Nationalism, Development And Democracy: Foundations Of Philippine
Foreign Policy
by David O.D. Wurfel
The military security and economic development of the Philippines are common goals of
Philippine and American policy. It is thus appropriate that the two peoples adjust their policies to
achieve these goals. Military alliances and bases agreements, trade pacts and foreign investment
laws are the techniques of adjustment in these areas,
But neither of these goals can be reached without popular, stable and effective government, i.
unless Philippine democratic institutions are broadened and strengthened to meet the increasing
demands upen them. That broadening and strengthening means, at least, more dynamic efforts
for social reform and a cleansing of administrative and electoral processes. In fact, the
preservation of Filipino democracy is and should be the primary goal of the policies of both the
American and Philippine govermments. Nowhere in the world is America’s historical stake in the
success of another country’s governmental system greater, Military security and economic
development, then, must be seen as secondary or intermediary goals as means to this end and be
evaluated in these terms, When preservation of American military or economic interest in the
Philippines becomes the primary goals of U. S. policy, to which other considerations become
subordinate, then Philippine democracy—and what is left of America’s image as a friend of
democracy—may be doomed.
Not only should we view military and economic policy as means to a broader end, but it must be
pointed out that neither military security nor economic development in the Philippines can be
achieved unless major steps are taken toward a more representative and more effective
democracy there. Some of the major obstacles to more rapid economic development today are
political. General Moorman has pointed out (and it should not need repeating) that the causes, as
well as the cures, of insurgency are predominantly political, too.
The irony for America today is that it is becoming more difficult to play a positive role in the
building of Philippine democracy than it is to contribute to the subsidiary goals of military
security and economic development. Trade, intergovernmental loans, and military pacts are
traditionally in the realm of interstate relations. The development of political institutions,
however, falls within the classic domain of “domestic jurisdiction,” now defended with renewed
vigor by rising nationalism.
‘Mr, Marcos has pointed to another element of inconsistency between the two factors: “Even
heroic national exertions may yet leave between success and failure, between poverty and
prosperity, a vital margin—the economic gap which only assistance from outside can fill af this
stage. [but]... foreign aid, though needed and desired, must be extended without the harsh
demands that remind Asia of its past enslavement and with some sophistication, if not idealism,
in ways compatible with Asian nationalism.” This is good advice, and many unnecessary irritants
in foreign aid administration can be avoided if problems are approached in this spirit, But there
still may be inherent conflicts between the fullest expression of nationalism and the most
effective aid to economic.development. For instance, if aid is to be
ected at the most crucialgaps and productive of the most beneficial results, the aid giver must often be involved in the
decision-making process in a way which displeases the most sensitive nationalists. Even
“strings” in the best interests of the recipient will often be resisted, even if it should mean losing
much needed capital for development. The new nationalism quite naturally is a jealous guard of
its definition of sovereignty. °
.¢ of Philippine democratic development.
Nationalism is, in fact, both a corollary and a prerequisit
the Philippines, and in other relatively
‘The most important dimensioi Of political development in
new states, is nation building. A sense of national unity within and a confident national identity
when facing outward are essential for democratic growth. Nationalism may also be a direct
stimulus to economic progress, a spur to indigenous effort, As President Marcos put it in his
address before the U. §. Congress, “Maximum selfshelp should be (the]watchword, dictated as
much by self-respect as by sheer necessity.”
But the relationship between these two great values of modern Asia—nationalism and
democratic development—is not always positive. National pride and the psychological need for
recognition may entice nationalist leaders into vast expenditures which hinder, rather than assist,
the development process. Sukamo’s stadiums are a classic case in point. Furthermore,
nationalism may be used to justify the suppression of individual or minority group rights—~a
phenomena found even in recent American history. Ly thy nasionaLitm | ephas tote
Before 1946, of course, the United States had two generations in which to contribute to both
political and economic development in the Philippines without such handicaps, and in fact, a
treat deal was accomplished. The best ideas in American education and administration —as well
as new technology—were exported to the Philippines, often by dedicated public servants.
Likewise the early introduction of the electoral process has led to a Filipino style of politics
unique in Asia. Nevertheless, the U. S. failed to stimulate the diversity of economic interests or
to insure the breadth of opportunity which could have averted the periodic appearance of a
dangerous degree of social unrest arising from the injustices of a landlord-dominated society.
Mass participation in politics has not altered a policy process effectively manipulated by the
large landowners or the great commercial houses.
When the Huks pounded at the gates of Manila in 1950, social reforms, as well as greater
administrative integrity, were recognized as urgent prerequisites to the preservation of Philippine
* democracy. This urgency was expressed in the language of the Well Report which was compiled
by 2 Survey Mission sent out by President Truman to assess both the need for American aid and
for Filipino action~ The. Report recommended the latter as well as the former by insisting that
aid be “strictly conditioned on steps being taken by the Philippine Government to carry out the
‘Report's recommendations,” In some fields this approach was productive. In some of the most
decisive policy areas, hiowever, legislative expressions were accepted as substitutes for fully
implemented programs. But by 1956 the rise of nationalism had made even the 1930 level of
‘American involvement in Filipino policy making unacceptable. And the political restraints on the
‘American role in Manila today are even greater than in 1956.
Nevertheless, despite the limitations which — rightful ly — surround American policy designed
to promote more democratic development, the goal itself cannot be downgraded in the roster ofAmerican priorities. Since Philippine independence certain American financed programs have
made lasting contributions to the strengthening of Philippine democracy, and some have been
‘continued until the present. Community development, for example, has been the major stimulus
to the growth of barrio self-government. Elected barrio councils would, in most instances, not be
functioning as well as they are today were it not for the assistance received from CD workers.
There can hardly be dissent from the proposition that Jocal self-government is an important
foundation stone of riational democracy. The Philippines in the last decade has developed from a
condition in which there was almost no village-level autonomy to one in which barrio councils
have not only changed the entire atmosphere of politics at the rice roots but are also affecting
national campaigning practices. Some Filipino leaders are pressing for still further local
autonomy, and eventually will probably get it. This is a movement with powerful potential, But
an important stimulus at the outset was American-financed and advised Community
Development, American support for CD has declined in recent years, coupled by decline in
Filipino leadership of the goverment program. Stress on the “Food for Peace” financed self
help projects in the recent Philippine-American joint communique is thus encouraging.
Fortunately for the Philippines, the vagaries of the government program have been supplemented
by a small, but steadily growing private effort, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement.
Present 'AID projects are concentrating on assistance at the provincial level. Certainly provincial
government needs reinvigorating, and these programs will provide a boost. Insofar as economic
aid concentrates exclusively on improvement of production, however, it may make little
contribution to the strengthening of democracy. It may be easier politically to reach bi-national
decisions on such a program, but production increases within the framework of inequality could
even widen the gap between rich and poor and thus stimulate unrest, There is a real danger that
American-aided projects may, in time, come to fall exclusively in this category.
It is most unlikely that the nationalistic climate in the Philippines will again permit a Quirino-
Foster type agreement specifying that all aid projects be subject to “continued supervision and
control” of U.S. officials. Philippine officers of PHILCUSA, (Philippine Council on U. S. Aid,
the Philippine counterpart of AID) are now pressing for the elimination of much of the present
‘angle of AID red tape. Nor, given the rising technical competence of the Philippine bureaucracy,
is American supervision-much less control—as justifiable as previously.
However, this does not mean that no conditions on the granting of aid are either feasible or
proper. Conditions which are designed to enhance the effectiveness of aid and which do not
impair the sovereignty of the recipient are always proper, e.g, those to stimulate maximum
domestic effort, The principle of maximum self-help has been enunciated by President Marcos
himself. It is embodied in the Alliance for Progress. It would be imminently appropriate,
therefore, for certain standards of performance to be expected of the Philippine government
before the commitment of additional U. S, aid funds for certain projects. (Though certainly the
carrot must provide a credible symbol of more bushels to come if itis to provide any incentive—
unlike the present situation in regard to Philippine land reform.) This was a principle perhaps
spelled out too blatantly in 1950. And in retrospect there is some doubt about the saliency of the
requirements made of the Filipinos in the Quitino-Foster agreement, But the principle is still
good.Today the levels of Philippine government revenue are, in relstion to GNP, woefully deficient.
Consequently many infrastructure projects which government should undertake are lagging.
President Marcos has shown commendable determination in his attempts to reduce smuggling
and raise excise and tariff revenue. But in this and other areas of revenue administration there is
still much to be done. At the moment no new taxes are necessary, but stronger regulations
regarding enforcement are very much needed. Land tax collection is incredibly poor in some
Provinces. And, yet there is not even a criminal penalty on the books for the failure of a
landowner to register his land for tax purposes. In practice the burden of the land tax falls on the
small owner without strong political connections.
Reasonable improvement in revenue collection is thus one performance standard which might be
‘established as a prerequisite to new Americen commitment in some fields. The manner in which
such expectations are conveyed to Filipino leaders would be crucial, however, Cultural
sensitivity is a sine qua non of a sophisticated U. S. aid policy, especially one designed to nudge
Filipino leaders toward reform.
To paraphrase President Marcos, “The crux of the problem is to use American wealth effectively
in Asia in terms acceptable to Asian nationalism.” It is relatively simple to use our wealth
acceptably, whether or not it furthered democratic development. Nor is it difficult to draw up
blueprints of superb projects which would quickly be rejected by Filipinos or other Asian
nationalist leaders. For us the dilemma is that we must try to meet both requirements
simultaneously. The problem is not insoluable, but the solution is not easy.
Ifthe U. S. should be content to support programs merely because they are acceptable to Filipino
leaders in power, we run the risk of reproducing tragic events in other parts of Asia or Latin
‘America, for which we share some responsibility. The experience of American aid and its effect
on the political processes of recipient governments has been that leaders in power tend to be
strengthened and their responsiveness to demands upon them by underprivileged groups in the
society tends to diminish, There is less of a feeling within the elite that social reform is in their
interest, and the result is often social unrest. Vietnam is a case in point. Thus if the consequences
of aid are to be a more progressive and representative democracy, and not less, the U. S. must
urge reform on the very government is has strengthened.
And the reform most urgent in the Philippines today is agrarian;
Expanded civic action programs by the military might appear to some as a commendable effort
to head off unrest. Yet any increase in the role ofthe military will increase the sense of security
of the elite and reduce the likelihood of basic reform which could solve long-term social
Problems. Furthermore, this is precisely the kind of program which draws the military more and
smore into the political process, which could be disastrous if it led to the frustration of military
leaders by civilian incompetence.
A revival of agrarian unrest in the Philippines is now a fact—the inevitable consequence of much
Propaganda about reform and litle implementation, The ambush slaying of a Pampanga mayor
by & Huk band in July confirmed earlier suspicions. Greater social justice must become a realityif the 1950's are not to be relived. Communist subversion is not primarily the product of an.
international grand design but a skillful reaction to local conditions.
The counterpoint of nationalism, democracy and economic development also pose a dilemma for
the Philippines and her emerging Asian role. An apparently vigorous democracy is the most _
Attractive asset which the Philippines has as she attempts to step into a position of leadership in
Asia. It is an asset which cannot be preserved without sacrifice by those in power. Perhaps U. S.
aid and encouragement may provide the margin which needs to be added to that sacrifice to
achieve success. But if the Filipino elite seek too much American assistance in order to speed
economic development, they will have lost the image necessary for Asian leadership!
‘The image which the Philippines must establish among her neighbors is that of complete
independence of the U. S, That the U. S. S. R. should have a different view—and thus withhold
Tecognition—is of no significance. But what is significant is that there are many non-Communist
Asian leaders, much more subtle in their manner of expression, who ate not above similar
suspicions. I have had the fascinating opportunity of viewing the Philippines through Indian,
Japanese, Malaysian and Vietnamese eyes. The view is often uninformed and usually quite
critical. It is assumed by many that Filipino initiative counter to American policy is not possible.
‘Though we know this view is wrong, the more important the donor-recipient relationship
between the U. S. and the Philippines, the more difficult itis to correct, This is by no means an
argument for ending U. S. aid, but contributes to the setting of optimal limits.
After a successful bid to increase U. S. aid to the Philippines—and after calling a conference
which so exquisitely suits the needs of the Johnson administration—it is not surprising that the
‘Marcos administration feels strong pressure to do something startling and innovative at their own
conference,
While Filipino leaders have not yet been able to “see ‘emselves as others see ‘em,” they are
leaming.
If the furbishing of an Asian image should become of primary importance to Filipino leaders,
however, as it already has to some Filipino intellectuals, they might resist the pressures or refuse
the assistance from the U. S. which could be crucial for the future of Filipino democratic
institutions. A few Filipino nationalists would probably not regret the establishment of a more
centralized and authoritarian regime, but most of this group would not admit that such a
development might result from an exclusive obeisance to nationalist pride. A nationalism which
truly inspires the leadership to new dedication and effort, especially social and administrative
reform, could largely compensate for a loss of foreign economic and technical assistance, But a
number of those nationalists who rejeet reform if proposed by Americans are not so inspired.
Philippine democracy cannot only enhance her Asian role, however,
handicaps to effective diplomacy. The rough and tumble competition
fone sense an indication of health in the system—the open policy proc
foreign policy to play to domestic aiudiences—not unheard of in the
rational formulation and skillful execution of foreign policy difficul
problems for the Philippines, of course,
it too may provide
of Philippine politics—in
ss, and the tendency to use
U. S.—all conspire to make
t, These are not peculiar
but are common to young democracies, Politicalconsiderations intrude on all levels of diplomatic appointments, lowering the average
competence and preventing the growth of diplomatic esprit de corps. In fact, the excellent work
that some of the outstanding Filipino diplomatic representatives abroad are able to do is
especially remarkable, in view of the constant interference they have from politicians.
‘The extent of corruption in some segments of Philippine bureaucracy, which is related to the
highly competitive elections, also helps to damage the Philippinss’ international reputation. The
situation at the Manila piers disgusts those engaged in world trade, Asian as well as American.
The Japanese people have had their image of the Philippines molded in large part by
irregularities in the Reparations Mission in Tokyo. The Filipino handling of the Borneo claim
has likewise shiaped the attitudes of many Malaysians.
Yet these problems can only be solved in the context of a general maturing of the Philippine
democratic system, And this can only be gradual. Abandonment of democracy might solve some
of these problems, but it would be a terrible price to pay for their solution.
In sum, nationalism bas improved the chances for success of Philippine nation building and thus
of democratic development. It may, however, in some respects be a handicap. Nationalism
impedes the ability of the U. S. to assist that development. And democracy itself may not be
entirely beneficial to the Filipinos’ efforts to play a more prominent diplomatic role.
But our commitment to Philippine democracy, and that of Filipino leaders, should be no less
firm. Nor should we be any less willing to recognize the essential validity of Filipino
nationalism, Incumbent upon us is the obligation to use all of our ingenuity and resources to
devise methods of transferring our best experience, utilizing our power, so as to support stable,
democratic growth—and still have our policy acceptable to Asian nationalism.