4 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONALLAW —_ Sees. 5-7 Principles and Cases membership may be increased by ordinary legislation through reapportionment of legislative districts. (Sec. 54.) (b) The members of the House of Representatives are elected from legislative or congressional districts and through a party-list system, The party-list representatives are filled by selection or election from the labor, peasant, and other sectoral ‘groups as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (See. 5{].) (©) Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. (Sec. 8.) (2) Term of office, — It is reduced from four (4) years to three (3) years, to begin also, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election. (Sec. 7, par. 1.) (a) The House of Representatives is intended to be close to the people” The shorter term of three (3) years is expected to make the representatives more responsive and sensitive to the needs of their constituents in line with the constitutional policy of accountability (see Art. XI, Sec. 1.) (b) The reduction of the term is also consistent with the objective to have election every three (3) years instead of every two (2) years as provided in'the 1935 Charter. However, the Representatives elected in the May 1987 elections, like the Senators, had a term of five (5) years, which expired at noon of June 30, 1992. (see Art. XVIII, Sec. 2.) (©) Unlike the Senate, the House of Representatives is not a continuing chamber. In theory, its membership can be subject toa complete change, so that all its elected members are newcomers. “The theory is that members of the House elected as they ae from the districts, can ‘be expected to be more sensitive to local needs and problems, (see Se. 24.) On the other ‘hand, the Senators, who are elected at large, ae expected to approach the same problems from the national perspectives. Both views are thereby brought to bear on the enactment of laws. (Tolentine va, Seretary of Finance, 225 SCRA 630 [1994], in the case of the Vice-President and Senators, just ike the President (see Art. VI, Sec 4.) a longer term of six (6) years is fixed because they are elected on a national level ‘With one (1) reelection, the Vice-Presicent and Senators can serve continuously for 12 Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ” (3) Qualifications: — The qualifications of a Representative are similar to those of a Senator except as to age and place and length of residence. A Representative must be: (a) anatural-born citizen of the Philippines; (b) at least 25 years of age on the day of the election? (©) able to read and write; (d) except a party-list representative (for he does not represent a district) a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected; and (©) a resident of the district (not of the province or city comprising the district) for a period of not less than one (1) year preceding the day of the election. (Sec. 6.) Congress is not also empowered to modify the above qualifica- tions. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meets the citizenship, age, literacy, voting, and residence requirements. Since sectoral representatives are provided only for a limited period as a stopgap for party-list representatives, they should have the same qualifications as the latter. (4) Residence requirement. — The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, ie., has domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. (Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400 [1995].) (a) It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality, city, or district or in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To require a candidate to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification which is not required by the Constitution. (Co vs. House Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 [1991]; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 [1935]; Maquera vs. Bora, 15 SCRA 7 [1965].) (b) The purpose of the residence requirement is to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems "The age requirement should not apply to representatives appointed from the youth ‘sector. (Sec. 5121.)4“ PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Secs. 5-7 Principles and Cases of his constituency. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area given period or who have been domiciled in the same her by origin or by choice. (Perez. vs. Commission on cctions, 317 SCRA 641 [1999].) (5) Maximum terms. — The provisions are the same as those for Senators (Sec. 4.) except that the limit is for not more than three (3) consecutive terms (Sec. 7, par. 2.) as in the case of local officials, exeept barangay officials. (Art. X, Sec. 8.) (a) Again, the purpose is to prevent the growth of ical dynasties which in the past made it almost impossible fied and deserving individuals to be elected as rntatives. The prohibition is in keeping with the principle of effectively equalizing the opportunities for publicservice, even in elective office. (see Art. II, Sec. 26.) Under the Constitution, a representative cannot serve continuously for more than nine (9) years (see, however, Art. XVIII, Sec. 2.) He can, provided the terms are not successive. (b) A Representative or Senator (Sec. 4.) who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office serves the term for which the latter he was elected. ‘As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term, after his election to fill the vacancy, is counted as his first term, (see Sec. 9.) Grounds for which tenure of Member of Congress may be shortened. ‘The grounds by which the tenure’ of a member of Congress may be shortened as provided in the Constitution are as follows: “The term limits are, of course, not foolproof solution against politcal dynasties although they effectively check or curb the advantages of incumbency. A Congressman, for example, who is disqualified from reelection can put a member of his family or a close relative or political ally to run for while he runs for Governor, or City Mayor, tnd after his term, runs again for his former congressional seat "The term of office isnot to be confused with tenure of office. (see comments under ‘Ast. VIL See. 4) The term of office preseribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by Congress but the period during which an officer actually holds the ofice (Genure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. ee otal stent Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ”° (1) Voluntary renunciation of office (Sec.7, par. 2.); Q) Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdi agency or instrumentality thereof including government-owned or -controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Sec. 13.); (3) Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Sec. 16[3].); and (4) Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral ‘Tribunal in an election contest. (Sec. 17.) There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure ‘of members of Congress among which are resignation, death, and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold office. (Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jt, 202 SCRA 779 [1991].) ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: Petitioner, who toas excluded from the Roll of Members ofthe House of Representatives for having filed his certificate of candidacy for another office, demands that his rights as duly elected member be recognized, Facts: Petitioner D, an elected representative for the Second District of Lanao Del Sur, filed with the Commission on Elections a certificate of candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ‘Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Upon being informed of this development, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP. Blg. 881.) which reads: “Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office ‘upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” Issues: The issues are: (1) Is Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code operative under the present Constitution; and (2) Could the respondents, by administrative act, validly exclude petitioner from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and thereby deprive him of his rights and privi- leges as member of said House? Held: (1) Constitutional basis for Section 67. — “The same constitutional basis for Section 67 of BP. Blg, 881 in the 19730 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Secs. 5-7 Principles and Cases Constitution remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In. fact Section 1 of Article XI on ‘Accountability of Public Officers’ is more emphatic in stating x xx! ‘Obviously then, petitioner’s assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He tailed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of lective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that uch officals, serve out their entire term of office by discouraging thom from running for another public office and thereby cutting hort their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their ‘candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is Corwonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials rust nerve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the jnandate which they have received from their constituents.” (2) Petitioner voluntarily cut short his tenure. — “Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files aNNertificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have Voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and hhis successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.” (3) Grounds by which tenure of members of Congress may be shortened are nol exclusive, — “That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg, 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that (he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members ‘of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by Taw, but not by impeachment. ‘Such constitutional expression dearly recognizes that the four (@ grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge v. Lansing (46 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104,), the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about vacancy does not necessarily exclude all preclude the legislature from prescribing " tURlenn 146 SED 2d 499, 143 ALR Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 5 465.) Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are ‘merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant (People ex rel. Fleming v. Short, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.) not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not fone of the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.” (4) Petitioner, in efect, voluntarity renounced his office. — “The ‘concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Big. 881, as discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners. x xx ‘The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, “Article IX of BP. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of Constitution.” (6) Respondents merely performed their ministerial functions in excluding petitioner from the Roll. — “The legal effects of filing @ ‘certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in ‘Section 67, Article IX, BP. Blg. 881 itself, nostatutory interpretation ‘was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of ‘Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. (Sec. 8, Rule I, Rules of the House of Representatives.) As administrative officers, both the Speaker land House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner’s name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX BP. Bg. 881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of ‘candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents hhad.no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg, 881. It was their ministerial duty to do 50, These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the “ae Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vo. 2, p 591, July 9 to August 6 1986.PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Secs. 5-7 Principles and Cases ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The Paso for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction ‘of publicbusiness if these officers were tobe permitted in al cases to {question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.” (6) Holder of public office is subject to regulation and conditions “We teiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. Itis created for the interest and benefit of the people. Ax such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations And conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain ‘of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.” (Dimaporo 0s. Mitra Jr, 202 SCRA 779 [1991], through Justice Davide, Jn) Gutierrez, J, dissenting: (1) Respondents have no power to remove from the Roll the name of petitioner, =» "It is a fundamental principle in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither ean Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining ‘constitutional officers other than those provided in the Constitution. ‘This is as true for the President and the members of this Court as it is for members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere disciplinary measures, They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the ‘unhampered and independent discharge of their functions. Itis for this reason that the court should insure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.” (2) Grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are exclusive. —”The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being tly comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the istify in the slightest an act of Congress for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying, a penalty of disqualification is ee isfication against running for public office. Whether or not Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 53, the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congressis a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. ‘My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it. x xx Tt may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate ‘of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officer.” (3) Running for another elective office does not constitute voluntary renunciation. —"From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when BP. Blg. 881 was enacted or for 50 long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. 1 see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. ‘Noluntary’ refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. Itis true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for 50 years of our constitutional history, running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were bom. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of ‘voluntary renunciation’ and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.” (4) Principle of accountability is tot applicable to petitioner's case. _— “The invocation of the principle of accountability found in ‘Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to ‘add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman. Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claimsATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSIY «rr QLbG GE Od Oe aw ses.s7 Principles and Cases (@ mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving is people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of ‘Congressman Dimaporo.” Number, election/selection and classification of members. (1) The Constitution limits the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives to 250. The same may be raised from time to time by law. (Sec. 5[1].) Fixing a ceiling in its membership which cannot be changed without constitutional amendment may not be practical for what may be an ideal number today may not bbe so anymore in the years to come. As our population grows, the number of constituents enlarges and as they increase in number, so does the need for a larger representation of the people in the House of Representatives if it is to be truly representative of the people. 2) The members of the House of Representatives are presently of two (2) kinds: (a) those who shall be elected from legislative istrict; and (b) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. ‘The party:list representatives shall constitute 20% of the number of representatives in the lower house, including those under the party-list. (Ibid,) For three (3) consecutive terms after the ratification of the new Constitution, one-half (1/2) of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector’ (Sec. 5[2]; see Art. XVI, Sec. 7.) (3) In view of the above, the members of the House of Representatives may be classified into district, party-list, and sectoral representatives with the last to exist only for three (3) consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution. 7E.O. No. 198 (June 18, 1987) provides for the manner of nomination and appoint- anant of uichorel seodebensniblale Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 58 Apportionment of elected representatives. (1) Conditions for apportionment. — Legislative apportionment isthe determination of the number of representatives which a subdivision ofa State may send toa legislative body. Iti the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population so as to equalize population and voting power among the legislative districts. (see Bagabuyo vs. Commission on Elections, 573SCRA 290 [2008].) It is a requirement under Section 5 which lays down the rules on legislative apportionment and reapportionment* (infra.), that the elected representatives from legislative districts shall be appor- tioned or distributed among the provinces, cities, and the Metro- politan Manila area subject to the following conditions: (a) Such apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants; (b) Itshall be made on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; (©) Each legislative district shall comprise as far as practi- cable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory’ (see Navarro vs, Ermita, 612 SCRA 131 [2010].); and (d) Each city with a population of at least 250,000 or each province shall have at least one representative. “in contrast to Sec. 10 of Art. X, there is no plebiscite requirement for apportionment and reapportionment. Ibid.) ‘This isto prevent the practice known as “gerrymandering” whereby a territorial unit is divided into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the of giving one political party an electoral majority in a lrge number of districts while ing the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible, (see ‘Webster's ded New Int. Dictionary. It isthe act of altering the legislative districts so that they are unfairly arranged forthe benefit ofa particular party o candidate. This practice ‘was supposed to have been initiated by ridge Gerry, Governor of Massachusetts (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary) Th accordance with this practice, ifa province, for instance, were tobe given five (3) districts, they would be so distributed as to ereate as many safe districts forthe ruling party as possible and to crowed the electorate suspected of miroity leanings inthe fewest possible districts without regard to the requirements of grgraphy and convenience. (anada and Fernando, op cit, p- 821.) “Contiguous” and/or “adjacent” means adjoining vearby, abutting, having ‘common border, connected and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances.” (Herrera vs. Commission on Elections, 318 SCRA 3% [1999])56 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Secs. 5-7 Principles and Cases ‘The constitutional command to the effect that each represen- tative district shall comprise contiguous, compact and adjacent territory is not absolute but is qualified by the phrase “as far as practicable.” Thus, the delimitation of the legislative districts may be based upon the tribes or ethnic groups inhabiting the same, (Belwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966].) (2) Ratio to be adopted. — Under the Constitution, the ratio to be adopted must not only be uniform, say, for example, one territorial unit for every 250,000 inhabitants or fraction thereof, Thus, every elected representative represents a territorial unit whose population is nearly equal with the others. This insures that the majority vote ‘of such members of the House of Representatives represent the popular majority. ‘The ratio must also be progressive, for the size of the House of Representatives must be considered. It must not be too big as to be unwieldy. So, as population grows, the ratio may be increased, say from 250,000 to 300,000 inhabitants for each legislative district. (3) “One-citylprovince-one representative.” — The new Consti- tution provides, however, that (regardless of their population) provinces (with their component cities) shall have at least one (1) representative each,” This is an exception to the principle of propor- tional representation prescribed by the Constitution. (see Macias vs. ‘Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA 1 [1961].) The 250,000 minimum population is required only fora city, but not for a province which is TPThe power lo create @ province oF city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. A province or city cannot be created without a legislative district Because it will violate Sec, 5(3) and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance apprehended to the Constitution. The power fo reapportion legislative districts (Sec. S{1], [4.) necessarily Includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. This power to ‘Greate of reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress. (Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA 700 [2008],) Te has been held that where a town is converted by law into a highly urbanized ity with a population of not les than 250,000, the creation of a separate congressional Giebict for the city as decreed under the law is in compliance with the “one-<= m_ group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated bj citizexa=s — ‘_ —ammt must be independent of the government. xxx Sisc#-F2_—___theparty mustnot only comply with the requirements o the lawn = “MEE s nominees must likewise do 0. xxx Secre=ra— +h, not only the candidate party or organization mu: repress «marginalized and und ted sectors; 80. als must === m——=mominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, th nom ix e<——>=—=== must be Filipino citizens ‘who belong to marginalize and Vn = #——e {o the formulation and enactment of appropria legis =a tae <> an that will benefit the mation as a whole. x x x” (Ar Bgore se 2 {-OFW Labor Party, et al. vs. Commission on Election 359 S > BS. 698 [2001], through Justice Panganiban.) Nro 2 __ The niling in this case was effectively reversed in Bart vs. Comore alec (No. 4, infra.) with regard to the computation of se allotex-a<—=a-m__—=ats for party-list representatives and in Atong Paglay vs, Capra a= aaliBec. (64 SCRA 486 [2013].) See Note 12 with regard | orgax-e i === =m ations or group that may participate in the party list systen a. a etitioner party-list petition the Supreme Court to proclaim t full ree 7a Emer of party lst representatives provided by the Constitution af the <> ELEC partially proclaimed 13 parties, not including petition that poe — €- a= —cipated in the party-list system election. Fee 2 =: The May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for parts7 — Bs === —a representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 vot cast <> “93 parties under the Party-List System. The COMELE setting © <=mmm_s the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), proclaimed partie=== <==aems winners in the party-list elections. The proclamation petits <> mem er party-list was deferred. ae 5 —mmioness filed a petition before the Supreme Court proc re =tltution. Tes eo =: As defined by the Supreme Court, they are the followir 1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representativ JS sided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constituti oe a ee idatory or is it merely a ceiling?ry PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Secs. 5-7 Principles and Cases ed operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party>list representatives. ‘To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party- list elections. A party that has two percent (2%) of the votes cast, ‘or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if ‘we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent (2%) of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exeeed 50 seats as long as the two percent (2%) threshold is present.” (A) ‘The two percent (2%) threshold is unconstitutional, — “We therefore strike down the two percent (2%) threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent Q%) threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of ‘the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (5) Procedure in determining the allocation of seats. — “In determining, the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered curing the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving, at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT % 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according, to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4, Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.” (6) Computation of additional seats, — “In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, atone seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as ‘additional seats’ are the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing, for a rounding off of fractional seats. In declaring the two percent (2%) threshold unconstitutional, ‘we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes ‘gamered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining, available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, ‘we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each ‘qualified party-list candidate is entitled.” (7) Participation of major political parties in party-list elections. — "The Constitutional Commission adopted amulti-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-lis elections. ‘The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus: xxx Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7341 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ‘major political parties to participate in party ist elections through% PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Secs. 5-7 Principles and Cases their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, nd in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a ‘party’ that participates in party-list elections aseither“a political party or a sectoral party,’ R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing, xxx" (8) Qualifications of party-list nominees. — “Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, itis not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee ‘wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity’ as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party /organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a nior citizen,” (9) Allocation of party-list representatives merely a ceiling. — “Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members, of the House of Represent to Congress: ‘The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x’ The 20% However, by a vote of 8.7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major politcal partes “from participating i the party-ist elections, directly ‘or indirectly.” This ruling was also reversed in Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec, 6 SCRA 477 (2013). See Note 15. Secs. 5-7 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT a” allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued ‘existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.” (Barangay Association for National Adoancement ‘and Transparency [BANAT] vs. COMELEC, 586 SCRA 211 [2009] through Justice Carpio; see Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. {PGBI] vs. Commission on Elections, 619 SCRA 585 [2010]; Aksyon Magsasaka Partido Tinig ng Masa [AKMA-PTM] vs. Commission on Elections, 758 SCRA 587 (2015].) Puno, C.., dissenting: Participation of major political parties in the party-list system. — “xx x Similarly, imiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the lection of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to ‘reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good’; the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision- processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic fore; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy. Xxx In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and under- represented people at the time of the framing ofthe 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-ist system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying, the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the88 © PEIILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Secs. 8-9 Principles and Cases traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political n the party-list system electoral process, we ate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their ignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. SEC. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May SEC, 9, In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. Kinds of election for members of Congress. ‘There are two (2) kinds of elections provided for members of Congress, namely: (1) Regular election, — It shall be held on the second Monday of May. Congress may, by law, provide otherwise. (Sec. 8.) If the election is held beyond the term of office, the members of Congress. cannot hold-over, The purpose of a regular election is to give the people an opportunity to renew or withhold their mandate on elected officials; and (2) Special election. — It may be called in case a vacancy arises in the Senate or House of Representatives to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law. ‘The Senator or Representative elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Sec. 9.) (a) The authority to call a special election may be given by law to the Commission on Elections. The holding of a special election is not, however, made mandatory by the Constitution. *The second paragraph of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 7166 provides: “In ease a ‘vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives a least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill Sec.10 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT # (b) A member of Congress who is elected to fill a vacancy created by the death, resignation, incapacity, or removal from office of another member serves the term for which the latter was elected for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed under Sections 4 and 7. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor who succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law and a member of Congress who is elected to fill a vacancy: (see Borja, J. vs. Commission on Elections, 295 SCRA 157 [1998].) SEC. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Salaries of members of Congress. (1) Prohibition against receiving immediate increase in salary or compensation. — Under the above provision, Congress is not prohibited from increasing or decreasing the salary of its members. However, any increase can take effect only after the expiration of the full term of the members approving such increase. This rule applies even as to members who voted against the increase. Therefore, the computation of the retirement benefits of members of Congress should be based on their salaries as of the time of retirement. (see Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 [1974].) (2) Purpose of prohibition. — The obvious purpose of the restriction is to prevent Congress from increasing the salary of its members during their incumbency — “to place a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries.” Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is the vacancy not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days afer the occurence ofthe vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election” It has been held that the above statutory proscription is inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Sec 6 ofthe Omnibus Hlection Code by the Commission on Elections (Lucero vs ‘Commission on Elections, 234 SCRA 280 {1994}; see Note 1 to Sec 10, Art. VIL) "See Art. X, See. 8.% © PEILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 10 Principles and Cases ing, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt. (Phil. Constitution Association, Ine. vs. Mathay; 18 SCRA 300 [1966].) (3) Per diems and allowances not considered part of salary. — The 1987 Constitution (like the 1973 Constitution), speaks of salaries or fixed annual amounts of compensation. Thus, there isno prohibition against members of Congress receiving immediately per diems, ‘emoluments, and allowances without waiting for the expiration of the full term of all the members of Congress approving the same as they are not considered part of their salaries.? There is also no limit on the amount that may be appropriated except that under Section 20, the books of Congress “shall be audited by the Commission on ‘Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member.” ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: Petitioner questions the payment of increased salaries to Representatives even before the expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase. Facts: The Philippine Constitution Association (PCA), a non- stock, non-profit corporation whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers filed a suit seeking to permanently enjoin the Auditor General (now Commission on Audit), and the auditor ‘of Congress from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by R.A. No. 4134 to the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives. It contends that ERNANDO, p. 867. nuded in the “annual compensation” of legislators “per allowances,” excluding only “travelling expenses to and from their espoctive districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and from their place of residence in the ease of Senators, when attending sessions of Congress.” (Att. Vi. See. thereof) Hence, a grant of “po dems and other emoluments oF allowances" to take effect immediately would run counter tothe probibition. Accordingly, 2 law (RA. No. 3896.) which provides for retirement benefits for members of Congress, “insofar as the same allow retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to elective oficial of both Houses,” to take effect upon approval ofthe Act, was held unconstitutional fri in effet, provided for an increase in the emeluments of Senators and Members ofthe House of Representatives which are 2 part of their compensation. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965] Sec.10 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT o its implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14 (now See. 10.) of the 1935 Constitution the reason given being that the term of eight (8) Senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of the Act would expire only on December 30, 1969, although the terms of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965. Issue: The main issue: Does Section 14 require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Held: After resolving the preliminary question that as taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain public officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law: (1) Phrase “expiration of the full term” construed. — “In establishing a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision (Art. VI, Sec. IV.) refers to ‘all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives’ in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. The fundamental consideration is that the terms of office ofall members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.” (2) Increased compensation not operative until Decemther 30, 1969. — "Tt follows that the increased compensation provided by R.A. No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Insofar as RA. No. 4642 (1965- 1966 Appropriations Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.” (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 11966], through Justice Reyes, [B.L.) Bengzon, J., concurring: (Q) Word “Congress” was not used in the proviso. — “The terms ‘the Senate’ and ‘the House,’ instead of the word ‘Congress, were used in the provision of the Constitution relating to increase in compensation of Senators and Members of the House of2 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Sec. 10 Principles and Cases Representatives, obviously because after every four years the Congress is dissolved. On the other hand, the term of a member of the Senate, being six (6) years goes beyond the duration of one Congress and extends to that of the next Congress. In other words, while the term of the Members of the House of Representatives coincides with the lifetime of Congress, the term of a member of the ‘Senate goes beyond the existence of one Congress. ‘The use in the Constitution of the words ‘Senate’ and ‘House of Representatives’ and of the word ‘all’ before the Members,’ clearly indicates the intention not to allow an increase in the compensation therein provided until after the expiration of the term of the most Ive nang te eater Dao at le igre Precisely because the Constitution speaks of "Senate and ‘House of Representatives instead of ‘Congress, the prohibition against effectivity continues even after the end of the ‘Congress which approved the measure and, which amounts to the same thing, even after the term of the members of the House of Representatives approving the increase.” 2) Word “term” was used in the general sense. — “The word “term’ in the provision of the Constitution in question is used in the general sense. For, otherwise, even in referring to members of the Senate alone, it should have used ‘terms’ since the Senators had originally different terms of office (two, four and six years), as provided for in Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, a provision contemporaneous with the one involved herein. Yet just the same, the Constitution uses the word ‘term’ to cover all those different terms of office.” Zaldivar, J, concurring: (1) Equal compensation was intended. — “The sense of the Members of the Second National Assembly that approved the constitutional amendment in 1940 was to provide for equal compensation for the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives at all times, not only in amount but also at the same time within their respective terms of office.” (2) All members are considered collectively. — “In referring to the compensation to be received by each of them, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives are considered by Section 14 individually. But in the matter of determining the time when the increase is to take effect, they are considered as collective ‘by the use of the phrase ‘all the Members'of the Senate and of the Sec.10 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT % House of Representatives approving such increase’ The use of the word all includes every Member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, regardless of whether or not he or she voted affirmatively for the increase. Since there were members of the Senate whose term of office was longer than that of the House of Representatives when the increase was approved, itis the term of the Senators which was the longest that should first expire before the increase should take effect.” Castro, J., concurring: (1) Phrase “no increase in said compensation shall take effect” construed. — “The phrase establishes the character of the provision as a prohibition or ‘imitation, as can be seen from the unqualified words ‘no increase’. The words ‘until after the expiration of the full term’ impart the period of time during which the prohibition or limitation operates, after which period the increase in compensation can take effect.” 2) Impact ofthe phrase of the members ofthe Senate and ofthe House of Representatives approving such increase. —“"The immediate as well as the lasting impact of the words ‘of the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase’ is that what must first expire is the full term of the members of both Houses of Congress approving the increase. It cannot be the full term of the members of either House, nor yet the full term of the members of the Senate or that of the members of the House of Representatives. The key word is the particle ‘and.’ As understood from the common and usual meaning of this word, the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of the full term of all the members of the House of Representatives.” (3) Word “or” in provision may not be interchanged with “and.” — “There is a specific rule of interpretation that would allow ‘or’ to be interchanged with ‘and,’ in which event a negation of the concept of joinder would ensue. But this is the exception rather than the general rule. The exception is resorted to only when a literal interpretation would pervert the plain intention of the writer or draftsman as gleaned from the overall context of the writing and//or from external factors. This does not obtain in the provision ‘under discussion. Indeed, a departure from the general rule and a resort to the exception would pervert Section 14 of Article VL”om PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 11 nciples and Cases (A) Disparity of compensation between Senators and Representatives {ws nol intended. — “If the expiration of the full term of the members ‘of the Senate would be considered as separable from the expiration ‘of the full term of the members of the House of Representatives, ospite the conjunction ‘and/ then the result would be to allow members of the House of Representatives to enjoy the increase in compensation ahead of the Senators, thereby producing a disparity ‘of compensation. Furthermore, if the framers of the provision were concerned with the realities of the term of office of the Senators and that of the Representatives, more than with the reality of the parity ‘of compensation, then they should have staggered the effectivity of enti! to the increased salary and allowed the first group of Senators, elected, after the approval of the increase, to enjoy such increase.” SEC, 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Freedom from arrest of members of Congress, Section 11. provides for the parliamentary immunities of the members of Congress (1) Every member of Congress is entitled to the privilege from arrest while Congre ion, whether or not he is attending session. Congress i lered in session, regular or special, for as Jong as it has not adjourned. During a recess (see Art. VIII, Sec. 16, par. 2.), Congress is not in session. ee of freedom of speech or debate (infra.), this fundamental privilege which goes all the way back to the ancient origin of parliamentary democracy in England, is intended to enable members of Congress to discharge their functions adequately and without fear. The legislator’s motive, whether good or bad, is immaterial. “It is true that the privilege may be abused ‘tot the harm which would come from its abuse would be slight Sec.11 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 95 in comparison with that which might arise from its denial,”: The principle is that the immunity from arrest serves the public good? ‘When immunity cannot be invoked. The immunity cannot be invoked where: (1) The offense by reason of which the arrest is made is punish- able by more than six (6) years imprisonment. In this case, the seriousness of the offense does not justify the grant of the privilege considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should be punished; or (2) Congress is no longer in session. In such case, the reason of the privilege does not obtain. ‘The privilege is a personal one and may be waived by failure to assert it at the proper time and place. Freedom from being questioned for speech and debate. A member of Congress enjoys parliamentary immunity in that he shall not be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate “in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” (1) The quoted phrase should be construed to mean that the statements must be in connection with, or in relation to the performance of legislative duties although made outside its premises whether it is in session or not. Thus, a letter charging a cabinet member with the commission of certain anomalous transactions, filed by a Senator with an investigating committee of the Senate and the Commission on Appointments was held to be a privileged communication. Accordingly, the charges, even assuming that they contained defamatory imputations, would not be libelous (Antonino vs. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70 [1974].) “for any 'BURGEN, Pol Science and Const. Law, Vol.2, p. 53. the parliamentary immunity is only from arrest to ensure representation ofthe ‘constituents of the member of Congress. There is no immunity rom searches "The confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by {imprisonment of more than six (6) years is not merely authrized by la; it has a constitutional foundation. The functions and duties of the ofce are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the dass of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and muaisitad in: thai Ulearte of msimmntian OPacedie va Talcdica Sala hAtas aT9% PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 11 Principles and Cases speech or debate” includes the giving of a vote or the presentation of a resolution, (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946].) (2) Like the immunity from arrest, this privilege is secured not to protect the members against prosecution for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the vital functions and responsibilities of their office according to the dictates of their conscience without being made responsible in civil or criminal actions for libel or slander before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall (Coffin Coffin, 4 Mass. 1; Osmefa, Jr. vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 [1960]; Martinez vs. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 [1972].) for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” (Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367.) Thus, the immunity is a much broader right than the freedom of speech guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. (Art. Il, Sec. 4.) When immunity cannot be claimed. ‘The privilege cannot be claimed where: (1) ‘The member is not acting as a member of Congress, for he is not entitled to any privileges above his fellow citizens; nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed on the same ground on which his constituents stand (Ibid,); and 2) The member is being questioned in Congress itself, when- ever said body considers that his words and conduct are disorderly and unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended, or even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. (see Sec. 16[3]; Osmena, Jr. vs. Pendatun, supra.) ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: Congressman caused to be published an allegedly libelous open letter he sent to the President rohen Congress was not then in session. Facts: An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by plaintiffs against defendant, a member of the House of Representatives, for the publication of an allegedly libelous open ‘etter cent to the President when Congress was not then in session. Sec.12 ART. VI, LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 9 (One of the two (2) issues was whether the publication in question was a privileged communication. Issue: The determination of the issue depends upon whether or not the said publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate therein,” that is to say, in Congress for in any committee thereof]. Held: No. (1) Phrase “speech or debate therein” construed. =~ “Said ‘expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, ‘whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by ‘Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of ‘Congress and the Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.” Q) Publication is not privileged communication, — “The publication involved in the case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. Itis obvious that, in thus causing the communication to bbe so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.” (Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 [1966], through Chief Justice Concepcion.) ‘SEC. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. ‘They shall notify the House concemed of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. Disclosure of financial and business interests. Section 12 is intended to implement the State policy of full disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28.) Itimposes two (2) obligations on all members of Congress:98 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 13, Principles and Cases (1) To make a full disclosure of their financial conflict of interests, upon assumption of office; and (2) To notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. ‘The first obligation is necessary in view of the prohibition in setion 14 against having financial interest in any contract with, or ¥ franchise or special privilege granted by, the government. (see ‘Att, VII, See. 13.) Note that Section 12 requires “full disclosure.” Hf a member of Congress withholds or hides any information of his interests, he may be disciplined — censured, suspended, or even expelled — by the chamber where he belongs. There is no prohibition against members of Congress having “financial and business interests.” As to the second obligation, it is a betrayal of public trust for ‘a member to vote for the approval of a proposed legislation from Which he expects to derive financial advantage especially if he is the author thereof. (see Art. XI, Sec. 1.) Even if he is not engaged in a business activity when ke files a bill but later gets into such business, he is still required to disclose the new business interests and notify the House concemed of the potential conflict of interest. Note that a legislator may still propose the bill referred to. Unlike in the case of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants (see Art. VIII, Sec. 43, par 1.), members of Congress are not required to strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office, but are required to notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing, of proposed legislation. SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat, Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. ie. Sec.13 ART. VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT » Disqualification to hold any other office or employment. Sections 13 and 14 provide for certain disabilities for members of Congress, the first with respect to their right to hold any other office or employment, and the second, with respect to their right to engage in certain activities. Precepts of propriety and ethics underlie the constitutional provision disqualifying members from holding certain offices in the government! Under this provision, a member is disqualified to hold two (2) classes of office: (1) Incompatible office. — This includes any kind of office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries during his term. The phrase “any other office or employment” includes any position in the government outside of Congress, including ex-officio membership (ee Art. VII, Sec. 13.) in any non-congressional body, committee, or commission in any guise whatsoever, unless the second office or employment is connected with or in aid of legislative duties. (a) The prohibition finds its rationale in the need for ‘members of Congress to concentrate their full ime and attention to the discharge of their legislative responsibilities, without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment, and also to protect the independence of the legislative body. It reinforces the principle of separation of powers and prevents conflicts of functions of members of Congress who are given executive positions. (b) The prohibition, however, is not absolute. Under the Constitution, a Senator or a Representative may sit as a member of the Electoral Tribunal (Sec. 17.) and the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 18.), or as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Art. VIN, Sec. 8.) Under certain conditions, the Senate President or the House Speaker may act as President. (Art. VII, Sec. 7, par. 5.) A Senator or Representative may accept any other office or employment in the govemment during his term but he automatically forfeits his seat. WG SINCO, Phil Political Law, 11th Ea, p. 159 (1982)