Resumen breve

In the present work we propose to analyze the foreign story in Staseman 268c-277d as
opposed to the story of Timaeus in the homonymous dialogue in order to determine what
is the difference between the principle of movement in each case. We will try to show
how the common elements: demiourgós theós, noûs, sóma and anánke have different
nuances depending on the different contexts,- in one case show how the argument of the
politician-pastor is not adequate, in another show the cosmological and anthropological
bases necessary for be able to achieve any political discourse-. We will try to show in
what sense the notion of soul of the world of Timaeus 34d-37c is incompatible with the
mythical postulates of the Staseman.
Resumen extendido
The myth of the Statesman 268c-277d, characterized as eikótos (credible) and followed
by a reasoning (logisámenoi) on it, as stated in 270b-d, comes to show the need to
reformulate the relationship that had previously established the interlocutors between
pastor and politician and show that the king, rather than the shepherd of the human flock,
is distinguished from the tyrant by being the one whose care (epiméleian 275d and ss.) is
accepted voluntarily, opposed to the tyrant whose care is compulsive (257a-268d). The
story of the foreigner illustrates how the god is a divine shepherd who orders the
movements of the world, characterized as living (zôon ôn), but distinguishes between two
methodologies of very different gods that lead to a dichotomy. In a first epoch, the reign
of Cronus (basileían ên êrxe Krónos), the god carries all the time the rudder, the
government of the universe, the direction of the movements, and assigns to specific deities
inferior tasks. In this way, there is no entity in the universe (kosmos or ouranós) that is
not being managed by an external entity that endows its measurement movements (269a).
In the age of Zeus, on the other hand, the god begins to handle the rudder but after having
equipped the universe with phronesis it precedes to leave it moving remembering the
teachings that he has bequeathed to him as both his artificer and father (demiourgós kaì
patèr 273b). This release of the rudder by the god produces a retrogradation, that the
world changes its direction and changes in the functioning of the universe among those
that highlight the death of most living beings. Thus, time produces that the teachings of
the god are remembered less and less and that therefore the order and the good both left
by the god are increasingly replaced by the chaos and the bad product of the movements
of the corporeal nature (somatos dè phùsis) (269b-d). When chaos reigns, the god returns
to take the helm and order the world, thus producing the changes again and after giving
order again to the world, returns to kill most of the living beings in a cycle of regular
cataclysms (273d -274c).
On the other hand, in Timaeus 34b-37c we have the creation of the soul by the demiurge
(demiourgós kaì theós), the soul is generated and mobile, first mobile created and moving
for the other created things; principle of the teleological and non-chaotic movements,
cause in the strict sense therefore of a rational nature, in opposition to synaitíai that are
not psychic or teleological (46d-e, 52a-58a). Here, in 48a, the principles of motion would
be two: the intellect (noûs) and necessity (anánke). The first is condition sine qua non of
the creations of the demiurge that give order and measure to the chaos turning it into an
orderly and perfect kósmos, of which the soul is the first created principle of the ordered
movements. The second, on the contrary, is the cause of the accidental movements that
operated in the precosmic chaos, which the demiurge orders as far as possible for
something sensible to imitate the eternal model (28a-32d) and with which the intellect is
in constant negotiation.

We will try to clarify, then, in what sense for Plato the soul is the principle of movement
in the Timaeus and show the nuances that appear between the principle of movement
posed there - the soul of the world (34c-37b) - with Statesman 268d-277c.

We aspire to show, that the proposal of the story of Timaeus in the homonymous dialogue
and of the myth of the foreigner of Elea in the Statesman have points in common,
nevertheless the lack of appearance of the psyche as a principle of movement in the
second case makes it necessary that we distinguish between the powers of corporeal
nature and of the god-maker in each dialogical context and let us note what role the
notions proper to each context play, ie phronesis, reign of Chronos and Zeus and
epiméleia in the cosmological context of the Statesman; anánke, noûs, khaós and khóra
in the context of the Timaeus.