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Nick D’Orazio
CST 300 Writing Lab
5 October 2019
Insect Allies: An Ethical Debate

Are you comfortable with genetically modified foods? Well the next use of genetically

modified organisms is underway. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as

DARPA, is current genetically modifying insects to deliver desirable traits by the means of

viruses to plants susceptible to “pathogens, drought, flooding, and frost, [and] especially by

threats introduced by state or non-state actors” (Bextine, n.d.).

While insect genetic modification is not new. We are just beginning to see the release of

such experiments into the environment. Between 2013 and 2015 DARPA released genetically

modified mosquitos to breed genes that would kill off the mosquito population and effectively

kill malaria. It’s still unclear if the project was a success or failure due to 3% of the mosquito

population surviving with some of the new genes in their genome; and as much as 13% of the

genome in one case (Servick, 2019). In its current project, named Insect Allies, DARPA is

“pursuing scalable, readily deployable, and generalizable countermeasures against potential

natural and engineered threats to the food supply with the goals of preserving the U.S. crop

system” (Bextine, n.d.). But opposers to the program are taking to the internet to warn that the

science behind the project is dual-purpose and could be viewed as a bioweapon. While the rest of

the population sits back and watches the debate unfold, we must ask ourselves, who is right; and

what implications could this mean for us? Should we be genetically modifying insects for the

purpose of releasing them into the environment?

Scientists in Genetic Modification, Biology, and Ethics can’t agree whether releasing the

insects will improve the environment for humans. Those vocally debating the issue include
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DARPA scientists and opposing scientists from around the world. The biggest difference

between these two groups is whether the focus of the debate should be in the present or the

future.

DARPA maintains that the scientific knowledge being advanced and applied to the

present in emerging plant death issues among U.S. crops, “would provide an urgently needed

alternative to pesticides, selective breeding, slash-and-burn clearing, and quarantine, which are

often ineffective against rapidly emerging threats and are not suited to securing mature plants”

(Bextine, n.d.). ‘Claiming the cause’ that a whole new approach needs to be applied to

agriculture, they claim they can make it happen by enlisting insects which would make

delivering genetic traits exponentially faster than the current methods. The agency supports their

position by detailing the projects specifications with facts and a statement of good intentions.

While it may be true that DARPA has the best intentions, since they are not funding open release

of the insects, the statement is ‘unfalsifiable’; a logical fallacy that occurs when a statement can’t

be proven to be false, even if it is true. What we do know is that DARPA intends to progress

scientific breakthroughs and has received governmental grants to do so.

However, opposing scientists maintain the project poses “major questions concerning

how this technology might actually be usefully deployed in agriculture”, and that it has a greater

potential to be misused (Reynolds, 2018). ‘Claiming the cause’ that anyone with ill-intentions,

and the skills to do so, can manipulate the project into a bioweapon. These scientists are

‘claiming’ we should adopt a ‘policy’ to prevent potential dual-purpose technologies by

restricting the research. While the claims provoke strong emotions, they are indicative of a

‘moralistic fallacy’.
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DARPA scientists declare the project is “poised to provide an alternative to traditional

agricultural threat response, using targeted gene therapy to protect mature plants within a single

growing season” (“DARPA Enlists”, 2016). That’s over a decade faster than selective breeding

methods, which typically take fifteen to twenty years for the plants to adopt the desired traits

(“DARPA Enlists”, 2016).

But the opposition holds that insects are hard to control. Once an insect is released,

restricting its flight path may be impossible. The insect could potentially go anywhere, infecting

neighboring crops. This is a common view among ‘consequentialists’; a form of ethics first

adopted by Jeremy Bentham and later advanced to its modern state by John Stuart Mills. To

which the ‘Kantian subscribing’ DARPA scientists insisted that controls were placed on the

program to prevent such an event. Three kill switches along with biocontainment labs and

greenhouse are built into the program to control the insects. DARPA goes on to say, “At no point

in the program is DARPA funding open release of Insect Allies systems” (Bextine, n.d.).

Critics would suggest that very action limits the usefulness of the program. If the

program is supposed to address attacks on the U.S. food crop by foreign nations, then how can

enough insects be released to stop a large-scale assault. The best course of action, using a

‘utilitarian’ approach that weighs the benefits vs. the consequences of an action, is to shut down

the program. Other countries viewing the program as a threat could be what instigates an attack

in the first place. “The concern is that this research might serve as the basis for a biological

weapon or simply create fears that it is a cover for such a project” (Trevithick, 2018). The last

thing we want is a biological arms race. According to The Nuclear Threat Initiative, “16

countries plus Taiwan have had or are currently suspected of having biological weapons

programs: Canada, China, Cuba, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea,
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Russia, South Africa, Syria, the United Kingdom and the United States” (“The Biological”,

2015). In response to the program Russia has already made allegations that it is a covert

bioweapons program (Trevithick, 2018).

DARPA claims it is not their intention to create an atmosphere of distrust, but that comes

with, “a unique charter to pursue revolutionary and technologically high-risk projects that go

well beyond the incremental advances typical of many other research and development

organizations” (“DARPA Enlist, 2016). The project will exercise responsible biosafety and

biosecurity to minimize these risks.

The “Emerging biotechnologies—and especially the cutting-edge research being

performed on Insect Allies— are pushing science into new territories. DARPA is proud

to be taking a proactive role in working with stakeholders to inform a new framework for

considering how the benefits of these technologies can be most safely realized”

(“DARPA Enlists”, 2016).

Both sides of the debate hold firm in their positions. Ethically, DARPA fits a Kantian

framework. Kant was a philosopher who used a moral reasoning called ‘formalism’; a

philosophy that determines “moral principles that are inherently right or wrong apart from any

particular circumstances” (“Ethics and Morality”, n.d.). In his works he purposed many ideas

that revolutionized ethics in his time. Kant proposed in his major works the ‘Principal of

Universality’ that we are duty-bound to act in a way that we wish to be universal law, which we

can see in DARPA’s statements for progressing new scientific breakthroughs; and the ‘Principal

of Autonomy’ remarking moral laws are imposed from within oneself, not from without, which

is found in their reluctance to shut down the program against such opposition.
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While those voicing the opposing position fit a Utilitarian framework emphasizing “the

good of all, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, must be the standard of what is right

in conduct” (“Ethics and Morality”, n.d.). They believe the greatest happiness would be

generated by political world stability and the safety of citizens. This belief is seen in their

concern over the project’s perception to foreign countries and the projects overall usefulness

when applied to protecting the U.S. food crop.

With the evidence presented, I agree that stopping this specific project, due to its

limitations and perception is the correct course of action. However, I would not restrict the

science of genetically modified insects. Both sides make a point on the potential benefits or

pitfalls of the project if used in the manner they suggest. While, it is compelling to pick a side,

the truth may be more on the grayscale. The benefits and consequences will likely be tied

together just as we’ve seen with other risky technologies such as pesticides and nuclear energy.

The insects escaping the desired zones will have negative effects, and the consequences of being

aware the project could be used as a bioweapon may force us to enact stricter technological

controls.

What we should focus on is the more immediate situation. DARPA has released

statements that they will not be funding the open release of the project and wish to progress the

science of new technologies in a safe manner. Meanwhile, the opposing scientists demonstrated

the distrust growing among competing nations, and DAPRA has acknowledged it. Therefore, my

views align with the intentions of DAPRA to progress scientific research into innovative

technologies while doing so in a safe way that more closely resembles the opposing arguments.

There are two ways I see we can implement safe research while not raising conflicts with

other nations. First, stopping the program and using previous methods where genetic
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modification programs are created using more controllable methods and animals, which are not

ultimately to be used for open release. The benefit of this would be other countries are already

accepting these methods since they have been in use for many decades.

Or second, use insects that cannot fly as to minimize the risks of an unwanted spread

because if the insects cannot fly then the time to respond to unintended effects of the insect’s

spreading can be maximized and less drastic quarantine measures can then be appropriately

applied. While other countries may still view this as a threat, it will be a deterrent from actively

using the program against another nation due to the increased ease of tracing the act back to its

origins; leaving no questions as to whether the spread of insects was due to accidental spread or

an attack as long as custom regulations are followed.

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References

Bextine, D. (n.d.). Insect Allies. In DARPA. Retrieved September 17, 2019,

from https://www.darpa.mil/program/insect-allies

DARPA Enlists Insects to Protect Agricultural Food Supply (2016, October 19). In DARPA.

Retrieved October 8, 2019, from https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-10-19

Ethics and Morality (n.d.). Retrieved October 7, 2019, from

https://ilearn.csumb.edu/pluginfile.php/1234017/mod_resource/content/4/Morals_Ethics.

pdf

Reynolds, M. (2018, October 4). The US military is hacking insects with virus DNA, raising

fears of dangerous new bio-weapons. In Wired. Retrieved October 7, 2019, from

https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darpa-insect-allies-crop-editing

Servick, K. (2019, September 17). Study on DNA spread by genetically modified mosquitoes

prompts backlash. In Science. Retrieved October 6, 2019, from

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/09/study-dna-spread-genetically-modified-

mosquitoes-prompts-backlash

THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT (2015, December 30). In NTI. Retrieved October 8, 2019, from

https://www.nti.org/learn/biological/

Trevithick, J. (2018, October 5). DARPA's Virus-Carrying Bugs Aren't Officially Weapons, But

It Sure Sounds Like They Could Be. In THE WARZONE. Retrieved October 7, 2019,

from https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24078/darpas-virus-carrying-bugs-arent-

officially-weapons-but-it-sure-sounds-like-they-could-be