4.

25APR
MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.

Ponente: REGALADO J.

FACTS:

Respondent Judge filed a case against petitioner in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or
the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court (criminal case). Petitioner filed a
motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable
or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of
a chapel. This was denied by the trial court, and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having
met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued. Trial court found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in its broadest sense so as
to include a religious purpose.

HELD:

NO. Decision appealed was reversed and set aside. Petitioner was acquitted.

RATIO:

[S]olicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

[I]t is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications,
intendments, analogies or equitable considerations.

[I]t is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim “expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.” Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

SEPARATE OPINION:

MENDOZA, concurring

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for
“charitable or public welfare purpose” but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not
necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or
repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the
construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious
magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls
upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to
the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as
the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the
proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since
religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need
for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does
the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify
state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed
is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well
justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But
in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, we precisely held that an ordinance requiring
payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the
appellant’s sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a
constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from the
requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets.
5.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976) (SpecPro 2016)

Posted onJUNE 29, 2016

FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters
of administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties
in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the
same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over the estate.
Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the

deceased, contending that

1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death certificate
and therefore have an improper venue.

2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

CFI denied the motion.

CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.

Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:

a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?

b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?

c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Held:

1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the
merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted
by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is
the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on
procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

1. “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the
venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on
his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at
the time of his death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.

6.
Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador [G.R. No. L-35910. July 21, 1978]

15AUG

Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.

FACTS:

[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to compel said
respondent Judge to decide petitioner’s perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records
of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already
submitted by the petitioner and respondents. The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No.
296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031
provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda
and/or brief with oral argument if so requested … . (Emphasis supplied).

A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the
respondent Court. The respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of
defendant–appellant to prosecute her appeal, with costs against her. Petitioner filed her
memorandum. The respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration on October 30, 1971.
Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic
Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time
the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance
to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute.

HELD:

NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and
March 15, 1972 are set aside as null and void.

RATIO:

The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted
otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being
optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the
memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot
dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the appellant so
chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but
to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere
failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court’s mandatory duty to
decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.

As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to
confer discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The
implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda
and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
8.
QUIZON V. BALTAZAR [76 S 560 (1977)]

The RPC provides that an action for serious oral defamation prescribes in six months. The
months should be computed by the regular 30 days, not the calendar months. Hence, where
the crime was committed on November 11, 1963, and the action was filed exactly 180 days
later, said action was filed on time.

9.

Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107508. April 25, 1996]

30JUL

FACTS

Petitioner returned the check to PBCom and debited PBCom’s account for the amount covered
by the check, the reason being that there was a “material alteration” of the check number.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is “material alteration” on the check.

RULING

NO. An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an
unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a
party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete
instrument relating to the obligation of a party. Here, the alteration of check number does not
affect its negotiability contemplated in Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

10.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC [G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]

15AUG
Ponente: FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:

[P]etitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed

separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the
NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and
after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall
continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists,” but entitled to
the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.

The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform
work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which
had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly
related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to
petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.

The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are
“regular” employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to
private respondent’s main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6)
or more years to private respondent NSC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being only
“project employees” of NSC.

HELD:

NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.

RATIO:

Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However,
contrary to petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named employees as “project
employees” and their assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good
faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.

On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as
“regular employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple
fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does
not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”. The second paragraph
of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for
at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to
project employees.

11.
Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita

Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform
Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government
from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: “That
the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1½%)”

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is
an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered
by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange
of goods and services which can’t be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption
delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President
has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the
conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to
how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT
rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance,
constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is
the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to
whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of
the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts
upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.
The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate
upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by
the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in
the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be
evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified
conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact-
-- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of
Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions,
the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate.
He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon
which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool
by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job
must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy
that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution
of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the
mere implementation of the law.

3 important keys ( in relation to Tolentino case)

1. It is not the law but the bill that should originate from the House of Representatives
2. Not allowing senate to amend, violates co-equality between two houses
3. Senate can propose, concur or amend

12.
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural
Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E.
SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and
serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar
checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from
prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion
therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: NO.

The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ
of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in
such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate
the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign
lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign
currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD
Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case
of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
___________

NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape
the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On
February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the
following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20;
2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China
Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash;
6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

FROM ATTY. BAYANI^^

13.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Facts:

On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice
Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors
Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative
documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were
allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation
from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.

The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case
filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect
their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September
1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain
him from enforcing suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of
his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of
subsequent enactment of RA 7160.

Held:

No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by
LG Code of 1991.

There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by
implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent
application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must
be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over
elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No.
6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister)
of Local Government by the Office of the President.

14.
Paras vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996)

16APR

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: FRANCISCO
FACTS:

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay
election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent
the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that “no recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election“.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the
recall election is for Barangay post.

HELD:

NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RATIO:

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity
of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate
could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the
same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

CONCURRING OPINION:

DAVIDE:

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by
those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are
registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he
can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local
Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a
regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be
considered a regular election (whether national or local).

15

Ursua vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996)

17APR

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponente: BELLOSILO

FACTS:

Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in receiving
the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and
reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly
charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended
by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of sentence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.

HELD:

NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed
and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged

RATIO:
[A]n alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered
at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A
man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows
and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and
these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes
to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute
an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is
prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against
the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.

16.
Leovillo Agustin vs Romeo Edu

G.R. No. L-49112 – 88 SCRA 195 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Generally Accepted
Principles of International Law – Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly
to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices•. Agustin is arguing
that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least
400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and
equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by
Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc
with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and
at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public
needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with
the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

17.
Llamado vs. CA GR 99032, 26 March 1997 Second Division, Torres Jr. (J)

Facts: Ricardo Llamado and Jacinto Pascual were Treasurer and President of Pan Asia Finance
Corporation. Leon Gaw delivered P180,000 to Llamado with assurance that the amount would be
repaid on 4 November 1983 with 12% interest and a share of the profits of the corporation. On
said date, Gaw deposited the check but it was dishonored. Informing Llamado of the dishonor,
Llamado offered in writing to pay Gaw a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14
or 15 November and the balance rolled over for a period of 90 days. Llamado failed to do so.
Gaw filed a complaint against Llamado and Pascual for violation of BP 22. Pascual remains at
large. Llamado contends he signed the check in blank.

Issue: Whether Llamado is personally liable for the bounced check.

Held: Llamado’s claim that he signed the check in blank is hardly a defense. By signing the
check, he made himself prone to being charged with violation of BP 22. It became incumbent
upon him to prove his defenses. As treasurer of the corporation who signed the check in his
capacity as corporate officer, lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction is not a
defense. Llamado is personally liable even if the check was in the name of the corporation. Third
paragraph of Section 1, BP 22, states that “where the check is drawn by a corporation, company
or entity, the person(s) who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.”

It must be noted that the check was issued for a valuable consideration (P180,000). Had the
money been intended to be returned when the investment was successful, the check need not be
issued. A receipt and their written agreement would have sufficed.

20.
PEOPLE v. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, GR No. L-45127, 1989-05-05
Facts:
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555... thereof for violation of Republic Act No.
4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the
herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the... charge.
the facts charged do not constitute an... offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No.
4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional.
On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said
amended petition... respondent judge denied the same in his... resolution of April 20, 1976.[10]
On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the
amended... petition.
Issues:
It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to... reclusion perpetua; and
(2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative...
department of the Government.
Ruling:
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual.
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not... make it cruel or
unsual.
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the
courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that
when the courts are said to exercise a... discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is
exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of
the court to follow.
criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents... herein is hereby ordered to
be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte
Principles:
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created.
whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to
the proportion between the penalty and the crime.
the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative
power.

22.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEDRO ZAPATOS
G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts:
On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract
of carriage2 against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), before the then Court of First Instance.
Zapatos purchased a ticket from Philippine Air Lines (PAL) wherein it was agreed that the latter
would transport him to Ozamiz City. The plane’s route was from Cebu -Ozamiz-Cotabato.
However, due to unfavoarable weather conditions and the fact that PAL did nothave an all-
weather airport, PAL had bypassed Ozamiz City. PAL then informed Zapatos ofhis options, to
return to Cebu on the same day, or take the next flight to Cebu the followingday, or to take the
next available flight to Ozamiz City. Zapatos chose to return to OzamizCity on the same day.
However, there were only six (6) seats available and, the seats weregiven to the passengers
according to their check-in sequence at Cebu. Consequently,Zapatos was stranded in Cotabato
City, where a battle between the government and theMuslims was ongoing.During his stay in
Cotabato City, PAL also failed to provide accomodations for Zapatos. Italso refused to have the
latter hitch a ride with its employees on a ford truck bound for the City. It also failed to return
Zapatos’ luggage. This prompted Zapatos to file a complaint for damages against Philippine Air
Lines forbreach of contract.PAL claimed that it should not be charged with the task of looking
after the passengers'comfort and convenience because the diversion of the flight was due to a
fortuitous event,and that if made liable, an added burden is given to PAL which is over and
beyond its dutiesunder the contract of carriage

Issue:
Is PAL liable for the breach of contract of carriage?

Held:
YES. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous
event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being
in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed
equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must
be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still
have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of
its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly
failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in
Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. While we find
PAL remiss in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being stranded in
Cotabato City, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that PAL failed to inform him about his
non-accommodation on Flight 560, or that it was inattentive to his queries relative thereto.
24.

Republic of the Philippines vs. IAC and Spouses Pastor (G.R. No. 69344. April 26, 1991)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR,
respondents.

Roberto L. Bautista for private respondents.

Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO

FACTS:

Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), to collect from the spouses Antonio
Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with surcharge
and monthly interest, and costs. The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the
motion was denied. They filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them for
income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the
tax amnesty under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes
amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, and a final payment on October 26,
1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government’s Official Receipt. The trial court held that
the respondents had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under
P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213.

The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the private
respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that
decree are available only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as
provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a
pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in
P.D.’s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further argued that “tax exemptions should be
interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. The Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Government’s appeal and holding that the
payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance
thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency
income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment
against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an action for
recovery of deficient income taxes under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.

HELD:

YES. Petition for review is denied.

RATIO:

[T]he Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax
assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. The finding of the appellate
court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the
Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to file
income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be
disturbed except under exceptional circumstances

The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government
and liberally in favor of the taxpayer strictisimi juris for taxes, being burdens, are not to be
presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly
declares.

25.
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to
impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.

Issue:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:

1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.
Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the
municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to
tax.”

The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish
municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by
P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No.
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual
role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it
in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of
the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by
P.D. No. 1869.

Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.”

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and
fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

26.
Commissioner on Internal Revenue V. Court of Tax Appeals

Facts

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation, SC overruled Court of Tax

Appeals decision that caterer’s tax under RA 6110 is illegal because it was vetoed by Former
President Marcos and Congress had not taken steps to override the veto. SC ruled in this case
that the law has always imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax
Code.

Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is exempt from
the 3% on gross receipts because President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax
Law). President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A because according to him it would 1) shift the burden
of taxation to the consuming public and 2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential
to the tourist industry. The protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec 42
was not entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels, motels, resthouses.” House of Ways and
Means concurred with petitioners stating that veto message only seems to object with certain
portions of 191-A and that can be gleaned by the reasons given by the President.

Issue
WON veto referred to the entire section or merely the 20% tax on gross receipts of operators and
proprietors of eating places within hotels, motels and resthouses.

Held and Ratio

President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not have
repealed the 2% caterer’s tax.

CTA agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part. CTA mentioned that
President can veto only an entire item, and not just words. The President intentionally only
vetoed a few words in Sec 191-A. Assuming that the veto could not apply to just one provision
but all would render the Presidential veto void and still in favor of petitioner.

Inclusion of “hotels, motels, resthouses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are items. President
has the right to veto such item, that which is subject to tax and tax rate. It does not refer to an
entire section. To construe item as an entire section would be to tie his hands to either completely
agree with a section he has objections with or to disagree with an entire section where he only
has a portion he disagrees with.

27.
Case Digest: CLU vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

FACTS:

The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued
by then President Corazon C. Aquino.

The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials

of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than
those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution
namely: 1. The Vice President (may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3
par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no confirmation.”) and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold at
least two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment which is a direct contravention of the express
mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself
which are Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of
Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

28.
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
This entry was posted in Constitutional Law 1Self Executing and tagged Political Law 1 on
October 31, 2014 by Morrie26
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Self Executing Statutes

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid
security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.

Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.

Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.

10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.

The Court agree.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.

It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

It is not premature.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be
simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in
a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any
of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.

There was grave abuse of discretion.

To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic
conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
29.
Osmeña v. COMELEC (199 SCRA 750)

FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the
Constitution:

1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized
national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and
shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;

3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or
tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-
Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the
title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution;

5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056
to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of
May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to
the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at
all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate
or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the
self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition
arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file
the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no
justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is
a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process
prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant
petition?

HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGen’s
contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within the Court’s power considering the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding
the challenge to the petitioner’s standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners
have no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the
“transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987
Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law,
on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two
separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional
provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination
date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the
local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But
under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992
and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme
Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the legislature to
extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to
qualify within the time”.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed
the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the
local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be
elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to
June 30, 1995, not three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the
campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of
election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city
and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.

30.
JOKER P. ARROYO v. JOSE DE VENECIA, GR No. 127255,
1997-08-14

Facts:
Challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240... charging violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November
21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated.

He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum,... although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as
finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
having been
Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
etitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these
rules embody... the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was... properly passed is false and spurious.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40
p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De
Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the
existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that
under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners
is barred.
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone...
objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared
the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday,
November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one
objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
Issues:
Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to
the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
Ruling:
"When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted
to asce... n this case no rights of private individuals are involved but
only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to this Court
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report
should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the
Members should have been taken. They say that the method used in...
this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when
the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own
making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act
upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as
an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's... question was
not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so,
Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would
have put an end to any further... consideration of the question.[31]
To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the... business
of the House.[
Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the
sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a
quorum.[3
34 Phil. 729, 735
Principles:
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the
request of one-fifth of the Members... present,[27] and in repassing a bill
over the veto of the President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in
the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and
nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer... tedium to repeat
the process.
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess... of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure.
31.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, GR Nos. 146710-
15, 2001-03-02
Facts:
Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency.

"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to... determine whether the President
is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII."

President on leave

Arroyo is only an Acting President.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner

Whether or not the petitioner... resigned as President

Whether or not the petitioner... is only temporarily unable to... act as President.

Ruling:
Principles:

32.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL,

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.

NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17,
2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC
to be unconstitutional

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends
that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
“congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

33.
DLSU - ARANETA v. BERNARDO
De La Salle University - Araneta Vs. Juanito C. Bernardo
G.R. No. 190809
February 13, 2017

Facts:

The case was about the denial of the retirement benefits of an employee by its employer.
Bernardo was a part-time lecturer for DLSU. He has been an employee of DLSU from 1974 up
to 2003. On the year 2003, Bernardo received a letter from DLSU that his services is no longer
required. Bernardo being a 75 years old teacher, did not protest the decision of DLSU not to re
hire him. Bernardo, later, then asked his employer for his retirement benefits, which the latter
then refused to pay and allege that Bernardo is only a part time employee and is not allowed to
avail the retirement benefits agreed by the labor union, and that; he’s action has already
prescribe, stating that he should have filed for his claim 3 years after he turned 65 years old.
Aggrieved, Bernardo filed a claim against DLSU.

Issue:

WON the agreement of their labor union and the employer shall prevail.

WON the prescription shall run against Bernardo when he turned 65.

Held:

No. provisions of the CBA can be respected as long as it is not contrary to law. Hence, a part
time worker is not one of those who are exempted from receiving a retirement benefit.

No. The prescription should run after his last day at work. Even though the compulsory
retirement age is 65, the mutual consent of each party to work for and to allow to work the other
will still be respected. Hence the prescription should run after the last day of work.
35.
CASE DIGEST: JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 191084;
March 25, 2010.

FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial
election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of
15,732 votes. Respondent filed the Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral
fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner.

Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, the
COMELEC Second Division went on to render the 1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled
and set aside petitioners proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly
elected to said position. Coupled with a directive to the DILG to implement the same, the
resolution ordered petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from
discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to
respondent.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution with the
COMELEC En Banc on the ground that lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of
the Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. However,
the motion was dismissed in a Resolution dated 8 Feb 2010. Petitioner filed before the
COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010.
Anchored on the same ground, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General
argue that, in addition to its premature filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against forum
shopping.

ISSUE: Is the assailed COMELEC Resolution valid?

HELD: No, the assailed resolution is not valid. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster
the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the
dismissal of respondent's Election Protest.

Even before petitioners filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on 8
February 2010 and the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the
record shows that the COMELEC En Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering the
re-hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote of the members obtained in
the Resolution of the Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." Having conceded
one of the grounds subsequently raised in petitioners Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution
Promulgated on February 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc significantly failed to obtain the
votes required under Section 5(a), Rule 3 of its own Rules of Procedure for a second time.

The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15
February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest.
Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any
trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor cannot be
gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondents
Election Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the
elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc
cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal.

Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent
penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed
with the Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly, considered an action or
proceeding "originally commenced in the Commission."

There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election
contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined
by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the
COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is
a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a
decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision
stands affirmed.

Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the
COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the
protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the
banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is
reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first
instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc.
It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the
form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the
protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed
proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body,
and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect
dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. GRANTED.