Simultaneous Elections: The Indian Debate

The Idea of Simultaneous elections has gained currency and traction in the recent past. The
need for simultaneous election was felt essentially because over the decades Indian
Democracy has been a victim of petty party politics for electoral gains which has resulted
into higher frequency of elections. As a result of greater number of elections which includes
16 general elections and more than a 100 state legislative assembly elections not only the
governance, economy of the country is disturbed it also has negatively impacted the essence
of democracy in the country which has been reduced to once in a five-year event. Present
dispensation at the centre under Prime Minister Modi has expressed its willingness to
generate discussion and broad-based consensus on the conceptualization and implementation
of simultaneous elections in the country. The arguments given in favour of the simultaneous
elections include the economic benefits of the simultaneous elections, curb on the black
money and corruption, effective governance among other. The NITI Aayog has brought out a
discussion paper developed by Shri Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai. The discussion paper
has argued comprehensively for the implementation of the Simultaneous elections. Its major
argument hinges upon the issue of governance and virtual stalemate of day to day
administration in the one part or the other in the country by virtue of Model Code of Conduct
for most part of the year. This stalemate is reflected in the governance output as well.

Constituent Assembly Debates on Elections in India

The Constituent Assembly of India was the pivotal organization which not only wrote and gave
to the people of India their constitution declaring their sovereignty to the World. Debates that
took place in the Assembly also reflect the intention and vantage point of our founding fathers.
It gives us the idea as to what was hoped from the new nation to which this assembly was
giving birth to. In one particular debate regarding the elections in India, in the Constituent
Assembly not only the modus operandi of the future electoral processes were discussed in
details it also gives clarity regarding the importance and intentions for democracy in India. For
our present discussion on simultaneous elections it is of significance because one prominent
criticism of the simultaneous elections is that it will fundamentally change the electoral
apparatus of Indian democracy. In this light one must consider the argument that K M Munshi
gave in this particular debate. The larger debate was regarding the formation of Election
Commission in India to oversee the electoral process across the nation, issue of impartiality of
elections and the federal relations between the Centre and the states and perceived threat to
provincial autonomy at the hands of excessively powerful centre.

For our discussion, potent are the thoughts of K M Munshi because not only did he touched on
the nerve of the times he was addressing but also the need to recognize the fragility of the
situation at hand where the newly born nation was laying her democratic roots. In the statement,
he made in this particular debate he emphasized one aspect time and again and that was to
consider issues from the time and space to which we belong and he argued “We must realise—
and this is the general answer that I propose to give to my honourable Friends Mr. Pataskar and
Mr. Chaliha—we can only consider the problems before us from the conditions as they exist
today. We cannot forget the fact that some tenor eleven of the Indian States which are not
accustomed even to the little measure of democratic life which is enjoyed by the provinces are
coming into the Union on equal terms. We cannot ignore the fact there are corners in India
where provincial autonomy requires to be placed on a better footing. In these conditions, it is
but natural, apart from world conditions, that the Centre should have a larger measure of control
over the affairs which affect the national existence as a whole. Even in America in which it
was not a question of the Centre decentralising itself, but thirteen, independent States coming
together first in a sort of confederacy, and then in a federation what do we find? After the
depression of 1929, agriculture, education, industry, unemployment, insecurity, all passed
gradually by various means under the control or influence of the Centre. There, the Constitution
is water-tight and they had to go round and round in order to achieve this result. There cannot
be smaller units than a nation today; even a nation is small unit in the light of the international
situation. This Idea that provincial autonomy is the inherent right of the provinces, is illusory.
Charles Merriam one of the leading political thinkers in America to his book called "The Need
for Constitutional Reform", with reference to the States of U.S.A., says, "Most States do not
now correspond to economic and social unities and their position as units of organisation and
representation may be and has been seriously challenged." In our country, the situation is
different. From the Councils Act of 1833 till the Government of India Act of 1935, there has
been central control over the provinces and it has proved wholesome. The strength, the power
and the unity of public life which India has developed during the last one hundred years is
mainly due to centralised administration of the country. I would warn the Members who are
still harping on the same subject to remember one supreme fact in Indian history that the
glorious days of India were only the days, whether under the Mauryas or the Moghuls, when
there was a strong central authority in the country, and the most tragic days were those when
the central authority was dismembered by the provinces trying to resist it. We do not want to
repeat that fatal mistake. We want that the provincial sphere should be kept intact that they
should enjoy a large measure of autonomy but only subject to national power. When national
danger comes, we must realise that the Centre alone can step in and safeguard against the chaos
which would otherwise follow. I therefore submit that this argument about Provincial
Autonomy has no a priori theoretical validity. We have to judge every subject or matter from
the point of view of what the existing conditions are and how best we can adjust the controls,
either Central or Provincial to secure maximum national efficiency.” 1

This argument was given almost seven decades ago and it resonates with our times as well. If
the time of India right after independence was such that we had to make electoral rules to suit
our needs and if the founding fathers had the wisdom to recognize the novelty of their situation
to bend the classical democratic practices because India was a unique case in terms of the
democratic polity, then how are our times today any different today? In contemporary times
Indian Democracy has been at the receiving end of the continuous electoral mode which has
drastically affected quality of governance and not to mention rising costs as well as use of
extensive amounts of black money as well as security concerns. These put together beg the
question as to if there is a need to bring reforms into electoral politics in India and if the
simultaneous elections are the answer to it.

http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/eci_publications/books/miscell/Debate_in_Constituent_Assembly_On_Elections.pdf
Report of Standing Committee on ‘Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to
House of People and State Legislative Assemblies’

There have been many committees which have suggested simultaneous elections as one of the
answers for electoral reforms in India. One among them is the Standing Committee on
Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to House of People and State Legislative
Assemblies headed by Dr E M Sudarsana Natchiappan. It noted that the need to hold
simultaneous elections to Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies was the need of the hour
for multiple reasons which included high frequency of elections and the case in point is general
elections where out of 16 elections to Lok Sabha, 7 times the lower house of Parliament was
prematurely dissolved due to exigencies of petty politics and with no party getting clear
majority. Committee also noted various developments which together paved the way for more
stable politics in the Country. Prominent among them were the Anti-Defection Law which
curbed the defection of members of legislature. And the S R Bommai Case of 1994, where
“Supreme Court had held that the President can put the legislative assembly of a State in
suspended animation but cannot dissolve it without concurrence of Parliament. Further the
validity of the proclamation of the President’s rule may be examined by the Judiciary. The
Committee stated that this has strengthened the federal structure of the country by striking a
constitutional balance between the Central and state governments.”2

The major recommendations of the Committee regarding simultaneous elections covered the
whole apparatus of the simultaneous elections of Lok Sabha and the State legislative
assemblies. It argued for conducting elections in two phases whereby half the assemblies could
have elections conducted along with the Lok Sabha and the other half at the midterm of the
Lok Sabha. With regard to the bye elections the Committee recommended that “bye elections
to all seats that have become vacant during a year may be conducted together during a pre-
determined time period.”3

Discussion Paper by NITI AAYOG on Simultaneous Elections

NITI AAYOG takes forward the discussion on Simultaneous Elections from the Standing
Committee and discuss in detail the issues, modus operandi and the reservations around the
concept of Simultaneous Elections. The paper conceptualizes simultaneous elections as
“structuring the Indian election cycle in a manner that elections to Lok Sabha and the State
Legislative Assemblies are synchronized together. In such a scenario, a voter would normally
cast his/her vote for electing members of Lok Sabha and State Assembly on a single day.”4
That is conduction of Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections at the same time. Before
dabbling into the details regarding it, the paper points that historically, India has witnessed a
phase of simultaneous elections roughly from 1951 to 1967 which coincide with three terms of
general elections to Lok Sabha, by the virtue of independence electoral process started from
ground zero. Hence, simultaneity was implicit in this period. However, the circumstantial
simultaneity was hampered from the 1967 elections. From that point on not only the cycle of
elections for both Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies digressed, but also the

2
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%20feasibility%20of%20holding%20simultaneous%20central%20and%20state%20elections.pdf
3
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%20feasibility%20of%20holding%20simultaneous%20central%20and%20state%20elections.pdf
4
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf
exigencies of Indian politics at federal and central level along with electoral politics pressures
took its toll on the Indian democracy.

The need for simultaneous elections was felt due to the long awaited and desired electoral
reforms. India is world’s largest democracy, a developing country which is developing her own
political culture. As a result of 70 years of democratic experiences, it is high time to do course
correction in order to introduce reforms. The concept of simultaneous elections need to be
viewed in this light and since we have certain amount of experience in simultaneous elections
it is hoped that it will address a number of anomalies of Indian electoral politics which have
emerged over a period of time.

In this light, the Discussion paper chart out a number of drawbacks which are roughly clubbed
under four heads, namely, issues related to development programmes and governance issues,
expenditure and black money issues, security issues and other issues. With regard to the
developmental programmes and governance issues the paper argues that due to imposition of
Model Code of Conduct of Election Commission governance in the country in parts and as a
whole is routinely affected. The paper gives crude data to substantiate the point and argues that
till 2021 the Country will witness imposition of MCC for about 4 months. It argues “Assuming
the average period of operations of MCC as 2 months during elections to a state assembly… it
would be reasonable to expect applicability of MCC for about 4 months or more every year till
2021.This means. Development projects and programmes (that of the State Government going
to polls and of Union Government in those states) may potentially get hit every year and that
too for about one-third of the entire time available for implementing such projects and
programmes.”5

With regard to the expenditure incurred in conducting elections the paper argues that with the
passage of time conducting elections is becoming more expensive. It gives the example of
expenditure incurred in general elections conducted in 2009 and 2014 which amounted,
roughly to 1115 crore and 3870 crore rupees respectively. If one adds the expenditure of 31
state assembly elections the expenditure becomes exorbitant. Also, the cost of elections and
the client patron relation between political parties and the electorate also pushes the expenditure
is the upwards which more often than not go unrecorded, Case in point is the distribution of
goods, liquor, and money. It has been argued that such incentives and bribes given are the main
source of black money in India. Former Chief Election Commissioner Dr S Y Quarishi argue
that “. Elections have become the root cause of corruption in the country…after winning
elections, the politician-bureaucrat nexus indulges in ‘recovering the investment and that is
where corruption begins.”6 As far as the security issues and infrastructure required to conduct
elections is concerned the paper argues that elections being a mammoth exercise it also includes
massive security concerns. The data provided by Election Commission suggests that in 2014
General elections only 1349 Companies of CAPF’s were deployed. Besides the force, state
armed police, home guards and district police personnel are also deployed. This only suggest
not only the security concerns but also the extensive security arrangements required to be in
place for successful conduction of elections. To add another dimension 31 assembly elections
which are conducted across the years only accentuates the security argument and the required
physical infrastructure and personnel.

5
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf
6
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf
 Besides the above-mentioned issues frequent elections, for that matter electoral politics has
negative impact on our democracy as well. Frequent elections perpetuate politics of caste, races
and parochial politics. Since all political parties are in the fray to win, to play along the
restrictive, parochial identities becomes currency for vote banks. Former Chief Election
Commissioner S Y Quarishi points “elections are polarising events which have accentuated
casteism, communalism, corruption and crony capitalism. If the country is perpetually on
election mode, there is no respite from these evils. Holding simultaneous elections would
certainly help in this context.” One implication of electoral politics on India democracy has
been the centrality of elections, whereas essence of democracy is lost since the country is
invariably in “election-mode”. It is argued that simultaneous elections take this stress of
perpetual elections away and allows government to deliver on promises of development and
governance it has made.

Criticism

However, there have been reservations expressed by a number of scholars regarding the
feasibility of simultaneous elections. According to Dr S Y Quarishi “…elections have become
the root cause of corruption in the country.” He also emphasised that “caste, religion and
communal issues are perpetuated by constant elections”7 But at the same time since elections
are the only means through which politicians are held accountable, it is questionable as to how
simultaneous elections will facilitate the accountability aspect of state as well as central level
of political parties and stakeholders.

‘Dr MR Madhavan, president of PRS Legislative Research, explained that when the public is
deeply swayed towards a party, there might be more chances of the party winning not only
during the general elections but also any assembly elections held around the same time which
could drastically affect the role of the regional parties representing the marginalised
communities of the country.’8

Suhas Palshikar in his article “Polls Apart” makes a case for the unsuitability of simultaneous
elections in India. His major concern lies with the workability of the idea of simultaneous
elections especially if it would mean that the legislatures whose tenure is ending before the Lok
Sabha, they would be “prematurely dissolved”. Secondly, in the case of no confidence motion,
and midterm elections, the re-elected assembly will be given “remaining tenure” of the
previous assembly. These issues become problematic for Palshikar.

Conclusion

7
http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/possibilities-challenges-simultaneous-elections
8
http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/possibilities-challenges-simultaneous-elections
However, these criticisms take us back to the Constituent Assembly debates and what K M
Munshi had to say about elections that is we need to make rules to suit our times. And if this is
a dictum one can argue that at the first assembly of Rajya Sabha gives us an idea regarding
merging or not merging the tenures of assemblies considering the fact that for the first four
years of Rajya Sabha the elections were done through lottery because constitutionally the house
had to have a six-year term per member and elections every two years but there was no
possibility of conducting such elections since no member had a proper six-year term. Hence
the mechanism developed to address this anomaly was the lottery system, which is not even
prescribed in the constitution. It was an improvisation and wisdom of the legislators of that
time who understood the need of the hour. This improvisation goes back into Munshi’s
argument of developing mechanisms to suit our times and not at the cost of our democracy, but
rather to enhance it.

Reference:
● Austin, Granville : Indian Constiotution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University
Press, Delhi 1999).
● http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/eci_publications/books/miscell/Debate_in_Constituent_Asse
mbly_On_Elections.pdf
● http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1451885664_SCR%20Summa
ry%20feasibility%20of%20holding%20simultaneous%20central%20and%20state%2
0elections.pdf
● http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultane
ous%20Elections.pdf
● http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/possibilities-challenges-
simultaneous-elections
● http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/election-commission-simultaneous-
elections-in-india-lok-sabha-assembly-elections-4951569/