Dir. of Lands v.

IAC
Dec. 29, 1986 | 146 SCRA 509 | J. Narvasa

SUMMARY:The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was
accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. Referring to the ruling in
Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively deemed as private
land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in the 1935 Constitution prohibiting this
sale, this was held to be valid. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it
purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public
lands by private corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied.

DOCTRINE: Nothing in the Constitution, which would prohibit corporations from acquiring interest in lands, which
were acquired by a person through acquisitive prescription. Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessor in interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of thirty
years is converted to private property by the mere lapse of completion of said period. The validity of the acquisition
is determined as of the time land was acquired.

FACTS:
1. The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming
a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. of five parcels of land, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
2. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public
Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment.
3. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution
to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on
July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and
since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in
force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration
in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
a. SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
i. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
ii. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30
years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799) should be overturned in light of
jurisprudence.
2. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
3. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

RATIO:
Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799) should be overturned in light of
jurisprudence.
1. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Gov’t, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned
the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the
operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a
Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified
as private property at the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the bona fide
right to ownership from Meralco’s predecessors-interest. There being no law prohibiting the sale of private lands to
privately held corporations, the court thus overturned the decision.

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

1. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively
deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in the 1935 Constitution prohibiting
this sale, this was held to be valid.
2. The land was already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient.
3. Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor in interest, openly, continuously, and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of thirty years is converted to private property by the mere lapse of
completion of said period.
4. it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
5. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
6. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO
1. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it purchased the land from the Infiels. The
provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or
associations cannot be retroactively applied.
2. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
had a perfect right to make such acquisition
3. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess
of 1,024 hectares
4. The validity of acquisition is determined as of the time land was acquired.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: (In case ma’am will ask)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
1. I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:-

1. I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases,
2. My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino through the 1925 case of Susi and the long line of
cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico that "it is established doctrine that an open, continuous, adverse
4

and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at
the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent
to the period of acquisitive prescription ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an
effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-
cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
3. To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
 predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious.
4. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for
confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be
to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the
corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to
natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the
purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title
to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

1. The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply
for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature"
2. The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to
take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.