Republic v.

Manalo adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust

discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese
national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce
in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to
cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from
the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden
surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can
the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the
foreign spouse?
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is
in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that
the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The
violation of the equal protection clause in this case is
shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who
obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had
initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are
alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to
the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one
undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to
strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to
defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State
cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign
divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from

Japan valid here in the Philippines? 2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

Ruling: It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a
intent should be taken into consideration. According to vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid leaves the bond in full force.
the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still
married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
longer married to the former. According to the Supreme
suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid
Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained
still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce
abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the
must still be proved.
divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign
spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision
should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of
initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as
such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
legislative intent of the law.

REPORT THIS AD
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil
Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo
should be bound by the nationality principle, blind
 LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ
MORISONO vs RYOJI* MORISONO
AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
Doctrine: Pursuant to Manalo,
foreign divorce decrees obtained
to nullify marriages between a
Filipino and an alien citizen may
already be recognized in this
jurisdiction, regardless of who
between the spouses initiated the
divorce; provided, of course, that
the party petitioning for the
recognition of such foreign
divorce decree – presumably the
Filipino citizen – must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law
allowing.
FACTS:
Luzviminda was married to Ryoji
Morisono in Quezon City. While
living in Japan, Luzviminda and
Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by
Agreement" before the City Hall of
Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, which was
eventually approved on and duly
recorded with the Head of Mizuho-
Ku. In view of the same, Luzviminda
filed a petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree before the
RTC of Quezon City, so that she
could cancel the surname of her
former husband in her passport and
for her to be able to marry again.
The RTC denied Luzviminda's
petition. It held that while a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien spouse
may be recognized in the Philippines
– provided that such decree is valid
according to the national law of the
alien – the same does not find
application when it was the Filipino
spouse, i.e., petitioner, who
procured the same. Invoking the
nationality principle provided under
Article 15 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code, the RTC opined that
since petitioner is a Filipino citizen
whose national laws do not allow
divorce, the foreign divorce decree
she herself obtained in Japan is not
binding in the Philippines. Via
petition for review under Rule 45,
Luzviminda elevated the case before
the Supreme Court on pure
question of law
ISSUE: Whether, a Filipino citizen
has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who
is capacitated to remarry
RULING: Yes. pursuant to Manalo,
foreign divorce decrees obtained to
nullify marriages between a Filipino
and an alien citizen may already be
recognized in this jurisdiction,
regardless of who between the
spouses initiated the divorce;
provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of
such foreign divorce decree –
presumably the Filipino citizen –
must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing.
In this case, a plain reading of the
RTC ruling shows that the denial of
Luzviminda's petition to have her
foreign divorce decree recognized in
this jurisdiction was anchored on
the sole ground that she admittedly
initiated the divorce proceedings
which she, as a Filipino citizen, was
not allowed to do. In light of the
doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had
been rendered nugatory. However,
the Court cannot just order the
grant of Luzviminda's petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree, as Luzviminda has yet to
prove the fact of her. "Divorce by
Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya
City, Japan and its conformity with
prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
Notably, the RTC did not rule on
such issues. Since these are
questions which require an
examination of various factual
matters, a remand to the court a
quo is warranted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23,
granting respondent’s petition for authority to
remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and
Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an,
Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.
bringing along their son and after a few years
she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned
from his son – who was living with his wife in the
States – that his wife had remarried after
obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed
a petition for authority to remarry with the trial
court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur
granted the petition of the respondent and
allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. In view of that,
petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of
proof, failed to submit competent evidence
showing his allegations that his naturalized
American wife had obtained a divorce decree
and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under the Philippine laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies
to case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in
the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26
does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken
into consideration and rule of reason must be
applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of
Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of then becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were
the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
stature may therefore be extended to case not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirits or intent.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved. Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
However, in the present petition there
is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of
the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution
dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS
AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left
for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he returned to
the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas
was already romantically involved with another
man. This brought about the filing of a petition
for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the
divorce decree took effect. Two years later,
Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina
and wished to marry her. He went
to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register
the Canadian divorce decree on his
marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of
National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that
the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial
recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a
competent judicial court in view of
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning
out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action under
the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in
case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce
decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
Yes.
The General Rule is that the alien spouse can
claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive
evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction
BUT - direct involvement or being the subject of
the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,
but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.
The case is remanded to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law. Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree. We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
to what had been done.
But while the law requires the entry of the
divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do
not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can
be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.
Cancellation of the entry in the civil registry
requirements:
(1) verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located
(2) civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings
(3) time and place for hearing must be published
in a newspaper of general circulation
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. Sulit
predeceased Felicisimo.
The second marriage was with Merry Lee
Corwin, an American citizen, with whom he had
a son, Tobias. Corwin filed a complaint for
divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on
The last marriage was with respondent Felicidad
San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for
letters of administration 8 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City praying that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis joined by his sister
Linda filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Petitioner claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed
in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. The trial court denied the two
motions to dismiss.
Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss
which was subsequently denied.
Mila filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding
Judge Anthony E. Santos but was deemed moot
and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of
said motion. Mila filed a motion for
inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan which was
granted. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel. Trial court
required the parties to submit their respective
position papers.
The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
who was a Filipino citizen.
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for
the disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court and ruled that under Section 1, Rule
73 of the Rules of Court, the term “place of
residence” of the decedent, for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode
of a person as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor
in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo
had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code. It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and
Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not
be denominated as “a bigamous marriage.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate
motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
instant petition for review on certiorari.
Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo
never changed his domicile, the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s
marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry
Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo;
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not venue was properly laid
 Whether or not respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration.
HELD:
 Yes the venue was properly laid.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the term “place of residence” of the decedent,
for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile.
In the instant case respondent proved that
Felicisimo also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of
his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property,
billing statements from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.”, proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990
sent by the deceased’s children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards stating that his home/city address is at
“100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa” while his office/provincial address is
in “Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.” From
the foregoing, the Court held that Felicisimo was
a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa
 Yes, the re spondent has legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
provides “Contents of petition for letters of
administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner”. An “interested person” has been
defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, Even assuming that
Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent because there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A wherefore, the case should be
remanded to the trial court for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo, nevertheless, the Court held that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging
to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven. 77
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. MERLINDA L.
OLAYBAR, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five
years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married
to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did
not know the alleged husband; She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof.
During trial, She completely
denied having known the supposed
husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while
she was working as a receptionist in
Tadels Pension House. She believed
that her name was used by a certain
Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain
a passport. A document examiner
testified that the signature appearing in
the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for
the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation
of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the
RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of
entries even on substantial errors under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding
required. Considering that respondents
identity was used by an unknown
person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible
for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it
is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
Issue
Whether or not the cancellation of
entries in marriage contract which, in
effect, nullifies the marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding
HELD:
Yes. Aside for the certificate of
marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed
by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she
was not even aware of such existence.
 Since the promulgation of Republic
v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves
of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit
or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partys case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
It is true that in special proceedings,
formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted
upon mere application or motion. However,
a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule
108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it
mandates the inclusion as parties of all
persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar
and any person in interest to file their
opposition, if any; and it states that although
the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the same. Thus, as long as
the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections
and changes in entries of the civil
register.Lee v. CA 419 Phil. 392
To be sure, a petition for correction
or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among
these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the National Statistics Office G.R.No.
196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all
the parties had been given the opportunity
to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction
of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
 BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR
summary Petitioner as first wife of the
deceased, seeks to correct the birth
certificate of her husband’s alleged
child. She wants to annul the
marriage between her dead
husband and respondent, to
impugn the legitimacy of the child,
and to subject him to DNA testing.
The court held that under Rule 108,
only corrections of entries because
of clerical errors are permissible.
Validity of marriage as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral
attack.
Facts of the case
Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza were married
on Jan. 4, 1978. They had three children namely
Josef, Janelle and Gian. However Pablo died on
April 2002 in a vehicular accident in Indonesia.
During his wake, the respondent Lucille
introduced her son Patrick as Pablo’s child.
Naturally Ma. Cristina inquired as to the
veracity of Lucille’s claim. She acquired a copy
of Patrick’s birth certificate from the Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City. It reflects that the
child was born on Jan. 1, 1996 but was registered
late a year after. It has an annotation wherein
Pablo acknowledge the child as his, and that
the child was legitimated by a subsequent
marriage of his parents on April 1998.
Because of her findings, she filed a petition
to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick with RTC of Himamaylan Negros
Occidental. Her contention is that Patrick could
not have been legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Lucille and Pablo because such is
bigamous (their marriage was subsisting at that
time). She prayed for the correction of Patrick’s
legitimation, acknowledgment of the father, and
use of Braza as last name. She also asked that
Patrick be submitted to DNA testing (hindi niya
talaga matanggap na niloko siya ng asawa niya)
and to declare Lucille and Pablo’s marriage as
bigamous.
Respondent filed MTD alleging that a
special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court does not have jurisdiction to annul her
marriage, impugn legitimacy and order DNA
testing. Why? Because the court is not acting as a
family court. These should be ventilated in an
ordinary action.
RTC granted MTD. Petitioners filed MR but
was denied so they filed this present action.
issue
WON RTC has jurisdiction to annul the
marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy
of respondent’s child in a petition to correct
entries in local civil register? NO.
ratio
Petitioners: the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage and legitimacy of child in
an action to correct entries in civil registrar. As
basis, they cited Cariño v. Carino, Lee v.
CA and Republic v. Kho, alleging that even
substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject
of a petition under Rule 108.
SC: Nope. In a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
and rule on legitimacy and filiation.Under these
rules, only correction of clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry may be allowed.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as
a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or
of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly
observed.
As applied: the petitioners seek to nullify
the marriage of respondent and Pablo and
impugn their child’s filiation and to subject him
to DNA testing. They contend that these are
merely incidental to the main petition which is
correction of entry under Rule 108. However the
court held that the applicable rule is under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC Art. 171 of the Family Code, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.
Petitioners: How about the cases in support of
my theory?
SC: Nope. They don’t apply. Validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack. The cases cited are not
applicable.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a
second wife against the first wife for the return
of one-half of the death benefits received by the
first after the death of the husband. Since the
second wife contracted marriage with the
husband while the latter’s marriage to the first
wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the
validity of the two marriages, it being essential
to the determination of who is rightfully entitled
to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that contrary to the contention that the petitions
filed by the therein petitioners before the lower
courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the
prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as
stated in their records of birth but to establish
that they are not the latter’s children, hence,
there was nothing to impugn as there was no
blood relation at all between the petitioners and
Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court
ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh
Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the
substitution thereof with “Tiu Chuan” who is
their biological mother. Thus, the collateral
attack was allowed and the petition deemed as
adversarial proceeding contemplated under
Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners
themselves who sought the correction of the
entries in their respective birth records to reflect
that they were illegitimate and that their
citizenship is “Filipino,” not Chinese, because
their parents were never legally married. Again,
considering that the changes sought to be made
were substantial and not merely innocuous, the
Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108
to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower
court’s grant of the petition.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
GR NO. 145226 FEBUARY 6, 2004
FACTS:
 Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol for four years.
 After school year 1977-1978, they both
lost contact with each other.
 In 1984, Lucio received a card from Lucia.
After an exchange of letter, they
eventually became sweethearts.
 In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to Lucio to join
her in Canada. Thus, they both agreed to
get married on August 30, 1990.
 However, on August 19, 1991, Lucia filed
with the Ontario court, a petition for
divorce against Lucio, which was granted
and was to take effect on Febuary 17,
1992.
 In 1992, Lucio married Maria Lumbago.
Subsequently, he filed a declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Lucia; on the
ground that no marriage ceremony took
place.
 He was charged with bigamy by the
prosecutor of Tagbilaran City.
 The Regional Trial Court found him guilty
of Bigamy; stating that Lucio’s claim that
his first marriage was void on the ground
that no marriage ceremony took place is
not a defense in a charge for bigamy. He
should have secured a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his marriage to Lucia first
before he can be allowed to remarry.
 Lucio filed for an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
 While his appeal was still pending, the
trial court declared his marriage to Lucia
void ab initio since no marriage actually
took place. Such decision became final
and executory.
 Despite the fact that Lucio’s first marriage
was declared void, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC’s decision in convicting
Lucio with bigamy
ISSUE: Whether or not Lucio committed bigamy.
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court laid down the elements of
Bigamy.
1. the offender has been legally married;
2. the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
3. he contracts a subsequent marriage;
and
4. The subsequent marriage would have
been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
The first element of bigamy as a crime
requires that the accused must have been legally
married. Yet, the trial court found that there was
no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead,
what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer.
The Supreme Court held that, the mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married “from the
beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its
logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria.
The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime
of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of.
The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of
the instant charge.

REPUBLIC
vs ALBIOS
This is a case of MARRIAGE
FOR CONVENIENCE.
FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee
Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a
petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She
said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the
RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception.
In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that
the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal
before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC
decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As
in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the
marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme
Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios
and Fringer be declared null and void.
RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do
so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no law
that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both
of them had attained the age of maturity and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. Then
Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that
his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint for the ground that the
testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the
foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code
were not fully attendant in the case at bar he
cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is void
ab initio?
2. Whether or not the action for
nullity prescribes where jose
filed the case seven years after
the marriage?
RULING:
1. Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning)
for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in
which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is
merely a scrap of paper because they started
living together five months before the celebration
of their marriage. That according to the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article
34 “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage for a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediments to
marry each other… “ it means that a five years
period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized
by exclusivity, meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would
lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision
that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
 2. No. SC held that an action for nullifying
a marriage is imprescriptible. It may be
raised anytime. Jose and Felisa’s
marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license. No other conclusion
can be reached except that it is void ab
initio.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City in September 1994. When the couple went back
to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed a false affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple
got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and
did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a
child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. On 4 June
1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. In her complaint, respondent alleged that
she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
“reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia
as his child.” Petitioner denied that he is married to
respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her
from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he
was not able to get parental advice from his parents
before he got married. He also averred that they
never lived together as husband and wife and that
he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child,
and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule
that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties’
marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned
upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to
prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had
carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioner’s “forgetfulness should not be used as a
vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible.” Moreover, the Court
of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998
executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily
admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is
an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as null and void in the very same case.
There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there
is no collusion between the parties, as required by
the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity
of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a
matter that can be raised in an action for declaration
of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUEs:
1. Whether of not their marriage is valid.
2. Whether of not the marriage can be
attacked collaterally?
3. . Is Reinna Tricia a legitimate child of
Reinel?
HELD:
1. Under the Family Code, the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas
a defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had
been living together for more than five
years. However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit
when she was asked during cross-
examination. The falsity of the affidavit
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The
law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside
a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. In the instant case, there was no
“scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in
fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The
false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain
and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
2. Yes. The validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked. In Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
3. 3.) Reianna Tricia is an illegitimate
daughter of Reinel, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate
children. Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document
 or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
The Certificate of Live Birth of
the child lists petitioner as the father.
In addition, petitioner, in
an affidavit waiving additional tax
exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of
the child.
Ninal v. Bayadog
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones
on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February
19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights. The defendant contends
that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file
an action for "annulment of marriage".
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’
living together as husband and wife for
at least five years exempts them from
obtaining a marriage license under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
(b) Whether or not the heirs of the
deceased may file for the declaration
of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage
after his death.
Held:
1. The 5-year common law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-
meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during
the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least
5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
 with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where

there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife”.

Having determined that the second marriage

involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

2. Yes, void marriages are deemed to

have not taken place and cannot be
the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of
one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void
marriage.

Voidable and void marriages are not

identical. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.

A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally

except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.