G.R. No.
178607 December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of
UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City),
SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and
MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by Dante La. Jimenez
(petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals ( CA)
dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584,
which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his motion
for reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management
Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen
Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the
listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local
manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.5 The petitioner alleged that
the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of
incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint
counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s allegations. Respondents
Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of an information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment
against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation
and filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and
raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor
reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to
withdraw the information. The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and
Gaza filed their opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion to withdraw
information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the
respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus
motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of
arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied the omnibus
motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the
warrants of arrest.
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to
expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice,
had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005
resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.16
In a September 30, 2005 order,the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion
for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found probable
cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it
affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for
the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. On October
25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge,
reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the
RTC.
In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself
from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for
reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case was later
re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for
reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial
determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1)
no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false
information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the
POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s
jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the
RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the
existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being
a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s
conformity.
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in
issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged
from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s
conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s
notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and
the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge,
claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order
dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in forming TMSI
greatly prejudiced him.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of
appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor
General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in
criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of
appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule
65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006,
and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the
petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on
behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People,
under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to
institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the
respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA
denied the motion for reconsideration that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party in
interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents’
illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from
the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail
the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely
with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted
independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the
prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible
error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for
lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate
or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real
party in interest, the suit is dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA
and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People,
pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG
can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases38 and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed
to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf39 (as when there is a denial
of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present
case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the
criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The
petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an
offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal
action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which
pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the
criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the
Cour t of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R.
SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court
of First Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal
of Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. TEVES, respondents.
Geminiano M. Eleccion and Jose A. Arbas for petitioners.
Lenin R. Victoriano for private respondent.
CUEVAS, J.:
Petitioners Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and
charged with 'ADULTERY' before the defunct Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental under Criminal Case No. 1079 assigned to Branch Ill
thereof, presided over by the Honorable respondent Judge. The said criminal
proceeding was initiated by a letter-complaint dated July 13, 1972
thumbmarked and sworn to by complainant Julian L. Teves, the husband of
petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves, on the same date before respondent City
Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug. Said letter-complaint reads as follows:
Sir:
I have the honor to file a criminal complaint for 'Adultery' against my wife
Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour, Manuel Moreno, residents of this
City and Bouffard Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, respectively.
The affidavits of my witnesses are hereto attached Dumaguete City

Truly yours, Sir:

(Thumbmark)
I hereby accused my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel
JULIAN L.TEVES Moreno, residents of Bais City and Bouffard Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros
Complainant Oriental, respectively of the crime of 'Adultery committed as follows:

WITNESSES TO THUMBMARK: That on or about and during the months of May, 1970, to December, 1970, in
the City of Dumaguete, and within the jurisdiction of this Office for
1. (Sgd) Mita D. Escaño preliminary investigation, the said Milagros Donio-Teves who is my wife,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with her co-
2. (Sgd) Rubi Villariza Destano accused Manuel Moreno, who is not her husband, while the latter, knowing
her to be married, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of July, 1972, at of her.
Dumaguete City.
Contrary to law.
(Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
City Fiscal I hereby attach my affidavit in support of this complaint, in addition to the
Dumaguete City affidavits of Milagros Quiteves, Elisa Chin and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina .... .
This complaint is in amplication of my complaint , dated July 23, 1972,
Attached to the said letter-complaint were the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, against the same persons for the same offense, filed with your office on July
Milagros Quiteves and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina, witnesses of complainant 13, 1972. ...
Julian L. Teves.
Truly yours,
On the basis thereof, respondent City Fiscal conducted a preliminary (THUMBMARK)
investigation of the aforesaid charge. Complainant Julian L. Teves took the
witness stand affirmed the statements appearing in his letter-complaint. He JULIAN L. TEVES
also Identified one of the respondents, his wife Milagros Donio-Teves. Complainant
Thereafter, he was cross-examined lengthily by counsel for both
respondents, now petitioners. xxx xxx xxx

After terminating his examination, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January, 1973, at
assailing the jurisdiction of the City Fiscal to take cognizance of the case on Dumaguete City.
the ground that there was no proper complaint filed by complainant Julian L.
Teves. The motion was denied and continuation of the preliminary (Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
investigation was thereafter set for December 2, 1972. Petitioners' motion for City Fiscal
reconsideration of the aforesaid order of denial was likewise denied by the
respondent City Fiscal. Meanwhile, complainant Julian L. Teves filed a new Continuation of the preliminary investigation was set for February 12, 1973.
letter-complaint dated January 16, 1973, this time attaching his affidavit It was later reset to March 6, 1973 and finally to March 23, 1973 at the
thereto. instance of respondents-petitioners.

The said letter-complaint 3 reads as follows: At the resumption of the preliminary investigation scheduled on March 23,
1973, petitioners filed a Joint Urge Omnibus Motion dated March 23, 1973,
The City Fiscal praying that portions of the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, Milagros Quiteves and
Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina which relate to the adulterous acts allegedly
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Dumaguete City be ordered
stricken out, the same not falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent City
Fiscal. With the said motion still unresolved, an information to which a
complaint thumbmarked by complainant Julian L. Teves, was filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on March 26, 1973 which, as
herein earlier stated, was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 1097. The
complaint reads:
Complaint
The undersigned complainant accused MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and
MANUEL MORENO of the crime of ADULTERY, committed as follows:
That on or about and during the months of May, 1970 to December, 1970,
and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES, being then united in lawful wedlock
with the undersigned complainant, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay
with, and had carnal knowledge of, her co-accused MANUEL MORENO,
who in turn, knowing that said MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES was a married
woman, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with, and had carnal
knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
City of Dumaguete, Philippines, March 26,1973.
His Thumbmark
JULIAN L. TEVES
Complainant
WITNESS TO THUMBMARK:
(Sgd) YOLANDA D. BAGUIO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 1973, in
the City of Dumaguete, Philippines.
(Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Witnesses:
1. Julian L. Teves, Bais City
2. Elisa Chiu, Bais City
3. Milagros Quiteves, Bais City
4. Lorenza Regala-Lacsina, Bais City and others.
On September 28, 1973, the day before the scheduled arraignment,
petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the offense charged and the
persons of both accused; and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of
Dumaguete to file the information. In a "Manifestation" dated September 28,
1973, petitioner Manuel Moreno formally adopted as his own, Milagros
Donio-Teves' aforesaid Motion to Quash.
After the Opposition and Joint Answer to Opposition were filed, respondent
Judge issued an Order dated December 3, 1973 denying petitioners' Motion
to Quash for lack of merit. Petitioners' joint motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in an Order dated January 14, 1974. Arraignment of
petitioners was set for March 1, 1974 and later reset to March 7, 1974.
Hence, the instant petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION and mandamus
with preliminary injunction praying for the annulment of:
(1) all the proceedings conducted by the respondent City Fiscal that led to
the filing of the challenged information;
(2) the Order of the Honorable respondent Judge dated December 3, 1973
denying petitioners' motion to quash as well as the Order dated January 14,
1974 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration; and
(3) commanding the respondent Trial Judge and respondent City Fiscal to
desist from taking any further action.
The petition is devoid of merit. Hence, its dismissal is in order.
Petitioners' attack against the validity of the proceedings conducted by the
respondent City Fiscal is anchored on the lack of a valid complaint on the
part of the offended party. The challenge against jurisdiction having been
acquired over the case and persons of the accused, is similarly predicated
on the same ground — absence of a valid complaint.
Adultery, being a private offense, it cannot be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
This Court has invariably maintained strict adherence to this jurisdictional
requirement of a complaint by the offended party, as defined in Section 2 of
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
So much so, that an Information filed with the provincial fiscal wherein the
offended party signed at the bottom thereof over and above the signature of
the prosecuting officer, the information even reciting that the provincial fiscal
charges defendant with the crime of seduction at the "instance of the
offended party" was considered insufficient. In another case, this Court motu
proprio dismissed the case for failure of the aggrieved party to file the proper
complaint for the offense of oral defamation imputing the commission of an
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, although the accused never
raised the question on appeal, thereby dramatizing the necessity of strict
compliance with the above legal requirement even to the extent of nullifying
all the proceedings already had in the lower court.
However, this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial. Thus, the law leaves it to the option
of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by
the erring spouse. This should be the overriding consideration in determining
the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed by said Article
344 has been complied with. For, indeed, it is the spirit rather than the letter
of the law which should prevail.
The complaint referred to which is required by way of initiating the criminal
prosecution of crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is, however, that
one filed with the Court and not that which is necessary to start the required
preliminary investigation by the fiscal's office. In the latter case, a letter of
complaint sufficed for the purpose.
Coming back to the case at bar, the desire of the offended party Julian L.
Teves to bring his wife and her alleged paramour before the bar of justice is
only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is amply
demonstrated in the strong and unequivocal statement contained in his first
complaint of July 13, 1972 making clear and implicit his purpose, which is no
other than "to file a criminal complaint for ADULTERY against my wife
Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel Moreno"... plus the fact that
he filed no less than three (3) complaints in order to meet the objections of
the petitioner herein as to the sufficiency of his first complaint dated July 13,
1972.
Petitioners' submission — that there is no sufficient and valid complaint —
instituted in the instant case so as to confer jurisdiction over the offense and
persons of the accused (herein petitioners), hardly convince Us. The second
complaint dated January 16, 1973 filed with the Fiscal's Office and that filed
with the respondent Court on March 26, 1973, are both sufficient and valid
complaints. Both state the name of the defendants; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed
which is an absolute compliance with what Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court prescribe. Both
complaints were also thumbmarked by and under oath of the complainant.
The allegations of the complaints fully apprised petitioners of the facts and
acts subject matter thereof and enables them to fully comprehend to which
acts of theirs it refers. 12 Both sufficiently identify the acts constituting the
offense, sufficient enough to enable the Court to pronounce a valid judgment
thereon in case of conviction. 13
As it is, doubt could not have set in and confusion would not have arisen had
the Fiscal limited himself merely to the filing of the complaint (thumbmarked
and under oath of the complainant) instead of an information with the
complaint annexed thereto.
Finally, as a last-ditch attempt to throw the ADULTERY case out of court,
petitioners invoked the death of the complainant which took place on April
14, 1974 and during the pendency of this case, as an added argument in
support of their plea for dismissal.
Such a stand is erroneous. Death of the offended party is not a ground for
extinguishment of criminal liability whether total or partial. The participation
of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the criminal
action but soley for the initiation thereof.
The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is
misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who is
offended in such crimes but also the State. Every violation of penal laws
results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the State is
committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition that private
crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by
the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial." Once a complaint is filed, the will of
the offended party is ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any
other crime. This is shown by the fact that after filing a complaint, any pardon
given by the complainant to the offender would be unavailing. It is true, the
institution of the action in so- called private crimes is at the option of the
aggrieved party. But it is equally true that once the choice is made manifest,
the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the
complainant, his death notwithstanding.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. The Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch of Negros Oriental to whose sala
Criminal Case No. 1097 had been assigned, is hereby ordered to
immediately continue with the trial of the aforementioned case and render
judgment thereon on the basis of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. The motion to quash is obviously dilatory. The instant petition
should not have been given due course.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. The motion to quash is obviously dilatory. The instant petition
should not have been given due course.
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest
may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law.
G.R. No. 165922
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(BAMARVEMPCO), represented by RECTO INSO, Operations Manager,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review are the Orders of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees.
The Facts
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a
credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts
cooperatives:
from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code,
or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority
before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
the cooperative.
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially
foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c) of
Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to
legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee’s claim. Invoking Article 62
(6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes
(respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for
exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
exempting from the Rule’s coverage only the "Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities" and certain suits of local government units.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the
Order dated 6 October 2004. This time, respondent reasoned that
petitioner’s reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the
fees collected under Rule 141 are not "fees payable to the Philippine
Government" as they do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special
fund under the Court’s control.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple
application of Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of
Comment), joins causes with petitioner. The OSG submits that as the
substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule
141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with
respondent’s finding that the legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not
"fees payable to the Philippine Government" as the judiciary forms part of
the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised Administrative
Code.
Although not a party to this suit, we required the Court’s Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) to comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues
relating to the Court’s power to promulgate judicial rules. In its compliance,
the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22,
Rule 141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1)
the power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2) the 1987
Constitution insulated the Court’s rule-making powers from Congress’
interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973
Constitution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT called
attention to the Court’s previous denial of a request by a cooperative group
for the issuance of "guidelines" to implement cooperatives’ fees exemption
under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.11 Lastly, the OCAT recommends the
amendment of Section 22, Rule 141 to make explicit the non-exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.
The Issue
The question is whether petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is
exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s
foreclosure proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to
cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought
under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article
62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the
payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on
petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner
is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption
only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
The Power of the Legislature
vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court
to Enact Judicial Rules
Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En
Banc has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees on
the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity
to reiterate our En Banc ruling in GSIS.
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions
textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court
in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law." However, these constitutions also granted to the
legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the
previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’
subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission led
the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress":
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court
[under] Section 5(5), Article VIII x x x .
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. x x x x
Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5)
should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment
of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291,
exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all
kinds." Reaffirming Echegaray’s construction of Section 5(5), the Court
described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and
procedure as "one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence":
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by
this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this
Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.20 x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30
August 2004 and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA),
MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL
BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of
her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was
not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security
System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The
POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted
of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor
General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the
agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. Moreover,
the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct
resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the
disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under
Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and
monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It
replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the
POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers,
including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and
Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims
for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the
claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not
an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's
claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal
to the Employees Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano
Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the
fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas
employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines,
including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered
by a valid contract. A contract worker is described as "any person working
or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen" or "any person working overseas or who has been
employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer,
principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen." These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not
disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the
petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris,
while berthed in a foreign country.
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which
constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at
the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping
articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive
Order NO. 797. The second is its payment of the contributions mandated by
law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was
created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare
services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for
the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial
benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." While this receipt is
certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own
previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made
contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the
employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its
international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the
petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to
the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the
analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the
definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed
through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No.
2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a
standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A
similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and
had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner
claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased
Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have
done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all
parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going
vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01
February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment
contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so,
the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the
contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself
as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends
that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a)
of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which,
as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract
substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion
as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not
what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court
12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition
of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order.
It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.'
(Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations
that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority
that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to
be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of
the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the
delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation
the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general
are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number
of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA
(and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive
order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient
standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in
Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang
v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v.
Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the
"sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United
States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly
death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also
paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition,
as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the
Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude
allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it
is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino
seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that—
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master
electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall
be separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits
which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners
shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding
P18,000.00 for burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No.
22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an
follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be
granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the
seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment
contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social
Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the
seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the
working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific
provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the
promotion of its interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its
argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that
issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an
uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are
vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial.
The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations,
and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.
Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own
revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities
and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine
Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad
infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement
has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be
considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down
by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this
case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express
mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life
should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales
of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced
by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to
assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of
management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a
mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby
LIFTED. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 176033
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated August
11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094. The CA dismissed for lack of merit the Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and
Benjamin Perez, praying for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the
public respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from implementing the Orders
dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005; (2) the issuance of a Writ of
Certiorari to annul the said Orders, and (3) the dismissal of the estafa case
against them for having been prematurely filed and for lack of cause of
action.
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B.
Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo
and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming
to be business partners in financing casino players, private respondents
alleged that sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in
convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty Thousand
(P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles
which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned
out to be owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-
A-Car.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit,4 denying the
accusation against him, and claiming that his only participation in the
transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to
having initially introduced them to each other.
On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their Reply-Affidavit,5
asserting that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the
registration paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as
the one who personally took them out from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit,6 stating that neither
original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private
respondents to be submitted to them because from the very start, they were
informed by Aguinaldo that she merely leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-
a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga
issued a Resolution7 recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court
for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any
controverting evidence despite the subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners
with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-216182, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and
Benjamin Perez," the case was raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reduction of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted
in an Order of even date.9
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to
Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest,10 alleging that the Resolution dated
February 25, 2003 has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file
a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointlyy filed with the OCP of Manila their
"Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information
Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila."11
Citing the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez, Aguinaldo
asserted, among others, that no deceit or false pretenses was committed
because private respondents were fully aware that she does not own the
pledged motor vehicles.
On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order12 granting the
motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest
warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her
motion for reconsideration with the OCP.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with
the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's motion,13 the public respondent
ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.14
On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived
pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of
Manila.15
On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel,
filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial,16 considering that petitioners' motions
for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.
On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
a petition for review17 in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled "Benjamin
Perez and Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson."
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners'
motions for reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion
to set the case for trial, the public respondent issued an Order18 dated
March 15, 2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment
and Suspend Further Proceedings,19 until their petition for review before the
DOJ is resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration20 of the Order dated March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion
to cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for
reconsideration.21
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest.22 De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the
estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition
with Motion to Expunge,23 alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said
case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for review
before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation24 informing the public
respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G-
29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo."25
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion
to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with
conformity of the public prosecutor. x x x
It appears from the records that:
(1)the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was recalled
pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ; x x x
(2)the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed
xxx
(3)accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond.
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant
of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let warrant of
arrest be issued against accused Aguinaldo.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Quash Warrant of Arrest.27
On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of
Arrest, and setting petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only a 60-day period of
suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul,28 he also ruled that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court.
He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the
petition for review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing the
Orders dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution29 dated December 4,
2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT
THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A WARRANT OF
ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE CASTRO WHO IS NOT A
PARTY TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.
II.
A PROCEDURAL TECHINICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED
FOR ARRAIGNMENT IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60- DAY PERIOD MAY
BE RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND SPEEDY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
III.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569
(CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.30
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in
issuing the Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an
arrest warrant against Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate
the Case and to Issue a Warrant of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De
Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case No. 03-216182, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," instead of
private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also
assert that said motion was erroneously granted based on the purported
denial of their petition for review by the DOJ, despite a Certification showing
that their actual petition in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo
Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo," has not yet been resolved and is still
pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only
sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their
procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet been
resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could
receive a copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and
thus move for its reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-
216182 had already been filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend
that such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a warrant of
arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary
investigation having been completed because they were not afforded their
right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support of
their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that
an Information filed without affording the respondent his right to file a motion
for reconsideration of an adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a
denial of a complete preliminary investigation deprives the accused of the full
measure of his right to due process and infringes on his constitutional right to
liberty.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest31 was filed by one Levita
De Castro who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records
show that De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness
for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in
defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their
P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners'
motion to expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper
with no legal effect, as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted
based on the purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In
reinstating the case and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the
public respondent erroneously relied on the DOJ Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a different case, i.e.,
I.S. No. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa." As correctly noted by petitioners,
however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending resolution. In
particular, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr. certified that
based on available records of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, their
petition for review filed in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus,
et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo" for estafa, is still pending resolution as of May
27, 2005.32 It bears stressing that their petition stemmed from Criminal
Case No. 03-216812, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez" wherein the public respondent issued the
interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that
the provision of Section 11 (c),33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the
suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus,
the estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their
petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,34 the Court explained that while the pendency
of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.35
In Diño v. Olivarez,36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite
suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing
authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible
time was anchored on the rule provided under Department Memorandum
Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for the
disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy- five (75)
days.37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court ruled that in a long line
of decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. After all,
rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants, and they
are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of
invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules,
or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by
compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.39
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such
reasons shown to warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA
correctly ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon
the petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was ordered
deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of one year
and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public
respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner
Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity
to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The
petitioners though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30,
2005 stating that their petition for review is pending resolution by the
Department as of May 27, 2005. However, such delay in the resolution does
not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the afore-quoted Section
11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the
petitioners may be faulted for the delay in the resolution of their petition.
According to their counsel, she received the letter dated April 15, 2004 from
the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings relative to petitioners'
petition for review; admittedly, however, the same was complied with only on
October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners'
argument that the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the
preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing
that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a
motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that since filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, an
Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales42 as misplaced. A closer look
into said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to
move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
before the filing of an Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were
afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation when they filed their "Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,"43 pursuant to Section 3 of
the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)44 and Section
56 of the Manual for Prosecutors45 .
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July
16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to
quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the final
resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that the
period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time petitioners
filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 200546 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was
more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very
liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-day period from the
filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years having
elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to
be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits
in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the
affirmative. Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder- Affidavit to
the OCP of Manila before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez cannot be
heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not completed.
For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of any notice of
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information, she was
nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation. In
petitioners' motion for reconsideration47 of the February 25, 2003 Resolution
of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter- Affidavit and
Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of the prosecutor
to indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for reconsideration
was held to be consistent with the principle of due process and allowed
under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors,48 she cannot complain
denial of her right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, "[d]ue
process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process."49
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16,
2005 Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest, as it was filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was based
on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition for review in a different case.
Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August 23, 2005
Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the
DOJ. For one, the public respondent had been very liberal in applying
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which allows suspension of
arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For another, records show that
petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the preliminary
investigation of their estafa case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without
petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case
to the trial court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No.
38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the "Implementing the Provisions of
Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All
Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.'" In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot
invoke violation of their right to speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular
No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial must commence
the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders,
such as their petitions before the CA and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or
petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest
previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take
place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges
should take note of the following:
1.If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court
should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the public prosecutor to
submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before the period fixed by
the court, which in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the
court counted from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment,
otherwise the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and
without further delay.
2.If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court
should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the
resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules
which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of
the Petition for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with
the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, are AFFIRMED. Considering
that the proceedings in this criminal case had been held in abeyance long
enough, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court which is
hereby DIRECTED to try the case on the merits with dispatch in accordance
with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the May 4, 2007 Resolution4 and the September 4, 2007 Resolution5
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R.
No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27,
with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise
known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8 docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner’s counsel
informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not
notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The RTC, however, found their
absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as
scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y
Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended, they are each sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum
period. Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren13
and issued warrants of arrest against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the
validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction,
and the correctness of the penalty imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED. On the basis of the evidence on record, accused Efren S.
Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence
of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their own choice,
after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the complete records of this case
be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate
the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated
the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to
wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated September
8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
by this Court in a Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration,
which were denied by this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9,
2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still
appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without
action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006 Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Repromulgation25 of the September 8, 1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for
Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its
February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari28 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its
Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in
its September 4, 2007 Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner Almuete of the
charge against him passed the requisite conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC convicting the
petitioner was valid despite the absence of the petitioner and regardless of
petitioner’s intention to be present at the promulgation of the Decision.
3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it acquitted petitioner Almuete in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA bars further
proceedings and that to do so would constitute a violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioner’s motion for re-
promulgation is in order, the denial being based on an inappropriate
Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court (Administrative Order
No. 16-93).32
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly
convicted by the RTC because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial and
hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck
containing the lumber.34 Thus, he contends that his earlier acquittal by the
CA was proper,35 and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed without
violating the principle of double jeopardy.36
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment
against him since it was made in his absence.37 He insists that he had a
valid reason for not attending the promulgation of the judgment as he was
suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and thus,
was advised to rest.38 He also claims that the RTC’s denial of his Motion for
Repromulgation was not proper.39 Hence, a repromulgation of the judgment
should be made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.40
Respondent’s Arguments
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the issues and
arguments raised by petitioner may no longer be entertained as these have
been addressed in People v. Court of Appeals,41 which is already the "law
of the case."42 He likewise points out that the promulgation of judgment in
absentia is allowed under Section 643 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioner’s Motion for
Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the same is
in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45
As to petitioner’s right to appeal, respondent opines that petitioner’s right has
prescribed,46 as the same should have been filed within 15 days from the
time he or his counsel received a copy of the September 8, 1998 Decision
instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.47
However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioner’s conviction, respondent
recommends that the penalty be modified by reducing the same to six (6)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL).48
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93
Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides
that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY
SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in
criminal cases after their judgments of conviction shall have been affirmed or
modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, attention is invited
to the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.
1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in
criminal cases, differs from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals where promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of
the judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies thereof to be
served upon the parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction was
reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in
relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment
is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment
for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it
was explained that "the certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of
the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of rule 53, not for the
promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of the
judgment against him," it "not being necessary to promulgate or read it to the
defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney had
already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as
amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51)," and
that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is
merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of
the court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for
"promulgation" of the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be
immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing
unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the
convict was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and
the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court.
Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the
convict is under detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the
corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may be
considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison
facility for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on
bail, the trial court shall immediately order the bondsman to surrender the
convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the
corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this
Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of
such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear
before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by
this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer
allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC in denying the
Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which
was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioner’s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTC’s
September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise fail as this has already been
addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals.50 As this Court has
explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because
petitioner’s absence was unjustifiable.51 Hence, no abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the
absence of petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained
finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February
15, 2005.
Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision, we rule in the negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by
the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained
that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the
authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of
error."54 Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal,
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused,
respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged based on the evidence on
record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and
305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of the
promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s denial of their motion
for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of error,
from the decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The appeal
of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts of the trial
court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty
imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal case
throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court can
reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned, found
in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error,
the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the
decision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction and
the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely
hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged
mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved the
appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course
and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on record, its
findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA
forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete of the
crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured
beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari
proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal
by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent
Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute to
entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the
jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the
judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case,
the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create
rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete cannot
base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court’s decision.55
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s right to appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision
has long prescribed. Consequently, the said Decision is no longer open to an
appeal.
The penalty imposed must be modified.
Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the penalty imposed by the RTC in its September 8, 1998
Decision must be modified. Concededly, this case is an offshoot of G.R. No.
144332 which the Court decided on June 10, 2004 which found grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA in acquitting Almuete.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation
or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as
prescribed in Article 310 which is two degrees higher than those specified in
Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering that the penalty prescribed in
Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under any the
following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these
circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is ₱57,012.00. Since the
amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods57 should be imposed in its maximum period58 plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000 pesos in excess of
₱22,000.00 or three more years.59 Thus, the correct imposable maximum
penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one
degree lower than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum
penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years.
This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no longer be
altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest court
of the land, rendered it."60 However, this Court has suspended the
application of this rule based on certain recognized exceptions, viz:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of
fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case,
(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty
of petitioner. If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be
not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside
the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper
imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the
maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice
demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the
power of the court to suspend its own Rules or except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when
there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the
same in the interest of substantial justice."62 Suspending the Rules is
justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the
ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all, the Court’s
"primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed
notwithstanding the finality of the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel
Barro (Joel) were charged with murder. After trial, the trial court convicted
them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed their notice of appeal. Joel
failed to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial court’s
Decision insofar as Joel is concerned had become final and executory. In the
Court’s Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and Florin
was found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards Joel, the
penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside the range"66 of the penalty
prescribed for the offense. Consequently, the Court modified the penalty
imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already become final and
executory. The Court ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees lower is
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped
from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight
years which is within the medium period (6 years 1 month and 11 days to 8
years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the
range of said penalty. The records show that Joel Barro did not appeal.
However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal
was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed
on the accused can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty
prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become
final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court
to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa.
While the trial was pending, petitioner jumped bail. Understandably, during
the promulgation of judgment in 1997, petitioner was absent. Two years
later, or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for reconsideration
of the trial court’s Decision. The same was denied for having been filed out
of time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which
was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before this Court. In its
Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled that petitioner’s trial in
absentia was proper; that she was not denied due process; and that the
denial by the trial court of her motion for reconsideration was proper as the
same was filed beyond the reglementary period. However, the Court noted
that the penalty imposed by the trial court (which is 12 years of prision mayor
to 24 years as maximum) on petitioner was erroneous. As computed by the
Court, considering that the amount defrauded is only ₱68,700.00, the proper
minimum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "6 months,
and 1 day of prision correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional in its medium period"69 while the proper
maximum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8
months and 21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum
period."70 Hence, notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s Decision, the
Court modified the penalty imposed, as the same was outside the range
prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also
modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner notwithstanding the finality of
the trial court’s Decision based on the observation that the penalty imposed
by the trial court was erroneous because it was outside the range prescribed
by law. The Court ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of
the trial court that must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial
court erroneously included an additional one day on the maximum period of
arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the
range of said penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month
and one day to six months. Adding one day to the maximum penalty will
place it within the range of prision correccional.
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years,
four months and one day of prision correccional is also incorrect as it is
outside the range of the penalty imposable in this case. x x x
xxxx
The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law as it is within the Court’s duty and
inherent power. x x x
xxxx
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty
imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with the law and nothing
else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order to be favorable to the
petitioner nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.72
In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely modifying
the penalty imposed, it is not reopening the case; neither is it saying that
there was error in judgment. In the same manner, in this case, we are not
reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more reversing it. Thus:
x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect to
Gatward, the penalty inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity because it was
never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The penalties which
consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are self-
contradictory in terms and unknown in penal law. Without intending to sound
sardonic or facetious, it was akin to imposing the indivisible penalties of
public censure, or perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death in
their minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting
a penalty higher or lower than the one imposable under the law but with both
penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid punishments. An
erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment. But a
judgment which ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of
penalties or which is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful
penalties is necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of
the penalty and does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof.
Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final and executory.1âwphi1
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case
was reopened in order that a higher penalty may be imposed on him. There
is here no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is being affirmed
but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it
conformable to law, pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The
penalty has not been changed since what was decreed by the trial court and
is now being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court in an
elemental form which is non-existent in and not authorized by law. Just as
the penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the accused,
neither has it been increased so as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the
imposition upon him of the corrected duration, inherent in the essence and
concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with
an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial
legislation and unequal protection of law. He would thus be the victim of an
inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment
and the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually
have served. Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the
remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion protect him
against the risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct
period of imprisonment.74
Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the Solicitor General
prayed for the modification of the imposable penalty.75
Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the favorable modification of the penalty should likewise
apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed to appeal.77
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and the
September 4, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, for reasons stated above, the
September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 27, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672, is hereby MODIFIED
insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The accused, namely,
Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149995 September 28, 2007
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879
dated September 17, 2001,1 affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-
5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or
for the value the check described below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : ₱590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
amount of such check when presented for payment within (90) days from the
date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said
check or make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.2
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner’s non-
apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3 On June 27,
1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside4 after petitioner
posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September
1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of
₱590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a
postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant.6
However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by
the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding,
petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.7
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was
an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the
subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment
of a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1,
1987.8 He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in
his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the
partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when
the check was issued sometime in February 1988,9 complainant knew that
the same was not funded.10
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23,
1997 a Decision11 finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as
charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to
indemnify the private complainant the sum of ₱590,000.00 plus legal interest
from filing of this case until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto.12
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued
as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner’s "investment theory".
In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court
noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palana’s General
Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner.13 The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money
does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE
LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED
THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS
NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS
ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID
CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS
INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING
FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE
TIME THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691
EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.14
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the case.
Petitioner’s argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A.
7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action15 and not during
the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the
governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30
days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
₱200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the discretion of the court.
In the present case, the fine imposable is ₱200,000.00 hence, the Regional
Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.18 The Metropolitan
Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its
jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than
₱4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court"19 on June 15, 1994 cannot
divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioner’s case. Where a
court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy,
its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment.
Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only
apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from
an express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691
has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the
Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of the RTC
over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of
the Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691
reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to
criminal cases is prospective in nature.21
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner’s
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized
under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues
any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner
admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it
was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private
complainant but he did not comply with it.22
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainant’s claim
that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioner’s
"investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the subject
check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to
petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question
involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the
appellate court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the
advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the
trial, which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In
the present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was a
loan and not an investment.23
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from
private complainant in various amounts,24 petitioner cannot now claim that
the checks were not issued for value.25
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential
suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,26 the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be
shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a
defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act
of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad
check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in
mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached.
Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of
criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed
or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What
the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose
for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as
well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly
erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and
banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to
the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such
distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. What is
important is the fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question
and those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to
the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.27
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is
likewise immaterial.1âwphi1 Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, is the first delivery of the check.28 In the case at bar, the
Information alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988
although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified
that the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that
the check was issued sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and
proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material
and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial
rights.29 In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of
the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the
offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of
funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such
variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the
time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank
to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same
claiming that the same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a
defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner’s allegation that private complainant
knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of
the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered
when presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified
by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be
imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to
prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender.30 Hence, in lieu of
imprisonment, a fine of ₱200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO
M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount
of ₱590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent
interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision,
the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent
(12%) interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of
imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 31, 2011 and its
Resolution2 dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14 October
2008 and 12 February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 01-197750, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let the records of this case be REMANDED to Branch 40 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.3cralawlawlibrary
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46
of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).4
The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, and as such, have
a complete control and exclusively manage the entire business of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such
and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse to A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and
there entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal
capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the
sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5cralawlawlibrary
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had
entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same
school. By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement between the school and
the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school principal, directed
petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson.
Instead, petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority to
require her to produce financial statements, and that the said reports had
been posted on the school bulletin board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the
financial reports of the Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora
Catabona (Chairperson), Monica Nealiga (member), with Noemi Olazo
(Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later executed their
respective affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on the
documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual
deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the
audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its
members for three (3) years in the following amounts: School Year (S.Y.)
1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y. 2000-2001
- P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the
amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to
do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing
of criminal charges against petitioner.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner
moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave
of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the
crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a
sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of
[Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than
six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this Court
(RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case which
properly pertains to the first level courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is
hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no jurisdiction, further discussions
over the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the principle of
primary jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a falsified
resolution to purposely empower them to file the instant case become moot
and academic.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private
prosecutor's motion for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal.7 The
RTC
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal
sanctions/liability for violation of acts or omission prescribed therein. If ever,
the liability is only for damages and for double the profits which otherwise
would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in law that an
act or omission is not a crime unless there is a law making it so and
providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the facts charged in the
information do not charge an offense. And even assuming arguendo that
they do constitute an offense, the penalty therefor is that provided under
paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is "imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court,"
which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second level
court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution
is the undisputed fact that before this case was filed in Court,
conciliation/mediation process for the amicable settlement of the dispute was
not availed of by the private complainants who are all members (directors) of
the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in
accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the Cooperative Code
itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of
Cooperative dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The
dispute involving the parties is certainly a dispute and issue between and
among directors, officers or members of the A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed by the Guidelines.
Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of
the President as outlined in the Cooperative Code and in its implementing
rules not having been resorted to by the complainants, the rule on primary
jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and
determine the present case.8cralawlawlibrary
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside
the RTC Orders dated October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and
remanded the case records to the RTC for further proceedings. On January
31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its
decision.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS
AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124
OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE TO THE PENAL SANCTION FOR
VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-6938 AND
ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS
INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER
PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT TFIE
RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A
GROUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT.
2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER
GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL
CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938,
(COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE
ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION - EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING TO COURT.
3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING
THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL OF THE
CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL,
AND THE DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.
4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-
ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER PENALTY HAS
NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND
AMENDED COOPERATIVE CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY
TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE OF EXPOSE
(SIC) FACTO LAW.
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out as the proper
remedy to assail the CA decision.
Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the
assailed CA decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits
that the Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one of the party
respondents, and considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since
the focal issue raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an
interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by RA 7691. She adds that had she chosen to file an appeal by
certiorari, the Court would be faced with the same question of law.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.11 In Mercado v.
Court of Appeals,12 the Court had again stressed the distinction between
the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to
xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a
petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action
under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein
provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the
lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45.
xxx.
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association,
Inc.,14 the Court explained that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where
an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor
is grave abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party cannot file a
petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said
procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications.
The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari
under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.
Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper remedy, petition may be
dismissed outright.
However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when
the petition before it is clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules
45 and 65.15 In accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules
of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as
having been filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered
by petitioner for a more liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it
was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the petition at bench lacks
substantive merit and raises only questions of law which should have been
duly made in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.16
On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's
criminal case for violation of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the CA ruling that it is
the RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over
her case.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments
of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of
the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for
the crime charged at the time of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective
of the amount of fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise.
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of
the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in
accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members) of RA 6938 provides only for a civil liability but not a
criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her criminal case
which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section
124:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting
cooperatives are hereby prohibited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is
imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors,
Officers and Committee Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section
124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain, unambiguous, and categorical.
She submits that statutory construction of such clear provisions, especially if
prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would subject her to higher
penalty, should not be allowed.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over
petitioner's case pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of
Section 47 (liability of directors, officers and committee members), Section
50 (disloyalty of a director) and Section 51 (illegal use of confidential
information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not
more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; (Emphasis
supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a
clerical error because the "liability of directors, officers and committee
members" is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while Section
47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and employees,
to wit:
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. -
Directors, officers and committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote
for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of gross negligence
or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or
committee member shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or
profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or
acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest or equity adverse to the
cooperative in respect to any matter which has been reposed in him in
confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for damages
and for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-
laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receive any
compensation except for reasonable per diem: Provided, That any
compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by a
majority vote of the members with voting rights at a regular or special
general assembly meeting specifically called for the purpose: Provided
further, that no additional compensation other than per diems shall be paid
during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any
compelling reason to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on
why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her criminal case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may
correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would
render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or
impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent
on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.
To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute
and give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a
statute a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and
avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and
in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule under which it must be held
without variance or shadow of turning the legislature intended to make a
typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the
act, and not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.
xxxx
Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124,
paragraph 4, as the trial court did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the
dismissal of the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec] 46 of
the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee Members,"
provides for violations under which the said officers could be held liable for,
and the corresponding liability for damages and profits from the said
violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for penal sanction, an
application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision
evidently refers to the penal sanction on erring directors, officers and
committee members. It would make no sense if we were to follow what
clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124, paragraph 4
instead, just because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47,
which upon examination of the Code provides for the "Compensation" of the
directors, officers and other employees of the cooperative.
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3)
should refer to "[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and [Section] 51 (Illegal use
of confidential information)." Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec]
46, therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more
than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg.
129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.18cralawlawlibrary
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in
Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and
committee members, has been recognized and duly corrected when the
legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of
2008." Pertinent portions of the corrected provision read:
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors,
officers and committee members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or
assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or
committee members shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or
profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members, and other persons.
xxxx
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting
cooperatives are hereby prohibited:
xxxx
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of
Article 45 on the Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members,
Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a Director, and Article 49 on the Illegal Use of
Confidential Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than five (5)
years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion;
[Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated
when the Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without
undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative
Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative.
Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case
for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-
cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative
dispute and should have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly
argued by the People, this is not an intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-
cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the
same cooperative. The instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative
and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for
and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is not an intra-cooperative
dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the regular court.19cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party
is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal case
for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party,
while the Cooperative and its members are mere private complainants and
witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly,
such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as
it is not one arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court
rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to the
evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in
a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule that the
grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final
and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed
after the prosecution had rested its case" and when the same is granted, it
calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends
there.23cralawlawlibrary
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and
dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the
case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being
the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as
an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.24 As aptly noted by the CA:
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the
case against her is an acquittal. It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is
always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the
evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable
doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because
the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not
show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc."25cralawlawlibrary
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right
against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that
the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double
jeopardy did not attach, thus:
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double
jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case
against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the
finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted
or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent
of the accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with
the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the
case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued by the People,
where the dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the
accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against doubly
jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of
petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.26cralawlawlibrary
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the
prosecution of her case before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA
6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res judicata because the
MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution27 dated August 13, 2012,
granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.28 In
support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the private
complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and the subject
matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are the
same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually
and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing
on criminal proceedings.29 At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally
related to double jeopardy which embrace's a prohibition against being tried
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of
double jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is
for the same offense as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.32
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double
jeopardy are present in view of the MeTC Resolution33 dated August 13,
2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a
criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No.
370119-20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of
double jeopardy — a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first
— is present. Such question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is
addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses
charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions
of the offense involved.34
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged
in the information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private document under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to
determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for
violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court
holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not
necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second offense.
The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand,
alleged that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of
A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part
of her duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School
Year 1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in
violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the RPC. The elements of falsification of
private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph
7, Article 171;36 (2) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at
least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other
hand, that being then such officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner
willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her
duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with
Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales
profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The
essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the
offender is a director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender
willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b)
is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with
their duty as such directors, officers or committee member.
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of
the crimes of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the
RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the
Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be
said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third
requisite for double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements
different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as
what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the
latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special, law
enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the
other.38cralawlawlibrary
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct
offenses as discussed above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA
6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on
double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused
may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if
these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against
one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal
Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the
prosecution of the other.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court
of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu
City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated
December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution2 dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City,
petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the
crime of libel committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-
Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of
impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo,
a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious
intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the
health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to
serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel
Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company
physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn
obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports
reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing
in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her
story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr.
Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking seven
months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an
operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los
Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a
clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family
chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to
recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the
hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty
in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating
to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and
vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole
on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly
turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease
was already on the terminal state.
The company and the family spent some ₱150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all
healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the
conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license
for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed
away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians
treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of
multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are
equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also
have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-
called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and
mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still
prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although
mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands
they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days,
conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the
mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died
July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G
Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of
professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician,
which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false
and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous,
offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the
said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel
de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial
thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners
guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence
aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny
Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for
the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months
and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay
a fine of ₱1,000.00 each.7
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8 dated
February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which
affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT
ARTICLE "LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF
ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF
MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT
ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER
OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE
OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory
imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr.
Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at
the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a
newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family
and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist
criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to
be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was
written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They
contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication
of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the
prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of
the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that
the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnist’s
exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of
Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held
responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are
reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45;
that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of
malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the
prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already
passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA,
affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on
records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, may alter the result of the case − a situation that is not,
however, obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their
petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that
malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised
as an issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first
time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain
allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the
RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before
this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised
the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that
the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case
cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this
Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein
the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned
ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual
circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the
departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal
case.11
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court
held in Macasaet v. People12 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)13
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written
defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as
follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the
criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided
at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time
of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.15
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private
individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the
venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous
article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for
convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and
Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of
impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo,
a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious
intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with
a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a
private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of
which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others
whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty,
virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former
Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring
and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a
magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as
Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the
RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The
Court made the following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word
"published" is utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants
"cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in
Manila." The Information states that the libelous articles were published in
Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is
in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and
not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File
was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was
published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading
national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star
are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers
are published and first printed in Cebu.1avvphi1
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in
Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there
would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations
where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer
or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file
a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because
these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is
precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.18
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a private
individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the
RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous
article was "published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines," the Court
did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the
venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private
individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The
Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr.
Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician
and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and
positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually
residing in another place.
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged that
the "offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
Club and of good standing and reputation in the community," the Court did
not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was
actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is
required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the
place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house
therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental
elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined
with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an
indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in
Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing
therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that
the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time
thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may
have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the
meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.21

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the
offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.22 Considering that
the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under
Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to
hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with
the court of competent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24,
2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No.
44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164938. August 22, 2005
VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3; ANTHONY DE
LEON and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’
(CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Victor C. Agustin which, in turn,
assailed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch
3, denying the motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
17892-R to 17895-R, for libel.
On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, filed four
separate Informations2 charging the petitioner, a Philippine Daily Inquirer
columnist, with libel. The inculpatory portion of that in Criminal Case No.
17892-R is quoted infra, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent and malicious intent and evil motive of
attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue
and reputation of one Anthony De Leon the acting general manager of the
Baguio Country Club, and as a private citizen of good standing and
reputation in the community and with malicious intent of exposing the (sic)
Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor,
without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and
criminally prepare or cause to prepare, write in his column "Cocktails" and
publish in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in
the City of Baguio and in the entire Philippines, wherein in said column the
said accused did then and there defame the complainant Anthony De Leon
by branding and imputing upon him the following defamatory and libelous
statements, to wit:
"The trysting place between the President Marcos and Hollywood actress
Dovie Beams is not the subject of a high level tax evasion investigation
ordered by no less than the new BIR Commissioner, Dakila Fonacier.
That bungalow on Northwestern Street had hastily changed hands in the last
two years, and had supposedly been sold to, first Anthony De Leon, the
acting general manager of the exclusive Baguio Country Club, who in turn
disposed of it to an unwitting Chinoy couple.
According to preliminary BIR findings, the transfer to Mr. De Leon is already
spurious since the cook De Leon had been missing and had gone ‘TNT’ in
New York more than eight years ago. The spurious sale to the male De Leon
who is not related to the cook, was necessary to make it appear that it had
been an intra-family transfer.
Second, the Baguio Country Club manager made it appear that he and his
family had been using the house himself, but the BIR had now gotten a
certification from the Greenhills homeowners’ association that the said
bungalow has all these years been rented to third parties, the last of which
was an ADB executive.
The most damaging of the findings was the supposed transfer price of the
bungalow between the De Leons and how much the bungalow was later
palmed off to the Chinese-Filipino couple.
We will leave those details for the BIR Commissioner to announce himself,
that, if he could overcome the tremendous and well-oiled lobbying efforts by
De Leon’s principals.
Tip: One of the principals is a lawyer and self-proclaimed best friend of
Lenny ‘Dragon Lady’ de Jesus."
which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous words and statements
have been read by the personnel of the Baguio Country Club, by the
residents of the City of Baguio, and by the public in the other parts of the
country, and that those libelous and defamatory words and statements
aforementioned are untrue, false and malicious tending to impeach the
character, integrity, virtue and reputation of the said Anthony De Leon as
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, thus, placing and
causing said Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, dishonor, discredit
and ridicule which acts are serious and insulting in nature, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Anthony De Leon.3
Except for the alleged libelous articles, as well as the dates of the
commission of the crimes charged therein, the three other Informations are
similarly worded.
Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to all
the charges.4
Agustin then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations, on the sole ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out
that the said Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended
party, Anthony de Leon, was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of
general circulation in Baguio City.
Private complainant De Leon, through counsel, opposed the motion, alleging
that he was a bona fide resident of the Baguio Country Club located at the
Country Club Road, Baguio City; he was also the acting general manager of
the club at the time the alleged libelous article was published. He
emphasized that the Informations alleged that he was of good standing and
reputation in the community, and that the word "community" meant Baguio
City, where he was residing. Moreover, Agustin was estopped from assailing
the court’s lack of jurisdiction since he was arraigned before he filed his
motion to quash the Information. Even if it may be assumed that there was
some ambiguity in the Informations as to whether he was an actual resident
of Baguio City, amending them would suffice; based on the entirety of the
context and applying the doctrine of necessary implication, there can be no
other conclusion than that he was a resident of Baguio City.
By way of Reply, Agustin averred that the allegations in the Informations
(that the private complainant was the acting general manager of the Baguio
Country Club and was a private citizen of good standing and reputation in
the community) do not constitute an allegation that the private complainant
was an actual resident of Baguio City. He insisted that to construe the word
"community" in the Informations to mean the community in Baguio City
would be to unduly strain the limits of a fair interpretation; there must be
clear and positive allegations in the Informations that the private complainant
actually resided in Baguio City. He argued that he was not estopped from
assailing the court’s jurisdiction over the crimes charged even after his
arraignment because lack of jurisdiction is a matter which can be dealt with
at any time.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court issued an Order5 denying the motion to
quash, holding that in the light of the petitioner’s admission that the private
complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, "it was
reasonable to infer therefrom that the private complainant was actually a
resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged libelous articles were
published."
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, insisting that the
mere fact that the private complainant was the General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club did not necessarily mean that the latter was actually
residing in Baguio City, as it was also possible that he was actually residing
in a place nearby. The trial court, however, denied the motion on April 1,
2002.
Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a plea for
an injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his Motion to Quash.
On February 24, 2004, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It
disagreed with Agustin, and held that the trial court did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in so ruling.
According to the CA, while the Informations filed by the prosecution did not
contain allegations that the complainant was actually a resident of Baguio
City at the time the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published,
and that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in
Baguio City, such defects were merely of form and not of substance. Thus,
there is no need to quash the Informations, as they may merely be amended
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that "an amendment, either of form or substance,
may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge,
and thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court."6 The CA further
ruled that any amendment that would be made to conform to the private
complainant’s residency requirements would not place the accused at a
disadvantage.
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate
court denied for lack of merit.7
Agustin, now the petitioner, insists that the CA erred in dismissing his
petition for certiorari and prohibition, it appearing that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the
Informations, as well as his motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
order denying the same.
The petitioner maintains that in the absence of any allegations in the
Informations that the private respondent was actually residing in Baguio City,
or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio
City as mandated by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He asserts that the
amendments of the Informations would likewise be improper, considering
that the defects of the Informations were not merely of form but of
substance. The petitioner posits that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional
and mandatory; hence, conformably with the decisions of the Court in Lopez
v. City Judge,8 and Agbayani v. Sayo,9 the Informations must be quashed.
In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
maintains that the failure of the Informations to allege that the private
respondent is a resident of Baguio City (where the Informations were filed) is
not a jurisdictional defect. It asserts that the averment in the Informations
that the crimes charged were committed within the jurisdiction of the trial
court in Baguio City, taken in conjunction with the other allegations therein,
are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the subject cases in the RTC of Baguio
City.
For his part, the private complainant reiterated his arguments in the RTC and
in the CA in his Comment on the Petition.
The threshold issues in the present petition are (1) whether or not the RTC
of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four
Informations on the premise that the Informations are defective; and (2)
whether the Informations may be amended to cure the said defects.
The petition is meritorious.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.10 The
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed
or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.11
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides –
ART. 360. Persons responsible.— Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in
the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city
or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance or the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is
a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published:
Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where
the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the
court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall
acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided, finally,
That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil
and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as
provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal
of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance
of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the
criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided
at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time
of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.12
Experience has shown that under the old rule, the offended party could
harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action
in a remote or distant places.13 To obviate controversies as to the venue of
the criminal action from written defamation, the complaint or Information
should contain allegations as to whether the offended party was a public
officer or a private individual at the time the offense was committed, and
where he was actually residing at that time; whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise
be alleged.14
In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was
actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses,
or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio
City. It cannot even be inferred from the allegation "the offended party was
the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good
standing and reputation in the community" that the private respondent
(complainant) was actually residing in Baguio City.
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is
required. However, the residence must be more than temporary.15 The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the
place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house
therein.16 To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental
elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined
with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an
indefinite time.17 While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of
the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in
Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing
therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that
the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time
thereat does not render such person a resident therein.18 Where one may
have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the
meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.19
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations
are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations
that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the
crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed,
the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court
cannot be allowed.20
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 are SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is hereby DIRECTED TO
QUASH the Informations and DISMISS the cases against petitioner Victor C.
Agustin in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-R.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012
HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly
within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the
case and render judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January
2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a
house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then
mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended
the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of
the title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of
the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would
be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a
corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth
Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed
that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other
transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank
of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount
of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s
fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to
pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita
Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the
said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in
possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the said accused failed
and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the
aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel,
entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and
the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial
and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding
accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence
as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which
offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned
information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal.
Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja
the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and
Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the
name "Treñas", under which he was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which
was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the
CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari12 before this Court. He asked for a period
of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his
motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED
HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK
OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS
IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE
BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF
ESTAFA;13
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented
by the prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by
petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued
by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any
indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and
notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in
Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as
well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City
was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by
petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to
allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in
Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to
prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000
actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was
actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended party. Thus, the latter’s
demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have
been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand
was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27
July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional
period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011,
the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period
of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting
petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the
factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of ₱150,000 to
him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him
and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been
filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as
he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to
weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight,
unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance,
which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no
valid demand" was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand
letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants
alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was
adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry
Return Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for
executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition
requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence
upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has
laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on
misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record.14
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of
the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation
of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on
conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without
any finding as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas
had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that
he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to
him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had
obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts
purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent
purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his
duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant
Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the
argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court
denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its
findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was
incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the
other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is
only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the
evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would
still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo
City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by
private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning
the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to
be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire
concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because
the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus,
his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this
wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it
is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the
formal offer of prosecution’s evidence nor present any evidence on his
behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the
amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be
given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility
of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal.
They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
review.17
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual
findings of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal
cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip
v. People,18 this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was
committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa,
wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the
offense took place within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to
establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with
him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the
premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x
xx
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed
with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in
Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April
19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of
the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in
Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,
P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there
proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has
in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is
authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the
elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit:
that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that
with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter
pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell
the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the
initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated
differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and
Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending
to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with
his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should
be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing
of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under
Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in
the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed. It provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY.
HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and
ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the
latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA
ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps
and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished
was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A
copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS
issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s
fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the
net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela
Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as
follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.22
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23
that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A
review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of
the place where the offense was allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what
happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have
to… and she will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for
the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for
documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses
for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified
during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated
December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this
court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treñas issued
to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given
to Atty. Treñas by you, what happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the
offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in
the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of
the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection
may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law
in the manner and form prescribed by law.26
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the
court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from
that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him
great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where,
due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing
health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against
him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the
RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.29
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by
petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional
Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling
the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.1âwphi1
Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was
spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting
or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.31
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as
they fall due or upon demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.34
In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case,
should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds
received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to
immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the
appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010
and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal
Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is
REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The
petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the
Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The
RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-
Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay
City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making
a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on
April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000,
was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that
the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the
MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third
element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was
not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or
proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court
when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury
by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out
perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.5 The
MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to
annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in
United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which ruled that venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of
[Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009)
however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with
respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the
rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject
document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to
state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the
case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which
constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of
subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the
accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-
affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned
documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the
subject documents before the court of Makati City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave
abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based
on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that
the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly,
the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the
petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-
Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and
quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend
that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling
in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in Ilusorio
showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements
was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the
perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that
was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’
view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby
treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on
Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate
or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue
and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines
not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the
court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this
rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the
locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused
on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for
his defense are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries
jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where
any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement
under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it
may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory
pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement
under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent
person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that
fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of
perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the
truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants
pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.14
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit
upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by
law or made for a legal purpose.15 (emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the
ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information
must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of
perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the
MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have
been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a
notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x
x x.16
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was
also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay
City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the
Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused
knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly
shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were
not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the
proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case
that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the
basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements
contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions
containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City,
but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was:
which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to
try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay
City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned
out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found
relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of
United States. v. Cañet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it
appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit,
"swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in
Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and
underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the
perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to.
We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the
dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material
falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is
complete when a witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the
historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of
the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and
181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC);
and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on
the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful
statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited
by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling,
although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet
which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.21 Sy
Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case
that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case.
Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered
after the present RPC took effect.22
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury
through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn
affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on
perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in
Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4,
Section 6 of General Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or
certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is
guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall
moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 539224
and 539325 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No. 1697
was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in
our jurisdiction.27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the
venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by
the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.28 The
venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false
document was presented since the presentation was the act that
consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the
RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the
present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the
present Code. To quote these authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del
Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of
the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code.
Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were
impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23,
1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of
1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321
of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly
revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes
perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on
perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American
statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace
perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury
as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe
and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC
which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly
makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the
next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases
ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under
oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a
false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any
material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC –
essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed
and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City.
Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in
a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs
of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the
offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been
the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an
actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported
and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of
Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in
a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the
perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings,
and at the same time separately penalized the making of false statements
under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false
testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time
also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs
of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn
to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where
the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of
title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the
charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court
ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay
because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new
owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court, "whether the
perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,"32 citing Cañet as authority for its
statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on
venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations
to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the
place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration,
forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while
Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the
charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself
constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then
have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil
case, although no such distinction was made under Cañet because the
applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the
Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of
an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false
testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not
because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of
a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was
taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various
changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to
122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly
included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential
ingredients of the crime took place.1âwphi1 This change was followed by the
passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,34 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue
of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place
where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made
integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that
followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable
provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of
this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the
making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the
statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in
accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the
Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a
false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the
affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that
all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is
given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack
of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,
Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE,
and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September
21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated
November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all
issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6,
2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE
forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon
and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-
3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2
Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of
SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of
arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted
the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent
motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the
meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took
over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to
petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State
Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge
Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order
dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint
Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and
22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the
prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this
Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532
dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent
in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully
committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view
of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in
the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court
the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July
6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the
alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in
the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court
of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-
issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No.
36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional
trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent
to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body
of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the
Court of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person
to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of
arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to
the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the
court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of
the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were
not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed
their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate;
to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for
bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over
their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication
of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice
Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other
relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192),
the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause
without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice.
And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered
the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually
ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before
the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files
a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one
can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be
in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law
is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited
to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of
Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which
is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of
the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.
Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of
the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the
accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in
the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement
of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16
we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’"
The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could
just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance
with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case
of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of
the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are:
(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are
included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions
to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that
failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is
the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of
the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances,
an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this,
there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused
who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed
their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these
cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and
the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department
of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from
further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal
cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in
applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest.
If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very
rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who
will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did
find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the
warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still
be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22
Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against
him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is
likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before
asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights
than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of
liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the
political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of
Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the
criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant
of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal
to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of
probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the
Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the
criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary
of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant
of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x
prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the
proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to
charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity
when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the
petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s resolution
to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of
a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to
quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground
that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ
Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as
premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of
arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad
asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-
quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to
Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the
arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds
merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as
having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination
of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated
that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification,
under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the
order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the
fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such
indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint
Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally
evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under
Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the
following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente
Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part
of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge
Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad
ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following
reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the
National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered
himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it
was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario
where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of
the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason
to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a
witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As
we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another
case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among
other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge Anghad summarily
dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the
following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al.,
RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he
pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other
police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the
Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn
Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the
decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the
defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when the
Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced
in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state
witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted
to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated
October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the
Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the
accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the
prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder
filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to
twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was
still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was
presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a
crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable
doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found
that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which
interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners
in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The
accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of
respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable
doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without
probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our
decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually
points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein.
Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations
two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary
restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The
bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the
dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild
suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of
the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new
warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of
probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new
warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of
arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous
semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other
dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the
Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad
void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to
carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had
been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed
unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new
warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have
been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary
investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also
available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to
personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the
certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and
Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not
rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule
the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a
judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued
therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were
assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals.
As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad,
which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is
NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court
of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint
Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case
because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution.
Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the
14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order,
however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to
Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to
the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent
in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the
case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad
committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,
respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious
than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001
Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our
12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing
of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the
bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing
as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are
cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be
heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in
contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should
be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November
2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be
invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his
express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as
well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of
abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent
bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of
People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No.
36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December
2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of
the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the
cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10)
days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to
this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said
compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act
on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants
of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P.
Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably
with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003
is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.