Skepticism Belief and The Criterion of T

U:/p_1/apeiron/apeiron13_03/apeiron-2012-0026/apeiron-2013-0026r.3d vom 31.5.
2013
Schriften: (In der CS3-VMware standardmäßig installierte TrueType-Schriften und
aus Schriftenordner OTF-Schriften)
#2123065 Sociocultural Pragmatics 1–2/2013
DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0026  apeiron 2013; aop
Whitney Schwab
Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion
of Truth1
Abstract: This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the cen-
tral argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepti-
cism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains
that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth
exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of
truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about
anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argu-
ment in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of truth along the lines pro-
posed by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, the argument fails because such criter-
ia were introduced to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as
knowledge, and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in
the first place. Second, if we broaden our conception of a criterion of truth,
such that a criterion is any standard against which an impression can be eval-
uated, the argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’.
On the one hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion
in order to make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning
their existence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. On
the other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a cri-
terion, possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making
judgments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptics’ epistemic attitude towards the
existence of criteria of truth (i.e. suspension of judgment) does not entail that
skeptics cannot possess any beliefs.
Keywords: skepticism, Pyrrhonism, criterion of truth, belief
Whitney Schwab: Princeton University – Philosophy, Philosophy Department 212 1879 Hall
Princeton University Princeton New Jersey 08544, United States;
E-mail: wschwab@princeton.edu

1 I would like to thank Charles Brittain, Matt Evans, and Hendrik Lorenz for helpful discussion
and written comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Ryan Cook,
Adam Crager, Josh Gillon, and Jack Woods for helpful discussion. James Allen provided (albeit
indirectly) a very helpful comment on the third section of this paper. Above all I would like to
thank Benjamin Morison, with whom the ideas expressed in this paper have been in develop-
ment for quite some time.
U:/p_1/apeiron/apeiron13_03/apeiron-2012-0026/apeiron-2013-0026r.3d vom 31.5.2013
2  Whitney Schwab
One of the most pressing questions concerning the skepticism outlined by Sex-
tus Empiricus is, “Can one be a true skeptic and possess any beliefs?”2 In his
groundbreaking work on skepticism, Jonathan Barnes offers a general philoso-
phical argument to the effect that the answer to this question must be ‘No’.3 In
brief, the argument centers on the consequences of the skeptic’s resolute sus-
pension of judgment (epochê) on one specific philosophical question, namely
whether there exists a criterion of truth. Barnes thinks that, because skepticism
requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can,
consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; but, he argues,
anyone who does not possess a criterion of truth cannot make any judgments of
any kind about anything; yet, he contends, making judgments is a necessary
condition for believing anything. Hence, Barnes concludes, skepticism pre-
cludes the possession of any beliefs.
The aim of this paper is to reject this argument. This project is of the utmost
importance to developing a correct understanding of skepticism since Barnes,
among others, takes the argument to be the main philosophical obstacle facing
those who might like to give a positive answer to my opening question. Indeed,
Myles Burnyeat goes so far as to refer to the skeptic’s inability to find an “intel-
lectually satisfying criterion” as “the real backbone of the discussion” over
whether a skeptic can possess beliefs [1980, 29]. Moreover, the argument is par-
ticularly interesting because it is a philosophical argument that attempts to
tease out the consequences of aspects that are uncontroversially part of the
skeptical position. As such, it does not rely on any idiosyncrasies there may be
in Sextus’ particular presentation of skepticism. Rather, it deals directly with
deep and subtle epistemological issues about the extent to which one’s philoso-
phical views (e.g. concerning the existence of criteria of truth) might have an
impact on one’s every-day practice of belief formation. To adopt the language
that Barnes and Burnyeat use, the argument forces us to consider whether our
ordinary practice of making judgments can be “insulated” from our philosophi-
cal failure to find decisive reason for making judgments in the way that we do.4
As stated above, Barnes’ argument stems from Sextus’ explicit report that
the skeptic suspends judgment concerning the existence of criteria of truth
(PH II 18). I will examine what Sextus means by this by considering the concep-
tions of criteria of truth that he discusses. I will argue that, if we limit ourselves
to those conceptions, Barnes’ argument fails because such criteria were posited

2 In this paper, “skepticism” is short for “Pyrrhonian skepticism.”
3 Barnes presents this argument in [1982, 77–78].
4 For the language of “insulation” see Burnyeat [1984] and Barnes [2007].
Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  3
in order to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as knowledge
and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in the first place.
This result, however, by no means exhausts the power of Barnes’ argument.
Even if the argument fails when we consider the conceptions of criteria of truth
offered by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, it still has philosophical import. The
argument can be re-interpreted in such a way that it takes its force from the
obvious fact that people discriminate among impressions – that is, that only a
proper subset of a person’s impressions will give rise to judgments. This phe-
nomenon suggests that people must be employing some criterion, although not
necessarily the sort of criterion that the Hellenistic philosophers propose, in
making judgments.
On this understanding, Barnes’ central claim would be that the skeptics’
ability to make judgments cannot be insulated from their philosophical inability
to find some basis on which to discriminate between their impressions. I argue
that, even on such a broadened conception of criteria of truth, Barnes’ argu-
ment fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’. On the one
hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion in order to
make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning their exis-
tence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. One the
other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a criterion,
possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making judg-
ments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptic’s philosophical failure to find an intel-
lectually satisfying criterion does not entail that she cannot make any judg-
ments and, hence, possess any beliefs, about the world.
I: The Argument
In this section I lay out Barnes’ central argument in favor of the view that skep-
ticism precludes the possession of any beliefs. I focus here, and in what follows,
on the version advanced in Barnes [1982, 77–78].5
Sextus directly addresses the question whether the skeptic can possess
dogmata in a chapter entitled “Does the Skeptic Dogmatizein” (PH I 13–15).
Although the verb “dogmatizein” and the noun “dogma” are often rendered as
“to hold beliefs” and “belief” respectively, I leave them transliterated. I do this
because the debate over this section is precisely whether the mental states at

5 Burnyeat [1984, 114–16] offers what he calls a “generalization” of Barnes’ argument.
issue are, in fact, beliefs. Thus, it would prejudge the matter to translate the
relevant words at this point in the proceedings. I quote Sextus in full:
When we say that skeptics do not dogmatizein, we do not take ‘dogma’ in that sense in
which some say, quite generally, that dogma is acquiescing in something; for skeptics
assent to the states that are forced upon us so far as impressions are concerned – for
example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, ‘I think I am not heated (or:
chilled).’ Rather, we say that they do not hold dogmata in the sense in which some say
that dogma is assent to some non-evident matter (adêlôn) of investigation in the sciences
(kata tas epistêmas); for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything non-evident. (PH I 13)6
Sextus here distinguishes between two kinds of mental states, one of which a
skeptic can possess, one of which a skeptic cannot possess. If the mental states
a skeptic can possess count as beliefs, then clearly skepticism is compatible
with the possession of beliefs.
Barnes’ argument that the skeptic cannot possess any beliefs begins from
the fact that Sextus says the skeptic does not assent to any non-evident matter
of investigation in the sciences. According to Barnes, the belief that there is a
criterion of truth is a “perfect specimen” of the sort of dogma a skeptic cannot
possess [1982, 78]. That is, the existence of criteria of truth is a non-evident mat-
ter and so the skeptic must suspend judgment concerning it. As a result, Barnes
claims, the skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth. His argument can then
be presented as follows:
[1] one must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p

[2] one must judge that p in order to believe that p
[3] the skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth,7 so
[4] the skeptic cannot judge that p (from 1 and 3), therefore
[C] the skeptic cannot believe that p (from 2 and 4)
This argument is supposed to hold for any proposition whatsoever. Thus, ac-
cording to Barnes, it is the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning the ex-
istence of criteria of truth that renders her incapable of making any judgments
and, hence, possessing any beliefs whatsoever. As Barnes sums up his argu-
ment: “the possession of ordinary beliefs presupposes the possession of at least
one dogma – the dogma that there is a criterion of truth” [ibid., 78]. It is small
wonder that Burnyeat refers to the skeptic’s inability to find an intellectually
satisfying criterion as the “real backbone of the discussion” [1980, 29].

6 Translations of PH begin from (and remain largely faithful to) Annas and Barnes [2000].
Translations of M begin from Bett [2005].
7 Barnes acknowledges that he may only be entitled to the premise ‘the skeptic does not be-
lieve that she possesses a criterion of truth’ [1982, 78]. I deal with this modification below (Sec-
tion 4).
It is a familiar point that in epistemological contexts, modal operators such

as “must” and “cannot” may denote two different kinds of modalities: on the
one hand, they may indicate psychological necessity; on the other hand, they
may indicate rational necessity. Barnes’ argument, as he presents it, is directed
against the psychological possibility of making judgments while being in a state
of epochê towards the existence of criteria of truth. That is, when Barnes claims
that one must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p he means that
it is psychologically impossible to judge that p without possessing a criterion of
truth. Indeed, the majority of the debate over whether a skeptic can possess
beliefs centers on issues of psychological possibility.8 This focus is understand-
able – the charge of irrationality seems misplaced against an epistemological
position that does not claim to have any rational support. Although I, too, will
focus on issues of psychological possibility, I briefly turn my attention to issues
of rational permissibility in the final section of this paper.
II: Criteria of Truth

As we saw above, Barnes’ claim that the skeptic does not possess a criterion of
truth depends upon his claim that the skeptic suspends judgment whether there
is a criterion of truth. Barnes’ evidence for this latter claim, in turn, comes from
the section in Sextus in which “[the skeptics] produce reasons for doubting the
existence of a criterion (PH 2.14–96; M 7.24–8.140)” (Barnes [1982, 77–78]). In-
deed, in that discussion, Sextus explicitly reports that the skeptic suspends
judgment concerning the existence of criteria of truth (PH II 18, 79). In order to
determine what Sextus means by this, and, so, to determine what notion of cri-
teria of truth must be at issue in Barnes’ argument, we must examine the con-
ceptions of criteria of truth that Sextus discusses. There are, however, many
difficulties surrounding a correct interpretation of these conceptions. Fortu-
nately for our purposes, the aspects that are immediately relevant to evaluating
Barnes’ argument are limited and, I think, relatively uncontroversial.9
It is perfectly understandable why commentators have placed such impor-
tance on the skeptic’s epistemic attitude towards the existence of criteria of
truth. Indeed, I think that much of Barnes’ philosophical creativity on this issue
consists in looking towards Sextus’ discussion of criteria of truth in order to

8 See, for example, the discussion in Frede [1979] and Burnyeat [1980, 1984].
9 In my discussion of criteria of truth I am heavily influenced by the work of Gisela Striker
[1974, 1990] and Michael Frede [1983, 1999].
provide an answer to the age-old question whether skepticism precludes the

possession of any beliefs. In the Outlines, Sextus begins his presentation of the
“specific” (eidikos) account of skepticism with the following comment10:
The Stoics and some others say that there are three parts of philosophy – logic, physics,
ethics – and they begin their exposition with logic (although there has indeed been much
dissension even about where one should begin). We follow them without holding any opi-
nion on the matter; and since what is said in the three parts requires judgment and a
criterion (kritêrion) and the account of criteria seems to be included in the logical part, let
us begin with the account of criteria and with the logical part. (PH II 13; cf. M VII 24)
So, what are these criteria of truth that Sextus says in some way underlie the
entire dogmatic philosophical enterprise? At the beginning of his discussion of
criteria of truth in M VII, Sextus writes:
[E]vident things (ta enargê) are thought to become known (gnôrizesthai) all by them-
selves through some criterion (dia kritêriou), while unclear things are thought to be
tracked down through signs and demonstrations, by way of a transition from evident
things. (M VII 25)
At a general level, then, criteria of truth were introduced into philosophical dis-
course to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could have a special episte-
mic status (cf. Cicero, Academica I 40–42). Such beliefs, it was argued, would
either themselves count as knowledge or could provide a secure foundation for
attaining knowledge. It has been well documented that Sextus does not always
seem consistent on whether the principal role of criteria of truth is to guarantee
knowledge of evident things or non-evident things.11 In the passage just quoted
it would seem to be the former, but shortly after Sextus says that criteria of truth
are “every measure of apprehension of a non-evident thing” (M VII 33). Although
these discrepancies are important for an overall understanding of Hellenistic
epistemology, the important point for our purposes is uncontroversial: criteria of
truth serve to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs can have a special status
(i.e. can count as knowledge); they do not serve to guarantee the possibility of
possessing beliefs in the first place.12

10 The specific account of skepticism, which consists in direct attacks on the particular views
of various dogmatic schools, contrasts with the “general” (καθόλου) account, which consists in
a characterization of skepticism at a general level. The former account occupies Books II and II
of the PH and all of M; the latter account occupies Book I of the PH.
11 See Barnes [1982, 77] and, most notably, Brunschwig [1988].
12 This general point is common ground among most commentators who discuss criteria of
truth. For a few representative samples, see Striker: “the debate [over criteria of truth] centered
on the question of whether it is possible to distinguish with certainty between true and false
opinions and assertions…” [1974, 22, emphasis mine]; Long: “For Epicureans and Stoics alike a
By far the two most prominent and well worked out theories of criteria of
truth that Sextus discusses are those of the Stoic and Epicurean schools. Indeed,
scholars have long noted that Sextus’ attempt to understand pre-Hellenistic
epistemological theories as involving criteria of truth (see, for example, his gen-
eral survey in M VII 46–260) may be dangerously anachronistic.13 Although
many difficulties surround these two conceptions, I wish briefly to lay them out
and give a rough idea of how they are supposed to operate.
The favored Stoic criterion of truth is the famous “cataleptic impression”
(phantasia katalêptikê), which is defined as an impression that:
(1) arises from what is and (2) is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what
is, (3) of such a kind as could not arise from what is not. (M VII 248; cf. PH II 4 and
Diogenes Laertius’ Lives VII 46, 54)
The definition of the cataleptic impression lays out the conditions an impression
must meet for it to belong to the class of impressions that can give rise to a
mental state the Stoics call catalêpsis. Although catalêpsis is not sufficient for
knowledge (epistêmê), the Stoics claimed that, because it arises from an impres-
sion that is “of such a kind as could not arise from what is not”, it has a more
secure status than that of mere opinion (doxa) (M VII 151–154; Cicero Academica
I 41–42). Because it has this privileged status, catalêpsis can provide a secure
foundation for knowledge – indeed, according to the Stoics, a person possesses
knowledge if and only if all her beliefs are held as a matter of catalêpsis (M VII
151–152).
Epicurus, on the other hand, held the criteria of truth to be sense-impres-
sions (aisthêseis), preconceptions (prolêpseis), and feelings (pathê) (D.L. Lives
X 31; cf. Letter to Herodotus 82).14 According to Epicurus, the truth of sense-im-
pressions must simply be accepted.15 The status of sense-impressions as criteria
of truth resides in the fact that the truth-value of any proposition that does not
express the content of a sense-impression can be determined by reference to
propositions that do (cf. M VII 211–16). To take an example from Striker [1990,

“criterion of truth” is a means of judging correctly that something is the case” [1978, 25, empha-
sis mine]; Baltzly: “A criterion or canon of truth is an instrument for definitely determining that
something is true” [2010, emphasis, mine].
13 See Long [1978, 38].
14 In what follows I will only directly discuss the criterial status of sense-impressions.
15 Epicurus thinks that the truth of sense-impressions must simply be accepted because he
thinks that there is no way to show that a given sense-impression is false (Diogenes Lives X 31–
32; cf. Lucretius De Rerum Natura IV 480–99). Hence, he thinks, we must either reject all
sense-impressions as false or accept them all as true. The former option, however, would make
knowledge impossible, which possibility Epicurus rejects (cf. Lucretius DRN IV 469).
152], the proposition ‘void exists’ (a non-evident matter) can be proven (and,
hence, known) because its denial, namely ‘void does not exist’, is repudiated by
the fact that motion exists, which is a basic truth given in perception.16
Despite the differences between the Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of cri-
teria of truth, there is one important feature that they share in common: both
schools conceived of criteria of truth naturalistically. That is, they held certain
natural faculties and, more centrally, certain deliverances of those natural fa-
culties, to be criteria of truth. The faculties of perception and phantasia, which
generate sense-impressions and cataleptic-impressions, are faculties with which
human beings are naturally endowed. It is not part of either theory that a per-
son must believe that a given candidate is a criterion of truth in order to possess
it. Moreover, the person does not need to believe that the given candidate is a
criterion of truth in order for it to have criterial status. So, for example, a person
does not need to believe that a given impression is cataleptic in order to possess
a cataleptic impression; nor does she need to believe that cataleptic impressions
are criteria of truth in order for them to have criterial status.
With this understanding of criteria of truth in hand we can return to Barnes’
argument.
III: Rejecting Barnes’ Argument

Recall that Barnes’ argument runs as follows:
[1] one must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p

[2] one must judge that p in order to believe that p
[3] the skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth, so
[4] the skeptic cannot judge that p (from 1 and 3), therefore
[C] the skeptic cannot believe that p (from 2 and 4)
It is the task of this section to show that this argument does not work. To do so,
I first evaluate it on the assumption that the criteria of truth at issue are those
offered by Sextus’ dogmatic opponents. I claim that on this understanding, the
argument fails because premise 1 and 3 are false. I then consider whether
Barnes’ argument can go through if we broaden our understanding of criteria of
truth. I argue that even on this second rendering the argument fails because it
equivocates on the notion of “possession”.

16 See Sedley [1982] for a detailed discussion of the role of sense-impressions in confirming
and repudiating propositions.
According to the first premise of Barnes’ argument, one must possess a cri-
terion of truth in order to judge that p. However, if criteria of truth are being
conceived of along the lines proposed by the Hellenistic philosophers, this
claim is false. As we saw in the previous section, dogmatic philosophers intro-
duced criteria of truth to guarantee that some of our beliefs count as knowledge.
We should find it jarring, then, for Barnes to claim that possession of a criterion
of truth is necessary simply for making judgments, rather than for making judg-
ments that have a special status.17 Indeed, in the introduction to his discussion
of criteria of truth in the Outlines, Sextus cites Xenophanes of Colophon as
someone who asserted both that there is no criterion of truth and that “belief
(dokos) is found over all” (PH II 18).18 On the assumption that judgment is
necessary for belief (which I will grant as a conceptual truth and is, after all,
Barnes’ second premise), Xenophanes would have thought that possession of a
criterion is not a necessary condition for judgment. The fact that Sextus unhesi-
tatingly reports that several philosophers both denied the existence of criteria of
truth and maintained the possibility of judgment gives us strong reason to
doubt Barnes’ first premise.
If we move from considerations of the general nature of criteria of truth to
the specific candidates offered by the dogmatists, the problems facing the first
premise become even clearer. To take just one example, consider the Stoic’s
favored candidate, the cataleptic impression. According to the first premise, one
must possess a cataleptic impression in order to judge that p. The most natural
way to take this claim is to mean that one must possess an occurrent cataleptic
impression in order to judge that p. This claim, however, is false. According to
the Stoics, people are constantly making judgments in the absence of a cata-
leptic impression. That is, it is entirely possible for someone to have a non-cata-
leptic impression that represents p as being the case and judge that p without
having to appeal to any other impression, whether cataleptic or non-cataleptic.
Indeed, as Sextus reports, the Stoics maintained that opinion (doxa) just is “as-
sent to the non-cataleptic” (M VII 156).
The third premise, namely that the skeptic does not possess a criterion of
truth, fares no better on the dogmatists’ conceptions of criteria of truth.19 Inso-

17 See Brennan [1994, 154–55] for a similar point against Barnes’ claim.
18 In M VII, Sextus presents this as one of two possible interpretations of Xenophanes (49–52).
On the other interpretation, Xenophanes did accept a criterion of truth (110). Regardless of the
correct interpretation of Xenophanes, the point I make in the main body stands. In M VII, Sextus
also characterizes Xeniades of Corinth (53–54), Anacharsis (55–59), and Protagoras (60–64) as
philosophers who denied the existence of criteria of truth yet maintained the possibility of belief.
19 This marks the major difference between the critique of Barnes’ argument that I am advan-
cing and that of Tad Brennan. Brennan argues that the skeptic’s ἐποχή towards the existence
far as the dogmatists conceived of criteria of truth as natural faculties and the
deliverances of natural faculties, they are the sort of thing that any (normally
developed) human being possesses simply in virtue of being a human being.
They are not the sort of thing that can be disposed of simply as a result of going
through some rational process (e.g. considering arguments for and against the
existence of criteria of truth and suspending judgment on the matter). The
Stoics, for example, would not think that a skeptic’s suspending judgment
whether cataleptic impressions exist could make it the case that she altogether
ceases to have cataleptic impressions. Likewise, Epicurus would not think that
the skeptic’s suspension of judgment could make it the case that she ceases to
have sense-impressions, nor, indeed, that she ceases to have unfailingly true
sense-impressions. To think that skeptics could cease to possess criteria of
truth, as the dogmatists conceive of them, simply by suspending judgment con-
cerning their existence, would be akin to saying that they could alter the struc-
ture of their perceptual system simply by suspending judgment concerning the
criterial status of their perceptual system.
Thus, if we restrict ourselves to a conception of criteria of truth along the
lines proposed by Sextus’ dogmatic opponents, Barnes’ argument does not get
off the ground. Given the general role played by such criteria in their epistemol-
ogy, the dogmatists just could not have thought that it is psychologically neces-
sary to possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p. Furthermore, given
that the particular candidates offered by the dogmatists were naturalistic, sus-
pending judgment concerning their existence could not have been thought to
render the skeptic criterion-less.
This is already an important result. Insofar as the evidence Barnes adduces
in support of the claim that the skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth is
precisely the discussion of criteria of truth we find in Sextus, his argument
misses the mark. However, I think that it would be too quick to dispense en-
tirely with Barnes’ argument. We can understand his argument as being moti-
vated by the following philosophical question: how do we explain why only a
proper subset of a person’s impressions give rise to judgments? That is, we need
some way of explaining why S’s impression that p gives rise to the judgment
that p whereas S’s impression that q does not give rise to the judgment that q.
Why, for example, her impression that the coffee is hot gives rise to the judg-

of criteria of truth, in the sense in which the dogmatists conceive of such criteria, does result in
her failing to possess any such criteria [1994, 157–58]. According to Brennan, however, it is in
virtue of possessing a different sort of criterion that the skeptic is capable of possessing beliefs.
On my view, however, the skeptic’s ἐποχή does not entail that she ceases to possess a criterion
of truth, as the dogmatists conceive of such criteria.
ment that the coffee is hot, whereas her impression that the stick in water is bent
does not give rise to the judgment that the stick in water is bent? Perhaps Barnes
understands criteria of truth, not as things that provide a secure foundation for
knowledge, but simply as anything that can play this explanatory role. Barnes’
point, then, would be that judging that p – that is, any kind of judging, whether
it be the sort of judging that would generate knowledge, or merely belief – re-
quires some criterion, any criterion, which the judger’s impression that p must
pass in order for that impression to give rise to a judgment. A criterion of truth,
on this understanding, is simply any criterion against which an impression can
be evaluated. The main upshot of Barnes’ argument, then, would be that the
skeptic’s ability to make even ordinary judgments cannot be insulated from her
philosophical failure to find a basis on which to discriminate between her im-
pressions. In the rest of this section, I evaluate Barnes’ argument on this broa-
dened conception of a criterion. It is important to note, however, that in turning
to this issue we have departed from the conceptions of criteria of truth offered
by the philosophers with whom Sextus himself did battle.
Let us consider the third premise of Barnes’ argument, namely that the
skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth. On the broadened conception of
criteria, this means that the skeptic does not possess a criterion against which
an impression can be evaluated. As we have seen, the driving force behind this
claim is that the skeptic, like she does on all issues up for philosophical discus-
sion, suspends judgment whether such criteria exist. To be sure, this entails that
she will not believe that criteria of truth exist and, hence, will certainly not be-
lieve that she possesses a criterion against which her impressions can be evalu-
ated. That is, Barnes is entitled to the premise:
[3*] the skeptic does not believe that she possesses a criterion of truth20
It is important to note that it is incorrect to say, “the skeptic believes that she
does not possess a criterion of truth”, as this would attribute a dogmatic belief
to the skeptic. That is, skeptics have found, for every argument to the effect that
there are criteria against which impressions can be evaluated, an equally com-
pelling argument to the effect that there are no such criteria.21 As a result of
having this philosophical experience, skeptics can neither affirm nor deny the
existence of criteria of truth. Thus, they cannot, on this basis, believe that they
possess a criterion of truth, nor can they believe that they do not possess a

20 Barnes, in fact, acknowledges that this may be the only claim to which he is entitled [1982,
78]. I respond directly to Barnes’ modification in the next section.
21 Such arguments can concern either the general question whether there are such criteria or
the particular question whether a specific candidate C is such a criterion.
criterion of truth. Barnes, however, moves seamlessly from the claim that the
skeptic does not believe that she possesses a criterion of truth to the claim that
the skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth. The only way for this move to
be legitimate, however, is for possession of a criterion to require the belief that
a given candidate is, in fact, a criterion of truth. Moreover, given the particular
way in which the skeptic’s failure to have such a belief has come about, namely
by reflecting on considerations pro and contra and finding those considerations
equally balanced, possession must require something like reflective endorse-
ment. On such an understanding of possession, it will be true to say that the
skeptic’s suspension of judgment renders her criterion-less.
Let us turn now to the first premise of Barnes’ argument, namely that one
must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p. If this premise, in con-
junction with the third premise, is to lead to the conclusion Barnes wants, the
notion of possession must remain constant between them. On the conception of
criteria of truth at issue, premise 1 would have to mean that one must believe
that a given candidate is a criterion against which impressions can be evaluated
in order to judge that p. For example, in order for a perceptual impression to
give rise to a judgment, one must have reflectively endorsed perception as being
a criterion against which impressions can be evaluated. This claim, however, is
clearly false. To see this, consider the case of the ‘man on the street.’ Most peo-
ple do not have any reflectively endorsed beliefs about whether there are criteria
against which impressions can be evaluated yet still make all sorts of judg-
ments. If someone were to respond to the statement ‘it is day’ with the question
‘does a criterion justify your belief that it is day?’ this would be most odd. And,
its oddity stems not (or, at least, not only) from the fact that the ordinary, non-
philosophical person is being asked to engage with a sophisticated philosophi-
cal concept. Rather, it stems from the fact that it is quite clear that an ordinary,
non-philosophical person can perfectly well judge that it is day without ever
having considered whether there is some criterion against which one can evalu-
ate an impression.22 As is well known, Sextus repeatedly claims that the life of a
skeptic will be very much like the life of an ordinary person (cf. PH I 16, 24; II
102; III 2). This is one of those instances. Barnes is surely wrong to claim that
“the possession of ordinary beliefs presupposes the possession of at least one
dogma – the dogma that there is a criterion of truth” [1982, 78]. Just as ordinary
people can judge that p in the absence of any beliefs about whether there are

22 The point is perhaps even clearer if we consider the case of children. A child’s perceptual
impression that p can certainly give rise to the judgment that p, but do we really want to say
that children have a view about whether perception is a criterion against which an impression
can be evaluated?
criteria against which the impression that p can be evaluated, so too the skeptic
can judge that p without having any such beliefs. Thus, I submit, on the notion
of possession required to make premise 3 true, premise 1 is false.
Although we have seen that premise 1 is false if the notion of possession at
issue is the same notion that renders premise 3 true, we must ask why premise
1 might seem true in the first place. Given the broadened conception of criteria
of truth with which we are operating, it may seem that premise 1 is almost true
by definition. That is, if criteria of truth are any criteria against which an im-
pression can be evaluated, then, insofar as people make judgments on the basis
of their impressions, it seems that they are employing some such criterion. If,
for example, we observe someone over time and notice that he always judges
that p when he perceives that p, we could say that he employs perception as a
criterion. And, if one must possess something in order to employ it, it seems
that one must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p. There is, then,
a plausible reading on which premise 1 is true.
To see how this reading of premise 1 affects our evaluation of premise 3, it
is crucial to note that, in order to attribute to a person the employment of such
a criterion, it must be possible for him to employ it unconsciously. The person
just described would not have to be aware that he is employing perception as a
criterion. For example, in order to judge that the chair is blue when he perceives
that the chair is blue, he does not have to be aware that he is making the judg-
ment because he has the perceptual impression. Indeed, he need not have any
beliefs about the link between his perceptual impressions and his judgments. If,
however, the sort of criterion someone must possess in order to judge that the
chair is blue is the sort of thing that can be employed unconsciously, there is no
reason to think that suspending judgment concerning its existence would pre-
vent someone from possessing it and, indeed, employing it. It is well attested
that the unconscious employment of certain beliefs and belief-forming mechan-
isms can be unresponsive to rational revision. Unconscious racial prejudices, for
example, often persist and affect one’s behavior (i.e. are employed) even though
the person consciously comes to disavow them.23 Insofar as the skeptic is con-
cerned, it seems that the unconscious possession and employment of the sort of
criteria at issue here can be unresponsive to suspending judgment whether such
criteria exist. Of course, one may argue that the skeptic is rationally obligated
not to employ, even unconsciously, such criteria. This, however, is a separate
issue that I will deal with in the next section. But, insofar as the question is
whether it’s psychologically impossible for the skeptic both to possess and em-

23 See, for example, Schwitzgebel [2010] and the references therein.
ploy such a criterion unconsciously, the answer is obviously ‘No’. Thus, on the
notion of possession required to make premise 1 true, premise 3 is false.
Let us take stock. In order for the first premise of Barnes’ argument to be
true, it requires a notion of possession such that any human being who makes
judgments, no matter how unreflective that person might be, possesses a criter-
ion of truth. Importantly, this entails that possession of a criterion cannot re-
quire that one believe that a given candidate is, in fact, a criterion of truth. In
order for the third premise of Barnes’ argument to be true, however, it requires
a notion of possession such that reflectively endorsing a given candidate as
being a criterion of truth is a necessary condition for possession of that criter-
ion. That is, in order for the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning the
existence of criteria of truth to make it the case that she does not possess a
criterion of truth, possession of a criterion must require the belief that the given
caudate is, in fact, a criterion of truth. Thus, in order for premise 1 to be true,
premise 3 must be false; in order for premise 3 to be true, premise 1 must be
false. Therefore, even on the broadened conception of criteria, Barnes’ argu-
ment fails because it equivocates on the notion of possession.
IV: Rejecting the “Loss of Innocence” Charge

Although we are close to seeing how Barnes’ argument cannot achieve what he
wants it to achieve, I wish to address one more twist. Barnes, in fact, acknowl-
edges in a footnote that an objection such as the one I have offered can be
leveled against his argument:
Against the argument advanced in the text it might be objected that, although in order
to judge that p I must possess a criterion, it is not true that in order to judge that p I
must believe that I possess a criterion. Thus the Pyrrhonian may possess a criterion even
if he himself does not believe that he does; and in that case he is in a position to judge
that p. [1982, 78 fn. 76, emphasis original]
Although Barnes accepts that this may be a valid criticism, he does not seem to
appreciate the disastrous consequences it has for his argument. He merely
shrugs it off by asking, “could a Pyrrhonist judge that p after reflecting on the
existence of a criterion and reaching epochê on the matter?” (ibid.). In the rest
of this paper I argue that the answer to this question is “Yes”.
I think that Barnes’ question presents what can be called a ‘loss of inno-
cence’ charge that is often leveled against the skeptic. The skeptic and the or-
dinary person may be alike in that both do not have beliefs concerning criteria
of truth. What differentiates the skeptic, however, is that she has explicitly con-
sidered the question whether criteria of truth exist and failed to come to a con-
clusion on the matter. The skeptic, it is argued, can’t then just retreat to the
position of the ordinary person. In other words, although it may be true that all
we can say about the skeptic is that she does not believe that she possesses a
criterion of truth, there is something special about the way in which she has
come to be in that epistemic state that precludes her from making any judg-
ments. Perhaps she is subject to some psychological or, indeed, rational com-
pulsion not to make any judgments. Although this idea may initially seem plau-
sible, it is crucial to see why it is mistaken.
I have dealt in the last section with the question whether it is psychologi-
cally impossible for the skeptic to judge that p despite suspending judgment
whether there are any criteria against which impressions can be evaluated. As we
saw, the answer must be ‘No’ – human beings are constructed such that, in
many circumstances, perceiving that p (to take one possible example) will lead
us, through no conscious process of our own, to judge that p. For example, if
we stand outside in broad daylight and take stock of the lighting situation, we
often will unconsciously judge that it is day. However, if there are cases in
which our judging that p as a result (in the causal sense) of our perceiving that
p requires no conscious effort on our part, suspending judgment whether per-
ception is a criterion of truth will not make us psychologically incapable of jud-
ging that p as a result of perceiving that p.
The likely response will be to say that, even if they often unconsciously
make such judgments, nevertheless skeptics should attempt to stop making
them. In other words, although it may be psychologically possible for skeptics
to judge that p after suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, it is
rationally impermissible for them to do so. After all, skeptic does not believe
that there are any criteria against which her impressions can be evaluated. If
she does not have this belief, how can she rationally make any judgments on
the basis of her impressions? If, for example, she does not believe that impres-
sions can be evaluated by appealing to perception, how can she rationally
judge that p as a result of perceiving that p?
Before responding to this point, I wish to note that by moving to the issue
of rational permissibility we are dealing with a topic that is not the primary
focus of debates concerning ancient skepticism. Those debates usually center
on whether the epistemic position that the skeptic reports being in is a psycho-
logically possible position for a human being to occupy. The charge that such a
position is psychologically possible but irrational is unlikely to have much ef-
fect. After all, skeptics do not claim that their epistemic position is supported by
reasons. The demands of rational permissibility are dogmatic demands that
their opponents may accept but that they certainly do not.
Nevertheless, it is an interesting question whether it would be irrational for

the skeptic to make judgments despite suspending judgment whether criteria of
truth exist. Although this is a large and important issue, in closing I wish to make
two points in favor of answering “No”.24 First, judging that p as a result (in the
causal sense) of perceiving that p is not, in itself, inconsistent with suspending
judgment whether perception is a criterion against which impressions can be eval-
uated. Rather, an inconsistency would only arise if the skeptic possessed certain
other beliefs, such as a belief to the effect that she should only judge that p if the
impression that p meets some criterion against which she believes impressions
can be evaluated. Although some non-skeptics may find such a mediating belief
compelling, why on earth should the skeptic? The skeptic, true to her skepticism,
will marshal arguments on either side of that issue and, as a result of finding
those opposed arguments equally compelling, suspend judgment whether she
should only judge that p if the impression that p meets some criterion against
which she believes impressions can be evaluated. The alleged inconsistency, then,
is not something with which the skeptic is faced.
Secondly, and more importantly, this line of reasoning misunderstands the
nature of suspension of judgment. ‘Epochê’ is defined as a “standstill of the in-
tellect owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything” (PH I 10). If the
skeptic has suspended judgment whether p, this entails, among other things,
that she is as open to the possibility that p is true as she is to the possibility that
p is false. With respect to the situation we are considering, this entails that the
skeptic is open both to the possibility that there are and the possibility that there
are not criteria against which propositions can be evaluated. Why would people
who meet that condition be rationally compelled to reject judgments they pas-
sively make as a result of perceiving things to be a certain way? Remember,
skeptics do not infer that p from their impression that p. Nor do they take their
impression that p to be a reason to judge that p. Rather, they simply judge that p
and this is as a result (in the causal sense) of their perceiving that p.
To demand that skeptics are rationally compelled not to make any judg-
ments as a result of suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist would
be to place the same demands on their epistemic lives as people who believe
that there are no criteria of truth. This, however, would be to take the conse-
quences of suspension of judgment to be akin to the consequences of some
form of negative dogmatism. Negative dogmatism, however, involves thinking
that one has found decisive reason for disbelieving a certain proposition. If, for
example, someone were to believe that perception is not a criterion of truth, this

24 In what follows I focus on the case of perception. The discussion would have to be mod-
ified for different candidates for criteria of truth.
would entail that she believes that perceiving that p does not give her any rea-
son for believing that p. Even if this would make it rationally impermissible for
her to judge that p on the basis of her perceiving that p (and it is not obvious
that it would), this is not the situation of the skeptic. Skeptics are as open to the
possibility that perceiving that p gives a reason for believing that p as they are
to the possibility that perceiving that p does not give a reason for believing that
p. Thus, whatever reason the negative dogmatist’s belief that perception is not a
criterion of truth may give her not to make judgments on the basis of perception
is not a reason that the skeptic possesses.
Despite its rhetorical force, then, the claim that the skeptic cannot simply
retreat to the position of the ordinary person and go on making judgments in
the way the ordinary person does is false. It is certainly psychologically possi-
ble, and it may be rationally permissible as well, for the skeptic to judge that p
despite having reflected on the existence of a criterion and having suspended
judgment on the matter. Thus, I conclude that Barnes’ response to an argument
such as the one I have presented in this paper fails.
V: Conclusion
In this paper we have examined and rejected, the central argument offered by
Jonathan Barnes in support of the claim that skepticism is incompatible with
the possession of any beliefs. As we have seen, the argument fails because it
misunderstands the nature of criteria of truth. Key to the argument is the claim
that the skeptic’s suspension of judgment regarding the existence of criteria of
truth entails that the skeptic does not possess a criterion of truth. If that claim
is to be correct, however, possession of a criterion cannot be a necessary condi-
tion for making judgments and, hence, cannot be a necessary condition for pos-
sessing beliefs. Therefore, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment does not have
the consequences that Barnes contends. Although this does not show that skep-
ticism is compatible with the possession of beliefs, it does remove what has
been taken to be the main philosophical obstacle facing that position.
Works Cited
Baltzly, D. [2010] ‘Stoicism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entires/stoicism/.
Barnes, J. [2007] ‘Sextan Skepticism’, in Dominic Scott (ed.) Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philoso-
phy in Honor of Myles Burnyeat (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 16.
Barnes, J. [1982] ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’, in Burnyeat and Frede (eds.) 1997, pp. 58–91.
Brennan, T. [1994] ‘Criterion and Appearance in Sextus Empiricus: The Scope of Sceptical
Doubt, the Status of Sceptical Belief’, in Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 39
(1994), pp. 151–69.
Brunschwig, J. [1988] ‘Sextus Empiricus on the Kritêrion: the Sceptic as Conceptual Legatee’,
in J. Brunschwig Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Burnyeat, M. [1984] ‘The Sceptic in His Place and Time,’ in Burnyeat and Frede (eds.) (1997),
pp. 25–57.
Burnyeat, M. [1980] ‘Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?’ in Burnyeat and Frede (eds.)
(1997), pp. 25–57.
Burnyeat, M. and M. Frede (eds.) [1997] The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1997).
Frede, M. [1999] ‘Stoic Epistemology’ in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield
(eds.) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), ch. 9.
Frede, M. [1983] ‘Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions’, in M. Frede Essays
in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 151–76.
Frede, M. [1979] ‘The Sceptic’s Beliefs’, in Burnyeat and Frede (eds.) (1997), pp. 1–24.
Long, A. A. [1978] ‘Sextus Empiricus on the Criterion of Truth’, in Bulletin of the Institute of
Classical Studies 25 (1978), pp. 35–49.
Sedley, D. [1982] ‘On Signs’, in J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat, and M. Schofield (eds.)
Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice (Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 239–72.
Striker, G. [1996] Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Striker, G. [1990] ‘The Problem of the Criterion’, in Striker [1996], pp. 150–68.
Striker, G. [1974] ‘Κριτήριον τῆσ αληθείας’, in Striker [1996], pp. 22–76.

Skepticism Belief and The Criterion of T

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Skepticism Belief and The Criterion of T

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

U:/p_1/apeiron/apeiron13_03/apeiron-2012-0026/apeiron-2013-0026r.3d vom 31.5.

DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0026  apeiron 2013; aop

Keywords: skepticism, Pyrrhonism, criterion of truth, belief

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  3

[1] one must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  5

It is a familiar point that in epistemological contexts, modal operators such

II: Criteria of Truth

provide an answer to the age-old question whether skepticism precludes the

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  7

III: Rejecting Barnes’ Argument

[1] one must possess a criterion of truth in order to judge that p

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  9

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  11

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  13

IV: Rejecting the “Loss of Innocence” Charge

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  15

Nevertheless, it is an interesting question whether it would be irrational for

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth  17

You might also like