Malabanan Vs CA

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J : p
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled
and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third
World. And it has many consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's

in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In
Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other
which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,

and you walk by field after field — in each field a different dog is going to
bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only
one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal
legal system does not know how to recognize.
Hernando de Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of

persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
Copyright 1994-2018 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2018 Third Release 1
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to
provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public
Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has
spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws
are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still,
the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the
Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law,
though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land

registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)

Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing.
Velazco testified that the property was * originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban — the fourth being Aristedes's
grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it
among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine

Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I
affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan,

the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for

registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands
described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of
MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding

decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing

the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held
that under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable
only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be
factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree was based
on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10
hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, 11 which
was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the
discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum
since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of
the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of
hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in
question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November

2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal
issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public

domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land
be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character

either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in

their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered
obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio
due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point
out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied
Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the
OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent
that for Section 14 (1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the
subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15 Fieldman Agricultural
Trading v. Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 17 as well as
the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it
under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property
had already been "converted" into private property through prescription. To
bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are
more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property",
while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that the Court has yet to
decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of
possession under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of
prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that
the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be
reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a

full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. 20 Alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public
Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial
legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977
when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were
introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain". The OSG submits that this
amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. 23 This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are
a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition."
Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period
of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at
June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is
virtually the same as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said
Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including
lands of the public domain. It is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration
of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

inclusion of Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. —
The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with
the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of
the corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11

of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land
Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of
the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b). Section
47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the
right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended
several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which
to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares:
Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also
to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and
his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG's
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot
be registered either under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an
implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable

character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 25
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we

adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it

merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property. EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of
virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona

fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages

from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice
of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Court's acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court,

citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. . ." That statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section
14 (2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode
of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of
Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14 (1),
their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has
any precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between
Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now
settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court

of Appeals 27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after
Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned
the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a claim of possession that
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and
disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and
following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should
have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is

alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated

November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I,
Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December
9, 1980". This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of private respondents' application. Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is
true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of
Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and

Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the
property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land. . . . IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere

possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its
occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor
of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents

were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are
bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of public
domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days
after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for
registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared
alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section

14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by

prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14

(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the

amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application
of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the

Civil Code. [30] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years. [31] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date
later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and
where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far
back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the
provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14 (2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application.
It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the
other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands. caTESD
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may
be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith, 34 as well as just title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly

provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to the
Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only
existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private
lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14 (2) does encompass original
registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private
person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to how exactly it operates
would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year
rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original
registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands

of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073,
which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time.
Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked
the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by

implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds
of prescription under the Civil Code — ordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed
"through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No.
1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
under Section 14 (2). However, there is a material difference between how the
thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding
the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty (30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a
requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language
of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession
period as basis for original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for
original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil
Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on

prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil
law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of
Section 14 (2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14
(1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
"[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription". The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes

property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain, whether declared
alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the
public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article
1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of
the State may be acquired by prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the

public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the

Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet
this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative
branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to
liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion
Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is more commonly
known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain
military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including
Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the
military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to
the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. 41 The President is authorized to
sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA
law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing
sales of government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands
have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public
service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at
that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420
(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared
as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion
into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the
period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be
counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public
dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under
Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil
Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still
classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and
Section 14 (2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration
on the basis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the
basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period

under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472,
and the thirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period
under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the
period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code
should not apply as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of
the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor
inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative
branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate
the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such
intent exists with respect to Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is

seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription,
which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be

acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title;
and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There
is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property
of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent
reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites
— good faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the
application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification.
Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains:
ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if the
grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by
prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,
and dacion in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor, could
not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required
period of possession". 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the
grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom
the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by
sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or

extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is
ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the
periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the

Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system
then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of
possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep.
Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over
the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing
original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code
as of now. AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June

1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession,
the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial

property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just
title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at
least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that

Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence — the Tax Declarations
they presented in particular — is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for

registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not,

is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully
evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The
law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven
unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties. 52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the
informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with
their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of
according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate
into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public
dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform
to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal
theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This
could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease
the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of
well-being not only of that individual, but also to the person's family. Once that
sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem. caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of

Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents — see Opinion.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for

registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan
(Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant
Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public domain, may not be
acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered
pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree
governs registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only identify which
titles, already existing or vested, may be registered under the Torrens system; but
it cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the
land they are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, a fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and

explicitly refers to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands. There is
no other way to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree except that the land was already private when the applicant
for registration acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription
therein was not the means by which the public land was converted to private land;
rather, it was the way the applicant acquired title to what is already private land,
from another person previously holding title to the same. 2 The provision in
question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration

Decree applies only to what are already private lands, then, there is no question
that the same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil
Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights to private lands.
ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the

Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

(Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be

disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter can only do
so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the intent of the legislature
to make exclusive the enumeration of the modes by which agricultural public land
may be disposed of by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended,
is not only readily apparent, but explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the
modes for acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include
prescription, in the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome
the express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes
by which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to

lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act,
as amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a
general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are
of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor
specially should prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same
cannot confer title to land and can only confirm title that already exists or has
vested. As has already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural public
land vests or is acquired only by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the
Public Land Act, as amended. TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several
times, changing the period of possession required for acquiring an imperfect title
to agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title

required possession en concepto de dueño since time immemorial, or since
July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained.
However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending
C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period
of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D.
No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and
Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of

the public domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years.
Presidential Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act by requiring possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect
title. Hence, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of
possession for acquiring imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain is no longer determined according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years);
instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from
which the possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the
public domain by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to
land thus acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, it
would be sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of the amendment
introduced by Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain by
possession would again be made to depend on a fixed term (i.e., 10 years for
ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription), rather than
being reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the

public agricultural land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority

opinion concerning the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit, a person seeking judicial confirmation of an imperfect

title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove
that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of
the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land is alienable
and disposable at the time of filing of the application for judicial confirmation
and/or registration of title. On the other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a
person must establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and
that the subject land was likewise already declared alienable and disposable since
12 June 1945 or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and
declares the pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of

my elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon

some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It
is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause,
"by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the
question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination
of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such
are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the

registration of certain parcels of land of the public domain in the names of
Jeremias and David Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the other
procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to prove that they
possessed the subject parcels of land for the period required by law; and (2) the
application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by
two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that
the alleged infirmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of causes of action
which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of the misjoined
causes of action so that they could be heard by the court separately. The Court
though took note of the belated publication of the notice of hearing on the
application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto, the hearing was
already held before the notice of the same was published. Such error was not only
procedural, but jurisdictional, and was fatal to the application for registration of
Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue in
Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the parcels
of land they wish to register in their names for the period required by law. The
Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, on
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requires possession of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the
land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June
1963, and the period of possession prior to such declaration should not be counted
in favor of the applicants for registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could
not be deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite
period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to

alienable and disposable land of the public domain, which could be the subject of
judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said case. It was not
a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, "by the way", or only
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon a question before the Court; or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter
dictum. ECaHSI
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable

and disposable land of the public domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto and
discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That the application of
Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of lack of
proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the
Court from resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it.
Thus, the Court dismissed the application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court
over the application, in light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of
hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the application given that the
applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. This is
only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and completely resolve
the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between the
parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the second
ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could
re-file their respective applications for registration, just taking care to comply with
the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v.

Court of Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what does not
constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule
applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which
are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the
case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on
which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided
does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is,
or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though, by reason
of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if
the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision
which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely
because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to
consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision,
brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be
regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points,
any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to
every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the
status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely
because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the
court regarding other propositions dicta. IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although
only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course
of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any
statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent
because the disposition of the case is or might have been made on some other
ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached
might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise
than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and
established jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for
the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June
1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially

reiterating Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the
imperfect title thus acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in
(1) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the
applicant for registration prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect

title, under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when:
(1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily,
was already declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land

Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
would not run afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or
binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the

interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted in
Herbieto, would result in absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person
from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, which could be judicially confirmed.
Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the intention of the law is to dispose of
agricultural public land to qualified individuals and not simply to dispose of the
same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation and application of both law and
jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant consequences
arising from a finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the
public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land
could ripen into an imperfect title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by
occupation and possession of the land by a person and his
predecessors-in-interest for the period required and considered by law
sufficient as to have segregated the land from the mass of public land. When a
person is said to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the land ceased to be
part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the State to
dispose of. An application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a mere
formality. 12 EIAHcC
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land

Act, as amended, has identified several ways by which agricultural lands of the
public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of agricultural public
land has its own specific requirements which must be complied with. If a person is
not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an imperfect title, because the land in
question was declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not
totally without recourse for he could still acquire the same by any of the other
modes enumerated in the afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of the ruling in

Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the majority, to DENY
the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing, for absolute
lack of basis, petitioners' application for registration of alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the application of

prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree (PRD), and
on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in
accordance with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit
(Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a new law, crafted by this
Court, going beyond what the Constitution ordains and beyond the law that the
Legislature passed. Because the majority has not used the standards set by the
Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA), 2 its conclusions are based on a
determination on what the law ought to be — an exercise in policy formulation
that is beyond the Court's authority to make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the
order these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy
of laws that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the grounds for
dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine

Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony)
establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding
principle. 3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the State, 4 and that no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and, other than
the Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter. Section 7 of the PLA
delegates to the President the authority to administer and dispose of alienable
public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession,
and the requirement that they should be officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant section, states that —
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of

only as follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of title to

the qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This section
provides: cHAIES
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from

Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted
and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have,
with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not
received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs
have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing
of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors

in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been
amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),

Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various
laws relating to property registration. It governs the registration of lands under the
Torrens System, as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.
Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by

prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or

abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other

manner provided for by law. SEDIaH
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from,
Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in intent and legal
effect based on the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a
substantive law that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable
lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the other hand, specifically refers to
the manner of bringing registerable lands, among them alienable public
lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the first is a substantive
law, while the other is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive
content, the PLA should prevail. 7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and
its provisions on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes
importance because land, whether public or private, is property. Prescription, on
the other hand, is a mode of acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of
the modes of disposition mentioned in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in

Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classifies
property to be property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420
proceeds to further classify property of public dominion into those intended for
public use, for public service, and for the development of the national wealth.
Article 421 states that all other properties of the State not falling under Article 420
are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422 adds that property of public
dominion, no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425, property of private
ownership, besides patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of

the modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Significantly, the
PLA — under its Section 48 — provides for its system of how possession can
ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive prescription but
as basis for confirmation of title.) Section 14 (2) of the PRD, however, specifies
that "[t]hose who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws" as among those who may apply for land
registration. Thus, prescription was introduced into the land registration scheme
(the PRD), but not into the special law governing lands of the public domain
(the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is

Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run against
the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides that "all
things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided; property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The provisions of
Articles 1128 to 1131 may also come into play in the application of prescription to
real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the

supremacy of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of the
public domain should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine;
all lands belong to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the burden
of proving his claim. 10 Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the
terms of the grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the public
domain, and the PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are
special laws supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the
Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on property and
prescription and should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms,
where alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the
PLA is the primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on
property and prescription must yield in case of conflict. 11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a reiteration
of the first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 12 Thus, all lands that have not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 13 We should never lose
sight of the impact of this first principle where a private ownership claim is being
asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, starting
from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that followed, Act
No. 2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was described
in the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It

prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands
in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands", for the establishment of town sites and sale of
lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that
the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to
the present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the requirement for
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide claim of ownership also
never changed. Still another consistent public land feature is the concept that once
a person has complied with the requisite possession and occupation in the manner
provided by law, he is automatically given a State grant that may be asserted
against State ownership; the land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land.
15 The application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,
based on the procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner that the PLA
ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the
required occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the required
occupation/possession to qualify for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10
years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926 — July 26, 1904 (or since July 26,
1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141, until this law was amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957), 17 which provided for a
simple 30-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. This
period did not last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073)
18 changed the required 30-year possession and occupation period provision, to
possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
PD 1073 likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural
lands of the public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
PD 1073 also extended the period for applications for free patents and judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to
history. A major concern raised against this date is that the country was at this time
under Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the
uncertainties and instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on
how one could possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier
occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation
did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a

Presidential Decree) was solely through the President's lawmaking powers under a
regime that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is the
possible impact of the interplay between the old law and the amendatory law.
When PD 1073 was enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the
law would affect the application of the old law which provided for a thirty-year
possession period. Counting 30 years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073
on January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a January 24, 1947 cut-off
date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons, the date June 12,
1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired
under the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year
possession period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We
recognized this legal dilemma in Abejaron v. Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession

and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in
1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession
should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him.
As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes
place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the
requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the
disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair
vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens
who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to
the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24,
1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express
legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that
where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled
to perfect his or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date back to
June 12, 1945. For purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-off
date has been fully made to highlight that it is a date whose significance and
import cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation
or by judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must be
respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not
confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented by
Presidential Decree No. 892 (PD 892) 20 — issued on February 16, 1976 —
which limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands shall
be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial confirmation of
incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for filing applications for

free patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The
law now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12
hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to
December 31, 2020. 23
Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the

administrative grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain through homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940 and
RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 that the
Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist under the law for the
grant of alienable lands of the public domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the

Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978
to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its Section 14
describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree, among
them —

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by

prescription under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately discussed
below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June
12, 1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to be
January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section
14 (1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the current state of the
law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only
until December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in 2002, 24 limiting
the filing of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December
31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently refers only to the use of Section 14 (1)
of the PRD as a mode of registration. Where ownership right or title has already
vested in the possessor-occupant of the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants
by operation of law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes
of registration of a "private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the PLA
vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders the land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the public land to be registered must have been classified as
alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in Section 48
(b) — June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and reiterates its continuing support for
the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable

character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we

adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is

that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,

wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession
since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified
as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not
succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or
nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and
disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years
after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the
Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It

does the same with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and should
have therefore overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites with
approval the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 27 penned by the same ponente who
wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however

completely misses the point from the perspective of whether possession of public
lands classified as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited
for purposes of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA, and of registration under
Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases, as analyzed by the ponencia, merely
granted or denied registration on the basis of whether the public land has been
classified as alienable and disposable at the time the petition for registration was
filed. Thus, except for Naguit, these cases can be cited only as instances when
registration was denied or granted despite the classification of the land as alienable
after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above,

this is one case that explained why possession prior to the classification of public
land as alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who filed his or her
application for registration after the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable, but where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its
statutory construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed
ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its
reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies

public lands into agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural lands
can be alienated. 28 Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis to
determine which lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not;
hence, classification is a constitutionally-required step whose importance
should be given full legal recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without
classification into disposable agricultural land, the land forms part of the mass of
the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that
are completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed with legal effects. To
allow effective possession is to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership
and control that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the possession that
should be with the State as owner, but is elsewhere without any authority, can
anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed
under its Section 48 (b), it is very important to note that this law does not
apply until a classification into alienable and disposable land of the public
domain is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a public land's classification
as alienable and disposable, how can possession under its Section 48 (b) be
claimed prior such classification? There can simply be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable because, in the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land that fully
belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA
141. 29 If the land is either mineral or timber and can never be the subject of
administration and disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the possession of these
unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of public land as
alienable and disposable is inextricably linked to effective possession that can
ripen into a claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term
that can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any
specific definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of possession. 30 Article
530 of the Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the
declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated;
hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This perspective fully
complements what has been said above under the constitutional and PLA reasons.
It confirms, too, that the critical difference the ponencia saw in the Bracewell and
Naguit situations does not really exist. Whether an application for registration is
filed before or after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as
in the other, no effective possession can be recognized prior to the declaration of
alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date — June 12, 1945. The
ponencia assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its reading of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from June 12,
1945 and that it suffices if the land has been classified as alienable at the time of
application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-off date was
painstakingly set by law and should be given full significance. Its full import
appears from PD 1073 that amended Section 48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly state
what Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment PD 1073 introduced in
terms of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b). But under the PD 1073
formulation, the intent to count the alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very
clear. The provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain that is described in terms of the character of the possession required since
June 12, 1945. This intent — seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under
the wording of the Decree — is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the PLA. Naguit's

absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than
real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration of
alienability will not render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach. The
acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by other modes under the
PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above, now allows the use of free
patents. 31 It was approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years
backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts may qualify a possessor to
apply for a free patent. The administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the
PLA are also open, particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — the absurdity — of the law. This Court
acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in
giving Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain
wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even
your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has
absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role under the principle of
separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation that is not there in
order to avoid the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of policy —
a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, we
should avoid expanding — through Naguit and the present ponencia — the plain
meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling in

Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As to legal
correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated above; hence, it
cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling. Likewise, its ruling on the
lack of effective legal possession prior to the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable cannot strictly be obiter because it responded to an issue
directly raised by the parties. Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could
have fully resolved the case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this
threshold issue into the merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the ponencia
passes off as the established and definitive rule on possession under Section 14 (1)
of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no definitive ruling
touching on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have been established in the
present case since the applicant Heirs could only prove possession up to 1948.
For this reason, the ponencia falls back on and examines Section 14 (2) of the
PRD. In short, if there is a perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary
for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary ruling is the ponencia's ruling
that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus,
on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference between
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the

coverage of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law
provisions on prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
To quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the
definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the

Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date
later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous and
exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered
in the interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully
applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that
the Civil Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore
"private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these
properties are within the commerce of men and can be acquired through
prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above

assumptions and its direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2) to
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. This Section becomes
relevant only once the ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain vests in the occupant or possessor pursuant to the terms of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with or without judicial confirmation of title, so
that the land has become a private land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes
fully operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's

Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear
from Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the
Constitution itself provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal with.
Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution took it upon itself to classify lands of the
public domain, and to state that only agricultural lands may be alienable lands of
the public domain. It also laid down the terms under which lands of the public
domain may be leased by corporations and individuals. At the same time, it
delegated to Congress the authority to classify agricultural lands of the public
domain according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Congress likewise
determines, by law, the size of the lands of the public domain that may be
acquired, developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act,
specifically, whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, Congress has, from the very beginning,
acted through the medium of a special law, specifically, through the Public Land
Act that by its terms "shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and
mineral lands shall be governed by special laws." Notably, the Act goes on to
provide that nothing in it "shall be understood or construed to change or modify
the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and
those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be
governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted." 33 Under
these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage extends
only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the
effect and application of laws and human relations; persons and family relations;
property and property relations; the different modes of acquiring ownership; and
obligations and contracts. 34 Its general nature is best appreciated when in its
Article 18, it provides that: "In matters which are governed by the Code of
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions
of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the
latter's special focus — land registration — and fully applies civil law provisions
in so far only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code
is expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section 14 (2) of the PRD which
calls for the application of prescription under existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specific
purposes and are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the
higher Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides
when the matter to be registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including
State property. It classifies property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership, 35 and property for public use, public service and those for the
development of the national wealth as property of the public dominion. 36 All
property not so characterized are patrimonial property of the State 37 which are
susceptible to private ownership, 38 against which prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer to
the properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties. 40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land
alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the special governing law
and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in
case of deficiency. 41
This conclusion gives rise to the question — can alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the State
because they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the development of
national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction
discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil Code,
on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or

disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has been
made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only suppletorily.
The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on its Section 48
(b) and, until the requirements of this Section are satisfied, the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain remains a State property that can be disposed
only under the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the
question of whether — for purposes of prescription — an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land,
even if alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription does not run
against the State. 42 In other words, there is no room for any hairsplitting that
would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil Code to
be directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
before this land satisfies the terms of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of

alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is
rendered moot and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration invoking
Section 14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly show that the land
has been withdrawn from the public domain through an express and positive act of
the government. 43
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land

from the mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the prevailing
Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the required
possession of agricultural public land (under the first and second PLAs) or
alienable and disposable land of the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in
the manner and duration provided by law is equivalent to a government grant.
Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private land. It is only at that point that the
"private land" requirement of Section 14 (2) materializes. 44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed

ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone
unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription directly
applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under Section 14
(2) of the PRD. I am happy to note that the present ponencia has adopted, albeit
without any attribution, part of my original academic discussion on the application
of the Civil Code, particularly on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State
and prescription.
Specifically, I posited — assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies —

that the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable does not per se
signify that the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to be
patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public purpose or for the development
of national wealth. Something more must be done or shown beyond the fact of
classification. The ponencia now concedes that "[T]here must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public use or the development of the national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin
to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has
become private by the government's own declaration so that prescription under the
Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this
conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I
expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and primary law
when a public land is classified as alienable and disposable, and remains fully
and exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the
land now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the application of
the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The application of
Section 14 (2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application

in considering lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be accorded
to the Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the
consideration of applicable special laws — the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this
Decree applies to lands of the public domain. The Civil Code and other general
laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the primary laws or to supply any
of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classification of

public lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12,
1945 at the latest, is wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classification is a
required step whose full import should be given full effect and
recognition; giving legal effect to possession prior to
classification runs counter to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is
classified as alienable and disposable; thus, Section 48 (b) of
this law and the possession it requires cannot be recognized
prior to any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal
effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain under the Public Land Act; this legal
reality renders the ponencia's absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the

law and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to
address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on

legally-flawed premises and for being an aberration in land registration
jurisprudence. At the very least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an
authority on the effective possession prior to classification since this ruling, by the
ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for the resolution of the present case.
Footnotes
1. "Hernando de Soto Interview" by Reason Magazine dated 30 November 1999, at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last visited, 21 April 2009).
2. More particularly described and delineated in Plan CSD-04-017123. Records, p.
161.
3. But see note 5.
4. Id.
5. The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of the property,
notwithstanding the original allegation in the application that Malabanan
purchased the same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent
pleadings, including those before this Court, Malabanan or his heirs stated that the
property was purchased from Eduardo Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point,
the appellate court made this observation:
"More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A. In
his application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the
subject lot from Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case, however,
Malabanan testified that he purchased the subject lot from Eduardo Velazco,
which was corroborated by his witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio
Velazco, who stated that Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather. As aptly
observed by the Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A,
executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was
marked and offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision, the court a quo
mentioned of a deed of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of
Malabanan which was allegedly marked as Exhibit "I". It appears, however, that
what was provisionally marked as Exhibit "I" was a photocopy of the deed of sale
executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer is necessary because
it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Thus, Malabanan has
not proved that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest."
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6. Rollo, p. 74.
7. Id. at 38. Emphasis supplied.
8. Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals Fifth
Division, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo Sundiam and Monina
Arevalo-Zenarosa.
9. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
10. See rollo, p. 11.
11. G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
12. Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See rollo, p. 141.
13. Id. at 186-187.
14. G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.
15. G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.
16. G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.
17. G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.
18. G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.
19. G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.
20. Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
23. OSG Memorandum, p. 13.
24. Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9176.
25. R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995) at 182.
26. See note 3.
27. 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
28. Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002).
29. Id. at 710-712.
30. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.
31. See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA
604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235
SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr.
Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
32. See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.
33. See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.
34. See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil Code. See also Articles 526,
527, 528 & 529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith required.
35. See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.
36. Citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA
604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235
SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr.
Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
37. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before its amendment by Rep.
Act No. 1942, reads as follows:
"Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter".
38. Again, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
was superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning
point, and which was then incorporated in Section 14 (1) of the Property
39. See Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
40. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
41. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4 (a).
42. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
43. Id.
44. Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.
45. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128.
46. A. TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991 ed.) at 26;
citing 2 Castan 175.
47. Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.
48. See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).
49. Act No. 496.
50. See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed application for registration
of title by "person or persons claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal
estate in fee simple".
51. See note 24.
52. See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
"Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions,
lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for
a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor
shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and
before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be
denied except on constitutional and legal grounds".
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 21 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
576.
2. As in the case where the land was already the subject of a grant by the State to a
private person, but the latter failed to immediately register his title, thus, allowing
another person to acquire title to the land by prescription under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
3. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1048, 1052 (1996).
4. See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 397, 408 (1998).
5. Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 901, 909-910 (2000).
6. G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
7. G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
8. Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 173, 186 (1997).
9. 429 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2002).
10. 1 C.J.S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting opinion of Tuason, J., in Primicias v.
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 125 (1948).
11. See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476;
Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-696 (1987); Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 444, 457 (1987), cited in Republic v. Herbieto,
supra note 7. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 238 Phil. 475, 486-487
(1987); Republic v. Bacus, G.R. No. 73261, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 376-380;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 38810, 7 May 1992; 208 SCRA 428, 434;
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898, 904 (1998); Republic v. De
Guzman, 383 Phil. 479, 485 (2000).
12. See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45664, 29
January 1993, 218 SCRA 41, 54.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.
2. Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (CA 141).
3. See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA
343.
4. CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
5. See Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 182.
6. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, amending Act No. 496 that originally brought
the Torrens system into the Philippines in 1903.
7. Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, that part of the
law which courts are established to administer, as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress
for their invasion (Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is the nature and the
purpose of the law which determines whether it is substantive or procedural, and
not its place in the statute, or its inclusion in a code (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19). Note that Section 55 of
the PLA refers to the Land Registration Act (the predecessor law of the PRD) on
how the Torrens title may be obtained.
8. CIVIL CODE, Book II (Property, Ownership and its Modifications), Articles
415-711.
9. CIVIL CODE, Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Articles
1106-1155.
10. See the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay v. The Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 173775, jointly
decided on October 8, 2008 (the Boracay cases).
11. CIVIL CODE, Article 18.
12. Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate
Court and J. Antonio Araneta, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
13. See the Boracay cases, supra note 8.
14. See the opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno (now Chief Justice) in Cruz v.
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (G.R. No.
135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128) quoted in Collado (supra note 2).
15. Enunciated in the old case of Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424
(1925); See Abejaron v. Nabasa, cited on p. 10 of this Dissent.
16. PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)
should now be understood to mean the PRD which repealed Act 496.
17. An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty Eight of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One Hundred Forty One, otherwise known as the The Public Land Act.
18. Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legislation (Free
Patent) and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable
and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years Commencing
January 1, 1977.
19. G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.
20. Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of
Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings.
21. Section 1 of PD 892 states:
SEC. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered
by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands
under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6)
months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be
used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
22. An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31, 2000 for Filing Applications
for Free Patent and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title to Alienable and
Disposable Lands of the Public Domain under Chapters VII and VIII of the
Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended).
23. R.A. No. 9176, Section 2.
24. See pp. 14-15 of the ponencia.
25. Supra note 1.
26. G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202.
27. 440 Phil. 697 (2002); penned by Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
28. CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
29. SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other
valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public interest,
declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had
their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason,
suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
National Assembly.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of
the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
SEC. 10. The words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as used
in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the
acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than
timber or mineral lands.
30. See: Article 18, Civil Code.
31. See: pp. 10-11 of this Dissent.
32. See p. 20 of the ponencia.
33. CA 141, Section 2.
34. These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to IV of the Civil Code.
36. Id., Article 420.
40. Article 415 of the Civil Code defines immovable property, while Article 416
defines movable property.
43. Supra note 10, Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
44. At this point, prescription can be invoked, not by the occupant/possessor who now
owns the land in his private capacity, but against the new owner by whomsoever
shall then occupy the land and comply with the ordinary or extraordinary
prescription that the Civil Code ordains. This assumes that the new owner has not
placed the land under the Torrens system; otherwise, indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility would set in.

Malabanan Vs CA

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Malabanan Vs CA

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC

xxx xxx xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan,

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing

The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,

First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

(1) those who by themselves or through their

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court,

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the

When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by

Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period