composition. — (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, the
legislative body of the province, shall be composed of the vice-governor as presiding officer,
the regular sanggunian members, the president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga
barangay, the president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan,
the president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of municipalities and
component cities, and the sectoral representatives, as members.

(b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives: one (1) from the
women; and as shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days
prior to the holding of the local elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers;
and one (1) from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons.
 13 Sec. 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation. — (a) The
provincial governor, as the chief executive of the provincial government, shall exercise such
powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

14 Paredes v. Antillon, 3 SCRA 662.

15 Gelinas v. Fugere, 180 A. 346, 251, 55 R.I. 225; Watkins v. Mooney, 71 S.W. 622, 624,
114 Ky. 646 quoted with approval in Grapilon v. Municipal Council of Carigara, Leyte, May
30, 1961 cited in Paredes v. Antillon, supra; Bautista v. Garcia, 6 SCRA 603.

16 Bautista v. Garcia, 6 SCRA 603.

17 See Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326 cited in Mechem. A Treatise on the Law on Public
Offices and Officers, p. 61 cited in Menzon v. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251.

18 Menzon v. Petilla, supra.

19 Menzon v. Petilla, supra.

20 R.A. 7160, Section 49(b).

4) People vs Josefina A. Esparas etc GR no 120034 8/20/1996

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 120034. August 20, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA A.

ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of
"shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114.
After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On
March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the
death penalty.
As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the
Court is whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. The
issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et
al.,[1] we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to review
a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or
by the courts, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx

"It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction and sentence
thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the trial of the
accused. Such trial is not terminated until the Supreme Court has reviewed the facts
and the law as applied thereto by the court below. The judgment of conviction
entered on the trial is not final, can not be executed, and is wholly without force
or effect until the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. In a sense
the trial court acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports thereon to
the Supreme Court with his recommendation. While in practice he enters a judgment
of conviction and sentences the prisoner thereunder, in reality, until passed upon by
the Supreme Court, it has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence. It is
a mere recommendation to the Supreme Court, based upon the facts on the record
which are presented with it. This is meant in no sense to detract from the dignity and
power of Courts of First Instance. It means simply that that portion of Spanish
procedure which related to cases where capital punishment was imposed still survives.

"xxx xxx xxx

"The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital
punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for its
object simply and solely the protection of the accused. Having received the highest
penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and
all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest
tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and
conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for
life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of
the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions." (Emphasis
supplied)

The Laguna case interpreted section 50 of General Orders No. 58 as amended,

which provides:
"xxx xxx xxx

"It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the record, or any part
thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an acquittal, or in which the
sentence imposed is not death, unless such case shall have been duly appealed; but
such sentence shall be executed upon the order of the court in which the trial was
had. The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed
by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or
not, and of all cases in which appeals shall have been taken shall be forwarded to
the Supreme Court for investigation and judgments as law and justice shall
dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme
Court within twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen days after the rendition of
sentence."

The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Its section
2(4) of Article VIII provided for review by this Court of death penalty cases. Both our
Rules of Court of 1940[2] and 1964[3] require the transmission to this Court of the records
of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by the trial court,
whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment as the law
and justice shall dictate. It will be noted that these rules were taken from the second
part of General Orders were taken from second part of General Orders No. 58, as
amended by Section 4 of Act No. 194.[4]
Necessarily, our case law under the 1935 Constitution reiterated
the Laguna ruling. Thus, in the 1953 case of People vs. Villanueva,[5] we held that
the withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict does not deprive this Court of its
jurisdiction to review his conviction, viz.:

"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to
withdraw his appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary criminal case before the
briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from
the jurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and called upon
to review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the withdrawal of the
appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In
fact, as was said by this court through Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs.
Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this court of a decision
imposing the death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not
final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has
been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of
conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a
final judgment and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court
which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this
automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is
something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade."

The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al.,[6] involves the escape of a death
convict. In no uncertain terms, we held that the escape of a death convict does not
relieve this Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case of People vs.
Daban, et al.,[7] the ponencia of former Chief Justice Fernando further stressed, to wit:
 "xxx xxx xxx"

"Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is unaware of Section
9 of Rule 122. Thus: `The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have
been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for review and judgment as
law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk
of the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than fifteen (15) days,
after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in the form prescribed by Section 11 of
Rule 41. The transcript shall also be forwarded as provided in Section 12 of Rule 41
within five (5) days after the filing thereof by the stenographer.' The penalty imposed
on appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of
death, the case was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover, until after this Court
has spoken, no finality could be attached to the lower court decision. As explained
in former Chief Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: `In this connection,
it must be emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty
entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without
force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta;
that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has
none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; and that until it has been
reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and
conclusive; and this automatic review by the Supreme Court is something which
neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.' The mere fact of escape of
appellant, therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as sufficient
cause for his failure to file appellant's brief."

Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the death
penalty.[8] Section 9, Rule 122 continued to provide the procedure for review of death
penalty cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure even reenacted this procedure of review. Significantly, it expressly used the
term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court. Our case law continued its fealty to
the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case of People vs. Saliling, et al.,[9] we held, thru
former Chief Justice Aquino, that this Court is not precluded from reviewing the death
sentence of an accused who is at large. In the 1984 case of People vs. Buynay, et
al.,[10] we reiterated the rule that the escape of a death convict will not automatically
result in the dismissal of his appeal.
Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so
provides.[11] On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases
involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this
Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It remains automatic
and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to be mandatory,
and leaves this Court without any option.[12]
 With due respect to the dissenting opinions, of our esteemed colleagues, section 8
of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the dismissal of an appeal
when the appellant jumps bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has
been imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text
and tone of section 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule, viz.:

"Section 10. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. - In all cases where
the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days but not
earlier than (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any
motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within
ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."

Similarly, the reliance in People vs. Codilla,[13] by our dissenting colleagues is

misplaced. Codilla is not a death penalty case. Only the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was imposed on appellant. Consequently, we ruled that the
escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper authorities justifies
dismissal of his appeal.
Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between "x x x a death convict, i.e.
one convicted to death by a trial court who remains in the custody of the law, and who
voluntarily withdraws his appeal and a death convict, i.e. one convicted to death by the
trial court but who escapes from the custody of the law during the pendency of the
appeal." They rationalize the distinction by holding:

"It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict withdraws his appeal
from the trial court's judgment convicting him to death, the appellate court may still
and nonetheless review the judgment of conviction for the convict-appellant has at
least remained in the custody of the law to await final verdict in his case. In the
second case, however, the accused no longer recognizes and respects the authority of
law and the duly-constituted authorities in general and this Court in particular. Such
supercilious conduct of an escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by the
Court. Respect for and recognition of the authority of the Court is an essential and
implicit element in an effective and credible judicial system.

"No one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of the justice
system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even vindication via an automatic
review of a death sentence and, in another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from
justice and repudiating the very authority of the system whose protection he seeks and
invokes."

We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence

mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict
and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any
court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and our
efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has
escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but
because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the
more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that
he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the
seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the
power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this
power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty
which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is
our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the
conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.
The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as
discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty
regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that
the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this
Highest Tribunal whose collectivewisdom is the last, effective hedge against an
erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to
continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of
societal value that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of
this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem
of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the
public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed
by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an
accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This
principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be
right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new period of thirty
(30) days from notice hereof within which to file the Brief of the accused Josefina A.
Esparas.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur in separate opinion.
Padilla, J., dissents.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Melo, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., join Justice Padilla's
dissenting opinion.

[1] 17 Phil. Rep. 533 [1910]; see also U.S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil. Rep. 23 [1916].
[2] See Section 9, Rule 118.
[3] Section 9, Rule 122.
[4] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 ed., pp. 360-61.
[5] 93 Phil Rep. 937 [1953]; see also People vs. Bocar, et al., 97 Phil. 398 [1955].
[6] No. L-1289, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 435.
[7] No. L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.
[8] See Section 5(2)(d), Article X.
[9] No. L-27974, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427.
[10] No. L-39960-61, March 5, 1984, 128 SCRA 31; see also People vs. Vallente, No. L-37937, September

30, 1986, 144 SCRA 495.

[11] Section 19(1), Article III.
[12] Section 22, R.A. 7659.
[13] G.R. Nos. 100720-23, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 104.

5) China Banking vs Tan Kim Liong GR no L-34964; 1/31/1973

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees.

Sy Santos, Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Tagalo, Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and March 27,
1972, respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 75138, is whether or
not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank
deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. *

On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development
Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in
default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the
plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.

To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B
& B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its
cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information
relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of
court.

In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong
was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and
if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from
this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In
the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within
ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be
ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong
instituted the instant petition.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission
of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to

disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any
information concerning said deposits.

Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand
pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.

The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within
any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are
complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case,
the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development
Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforequoted provisions of law.

We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry
into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment
issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the
lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:

Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a
tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say,
P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is
attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence
declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine
whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.

Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for
instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such
attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is
that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?

Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the
inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for
the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully
covered by the law.

Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?

Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.

Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the
amount of the deposit.

Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.

Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment

or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?

Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.

Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as
well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?

Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.

Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the
liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be
executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if
approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute
the judgment?

Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.

Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and
the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the
judgment may be executed?
 Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation
to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in
evasion of taxes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to
insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the
gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?

Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to
which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by
attachment.

Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?

Mr. RAMOS. That is so.

(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840,
July 27, 1955).

It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under
Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed
there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure
is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the
intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the
Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Teehankee, J., took no part.

Footnotes

* An Act Probihiting Disclosure of or Inquiry into, Deposits with any Banking

Institution and Providing Penalty Therefor.

6) Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs Games and Amusements Board Gr no L-12727 2/29/1969

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12727 February 29, 1960

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., petitioner-intervenor-appellant.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for appellant.

First Assistant Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Attorney Pedro L.
Bautista for appellee PCSO.
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for the other
appellees.
Cesar S. de Guzman for appellant.

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First
Instance Manila (Civil Case No. 31274), in which the Philippine Racing Club, Inc., intervened as
party in interest with leave of court, praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games
and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive
Secretary Fortunato de Leon:

(a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 1502 in such a manner that the 30 Sundays
unreserved for charitable institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 continue to pertain to said private entities, and that
the 6 additional sweepstakes races authorized under Republic Act No. 1502 should be held
on 6 of the 12 Saturdays not reserved for any private entity or particular charitable institution
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, or on any other day of the week besides Sunday,
Saturday and legal holiday;

(b) Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the
race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents compel
petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its
license revoked.

Respondents duly filed their respective answers to said petition and the case was heard. After
hearing, the court, on July 5, 1957, rendered a decision which, in part, reads:

The court does not deem it necessary to rule on the deprivation of property of the petitioner
and the intervenor without due process of law, as feared by them, because as they have
stated, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is using their premises and equipment
under separate contracts of lease voluntarily and willingly entered into by the parties upon
payment of a corresponding rental. There is therefore no deprivation of property without due
process of law.

Wherefore, the court is of the opinion and so holds that once a month on a Sunday not
reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross and other charitable institutions
by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is
authorized to hold one regular sweepstakes draw and races, pursuant to Section 9 of
 Republic Act No. 1502, thus reducing the number of Sundays which may be alloted to private
entities by the Games and Amusements Board. . . .

From this judgment, petitioner and intervenor interposed the present appeal.

The issue is the proper placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, approved on June 16, 1956.

The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic Act No.
309, the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines, as later amended by Republic Act No. 983, are
as follows:

A. Sundays:
(1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society
.................. 12 Sundays
(2) For the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
. 6 Sundays
(3) For the White Cross, Inc. ............................................. 4 Sundays
(4) For the Grand Derby Race of the Philippine Anti-
Tuberculosis Society ........................................................ 1 Sunday
Total ................................................................ 23 Sundays
(5) For private individuals and entities duly licensed by the
GAB, other Sundays not reserved under this Act, as may
be determined by the GAB ........................................... 29 Sundays
or 30 for Leap years
Total for the year .................... 52 Sundays
or 53 for leap years.
B. Saturdays:
(1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ..... 12 Saturdays
(2) For the White Cross, Inc. ....................................... 4 Saturdays
(3) For private Individuals and entities duly licensed by
GAB and as may be determined by it
.................................. 24 Saturdays
(4) For races authorized by the President for charitable,
relief, or civic purposes other than the particular charitable
institutions named above, all other Saturdays not
reserved for the latter .................... 12 Saturdays
Total ................................................................ 52 Saturdays

C. Legal Holidays: All, except Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, July 4th and
December 30th, have been reserved for private individuals and entities duly licensed by the
GAB.

As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve,
but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races,
the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by
six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays
reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be assigned to any other
day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday.

Appellants' contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by
Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the
Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to the
President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be disposed of by the
GAB without authority of law. As to the remaining racing days, the law provides:

SEC. 4. Racing days.—Private individuals and entities duly licensed by the Commission on
Races (now GAB) may hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act, on twenty-
four Saturdays as may be determined by the said Commission (GAB), and on legal holidays,
except Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, July fourth, commonly known as Independence
Day, and December thirtieth, commonly known as Rizal Day.

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that appellants have no vested right to the unreserved
Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of
races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB.
When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw
and races, but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to
make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved
by any law — the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold
their races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB.

It is suggested that the GAB should have chosen any week days or Saturday afternoons. In the first
place, week days are out of the question. The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with
betting on week days (See Article 198 of the Revised Penal Code). Secondly, sweepstakes races
have always been held on Sundays. Besides, it is not possible to hold them on Saturday afternoons
as, it is claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes balls, the drawing of
winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of the sweepstakes races. Be that as it may, since
the law has given certain amount of discretion to the GAB in determining and allocating racing days
not specifically reserved, and since the court does not find that a grave abuse of this discretion has
been committed, there seems to be no reason, legal or otherwise, to set aside the resolution of the
GAB.

Furthermore, appellants contend that even granting that the six (6) additional sweepstakes races
should be run on Sundays, yet if they are held on a club race day, the GAB should only insert them
in the club races and not given the whole day to the PCSO, to the exclusion of appellants. In support
of this contention, the following quotation from the debate in the House of Representatives before
voting on House Bill No. 5732, which became Republic Act No. 1502, is cited:

Mr. ABELEDA. If there are no more amendments, I move that we vote on the measure.

Mr. MARCOS. Mr. Speaker, before we proceed to vote on this bill, I want to make it of record
that it is the clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular and special
Sweepstakes races making it all in all, twelve, and that in cases where a sweepstakes race
falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes races should be inserted in the club race.

Mr. ABELEDA. The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. . . . (t.s.n., Proceedings in House
of Representatives, Congress, May 17, 1956; emphasis supplied.)
Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in the interpretation of
statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions, legislative debates and explanatory statements
by members of the legislature may be resorted to, to throw light on the meaning of the words used in
the statutes. Upon the other hand, the appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to
the effect that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to the meaning of
provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law, made during the general debate on the bill on
the floor of each legislative house, following its presentation by a standing committee, are generally
held to be in admissable as an aid in construing the statute. Legislative debates are expressive of
the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be
resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to
determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative
body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not
speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.1

In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of them.
It is to be noted in the specific case before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were,
admittedly, of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club races, still
there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such
an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received
the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication.
This is, therefore, not a case where a doubtful wording is sought to be interpreted; rather, if we adopt
appellants' theory, we would be supplying something that does not appear in the statute. It is
pertinent to observe here that, as pointed out by one of appellants' own cited authorities,2 in the
interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary
written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or
authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to
give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the
author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses
that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements — an internal and an external
one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the
former. The following, taken from 59 Corpus Juris 1017, is in the line with this theory:

The intention of the legislature to which effect must be given is that expressed in the statute
and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature, or individual
members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman, or the
legislature, so far as it has been expressed in the act. So, in ascertaining the meaning of a
statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all
members of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other persons.

Upon the other hand, at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956, the long,
continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays
and during the whole day. With this background, when Congress chose not to specify in express
terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would be held, it is safe to conclude that it
did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice.

"On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or
a course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in
determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties
concerned and has extended over a long period of time; . . . (59 C. J. 1023).

Likewise, the language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of
regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional
sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not
have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and
it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the
regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems
inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole
day, separate and apart from the club races.

Appellants' contention that to compel them to permit the PCSO to use their premises and equipment
against their will would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law, deserves no
serious consideration. As the lower court has found, every time the PCSO uses appellants' premises
and equipment, they are paid rentals in accordance with the terms of separate contracts of lease
existing between them and the PCSO.

The decision appealed from, being in consonance with the above findings and considerations of this
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 499-501; Ramos vs. Alvarez 97 Phil., 844; 51 Off.
Gaz. [II] 56087.

2 Vaughan Hawkins, in appendix to Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence.

7) Cecillo S. De Villa vs CA GR no 87416 ; 4/8/1991

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB
B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.

San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.

Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision* of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs.
Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
therein.

The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors
Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein
complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit
with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check
when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner
moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to
Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).

On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:

Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made
payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof,
are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against
current accounts in foreign currency.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by respondent
court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads:

Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by
the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.
1âwphi1

The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in
foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p.
1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The
Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp.
20-22).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19,
1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he
contended:

(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of
petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or
with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar
accounts;

(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private
transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be
legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and

(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and
void and is not enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon
such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check
cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo,
Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).

On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7,
1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).

Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has
jurisdiction over the case in question.

The petition is without merit.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for
hearing and deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).

Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over
the person of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais,
159 SCRA 37 [1988]).

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of
commencement of the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.

Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some
of the essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.

In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs.
Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the information."

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in
Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction
upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and
over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which
initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160
[1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative
factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check."

On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of
Justice, citing the case of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following
guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and
delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is
the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October
28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F.
Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p.
14).

It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to
herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.

However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account
of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law
(B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the
trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish
courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make
1âw phi 1

any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it
(Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of
doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is
doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San
Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is
to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor
of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.

MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who
interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are
talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our
currency, and many others.

THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.

MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a
check in whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks.
The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If
drawn, then this bill will apply.

MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Penned by Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by Associate Justices

Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial.

8 ) Casco Phil vs Pedro Gimenez et al GR no L-17931 ; 2/28/1963

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.

Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for
applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.
Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. —
which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by
plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid
therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made
another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of
these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin
fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund
of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon
the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations
of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed
said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are
exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:.

xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äw phï1.ñët

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it
should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has
expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a

condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for
use in the manufacture of plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as
a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of
the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615;
Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is
well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

9) Isidro G. Arenas vs City of San Carlos GR no L-34024 ; 4/5/1978

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978

ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C.
LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA B.
CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO
LAPEÑA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City
Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable
Presiding Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN),
BRANCH X, respondents.

Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.

Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at
San Carlos City, Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. SCC-182. 1

In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted against
the City of San Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and the Mayor, Vice-Mayor,
City Councilors and City Treasurer of San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.

The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos
City (Pangasinan, that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its creation in 1966 up to
the present, has been classified as a third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became
effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries of city judges of second and third class
cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then actually receiving a monthly salary
of P1,000.00 of which P350.00 was the share of the national government and P650.00 is the share
of the city government, which salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City Judge of
a third class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary actually being
received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in said act shall be paid by the city
government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21, 1971, the
petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact the necessary
budget and to pay him the said differential but the respondents, without any justification, whatsoever,
refused and still refuse to do the same; that it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the
necessary budget providing for the payment of the salary of the petitioner as provided for in Republic
Act No. 5967; that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy except the present
action for mandamus; and that because of the refusal of the respondent to comply with their
obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the petitioner was forced to engage the services of
a lawyer to file this action for which he was to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees. 2

In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents admitted and denied the allegations in the
petition and alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among other things, that the salary
of the city judge shall at least be one hundred pesos per month less than that of a city mayor; that
the city judge receives an annual salary of P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than the
salary being received by the city mayor which is P13,200.00 yearly; that assuming the existence of a
salary difference, in view of the provision of Republic Act No. 5967, that the payment of the salary
difference shall be subject to the implementation of the respective city government, which is
discretionary on the part of the city government as to whether it would or would not implement the
payment of the salary difference, and in view of the financial difficulties of the city which has a big
overdraft, the payment of the salary difference of the city judge cannot be made; and that the
petitioner should pay his lawyer and should not charge the attorney's fees to the respondents who
have not violated any rights of the petitioner. 3

The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered its decision dated
May 31, 1971 dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs.

The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads:

Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides higher salary, the city
judge in chartered cities shall receive a basic salary which shall not be lower than the
sums as provided thereinbelow:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos per annum;

xxx xxx xxx

For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge
shall receive one thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for
second and third class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand five hundred
pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for other cities, the city judge
shall receive two thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge: Provided,
however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per
month less than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would
be interpreted as the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city judges, then the principal
provision of Section 7 fixing the salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that of a City
Mayor (particularly in the case of second and third class cities) would be rendered totally useless."
The petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of the legislature in enacting Section 7 of
Republic Act 5967 is to increase the salary of the city judges, then the last proviso of said Section 7
should give way to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."

The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) was a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received an annual salary of
P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00
which was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary of the city judge.

During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became Republic Act No.
5967, the following discussion took place:

SENATOR GANZON — Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will be
some cities where the city judges will receive salaries higher than those of the
mayors. And in all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a department
head — theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It would not be fair for the purposes
of public administration that a city department head should receive a salary higher
than that of the chief executive of the city.

SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I would like to congratulate
Your Honor.

SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the concern of the

distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in this particular amendment prepared by
the distinguished lady from La Union, this will not require the council to pay it at
P100.00 exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is just the limit —
the maximum — but they may fix it at much less than that. That is why the words "at
least" were suggested by the Committee. It need not be exactly just P100.00 less. It
may be P500.00 less.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the cities of Iloilo, Cebu,
Bacolod or Manila for that matter. The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month.
Now, under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva Ecija and
Davao — which has already been accepted by the sponsor — does it mean that if
the salary of the city mayor is P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR ANTONINO — I would like to call his attention to lines 13 to 20. We

presented this amendment because it says here: "For the cities of Baguio, Quezon,
Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos
less than that fixed for the district judge". So it will happen, and my attention was
called by the gentlemen from Iloilo — that the city judge win be receiving more salary
than the city mayor. Hence the amendment, Mr. President.

xxx xxx xxx

 I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas, and this was their objection.
We have proposed this amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city
judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they will be receiving less
than what is proposed in this Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records,
pages 2773-2787. (Emphasis supplied .) 4

It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act
No. 5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor.
The saving clause "Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least P100.00 per
month less than that of the city mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of city
judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum.

The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is given
precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the
legislature.

Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of
P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of P18,000.00 for
the petitioner as city judge of the said city.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision appealed from is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-24.

2 Annex "B" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 25-30.

3 Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 31-32.

4 Answer, Rollo, pp. 41-42.

10) Mayor Pablo Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Co. GR no 111097 7/20/1994

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.

R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro
City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection
and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city
legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the
city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR
decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas
season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND

CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION
THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in

session assembled that:

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino
within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person,
partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons,

partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or
allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.
 Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as defined
in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60)

days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6)

months for the second offense, and a fine of
P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and

imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and
subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING

PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO
under its Resolution No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No.
2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353,

prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to
any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion
thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI
of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the
Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public
morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral
welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is

hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:
 a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor,
partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of
gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine
in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager,
supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and
maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local
newspaper of general circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro
does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of
a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458,
par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on
that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting

and are therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general
powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws
or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues
presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the
third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
 Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang
Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
city government, and in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress

and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of
houses of ill repute, gamblingand other prohibited
games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to
obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of
obscene or pornographic materials or publications,
and such other activities inimical to the welfare and
morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within
their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit
the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people.
Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power
conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only
over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may
have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to
prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government
Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in
Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein
seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to
prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has
recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to
prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat,
blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done.
The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit
all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter
of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail
in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the
decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and
provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code
on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction
in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the
Code specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code,

the following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted
in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the
Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation
of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and,
as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling.
They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in
creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines."

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress
to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of
statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the
constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And
we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety
of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid,
an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units
are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of
chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have
excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation
to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that
since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word
should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will
not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and
the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public
policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it
to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance
admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the
Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their
view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the
sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit
concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because
one law can change or repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only
been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for
all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and
regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local
government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the
Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units
have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes
both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of
chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units
pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to
exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently
discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts
thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order
No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are
hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the
Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential
Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and
rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-
funded projects.
 (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections
52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court
explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but
there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an
unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will
not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions,
with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general
to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private
respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of
Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the
benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for
measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes.
This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code
but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of
the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably
destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both
laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On
the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the
case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local
Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of
gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception
reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and
those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal
gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to
prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling
without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City
of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from
conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by
the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances
violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of
gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot
exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at
will of the legislature. 11

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their
constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by
the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without
special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness
and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped
out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling
"the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must
recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of
gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That
decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all
official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D.
1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government
units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for
the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less
repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:

. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and
regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It
is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the
executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of
gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy." (Emphasis
supplied)

However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by
respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the
government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally
perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.

It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country.

That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for
setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a
further deterioration in the Filipino moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do
not always justify the means.

As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the
former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can
be realized from it. The same is true of gambling.

In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR)
should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of
Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it,
and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized
from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values?

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of
this case.

I.

It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed
with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's
original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it,
however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional — for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for
impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy — the challenged
ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The
intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for
being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of
the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even
assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy
relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I
do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which
case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical
considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order
pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago
vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:

A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court
of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue
the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
 seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting
from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was
evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing
with applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate
Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations
omitted)

And in Vasquez, this Court said:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the
part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants
who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is
available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction,
or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because
of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the
case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.

II.

The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the
Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the
Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b)
Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing
Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the
Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19 November 1990 —
nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of lease under which the latter
leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino — which
resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang Panglungsod's express
powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and
(vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of
Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto,
repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned.

I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869.

III.

The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily
because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not
necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if
they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to
do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.

IV.

From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are,
for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling,
even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any
place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an
arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less
repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:

. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and
regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It
is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the
executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of
gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. (emphasis
supplied)

However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by
respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the
government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally
perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.

It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country.

That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for
setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a
further deterioration in the Filipino moral character.

It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do
not always justify the means.

As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the
former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can
be realized from it. The same is true of gambling.

In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR)
should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of
Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it,
and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized
from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values?

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of
this case.

I.

It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed
with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's
original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it,
however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional — for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for
impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy — the challenged
ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The
intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for
being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of
the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even
assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy
relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I
do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which
case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical
considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order
pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago
vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:

A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court
of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue
the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting
from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was
evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing
with applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate
Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations
omitted)

And in Vasquez, this Court said:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the
part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants
who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is
available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction,
or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not
 only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because
of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the
case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.

II.

The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the
Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the
Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b)
Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing
Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the
Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19 November 1990 —
nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of lease under which the latter
leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino — which
resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.

The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang Panglungsod's express
powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and
(vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of
Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto,
repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned.

I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869.

III.

The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily
because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not
necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if
they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to
do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.

IV.

From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are,
for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling,
even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any
place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an
arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.

#Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 64-94.

2 Ibid., pp. 53-62.

3 Pryce was dropped as private respondent in the resolution of the Court dated June
13, 1994.

4 197 SCRA 53.

5 Sec. 458, [2(vi-xv)]; [3(ii-vii)]; [4(i-ix)], Local Government Code, 1991.

6 Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish.

7 39 Phil. 102.

8 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516, quoting Cooley, Constitutional

Limitations, 8th ed., 379-380.

9 Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan

Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837; De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569; U.S. v.
Abandan, 24 Phil. 165.

10 44 Phil. 138.

11 Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455.

12 Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution.

13 Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No. 2210.

14 Ibid.

15 77 Phil. 88.

11) Lucita Q. Garces vs CA et al GR no 114795 ; 7/17/1996

 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114795. July 17, 1996]

LUCITA Q. GARCES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO
CONCEPCION, respondents.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Questioned in this petition for review is the decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals[2] (CA), as well as its resolution, which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court[3] (RTC) of Zamboanga del Norte in dismissing a petition for mandamus
against a Provincial Election Supervisor and an incumbent Election Registrar.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga
del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio
Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte.[4] Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service Commission, [5] both
appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however,
refused to transfer post as he did not request for it.[6] Garces, on the other hand, was
directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac
post.[7] But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming
office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.[8]
On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant
Director to defer her assumption of the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she received a
letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to
cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita
Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as
superseding the deferment order.[9] Meanwhile, since respondent Concepcion continued
occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to
Liloy.[10]
On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against
Empeynado[11] and Concepcion, among others. Meantime, the COMELEC en
banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to recognize respondent
Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac,[12] and ordered that the appointments
of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.[13] In view thereof,
respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the
same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the
case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. The RTC, thereafter, dismissed the petition for mandamus on two
grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy,[14] and (2) that the cases or
matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections. On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case. Hence,
this petition.
The issues raised are purely legal. First, is petitioners action for mandamus
proper? And, second, is this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court?
On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post
which was deemed vacated at the time of her appointment and qualification. Garces
insists that the vacancy was created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution.[15] On the contrary, Concepcion posits that he did not vacate his Gutalac
post as he did not accept the transfer to Liloy.
Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution provides:

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order
or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. (Italics supplied)

The above organic provision did not require any cause for removal of an appointive
official under the 1973 Constitution.[16] The transition period from the old to the new
Constitution envisioned an automatic vacancy;[17] hence the government is not hard put
to prove anything plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it. [18] Mere
appointment and qualification of the successor removes an incumbent from his
post. Nevertheless, the government in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent
indiscriminate dismissal of government personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 17. This executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed
prior to the issuance of Concepcions transfer order, enumerates five grounds for
separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article
III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:

1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil

Service Law;

2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;

3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;

4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;

5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the
service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.

Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when
respondent Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was
transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment.[19] If the transfer
was made without the consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal
without valid cause[20]contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for
cause.[21] Concepcions transfer thus becomes legally infirm and without effect for he
was not validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete
because he did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is indispensable to
complete an appointment.[22] Corollarily, Concepcions post in Gutalac never became
vacant. It is a basic precept in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how
qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is
not vacant.[23] There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent
must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated before one could be
validly installed to succeed him. Further, Garces appointment was ordered to be
deferred by the COMELEC. The deferment order, we note, was not unequivocably
lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even cancelled by the COMELEC en
banc.
These factors negate Garces claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the
Gutalac post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and
highly questionable. As correctly ruled by respondent court, mandamus, which petitioner
filed below, will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioners right is founded
clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.[24] It will not issue to give him something to
which he is not clearly and conclusively entitled.[25] Considering that Concepcion
continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding functions
therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not
mandamus.[26] Quo warranto tests the title to ones office claimed by another and has as
its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce
clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.[27]
Garces heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie[28] case is misplaced for material and
different factual considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed office of Assistant
Provincial Agriculturist in the case of Tulawie is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawies
appointment was confirmed by the higher authorities making his claim to the disputed
position clear and certain.Tulawies petition for mandamus, moreover, was against the
Provincial Agriculturist who never claimed title to the contested office. In this case, there
was no vacancy in the Gutalac post and petitioners appointment to which she could
base her claim was revoked making her claim uncertain.
Coming now to the second issue.
The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent
[29]
Empeynado contending that this is a case or matter cognizable by the COMELEC
under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling
the appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac, he argues, should be
raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the
latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7,
Art. IX-A.
The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members

any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this
Controversy. The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The
settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers[30] involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.[31] In this case, what is
being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency.[32] The
controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call
for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely
burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the
RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[33]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED
without prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1]
Promulgated on December 29, 1993. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied on
March 10, 1994.
[2] Thirteenth Division: Ynares-Santiago, J., ponente, Herrera, Ibay-Somera, JJ., concurring.
[3] Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Br. 11.
[4] Rollo, p. 17.
[5]
Garces appointment was approved on October 20, 1986, while that of Concepcions was on January
23, 1987.
[6] Rollo, p. 18.
[7] Issued on February 4, 1987, Rollo, p. 18.
[8]
Rollo, p. 18. The memorandum was dated August 18, 1987 (Petition, p. 5) but the CA said it was
August 17, 1987 (CA Decision, p. 4).
[9] Rollo, p. 18.
[10] Rollo, p. 19.
[11] Empeynado retired from service and was succeeded by Atty. Muhamad Hashan.
[12] Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25.
[13] CA Decision, pp. 2, 6; Rollo, pp. 16, 20.
[14] Rollo, p. 19.
[15] Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986, Pres. Aquino.
[16] Radia v. Review Committee Under. E O. 17, 157 SCRA 749.
[17] Ibid., pp. 120-121.
[18] Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 85, 120.
[19] Palma-Fernandez v. dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(3), 1987 Constitution.
[22] Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 560.
[23] Costin v. Quimbo, 205 Phil. 117.
[24]
University of San Agustin v. C.A., 230 SCRA 761; Tamano v. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 587;
Sanson v. Bamos, 63 Phil. 198; Marcelo v. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439.
[25] National Investment Department Authority v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 153.
[26] Pilar v. Secretary of Public Works, 19 SCRA 360.
[27] Lota v. Court of Appeals, 112 Phil. 619; 2 SCRA 715.
[28] Tulawie v. The Provincial Agriculturist of Sulu, 120 Phil. 595.
[29]
Garces claims this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The records, however, reveal
that this was tackled in the court a quo (cited in the CA Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 17.)
[30] Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25.
[31] Sec. 2(2) Art. IX-C.
[32] Gloria v. de Guzman, 249 SCRA 126.
[33]
Sec. 19(6) of BP 129 as amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 7691, otherwise known as the Expanded
Jurisdiction Law.

12) Commisioner on Customs vs CTA GR no L-4886-88 ; 7/21/1993

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 48886-88 July 21, 1993

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and LITONJUA SHIPPING COMPANY represented by Granexport
Corporation as sub-agent, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for private respondent.

MELO, J.:

This refers to a petition for review of the decision dated July 28, 1978 of the Court of Tax Appeals in
C. T. A. Cases No. 2785, 2831 and 2832 which was promulgated prior to the issuance on February
27, 1991, of Circular No.
1-91 to the effect that appeals from a final order or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals shall be to
the Court of Appeals.

The undisputed facts of the case as established by the evidence and as found by respondent Court
of Tax Appeals, are as follows:

The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed and improved
and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a
private corporation.

The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS "Messinia", MS "Pavel Rybin", MS

"Caledonia", and MS "Leonidas" are vessels engaged in foreign trade and represented in the
Philippines by private respondent Litonjua Shipping Company Granexport Corporation as its sub-
agent.

On various date, berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan City were
used by the above vessels and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which
were paid by private respondent under protest, to wit:

a) June 27, 1973, MS "Chozan Maru" — P2,551.00 paid on April 17, 1973;

b) April 27, 1973, MS "Samuel S" — P8,000.00 paid on May 9, 1973;

c) May 27, 1973, MS "Ero" — P5,000.00 paid on June 4, 1973;

 d) June 2, 1973 MS "Messinia" — P5,000.00 paid on June 11, 1973;

e) March 22-26, 1975, MS "Pavel Rybin" — P4,000.00 paid on April 3, 1975;

f) April 26-May 3, 1975 MS "Caledonia" — P7,000.00 on May 7, 1975; and

g) May 25-June 3, 1975, MS "Caledonia" — P9,000.00 paid on June 7, 1975.

Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of Customs for refund of the berthing fees paid
under protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan denied the protest, prompting private
respondent to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs who, however, affirmed the decision of the
Collector of Customs.

Private respondent then resorted to the Court of Tax Appeals. Consolidating the protests, the tax
court, thereafter rendered a decision on July 28, 1978, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed and respondent
Commissioner of Customs is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of
P40,551.00. No costs. (p., 51, Rollo)

Hence, the present recourse by the Commissioner of Customs.

The only issue involved in this petition for review is: Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade,
which berths at a privately owned wharf or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge under
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34,
reads:

Sec. 2901. Definition. — Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel
for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulk-head-wharf, river or channel marginal
wharf at any national port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a vessel
so berthed, or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal
under the jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines: Provided, however, That
in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty (50%) per cent of rates provided for in
cases of piers without cargo shed in the succeeding sections. The owner, agent,
operator or master of the vessel is liable for this charge.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs contends that the government has the authority to impose and
collect berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a national port. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the right of the government to impose berthing fees is limited to
national ports only.

The governing law classifying ports into national ports and municipal ports is Executive Order No.
72, Series of 1936 (O.G. Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 65-66). A perusal of said executive order discloses the
absence of the port of Kiwalan in the list of national ports mentioned therein.

Furthermore, Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 72 expressly provides that "the improvement and
maintenance of national ports shall be financed by the Commonwealth Government, and their
administration and operation shall be under the direct supervision and control of the Insular Collector
of Customs." It is undisputed that the port of Kiwalan was constructed and improved and is operated
and maintained solely by and at the expense of the Iligan Express Corporation, and not by the
National Government of the Republic or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

Petitioner insists that Kiwalan is a national port since it is within the jurisdiction of the collection
district and territorial limits of the national port of Iligan City. The claim is put forward that "Kiwalan
simply cannot claim to be an independent port within a national port without infringing on the
territorial jurisdiction of the Port of Iligan", citing the support thereof Customs Administrative Order
No. 1-76 dated February 23, 1976. However, a reading of said administrative order shows that it was
issued merely for administrative purposes redefining the jurisdictional limits of each Customs
Collection District "based on the approved staffing pattern." It has nothing to do with the collection of
berthing fees. On this point we quote with approval the following conclusions of respondent Court of
Tax Appeals:

. . . we see no significance therefore in the stand of respondent, as averred as

affirmative and special defenses of his answers, that it is not necessary to list
Kiwalan as a national port being already an integral part of the national port of the
city of Iligan, within its territorial limits, jurisdiction or collection district. Such an
assertion, besides being violative of the legal basis for the classification of ports into
national or municipal under Executive Order No. 72, series of 1936, as implemented
by subsequent Republic Acts and Executive Orders, would make all ports in the
Philippines national ports. A port is not classified as a national port just because it is
located within the territorial limits or boundaries of a city or municipality where a
national port is situated, much less within the jurisdiction or collection district of a
national port; otherwise, all ports in the Philippines would be classified as national
ports without any municipal ports.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 1-72 dated September 21, 1971, which is
entitled as defining the jurisdictional limits of customs collection districts, divided the
entire Philippines into thirty-four (34) collection districts. It bears emphasis that no
point or locality in the Philippines is not covered by a collection district, or does not
fall within the territorial jurisdiction or limits of a collection district, with a principal port
of entry which is always national port properly, classified and listed as such by law or
executive order. (pp. 47-48, Rollo)

The Bureau of Customs itself in its Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 dated March 29,
1973, does not accord the status of national port to the port of Kiwalan, nor does the list of national
ports appended thereto include the port of Kiwalan. Moreover, said memorandum circular indicates
the specific law (Public Act, Commonwealth Act, Republic Act or Executive Order) creating a
particular national port. Petitioner has not cited or brought to our attention, and we have found none,
any law creating Kiwalan Port as a national port or converting it to one.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned (Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 2nd Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161, and the cases therein cited). The port of Kiwalan not
being included in the list of national ports appended to Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73
nor in Executive Order No. 72, it follows inevitably as a matter of law and legal principle that this
Court may not properly consider said port as a national port. To do otherwise would be to legislate
on our part and to arrogate into ourselves powers not conferred on us by the Constitution.

Even the Bureau of Customs in its Customs Memorandum Circular No. 47-73 held —

It appearing that Banago Wharf in Bacolod City is not one of those listed as a
national port, the said part should be considered a municipal, pursuant to the
provisions of Executive Order No. 72 series of 1936. Berthing charges therefore may
not be collected from vessels docking thereat. (p. 3, Customs Memorandum Circular
No. 47-73)

Plainly, therefore, the port of Kiwalan is not a national port. However, petitioner maintains that
regardless of whether or not the port of Kiwalan is a national port, berthing charges may still be
collected by the Bureau of Customs from vessels berthing at said port, citing the case of Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner of Customs (18 SCRA 436
[1966]), where it was held:

Adverting to the terms of the law, it is quite apparent that the government's right to
collect berthing charges is not planted upon the condition that the pier be publicly
owned. The statute employs the wordpier — without more. Nothing there said speaks
of private or public pier. Where the law does not exact the nature of ownership as a
condition, that condition should not be read into the law. We are not to indulge in
statutory construction. Because the law is clear. Our plain duty is to apply the law as
it is written. So applying, we rule that, berthing or mooring charges here were
properly collected. (at pp. 438-439.)

The above ruling, however, is no longer effective and can not apply in the case at bar for the same
was decided before the Tariff and Customs Code was amended by Presidential Decree No. 34
which took effect thirty days from October 27, 1972, the date of promulgation.

Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code prior to its amendment and said section as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 34 are hereunder reproduced with the amendments duly highlighted:

Sec. 2901. Definition — Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or channel marginal wharf
at any port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or
for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal under the
jurisdiction of any port of the Philippines (old TCC)

Sec. 2901. Definition — Berthing charge is the amount assessed a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or, channel marginal wharf
AT ANY NATIONAL PORT IN THE PHILIPPINES; for mooring or making fast to a
vessel so berthed; or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river, or
canal under the jurisdiction of ANY NATIONAL port of the Philippines; Provided,
HOWEVER, THAT IN THE LAST INSTANCE, THE CHARGE SHALL BE FIFTY
(50%) PER CENT OF RATES PROVIDED FOR IN CASES OF PIERS WITHOUT
CARGO SHED IN THE SUCCEEDING SECTIONS.

It will thus be seen that the word "national" before the word "port" is inserted in the amendment. The
change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change
the meaning of the provision from that it originally had (Agpalo, supra, p. 76). The insertion of the
word "national" before the word "port" is a clear indication of the legislative intent to change the
meaning of Section 2901 from what it originally meant, and not a mere surplusage as contended by
petitioner, in the sense that the change "merely affirms what customs authorities had been observing
long before the law was amended" (p. 18, Petition). It is the duty of this Court to give meaning to the
amendment. It is, therefore, our considered opinion that under Section 2901 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, only vessels berthing at national ports
are liable for berthing fees. It is to be stressed that there are differences between national ports and
municipal ports, namely: (1) the maintenance of municipal ports is borne by the municipality,
whereas that of the national ports is shouldered by the national government;
(2) municipal ports are created by executive order, while national ports are usually created by
legislation; (3) berthing fees are not collected by the government from vessels berthing at municipal
ports, while such berthing fees are collected by the government from vessels moored a national
ports. The berthing fees imposed upon vessels berthing at national ports are applied by the national
government for the maintenance and repair of said ports. The national government does not
maintain municipal ports which are solely maintained by the municipalities or private entities which
constructed them, as in the case at bar. Thus, no berthing charges may be collected from vessels
moored at municipal ports nor may berthing charges be imposed by a municipal council
(Tejam's Commentaries on the Revised Tariff and Customs Code, p. 2486, citing Circular Letter No.
2981 dated September 30, 1958 quoting Op. No. 122, s. of 1958 and Op. No. 373, s. of 1940, Sec.
of Justice).

The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the Port of Kiwalan, which was
constructed, operated, and continues to be maintained by private respondent Iligan Express
Corporation, are not subject to berthing charges, and petitioner should refund the berthing fees paid
private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

13) Finman General Assurance Corp vs CA GR no 100970 9/2/1992

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.

Aquino and Associates for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary
mandatory injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11,
1991, 1 affirming the decision dated March 20, 1990 of the Insurance Commission 2 in ordering
petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation to pay private respondent Julia Surposa the
proceeds of the personal accident Insurance policy with interest.

It appears on record that on October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner
Finman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan Master
Policy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924 with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa,
and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. 3

While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October
18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men without
provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were
waiting for a ride on their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after attending the
celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival."

Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written
notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that
murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.

On February 24, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which
subsequently rendered a decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:

In the light of the foregoing. we find respondent liable to pay complainant the sum of
P15,000.00 representing the proceeds of the policy with interest. As no evidence was
submitted to prove the claim for mortuary aid in the sum of P1,000.00, the same
cannot be entertained.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to pay complainant

the sum of P15,000.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint
until fully satisfied. With costs. 4

On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision.

Hence, petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance
policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance
policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate
and intentional act of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab
wound on the insured. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very
nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.

We do not agree.
 The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not
acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which
happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place
without one's foresight or expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.

. . . The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from accident
or accidental means within the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of
the insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death
or injury. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which
produces or brings about the result of injury or death. In other words, where the
death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if
something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the
resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring against death or injury
from accident. 5

As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision:

In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of
an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of
these crimes. In the first place, the insured and his companion were on their way
home from attending a festival. They were confronted by unidentified persons. The
record is barren of any circumstance showing how the stab wound was inflicted. Nor
can it be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the
killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt the unknown
perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure
accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place
without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect
of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where was
a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger
considering that he was just going home after attending a festival. 6

Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten
(10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury,
disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of
" expresso unius exclusio alterius" — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
— is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly
included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy
cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for,
any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance
company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads
inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:

The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.

Moreover,
 it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance
contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. 7

WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Melo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 12-17. Ponente: Justice Luis L. Victor with the concurrence of Justice
Santiago M. Kapunan and Justice Segundino G. Chua.

2 Original Record, pp. 50-54. Penned by Insurance Commissioner Adelita A. Vergel

de Dios.

3 Id., at pp. 2-5.

4 Id.. at p. 50.

5 De la Cruz vs. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 559 [1966].

6 Rollo, pp. 15-16.

7 National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 533 [1986].

14) Meralco vs Quisumbing etal GR no 127598 2/22/2000

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127598. February 22, 2000]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor

Leonardo Quisumbing and Meralco Employees and Workers Association
(MEWA), respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent

Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set
aside to the extent set forth above. The parties are directed to execute a
Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions
contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors orders of
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth
above. The retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor
for reception of evidence and determination of the legal personality of the
Meralco retirement fund."[1]

The modifications of the public respondents resolutions include the following:

January 27, 1999 decision Secretarys resolution

Wages -P1,900.00 for 1995-96 P2,200.00

Xmas bonus -modified to one month 2 months

Retirees -remanded to the Secretary granted

Loan to coops -denied granted

GHSIP, HMP

and Housing loans -granted up to P60,000.00 granted

Signing bonus -denied granted

Union leave -40 days (typo error) 30 days

High voltage/pole -not apply to those who are members of a team

not exposed to the risk

Collectors -no need for cash bond, no

need to reduce quota and MAPL

CBU -exclude confidential employees include

Union security -maintenance of membership closed shop

Contracting out -no need to consult union consult first

 All benefits -existing terms and conditions all terms

Retroactivity -Dec 28, 1996-Dec 27, 199(9) from Dec 1, 1995

Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union
(Union for brevity) filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the
said Decision. A separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisors union
(FLAMES[2]) of petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the
outcome of the case.[3] The Court required the "proper parties" to file a comment to the
three motions for reconsideration but the Solicitor-General asked that he be excused
from filing the comment because the "petition filed in the instant case was granted" by
the Court.[4] Consequently, petitioner filed its own consolidated comment. An "Appeal
Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by the alleged newly elected
president of the Union.[5] Other subsequent pleadings were filed by the parties and
intervenors.

The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon by
the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for
consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein,
particularly those involving the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.

Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the
Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The
Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices
of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency
and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioners
employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a
wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its
position regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence
provides:

"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of

interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published
for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein."

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be

admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in
our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. [6] In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when
the source of the reports is available.[7] With more reason, mere analyses or projections
of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case
can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.

Nonetheless, by petitioners own allegations, its actual total net income for 1996 was
P5.1 billion.[8] An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated that petitioners net
operating income for the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union
relies on to support its claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is
higher than the P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net
operating income. The P5.7 billion which was the Secretarys basis for granting the
P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It
would be proper then to increase this Courts award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the
two years of the CBA award. For 1992, the agreed CBA wage increase for rank-and-file
was P1,400.00 and was reduced to P1,350.00, for 1993; further reduced to P1,150.00
for 1994. For supervisory employees, the agreed wage increase for the years 1992-
1994 are P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the foregoing
figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period awarded to the rank-and-file is
much higher than the highest increase granted to supervisory employees. [9] As
mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the Court does "not seek to enumerate in
this decision the factors that should affect wage determination" because collective
bargaining disputes particularly those affecting the national interest and public service
"requires due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the
dispute and of those who might be affected by the dispute."[10] The Court takes judicial
notice that the new amounts granted herein are significantly higher than the weighted
average salary currently enjoyed by other rank-and-file employees within the
community. It should be noted that the relations between labor and capital is impressed
with public interest which must yield to the common good.[11] Neither party should act
oppressively against the other or impair the interest or convenience of the
public.[12] Besides, matters of salary increases are part of management prerogative.[13]

On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, it is well to recall that this petition had its
origin in the renegotiation of the parties 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year
period thereof is concerned. When the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and
granted the arbitral awards, there was no question that these arbitral awards were to be
given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning period when
retroaction shall commence. Petitioner claims that the award should retroact only from
such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award, invoking the 1995 decision
in Pier 8 case[14] where the Court, citing Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC,[15] said:
 "The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the
parties was promulgated on June 5, 1989, the expiry date of the past
CBA. Based on the provision of Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be
agreed upon by the parties. But since no agreement to that effect was
made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the said
CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public respondent is within the
ambit of its authority vested by existing law."

On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should retroact to such time
granted by the Secretary, citing the 1993 decision of St Lukes.[16]

"Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to
the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of
petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be
properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent
in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration---

Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions

awarded, we would stress that the provision of law invoked
by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of
agreements by and between the parties, and not arbitral
awards . . .

"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting

retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of
Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein
involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof."

In the 1997 case of Mindanao Terminal,[17] the Court applied the St. Lukes doctrine and
ruled that:

"In St. Lukes Medical Center v. Torres, a deadlock also developed during
the CBA negotiations between management and the union. The Secretary
of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to
the date of expiration of the previous CBA. As in this case, it was alleged
that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused its discretion in making his
award retroactive. In dismissing this contention this Court held:

"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law

prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof."
The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall be "effective for a
period of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999."
Parenthetically, this actually covers a three-year period. Labor laws are silent as to
when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction
by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA
negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day
immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the
agreement of the parties.[18] On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a
CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties
but by intervention of the government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court rules
herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last
CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or
their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the
first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA
should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the date
of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.

It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily

entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of
the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the
arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining
agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. [19] The terms or
periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing that
would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary
considering the absence of an applicable law. Under Article 253-A: "(I)f any such
agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shal! agree on the duration of
retroactivity thereof." In other words, the law contemplates retroactivity whether the
agreement be entered into before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of
the parties need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered in
determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection, the Court considers the
letter of petitioners Chairman of the Board and its President addressed to their
stockholders, which states that the CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the
period December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997 is still with the Supreme Court," [20] as
indicative of petitioners recognition that the CBA award covers the said period. Earlier,
petitioners negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed CBA
covering the same period inclusive.[21] In addition, petitioner does not dispute the
allegation that in the past CBA arbitral awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity
commencing from the period immediately following the last day of the expired CBA.
Thus, by petitioners own actions, the Court sees no reason to retroact the subject CBA
awards to a different date. The period is herein set at two (2) years from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997.

On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative, there is no merit in the
unions claim that it is no different from housing loans granted by the employer. The
award of loans for housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of life. It is
part of a privilege recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In contrast, providing
seed money for the establishment of the employees cooperative is a matter in which the
employer has no business interest or legal obligation. Courts should not be utilized as a
tool to compel any person to grant loans to another nor to force parties to undertake an
obligation without justification. On the contrary, it is the government that has the
obligation to render financial assistance to cooperatives and the Cooperative Code does
not make it an obligation of the employer or any private individual.[22]

Anent the 40-day union leave, the Court finds that the same is a typographical error. In
order to avoid any confusion, it is herein declared that the union leave is only thirty (30)
days as granted by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed in the Decision of this Court.

The added requirement of consultation imposed by the Secretary in cases of contracting

out for six (6) months or more has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say that the
employer is allowed to contract out services for six months or more. However, a line
must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per
se and those which affect the rights of employees, and in treating the latter, the
employer should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its
decision or modes of action in order to attain a harmonious labor-management
relationship and enlighten the workers concerning their rights.[23] Hiring of workers is
within the employers inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of its
management prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the matter
and the fair standards of justice.[24] The management cannot be denied the faculty of
promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its
operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by
its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual
consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management
decides.[25] Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or
management prerogative.[26] Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an
employer.[27] As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already sufficiently
regulates this matter.[28] Jurisprudence also provides adequate limitations, such that the
employer must be motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be
resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of malicious or arbitrary
actions.[29]These are matters that may be categorically determined only when an actual
suit on the matter arises.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is partially granted and the assailed
Decision is modified as follows: (1) the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from the original
amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary
advances granted by petitioner to its rank-and-file employees during the pendency of
this case assuming such advances had actually been distributed to them. The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Decision promulgated January 27, 1999, G. R. No. 127598 penned by Justice Antonio Martinez (now retired) with
[1]

Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and Justices Jose Melo, Santiago Kapunan and Bernardo Pardo, concurring.

[2]
First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees.
[3]
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to treat this as Movants Intervention filed by FLAMES, p. 4; Rollo, p. 2476.
[4]
Solicitor-Generals Manifestation and Motion dated August 10, 1999, p. 2; Rollo, p. 2506.
[5]
Rollo, p. 2495.
[6]
20 Am. Jur. 819.
[7]
20 Am. Jr. 819-820.
[8]
Petitioners Comment to Motions for Reconsideration and Motion for Intervention, p. 6; Rollo, p. 2514.
[9]
See the January 27, 1999 Decision.
[10]
Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173, 196 (1999).
[11]
Article 1700, New Civil Code (NCC).
[12]
Article 1701, NCC.
[13]
See National Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 346 (1991).
[14]
Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, (2nd Div), 311 Phil. 311 penned by Justice
Puno with Chief Justice Narvasa (ret.) and Justices Bidin (ret.), Regalado (ret.) and Mendoza, concurring, p. 329.
[15]
192 SCRA 414 (1990).
[16]
St. Lukes Medical Center v. Torres, (3rd Div), 223 SCRA 779 (1993), penned by Justice Melo with Justices
Feliciano (ret.), Bidin (ret.), Davide (now Chief Justice) and Romero (ret.), concurring, pp. 792-793.
[17]
In Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Confesor, (2nd Div), 338 Phil. 671 penned by Justice
Mendoza with Justices Regalado (ret.), Romero, (ret.), Puno and Torres (ret.), concurring, p. 679.
[18]
Article 253-A, Labor Code, as amended..
[19]
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Confesor, 338 Phil. 671.
[20]
Rollo, p. 2347.
[21]
Annex "C" of the Petition.

See Section 2, R.A. No. 6838 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) which provides: "It is the declared policy of
[22]

the State to foster the creation and growth of cooperative as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and
harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice. The State shall
encourage the private sector to undertake the actual formation of cooperatives and shall create an atmosphere that is
conducive to the organizational growth and development of the cooperatives.

Towards this end, the Government and all its branches, subsidiaries, instrumentalities, and agencies shall ensure the
provision of technical guidelines, financial assistance, and other services to enable said cooperative to development
into viable and responsive economic enterprises and thereby bring about a strong cooperative movement that is free
from any conditions that might infringe upon the autonomy or organizational integrity of cooperatives.
[23]
Philippine Airlines v. NLRC, 225 SCRA 259 (1993).
[24]
Tierra International Construction Corporation v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 36 (1996); Business Day Information
Systems v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 9 (1993); Philtread Tire v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 805 (1993); San Miguel
Corporation v. Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293 (1993); San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union v. Ople, 170 SCRA 25
(1989).
[25]
Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., 39 SCRA 276 (1971).
[26]
De Ocampo v. NLRC, 213 SCRA 652 (1992).
[27]
Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 131108, March 25, 1999 cited in Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No.
117040, January 27, 2000.
[28]
See also Metrolab Industries v. Roldan-Confesor, 254 SCRA 182 (1996).
 Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173, 196 (1999) citing De Ocampo v. NLRC, 213 SCRA
[29]

652 (1992).

15) Meralco vs Quisumbing GR no 127598 8/1/2000

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127598. August 1, 2000]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY

OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES
AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 22, 2000, this Court promulgated a Resolution with the following
decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY

GRANTED and the assailed Decision is MODIFIED as follows: (1) the
arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30,
1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from the original amount of
One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the
monetary advances granted by petitioner to its rank-and-file employees
during the pendency of this case assuming such advances had actually
been distributed to them. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Manila Electric Company filed with this Court, on March 17, 2000, a
"Motion for Partial Modification (Re: Resolution Dated 22 February 2000)"
anchored on the following grounds:

With due respect, this Honorable Courts ruling on the retroactivity issue: (a) fails
to account for previous rulings of the Court on the same issue; (b) fails to indicate
the reasons for reversing the original ruling in this case on the retroactivity issue;
and (c) is internally inconsistent.

II
With due respect, the Honorable Courts ruling on the retroactivity issue does not
take into account the huge cost that this award imposes on petitioner, estimated
at no less than P800 Million.

In the assailed Resolution, it was held:

Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where
the Secretary (of Labor and Employment) had assumed jurisdiction by
virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA
negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA
retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed
thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the
other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award
or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by
intervention of the government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court
rules herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the
expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both
employer and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as
to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month
period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be
one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the date of
retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall
control.

Petitioner specifically assails the foregoing portion of the Resolution as being

logically flawed, arguing, first, that while it alludes to the Secretarys discretionary
powers only in the absence of a CBA, Article 253-A of the Labor Code always
presupposes the existence of a prior or subsisting CBA; hence the exercise by
the Secretary of his discretionary powers will never come to pass. Second,
petitioner claims that the Resolution contravenes the jurisprudential rule laid
down in the cases of Union of Filipro Employees v. NLRC,[1] Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services v. Roldan-Confesor[2] and St. Luke s Medical Center v.
Torres.[3] Third, petitioner contends that this Court erred in holding that the
effectivity of CBA provisions are automatically retroactive. Petitioner invokes,
rather, this Courts ruling in the Decision dated January 27, 1999, which was
modified in the assailed Resolution, that in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, an arbitrated CBA takes on the nature of any judicial or
quasi-judicial award; it operates and may be executed only prospectively unless
there are legal justifications for its retroactive application. Fourth, petitioner
assigns as error this Courts interpretation of certain acts of petitioner as consent
to the retroactive application of the arbitral award. Fifth, petitioner contends that
the Resolution is internally flawed because when it held that the award shall
retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the
last day of the CBA, the reckoning date should have been June 1, 1996, not
December 1, 1995, which is the last day of the three-year lifetime of the
economic provisions of the CBA.
Anent the second ground, petitioner alleges that the retroactive application of the
arbitral award will cost it no less than P800 Million. Thus, petitioner prays that the
two-year term of the CBA be fixed from December 28, 1996 to December 27,
1998. Petitioner also seeks this Courts declaration that the award of P2,000.00
be paid to petitioners rank-and-file employees during this two-year period. In the
alternative, petitioner prays that the award of P2,000.00 be made to retroact to
June 1, 1996 as the effectivity date of the CBA.

Private respondent MEWA filed its Comment on May 19, 2000, contending that
the Motion for Partial Modification was unauthorized inasmuch as Mr. Manuel M.
Lopez, President of petitioner corporation, has categorically stated in a
memorandum to the rank-and-file employees that management will comply with
this Courts ruling and will not file any motion for reconsideration; and that the
assailed Resolution should be modified to conform to the St. Lukes ruling, to the
effect that, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of
the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, he is deemed vested with plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.

This Court has re-examined the assailed portion of the Resolution in this case
vis--vis the rulings cited by petitioner. Invariably, these cases involve Articles
253-A in relation to Article 263 (g)[4]of the Labor Code. Article 253-A is hereunder
reproduced for ready reference:

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. --- Any

Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5)
years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the
sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year
term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three
(3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months
from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in
such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into
beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity
thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this
Code.[5]

The parties respective positions are both well supported by jurisprudence. For its
part, petitioner invokes the ruling in Union of Filipro Employees[6], wherein this
Court upheld the NLRCs act of giving prospective effect to the CBA, and argues
that the two-year arbitral award in the case at bar should likewise be applied
prospectively, counted from December 28, 1996 to December 27, 1998.
Petitioner maintains that there is nothing in Article 253-A of the Labor Code
which states that arbitral awards or renewals of a collective bargaining
agreement shall always have retroactive effect. The Filipro case was applied
more recently in Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Roldan-
Confesor[7] thus:

In Union of Filipro Employees v. NLRC, 192 SCRA 414 (1990), this Court
interpreted the above law as follows:

"In light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the

pronouncement of the NLRC holding the CBA to be signed
by the parties effective upon the promulgation of the assailed
resolution. It is clear and explicit from Article 253-A that any
agreement on such other provisions of the CBA shall be
given retroactive effect only when it is entered into within six
(6) months from its expiry date. If the agreement was
entered into outside the six (6) month period, then the
parties shall agree on the duration of the retroactivity thereof.

"The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be

signed by the parties was promulgated June 5, 1989, and
hence, outside the 6 month period from June 30, 1987, the
expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of
Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the
parties. But since no agreement to that effect was made,
public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the
said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public
respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by
existing laws."

In the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free

Workers, 189 SCRA 179 (1991), this Court reiterated the rule that
although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal effects as between
the parties until a new CBA has been entered into. It is the duty of both
parties to the CBA to keep the status quo, and to continue in full force and
effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-
day freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties (National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, 205 SCRA 478 [1992]). Applied to the case
at bench, the legal effects of the immediate past CBA between petitioner
and private respondent terminated, and the effectivity of the new CBA
began, only on March 4, 1993, when public respondent resolved their
dispute.[8]
On the other hand, respondent MEWA invokes the ruling in St. Lukes Medical
Center, Inc. v. Torres,[9] which held that the Secretary of Labor has plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity of arbitral awards. [10] Thus,
respondent maintains that the arbitral award in this case should be made
effective from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997. The ruling in the St.
Lukes case was restated in the 1998 case of Manila Central Line Corporation v.
Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor, et
al.,[11] where it was held that:

Art. 253-A refers to collective bargaining agreements entered into by the

parties as a result of their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the
other hand, is part of an arbitral award. As such, it may be made
retroactive to the date of expiration of the previous agreement. As held
in St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres:

Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must

retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA,
contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the
circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly
applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public
respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity

provisions awarded, we would stress that the
provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A
of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by and
between the parties, and not arbitral awards . . . (p.
818 Rollo).

Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law

prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof (223 SCRA 779,
792-793 [1993]; reiterated in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Confessor 231 SCRA 41 [1994]).

Indeed, petitioner has not shown that the question of effectivity was not
included in the general agreement of the parties to submit their dispute for
arbitration. To the contrary, as the order of the labor arbiter states, this
question was among those submitted for arbitration by the parties:

As regards the "Effectivity and Duration" clause, the

company proposes that the collective bargaining agreement
 shall take effect only upon its signing and shall remain in full
force and effect for a period of five years. The union
proposes that the agreement shall take effect retroactive to
March 15, 1989, the expiration date of the old CBA.

And after an evaluation of the parties respective contention

and argument thereof, it is believed that that of the union is
fair and reasonable. It is the observation of this Arbitrator
that in almost subsequent CBAs, the effectivity of the
renegotiated CBA, usually and most often is made effective
retroactive to the date when the immediately preceding CBA
expires so as to give a semblance of continuity. Hence, for
this particular case, it is believed that there is nothing wrong
adopting the stand of the union, that is that this CBA be
made retroactive effective March 15, 1989.[12]

Parenthetically, the Decision rendered in the case at bar on January 27,

1999[13] ordered that the CBA should be effective for a term of two years counted
from December 28, 1996 (the date of the Secretary of Labors disputed Order on
the parties motion for reconsideration) up to December 27, 1998.[14] That is to say,
the arbitral award was given prospective effect.

Upon a reconsideration of the Decision, this Court issued the assailed Resolution
which ruled that where an arbitral award granted beyond six months after the
expiration of the existing CBA, and there is no agreement between the parties as
to the date of effectivity thereof, the arbitral award shall retroact to the first day
after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA. In
the dispositive portion, however, the period to which the award shall retroact was
inadvertently stated as beginning on December 1, 1995 up to November 30,
1997.

In resolving the motions for reconsideration in this case, this Court took into
account the fact that petitioner belongs to an industry imbued with public interest.
As such, this Court can not ignore the enormous cost that petitioner will have to
bear as a consequence of the full retroaction of the arbitral award to the date of
expiry of the CBA, and the inevitable effect that it would have on the national
economy. On the other hand, under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in
law.[15] Balancing these two contrasting interests, this Court turned to the dictates
of fairness and equitable justice and thus arrived at a formula that would address
the concerns of both sides. Hence, this Court held that the arbitral award in this
case be made to retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the
expiration of the last day of the CBA, i.e., from June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998.
 This Court, therefore, maintains the foregoing rule in the assailed Resolution pro
hac vice. It must be clarified, however, that consonant with this rule, the two-year
effectivity period must start from June 1, 1996 up to May 31, 1998, not December
1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.

During the interregnum between the expiration of the economic provisions of the
CBA and the date of effectivity of the arbitral award, it is understood that the
hold-over principle shall govern, viz:

"[I]t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached
by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the
law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new
CBA shall have been validly executed.[16]

Finally, this Court finds that petitioners prayer, that the award of Two Thousand
Pesos shall be paid to rank-and-file employees during the two-year period, is
well-taken. The award does not extend to supervisory employees of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Modification is GRANTED. The Resolution

of February 22, 2000 is PARTIALLY MODIFIED as follows: (a) the arbitral award
shall retroact to the two-year period from June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998; (b) the
increased wage award of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) shall be paid to the
rank-and-file employees during the said two-year period. This Resolution is
subject to the monetary advances granted by petitioner to said employees during
the pendency of this case, assuming such advances had actually been
distributed to them.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

[1]
192 SCRA 414 (1990).
[2]
241 SCRA 294 (1995).
[3]
223 SCRA 779 (1993).
[4]
"When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. xxx xxx xxx."
[5]
Underscoring provided.
[6]
Op. cit., note 1.
[7]
241 SCRA 294 (1995).
[8]
Ibid., at 307.
[9]
Op. cit., note 3.
[10]
Ibid., at 793.
[11]
290 SCRA 690 (1998).
[12]
Ibid., at 702-703.
[13]
302 SCRA 173 (1999).
[14]
Erroneously written in the Decision as "December 27, 1999".
[15]
Felix Uy, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 130685, March 21, 2000; citing Ditan v. POEA Administrator,
191 SCRA 823, 829 (1990).
[16]
National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, 205 SCRA 478, 485
(1992).

16) Matabuena vs Cervantes GR no L-28776 ; 3/31/1971

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according
to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’
of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is
not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one
party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover,
as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations
should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES
WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the
death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage
on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether the
ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The
plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a
donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila
Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a
time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The
question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A
1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who
was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given.
The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition
and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court.
The decision must be reversed.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation
made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of
the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation
was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case
was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The
plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the
deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed
of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to
the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and
wife between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married
on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That
the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the
deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in
her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956,
Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They
became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been
executed." 6

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.

1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por
amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne
mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty
years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid
is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it
would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should
turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion
cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be
differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right
would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended
with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any
occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would
not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used
must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu
que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28,
1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso
heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate
disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, J, took no part.

Endnotes:

1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither
does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing." cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary

2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).

3. Ibid., p. 3686.

4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.

5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.

6. Ibid, p. 21.

7. 50 O.G. 3679.

8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations between the spouses made during
the marriage shall be void." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).

10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil.
833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretación de la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley
debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus dispociones. No deben atenerse a la
letra de la ley cuando la interpretación literal se separa de la intención de la legislatura especialmente
cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con objeto manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la
interpretación literal y la interpretación fundada en el proposito de la ley, la última debe prevalecer." Cf.
Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil, 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105;
Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.

11. According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children the other half. (953, 837a)."
17) PP vs Macarandang GR no L-12088 ; 12/23/1959

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for
appellee.

PARAS, C. J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal
possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:

That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody
and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions,
without firs having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in
question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows: 1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu
Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET
AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby
authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA.
Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his
hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities
and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of
Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing. lawphi 1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by
the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So
ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

18) PP vs Mario Mapa GR no L-22301 ‘ 8/30/1967

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not
the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control
one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the
gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we
can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an
assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that
only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on
their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal.
22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession
on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and
his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document
likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret
agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda. 1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit 1.

2
Exhibit 2.

3 Exhibit 3.

4 Exhibit 4.

5 Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.

6 Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.

7 Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.

8 L-12088, December 23, 1959.

19) PP vs Santayana GR no L-22291 ; 11/15/1976

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial
Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and
to pay the costs.

The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was
appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9,
1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one
pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated
certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special
agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official
duty and for his personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda
in possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license
to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was
filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the
crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused
assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and
whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286,
as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But
equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over
the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
more than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense
charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year
and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not
more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and
original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which
the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year
and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No.
4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS
secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a
firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that
appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to
register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be
registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received
the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are
already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of
People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to
assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang
case only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol
in question.

Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted.
The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit 1, p. 52, Rollo.

2 Exhibit 2, p. 53, Rollo.

3 Exhibit 3, p. 54, Rollo.

4 Exhibit 1 reads:

You are hereby accredited as Special Agent without regular

compensation. This designation does not confer upon you police
powers and authority to make investigations provided by Section 848
of the Revised Administrative Code nor does it entitled you to
(possess and carry firearms or) take free rides in any public
conveyances. ..." (The parentheses are ours and the words within
were crossed out and initialed by Col. Jose C. Maristela, Chief, CIS,
who signed appellant's appointment.)

5 Exhibit 2 reads:

I akcnowledged to have received from Captain Adolfo M. Bringas, Inf

(PC) ASO, CIS, HPC, the following property for which I am
responsible, subject to the provisions of the Accounting Law, and will
be used in the office of CIS, HPC: 1 Pistol Melior SN-122137 with one
(1) mag & stock Total value P40.00 Note: For the use of Agt. Jesus
E. Santayana while in the performance of his official duties.
Approved: t/s/ Jose C. Maristela, Colonel, Inf (GSC) Chief, CIS, HPC.
...

6 T.S.N., p. 4, July 30, 1963.

 7 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713. See also People vs. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607.

8 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

20) Pilar vs COMELEC GR no 115245 ; 7/11/1995

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution
dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively,
the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to
file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration
of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).

Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We dismiss the petition.

II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes"
provides as follows:

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.

Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after
the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,
true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election.

No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by
this Act.

Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or
reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein
shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to
pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.

It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by
personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all
candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their
statements of contributions and expenditures.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the
offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis
supplied).

To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the
COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations
Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local
Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:

Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to

file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department
of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the
provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by
personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of
contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election
 registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
said obligation (Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.

(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports
in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein
shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to
pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall
be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy
three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have
entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741
[1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer
not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation
or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word
"shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced ,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply
the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).

The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of
the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating
contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the
elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe
what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No.
7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).

Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several
states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated
by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be
spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am
Jur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters
contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted
by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 289). These statutes
also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors,
and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of
Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).

State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State
ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v.
Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)

It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and
incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by
the law is not all too remote.

It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may
not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from
filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of
Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no
contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
fact."

Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of
candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has withdrawn his
certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions and expenditures in line with
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No.
2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing
rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.

But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still considered
a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not bound to render an
accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to
designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs.
Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of
candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And considering the
shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,
petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy
for purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.

I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.

Padilla, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has withdrawn his
certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions and expenditures in line with
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No.
2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing
rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.

But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still considered a
candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not bound to render an
accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to
designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs.
Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of
candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And considering the
shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,
petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy
for purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.

I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.

Padilla, J., concurs.