Inforrn~r;on Processing & Manapmenr Vol. 29. No. 2, pp. 229-239. I993 0306.4573193 $6.00 + .

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Printed in Great Britam. Copyright 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd.

OPINION PA PER

INFORMATION SCIENCE:
THE STUDY OF POSTMODERN KNOWLEDGE USAGE

GERNOT WERSIC
Free University Berlin, Department of Communication Sciences,
Work Unit Information Science, Malteserstr. 74-100, 1000 Berlin 46, Germany

(Received 1 October 1991; accepted in final form 12 March 1992)

Abstract-There is a lot of discussion about paradigms. Most of the approaches seem

to have the same basic structure: Assuming a fixed problem and stating solutions. The
alternative view would be to look at the deeper structural problem which could be illus-
trated by comparison with actors dealing with knowledge under conditions of a change
in the role of knowledge. This is observed in four dimensions related to the development
of sets of technologies: depersonalization and communication technologies, believabil-
ity and observation technologies, fragmentation and presentation technologies, and ra-
tionalization and information technologies. This change is furthermore supported by the
phenomenon of “informatization.” If information science considers itself to be that sci-
ence, it has to learn that such a science would be established (together with some oth-
ers like ecology) as a prototype of a new or postmodern science. Postmodern science is
not like classical science, driven by the search for complete understanding of how the
world works, but by the need to develop strategies to solve in particular those problems
which have been caused by classical sciences and technologies. Such a science has to face
a new theoretical situation for which three approaches are envisaged: (a) development
of basic models by redefinition of broad scientific concepts (e.g., “system,” leading to
the concept of actor, “communication,” leading to the concept of complexity reduction);
(b) scientific reformulation of inter-concepts, that is, concepts that are that familiar and
common in that they are not yet scientifically worked out as such (e.g., “knowledge”,
“image”); and (c) interweaving of models and inter-concepts.

1. SOME BASIC STRUCTURES OF APPROACHES TO INFORMATION SCIENCE

The present discussion on information science is full of attempts to propose “paradigms,”

as it was reflected at the conference on “Conceptions of Library and Information Science,”
held August 1991 in Tampere, Finland. Sometimes one could even have the impression that
there are more paradigmatic papers on the market than substantial research reports of con-
siderable seriousness. If one looks at the papers critically it seems that the paradigmatic dis-
cussion seems neither to be caused by a dramatic paradigmatic change (because the real
scientific work goes on as before), nor by serious competition between alternative paradigms.
Of course, there are some different positions, such as:

l the distinction between libraries as a specific and traditional kind of social organi-
zation, and information retrieval as a field of engineering activity (e.g., Miksa, 1991)
l the shift within the last approximately 10 years from a technical-system-oriented
view towards a more user/human-oriented view (already indicated by Wersig, 1973),
including the cognitive approach and approaches for new system characteristics
based on observations of humans (e.g., Saracevic, 1991).

Based on a keynote address presented at the International Conference on Conceptions of Library and Infor-
mation Science: Historical, Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, August 26-28, 1991, The Umversity of Tam-
pere, Finland.

229
230 G. WERSIG

Let aside the question whether the case of information science would legitimate the
concept of paradigm, we can describe the commor~ basic structure of these positions as:
They take for granted that there is something like “information” (Bu~kland, 1991) which
is needed and they offer a solution for this assumed problem. From this viewpoint, librar-
ies and retrieval systems only are different solutions to a basically identical problem which
is not questioned any more. Consequently, new technologies arising in the same field could
easily be adapted to similar solutions and promise an expanded field of information sci-
ence based on that same assumption-expert systems, multimedia systems (which then
cause new papers to be written about new “paradigms,” e.g., Ellis, 1991).
Social organizations and technological systems always have been grown within society
as solutions to needs felt to be solved, but then they rarely constituted academic disciplines.
Otherwise, we would have jailhouse science or hospital science on one hand, telephone sci-
ence or camera science on the other hand. Computer science has tried to solve that prob-
lem by addressing itself not to computers but to algorithms (and now has to face the
problem that nonal8orithmic computer applications like neural networks and artificial in-
teliigence will not fit into that definition). Mass communications is in a similar situation,
tending more and more to become a set of media-oriented fields.
So far, it seems that solutions only constituted fields of reflections or practical expe-
riences but never constituted sciences in the traditional sense (this perhaps could be the ma.-
son why information scientists feel that urgent need to have a paradigm at hand in order
to demonstrate their scientific maturity). Solutions require sciences that study the under-
lying problems, and from that study justify practical approaches (or not), and provide the-
ories to design sufficient and alternative solutions. If we consider different paradigms,
perhaps the real alternatives are:

l The solution-driven approach using means of scientific reflection and research, or

l The problem-dri~~en scientific approach leading to scientifically derived solutions of
the underlying problem.

This discrepancy has perhaps been first expressed by the dispute between “informa-
tion man” of Roberts (1982; the assumed statement of something to which information re-
trieval was the solution) and “information action” of Wersig and Windel (1985; starting to
develop the idea of rationalized action). The alternative approach is indicated by the fact
that there always have been other traditions within information science not fitting into the
library/information retrieval structure: for example, citation studies, studies of information
flow, studies of social consequences of information technoIogies, and studies on knowledge
production. Today, other traditions start to develop in connection with the actual problems
of office communication (Davenport, 1991; Wersig, 19893 where researchers are faced with
real people and have to realize that they by no means are static “information men.”

2. THE CHANGING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE

Although there was a long way to go, the discipline started somehow at the beginning
of our century with the advent of “documentation” as having been a (not very) practical
way to deal with something that was felt to be a problem. It later centered around retrieval
systems (Vickery, 1966) and then, under the impression of new and more complex technol-
ogies, turned to become “information science” (e.g., Borko, 1968). The surface phenom-
enon which led to “documentation” certainly was the “literature flood” (Wersig, 1973). But
could there not have been some deeper structure, a basic change going on through all of
the industrialized countries which first required some new crafts, but which now becomes
apparent as a much more general problem? Or to put the question more simply: Why was
it necessary to develop “documentation ?” If one is not satisfied with the surface phenom-
enon of literature flood, then this question becomes a very complex one, which at that time
could not be answered comprehensively. But there are some developments observable in
the passing of our century which form some plausible elements of a possible answer. They
could be highlighted very briefly as follows: What really took and takes place is a change
of the role of knowledge for individuals, organizations and cultures. This change is evo-
lutionary and has at least two dimensions-one being “philosophical,” the other one tech-
 The study of postmodern knowledge usage 231

nological. In brief: We can observe that through several centuries the role of knowledge for
individuals, organizations, and societies changed in several ways, and these changes became
apparent from the beginning of this century and approximately since the 1960s are becom-
ing a part of a large turnover which sometimes is called “postmodernism.” Or one can take
it the other way round: What often is called the development towards “postindustrial” or
“postmodern” societies (Welsch, 1988a, 1988b) at least partly is to be described as a change
in the role of knowledge. There are at least four traces which could be of relevance to that
question.

2.1 The depersonalization of kno wledge: Communication technology

Before the broader invention of printing technologies, knowledge was more or less per-
sonal knowledge, its tradition being organized by oral tradition. Although with the inven-
tion of writing systems knowledge could be stored time-independently, its dissemination
relied more or less on people being able to read and to transfer the knowledge orally to
other people. The major invention of Gutenberg was, as most people know, not the im-
provement of printing but of setting technology which enabled more people to write down
their personal knowledge and present this personal knowledge to other people. If we look
into the history of science (as that part of society in which a lot of knowledge is generated)
we can find that this personalization of knowledge plays a most important role during the
first centuries: As outstanding examples we find coffee houses and academies as the places
where scientific knowledge was discussed and presented. Even printed discourses main-
tained the personal factor long into the 19th century (Engel, 1990). But we can look at other
areas as well: For a long period of time proverbs and peasant lore formed a respected body
of knowledge based on personal experience and tradition. This changed for the first time
when printing processes became mass processes in the second half of the 19th century. Ro-
tary printing machines, typesetting machines, machine-produced paper, and so on, intro-
duced a nonoral knowledge transfer process in which knowledge more and more became
something to be transmitted regardless of the person standing behind it. The development
from traditional alphabetical catalogues (where the main access is permitted by the name
of a person) to “documentation” is under this premise to be interpreted as one of the in-
dicators of the depersonalization of knowledge.
People had their problems with this depersonalization, and during our century we find
some developments trying to counteract these developments by making use of other more
personalized communication technologies: Television is one example where journalists of-
ten are helpless against the huge amount of depersonalized knowledge, and therefore do
not present the knowledge by themselves but by using interview partners (this explains the
success of some outstanding scientific journalists who became known as personalities who
communicated the impression that it was their knowledge they were presenting). Another
example is the enormous increase in conferences and workshops, where people use huge
amounts of transport energy to come together to communicate knowledge personally. The
situation now increases with new communication technologies which offer more ranges of
somehow depersonalized communication technologies (Wersig, 1985), such as online data
banks, CD-ROM, electronic mail, videoconferences, optical discs, multimedia systems. The
source of the knowledge becomes less apparent, the use of the knowledge becomes, by in-
creased interactivity of the systems, more personal (without the individual necessarily be-
ing able to deal with that new kind of personalization or individualization of knowledge).

2.2 The believability of knowledge: Observation technology

Over long periods of time the knowledge produced to some extent could be proved
by observation of the world. Over a long period of time the observation methods and
technologies were quite simple and whoever wanted to prove something could do it on
a relatively small scale of effort (one example of this development was the establishment
of public observatories when astronomical technology surpassed the home telescope). But
again, first of all in science, roughly from the beginning of the century, the knowledge cap-
ture techniques -technologies, research methodology, theories-became more and more so-
phisticated leading in many areas of science to a situation where the knowledge being
produced could hardly be understood or proved by a fistful of other people in the world.
232 ci. WERSIG

In particular, the scientific knowledge about our world today is something we have to be-
lieve in, we perhaps can rationalize our beliefs to some extent by scientific discussions or
by arguments brought forward, but eventually we have no other chance than to believe that
there are quarks or DNA-triplets or whatever. But this phenomenon is not restricted to sci-
entific knowledge. Observation technology has expanded into everyday life by satellites and
television, and again, both are technologies we have to believe in.
This forms a complicated situation: As we know, one of the most important factors in
acquiring knowledge is the person from whom the knowledge originates. If more and more
knowledge becomes depersonalized, but on the other hand more and more knowIedge has
to be believed, people are put in a difficult situation in deciding what to accept as knowl-
edge or what knowledge to believe. The situation will become more complicated with new
technologies. As we all know, the phenomenon of digitalization of all kinds of observations
being made with various kinds of technology becomes the subject of further processing,
manipulation, and transformation by data processing technology. Therefore, increasingly
we have to be careful with observation data in two respects: First we have to accept the
technology which originates it, and then we have to take into account what might have hap-
pened with the raw data in the process of transformation. To accept knowledge we have
to be very critical towards the capturing and manipulation technologies.

2.3 The frag~rlentati~n of knowledge: Presentation te~~n~l~gy

The universe of knowledge is increasingly falling apart for many reasons. One of the
reasons, of course, is its sheer volume, which makes it impossible for someone to amass
all the knowledge available (WC know that problem since the 1890s). A second reason is
what Max Weber calls the autonomisation of areas of action, meaning that increasingly dif-
ferent fields of action develop different standards for themselves, becoming autonomous
against each other. A third reason is the passing of what Talcott Parsons calls final systems,
like ideologies or religions, leading to the situation of pluralism of thoughts and world im-
ages. We can easily follow this trace within science itself where the different disciplines
hardly are able to dispute with each other because they have grown apart. Knowledge un-
der these conditions is generated in each field according to different standards, following
different lines of acceptance, is being formulated in another way. And this phenomenon
increasingly applies not only between the fields but within each field, since different ob-
servation technologies might have been used, different methods or techniques have been
applied, and different theories may have been the basis of the knowledge.
There is a parallel development in everyday life which becomes fragmented as well. We
all belong to different groups and settings, travel to other places, have different hobbies,
and so on. Scientists are predicting the increase of pluralism to what Nora and Mint (1979)
called a polymorphous society. We all need knowledge from very different fields, we eas-
ily change the fields we enter, and we try to compose ourselves out of the fragments that
are offered by the different cultural and knowledge industries (sometimes called “life-
style”-Schuck-Wersig & Wersig, 1988).
A very important factor in this connection could be that this development is at least
being supported by a diversification of knowledge presentation technologies. For several
centuries the spoken word and the printed word dominated. We now not only have a wide
range of unconnected and connected technologies to present knowledge-desktop publish-
ing, computer graphics, computer animation, computer simulation, optical cards and discs,
data banks, just to name a few of them- but also an increasingly diverse system of knowi-
edge-presenting organizations and media-publishing houses, television, movies, software
houses, disc producers, and multimedia producers. Although there are organizational cross
connections, the whole field of presentation of knowledge has become very diverse, and
thus confusing. People do have their problems finding their way through this triple frag-
mentation: the fragmentation of knowledge production, representation, and needs.

2.4 The rationa~izai~~n of knowledge: r~f~rmat~~n t~~~n~l~gy

Knowledge has become more important than ever. One reason is that our world, due
to the increase of knowledge about it and the effects of knowledge for the organization of
 The study of postmodern knowledge usage 233

societies, has become enormously complex and still is becoming more complex, due in part
to the advent of all the technologies aimed at reducing the complexity of knowledge. The
second reason is based on the occidental approach of “Aufklirung,” stating that world is
not explained by belief systems but by knowledge which has at least three characteristics:
being generated empirically, being representated in a way that it could be proved, and be-
ing of a nature such that, in principle, everybody can follow that knowledge. This led to
the development of calculi which should be available to everyone and could be filled with
standardized knowledge elements. We often call this development “rationalization of ac-
tion,” where our actions are based on calculi (like the prevalent economic one) which need
the filling up by standardized elements (which often are called information). Knowledge in
this respect is not every form of every possible knowledge but calculus-oriented knowledge.
It is a philosophical question whether we invented a calculating technology because of
the increasing importance of calculi or whether the importance of calculi is increasing be-
cause we invented sufficient machinery. In any case we can see that the use of calculi that
could be mastered by calculating technology (which is called information technology) has
increased during the last decades and will furthermore increase by the new intelligence of
the technology (which is called artificial). The organization of societies of our kind-either
if we consider them as modern or postmodern -without these technologies would be impos-
sible, but on the other hand we can see that the increasing reduction of rational behaviour
to calculus behavior being driven by standardized elements of knowledge causes difficul-
ties. Not everything is calculable, not in all cases are simple calculi appropriate, not every
knowledge is calculable, and calculi do not make fun. There should be other ways to pro-
cess rational behavior based on knowledge (Wersig, 1987).

3. INFORMATION IS KNOWLEDGE FOR ACTION

This perhaps has been the basic idea of the short formula being used in Germany for
some years if we describe information: Information is knowledge in action (Kuhlen, 1990).
That means: Rational behaviour, in all senses of “rational,” needs knowledge. This knowl-
edge has to be transformed into something that supports a specific action within a specific
situation. People cannot perform this task appropriately by naive means because the sit-
uation of knowledge has changed. Rational behaviour in this sense has become very com-
plex. Actors-whether they are individuals, groups, organizations, or cultures-need help.
If we look from this viewpoint at the history of information science we can understand
that this always could have been the primary objective which we perhaps have approached
rather poorly by constructing systems that to some extent made the body of knowledge
more complicated than it was before. This, by the way, is a quite recent feature of classi-
cal sciences: Intensifying a problem attempting to solve it (the vicious helix of science). Per-
haps information science-particularly its retrieval fraction-has been concerned too much
with reinforcing the problematic effects of technologies on the usage of knowiedge. But we
could treat that as a childhood disease if we now wake up and realize that the main objec-
tive of information science is to help people (or broader: actors) being confused by the sit-
uation of knowledge usage (which will become even more confused under the shaping of
postmodern society). There is need for people to be educated to behave in this knowledge
environment, there is need for rules and guidance for these people, for systems and other
means of helping them to find their way. How can we deal with the depersonalization of
knowledge, the problem of its secondary nature and its fragmentation and how can we de-
velop appropriate other ways of rationalization being open to all kinds of knowledge?
These are some of the questions requiring an academic discipline which-if one follows the
understanding of “information” just introduced-may be called “information science”
(which of course will have subsections dealing with the question of how libraries or infor-
mation retrieval systems might change to contribute to the mastering of this situation).
This seems to be a quite sound description of a possible discipline. If it is so, such ques-
tions arise as, “Why do we have so many difficulties finding and accepting it by ourselves
and then being accepted with this objective by others as a legitimate member in the universe
of academic disciplines?” A brief trial of an answer would state that information science
234 G. WERSIG

is not a discipline in the classical sense of sciences, but belongs to a complex set of newly
developing approaches.

4. INFORMATION SClENCE AS NEW/POSTMODERN SCIENCE

It seems that science is science, everybody knows that and due to that understanding
information science never reached that status because the characteristics of a science were
missing: unique object, unique method. Information science had no unique object because
nearly all possible objects of the world have been captured by other disciplines and nobody
accepts “information” as being such an object, because nobody really knows what it is (if
someone knows it appears to he a subject of an already existing discipline). It could not
develop a specific method because of the shadowiness of the believed subject. But already
Feyerabend (1979) directs our attention to the point that science today is in a new situa-
tion where the specificity or uniqueness of methods could not apply any more: Anything
goes (if it works).
This could be used as an indicator that in a situation which Habermas (1985) calls “new
complexity,” science has reached a new stage which perhaps leads to the development of
what one might call new science or postmodern science. From its very beginning science has
been a human activity to deal with the human fears like hunger, loneliness, and disease.
This has been very successful on one hand, but on the other hand the price of that success
was that in the second half of our century sciences and their offsprings, technologies, them-
selves became sources of new fears like environmental pollution, gene technology, artifi-
cial intelligence, military technology, and hidden persuaders. Classical sciences still have
to go on and they still can be very productive, but at the same time there is a need felt for
something that deals with the unwanted consequences of these sciences and technologies.
We can find searches of that kind on one hand in the esoteric circles that are looking for
something completely different from science but using similar rituals, but we can find it as
well within the field of science itself where increasingly new structures are discussed and
developed. Best examples for discipline~like developments are ecology, peace research, tech-
nology assessment, or the fields of labour and leisure studies. Another indicator is the
increasing amount of discussion spent on interdisciplinarity, multidis~iplinarity, transdis-
ciplinarity (or whatever it is called), and the success of approaches supporting these dis-
cussions, as, some decades ago, cybernetics and systems theory, or today chaos theory.
However, these approaches so far only are elements of rather classical discussions. All these
fields have similar situations and describe within their discussions similar problems of their
own. But the conclusion hardly is drawn: that they face a new stage in the development of
science, that they in fact form some avantgardes for a new development.
This article has been produced with the attempt to find out where information science
might go in the future, and therefore the viewpoint offered by this article is an informa-
tion science viewpoint. But since it starts with the observation of the new role of knowl-
edge within our time it may look like taking the viewpoint of “philosophy of science.” But
within the philosophy of science we hardly find approaches of this kind, perhaps again be-
cause this field has developed in a rather classicai way. Perhaps this paper indicates even
for philosophy a new development towards a “philosophy of knowledge” (which at least
has to be a close relative to information science). But this altogether is a discussion which
might start sometimes with inputs like this article.
Although we are standing on very unsettled ground, from the basis of some informa-
tion science experiences, some features of the new kind of science could be described rather
clearly. This new kind of science is not primarily driven by the search for complete under-
standing of how our world works but rather by the need to solve or to deal with problems.
Their outcome would not be statements how something works but strategies how to deal
with problems. They are strategy-driven problem approaches. They have to understand
problems. This needs the development of problem-internal perspectives and the structur-
ing of the field from that internal perspective. Problems occur because of complexities and
contradictions. Therefore, the field usually is of a structure that nowadays we would call
 The study of postmodern knowledge usage 235

chaotic. The next step would be to structure that chaotic reality by finding out the attrac-
tors and their contradictions or relations and then contrast the internal structure of the
problem field with the general structures. Then strategies have to be developed on how to
deal with the problem under chaotic conditions by using the available ordering concepts
or attractors.
If one follows the lines of thinking outlined above, the assumption is compulsory that
the new situation of knowledge - being caused by the development of sciences themselves
and the development of a set of technologies crystallizing in the phenomenon of "informati-
zation" (Nora & Mine, 1979)- requires a science of the new type. Therefore, information
science is not to be looked at as a classical discipline, but as a prototype of the new kind
of science. As long as it tries to behave like a classical discipline there is not much chance
of achieving much attention. This, in fact, requires that we fight on two frontiers: against
our own perception of tradition (most of us came from classical disciplines), and against
the classical disciplines which unavoidably do not have much understanding of the new-
ness of the situation (and which unfortunately are our partners as long as we are concerned
with constructing information systems in traditional disciplines).
At that time two, perhaps marginal, questions could not be answered:

• Will the new kind of science be organized similar to the traditional disciplines as dis-
ciplines or rather as fields of study? If so, then "information science" will not be-
come a discipline but has to find another organizational scheme (as would be the
case with the other fields of the new science mentioned above).
• Will the field of study being concerned with the new situation of knowledge in the
long run be called "information something?" It certainly is a necessary field of sci-
entific activity but its label will be decided by those people who first start to under-
stand the underlying problem and to convince the scientific community for their
expertise. Information scientists still have the chance.

5. THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM

This unavoidably calls us to think about the theoretical structures we would need to
establish the bases of such an information science. One aspect would be the development
of respective methods for internal perspectives, confrontation with broad concepts, devel-
opment of strategies. Examples for these methods may be (and they are already in the
making): communication analysis in organizational contexts, analysis of knowledge struc-
tures, with particular reference to knowledge-based systems, assessment of information and
communication technologies, and informational effect assessment of (in particular visual)
knowledge presentations. In general, methodological approaches like case studies and qual-
itative social research will become more and more important (Wersig, 1990).
But strategy-driven science needs, on the other hand, a theoretical background. To
state it very clearly: Under the conditions outlined above, one cannot expect from that kind
of science to develop one theory or a set of interrelated theories in the classical sense. Our
main problem would be that our field of study has been the subject of many fragmented
disciplines, and therefore we have to deal with all these fragmented items of an empirical
or theoretical nature. The basic need is to gain some overview about the field. I would like
to consider that on three stages.

5.1 Basic models by redefinition of broad scientific concepts

As outlined above, the feeling that a new scientific approach is needed is wide spread,
although in many cases it is not realized as such. Therefore, there are a lot of broad sci-
entific concepts and models in discussion which might guide our theoretical approaches but
which have to be redefined or rebroadened for our purposes. There are two examples.
First, one of the most commonly used concepts in many disciplines is "system." If we
look a little bit closer to "system," we can find in many cases the concept is used as if a sys-
236 G. WERSIG

tern is something real (the phenomenon of reification), but in most cases it is not something
with concrete existence, but rather something constructed in a very abstract sense, like a
set of equations (in chaos theory) or a series of actions in Luhmann’s theory of social sys-
tems (Luhmann, 1988). Although the systems approach in many cases is a very important
one, it only seems to be loosely related to reality. There is an urgent need to take the con-
cept and retranslate it into reality. If we take into account that information science as de-
picted here is a science concerned with humans and their knowledge usage, the analysis of
the system concept leads to the insight that information science needs a basic understand-
ing of “actors” in the knowledge transformation process. These actors may be individual
people, organizations, or cultures, perhaps even technological configurations (to avoid the
term “system”). A closer look then outlines that the system concept is not real and broad
enough, not far reaching enough to be used for a theory of actors in information science
but must be broadened. A recent approach tries to develop a model of actors as self-
referential complexes of functional units and systems working together under a goal and
reward structure and within differently perceived time orientations (Wersig, 1991). The ba-
sic structure is given in Fig. 1.
Second, if we base our thinking on actors, we need an understanding of action (which
to some extent could be provided by the action theories like Habermas, 1981). The actions
we are most interested in very often are called “cornrnunication,” and within communica-
tion the concept of “sign” plays an important role. Again, if we go back into reality we find
that from the viewpoint of knowledge transformation the traditional understanding of
“communication” (the dialogic communicator-message-recipient model like Merten, 1977)
would not be far reaching enough. Communication in the context of information science
tends to become a process of complexity reduction within which a lot of different mecha-
nisms may take part like filtering, reasoning, modeling, signification, resignification, and
pattern-matching. From this viewpoint, traditional acts of communication become com-
posed of much more than only the transfer of signs, we can see (in particular in visual com-
munication) a whole range of other components than signs (Wersig, 1991).
One could go on with other examples like “organization,” “evolution,” and “interface.”
To summarize: The first step of theory building would be to take such relevant existing
broad concepts/models, confront them with processes of reality, ask for their potential pur-
pose in information science, and then reformulate them or go onto newly created models.

Re-Definition

actions [systeml equations

I
actors

organizational individual cultural

“human”

self-referential complexes
functional units and systems
goal and reward structure
time orientation

..

variable finalized indefinite

Fig. 1. Example of the redefinition of “system.”

 The study of postmodern knowledge usage 237

5.2 Scientific reformulation of inter-concepts

If we look at our field in the context being outlined, we very soon will find that some
concepts which are most essential to gain the necessary theoretical background are not es-
tablished in a scientific framework of their own. We will find that a lot of concepts we have
to deal with are not being dealt with scientifically because they seem to belong to our com-
mon thinking. These are concepts which sometimes have been tackled by traditional disci-
plines, in each case a very restricted viewpoint, but outside the respective discipline they are
used as common concepts, not being questioned because they seem to be so familiar that
we think everybody will understand them. I call these concepts "inter-concepts," because
they interrelate a set of traditional disciplines without being understood transdisciplinarily.
A very good example of such an inter-concept is the basic concept on which I proposed to
build the understanding of information science: "knowledge." Of course, there is some psy-
chology of knowledge, sociology of knowledge, theory of cognition, classification research,
cognition science, knowledge-based systems, but we hardly know anything about knowledge
in all its manifestations and embodiments. Other good examples are "image" and "picture,"
"mise en scene," "lifestyle," "art," "technology," "culture," and "reality." They are con-
cepts of strong self-evidence, of an apparent familiarity, they penetrate a lot of disciplines
and common discourses but themselves do not have a scientific domicile. Scientific refor-
mulation of these concepts will mean taking them, looking for all their embodiments, fol-
lowing these concepts back to the roots in human evolution, and finding those crossroads
where the diversification of disciplines in regard to the respective inter-concept took place.
A recent approach of this kind is taking place with the bundle of concepts related to "pic-
ture," which turns out to have been an important means of complexity reduction that for
some centuries was drawn back by texts but now with new knowledge technologies regains
more importance by a split up of some different functional embodiments (Schuck-Wersig,
1991). A basic structure is given in Fig. 2. This would be of extreme importance even to
those restricted approaches of systems designers which urgently need some kind of "image
theory."

5.3 Interweaving of models and inter-concepts

Inter-conceptual work becomes a necessity if information science concerns itself with
concepts like "knowledge," "information," and "image." Of course, this does not consti-
tute perhaps a monopoly of information science, but information science needs the gen-
eral understanding of these concepts for the formulation of strategies, regardless of the
possibility that people from other (new) fields try to treat them as well.
Theoretical work in information science therefore has to be inter-conceptual work to
some extent, which may be considered as:

Inter-Concepts
Images, Pictures, Drawings, Paintings ...

I
cultural, functions

I I
magic orientation identification realization sensual

3 to 2 dimensions underlying idea "time clipping"

illustration visualization holography

Fig. 2. Example of analysis of the inter-concept "picture."

rPM 29:2-F
238 G. WERSlG

l evolutionary
l synoptical
0 trans-disciplinary.

There are examples of work of this kind like Elias (e.g., Elias, 1977) or Foucault
(1971), they even can be found in some approaches for exhibition design, one of the rea-
sons why we think that museums are not only an integral part of information science but
an integral part of postmodern strategies of knowledge presentation. They show that ap-
proaches of this kind still could be called scientific, since they are verifiable, disputable,
intersubjectively understandable, and plausible, but they are not monopolistic, noncon-
tradictory, abstract, and law-like. They are the basis for strategies, not for predictions.
But this kind of trans-disciplinarity for the time being would hardly be recognized in
inter-disciplinary organizational approaches. Inter-conceptual work therefore, at least for
some time, is a kind of combat of individuals, a case for lone wolves roaming through the
jungles of the disciplines. What one could hope is that the reformulated broad models and
the inter-concepts being dealt with rather independently from each other from time to time
would be interwoven by individuals or teams, that the loose ends of models and inter-
concepts to be found in the different disciplines would be knotted together. Into such a
proto-network of basic concepts of information science, then, other individuals may inter-
weave other loose ends, thus making the network more comprehensive and tighter in or-
der to increase its scientific safe-load. Such a network to some extent is put around the
inter-concept, it circles around the inter-concept and the inter-concept is encircled by it.
Thus perhaps the weaving bird may become the symbol of information science theory.
Inter-concepts form a kind of focus which is lying cross and running right through the es-
tablished disciplines. They constitute something like magnets or attractors, sucking the
focus-oriented materials out of the disciplines and restructuring them within the informa-
tion scientific framework. Some first structures of a network centered around “knowledge”
are given in Fig. 3.
If there is something like information science or whatever this field may be called, it
will not have a theory, but a framework of broad scientific concepts or models and refor-

evolution

activity complex

self-reference

I \
s:i1 [ lflK%&Qjq goals/
rewards

complexity reduction
\
action

: / I
communication rationalization

I image I
calculus
visual
\
complexity
\/ \

picture1 relties

Fig. 3. Example of a developing network.

 The study of postmodern knowledge usage 239

mulated common concepts which are interwoven under two aspects: how they have devel-
oped and how they can be put together from the viewpoint of the problem of knowledge
usage under postmodern conditions of informatization. Since everything is connected with
everything somehow information science would have to develop some kind of conceptual
navigation system (which perhaps develops into the postmodern form of theory). This is
the difference between the information scientist and the weaving bird: The latter already
has its plans provided by evolution. In our case the next step of evolution in science waits
to be done, by whomever.

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