Somalia

Somalia experienced the most tragic year in its modern history in 1992. Riven by conflict,
devastated by famine, and ignored by most of the international community, Somalis living at
home and as refugees have been undergoing traumatic suffering with apparently no end in
sight.

Factors for the crisis

1991 fight between President Ali Mahdi and Farah aided
The year began with intense fighting on the streets of Mogadishu between the forces of self-
appointed Interim President Ali Mahdi and his rival, General Mohamed Farah Aided. Both
are members of the same Hawiye clan and of the same political party, the United Somali
Congress (USC). The fighting, which broke out in November 1991, arose from a number of
factors, including rivalry for the position of President and the symbols of sovereignty that go
with it (particularly money), sub-clan loyalty, competition for the commercial exploitation of
looted property, and the need for unpaid soldiers to steal in order to eat. The fighting saw an
extraordinary level of indiscriminate brutality as all the weapons of the former dictator
Mohamed Siad Barre's arsenal were deployed. Field artillery, anti-aircraft guns, heavy
machine guns, mortars, the ubiquitous AK-47 and even air-to-air missiles mounted on jeeps
were used in the capital of Mogadishu. Most were fired by untrained teenagers merely in the
approximate direction of the "enemy." Residents referred to artillery rounds fired across the
city as "to whom it may concern" shells, because of their wholly indiscriminate targeting. In
addition, the breakdown of civil authority, the lack of legitimate employment and the scarcity
of food led to a serious problem of freelance banditry, with looters and thieves displaying a
near-total disregard for human life.
According to calculations made by Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 14,000
people were killed and 27,000 injured in Mogadishu between November 1991 and the end of
February 1992. An unknown number were permanently disabled. Tens of thousands more
were psychologically scarred and will suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and varieties
of pathological grief, not only because of the horrors they have suffered, but also because of
the failure to observe traditional rituals to respect the dead.
The city's medical facilities were swamped. On the southern side, in General Aidid's area,
four hospitals, staffed by Somali doctors and nurses who have not been paid since before
the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991, worked extremely long hours, often without electricity
and adequate clean water, and with few drugs, to tend the wounded. Week after week, the
physicians were compelled to use triage, neglecting those who would almost certainly die to
allow the possibility of caring for those who might survive. In the northern part of the city,
controlled by Mahdi, there was no functioning hospital, but on the second day of the fighting,
a group of Somali doctors came together and formed the Health Emergency Committee.
In March and April, the fighting in Mogadishu began to subside somewhat, although chronic
insecurity remained. The lull followed the failure of a major attempt by the Aidid forces to
overrun the Mahdi enclave at the end of February. It also coincided with the threat of a
renewed offensive by the forces of the former dictator Siad Barre, the Somali National Front
(SNF), composed mainly of Siad Barre's Marehan clan. General Aidid patched together a
coalition of forces to confront the SNF, and succeeded in driving it into Kenya in April and
May. Aidid also defeated forces belonging to the Somali Patriotic Movement (SNM),
consisting mainly of the Ogaden clan, and captured the southern port of Kismayo. The
military campaign saw widespread abuses against civilians, including the selective killing of
scores, possibly hundreds, of Marehan in the towns of Belet Hawa and Luuq.

The famine
What came to light was apocalyptic – a famine of perhaps unparalleled proportions. The
farming populations of these regions had traditionally been disadvantaged in Somali society;
the Rahanweyn farmers had been considered second-class citizens, and the Bantu
descendants of slaves living in the lower reaches of the Juba Valley had even lower social
standing. Under Siad Barre, they had suffered a gradual erosion of their economic position,
and in many cases, forcible confiscation of their land. They had few firearms and were easy
targets for looters. There had been chronic war in these areas since late 1988, and the
armies of Siad Barre, the SNM and the USC had crossed the region numerous times in
1989, 1990 and 1991, on each occasion looting as they went. The final straw was the 1 991-
1992 occupation by the SNF, which had engaged in systematic and comprehensive looting
of food, livestock, household possessions and even clothes. One relief worker reported that
Rahanweyn women, robbed of even their clothes, were so destitute and demoralized that
they would not leave their houses despite imminent starvation.
The Rahanweyn towns of Baidoa and Baardheere became the sites of some of the most
appalling famine camps seen in Africa. Death rates reached extraordinary levels, and
starvation was common. By the end of November, death rates were reportedly dropping in
Baidoa but had risen sharply again in Baardheere, due to a new outbreak of fighting.
The final factor in the creation of famine has been the blockage of relief. In a destitute
country, food is a vital resource which people are prepared to fight and kill for. Delivering
food relief under these circumstances is a difficult and hazardous business. While no warlord
will claim that he opposes humanitarian relief, few are prepared to allow it to be distributed in
areas not under their control. The negotiations needed to ensure effective delivery and
distribution have therefore been long and difficult. If one local warlord or clan believes that it
has been left out, it may decide to claim its share by force. There is also always the chance
of undisciplined soldiers or freelance bandits seizing the food to save themselves.
Along with the Rahanweyn and Bantu farmers, several other groups were severely hit by the
famine. They included those displaced by the fighting, urban people who had lost all their
possessions in the war or who had been reliant on trade, and Ethiopian refugees. The
displaced were affected not only by hunger but also by epidemic disease brought on by
overcrowded squatter camps and the lack of sanitation facilities and clean water. Nomadic
cattle and camel herders from the powerful clans were less hard hit; their herds remained
intact and they possessed the firepower and political influence to protect themselves and lay
claim to food resources.
Conflict and scarcity of food fed on each other in a vicious spiral. High food prices compelled
soldiers to steal to eat. Food aid was the target for looters because it was a precious
commodity. Merchants also hoarded food to drive the price up. Meanwhile, the fighting
caused more food shortages and population displacement. Fortunately, these processes
also operated in reverse. As food became more widely available (and, equally important,
people began to have the confidence that it would remain readily available) prices came
down and merchants released stored grain stocks onto the market. By the end of November,
the cycle of famine feeding war seemed to have been broken in some parts of the country,
allowing attention to turn to ensuring that the marketing system can be rebuilt and not
damaged by food aid supplies.
In October, the security situation deteriorated sharply as Aidid's alliances began to unravel.
His coalition of Hawiye, Rahanweyn and some Darod groups had lasted only a few months
before beginning to come apart. The SNF, with support from the Kenyan army, launched a
counter-offensive and succeeded in capturing the town of Baardheere. In Mogadishu, Aidid's
power perceptibly weakened as freelance banditry increased, and speculation mounted that
out of desperation he would resume full-scale war in the city.
The Somali National Movement (SNM), the Isaaq-dominated front controlling north-western
Somalia, unilaterally declared independence in May 1991, to create the Republic of
Somaliland, an entity not recognized by any other country. During 1991, the Somaliland
government of Abdel Rahman Tur appeared to be making progress in establishing peace
and security, rebuilding the shattered infrastructure that had been destroyed in the war of
1988, and encouraging the return of the 400,000 refugees who had fled to Ethiopia.
Still, enormous problems faced the government: it had virtually no resources, and
international assistance was slow in coming due to the lack of diplomatic recognition. Land
mines were a major problem in both the towns and countryside, killing and injuring hundreds
of people, but also blowing up livestock and discouraging the use of water-reservoirs, the
lifeline of the largely nomadic population.
In January 1992, a battle between the fighters of two sub clans of the Isaaq at Burao left
over 150 dead, and forced tens of thousands to flee to the countryside. In late March, fierce
fighting broke out in the port of Berbera, Somaliland's economic and commercial capital, and
unrest spread to Sheikh and the city of Hargeisa, the political capital. Most civilians had to
flee Berbera.
Problems faced by people
Fighting, insecurity and lack of state protection, and recurring humanitarian crises had a devastating
impact on Somali civilians in 2018. The number of internally displaced people, many living unassisted and
at risk of serious abuse, reached an estimated 2.7 million.

The Islamist armed group Al-Shabab subjected people living under its control to harsh treatment, forced
recruitment, and carried out deadly attacks targeting civilians.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) reported 982 civilian casualties by October,
over half from Al-Shabab attacks. Inter-clan and intra-security force violence, along with sporadic military
operations against Al-Shabab by Somali government forces, African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) troops, and other foreign forces, resulted in deaths, injuries, and displacement of civilians.

While federal and regional authorities made some progress in clarifying roles and responsibilities in the
security and justice sectors, political infighting diverted from greatly needed reforms. Tensions between
the former speaker of parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari, and the executive brought parliament to a
standstill for a month, resulting in the speaker’s eventual resignation.

The government has yet to endorse the list of nominees for the country’s first independent Human
Rights Commission and has made no tangible progress reining in abusive security forces, notably the
intelligence agency, or ending repeated forced evictions of the country’s displaced people.

Abuses by Government and Allied Forces

Security forces unlawfully killed and wounded civilians during infighting over land, control of roadblocks,
and disarmament operations, particularly in Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle. Dozens of government and
security officials and former electoral delegates were assassinated; Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for
some of the killings.

Intelligence agencies at the federal level, in Puntland and Jubaland, arbitrarily arrested and detained many
individuals for prolonged periods without charge or access to legal counsel or family members. Somali
authorities and Somalia’s international partners committed to building an accountable national security
sector, but the federal government failed to pass legislation clarifying the mandate of the intelligence
agency.

While military prosecutors handed over some files implicating security force members to civilian judges,
military courts continue to try a broad range of cases and defendants, including for terrorism-related
offenses, in proceedings falling far short of international fair trial standards. According to media reports
and the United Nations, the government in 2018 carried out at least four executions of security force
personnel mainly convicted of murder of other members of the security forces.

Tensions between Somaliland and Puntland in the contested Sool border region led to armed clashes,
including in January when Somaliland took over the strategic town of Tukaraq. The UN said the fighting
resulted in the displacement of 12,500 civilians.

Civilians were targeted or faced indiscriminate attacks during clan violence, notably in Ceel Afweeyn in
Sanaag region, Galgaduud, and Hiraan.

In July, media reported that Kenyan forces deployed outside of AMISOM forces had raped three women
and two girls in Belet-Hawo town along the Kenyan border.

In a December 2017 report, the UN highlighted the lack of transparency around AMISOM investigations
and prosecutions, and raised concerns about the lack of formal efforts to protect victims and witnesses
from reprisals.

Abuses by Al-Shabab

Al-Shabab committed serious abuses, including forcibly recruiting children and adults; arbitrary
executions, notably of those it accused of spying for the government and foreign forces; and extorting
“taxes” through threats. Al-Shabab attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure using improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and shellings in Mogadishu resulted in hundreds of civilian
deaths and injuries.

Al-Shabab continues to prohibit most nongovernmental organizations and all UN agencies from working
in areas under its control. The group continued to blockade government-controlled towns and attacked
civilians who broke the blockades, destroying goods and vehicles.

Abuses Against Children

All Somali parties to the conflict continued to commit serious abuses against children, including killings,
maiming, recruitment and use in military operations.

Al-Shabab pursued an aggressive child recruitment campaign with retaliation against communities
refusing to hand over children, particularly in Galmudug and South West State. As a result, hundreds of
children, many unaccompanied, fled their homes to escape. According to the UN, in July residents of
Xaradheere, a locality that has repeatedly come under pressure to provide children to Al-Shabab, fought
back, resulting in deaths and significant civilian displacement.
On January 18, Somali and US military forces rescued 36 children from an Al-Shabab-run camp in Middle
Shabelle. They were handed over to the UN for rehabilitation one week later.

Somali authorities, particularly the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), unlawfully detained,
and at times prosecuted in military courts, children with alleged ties to Al-Shabab. On appeal, Puntland
judges reduced, but did not overturn, prison sentences determined by its military court in 2016 to 40
children who fought for Al-Shabab.

Displacement and Access to Humanitarian Assistance

About 2.6 million Somalis live in protracted internal displacement according to the UN, facing serious
abuses, including indiscriminate killings, forced evictions, sexual violence, and limited access to basic
services.

According to humanitarian actors, over 204,000 people had been forcibly evicted in the first eight months
of 2018, including by government forces, primarily in Mogadishu and Bay region.

In December 2017, security forces demolished dozens of informal settlements, including humanitarian
infrastructure, without sufficient warning or providing residents with alternative settlements, leaving
around 30,000 people homeless. The Benadir regional administration investigated the evictions, and in
April suggested how to tackle forced evictions but did not press for accountability.

Humanitarian agencies faced serious challenges in accessing vulnerable populations due to insecurity,
restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict, illegal checkpoints, and extortion. Targetted attacks on aid
workers persist. On May 2, a staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was
kidnapped from an ICRC residence in Mogadishu; she had not been released at time of writing.

Sexual Violence

Internally displaced women and girls remain at particular risk of sexual and gender-based violence by
armed men, including government soldiers and militia members, and civilians.

Positively, federal and some regional authorities have adopted measures and legislation to improve their
capacity to prosecute sexual violence. In May 2018, the federal cabinet endorsed a progressive Sexual
Offences Bill; at time of writing, the bill is before parliament. Impact and implementation, including of
the 2016 Puntland sexual offenses law, have been limited.

Freedom of Expression

Targeted attacks on media, including harassment and arbitrary detentions, continued. The Somali
authorities seldom investigate cases of killings or attacks on journalists.
On July 26, a police officer shot dead Abdirizak Kasim Iman, a cameraperson for a privately owned
television station, at a checkpoint in Mogadishu. According to the UN, the Somali Police launched an
investigation, but at time of writing no arrest has been made.

Somaliland

In December 2017, Muse Bihi Abdi was sworn in as president of Somaliland. The Somaliland
government arbitrarily arrested numerous journalists and critics—targeting people who spoke out on
“controversial issues,” notably the ongoing border tensions with Puntland and unity with Somalia.

In April, Naima Ahmed Ibrahim, a popular poet; Mohamed Kayse Mohamud, a blogger; and Boqor
Osman Aw-Mohamud, an outspoken traditional elder, were convicted under vague and overly broad
criminal provisions for public criticism of government policies and public officials. Police officials and
judges violated due process rights during their detention and trials. All three subsequently received a
presidential pardon. According to the independent nongovernmental organization, Human Rights Center,
since the inauguration of Somaliland’s new president, 18 journalists have been arrested and five convicted
under similar provisions. In four cases, prison terms were later converted into fines.

Positively, in July the Somaliland House of Representatives rejected problematic amendments made by
the Upper House (Guurti) to the Rape and Sexual Offences Bill that defined an adult as 15 years of age
and above, and removed criminal responsibility of close male relatives for forced marriage. In August, the
president signed the bill into law.
Key International Actors

International support focused on building Somalia’s security sector, including the integration of regional
forces, including through implementation of the government’s transition plan; attention to ensuring
accountability for abuses remained limited.

AMISOM troop-contributing countries expressed concern over the capacity of Somali government forces
to assume key security responsibilities. In July the UN Secuity Council heeded African Union calls to
delay the withdrawal of 1,000 AMISOM troops by several months.

The United States Defense Department continued to conduct airstrikes and joint operations with an
increase in strikes in the Jubaland region. The department concluded without substantiation that there
were no civilian casualties in its operations in 2018. However, in May, media and the UN reported five
civilians casualities during a joint US-Somali raid in Afgooye district; the Pentagon announced in June that
it found the allegations “not credible.” After media reported the alleged killings of 10 civilians in Barire,
the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service committed to a second investigation into the August 2017
incident, but results have not been made public at time of writing.

The diplomatic crisis between Qatar and other Gulf countries continued to exacerbate tensions in
Somalia, between Mogadishu and federal states, with Somaliland, as well as among Mogadishu’s political
elite, over a United Arab Emirate company’s development of key ports.
What is Being Done for the Somalia Refugee Crisis?
At this juncture, addressing the short term problems of the Somalia refugee crisis is a key
priority. There is already a major funding gap for many of the humanitarian conflicts
impacting African nations at present. The funding for Somalian refugees stands at only $365
million.
Since 2016, the Somali and Kenyan governments have worked collectively with the UNHCR
to address the prevailing issues concerning the closure of the Dabaab refugee camp,
particularly the need for an effective repatriation program. According to a report by Xinhua,
the U.N. refugee agency recently helped over 78,000 Somali refugees as part of their
voluntary repatriation program with the cooperation of Dabaab refugee camp.
The UNHCR is also working to address the impacts of the conflict through the provision of
education, healthcare, livelihood and community-based initiatives. Food rationing is a
common practice at refugee camps owing to the magnitude of the problem. Furthermore,
the International Rescue Committee is providing crucial humanitarian assistance and
support to over 280,000 Somali refugees.
Solution
1. A fairly significant proportion of Somali refugees in camps would consider returning to
Somalia when conditions become conducive for a sustainable repatriation, especially those
who have fled recently.
2. They should not be pushed do to so by inadequate or deteriorating security and living
conditions in the refugee camps.
3. In order to make returns sustainable in a country destroyed by decades of conflict, careful
planning will be necessary, in close collaboration with local authorities and clan leaders