Archipelagic Doctrine

The fact that for Archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-a-vis continental coastal states which are subject,
in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right to transit passage through international
straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession
by archipelagic states, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless
of their depth, or distance from coast, as archipelagic waters subject to national sovereignty. More importantly,
the recognition of archipelagic state's archipelago and waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their
own maritime zones, placing the waters between the islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond
the state's territorial sovereignty subjecting these waters to the rights of other states under UNCLOS III.

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of the municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage (Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, et. al., GR No.
187167, august 16, 2011).

Doctrine of State Immunity (Immunity Against Public Officer)

We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal
capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the
NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in... that capacity. Also, it is evident from paragraph
4 of said complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of
GABI from Rizal Park. (Lansang v. CA)

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction
of the judgment against the public official... concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such
as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising
from acts... committed in bad faith.

Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public
position

(Republic v Villasor)

“It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state
as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties,
the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far
greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted.”

The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be sued without its consent”. This provision
is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule
insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification is the practical consideration that
the demands and inconveniences of litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing
matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.

Republic v. Sandoval

The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation
made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that
liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,
whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party
decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the
death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the
State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities
can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered
official.

Regallian Doctrine

All lands are presumed to be owned by the state and is out of the commerce of men

CRUZ v DENR (IPRA LAW)

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Chavez v. PEA

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands
to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may
only sell these lands to Philippine

citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended
JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of
men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Citizenship

Llmanzares v. COMELEC

Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino.

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized.

There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Co v HRET

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a...
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be... less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations... of choice for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when... he turned twenty-one

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?

The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized

Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a
minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had... already elected Philippine
citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."

Tecson v COMELEC

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino
citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution
on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Bengson III v HRET (repatriation)

Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12
and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On
the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in
the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5)
political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Aznar v. COMELEC

There are three modes thru which an individual loses his Filipino citizenship, (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to a foreign
county. None of the aforementioned extinguished Osmeña’s Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner relied that private respondent was issued an alien certificate of registration as an American Citizen
and was given a clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines, hence, he is an American, and must have
sworn allegiance to a foreign country. This is found to be a case of non sequitur or it does not follow. The mere
fact that he bears a certification of being an American does not follow that he is not anymore a Filipino.
Swearing of allegiance is also vehemently denied by the private respondent.

Also, repugnance of the Constitution to dual citizenship does not have retroactive effect.
EFFECTIVITY OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

De Leon v. Esguerra

The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that
time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in
Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III
of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.

De Jure Government

Lawyers League For Better Philippines v Aquino

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the present government.

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made the
judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

POLICE POWER

Inchong v Hernandez

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens
and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the
law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment
of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less
harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the
liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due
process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should
be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

Agustin v Edu

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the
police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed
in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons
and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated
the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in
negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm
anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen
or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed
for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention,
an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the
Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on
roads and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was
likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.\

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the VFA and
MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:

1. Agreed Locations

2. Rotational presence of personnel

3. U.S. contractors

4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The very
nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class
of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially
quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate
with which they are concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works
of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing
policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements,
ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements
concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.

An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis
d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute,
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even
an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements,
and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of
Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important features
that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements
under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted
by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements
cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they
purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.
Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a
statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An
executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a
treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an
executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole
web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court remains
unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime
through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military
capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.

DOCTRINE OF NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE

A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in
strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State
to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.

Republic v. Feliciano

No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded
the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of
property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action
directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The
complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon
a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint
itself fails to allege the existence of such consent

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